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Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses

6-1-1967

De Gaulle and Franco-German relations, 1945-1965Mary Ann ShumwayPortland State University

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Recommended CitationShumway, Mary Ann, "De Gaulle and Franco-German relations, 1945-1965" (1967). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 462.

10.15760/etd.462

for, the MAT ,in HISTORY

Title DE GAU:L,.LtEAND F'Rl''1-NCO~GE;FUv1ANf1ELA~10l' S 19!t5.1962

Abstl'Qot appt>oVlSd

The'd1Sluemberment and reparations policy FrMnQfJ follow-

ed at the end ot World War II as 5n oocupying power in Germany

WtilS til t:radl tional Qpproach or the vietor to the vanquished.

The Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland were the borderlands

long in dispute. One new element was the idea that while

demanding these territories, an attempt at natfon~l r8pp.

roohement could be carried on through educatlon~l measures.

For mmyGermans the University at bhllnz did not balance.

the dl$n1Qntled factories.

This postwar period w~s characterized by European

economic 111s. The 1947 l~arshall Plan, an AmericQn ap­

proach to restore Europe to economic health through 00­

operative erfort, was inaugurated. It, st1mulQteo. the guro ...

pe8n integration movement which flourished during the 1950's.

The 1948 Council of Europe had not lived up to ex.p~ctstions,

in the eyes of }I~uropefin federalists; but the next try, the

European 001111 and Steel OOlnrnuni ty. (1952) proved a lusty

child o,f the funotionQlist movement. \1hen theF:uropem

Defen.se Cornrnunit'y died, (19,$4) it embittered FrQ,nco-OermQrl

relations for .Q while. The EUI'ope&ilu Atomio Energy Community

,9,nd the :&;uropean Economio Corrununlty completed the EuropeQn

Community in 1958. Through the o.t'ganizatlons foreconom.l0

integra tion, Franoe snd GermatlY have, in spl te of disputes

and crises, been able to compromise 11{,l.8JlY divergent drives

in the interest of restoring Europe to full economic cQpac~

ity. The North At.l~ntleTre,\ty Organization, (1949) which

o~lg1nated lisa jo.1ntmi'litary defense and symbolized

\~'estern unity in the fQceot Soviet aggression, became a

a.,edbed of discox'd between France met Ge.r:rflany.

'When Genersrl de Gaulle beCQme president in 1958, he

p-ur·scued. "n active poliey of rapproachement wi'th Adenauer t 8

Fed~rail GertnQU Republleseek1ng to establish a Paris-Bonn. '/H~sP: '

axis on which to base French Ie aderahipln the European

Community. As leader o~ ~ West EuropeQn bloc independent

of the United St'ltes, Fr~nce would hold that place in the

first rank of na tiona thQ t de Gaulle be:liev~d she must have,

Oh«;.neellor AdenQueV cooperated with the French president

bea·~.use he believed a tightly knit Europe~n group would bene­

fit GermSin lnter~st$. The high point in Franco-Germm rap­

prochement occurred in 1962 during the $ummer exchange of

atQte visits, but by the time the 'l'reaty WQS signed and

ratified, (1963) the tone of' Franco-GermQn relations had

chtlilnged.

Disagreements on mil! tary polioies in NA'lIO,on pol!t­

ic~l developments in the !.iuropeG-rl Community, and on agri­

cul turQl poli..¢1es in E&1C .. :ill res.ohed serious proportions

&t the time that Chancellor Ernll.rd took offioe in 1963.

i],'he Erhard governrnent' a shift 01" emphasis f:rom at Europe

focused on Pranee to the Atlantio allianoe focused on the

United states led Presldent de Gaulle to consider Ii new

pOlicy to replaoe FrQnco-German rapprochement whioh had

been his primary strategy until 1963. Frs.nco-Russian re­

latioDS became notioeably 'Warmer atter the extension of

long term credits by France 'to the Sovifl./t U:nio:n. Germany

protested this new turn 1n French policy. A closer French­

Russian r~18tionahlp tn".,. add. to the discord which cooled

th~ Franoo-Germ9n aocord of 1962.

AJ?PHOVED:

•• • • • • •• • • '"

Protessor otliataI'll' in.' Charge of M•. jor

Dlite theei~ 18 preeented •• J.ug\1,t.ll,.19'6 •••

Typed by Dorothy Barron

by

MARY .ANN SlfOMWAI

sUbmitted to

PORTLAND STATE COLLEGE

in Pfltrtlal tulf111tne.nt ofthe requirements tOl' the

degree of

MAg!,llER OF ARTS IN TEACHIN G

June 1961

Introduo'ion ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••

...•• ,. 0.1

2

The Dl.emb.rmen' Policy ." •••0........ .... 3The Mal'.hall Plan and the Europoan Movement. ,

aor,£. elUI ion .

rhe l~ ot'th A'Ulan110 1'1'e.tYOrganlza t1on ••••Fl'lJnoo-o.rman Rapprochement ••••••••• , •• ~O.The European Economio Community •••• , ••••••

20

202$30

40

41tt§50

53

••••

• ••• 0 .'

1956~1963

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

;:'The North Atlantlc"l' Tr•• ty Organization ••••1he European mconom.l0 Oommunity ••••••• '6 •••

Nationa11sm ••••••••••••••••••••• ., •••••••••

Bibliography

The De Gaulle-AdenauerY.arat

v.

IV.

III.

DE GAULLE Ac~D FRANCO-GERMAN RFLA,TlOOS,1945-1965

I. DI TRODUCTION

France and Germany are major pillars ot western

European strength, Their rels,tionshlp to each other is

significant in determining the course ot European history.

France entrusted theguldance of that reletionship to

Charles de Gaulle when he beoame president of the Fifth

French Republic 111 1958. The seven years of hi$ term 10

otrice saw major shifts. In' Franco~G.rman rela tiona,. The

pu.rpose of this paper 1s to eXaM.lne the developmen ts that

took plaoe during thia time in order to understand ho-wand'

why this relationship progressed as it did.

However, nQ pErrlod in history 1s a self-corl talned un! to'.

The events or the post World Wer II era, wereext:remely influ­

ential in 88 u8b11~h1ng de Gaull.' s world. He had to deal

with ~rend$ begun before he came toott1ee. The o:rganiza­

tions which promoted close contact with Germeny werae shaped

under the Fourth Republic. The foreign policies which set

the tone of' Franco-Gattman relations were formulated by hi.

predecessors. The new president had to accept, adapt, or

reject policies al~ead1 in operation as well as originate

his own.

At the end of World War II Fran.ce WiltS in a difficult

position. The military defeat of 1940 had shown that she

was unable to defendj herself against German armies. TheJ,

foreign ocoupat1on,.~ndu;reduntil all110st the end of the war,

had exhausted 'the Frenoh economy. The relatively minor role

France played in the allledV'1ctory did notrtlnstateher 9,8

a gz-eat power. 1 WheniCharles de Gaulleoame to powerbriet'­

11 at the end ot World War II, he set forth three goals tor

French tore;ign pollcy. military security, eoonomic recover,.,

and great power status, WhrOU~lout most of the Fourth

Republic, the tiret two goals were the main objectives of the

French goverrunen t.

