1

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

TOP FIVE MOST DEADLY TACTICS TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPS)

AS OF 1 APR 05

PHOTO SOURCE: AL JAISH AL ISLAMI (ISLAMIC ARMY) IN IRAQ, http://www.globalterroralert.com

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

SOURCE DISCUSSIONTHE FOLLOWING OPEN SOURCE WEBSITES WERE USED AS PRIMARY SOURCES TO OBTAIN PHOTOS, ATTACK INFORMATION (DATE, TIME, LOCATION, INSURGENT OPERATION INFORMATION), COALITION FORCES (CF) UNIT INFORMATION, AND STATISTICS (VARIOUS OTHER RESOURCES WERE RESEARCHED AS WELL, SUCH AS FOX NEWS, YAHOO NEWS, ARMY KNOWLEDGE ONLINE, AND OTHER OPEN SOURCES, INCLUDING VARIOUS RADICAL WEBSITES, ETC):

MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY SMART CARDS (U) http://www.mcia.osis.gov/products/smart_card/ttp/index.htm AL QAEDA TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES (U/FOUO) http://www.osis.gov/JITF-CT/index.htmCOUNTERINSURGENCY FMI 3-07-22 http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-07-22.pdfFORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86 http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf http://www.dod.gov/releases/http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNewshttp://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspxhttp://www.globalterroralert.comhttp://www.defendamerica.mil/archive/2004-09/20040902pm1.htmlhttp://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppthttp://www.albasrah.net (Anti-US Bias)http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images (Anti-US Bias)http://www.middle-east-online.com/english (Anti-US Bias)

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

TOP CAUSES KIA

HOSTILE - SMALL ARMS FIRE (SAF) 436

HOSTILE - IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) ATTACK 350

HOSTILE - ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE (RPG) ATTACK 67

HOSTILE - AMBUSH 62

HOSTILE - MORTAR ATTACK 60

HOSTILE - HELICOPTER CRASH (SAF ATTACK) 53

HOSTILE - VEHICLE ACCIDENT 26

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

#8

#9

#10

HOSTILE - SNIPER 25

HOSTILE - SUICIDE IED (SUICIDE BOMBER, NON-VEHICLE) 23

TOP CAUSES OF DEATH (HOSTILE ACTS)

SOURCE: http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews & http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,

**VBIED MOVED UP FROM #6 TO #3 SINCE JAN 05; (CHART DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL HOSTILE & NON-HOSTILE DEATHS; ONLY TOP TEN HOSTILE CAUSES OF DEATH; 1710 TOTAL AS OF 1 APR 05)

HOSTILE - VEHICLE BORNE IED (VBIED, NON-SUICIDE)** 85

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

KILLED & WOUNDED BY MONTH/SERVICEUP TO 1 APR 05

SOURCE: http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,

PERIODS OF SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIESAPR-MAY 04 = NAJAF UPRISINGAUG-OCT 04 = BUILD UP TO FALLUJAHNOV 04 = FALLUJAH OPERATIONJAN 05 = ELECTIONS

ARMY NAVY MARINES AIR FORCE COAST GRD TOTAL1031 29 456 16 1 1533

(AS OF 4/1/05; INCLUDES RESERVES/GUARD/CIVS)

MONTH KIA

MAR-03 82

APR-03 53

MAY-03 6

JUN-03 24

JUL-03 28

AUG-03 23

SEP-03 18

OCT-03 35

NOV-03 94

DEC-03 32

JAN-04 39

FEB-04 16

MAR-04 35

APR-04 131

MAY-04 65

JUN-04 45

JUL-04 45

AUG-04 63

SEP-04 74

OCT-04 58

NOV-04 129

DEC-04 58

JAN-05

WIA

202

340

54

147

226

181

247

413

337

261

187

146

322

1206

753

572

551

883

699

636

1350

131

494

FEB-05

MAR-05

407

35 166

58

107

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

HIGHEST THREAT AREAS 1 APR 05

AL ANBAR PROVINCE IS STILL THE MOST DANGEROUS AREA AFTER ADDING AL ANBAR (VIC), RAMADI AND FALLUJAH’S KIA FIGURES TO TOTAL 394 KIA; INCLUDES ONLY 15 TOP HIGH THREAT AREAS.

