DDI BQ Japan Policy Blocks

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2AC Futenma PIC.............................................................................................................................................................. ... 22AC Futenma PIC.............................................................................................................................................................. ... 32AC Futenma PIC.............................................................................................................................................................. ... 42AC Futenma PIC.............................................................................................................................................................. ... 5

2AC Futenma PIC.............................................................................................................................................................. ... 62AC Conditions CP................................................................................................................................................................72AC Nuclear Rearm ............................................................................................................................................................. 9Hegemony DA.................................................................................................................................................................... . 17Hegemony DA.................................................................................................................................................................... . 182AC: Security K................................................................................................................................................................... 19

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1. Cannot solve for democracy we will isolate 2 links:

a) Removing all troops from Okinawa is key, that is Feffer 10-Leaving some bases in Okinawa

would be useless-the DPJ brought Japan out of a one party system and any minor set back will ruin it

b) Only the U.S.-Japan alliance can promote a model for successful democratic principles-thatsRapp 04-making it seem like we are turning our backs on Japan by only removing one base from

Okinawa will crush democracy

2. All bases need to be removed from Okinawa in addition to Futenma-more equal relationship with U.S.

Japan Times, Debito Arudou, 6/1/10, The Japan Times Online, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20100601ad.html

We keep hearing how Japan's noncooperation will weaken precious U.S.-Japan ties. But those ties have long been a leash one the U.S., aware of how susceptible risk-averse Japan is to "separation anxiety," yanks at whim. The "threatenedbilateral relationship" claim is disingenuous the U.S. is more concerned with bolstering its military-industrial complexthan with Asia's regional stability. In sum, it's less a matter of Japan wanting the U.S. bases to stay, more a matter of the

U.S. bases not wanting to leave. Japan is a sovereign country, so the Japanese government has the final say. If that meansU.S. forces relocating or even leaving completely, the U.S. should respectfully do so without complaint, not demand Japanfind someplace else for them to go. That is not Japan's job. Yet our politicians have worked hard for decades to representthe U.S. government's interests to the Japanese public. Why? Because they always have. The time has come to stop beingprisoners of history. World War II and the Cold War are long over. That's why this columnist says: Never mind Futenma.All U.S. bases should be withdrawn from Japanese soil, period. Anachronisms, the bases have not only created conflicts ofinterest and interfered with Japan's sovereignty, they are now incapacitating our government. Japan should slip the collar ofU.S. encampments and consider a future under a less dependent, more equal relationship with the U.S.

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3. Full withdrawal from Okinawa key-Only way to stop unnecessary intervention and allow Japan to

defend itself

Dough Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C., is a nationally syndicated columnist with Copley NewsService, and is the former editor of Inquiry magazine. Before that, he served as a special assistant to President Reagan and as a senior

policy analyst in the office of the president-elect and the Reagan for President campaign, 5/18/1999, CATO Institute,http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5127

In any case, SACO does not reach the more fundamental issue: why should the United States continue to station a MarineExpeditionary Force and other units on Okinawa? Although Washington doesn't seem to have noticed, with the end of the Cold Warthe world has changed, and so, too, has East Asia. The threats have diminished ? the Soviet Union is no more, North Korea iscrumbling, China has discarded Maoism. Moreover, the region no longer needs America's protection. Japan is the second-rankingeconomic power on earth, South Korea far outstrips its northern antagonist, and most of the ASEAN states have made dramaticeconomic progress. Indeed, so complacent are Tokyo and Seoul that both are cutting their defense budgets. What reasons do U.Sofficials give for a policy that could be summarized as what has ever been must always be? China looms large on the horizon, but if

Washington and Beijing eventually come to blows, the air force and navy would do the heavy lifting. Another favorite is themaintenance of regional stability, given widespread economic problems, political uncertainty in Indonesia, and so on. Yet it is timefor East Asia to look after its own stability. If one wanted to catalog conflicts in which the United States should not intervene, it wouldbe these. What if the Habibie regime in Indonesia totters? Let it fall. What if Filipino and Chinese ships exchange shots over theSpratly Islands? Stay out of the fight. What if Japan and South Korea rattle sabers over the Tokto/Takeshima Islands? Tell bothcountries to work together. These are East Asia's, not America's, problems. That doesn't mean Washington should be unconcernedabout the region. But instead of being meddler of first resort, the United States should act as balancer of last resort, intervening only ifa hegemonic threat develops that allied states are incapable of containing. America could then sharply reduce existing force levels andredeploy advanced units ? like the Third Marine division, currently stationed on Okinawa ? back to Guam and Hawaii. Japan, SouthKorea, and other countries could take on the military role dictated by their economic success. For a half century Okinawans haveborne the brunt of U.S. military deployments in Japan. But the Cold War is over. It is time for Japan to defend itself. And America togive Okinawa back to the Okinawans.

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4. Rape doesnt just occur on Futenma: Kadena

David Allen, former U.S. navy reservist, journalist, and recipient of the Clarion Award for Hard News, and Chiyomi

Sumida, Bachelor of Science in Management Studies from University of Maryland, 2008 (Okinawa police call forKadena soldier to be charged with rape of Filipina Stars and Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/news/okinawa-police-call-for-kadena-soldier-to-be-charged-with-rape-of-filipina-1.78127)

NAHA, Okinawa Okinawa police recommended Friday that a soldier assigned to the Patriot missile battery on KadenaAir Base be charged with rape involving an injury. An Okinawa police spokesman identified the soldier as Sgt. RonaldEdward Hopstock Jr., 25, attached to the 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment. Hopstock is accused of raping a21-year-old Philippine woman in an Okinawa City hotel Feb. 18. Army officials could not be reached for comment as oflate Friday. Previously, however, they have confirmed that a soldier was being held at the brig on Camp Hansen, Okinawa,in connection with the case. Under the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, the soldier can remain in military custodyuntil an indictment is filed in a Japanese court.

5. Soldiers from Kadena molested an elementary schooler

ErikSlavin, foreign correspondent, and Chiyomi Sumida, Bachelor of Science in Management Studies from University ofMaryland, 2005 (Kadena airman accused of molesting child Stars and Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/news/kadena-airman-accused-of-molesting-child-1.35458)

OKINAWA CITY, Okinawa A 27-year-old airman is in Okinawa police custody, accused of molesting an elementaryschool girl near Kadena Air Bases Gate Two on Sunday morning. The reported action sparked strong condemnation fromboth Japanese and U.S. military leaders. Police said Staff Sgt. Armando Valdez lured the girl and her friend from a street inOkinawa Citys Chuo District into a parking lot at about 8:25 a.m., forced the girl to roll up her T-shirt, then touched herbreast. Valdez then photographed the girl with his cell phone camera, said a spokesman for the Okinawa Prefectural Policein Okinawa City. The girl then ran to a nearby church while her friend fled and called for help. Police officers foundValdez accosting a woman on a street near the parking lot at about 11 a.m., the police spokesman said. Valdez, assigned tothe 18th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Kadena Air Base, admitted photographing the girl but said he did not touch her,police said. A Breathalyzer test detected five times more than the legal limit of 0.1 milligrams of alcohol on his breath,

police said. Police referred the molestation case to the Naha Public Prosecutors Office on Monday. The incident drewsharp criticism of the U.S. militarys discipline from Okinawa Gov. Keiichi Inamine. The prefectural government hasdemanded repeatedly that the military tighten rules and educate servicemembers each time a violent incident occurs,Inamine said in a statement Sunday. This incident shows that the efforts being made by the military are not sufficient andthat lessons from past experiences are not utilized, he said. I must question the discipline among the military members.Inamine said the crime infringes on womens human rights, especially in this case where the victim is an elementaryschool girl, which is an absolutely unacceptable act and intolerable.