To atta.in military security, the tbreat of Germany had

to be destroy-edt In August 194$, Generel de Gaulle told

President Truman ot the P:r:·ench dem.ands tor ail dismembered Bnd

dcmi11tari.ed Ge:rD18n1~ The a.ax-wQs to beoom~ French prop­

erty; the Ruhr was to be detached from Germany end put under

international control, to be used to benefit Ge:rma.nl'8

neighbors, The Rhineland was to be pr$vertted trom ever be­

coming an invasion route to Prance; Germany wou.ld be,de­

mi11tar1~ed. In order to prevent the rise of another milt-,

tant tlermanY', NQzl Ideaswere to be ellm1nti.ted through the

stressing ot dem,oor$tic prinoiples in German schdols.

lstQtlley Hottman, In Searoh of France (Ne~ York: Harpel'and Row PUblishers, 196)T, 31~. --

3

'rhe German goyernmen t would be I t eorgaulzed in a demo­

cratic form. 1

The political s1tuatiml ohanged rapidly after

de Gaulle maa.e claar the Freneh post tlon regarding Germany.­

The lJold war oS.used the tIn! ted States and, Sri tal.n to look

on West Germany &s a potential ally against the Soviet Uniono

They c.omb111ed their occupation zonas and began to plan what

became the central gov$l"nmental institutions of a future

Germany. Throughout 1945 and 1946. Franc, consistently re­

Jeoted the trend toward centralization fQr- Germany. She

fesl"ed that accepting cen.tralized institutions would also

me:an acoepting the existing boundaries or Germany end thus

force her to rellnquishcla.lms to the Saar and the Runr. 2

Oentralization of German Instlt'utlons would also mean 1nter-

terence in ho\lo1 j"ll'ance ran her zone of occupied Germany.

Since F!lrance intended to Qchleve part of her economio scour-

.tty through exploitation of he:r oocupation zone, ahe fought

centralizing measures. In the search tor }f~enoh economic

security, exploitation of the occupation zone was an ex­

pediency.Long l-ange pla.ns were aimed at bolstering the

Fl-eheh economy through possession of the Saar-'s coal and

80cess to the Ruhr and Rhineland industries.3

Unexpectedly, a basis for a Franoo-German

IF. Roy Willis, ~ren~ei ,Ge..~~l' and. the New E~rope(Stendord: Stanford universfty· Press,1.96'5T; 1'";";

3Ibid., 32.-

4rapprochement was laid in the FI~ench oocupation zone at the

sarne time that ]!~f.j.nce was pursuing a policy ofexploi tatlon

end r(:?p8~ationa. '.rh1s was the educs: tlon9,l pl)ogram insti.·

tuted by France, ranging f:rOrll reforms in the German primary

,schools to the foundation of the new University of ~hl1nt.

'Youth programs of religious andpoli tica,l orge.nlzations

were encou.r'aged and many co:ntBots between French and German

'youth were sponsored by the governruent to re~vive 41 German

a d.'i'f!11"U t10n for French civil1zatlon. l

The third. goal of ,French foreign pollcy set by

de Gaulle in 194L~ lay dormm t during most of the .l1'ourth

Republic, being revived only during its l$ter years. General

de GAulle had set the keynote of the search f()r 8. return 'to

great power status tor France when he said France m.ust

llresume a plaoe in the :elrat rank'-· and »m,a1ntain it. n He

had hoped. to achieve this first rank through acc}ord wi th

the Soolet Union, but the opposition of the Soviet Union to

French representation in the German ocoupation ended Fl'enoh

hopes ora Flraneo-Russ1an a111s.n08. Even the x·ole of a third

par.. ty m.ed,.iator between East md West WfiUJ prealuded by the

Russia!) att1tude.Fll aIlCe had refused to Jolnher zone with

those of Britain and the United S~tQtes, had accepted

Germany's 'b1astern front leI's , had. included. the Soviet Union

on .French pl6al1s fov -th$ internQ,tionalization of th., auhr,

but all this feiled to earn Russian gratitude and cooper­

ation Q s the .French had hope.d. E1' i ta1:n an.d the Un 1ted

States ind:tcated t.helr t4111ingness to coopere_te with French

d~siW1S, but the Soviet Union refused, though the French

Connnun,iat }')arty supportJ'd France t a program. 1 When F:renoh

bids for great power stfJ.tus tniled, end F~ench hopes tor

econolnic and 10111 tary secur1tl through explol tation of

Ge"onny faded, $ new polley had to be developed,

American action provided directio:n for & newF'rGrloh

approaoh to r@lat1ons with Germany. On April 12, 19J+7,

'Walter Lippmann pUblished 61n article, "Cassandra Speak.1ng, t.

in whioh he w61rl1ed that q'rhe truth 11 tbstpoll tics.! and

econo:mie meS.8ures for Axtie:rlean aid to 'Europe on e. scale

l4hich no reeponslbles'tatesman has yet v~ntured to .hint at

will be needed. in thE):n6Xt yeel' or $0. »2 As if lntulfille

men t of thl s prophecy, General George Marsh&ll, in June 19L.j..7I

proposed Q plan ,tor American aid to reconst~u(~tEuropet

Mo,rshall Plan Rid waato· Iflake J'ranee no longer depe.nden t on

theeJiPloi ta t1on()t' GeJ'!1lsny.:3

Another faotor whlchQa.used Franoe to change her

policy tow~.rd OeJmlar~y was._ g:c'owing apprehension of the

Sov'!et Union.

lWillis, ~.2.

2Herbel't Luethy, France At)81nst Herself (.New York:ftleridian Books Ino. I 19;$), 3~J. ,.. .. ~

3\"~:tl1i s I 29.

6

Some developments which indioated that prospective da.nger

lay with RUBSi. rather thQn Germany l'J~re the COftlMUnls't coup

in Czeohlosovak111, the Berlin blookad~, and th~ Ruseifm re­

fusal of ~la:r8hQ1IP1.n aid. These events persuaded France

to accept the London Agreements of July 1948. 'These .gree-

mente denied :mast or F1"anee'e original claims in Germany.

InsteQ-d of Q permanen tly 1nternational1zt')drtuhr, the te~~p­

orary International Authority tor the Ruhr (:rAR) was

established; 1n plaoe ot • sep.rate oocupation zone, a de­

layed ~lB1on with the combined British and American zones

was arriltlged; and in lieu or a deoen tr-.11zed German govern­

ment, Q tight tederatlonwas provided. Although the Frenob

poed.. t10n on the 8a,,1" wa 8 recogI1 tzed, no provision for the

Rhineland WQS made.

The major p.ttoblem t.eing the Fow..th R~public was

economio l'eeovery. The }1arahall Plan provided Frsnce wi th

• n~w m~thod to Qohieve this. Not only was money made

available to reoon8truotEurope's economy-,-but the Plam de­

mQnded that the EuX'opean oountries part101p#ting must prac­

tice clQee eoonomic oooperation. In a speeoh .t H8Pv.rd on

JunfJ5, 1947, General Marshalllns1sted that economic re­

covery 1s ftth~ ·bu~iness or the Europe.ns. The in! ti.tive

• • • must come fromP1urope. • • • The progr~m should be a

joint one agreed to by .. number, it not all E:urop49n nations. n

1.~., 23 ..

2Eugene Wll Castle, The Ore.•t Giveawall (Chioago: HenryRegn~ryComp.n11 1957), ~ -- - --

7

The Europe~ns we:re to work out production levels to be

achieved for the next four years and decide how much would

be needed to :make up the difference between what could be

earned by the E;uropetAn exportse:nd whG t had to be expended.

for European economic recovery. The preamble of th.e cong­

re~$lonal act which made General Marshall's proposal law

stated specifically' that th. pu:rpose ot the aotwas to en­

courage European 1rltegratlon.1 This Arr!ex:~can stimulus to

Europes.nun1 ty boosted the spirits ot the ftEuropean.s't who

worked tild hoped for a United states or Europe. By this

raeQns th~ rOQus of ,FrffJnoh foreign policy beo~me F...uropean

unlfica tion.•

At first. the French had 8 very broad conoept of th.