HIGHEST THREAT AREAS (U FOUO)

340

174

137

84 83

5446

38 31 28 27 27 25 25 25 23

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

VIC

BA

GH

DA

D

AL A

NB

AR

(V

IC)

FA

LLU

JA

H

RA

MA

DI

MO

SU

L

NA

SIR

IYA

H

BA

LA

D

SA

MA

RR

A

RU

TB

AH

TA

JI

BA

QU

BA

H

KA

RB

ALA

BA

BIL

PR

OV

BA

SR

AH

TIK

RIT

VIC

NA

JA

F

LOCATION

TO

TA

L K

IA

SOURCE: http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) ATTACK TRENDS

SOURCE: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

MARCH DATA NOT AVAILABLE

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) ATTACK TRENDS

SOURCE: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

WHILE IT APPEARS BY OPEN SOURCE REPORTING THAT AIF OPERATIONS HAVE SLOWED, ACTUALLY AIF HAVE SHIFTED TARGETING FROM CF TO IZ TARGETS.

AIF ARE NOW KILLING IZ CIVILIANS AND ISF AT ONE THE HIGHEST RATES EVER, ACCORDING TO THE AVAILABLE OPEN SOURCE DATA.

IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED BY ACTS OF WAR

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

#1: SAF ATTACKS

• SAF DURING CLOSE COMBAT - DIRECT ACTION• LIMITED SAF FIRES (TO HARASS) ON

– PATROLS– CONVOYS

• DRIVE-BY ON CHECKPOINTS

PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/1092130982_2802_jpg.htm

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

SAF DURING CLOSE COMBAT - DIRECT ACTION

PHOTO SOURCE: CHILD SOLDIERS http://www.albasrah.net/images/moqawama/pages/moqawama_55_jpg.htm; WOMEN PROTESTING http://www.albasrah.net/images/moqawama/pages/015_gif.htm

-PLANNED TARGETS & TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY-MASSED/UNMASSED FIRES-TARGET EXPOSED CF/INA/ING PERSONNEL THAT ARE MOUNTED OR DISMOUNTED-FIRES ORIGINATE FROM AIF IN -BUILDINGS -HOMES -AROUND STREET CORNERS -VEHICLES -DEFENSIVE POSITION(PREPARED/HASTY) -TUNNELS-SAF THREAT COMES FROM ALL AGES AND SEXES

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

SAF HARASSMENT ON PATROLS/CONVOYS

PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.albasrah.net/images/iraqi-resist/pages/r2863957857_jpg.htm

-UNPLANNED/TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY-NON-MASSED FIRES-PERFORMED BY 1-2 AIF WITH RIFLES OR PISTOLS-TARGET EXPOSED CF PERSONNEL ON VEHICLES -EXPOSED TRACK COMMANDER -EXPOSED GUNNER-SAF MAY ORIGINATE FROM AIF IN: -TOP OF BUILDINGS OR HOMES -WINDOWS OF BUILDINGS OR HOMES -AROUND STREET CORNERS -VEHICLES/MOTORCYCLES -MIXED IN WITH PEDESTRIANS-AIF WILL IMMEDIATELY BREAK CONTACT

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SAF DRIVE-BY

SOURCE: TCP VIC FALLUJAH, IZ, http://www.albasrah.net/media/sound/falluja.htm

-PLANNED-REQUIRES 1-2 AIF WITH AK-47S-MOST OFTEN AGAINST CHECKPOINTS-CAR DRIVE-BY (MOST COMMON METHOD)-MOTORCYCLE DRIVE-BY-TARGET EXPOSED PERSONNEL SUCH AS: -CF -IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD (ING) -IRAQI NATIONAL ARMY (INA) -IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS)-AIF WILL IMMEDIATELY BREAK CONTACT-PRE-PLANNED EXFIL ROUTES

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

#2: AIF IED ATTACKS

• IED ON LINEAR ROUTE:– AIF ARE EMPLACING FEWER IEDS– YET, AIF ARE EMPLACING MORE POWERFUL IEDS (REQUIRES MORE

AIF PERSONNEL & TIME TO PREPARE, EMPLACE, DETONATE)– DETONATED BY MANUAL OR REMOTE DETONATION– PLANNED, RECONNOITERED, PHOTOGRAPHED/VIDEOTAPED– IEDS CAN BE EMPLACED IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS:

ON ROADS (IN HOLES, DEAD ANIMAL CARCASSES, CONCRETE, ASPHALT, OR UNDER DEBRIS)

ALONG ROADS (MEDIAN, SHOULDER)THROWN FROM BRIDGESCREEK BEDS

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

#2: AIF IED ATTACKS• MULTIPLE ROADSIDE IEDS OR DECOY, MANUAL/REMOTE

DETONATION• IED THREAT TO DISMOUNTS• SUICIDE IED MANUAL DETONATION

-AIF ARE DEPLOYING MORE IEDS (AVERAGE 30 PER DAY FEB 05, VERSES 25 PER DAY APR 04); NOW THEY ARE FOCUSING ON ISF, NOT CF.