6. Violation of freedom negates the value of human existence and represents the greatest threat to human

survival

Ayn Rand, Philosopher, July 1989, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism , p. 145 Michigan Debate File

A society that robs an individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the freedom of hismind, or compels him to act against his own rational judgment, a society that sets up a conflict between its ethics andthe requirements of mans nature is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held together by institutionalizedgang-rule. Such a society destroys all values of human coexistence, has no possible justification, and represents,not a source of benefits, but the deadliest threat to mans survival. Life on desert island is safer than andincomparably preferable than existence in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany

7. Freedom comes before all other impacts

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SylvesterPetro, professor of law at Wake Forest, Spring 1974, Toledo Law Review, p480

However, one may still insist on echoing Ernest Hemingway I believe in only one thing: liberty. And it is always well

to bear in mind David Humes observation: It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus, it isunacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions

of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. AskSolzhenstyn, Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and proper ordering principlefor any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must beemphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

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5. All US bases on Okinawa costs millions and keep thousands of jobs from the economy.

Carlton Meyer, a former Marine Corps officer and author, 09 WBTA

The irony is that closing or downsizing some of these bases would save the USA millions of dollars a year and shift thousands of jobsto the U.S. economy. However, many powerful Japanese and American corporations support the status quo from which they profitThey work with American Generals and Admirals to argue that Japan helps defray the cost of U.S. bases in Japan by paying for someutilities and the salaries of some Japanese workers. In reality, Japan never pays one cent to the U.S. military, and most of the claimedcontributions are artificial. For example, goods imported for sale at U.S. military stores are not taxed by the Japanese government, sothis is counted as a financial contribution. Another major "contribution" is rent paid to Japanese landowners. Cost sharingcontributions have been reduced in recent years, and further cuts have been promised to prod the American military to reduce itspresence. Maintaining 50,000 U.S. troops in Japan requires millions of dollars each year to rotate GIs for three-year tours, whichincludes shipping their children, pets, and household goods. In addition, mainland Japan is an unpopular duty station because of coldweather, high costs, and polite yet unfriendly locals. Since housing costs for military families and American civilian employees aretwice that of the USA, the U.S. military also spends millions of dollars for additional housing costs and "locality" pay.

6. Financial crises leads to global war

Walter Russel Mead- Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of

God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World, February 4, 2009, The New Republic, Only Makes YouStronger: Why the recession bolstered America online at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2169866/posts

So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in aprogressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russiandevelopment has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened thepower of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist societyintegrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritariantraditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies andbanks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis thanmore established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has

relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably,it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power andwealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. Historymay suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuringmessages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist systemunder the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the SevenYears War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almostas long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, butthe Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into adepression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? TheUnited States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

8. PICs Bad

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1. Counterplans attempt to condition the act of strengthening the US-Japan alliance based on the views

of China will destroy the alliance Japan feels like the US is abandoning them.

TobiasHarris, doctoral student in political science at the MIT, Newsweek. 7-16-10 Japan-U.S. Relations Could GetBumpyhttp://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/16/a-fragile-alliance.html

The irony, then, is that despite the DPJs desire for a more equal relationship with the United States, the political andeconomic logic of austerity suggests that Japan will likely grow even more dependent on the U.S. for its security, with thedifference being that the relationship will be more fragile. For Japan, every U.S. initiative toward China will be scrutinizedfor signs that the U.S. is abandoning Japan in the region. Similarly, for Washington, every initiative to deepen cooperationwithin East Asia that excludes the U.S. will be questioned and may prompt grumbling about Japanese free-riding. In otherwords, these are the makings of a tumultuous decade for the alliance.

2. China says no - 1AC Rapp evidence indicates changes of US-Japan alliance will be able to mitigate

Chinas rise. Means China would not want the plan and the strengthened alliance.

3. China says no their Moltz evidence says the positive incentive that China wants is the halting of US

arms sales of TMD technology to Taiwan Okinawa doesnt matter to China.

3. United States would be able to accomplish the goal of the counterplan post plan by using Japan to

accomplish regional negotiations due to its influence in East Asia and China would be more inclined to

negotiate with Japan over the US 1AC Rapp. Means case solves and turns the Net Benefits.

4. Their Hebert evidence is not China specific it only says that MTCR has the ability to slow ballistic

missiles. Does not state that it would altogether stop China from proliferating

5. Their Moltz Evidence is not Okinawa specific and does not even mention using MTCR as a bargaining

chip only indicates that this is an issue where United States and Chinese interests clash. This means the

counterplan does not guarantee a China says yes scenario meaning a significant risk the plan doesnt take

place and only a risk China says no - means you vote aff. AND, their Moltz evidence is from 1997

Chinas position has changed. Its attempt to rise to power now means that it will not want to negotiate on

nonproliferation treaties like the MTCR.

6. Pressure not key China will join MTCR inevitably

Anil KJoseph Staff writer/Reporter for Press Trust of India, stationed in Beijing. 6/3/2004. China ready to join MTCR tocontrol missile proliferation. Press Trust of India Rediff India Abroad. http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/03mtcr.htm.

China on Thursday expressed its willingness to join the Missile Control Technology Regime in an effort to project itself as

a responsible missile power in the international community 's efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of massdestruction. After the end of a two-day, second round meeting between members of the MTCR and Chinese officials,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said the MTCR has promised to give "positive consideration" toBeijing's application. "The chairman of MTCR, Ambassador Carlos Sersale Di Cerisano, said the delegation will givepositive consideration on China's application," Liu told reporters. The MTCR is an informal and voluntary associationof countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for weapons of massdestruction and seeks to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. Liu Jievie,Director General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,represented China in the June 1-2 meeting with MTCR officials, Liu said. "Both sides believe that the dialogues have

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http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/16/a-fragile-alliance.htmlhttp://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/16/a-fragile-alliance.htmlhttp://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/03mtcr.htmhttp://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/03mtcr.htmhttp://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/16/a-fragile-alliance.htmlhttp://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/03mtcr.htm


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increased mutual understanding and trust and it is of importance for the development of China-MTCR relationship," thespokesman said.

6. Counterplan doesnt solve US-China relations. MTCR only affects the delivery system of the nuclear

weapons not the nuclear weapons themselves. Their Malik evidence says stopping the prolif of nuclear

weapons to China is key to solve.

7. Condition CPs Bad

8. China is more eager to balance with Japan

Michael J. Green, a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at CSIS, as well as being an associate professor of internationalrelations at Georgetown University. He previously served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and seniordirector for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), from January 2004 to December 2005, after joining the NSC in

April 2001 as director of Asian affairs with responsibility for Japan, Korea, and Australia/New Zealand, March 2007,

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62460/michael-j-green/japan-is-back-why-tokyo-s-new-assertiveness-is-good-for-washingto?page=show

The remarkable Chinese debate over the new thinking on Japan reveals both Chinese fears of U.S. hegemony and thelimits of a Chinese strategy to buffer U.S. power through a new Asian regionalism. The debate was touched off by MaLichengs provocative article, New Thinking on Relations with Japan, in the final 2002 issue of the influential Strategyand Management (Beijing).19 Ma, a well-known liberal, expressed shock at the pervasive anti- Japanese sentiment beingexpressed in Chinese communications on the Internet and argued that it was creating a backlash in Japan that was damagingto Chinas national interest. Mas solution is simple: We need the generosity of a great and victorious nation, and do notneed to be excessively harsh with Japan. Arguing that the apology question [from World War ii] has been resolved,Ma urges both Chinese and Japanese to overcome parochial views and look forward in the bilateral relationship.20Chinese cybernationalists were furious. Internet chatrooms cursed Ma as a traitor for being soft on Japan; he evenreceived death threats.21 He has since taken early retirement from his job in Beijing and moved to Hong Kong. Shi

Yinhong, an advocate of Realpolitik at Peoples University in Beijing, bravely came to Mas defense, arguing in asubsequent Strategy and Management article that rapprochement with Japan was indeed in Chinas interest. Unlike Ma,however, Shi views Sino-Japanese relations primarily from the perspective of geopoliticsthe broader internationalbalance of power. It will be extremely beneficial to China, Shi wrote, if, through improving relations with Japan,China can improve its security environment and its diplomatic position. Viewing U.S. power preeminence as historicallyunprecedented, Shi worries that the United States will utilize its hegemonic status to obstruct Chinas rise. He thereforeadvocates a cool, dispassionate realpolitik reminiscent of Henry Kissingers. Just as Kissinger proposed that the UnitedStates seek rapprochement with China to balance against the Soviets in the early 1970s, Shi proposes that China seekrapprochement with Japan to balance against the United States today. This diplomatic revolution, he argues, wouldgreatly benefit China.22 U.S. hegemony is so dangerous, in Shis view, that Chinese must put aside their historicalgrievances and reconcile with Japan.