Europe Wl11ch unification would enoompass. The roreign

ministers or Great Britain and France, Bevin andBldault

respectively, invited f1t·st Soviet foreign minister Molotov,

and then, every other Eu.ropeall foreign minis ter to confer

with tbemon the be,stway to gr,asp the initiative which

General l'fla:rshall offered.. 2 The refusal ot the Soviet Union

ond of the other East Buropenn countI-ies to Q,ocept 'Maarahall

l?lari aid 11m! ted partners Q.va11abl~\,.for the European move­

ment to the natiollS ofWest-.,m Europe~ The next os.llto

E"urapean unity w•. S an invitation 1~sued by enthusisstic

}t'~urope~n faueralis ts to the beneficiaries of the Marshall

loAn thony N'Ut t ing:,Euro;eeW111 !.2! ~!.~ (New York:It'7tederi ok Is II ~Pl'Qeger, 1960)" Ie;-;-

2Ibid.

8

Plan to torm the Oouncil of: Il;u:r-ope •

.fiiuropean feder'll:tstshopedthereby to st.rt a poll tical

1ntegrs,tlon of Europe, i'he Council was to be the t'uturt par­

liament of .. United Sta tee of lturope, but Dri taln vetoed

any propo$Ql that would m.ke the Council 3lnythlng strongoX'

than a oonsultative body,l In doing eo, ahe further naprow""

the Frerleh choice ot pa:rtners tor .. trulY' integrated Europe.

The only other country of eompa~.ble size &nd resouroes with

which Franoe could align hex-selt ",.sWest Germany.

. Betore. Franoe and Germany oould tom the h.ub o.f ..

unified We$te1'7l Europe, old Ftllench, derna-nas had to be aband­

oned.- However" :ma.ny Froncr:unen, even as lat. as Novemberl9$O,

were not reconoiled to ~e thought ot rel1.nquish1ng claim~

on the Saax-or furthe~ ~eparat1.ons. -rx-ance showed her re~

lu~tQnoe by at first opposing the PetexaebeZ'8 Protocol whioh

admltt.d Gerro..ny to the Council ot Europe, diminished the

dismantling of German faotories, gave the Germans a voice

in the IAR, and gr·an.ted Germany ~l.rshall Plan &1. id. Sinoe

most of the dismantling had b.en ·in the French zone for ex­

port to France, it 18 not su~prising that French industrial­

ists objected. 2 At the same time approximately that French

businessmen and Indu:strla11sta were raqulred to accept the

PetepsbergProtoool, they were presented wi th 8. whole- ne w

outlook on France' srelatlonehip to German'y by Frenoh

1.Ibid., 26.

9

funetlon6itlists. Ftlnctionaliats ai:med at Slttaining Eur'opEHUl

unity by Q step by step p~oe~ss in which limited functions

are performed through'soupr4lnatiQnal powers. Their new look

for French industry WIlS bas$d on a realist1c 9ppralsfil of

Europe's need to destroy old barriers and a d~t6rm1n.tion

to oper~ FrancefsprQteeted economy to freer trading. 1

The immediate economic taotorfJ that induced -lean ,lvlonnet and

.his cOllea,gues t·o draw up the Schuman Flm "W,ere the situ­

ation of overproduotion':1n< coal and steel which &'Urope faced

just before the Ko.pean \'\I61,;r and the neceaa1 ty of better pro­

tection ft'om the flu01;Ua.t$,,?:ns ot the· bus;lnes8 cycle, for

both oonsume;r and produQer~ ~rne Sohuman Pliln .founded the

Europf!Jall COfill and Ste~laom.l11unity (:IDOSO) to>help solve

E:Ul'opean eoonomic I11s 6S well as provide thefoundatlon .ror

eventuail po;J..i ticalunlon. The .greates t eeonom1cQaset to

France or Eose -wee &lceessto RUMooal, eVen though the.f'" •

ine£rl(~1ent mines in oth'er par;8 of France we~eput out

of business +3·

For ulany the morelnrp<>~tant issue .t stQke in the

Schum~n Pltlin was political 19& ther than eeol1011l1e. The exe­

QutivebrQtich of ECSO,cIJlled the High Authority, would be

the key to a cheok.on.I'~vtt~,llzed Germah 1:ndustry~ Qveto'

to future German arrrua.menta irJ.duB try; wd thus to Gern1&n

~.bili ty to make war. The price of this check would be the....', .*1:

3Ibld., 104.--

sacrifice or a certain amount of Frenoh sovereignty. on

this issue the Europeiln integrationists took the st&nd thatInationalism was passe tortoday's world. Whe1r opponents

maintained that nationalism was a. legitimate viewpoint and

that thelsaw no reasont.o ~egQl?,d a European nationalism

1.8 supel'1o~ to FrenohO"ational1sm.1 'While some Frenohmen

SQwECSC as .. sacrifice of French sovereignty, Germana SGW

it in jtl..stthf!' opposite light for themselves: an end to

o'p(e~~.tlon~ True, Ger:man>opponente to West Ellropean$uprs­

patti>n$.-J..ln t-srat1oncolliplairJ,ed ot- 11m!ted aovepe1gn~1;

distrusted-Frenoh oompetlt:1.on in industry; ·sus;pecte~·a.' ,

F~enoh p:l.an todom1nat@Lp.o11tlcally, .and tear-edtheeff'eet

on>ttiture German un1r~oat16n. In sp1te or these oomplaIn't. ,

the overwhelming German des!:pe to end ocoupation status

lett no real question ot'German acceptance ot the SohumQn

Pl~tl,2 In 1952...rt'ert"Wo years of .plannlngand. violent

deba.te, the Sri t1sh rejected EJCSC, but b"trance ,; Italy"West

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands_ and' Luxembourg aec~pted

it.

The functlona1.1,ects who designeagCSO buil'tinto it

f~..~ures that oould Peused to develop Q very closely

tederated EUt'ope. The foundation tor a new European trend'

wa$ seeuxlely ~a,1d. The organization or Eose branches set a

". , .laay"mo.nd Ar~n,Franc!,'.Steadtastand", ChQn~lnSi (CQmbrldge,

}t1QasQchueettst HarvardOnlvers!l;y iSress, 196 ), 1.59.

2Willis, 112.