-HOWEVER, US CASUALTIES STILL REMAIN AT AN ALL TIME HIGH FOR THE FIRST QUARTER 2005.

SOURCE: BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, IRAQI INDEX 11 MAR 05

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

15

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

16

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

DECOY IED ATTACKS

SOURCE: MCIA IED SMART CARD; PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_200412100.asp

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

SUICIDE IED ATTACKS

• TARGETS ARE PLANNED AND RECONNOITERED PHOTOGRAPHED/VIDEOTAPED• OFTEN INSIDE JOBS• REQUIRES 4-8 AIF• WALK UP METHOD OF ATTACK• TARGETS ARE PEOPLE:

-CF, IPS, ING, OR INA BASES OR POSTS-KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR OFFICES-KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR RESIDENCES-KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR CARS

• IEDS CARRIED BY-SUITCASE-BAG-BACKPACK-VEST

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

#3 VBIED ATTACKS

•STATIONARY, NON-SUICIDE VBIED: -PARKED VBIED -DROP-OFF VBIED-VBIED DIVERSIONS-UNWITTING VICTIM-DRIVER IN VBIED-VBIED DECOYS

19

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

VBIED ATTACKS (NON-SUICIDE)

• PARKED VBIEDS:

-REMOTE CONTROL OR COMMAND DETONATED VBIED: VBIED IS STATIONARY/UNMANNED: FROM AN OVERWATCH POSITION, AIF MAY USE A HARD WIRE OR A REMOTE CONTROL DEVICE (CELL PHONE, GARAGE DOOR OPENER, ETC.) TO DETONATE AS TARGET PASSES.

MAY BE A STRIPPED VEHICLE (STRIPPED OF SEATS/TIRES, BODY DAMAGE).

MAY BE A JUNK YARD VEHICLE THAT AIF SIMPLY PUT TIRES ON AND PLACED NEXT TO ROAD AS A VBIED. MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN HASTILY REPAINTED.

MAY APPEAR TO BE A FUNCTIONAL VEHICLE, BUT PARKED WITH HOOD UP. MAY HAVE FUEL CANS STACKED NEARBY OR IN BACK SEAT.

-COMPLEX AMBUSH: AIF OFTEN INITIATE A COMPLEX ATTACK WITH A STATIONARY VBIED (SINGLE OR MULTIPLE) THAT IS DETONATED ON A CONVOY OR CF BASE; AIF CONTINUE THE ATTACK WITH RPGS, MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE (SAF). NOTE: AIF CLAIMED TO HAVE USED SEVEN VBIEDS DURING ABU

GHRYAB PRISON ATTACK 3 APR 05.

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

VBIED ATTACKS

• DROP OFF VBIED: A VBIED IS DRIVEN AND PARKED NEXT TO TARGET (FOR EXAMPLE: ING FORMATION); DRIVER WALKS AWAY FROM VEHICLE AND DETONATES.

• DIVERSIONS: A VBIED EXPLODES IN ANOTHER PART OF THE TOWN, AT THE SAME TIME AIFS ATTACK AN IRAQI POLICE STATION.

• UNWITTING VICTIM-DRIVER: AIF PLANTS AN IED ON A VEHICLE OF AN UNWITTING EMPLOYEE, POLICEMAN OR GOVERNMENT WORKER, THEN DETONATES THE VBIED AS THE VICTIM DRIVES THEIR VEHICLE VICINITY OF THE TARGET (OFTEN A GOVERNMENT BUILDING, ETC).

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

• DECOYS:

-STATIONARY VBIED SIGHTED BY CF CONVOY; CONVOY STOPS AT A SAFE DISTANCE; SECOND DEVICE SUCH AS BURIED IED IS DETONATED ON STOPPED CONVOY.

-CFS FIND AND BEGIN TO CLEAR A VBIED (DECOY) OR A SIMPLE IED, WHEN A SECOND VBIED NEARBY DETONATES ON THE CF EOD TEAM.