9. Extend [1AC author] our evidence indicates that China is viewing the alliance now as hostile because

of the US, but the plan solves this by making Japan a more avid balancer, which is what China wants

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http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62460/michael-j-green/japan-is-back-why-tokyo-s-new-assertiveness-is-good-for-washingto?page=showhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62460/michael-j-green/japan-is-back-why-tokyo-s-new-assertiveness-is-good-for-washingto?page=showhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62460/michael-j-green/japan-is-back-why-tokyo-s-new-assertiveness-is-good-for-washingto?page=showhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62460/michael-j-green/japan-is-back-why-tokyo-s-new-assertiveness-is-good-for-washingto?page=show


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1. Japan considering rearm now

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, July 07, 2007, A New Era in Asia: Japan Rising

http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/07/06/a-new-era-in-asia-japan-rising/ | Suo

An equally dramatic, if perhaps not quite so problematic, shift is taking place in Japan. Tokyos forceful bid for regional dominationcollapsed as its warships sank and cities burned in 1945. During the Cold War Japan produced an economic miracle but remained ageopolitical pygmy. Washington fumed, but both Japans rulers and neighbors preferred U.S. dominance. Tokyo now is changingdirection, however. Japanese politicians and leaders alike seem ready to turn Japan into a normal country, undertaking diplomaticresponsibilities and creating military capabilities commensurate with its size and wealth. Although even a reenergized and rearmedTokyo would be unable to impose its will on its neighbors, a more active Japan could temper the ambitions of North Korea and, moreimportant, the PRC. Beijing may come to enjoy an unipolar moment in East Asia, but Japans new direction makes that prospectless likely, or at least more distant.

2. No link and turn - Japan will not rearm despite new threats to its security because of commitment to

non proliferation its greatest source of security is its alliance with the US and the alliance is

strengthened by increased Japanese participation. Even in the worst case scenario, nuclearization is not

in its best interest.

Llewelyn Hughes, Ph.D in Political Science from MIT, Assistant Professor of Political Science and

International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, 2007 Why Japan Will Not GoNuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/international_security/v031/31.4hughes.html

Regional and International Security EnvironmentRecent changes in the East Asian and international security environment have renewed speculation, primarily outsideJapan, that Japan may choose to guarantee its security by developing a n independent nuclear deterrent .16 First, the spinningaway of North Korea from the orbit of the former Soviet Union has caused it to emerge as a threat to Japanese security.North Korea is in the process of developing a deliverable nuclear device. It tested a ballistic missile over Japanese airspacein 1998 and carried out further missile tests in the Japan Sea in July 2006. In addition, North Korea has withdrawn from theNPT, and on October 9, 2006, it carried out a low-yield nuclear test. Further, North Korea appears to harbor aggressiveintentions toward Japan, issuing bellicose statements threatening to turn it into a "nuclear sea of fire."17 A major diplomaticinitiative designed to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons programthe six-party talks involving North and South Korea,the United States, Japan, Russia, and Chinahas thus far failed to achieve its goal.

Second, the rise in Chinese military spending is increasing tensions between China and Japan that growing bilateraleconomic interactions show little sign of ameliorating. The Japanese national defense program approved by the cabinet onDecember 10, 2004, highlights Japan's concern with growing Chinese military power by identifying for the first timeChina's nuclear and missile weaponry and modernization program for its air and naval forces as developments requiring

ongoing monitoring.18 [End Page 71]

Third, the international regime designed to manage the flow of nuclear materials is under threat. The NPT has constituted acentral component of Japan's strategy to manage the threat of nuclear weapons since the 1970s, yet verification and othermechanisms to ensure conformity with the treaty have been exposed as flawed by revelations in Iraq following the 1991Persian Gulf War.19 Further, the 199394 North Korean nuclear crisis, the subsequent withdrawal of North Korea from thenonproliferation regime, and its emergence (following India and Pakistan) as a declared nuclear power have underminedconfidence that multilateralism can manage nuclear threats within the Asia-Pacific region.20

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Fourth, the collapse of the Soviet Union altered the logic that underwrote the extension of the United States' nucleardeterrent to its allies. During the Cold War, the defense of Japan was determined to be integral to U.S. national interests,and this formed the bedrock under which U.S. security guarantees (including extended nuclear deterrence) were

provided.21 The end of the Cold War, however, undermined the rationale for the provision of security guarantees by theUnited States to its allies, including Japan, a fact recognized by the governments of both countries. The United States, forexample, conducted reviews of its nuclear doctrine in 1994 and 2001 in response to the new strategic circumstances. TheJapanese government also recognized the importance of the end of the Cold War to Japanese security in its NationalDefense Program Outlines for 1995 and 2005.22

Japan's Response to a Changing Security EnvironmentTaken together, these changes in the regional and international security environment suggest that threats to Japan haveincreased in salience while [End Page 72] the two central components of its strategy to defend against nuclear threatsmultilateral regimes and the United States' extension of its nuclear deterrent to Japanare weakened. In this section Iexamine how Japanese decisionmakers and organizations have responded to this weakening of Japan's nuclear insurancepolicies. I begin with a discussion of multilateral nonproliferation regimes to which Japan is a participant and then considerJapan's alliance with the United States.

Insurance Policy 1Multilateral Nonproliferation RegimesJapan's strategy to deter nuclear threats while remaining a nonnuclear weapon state has centered on its security treaty withthe United States . Strong support for multilateral nonproliferation and arms control regimes has complemented this policy.Indeed Japan has enmeshed itself in a web of international agreements both to enhance its own security and to signal itsintention to refrain from developing an indigenous nuclear deterrent.23

Japanese officials cite Japan's ratification ofthe NPT in June 1976 as the moment at which the option of developing anindigenous nuclear deterrent was discarded.24 Under its NPT commitments, Japan is prohibited from manufacturing,receiving the transfer of, or controlling directly or indirectly a nuclear device. Since ratifying the NPT, Japan has been acommitted participant in international agreements promoting arms control and nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons. It supports the missile technology control regimes and other export control regimes, and since 1989 hashosted the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues.25 Japan also continues to invest resources in training officials fromdeveloping countries in arms control and nonproliferation policies.26 [End Page 73]

Evidence demonstrates that in the 1990s Japanese officials strengthened Japan's commitment to arms control andnonproliferation, and began to engage in more prominent public diplomacy, increasing the reputational costs of unilateralwithdrawal from the NPT. Japan ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1997, and in 1998 became a signatory tothe Additional Protocol of the NPT. The latter significantly extends its reporting responsibilities to the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA), and enables inspections of declared and suspected undeclared sites at short notice. Japanundergoes a rigorous inspections program under this regime, reportedly accounting for up to one-third of the IAEA'sbudget.27 Japan also maintains bilateral agreements with its nuclear suppliers banning it from using imported materials forpurposes other than its civilian nuclear energy program.28

Japan has also increased its public rhetoric in support of nonproliferation . Since 1994 it has offered a resolution annually atthe UN General Assembly calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. And since 2002 it has published a biannualwhite paper, in both Japanese and English outlining Japan's policy position on arms control and nonproliferation.29

Reflecting these changes, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the lead ministry on disarmament and arms controlissues, has increased the amount of organizational resources invested in the nonproliferation regime. Management ofJapan's disarmament and arms control policy was initially subsumed within the United Nations Division of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs' Foreign Policy Bureau. Institutional reforms following the 1991 Gulf War, however, saw the disarmamentand arms control policy functions shifted into a newly created disarmament and nonproliferation section. This new sectionincluded a department charged with ensuring Japan's compliance with international obligations regarding the peaceful useof nuclear energy, and one responsible for managing Japan's arms control and nonproliferation policies.