11

pSittern readily adaptable to ne\4 Qdditlons to the li:uropean

COIrulluni ty." Tbe European Cormnuni ty lUi a whole 1s comprised

of: themuropem Coal Qnd Steel Community (EOSC), the

European Atomic Energy Community (EuratoJJl), and the

bluropean Economio Comtl'1unlty (EEC, usually clalled the Cotnrt1on

r1arket). E$ch of the three component$ o.t the European

Oommunity (ECSe, :mEO, end .Euratom) has 1~s own i,ndividual

exeeu.tlv,e.1~hfJ EOSe exeoutive b:rQrloh 1s called the High

Authol'tlty; the EEO and Euratom deslgn&\te theirs as Com­

missions., This Branch 1s to guard .ESSe intere s ts by ini t­

lating and advocQ~ll1g legislation to put t~eaty' provisIons

into effect, by l'Qisl:ngrevenue to cilrryoutits Qotionsl

bYP911cing ECse torreapect to the treaty and High Authority

rulings, by aiding 8.greements between' m~mbers, anab,- stimtl­

la ting turthev aotion lnbuildlng the European Oorrmrunl t;r.l

There is Jl.lso an EOSC' Oouncilor :Hln18ters which acts as I,

decIsion'lflaking body. This Council consists' or national

.repre sen;atlv8$ who havepoweZ'$ whl~h, in some cases, are

:1mmediQtely binding on all membe:rs. ' ,On several l$sufts

there is no :natlonral veto, the deoision being taken by

Ima.jority vote. This bodydeeides on spec.ific proposals

made by-the exeout1vebrBnch. Me and J£uratom also halve

sepa.ra te eouno lis of m1n istera,bllt the same men usually___ i. _

12

.sit. on all th~ee oounc11s. 1

i11e oth.x- branches of the l~uropean Community are'

shared in' common by ECSC,EEC~ and ~uratom, The Court ot

JU$tioe &$ juc;r101ary, &xerciaing the power or Q supreme

eouJ:'t. :tts seven JUdges glv& f~Ql decisions on indiViduals

andgov!J:t.'~ent$. The Cour-t deoides if the acta of the ,three

oomponen ts of the Oomm.un1ty accord with tb.aome Trea't1

~h~o~ es;abllshed thern.T!1e' European Parllment c6ul.(i'be- .' - - .

con.~·"'d.,r8d the leg1$1.t1'\1:.,~::br.nchof the EuropeQn eptrIt~unlty.~ '. - ,'., -- ~, . ", . ' ..-, . '. ~

~hf8':.$s.mbll QOlls1s~~fot'142 delegates nom1n·.',tedbY' ..... :., .

,national p~r:t.iament$.; These delegates a~t' nqt .seated in

na;t;tbnal g:rQup,. but in .t3.p~8tlIi tlon$l po11't10'8.1 groups: Con-,-

aerv.• tlve tr'om -. Italy" Prince ,Germany and othe:r member na.

tIO);f$ 8~ t together •• one,gvoup. The Pa:rllam~nt catltoroe

r.sl'gnation or theexeeut1.,vets (EOSO High Authority.EEO and

Eu-r'''tom Commissions )1)~.tw()-th1rds vc;>te ot.no oonfidenoe.~"',,, -, :;":... ,:,' -;'" ",;. :.'

1t1:$ con$ul t •. t1,.e oo",ce"t-.ln m. tters and publj.sh,esf-ts viewa

on executl'V8 .Ot1on8~ '$'bX'OUgh the assemblyts ritt~t)l"l stand­

ing ,ooram! t'Peea, it wo~ks~owar'd the fusion of markets and

e.x.~:oilne s budga t $~2

Accredited amlHUIt!adors to the EuropeanCo11'mnmit'Y' from

the ns.tlonal gove;l"nment$otrnembersta,tes make up Q Comm.

1ttee of Permanent aepX'es~':ntatlvea.. ~i8 group processes

de'tailed doouments, determines nation.tl positions and aots

2I,b1d., 21.

13

as 11ason betweentheo thr'e~ Oo:m.."'nunity ~xecutlv~:a land the

member nations' govevnmertts. f>h~present~_t1ves of V'4Ilrious

Isbor, 1.ndtlstry JI busin~ss, -$ndprot'ess!o.nal groups m411ke 'Up

the Eoonomlc' $ndSoci&l OOfl'uuittee. This Comtnittee, whioh

~cts as Q p:ressure group,ls Q o~on$ultQtivebodYQttQdhed

to the Council of 141nis ters. 1

Tbus through them~H;~hiner'1 of the Community FrlffiCe

ch~l'lged ,from all economio polioy or exploitQtl~n, wltnGermany

in the role of v1ot1mto Ob.e of oooperat1on, withGttI~nany as

lit partner. The.'littempt' to e,xtend the Corrununi ty to cov~r a

':m.l1ttary policy tOWQ~GeltrrUjlnS" p~oved lesa suocessful. The

'Bluropoan. Deten$~ ,pommun1ty (EOe) was a. ,Frenchetto:et.eto

less~n the impQct ora rearmed Germany,2 This effort grew

out ot the events, beginnIng in. 1946, which l:ntenalf'led the

Cold l'Jar and createdllin atmosphere- oC :fe~r 11'1 France, and

elsewhere • .3 The e5trlte$t~!$:.ot'cm to this te&P of Soviet

sggresslon: 1nWestern Eul'ope wQsthe signing of the Atlen tic

Ps,otin Ap~ll 1949, cre~ting the North Atlantlc Treaty

OrgQ:cizQtlon ('NATO). Itl hance's view, ot course, Germ~ny

'w8sexcludet1 from NA'l'O. In s, session of the Frenoh r~"tlon-

9.1 Assembly in 1949, ~'oreign t-'llnlster Schuman stated that

Germ.ny should never be able to rea~ "except by Q graYe

(Js

lIbld., 121.-2E. Drexe1 Godfre'9~ , Jr" ~jhe Gov~rnn1ellt otFr~e.nce

(2d ed; Nell1York;. TholUQS '1. CrowerIOomplilniJ-r9b~l,r97,•

.3Luethy, 355.

14

er~oron the p~rt 01" Prance. tt1

Considering France's position on Germfiuresrmarnent, the

out1?:reQk of the'KoreanWar preoipitated a sftuQtion which

placed&. tremendous str.alt.l. on }J"'rQ.,rlco-Germ&lo relsitlons·.

FjaElt""W~st ,tensions reduc~d FrQuee'" a role 1nthe ,Atl"nttc

Ql.~i.noebeOQuse hercommitl)'!ell,ts outside Europe mem't she

co'U~d no,tnu~keQ larg~,mir1.tary eOlltrlbu:tlon to NAtrO (I

Germany;, on the other hand,ach1eved a more 'active p8.rt in. .

interna,t40nal arrairsbecQUS80fher ml11taz.y potentlQl.2

--.wrthAlllerloan troop$oontrl11..tted to the Korean War, Qdd­

ltlonal United State's force$ for Europe were unlikely.

Consequently Europe's military weakness WIi$ evident at a

t1tl1.~when European tena1onswere' also rlsing.3 Th$ Oouncil

ot:mu,t'ope propo8edaEu~ope$ln army finan-oed by EuropeQn

funds glthere-d from Eurdpt',~n taxes, but mAking notnen t10n

or: Oer,'m,n pa:rtioipation. 1'he United. Sta.tes deeld~d thQt

Ge~~"n p~~~;Plo'1patlon was neoessary.4. ,- , :

When troth tb$ 'Unit.,Hf 'StQ tea and the Councl1qf·Europe

cQl',1.11'1gfor EurQpeantroc):p~, Ren' Plevefl, . the· FX-tU1Ch 'premier,

produced Q" pl4in for aEu~opeQn Defense Community. '£ho:1' .

jPleY~ll 'Pl~n hoped to ,aontt:a.ioQ raearmed Qerm~y.':"bY' ititegrQ t ..

lng' <}ont1nental'europ~$!l,;·,rmed.forces into 6heml1ftiiry

lAltred Grosse:r,"'Prance and. Germany 'in the AtlanticCommuni ty, ff Inte:rna t1on~lOl)t?iQn1$atlQn,XVII.·.(SUltUner, 1963,554~" ... .. .. -

2~,'t?ld., 555. 3W1111$, 145,. 4Ibid., 131.