-‘PUSH AWAY VBIED’-- CF IDENTIFY A ‘BROKEN DOWN, ABANDONED’ VEHICLE BLOCKING AN MSR; CF HMMWV BEGINS TO PUSH THE VEHICLE OFF THE ROAD; AIF IN OVERWATCH REMOTELY DETONATE THE ‘BROKE’ VEHICLE JUST AS THE HMMWV BEGINS TO PUSH IT.

VBIED ATTACKS

PHOTO SOURCE: CNN

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

#4: RPG ATTACKS• SINGLE RPG FIRED AT A CF, INA, OR ING TARGET TO HARASS

– BUILDING– BASE– PATROL– CONVOY– CHECKPOINTS

• RPG FIRED DURING CLOSE COMBAT – DIRECT ACTION

PHOTO SOURCE: FIGHTING IN IRAQ http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/index.htm

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

RPG ATTACKS ON CONVOYS/PATROLS

PHOTO SOURCE: FIGHTING IN IRAQ, http://iraq4ever.blogspot.com/ ; MAHDI MILITIA, http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/r977494193_jpg.htm

-LIMITED PLANNING-TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY-UNMASSED FIRES-PREFER TO FIRE AT VEHICLES RATHER THAN BUILDINGS-TARGET CF, ING, INA, OR IPS-AIF WILL QUICKLY BREAK CONTACT

24

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

RPG FIRED IN CLOSE COMBAT

PHOTO SOURCE: MAHDI MILITIA, http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/r3220281186_jpg.htm

-HASTILY PLANNED-UNMASSED FIRES -MAY BE COMBINED WITH SAF -TARGET PERSONNEL, A BUILDING, VEHICLE-TARGET CF, ING, INA, OR IPS-OCCUR DAY OR NIGHT -AIF MAY BREAK CONTACT WHEN: -FACING SUPERIOR FIREPOWER -AIR/GROUND QRF ARRIVE

25

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

#5: AIF AMBUSHES

• HARASSMENT AMBUSHES ON PATROLS/CONVOYS – INTENT IS TO ATTACK AND THEN IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW– MAY USE ONLY AK-47S+RPGS– DAY OR NIGHT

• COMBAT AMBUSHES ON PATROLS/CONVOYS– INTENT IS TO ATTACK AND DESTROY TARGET IN KILL ZONE– MAY OFTEN BE COMPLEX AMBUSHES (IED+AK-47S+RPGS+LIGHT

MACHINE GUNS+MORTARS)– DAY OR NIGHT

SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

AIF HARASSMENT AMBUSH

-TARGETS COMBAT PATROLS OR CONVOYS-INTENT IS TO HARASS-PROBABLY LESS HEAVILY ARMED -LAY IN WAIT, ATTACK AND WITHDRAW-PREPLANNED, RECONNOITERED-PHOTOGRAPHED OR VIDEOTAPED-AMBUSH ELEMENT CAN BE STATIONARYOR IN VEHICLES-POSSIBLE STATIONARY AMBUSH ELEMENTS:

-MAIN FIRING LINE (AMBUSH LEADER IS INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP) -SECURITY ELEMENT.

SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86 PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/mahdi-resistance6_jpg.htm.

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

AIF COMBAT AMBUSH

SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86 PHOTO SOURCE: FIGHTING IN KARBALA http://www.albasrah.net/images/iraqi-resist/pages/r3290927916_jpg.htm; FIGHTING IN RAMADI http://www.alchahed.net/ramadi_101004.htm

-TARGETS COMBAT PATROLS OR CONVOYS-INTENT IS TO CAUSE MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION OF CF (OR ING/INA/IPS) VEHICLES/EQUIPMENT AND MAXIMUM CASUALTIES-PROBABLY A COMPLEX AMBUSH; MAY HAVE MINED ROADSIDE-LAY IN WAIT, ATTACK, DESTROY EQUIPMENT + VEHICLES, KILL CF PERSONNEL IN KILL ZONE, AND WITHDRAW-PREPLANNED, RECONNOITERED-PHOTOGRAPHED OR VIDEOTAPED-AMBUSH ELEMENT CAN BE STATIONARY OR IN VEHICLES-POSSIBLE STATIONARY AMBUSH ELEMENTS:

-MAIN FIRING LINE (AMBUSH LEADER IS INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP) -SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT GROUP (DEMO TEAM TO DESTROY VEHICLES & EQUIPMENTS IN KILL ZONE AFTER ATTACK)-SECURITY ELEMENT.