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A second round of reforms in 2004 gave greater prominence to Japan's disarmament and arms control policy. The arms

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control and nonproliferation section was elevated to the divisional level, and within this division arms control andnonproliferation functions were given prominence over nuclear energy compliance functions. These organizational changesreflect two factors: first, the prominence of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation within [End Page 74] Japanese

foreign policy and increased administrative obligations to treaties to which Japan is now a party; and second, thecompletion of bilateral treaty negotiations associated with Japan's civilian nuclear energy program.30

Insurance Policy 2U.S.-Japan AllianceJapan's most significant insurance policy against nuclear threats is its bilateral alliance with the U nited S tates . Under therubric of the Yoshida doctrine, Japan has relied on this alliance to provide security in the postWorld War II period, whileretaining limited defensive capabilities.31 Official records do not show any apparent change in Japanese leaders' confidencein the U.S. commitment under this alliance to defend their country from conventional and nuclear threats. The Defense ofJapan , for example, a report that is prepared annually by the Japan Defense Agency and represents the official record ofJapan's defense posture and the agency's assessment of Japan's strategic environment, continues to note simply that Japan'salliance with the U nited S tates is crucial to the defense of Japan. Reviews of Japan's defense posture in 1995 and 2005 alsostate this, and note that Japan continues to rely on the United States to deter military threats.32

Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, Japanese policymakers haveworked to ensure that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is not compromised. Although there was no significant difference betweenthe governments of the United States and Japan during U.S. negotiations with North Korea over Pyongyang's nuclearprogram,33 evidence suggests that Japanese officials lobbied the United States not to offer any concessions they judgedcould "punch a whole in the American nuclear umbrella."34 Mitoji Yabunaka, director-general of the Asia-Pacific Bureauwithin MoFA, for example, urged U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly never to offer North Korea assurances thatthe United States would refrain from using nuclear weapons against it in return for concessions.35 [End Page 75]

Preliminary evidence also suggests that following the North Korean nuclear test of October 9, 2006, calls by seniorJapanese leaders to debate the merits ofnuclearization were partially designed to elicit confirmation of the ongoingcommitment of the U nited S tates to deter threats against Japan . Foreign Minister Aso Taro, who called openly for publicdebate on the conditions under which Japan should reconsider its nonnuclear stance, stated in a December 2006 interviewthat the most crucial action for Japan to take following the nuclear test by North Korea was to confirm the willingness ofthe U nited S tates to defend Japan from conventional and nuclear threats, and that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's

visit to Tokyo in October 2006, which followed his remarks, achieved this objective.36

More fundamentally, new evidence demonstrates that Japanese defense officials recognized the implications of the end ofthe Cold War for Japan's alliance with the United States, and by extension for the continued robustness of the U.S. nuclearumbrella. The JDA addressed the question of how to manage this issue in a discussion paper prepared in 199495. Thepaper also considered whether it would be in Japan's interest to develop an independent nuclear deterrent.37

The JDA study is not the first of its kind. The director-general of the Defense Bureau within the JDA testified before acommittee of the House of Councillors in 1972 that his office had concluded there was no justification for developingnuclear weapons, suggesting that a study of this question had been carried out by military officials.38 Further, a group ofanalysts examined the technological and strategic constraints on Japanese nuclearization from 1968 to 1970, prior to Japan'ssigning of the NPT and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. The group concluded that developing a nuclear weapon wouldnot be in the national interest.39 [End Page 76]

The 199495 discussion paper also does not represent a formal policy statement. Nevertheless, three factors suggest that itis aligned with JDA policy preferences. First, it was prepared at the request of the most senior JDA officials andimplemented by senior military planners. Preparation of the discussion paper was requested by the former top bureaucratwithin the JDA, Administrative Vice Minister Shigeru Hatakeyama. The group was backed by former JDA AdministrativeVice Minister Nishihiro Seiki, a powerful voice on defense issues.40

Second, the discussion paper was prepared at a crucial time for Japanese security policy. Japan signed the permanentextension of the NPT in 1995, which increased the international legal constraints on Japanese leaders seeking an

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independent nuclear weapons capability. The mid-1990s was also a period of strained U.S.-Japan relations, and there werefears on both sides of the Pacific that the bilateral alliance would be rendered obsolete. The paper was written before these

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concerns were allayed with the April 1996 announcement of the Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Declaration on Security, whichpledged the United States to maintain U.S. troop levels in Japan and a forward presence in Asia.41

Third, there was wide institutional commitment to the set of studies of which the discussion paper was one component.These studies were prepared in 199495 following the 1991 Gulf War and were designed to reexamine Japanese grandstrategy. Participants in the studies were encouraged to engage in free debate, and Vice Minister Hatakeyama ordered allparts of the JDA to be involved in the project. Therefore, even though the discussion paper does not carry the weight of anofficial policy statement, these factors suggest that it is an important piece of recent evidence regarding the preferences ofthe JDA toward independent nuclearization.42

The discussion paper sought to accomplish three tasks: (1) analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War on U.S. andRussian nuclear weapons doctrine; (2) examine the threat posed by nuclearprolif eration; and (3) considerthe robustness ofthe U.S. nuclear umbrella , as well as examine the costs and benefits to Japan of developing an independent nucleardeterrent. It begins by noting that the collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the foundation of U.S. nuclear [End Page77] strategy during the Cold War. Coupled with the weakening of former Soviet forces in the Far East, this raised thequestion of what Japan could expect from the extension of the United States' deterrent to Japan under their bilateralalliance: "In the postCold War environment, Japan only has the option of relying on the extended deterrent of the UnitedStates if a nuclear threat emerges from regional states, yet there is a danger that the elements that ensured its continuedeffectiveness have been lost."43

Rather than recommending that Japan reconsider its commitment to remain nonnuclear, the paper emphasizes the lack ofstrategic logic supporting Japanese nuclearization. It notes that backers of independent nuclearization within Japancommonly emphasize national prestige while not giving adequate consideration to the costs such a decision would entail,including accelerating the disintegration of the NPT, damaging the U.S.-Japan alliance, causing a domestic political furor,and incurring huge economic costs related to the infrastructure needed to develop and maintain a nuclear capability.

The paper also argues that Japan's high population density and small geographic area undercut the logic of mutually assureddestruction (MAD), and that other rationales used to legitimate the decision for nuclearization during the Cold War areirrelevant. It notes, for example, that NATO's decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons to make up for the conventional

arms deficit in Europe does not apply in Japan's case, given that it is surrounded by water and is likely to have adequatewarning time to prepare before being attacked. It also argues that differing strategic circumstances mean the logic offreedom of escalation that drove nuclear decisionmaking in France and the United Kingdom does not apply in the case ofJapan.

The discussion paper concludes by examining the utility of nuclearization under current conditions, and under conditions inwhich Japan's existing insurance policies against nuclear threats are no longer effective. In the former scenario, the reportconsiders whether it would be in Japan's interest to develop a nuclear deterrent if the U.S.-Japan alliance remains robust andthe multilateral nonproliferation regime remains in place, but neighboring countries seek to develop a nuclear capability.44It concludes that Japan should not [End Page 78] develop an independent nuclear deterrent in this case, as it would serve toincrease proliferation and weaken the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In what it terms a "worst-case scenario," the paper then askswhether this conclusion would hold if the U.S.-Japan alliance no longer existed and the multilateral nonproliferation regimehad disintegrated. It concludes that nuclearization would nevertheless not be in Japan's national interest, given the

geographic and population constraints noted above, as well as the likelihood that the international stability Japan relies onto prosper as a trading state would be undermined, rather than enhanced, by such a decision.45

As an alternative, the paper argues that Japan should support the permanent extension of the NPT and examine strategiesfor ensuring that the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains robust. As an example, the paper presents what it takes to be asuccessful attempt by Japanese leaders to influence U.S. policy. During U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union overintermediate-range nuclear forces, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone feared the United States would agree to areduction in such forces in Europe while acquiescing to Soviet placement of SS-20 missiles in the Far East. By pushing forPershings to be placed in Alaska in response, the report suggests that Nakasone successfully lobbied President Ronald

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Reagan's administration to alter its negotiating position.46 The paper notes that this incident serves as an important lessonfor study not only because it reconfirmed the robustness of the U.S. deterrent commitment to Japan, but also because it seesthis incident as an example of how Japan may influence U.S. nuclear strategy despite remaining a nonnuclear power.