1,estt.ilblishment which would operate under" 8uprQnatlonal

politlctil author!ty oontrolled by-the governments 61:, the

pQrtieipants" ttl ,Premier Pleven ~,nd supporters o:r the 'plan

stressed these polntst (1) (lermany WQsnot a m~mberot the

Atllult1c Pact but did benefit 1'Z.Onl the Fa.ct's protection;

thtIJU?e.r()~e she should share in the defense ot W~atem

Europe trom possible attack; (2) tba pl$n would turther

Eu:ropeilr1 integration; (.3) Frsnoo-GermGn reooncl11Ailtlon

wPuld be promoted; and (4) GermarlY would bekept.tromh.v­

ing £\ na~tionalQrmyr.2

Deba tea over 1ltpGW~X'.··long Imd ha.rd~ Freriobopp()n­

epte prO,ies tedtha t th~,' s'upran'tti onal aspects of .the, plan

'~-:',':': ",'>- ,";::" ,"

For $ome:~ Gerrrilhl l'earmament in any fO~W'tS- un.> ' :: •• ,)""",, " "';

.oeep1a~ble;· others it~,~;edthat suoh an arnl'ymightpr()voke

Russian inte~vent1on. Pr,~chcr1tics ,also p("lnted:Ql.t-~ thQ t. . • • '. '.

th~,'¢rlgin&l plan had b.enmQc;ilfled to allow ' n.atio;nal units,

S11d,·~:thatthe »,r~nch Q~mt,.''Which'had calYlm1tm~ntsln, At:V:i.oQ, I ' . ; ..,~._ ,",', : _, ': ;':' ',' -'>.' ;' '.:'. , , .)

Qnd~~1ai would ,beWe~k"t1;~d.,by; the sUP~i.natiOn611:q~R11ty,::"'. : '.<. :, ..':-',' .. ,.:-.

or~})c..3 ·Placing the. Gertn4\ns, under a supranat1onai'lilu-

thorlty meant tha~, t~$ ,Gerrtume would be su.b3ecttot~~t au­

th6ri tYQnd not at tbe dfspoeal· ~f the qerxruln goverllmen t.; "..!,"." ~.;-) : 'r

Bt the same token French,:broops committed toF~DC would not

be \~nder the direction· ottheFrench govertunent.

'-

16

The bitterness engend~red by the prolonged Qr.td heARted

debates over rono haa been compared to th,,-t of the Dr~yrue

Af'fair. ,Eve:ry F~rench political group spelled out; its stliind

01'1 this issue, thus hBrdenlng attitudes towlitrd it. The re­

vived nationalism thi',t appeQred in both Frtinae and GermGlny

'WQS a set-baok to Franco--German :r~COllo111atlon.l Gernumy

WQS particularly Inoensedbect.use the' Contractural Agree­

ments. which were to restore German sovere1gnty,were tied

to the a.cceptanoe of EOO. When the It''lrenoh,llri tlsh md

Amerioan foreign ministers met in Washington in Septe'rrtber

1951_ they decided German p'trtioip~tlon in EDO 'Would mean

the$nd of ocou.patlol1status.1'heretore, the ag:reenl&nts

providing tor an :Independent Federal Republic ofOe:rmany

were negotiated simultaneously with the m11itQl-Y arrange­

ments, The Cotltractu8.1Agreements could onlybecorneef.fec­

tive when (Jermany partioipated 1n Ene•. GeI'mQny naturally

saw tal denial of Qerx.nan 8ove1"elgnty 1n. the French reject:lon

of EDO.2 &ermQrl sovereignty md rearmament had to 'Wait

until the Western Europe~ln Union WtitS forMed Qnd attached to

NATO sho~tly after the 1954 death of EVa. 3 At thRt time

West GermQny renouno~d atomic, bQcte~iolog16al and ohemlcsl

wetipons, pl"oed all her troops under NATO, and entrusted

-(. IThe?s we~e lilleo hellhd arguments in Gerllumy.tbid" 1.77).

2Ibid,. 137. .'.3Edg&r Stephenson. Furn.iss,Jr., _It'ranee Troubled A111

(New York: Harper ~nd Brotb~rs.. 196oj, 273.

17

West Berlin exolusively to ,American; British Qnd Frenoh

protectlonClf 1

The effect of East-West tensions on the FI'filnco-German

rapproehement WQS aooentuQted 1nsid,e N'ATO. Because Berlin

18 $0 totally dependent on Ame:r1oarl £o%'oe$ vis-~ ..V'is the

Soviet Un1on,Germany.found het-self siding with the united" :;

stl.te~ on issues d.ividing the Un'! t,ed Stat~8 and France.

Frs-nee's d1esatistactlon l\rlth NATO stemmed pr1marl1Y.from

'herpos1t1on as a nation hQ,vingoolonial oommittuents Qnd

fpolliber stand on nuolear'a:rms~ French unhappinessW'Qs,

a1'80' linked to a renewed French interest 1nnationQl pres­

tige" whioh began aboub1.9".

!rhePrenob Qrguedtha:t the Atl.a:nt1c Pact ~equ.l:r~d co..

operation'Unong its memOevs throughout the world, even in

Asia •.nd Atric.ul* Ola1mingto act as .. de1l'1ocra tie nation" .

fighting communism ID"Vletnam and Alge:r1Q~ :FrQnoe expeeted

NATO to aid 1n cAr'r11ngout that task. 2 In8te.~. or aid,

her N'A'PO allies, inoluding Germany, crt t1c18ed Franoefo:r

belngunwil1ingto terminate colonialism. France reacted 01

aoouslng NATO of not doing ita job andot humiliating Fr~ce

with such criticism. The F'ourtbReptibllc f s reluctance to

relinquish Frenoh colonlesoan be attributed to motlv~s ot

na tional prestige rQthe,I' th$Il economic' rtUilSOTlS,3

lKlausEps te1n. germanl After A4.enauer (New YorktForeign Policy Association, 1964'. 6J•..,... ,

20rosser, 558. 3A~on, 15).

18

The nationalism. wh1chocC$.sioned the F~ench stand on

colonialism alsopro.moted Franoe t $ desire for Q greater

voice lnthe oontrol of Nl.lolear arms. posae$~lonor nu­

clear weQpons beQa:me a l1~o,ssary status symbol tor a great

P9W~:r. .~ .. role FrQ!ice l1ished to play.1 Dlseontented with

the pOf;lltion,tnat the United States alloted her NATO allies,·:A-:

France ultlm,.tely deo!d~d to establish anindependellt French

nucleQir t'o~oe,PreroferHende's.F'ranoe ,. put ,the program into, I

()per~tio;n~n 19$4~ SlnceEure,tom was to stimulate and 00-'

ordil)ate nuoleQX' research, Frmce expeoted to use it to

benetither I;luelfHu' program." German insistence that all

Eurll~omettort8 be directed at purely peaoe.fUl purposes

foroed France to vel inqu:lshtha.t hope J accordingly, dlmin­

i,sh~d French, lnteres,t d~lprived mUI'Qtom of muoh ot ita

v1ta11ty.4

In 0 on trias t to theobsQ,url ty into whl~b E1;trQ tom lapsed,

its twin, the, Europeiln r~oonotnlc ..Op~Wlity; experlenOedd;ram­

atlc'.dovel.opnJ.ent. Both EUr'Qt,pnl -11.q :arwo were the result of

a:".r~l'le,w~d drive by the!ur¢'p-ean tunction,Jl11st movement.