28

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

SAF/RPG ROLLING AMBUSH(5 JUN 04, BLACKWATER AMBUSH)

FRIENDLY CONVOY (VICINITY BAGHDAD AIRPORT-TWO VEHICLE (SUBURBANS) CONVOY TO BIAP-SOFT BODY LEADS; ARMORED TRAILS-LEAD VEHICLE-4 PERSONS; TRAIL VEHICLE-3 PERSONS-EQUIPPED: M4’S BODY ARMOR, RADIOS, AK-47S, HGS-LEAD TOOK RPG HIT; TRAIL PULLED ALONG SIDE-DEFENDED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE; 4 KIA, 2 WIA-WITHDREW UNDER FIRE; -COMMANDEERED VEHICLE IN ON-COMING LANE TO ESCAPE

BIAP

?

?

AIFS-VEHICLES ATTACKED, PASSED & RETURNED -TWO VEHICLES STOPPED IN FRONT-PKM (ARMOR PIERCING TRACER?), SAF, RPG-FIRED/MANEUVERED ON TARGET-POSSIBLE FLANK UNIT-POSSIBLY MORE THAN ONE AIF VEHICLE IN REAR-COLLECTED CASUALTIES BEFORE DEPARTING-DISCIPLINED

? ?

DIAGRAM SOURCE: http://www.blackwaterusa.com

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

COMPLEX AMBUSH ON PATROL/CONVOY

DIAGRAM SOURCE: http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt

T

2. GUN TEAM ENGAGE CONVOY, DRAWING ATTENTION TO ‘THEIR’ SIDE OF THE ROAD.

1. IED INITIATES AMBUSH HALTING CONVOY.

T3. REAR OF CONVOY ATTACKED BY RPG, FROM OPPOSITE SIDE OF ROAD.

30

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

MORTARS-WITH AMBUSHES

-PLANNED FIRES AGAINST CF, INA, ING OR IPS PATROLS/CONVOYS-MASSED FIRES WITH SAF, MACHINE GUN, RPG, IED, AND/OR VBIED-EXPLOIT MAXIMUM RANGE OF MORTAR SYSTEM-IMMEDIATE DISPLACEMENT AFTER FIRING-SYSTEM TRANSPORTED BY: -VEHICLE -CART -MOTORCYCLE -HAND CARRIED BY CREW-DAY OR NIGHT FIRES-EXPLOIT RESTRICTED FIRE ZONES (HOUSES, APARTMENTS, OR BUILDINGS)

SOURCE: FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86;

31

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

ANALYST COMMENTS

• AIF FIRING SMALL ARMS IN CLOSE COMBAT REMAINS THE #1 CASUALTY PRODUCING TACTIC

• THE IED REMAINS #2 CASUALTY PRODUCING TACTIC– AIF ARE ACTUALLY DEPLOYING MORE IEDS THAN BEFORE– HOWEVER, ARE TARGETING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

MORE THAN THE COALITION

• VBIED ATTACKS MOVED UP FROM #6 TO #3 SINCE JAN 05– AIF HAVE REALIZED THAT THE VBIED IS THE NEXT MOST

DANGEROUS THREAT TO MOUNTED CF BESIDES THE SUICIDE VBIED

VEHICLE IS EASY TO OVERLOOK ON SIDE OF ROAD CAN HOLD A MUCH LARGER EXPLOSIVE THAN AN IED DOES NOT REQUIRE CONCEALING/BURYING (BURIED IED)

32

DCSINTDCSINT

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

ANALYST COMMENTS

•AIF HAVE CHANGED THEIR TARGETING FOCUS TO INA, ING, AND IPS TARGETS

•AIF MAY BEGIN TARGETING PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENTS/VICE PRESIDENTS, AND ASSEMBLY MEMBERS, AS THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ASSUMES POWER APRIL 2005

(DATA MAY NOT BE ALL INCLUSIVE; GREAT CARE WAS GIVEN TO ACCURACY, BASED ON AVAILABLE OPEN SOURCES)

POCs: vincent.mclean@leavenworth.army.mil, penny.mellies@leavenworth.army.mil, ADCSINT, TRADOC, FORT LEAVENWORTH, 913-684-7920