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Changes in Japanese security policy since the end of the Cold War appear to bear this strategy out. Most notably, theloosening of Japan's self-imposed constraints on military participation in alliance activities has strengthened U.S.-Japanties.47 In announcing his government's decision on December 9, 2003, to send Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, Prime MinisterJunichiro Koizumi directly [End Page 79] linked Japanese action with being a trustworthy partner to the United States andstrengthening the alliance.48 Foreign Minister Aso also directly linked Japanese actions in support of operations inAfghanistan and Iraq with the U.S.-Japan alliance.49 Incremental changes, such as the agreement to participate in the U.S.-led missile defense system and increasing regionally oriented activities under revised guidelines governing U.S.-Japanesejoint actions, have similarly served to strengthen the alliance.50 Coupled with the April 1996 Hashimoto-Clintonagreement, these changes have renewed confidence in the bilateral security alliance.

Japanese leaders and ministries and agencies with responsibility for foreign and security policy responded to

the worsening strategic environment in the 1990s, then, by working to consolidate Japan's existing insurance policies

against nuclear threats rather than rejecting their viability and supporting the development ofan independent nucleardeterrent. In particular, senior military officials within the JDA, the agency responsible for security policy,

determined that nuclearization was not in Japan's interest despite changes in the international

environment, and that policymakers should instead work to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and

multilateral nonproliferation regimes. They also concluded that independent nuclearization was not in

Japan's national interest, even if its existing policies to manage nuclear threats were weakened.

Meanwhile MoFA, as the ministry with primary responsibility for implementing Japan's

nonproliferation and arms control policies as well as managing its alliance with the United States, has

increased resources allocated to multilateral nonproliferation regimes.

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3. And, domestic opinion and legal barriers make rearm impossible everyone is opposed.

Llewelyn Hughes, Ph.D in Political Science from MIT, Assistant Professor of Political Science and

International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, 2007 Why Japan Will Not GoNuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/international_security/v031/31.4hughes.html

Domestic Institutional ConstraintsLegislativeA third domestic legal constraint on Japanese nuclearization is the Basic Law on Atomic Energy, enacted in 1955 as thefoundational law managing Japan's extensive civilian nuclear energy program. Article 2 of the law establishes that theresearch, development, and utilization of atomic energy must be limited to peaceful purposes and carried out independentlyunder democratic management. The Basic Law potentially constrains the development of nuclear weapons in two ways.First, amendments to the law must pass through normal parliamentary procedures, giving the opposition to any amendmentan opportunity to block proposed changes. Second, the law establishes the Atomic Energy Commission as a bodycomposed of civilians that is a formal part of the cabinet, reporting to a minister without portfolio within the CabinetOffice. The Atomic Energy Commission is charged with creating policy and coordinating with other parts of thebureaucracy on nuclear budgetary issues. The most important policy role of the commission is drafting the long-term planfor the use of nuclear energy, and ensuring that nuclear energy planning conforms with the articles of the Basic Law. Assuch, the commission defines its role as making sure that Japan continues to limit its use of nuclear energy to peacefulpurposes. Meeting records of the commission show that its members are united against the development of a nucleardeterrent. Following the 2002 comments by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda on the constitutionality of nuclear weapons,for example, debate within the commission was dominated by [End Page 88] the question of how to respond to what wasjudged by committee members as a transgression of the Basic Law. Nevertheless, discussions between committee membersindicate that few regulatory tools are available to them to halt any drive to revise the law to allow the diversion of nuclearmaterials to a nuclear weapons program; the commission does not have the power to veto changes to the Basic Law itself.This suggests that if an effort was made to alter the law to allow the diversion of materials used in the civilian nuclearenergy program to military use, the commission could do little beyond attempting to mobilize public opinion.86 DomesticConstraintsInformal Informal constraints present a more significant barrier to Japanese nuclearization. First, public

polling in Japan consistently demonstrates an aversion to nuclearization that has not varied significantly despite the end ofthe Cold War and the emergence of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state . In 1968, polling carried out by the AsahiShimbun newspaper found that 21 percent of the population answered affirmatively when asked whether Japan shouldobtain nuclear weapons. In 1978 and 1981, supporters had fallen to 15 and 16 percent.87 The end of the Cold War and theemergence of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state have not reversed this sentiment. A poll carried out in October 1999by the National Institute for Research Advancement, for example, asked respondents what position in relation to nuclearweapons Japan should take in the event that the U.S.-Japan alliance was either dissolved or rendered meaningless. It foundthat support for independent nuclearization nevertheless stood at 7 percent. This result replicated a January 1994 poll askingrespondents whether they would favor Japan developing its own nuclear weapon if North Korea did the same. Nine percentreplied they "somewhat favored" or "strongly favored" such an outcome.88 The October 2006 nuclear test by North Koreaalso appears not to have reversed public sentiment. In a poll conducted on November 1112, 2006, the Yomiuri Shimbunnewspaper found that 17.6 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that Japan's commitment to remain [End Page89] a nonnuclear weapons state should not be absolute, but rather Japan should reconsider its commitment to remain a

nonnuclear state depending on changes in the international environment.89 Second, a feature of the postwar period hasbeen the repeated inability of political actors to implement substantial changes to Japan's security policy in the face ofopposition. Most notably, the Liberal Democratic Party, which has governed Japan for all but a handful of years since theparty's creation in 1955, has suffered from a lack of intraparty cohesion on security policy, with both centrists and morehawkish groups coexisting within the party. Although the balance of power between these groups is dynamic, theequilibrium between them has historically been found in a reliance on the U.S. deterrent and limited domestic spending onautonomous defense.90 These intraparty divisions influenced nuclear decisionmaking in Japan. The initial response of theLDP to China's explosion of a nuclear device on October 16, 1964, for example, was hammered out through compromisebetween party members.91 Divisions on nuclear weapons policy surfaced once again in a draft bill prepared by the LDP

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Constitutional Reform Committee in 2004, which recommended that Japan's three nonnuclear principles be written

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explicitly into the Japanese constitution. This would have significantly increased the domestic legal barriers tonuclearization by making constitutional revision a requirement of any decision to manufacture a nuclear device within the

parameters of domestic law. Although removed from later drafts, this initiative demonstrates that significant numbers ofLDP members remain committed to Japan's nonnuclear policy.92 Members of the committee were drawn from across theLDP's factions, suggesting this preference is widespread within the government.93 Divisions also surfaced followingremarks by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda that were interpreted to suggest that the LDP was wavering on its commitmentto eschew the development of nuclear weapons. Fukuda came [End Page 90] under pressure to qualify his statement notonly from opposition partiesbut also from senior members within the LDP, including Secretary-General Makoto Koga.More recent comments made by Foreign Minister Aso and Head of Policy Shoichiro Nakagawa supporting a public debateof the conditions under which Japan should consider developing an independent nuclear deterrent were criticized fromwithin the party by Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency Fumio Kyuma and LDP Chairman of ParliamentaryAffairs Toshihiro Nikai. Data incompleteness makes it is impossible to reach definitive conclusions on the extent to whichthese divisions are reflected in legislator preferences toward nuclearization throughout Japan's parliament, or how stablethese preferences are over time. Nevertheless, a poll conducted in 1998 found that legislator opposition to nuclearizationwas dominant in the late 1990s despite changes in the international system. In the poll, which targeted legislators of bothhouses of Japan's bicameral parliament, just 4 percent of respondents were "in favor" or "somewhat in favor" of Japandeveloping a nuclear deterrent.94

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4. Japan public and politicians have no interest in nukes memories of Hiroshima, against their best

interests, completely secure by the US nuclear umbrella.