Th~y', were conceived at,hiJ4esslna Conferen.ce, in·'1955'·an<i

-took: shape during two yeQX"$ of negotiations. The ~r.rreaty

lFurnfss', 246'. 2Godf~ey. 128.,

.3B;uratom pe:rf'oI'l'&sits fUnotions 'through 'speol.flere­search.contraots,a docu:m.enttiltlon pool, investment gUidanceQnd health snd safe:by st"nclards. (Robox-tLbuis Reilbroner,;Forgl!1i ! p:nlted ,El.lr0J;?e: theSloifi !,!. the Eu.roEemOommunity,N e'W York: PublIc :APralrscomm t ee~ 19b1 " M."yne. 11[1.

!,'·Ibld.-

19'

of Rome delivered thetWOeld<llt1ons to the Europelin Com..

. . ' .,' . '.' 1munity :tn 19,7.

olol:t~'bl.tne :for the 1rappea~ance on the t~urop$an scene t

Goodwill 14&8 high Qnd 'rQ~lco....oermQ1'l relationsr$pidly 1m­

pnoved due to sever5.1.c:ilr,o'.tillllst"noes II l')rom!nen t illnong: ,these,.. " .. ',.,.' ..

"T"',' '- '.

was the burial of the:;\PQ'l.:f~y 'ot GermQIl d18m~iliberzneht,-""".:".-,.,.-;

Qocomplishecl by the settle,nlent of: the. oompetitlonqve~ the, . .'" .

'.' , ' . " ,

Ssar. A 19$$ referendum by the SaaJ'land~r'8~eJecrtedboth

FrtHl0e and Europeanlzat:J.on1n :fliV'OX" of a return to GernuUlY;

in 1951 the Saar was ortleially reunitf!tG w1tht.he Fe(i$rtitl

Republ1c,2 -Anothe:r contribution to Franoo.(}e:rm...n a,cn:rord

whioh appeared in 19.55wQ8 a decline in the fi-1ctlons which

h~d dev:eloped in Eose •.3The bitterness or the Gennan teel~

ing ot rejection after the defeat or Eoo abated wi..th the

Q.coep'tfJS;r.lcftof Gernu~nY' into-NATO. However,; with1.n NATO it­

self &.nd soon within the nOj' issues evolved thit acted as

G we'dge be~ween Fra:nceandGe1'l'l1.an1_

l'Wl111e,251,. 2Ib1d ., 208.

)P:r,.noe and GepmQnyt~mQJor issues in. dlsputeif1 EOSOwe:red~lsc1"1m1natoryfre~gh~ rates, divergent tax sY$t~ms,

indus trialenterprlse,'agreenients and ownershlp-mm il:gemen tconcentrQtion,~ll ot.whlch the High Authorityfpcoqpuringthe economic rec-eS$ ion. 0'£195.3. F. ,RoY-Willis t~elits. theseproblems in detail 1nhieohapter "lturopean:l.SM in Decline,1954-1955" (ErtitTIQe, GermQrl;Y:, Q~dthe~;ewE~~Qp~).

When GenerQl de Oaulle returned 'to power in. 1958 QS

President of the ,FltthRepubllc, he dec1dedto use the

instruments of fiTATOand the Europefin Commun1tyto tux-tiler

his gOQl of:restoringl1"rance to Ii great pow~r position.

The Fourth Republl0 had nllilde only pilrtlal advanoes t(')ward

fulfilling the objeot:tvesoutlirled. by de Gaulle in 1945.

Through tb$ fr.nnewo.r-k ot the :ft1uroperm Com.rnunl:t.y it; had,' pro""

v1ded .th. bGS is tor French eoo.nomic :reco"er:y"~b'uthQd 'fQ 11~

en. to' supply FrQnce· sml11.t~.ry need, the barestbeglnning

hadibeen nuade to cres~eam111tarily Independent Ft-Qn(je •

A1 tbougb }f"'renQhmen bad beeniuuong the leaders otthfJ

t'wlotlo,nallst movement; the Fou~th RepUblic Is fnstabili. ty

ha.d not improved Frenoh. standing in other nations t e$t~em.

Itrema1ned for Gen$;tJflil de Gaulle to take action which

would ~a18e }4""rar10e to • position or world Influ.ence. Be..

tween 1956 arld 1'963 the Fed~:rQl RepUblic ot Germar.ry

.figured v 1. tallY' in It''renehpol1c1es whloh 8imed Qt recove:r­

!ngfor FrQnce the st.tus. of Q greQt powe%t;fully- inde.r.

pendent, a ~eade%' among the nations ot Europe .•

In Septembe:r 1958, ;}?r~81dent de Gaulle sent letters to

Brlt~1n and the Un:lted stQtes e,itpr~ss.1:ng his views on :NATO

QndFrs:noe's role in it. He Sfii,W NATO ».$ pasa~, ftu. struoture

formed to meet oonditions whioh no longer e.x.lst. tt to be

21

useful, rnodlfleat1ons would have to be lll~de.l De G"ull~

m~de thr~e c~i tioisl&S of NAT<)t (l) th..- t importQnt de-

c 1s ions;\lJo;re Qll nUlae by the Un1 ted s'~,~teS(ln.~ Ore", tar1 taln IJftJ%f .

(2) that the geographic $oope of l'~ATOwas too limlted,an,d

<) that Franoe did not r~c,elv'e a fQl~sha:r~,.of importQnt

p081t1ona :in the eomm~ndstruc:ture.2 In sho~t,.. to make

NATO aoeepta.ble to de afl1l11e, France would hav.e to l:>e.rully­

;recognized asa great power and treat~dQs such. This

would mean being consulted on Qll,Westernpol-l~i~s regsrd­

ingQny area or the wo~ld, r~c~lvlng AmerloQn fild11i8:C­

quiring ~n atomic stockpile <at lelitst to the txtento£

$uehi aid tloBri tam ).Ql'~d.being glvenmo:r~ and be'tter

p.ositlons in NATO· $ COD,1mllnd .tr~~ture.l A revamped I~ATO,

would have ~ .. directorate of the three states having .world..

wide resporAelb11i ties (United States; Groat. 13r~ta1int

Franoe), and eaoh otth$.s$ states would h&vea VQ.1c~1n the

employment ot nueleaZ'weapons. 2

Frenoh desires stated in .the 1958 letter$were r~­

Jeeted 'by-President Eisenhower and?rime HlnisterMaoIiJ.:tllm

RhdGerm».ny, .w1 thth¢'other NATO oountries, jo:tnfJdlti

cr1 tlo1sing )'ranoe' sstand.3 De Gaulle f s d~sir~. to extendfl. ",. '

lFurnlss, f'rQnce Qnder 9c! Q~~lle, 10. 2Godrre~1, 128.

3Roy c. M~orid.1s~ndBel'r1Qrd E. BrOl'tl, The De Gtrulle¥9E~~;1j2~~Ol1ie1ol)od • l111nob % The Dorsey l-'l'ess .'no••

22.

~!ATO's geogr.phlc· ecope w~s. not sh.re~ by most Germ,,-us

since Germany d1dnot have Franoe's oommitmentsabout the.. 1

globe.. Moreover" d,$ Gaulle t S proposed d1,:-eotox-.teo£fered

alpOS 1. tlon of equality to :£PrInee, but, not to Gerrnany,2

Such German opposition provided fJ, source ofdlsoord \vhic~

under4rn1n~:d efforts to lilonteve that 1JItranco-Germliln rapproohe­

ment so important to de GQulle's strategy for Europeuin

leadership.

