David H. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

U.S. Supreme Court505 U.S. 1003June 29, 1992

Background1972: Federal Coastal Zone Management Act1977: South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act

Based on federal Act to require permits to be obtained before development in “critical areas” along beachfronts

Late 70’s: Lucas and others developed Isle of Palms1986: Lucas purchased two lots in Beachwood East

Subdivision for $975,0001988: Beachfront Management Act

Construction of habitable improvements was prohibited seaward of a line drawn 20 ft. landward and parallel to the baseline.

Background

Merrick Road Lot 1

Lucas

Lot

Beach Line 1986

Beach Line 1956

Beach Line 1902

Lucas v Carolina Coastal Commission

ControversyLucas bought two beachfront lots zoned for

single-family residential development in 1986 with no restrictions imposed upon the use of the property by the state, county, or town

In 1988, the Beachfront Management Act made a permanent ban on construction on Lucas’s lots

Trial CourtLucas contended that the construction of the

Beachfront Management Act caused a taking of his property without just compensation

The Trial Court agreed and found that the Act “deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots,…eliminated the unrestricted right of use, and rendered them valueless”

Change in Beachfront Management Act

In 1990, while the issue was in front of the South Carolina Supreme Court and before issuance of the court’s opinion, the Act was amended to allow for special permits to be issued

The State Supreme Court determined that that case was unripe

Supreme Court of South Carolina

The State Supreme Court reversed the decisionThe court’s reasoning was that “when a

regulation respecting the use of property is designed to prevent serious public harm, no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation’s effect on the property’s value”

Dissent of State Supreme Court

Two justices dissented because “they would not have characterized the Beachfront Management Act’s primary purpose as the prevention of a nuisance”

“To the dissenters, the chief purposes of the legislation, among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a habitat for indigenous flora and fauna, could not fairly be compared to nuisance abatement”

US Supreme CourtPrior decision was overturned based on two

principles:The court decided that the case was ripe because it

was filed before the amendment to the Act in 1990The State Supreme Court erred in applying the

noxious uses principleTie in to previous case law

In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 413, “if the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits”

ReasoningLucas sacrificed all economically beneficial uses

in the name of common good, so it is a categorical taking

Creating a distinction between regulation that prevents “harmful uses” and that which “confers benefits” is next to impossible

Background principles of nuisance and property law must be defined

Kelo v. New London (2005)