Congressional Research Service Emma Chanlett-Avery, an Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Tradedivision of CRS and Weston S. Konishi Analyst in Asian Affairs, CRS. The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S.

Interests 7-23-09

Japan is not likely to move forward precipitously with nuclear weapons development.30 Japan has abided by the self-imposed threenon-nuclear principles, which ban the possession, production, or import of nuclear arms. With memories of Hiroshima and Nagasakistill vivid, the Japanese public remains largely resistant to arming themselves with nuclear weapons. Many Tokyo strategists mayrecognize that going nuclear could actually undermine their security by further eroding the global nonproliferation regime andreinforcing mistrust in the region. Under the terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan remains protected under the nuclear umbrella.Following the 2006 North Korea nuclear test, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to defendJapan and South Korea against any threat from North Korea. Former Foreign Minister Taro Aso had called for a discussion ondeveloping nuclear weapons, but he and then-Prime Minister Abe later both reiterated that Japan had no intention of doing so. The

May 2009 North Korea nuclear test has similarly failed to change Japans three principles on nuclear armaments.

5. Non Proliferation Rhetoric

Hughes (Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International aide and interpreter to Ichiro

Ozawa) 07 (Llewelyn, Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet) Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet), International Security, Volume31, Number 4, Spring 2007, pp. 67-96 (Article))

Japan has also increased its public rhetoric in support of nonproliferation. Since 1994 it has offered a resolution annually at the UNGeneral Assembly calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. And since 2002 it has published a biannual white paper, in bothJapanese and English outlining Japans policy position on arms control and nonproliferation.29

6. Japan would only use its military peacefully Japan has proven that its anger over World War Twois over

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach,June 18th, 2010[Get Out of Japan, National Interest Online, June 18 th, 2010, available online at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592, accessed June 28, 2010//Thur]

Some Japanese see little danger and correspondingly little need for much defense. Others are not so certain. Its a decision for theJapanese people. North Koreas military abilities remain uncertain and its aggressive intentions remain unpredictable. PrimeMinister Hatoyama cited the current situation in the Korean peninsula as a reason to maintain the base on Okinawa. Moreover,Chinas power is growing. So far Beijing has been assertive rather than aggressive, but increasingly seems willing to contestislands claimed by both nations. The best way to keep the competition peaceful is for Tokyo to be able to protect itself. Of

course, several of Japans neighbors, along with some Americans, remain nervous about any Japanese mislitary activity given theTokyos wartime depredations. However, the Japanese people do not have a double dose of original sin. Everyone who plannedand most everyone who carried out those aggressions are dead. A country, which goes through political convulsions before itwill send unarmed peacekeepers abroad is not likely to engage in a new round of conquest. Anyway, the best way to assuageregional concerns is to construct cooperative agreements and structures between Japan and its neighbors. Democratic countriesfrom South Korea to Australia to India have an interest in working with Tokyo to ensure that the Asia-Pacific remains peacefuland prosperous. Japan has much at stake and could contribute much. Tokyo could still choose to do little. But it shouldnt expectAmerica to fill any defense gap.

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Hegemony DA

1. Sharing power with Japan allows US to keep its presence despite overstretch the seventh fleet and

Pacific Air Force are sufficient deterrence and crisis response.

William E. Rapp, Brigadier General William E. Rapp graduated from the United States Military Academy (USMA) in 1984 and wascommissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers, Ph.D. in international relations Stanford University. Paths Diverging?

The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 1-04

Focusing narrowly on East Asia, for a number of reasons it is in the best interests of the United States to share power with Japan in awell-defined security partnership. First, the United States will find a growing objectivesmeans shortfall in the future pursuit ofnational security interests. The United States may increasingly find that it does not have the resources to maintain a dominanthegemonic position worldwide and will need to find like-minded partners to maintain its interests in various regions and share theburdens of maintaining peace. Second, sharing power with Japan in exchange for long-term basing guarantees maintains the Americanpresence in Northeast Asiaall the more important since the election of President Roh and the resulting uncertainties about Americanforce structure and bases on the Korean peninsula. Already, concrete plans are being made to move American troops further south in

Korea, or even to bring some of them home.164 These bases in Japan (especially ports for the Seventh Fleet and airfields for thePacific Air Force [PACAF] fighter and transport wings) are critical to the continued forward presence of the U.S. in East Asia

2. America needs to pull out to sustain hegemony-overstretch

[Doug Bandow 6/2 10 Needed: A New U.S. Defense Policy for Japan, Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute,http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2010/06/02/needed-a-new-u-s-defense-policy-for-japan/,

If change is to come to the U.S.-Japan security relationship, it will have to come from America . And it should start with professedfiscal conservatives asking why the U.S. taxpayers, on the hook for a $1.6 trillion deficit this year alone, must forever subsidize thenation with the worlds second-largest economy? Cliches about living in a dangerous world and defending freedom are no answer

America is made not only poorer but less secure when it discourages its friends from defending themselves and when it accepts theirgeopolitical conflicts as its own. To coin a phrase, it is time for a change. And not just with Japan. Theres also South Korea. Andespecially the Europeans. Its not clear who they have to be defended from, but whoever their potential adversary or adversaries maybe, the Europeans should defend themselves. The Obama administration is impoverishing Americans to support a growing welfarestate at home. Americans shouldnt have to help pay for the Europeans even bigger welfare state at the same time. The U.S. shouldmaintain a strong defense. Of America. Washington should stop subsidizing the defense of prosperous and populous allies. Whenthe Constitution speaks of the common defense, the Founders meant of Americans, not of the rest of the world. A good place tostart ending foreign military welfare would be Japan.

3. Withdrawal decreases instability-thats our East Asia advantage. By forming an alliance with Japan

we can ensure through cooperation that east asia will be more stable

4. Withdrawal would not cause Japanese Hegemony 1) The U.S. would engage in offshore balancing with

the U.S.-Japan Alliance and 2) No other country can compare to the strength and sheer power that theU.S. has

5. The US will adopt off shore balancing in Japan

[Doug Bandow 10/20 09 Transforming Japan-US Alliance, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10645,]

American influence is facing another challenge in East Asia. The latest loss of U.S. power may occur in Japan. Last month,the Democratic Party of Japan ousted the Liberal Democratic Party, which had held power for most of the last 54 years.

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http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2010/06/02/needed-a-new-u-s-defense-policy-for-japan/http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2010/06/02/needed-a-new-u-s-defense-policy-for-japan/http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2010/06/02/needed-a-new-u-s-defense-policy-for-japan/


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Hegemony DA

Exactly how policy will change is uncertain: The DPJ is a diverse and fractious coalition. But Washington is nervous. U.S.policymakers have grown used to Tokyo playing the role of pliant ally, backing American priorities and hosting American

bases. That era may be over. Although Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama insists that he wants to strengthen the alliance,before taking office he wrote in the New York Times: "As a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, theera of U.S.-led globalism is coming to an end." Of course, there are significant barriers to any dramatic transformation ofJapanese policy. Indeed, during the campaign the DPJ platform dropped its earlier pledge to "do away with the dependentrelationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U.S. wishes, replacing it with amature alliance based on independence and equality." Nevertheless, the DPJ possesses a strong left wing and vigorouslyopposed the ousted government's logistical support for U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Other potentiallycontentious issues include reducing the military presence on Okinawa, renegotiating the relocation of the Marines' FutenmaAirfield to Guam at the Japanese expense, cutting so-called host nation support, and amending the Status of ForcesAgreement. Some Obama administration officials privately acknowledge that adjustments will be necessary. However, theday after the election State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said that there would be no renegotiation of the Okinawaaccord. This might seem like a good negotiating tactic, but it didn't go over well in Tokyo. Washington's dismissiveresponse gives the Japanese one more reason to want to escape dependence on the U.S. Actually, Americans should

support a transformation of the alliance . The current relationship remains trapped in a world that no longer exists . Japanhas the world's second (or third, based on purchasing power parity) largest economy, yet Tokyo remains dependent onAmerica for its security, a minor military player despite having global economic and political interests. There are historicalreasons for Tokyo's stunted international role, but it is time for East Asian countries to work together to dispel theremaining ghosts of Japan's imperialist past rather than to expect America to continue acting as the defender of the lastresort. Since Japan and Asia have changed, so should America's defense strategy. There should be no more troops based onJapanese soil. No more military units tasked for Japan's defense. No more security guarantee for Japan. The U.S. shouldadopt a strategy of offshore balancer, expecting friendly states to defend themselves, while being ready to act if anoverwhelming, hegemonic threat eventually arises. China is the most, but still unlikely, plausible candidate for such a role and even then not for many years. Washington's job is not to tell Japan which devotes about one-fourth the U.S levelto the military to do more. Washington's job is to do less. Tokyo should spend whatever it believes to be necessary onits so-called "Self-Defense Force." Better relations with China and reform in North Korea would lower that number. Japanshould assess the risks and act accordingly.