BaJ:ked of atta1ni'ng z-ecogn1 tlon .8 ... ~reat power wi thin

NATO, de Gaulle took several itdd1t1onal ·steps. Until an

•.g:reement could be reaohed on France' 13 propos.ls tor re­

vamping NATO, France would host no missile 'bases, would

join no unified air defense, and would remove its fleet

from NATO cont.rol.) The American reaction in turn was to

place more emphaafs on Ge:rman contributions to J:.LATO; even­

tually le.ding. tQ to the very disruptive M-u.lt11ateral nu­

olear fo:rce disput, between France ind Germany. The more

France 'wi thdrew from INA.TO, the. stronger the mill tar,. ties

bet-ween the United States and Germany became. And oe1"tlinly

German'Y" s post tion as a dl'vlded na t1on, half-communist .nd

half-demoor~tle, guaranteed the loyalty of democrQtlo West

Germ~ny to NATO.4 As GermQn-Amerlcan bonds tightened,------------_........._---.........- ........_-...... _-------larosser, 510. 21b1d., 567.

3The Fourth Republic'had Rlso refused to urilfy ~lelrt.11r defense. (Jt'u.rnl$$, Fr~nce 1!rQubled ~lll' 41.f.6).

4arosser, 570.

23

Franco-German relations cooled. The fund9ment~1 German

premise was that the·~ecurlty of Berlin 18 linked to the

Phy51cal presence ot, American forces» on ·Germ.nsol1; with

Amerlcantroops on the :spot, ony attQck would lmmeditately

involve Americana and force the United St.tee ,to prompt

aotion. 1 Suoh. view is quite the oppo~lte of the well

known~Ggull18t desire to see Europe cleared of American

rorc~5.2

The military poliaies of Franoe and Germany drifted

further apart 8$. de Gaulle con tlnued the Fourth Republic t!

program of an independent nuclear foroe. On April 11, 1961

de Gaulle declared:

'~It 1. both the right and duty of the continentalEuropean powers to h.ve their own national defense.It i$ intoler.ble tor. great state to have its destiny:!Subject to decisione and a.ct$ oS anoth.er at.te nomatter how friendly it may be." .

Though Germanyoould not be any more sure than Fr.nce

tha.t the United St.tee would risk retaliation from the Sov~t

Union by using atomic weapons In defense of Europe, she did

not follow de G.ullet~ lead, nor could ahe~ Germany seem8

1 Ib id., 16)..,._

2Raymond Aron m.ke~ the interelJting point that de Gaull,eaccepts the fact that West Germany hee to contin.ue to trustin American security,; thu3 he oan count on G~rm.ny Qnd otherEurope~n ~111ee to' $oothe. American feelings, lea.ving himfree to ~peak independently without fe.~ of losing Americ.nprotec tion. ("Reading de Gaulle' e r1ind," ~ Republi£,CXLlII May 4, 1963, 1213) •.~.... Hoffmann, 353.

~o p:rete:r deper.'dena." on the Un 1. ted' st,~ t..~s to dependence

on :Fri1tlce., if it OO!l'l~$ tQthat choice. 1 Preferubly she

wou1d not c.re to b.Tor¢ed to m.k~ tb~t aho1c~.2

Sinee de Ga.ulle' .~. l?eturn to power;·the Fl'"'~,nch have

ernphas,lzed nu.c'l&ar we.pone., sUbordinating c(t)nv~ntlon.l

forces to them. Gep~ral~,t/hlln~ ,Chief of the F¥~nehAl1"

FOl'..~.j expressed th'eb~lli:t that • thre.t of' r:,uc"le".:X-w~lWpons

ag":i'f,lstconv~r~tlor.t.iatt.ck. would oause" slowdown or even

e, stopping of the Att~:cl1.3 France o:r1tlclzed the growing.::',','" "',c.'",.-",,-... .. ','.

Germanemphlls1s on oonvIJntlonalwe8pous and France has

o!,f;t~cized this not only-because it enlarged the German

!tH1.:11:t.rye~ tabllshmen~,but also beeaus. ltrepres~nted •

giv:tng wa'y to Am.rio-ii pre·ssure.4 The Amerioan"'Oerman­

Frenoh trlan.gi. ol1~be 1••1.1801: nd.11tarypolfcy 1sl. m. jor

$tu.rt1bling block 1n Fr.nd()~Germ..n relat1oDe&'. Al though

deG,ull. ha.s refu,se¢! tooomprol1tlse his stmd on NA':PO, he

does not wish GermanY' to think that he rejeots the pX'inoiple

of the Atlantj.c .111ance.· In May 1962; at I- pr~ss confezl­

ene., he r ••. r:Pirmedh1s b~llef in that pri:ne.tple~ .ssuring

his allies th.t.

"So long as tllt Soviets i;hreaten thel.vor~ld, thisalllance must be m.1ntalned~ 'France ls.n Int&gril part--_.-...........'-"'"'-"'--"-------..-......'_..............~.._.----_.,,~~ .......

lGroaser, $68. 2EPstelnj 58•.3Anthony Verriel'JtfFr~neh md West German strategic

Thinking;» tIl!:.! trJ0:r~l:1 'l'odll, XIX (J'une i 1963), 236."

4Ib1d., 235.-

of it. If the fp•• wo:rld were attacked on the old orthe new C9ntinen t, -Frllno.would tak@ part in the COltll'llOn

detel1$ft aX the sid.so! her .111'8, wi.'Ch all the meansshe his." "

De G~ulltJ vle-wsthe ttapproehement which he wishes to

.ncoul".ge between FrfHlce and Germ._ny primarily to further

Fr-.,nch national inter.'ats.The alos.x- the F'ranco-G0rm.arJ.

ties,the eGsler it :fsforJ"raflce tach.ok It rising Gerrrum

powe~;. As early as 1957,., Kurt Si.v~kl:ng,. preslden t of the

Bundesrat', deal.e,reCit

It 1s $videtlt. that Germany will b~come.ev~rmor.,th. natural nuc161.lsot crystal11satlonfor Europ.. • •• It must b~ m.d~.apsolut.ly 01...1' that. •• this..

. '. 1s t th. t1rst~,~v~Xlt of :fi;urope.'

'With G~rm.n aupP'C))iltF;r-lno. wou.ld b. in •• good poat tlon

to lead the Europea.nQommuni ty .long the pa,th$of French

pbliey. The Comnl'un1tlwo~:.td httlp France become agp••t in­

dustrial pow&r. Indu'tp;i~l might was vit-Ito plaoing Frane.

in th. front rank ofri~ti.dns. It Bonn couldbepersu.ded

to .?cept Fr'ench nucl••r p6w.r in place of Artier-loan, F'ranoe

could tither ro~ce th.1>rATO :revisions she d.$ir~d or .:rr.et-.... ~-'.". ',' "." .'. :--'

iVl"ly destroy:NATO b1;\,~.i,ktng out of NATO w1'th Germttn'l.

As the leader Or"~;\1r():B., France could claim tht ;resouroes

of*-lmoat h.lfan industz-l 611 continen.t to h81p her st.nd as

• third force b,tw••n the two world power bloos. Prosident___________""'- ....._'.*_'_t_.·._, ......~~-~ ..........~~

. lFrench E;;mbIlSSY, Pr~s$ and InfO:I*rnatlon Division, 'I'heFirst Flve Y••rsoftn.~F1-ttA a.Eubll~:.2! li'r.no,~,(N.w-YOrk:Fv.noh~llssy, lC}04-r;-17.