6. Japan will balance East Asia

[Doug Bandow 6/23 09 Time for Japan to Do More, Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/06/23/time-for-japan-to-do-more/]

It seems that the Japanese government no longer seems entirely comfortable relying on America for its defense. Reports ReutersA draft of Japans new mid-term defense policy guidelines is calling for the reinforcement of military personnel and equipment in theface of growing regional tensions, Kyodo news agency said. The draft, obtained by Kyodo, says Japan needs to reverse its policy oreducing its defense budgets in light of North Koreas missile launches and nuclear tests, as well as Chinas rise to a major militarypower, the news agency said. The document urges the government to raise the number of Ground Self-Defense Forces troops by5,000 to 160,000, Kyodo said. The new National Defense Program Guidelines, covering five years to March 2015, are scheduled tobe adopted by the government by the end of the year. The draft also says there is a need to secure options responsive to changingsituations of international security, indicating Tokyos intention of considering if it should be capable of striking enemy bases, Kyodo

said. This is good news. Historical concerns remain, of course, but World War II ended more than six decades ago. The Japan oftoday is very different than the Imperial Japan of yore the mere fact that Japanese have been so reluctant to become a normalcountry again illustrates the change . Theres still a substantial distance for Japan to go. But the Japanese government is moving in theright direction . Obviously, peace in East Asia benefits all concerned. That peace will be more sure if Tokyo is prepared to defenditself and help meet regional contingencies. It is time for prosperous and populous allies to stop assuming that Washingtons job is todefend them so they can invest in high-tech industries, fund generous welfare states, and otherwise enjoy life at Americas expense.

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2AC: Security K

They reduce the world to language only our ontology accounts for existing material constraints on

action.

Emanuel Adler IR @ Hebrew Univ (Jerusalem) AND Peter HAAS Poli Sci @ UMass 92 Epistemic Communities, World Order,and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program International Organization 46 p. 367-368

Our critique of the approaches mentioned above should not be interpreted as reflecting a preference for poststructuralist,postpositivist, and radical interpretive analyses, although we do hope to build a bridge between structural and interpretiveapproaches. Rejecting the view of international relations as the mere reflections of discourses and habits-wherein the wordis power and the only power is the word-we nevertheless have incorporated into our reflective approach the notion that themanner in which people and institutions interpret and represent phenomena and structures makes a difference for theoutcomes we can expect in international relations.'3 Thus, we adopt an ontology that embraces historical, interpretivefactors, as well as structural forces, explaining change in a dynamic way. This ontology reflects an epistemol- ogy that isbased on a strong element of intersubjectivity. So long as even a tenuous link is maintained between objects and theirrepresentation, we can reject an exclusive focus on words and discourse. By defending a n epistemological and ontologicallink between words and the objects with which they are commonly associated, we believe that learning may occur throughreflection on empirical events rather than through their representation. Finally, epistemic communities should not bemistaken for a new hegemonic actor that is the source of political and moral direction in society.' Epistemic communitiesare not in the business of controlling societies; what they control is international problems. Their approach is instrumental,and their life is limited to the time and space defined by the problem and its solutions. Epistemic communities are neitherphilosophers, nor kings, nor philosopher- kings.

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2. Perm do both: we can reconstitute the world through policy advocacy. Public intellectuals should try

to break down barriers between short term problem-solving theory and long-term critical approaches.

Wesley WIDMAIERPoli Sci @ St. Josephs 4 Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The "Pragmatist Constructivist"Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth GalbraithInternational Studies Review p. 445

In recent decades, the "research design"-style structuring of questions and cases has come at the expense of suchconstitutional concerns. Certainly, scholarly efforts should not be evaluated exclusively in terms of the "correctness" oftheir policy views. Academia would not "work" if subjective political differences became legitimate grounds for dismissingarguments. However, scholars need to acknowledge that their views inevitably possess normative and policy implicationsrather than pretending that such implications do not exist. Consider again that despite their numerous differences, theconstitutive lessons inherent in the analyses of Waltz, Cox, Ashley, and Campbell are quite similar: that state and societalagents must define their interests in competitiveas opposed to collectivefashion. One suspects that this is not the"moral" that Ashley or Campbell sought to advocate. Unfortunately, the absence of a broader focus on such constitutive"lessons," a neglect rooted in the structure of IR debate itself, limited their attention to such issues. In contrast, by morepersistently asking questions about the constitutive effects of theoretical or empirical claims, scholars may enable a morerelevant study of international relations. They might reclaim the public space to act as not simply "academics" in the narrowsense of the termwithin elite epistemic communities or as participant-advisors in the policy processbut rather theymight aid one another in functioning as public intellectuals, focusing larger public debates in a more constructive,

pragmatic manner. What are the potential benefits of such shifts? The resulting academic contribution to public policylearning might enable not simply materialist-rationalist styled Bayesian probability updating (Iverson 1984), but rathercould promote a kind of "social learning." Such learning, as Albert Bandura (1962, viii) has argued "neither casts peopleinto the role of powerless objects controlled by environmental forces nor free agents who can become whatever theychoose," but rather recognizes that "both people and their environments are reciprocal determinants of each other." Suchsocial learning requires an ability to "make sense" of intersubjective contexts through a broader dialogue among the public,scholars, and policy agents. International structures, from this vantage, offer no unambiguous lessons. Contrary toKissinger's (1979:5455) view (noted earlier) that "the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office arethe intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office," possibilities for intersubjective variationrequire a constant monitoring of the prevailing intersubjective "mood." Just as balance of power rules are learned in a socialcontext, they can be unlearned if states come to expect cooperation instead of conflict. Kissinger-like claims regarding theirrelevance of ongoing reflection to policymaking seem misguided, as does the application of "balance of power" lessons inan inappropriate social context that may, in turn, contribute to new policy errors. Put simply, lessons that are applicable inone setting (for example, Europe in 1914) may be counterproductive in another (for example, Europe in 1992). Suchvariation might, perhaps, be more readily recognized by scholars engaged in a more pragmatic, ongoing social learning.Conclusion Theory constitutes social reality. This realization highlights the need for a pragmatist-constructivist approach toIR theory, one that involves an ongoing involvement in both scholarly and public debates. Unfortunately, the developmentof such a perspective in IR scholarship has often been impeded by the distinction between "long-term" critical theory and"short-run" problem-solving theory. The present essay has called this distinction into question by describing the ways inwhich John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith engaged in theoretical debates while also pursuing policy agendas. BothDewey and Galbraith highlighted the importance of socially constructed understandings in the issue areas of education andeconomic policy. More broadly, their work itself provided a better sense of what it means to act as a public intellectual inboth guiding and being immersed in public debates. In addressing the implications for IR scholarship, this essay has,therefore, urged a more explicit stress on both the role of agency in advancing change and a recognition of the constitutiveeffects of theory on social reality. In keeping with the tradition of pragmatist scholarship, let us conclude that distinctionsbetween critical theory and problem-solving theory need to be relaxed considerably to highlight the potential roles of theoryas a factor as well as of theorists themselves as actors in international politics (Edwards 1990).

3. Their alternative cedes the political- Weimar proves

LordWilliam Wallace,Baronof Saltaire, AND PhD Cornell, Former IR Prof London School of Economics, Total Badass, Review of international Studies 1996(22)

The failure ofthe WeimarRepublic to establish its legitimacy owed something to the irresponsibility of intellectuals of theright and left, preferring the private certainties of their ideological schools to critical engagement with the difficultcompromises of democratic politics. The Frankfurt School of Adorno and Marcuse were Salonbolschewisten, 'relentless in

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their hostility towards the capitalist system' while 'they never abandoned the lifestyle of the haute bourgeoisie'?x Thefollowers of Nietzsche on the right and those ofMarx on the left both worked to denigrate the limited achievements and thepolitical compromises of Weimar, encouraging their students to adopt their own radically critical positions and socontribute to undermining the republic. Karl Mannheim, who had attemptedin Ideology and Utopiato build on Weber's

conditional and contingent sociology of knowledge, was among the first professors dismissed when the Nazis came to power.Intellectuals who live within relatively open civil societies have a responsibility to the society within which they live: to actthemselves as constructive critics, and to encourage their students to contribute to the strengthening of civil society ratherthan to undermine it.32 (308-9)

4. No link and link turn our offshore balancing advantage is predicated off of giving Japan the room to

balance the East Asian region by itself meaning that the aff rejects the Western concept of security, and the

relations advantage also leaves more room for Japanese input in the security decisions made between the

two nations.

5. The alternative cant address a root cause or end enemy creation- it only causes war

Andrew Sullivan, PhD Harvard, 1-15-03 " Sheryl Crow, brain-dead peacenik in sequins. http://www.salon.com/opinion/sullivan/2003/01/15/crow/index.html

One is also required to ask: If war is "not the answer," what exactly is the question? I wonder if, in her long interludes ofgeopolitical analysis, Ms. Crow even asks herself that. Perhaps if she did -- let's say the question is about the threat ofweapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists -- we might have an inkling about what her "answer" might actuallybe. Mercifully, Ms. Crow provides us with what she believes is an argument. Are you sitting down? Here it comes: "I thinkwar is based in greed and there are huge karmic retributions that will follow. I think war is never the answer to solving anyproblems. The best way to solve problems is to not have enemies." Let's take this bit by bit. "War is based in greed." Somewars, surely. The pirate wars of the 17th century. Saddam's incursion into Kuwait. Early British forays in the Far East andIndia. But all wars? The United States' intervention in the Second World War? The Wars of Religion in the 17th century?Many wars are fueled by nationalism, or by ideology, or by expansionism. And many wars have seen their protagonists notenriched but impoverished. Take Britain's entry into the war against Nazi Germany. It would have been far more lucrative

for the Brits to have made a deal with Hitler, to preserve their wealth and empire. Instead, they waged war, lost their entireimperial project and ransacked their own domestic wealth. Where would that fit into Ms. Crow's worldview? And thenthere's the concept of a just war -- wars that have to be fought to defeat a greater evil. Wars of self-defense. Wars ofprevention. Wars against tyrants. Ms. Crow's remarks seem to acknowledge no such distinction. Does she believe thatremoving Hitler from power solved nothing? That preventing further genocide in the Balkans solved nothing? That ending50 years of Soviet tyranny meant nothing? Apparently so. There's only one word for this kind of argument: Asinine. Thenwe have this wonderful insight: "The best way to solve problems is to not have enemies." Wow. Like, wow. Like, war. It'sbad. Bad karma. But, ahem, what if you have no choice in the matter? What if an enemy decides, out of hatred orfanaticism or ideology, simply to attack you? I'm not sure where Ms. Crow was on Sept. 11, 2001. But the enemy made itspoint palpably clear. Does wishing that these crazed religious nuts were not our enemies solve any problems? I'm taking hertoo seriously, of course. I should ignore her. But the "antiwar" movement (I put it in quotation marks because any kind ofappeasement this time will only make a bloodier future war inevitable) is happy to use celebrities for its own purposes. Andso their presence in the debate has to be acknowledged, if only to be decried. So let's decry this moronic celebrity

convergence. The weak arguments of the appease-Saddam left just got a little weaker. And the karmic retributions aregonna be harsh, man. Way harsh.

6. Case outweighs prefer solving for the immediate risks of nuclear war from deteriorating US Japan

relations and from lack of balancing in East Asia to the more ambiguous, continuous impacts of security

7. Our body counts are good (calculations) the alternative is a dehumanized world of endless bloodshed

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without responsibility to the dead or the livingChernus, 2003,

(Ira, Prof of Religious Studies at UC boulder, Bring Back the Body Count, April 1,http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0401-12.htm

"We don't do body counts," says America's soldier-in-chief, Tommy Franks. That's a damn shame.During the Vietnam war, the body count was served up every day on the evening news. WhileAmericans ate dinner, they watched a graphic visual scorecard: how many Americans had died thatday, how many South Vietnamese, and how many Communists. At the time, it seemed the height of dehumanizedviolence. Compared to Tommy Franks' new way of war, though, the old way looks very humane indeed. True, the bodycount turned human beings into abstract numbers. But it required soldiers to say to the world, "Lookeveryone. I killed human beings today. This is exactly how many I killed. I am obliged to count eachand every one." It demanded that the killers look at what they had done, think about it (however briefly),and acknowledge their deed. It was a way of taking responsibility. Today's killers avoid thatresponsibility. They perpetuate the fiction so many Americans want to believe-that no real people diein war, that it's just an exciting video game. It's not merely the dead who disappear; it's the act of killing itself.When the victim's family holds up a picture, U.S. soldiers or journalists can simply reply "Who'sthat? We have no record of such a person. In fact, we have no records at all. We kill and move on. Notime to keep records. No inclination. No reason." This is not just a matter of new technology. There was plenty oflong-distance impersonal killing in Vietnam too. But back then, the U.S. military at least went through the motions of going in to see

what they had done. True, the investigations were often cursory and the numbers often fictional. No matter how inaccuratethe numbers were, though, the message to the public every day was that each body should be

counted. At some level, at least, each individual life seemed to matter. So It's much more likely that "we don'tdo body counts" because Vietnam proved how embarrassing they could be. As the U.S. public turned against that war, the bodycount became a symbol of everything that was inhumane and irrational about that war. The Pentagonfears that the same might happen if the Iraq war bogs down. How much simpler to deny the inhumanity andirrationality of war by denying the obvious fact of slaughter. What I fear is a world where thousandscan be killed and no one is responsible, where deaths are erased from history as soon as theyhappen. The body count was more than an act of responsibility. It was a permanent record. It madeeach death a historical fact. You can go back and graph those Vietnam deaths from day to day, month to month, year to year.That turns the victims into nameless, faceless abstractions. But it least it confirms for ever and everthat they lived and died, because someone took the time to kill and count them. In Iraq, it is as if thekilling never happened. When a human being's death is erased from history, so is their life. Life and deathtogether vanish without a trace. The body count has one other virtue. It is enemy soldiers, notcivilians, who are officially counted. Antiwar activists rightly warn about civilian slaughter and watch the toll rise atwww.iraqbodycount.org. It is easy to forget that the vast majority of Iraqi dead and wounded will besoldiers. Most of them were pressed into service, either by brute force or economic necessity. As

the whole world has been telling us for months, there is no good reason for this war, no good reasonfor those hapless Iraqi foot-soldiers to die. They are victims of brutality-inflicted by their owngovernment and by ours-just as much as the civilians. They deserve just as much to be counted Solet us bring back the body count. If we must kill, let us kill as one human being to another, recognizingthe full humanity of our victims. Without a body count, our nation becomes more of a robotic killingmachine. As we dehumanize Iraqis, we slip even further into our own dehumanization. Let us bringback the body count. if only to recover our own sense of responsibility to the world's people, tohistory, to our own humanity.

8. Perm do the plan and reject all other instances

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9. Exclusive focus on representation is epistemically and ontologically foolisheven a tenuous connection

between language and the outside world is

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