2Kar1 w. neu tsch ~nd L$w1s J. Edinger, G.~m.n:y' ~!join}!the Powers, (~rtanford: Statnford Univers:1 ty :Pres 8, 19~9),~.- -

d. Gaull. openly decl.,r.d~his intention:

I lrl:tend to "persuad. the st. t.s to form .. poll t­leal,_ .conomic, jii'gS;pat.gia blo'Q; to 8staPlish thisorganization bet~".n~be Soviet and th. Anglo... /nner1o,ncamps.l» .'

A F:renoh o~1.n te<,iW'e8t aorml,ny might eVen 8ncou~.g.

East European.s tt> loosen. tleswi"th the Soviet Union ;rod b.

drawn westward bee-us.' they would no longerr••r an arrned

,nd un! ted Germany. 2

Itw•• fortunate torP:resld.nt d. Gaulle that th;$ h••d

ot, th.'tideral a.pUblic of Germany, Ohancellor Adenauer,

also desired I rappro(jh.ment. Adfbnaue:r wlsheda reoona111-

a t10n wi thPr.tloe IlsI)artof his basio po11(ry' of 8S t$b11sh.

ip@ conf1.dculce in Ge:rnUlny- by firm.ly .llylng he!' wlththe

"'has t.,.3 Th1"Qugh a PO$~;,i~o#ot power ga1netd by' •.11gn1ng her­

solf wi ththe West, ae,rmany would be in;',. posltlonto :nego­

tiate for ':reunification. The burying ot the longst•.nd1ng

:Frarlco"'G~:rroan r(tud WIUS to b. the foundation ,or tnew progress­

lveEurop••4 a.n.rlt~,f()t'W.8t Germany would'1nelud.~eon­

omio advantages throu~hth. Community and .. usefulallianee

in case of an Am.r10.n ...Sovl~t accord oVer the, question of

G.rman unifioation.'

laa,.ns Joachim Morg.nth.u~ "Four Designs tor Tomorrow" sEurope", Th. !!!! YorkT1m.s.~.g.z1n. (MI." 17, 1964), 18.

20odtrey, 1)0. .3Ar~n, 164. 4Epste1n.58.

'Allin S. 'Nan.a, lttW.$.t G_;rman Foliey in W.st Europe,"OurZ'ent Hlatorl., XLIV (April, 1963), 21$0.

'Durin.g tn. first years or d. Gaulle' sachnlnietratlO'n

F):~noo...G.;r.man .ru~~ordp.rosr.!H1UU~d tHJtterlot·orl1y. Tb. 1958

I,ppolntnt*nt ot t~,.ur1c.. d. (-tou". de ~/ltU'f~1.1.ltt" ·thon 1('r~A'o:h

,p;mbas$ador, to German1••s l~or.l~ l/sJ.n1etlltr w,sftn auspioious

g~$ttl~.. Jh'19n~u"v took! t .. 8 a good orA~~h1 Af't.x- tll. first

m••tln@~ ot Adenauer .-f:l" d. a1ful:l.) it 'b1iHH,m~ ol4t_~r tb"t thfll

two h••de ota't.teshtr_dmutual .dm!'ratlon ror .ach other

'as1Jell •. $ In .w.~cen"·$~ o'fth. adval1 tagea ot F1"'ilineo-(~h~p[ft"n

oooper.tion.2 f:'tconomlc In,t..,gJ?atlon adV.llo_d -lrnost .uto-.

m.t.1c~lll. By 19$8 tl1••arly dlspute'$ w1 thin Re,se wor.

t.tlt1oo to upbQldth.T'~fl.,tl cr aom.md1rrjI,1~'mt.ntth.

tlotmton ,~:~A:rk.t _.3 Dlplomati('fall1., '&rif/; Frenoh pres ld.nt t 5

eupp().rt of 'th.G.rm.r~po.lt10tl tn S..r11n and his oompll..

mtt11tat'1 sp••eh.s publlefilly pr.l",lng Germany and ;'d.n~u.r

contrrlbuted to 1rnprot'lng ~.l.tlo-n. b.tw••n the two countrl.s.4

Tholl' tt8p!)J'ocrulfm.llt waa cll!~x.d b1 .n «Yxcha't"4g. 0,t vflr1

s~.lce~88tu18t.t& "lett. in 1962.

80 successful w.:r. tb. 1962 tttatt: vlsltm thl·t French

trod O.rman aoe1,,11at p.rtl.sbaoe::nf< alltl't'fted enough to issue

• j01tlt -w4l:rnine;. 1'hey r •• r.d, th-t the r~cono111.t!on was

1W11118, 276. 2notftnfUTo. 34"'.~W.ltfU~.Zt.hl (ed.), ,Ii!\t !rQ11.tlce off'oa t~..r .9!!rrt)!t..r~Xrork: Freder!(fk cA. t':c••ger, Ina.,L9m;

4\/111118, 294.

28

becoming an allianoe b.tw••ntwo n.,t1on.11sms.~ .1m~d at ..

P.Iris-Bonn •."-is which would dom!nllt. an integra,ted Europ_.

Insp1te of Ad.nllu(l)r*s,h.'tt.uj d.n1•. 1~; which appflllr.d in

Chrlatund ~.lt on S.pt.:mb.r 14. 1962,d. a•.ull.' s consis­

ten.t rejection of supran.tio:nalisffi lent 8u'bsta:nc. to th.'

chll,rg_. W'ith.out th.$upr••n.tlon.l.8p.ct~ th.Oomr.uunl ty

W'J, uldb. lim! t.d to depending on t~..d1 t1.ooa1 na tionaloo­

oper.t1on,l The Franoo-German .Tr•• ty or 1963 w•• oritic­

ized by sonte Gorman Qpponen,ta pr.ci,s.ly on the grounds

that 1t e.nteredon a Bonn-P.r1s •.111ane.inst••d of the

unity 01:' theS1x. 2 It "".8 to b. th. m••neot 'otun..ntlng the

Fr4ehoh-G'erman rela tlonshlp through c10,$. cooperation. Wh.

h••ds of gov.rnment m... t at l ••ost tw10e • y.ar. th. d.r.nm.

ministers every thr•• months, th. ohi-fa of staff every two

months. These 001'ls'ultat1ohS (lOV'lr fore1gn • .rraJ..lts, d.t~ne.j

.oonomic • .fforta,youth and eduoation..) a.oeptionot' the

tr••,ty WA. divldtd.lxl F:rana., th. Ootrmlunl$ts a-lied 1t

'''~.m.gogu.ryn, th. Socialists clalm.d it Was tn.••ningless

UJ,'11sss d. GaUlle controll.d both Frane. and Germany, and

th. mod_rat.a d.ploredit ... 8 bae.d on .. bre.k with Britain

lind the Unit.d Stat.s,,4'

lFurnlasj Franc.! Un~.;- s!! G.ull.p

' 49. 2Wil11sj 312.

~1.Jclm ,Faokl.r. ttThe p'ranoo-O.rma,Il Tr•• ty: the .nd ofhereditary .mnlty,~ World Tod8l, XXI (Jlnu8ry, 1965), 28,

4Wl111s, 34.

3Wl111s, 309.

29

Adonlluer _,nd the men who su.pport_a hiI'll wore llbled

German aaulllsts. It,14a$ proof of the high pr10rltythllt

Adenauer placed on good Fr.n.oh rttl.tions that h. rat_d th.

treaty abov. B:rlt..in 'e .n~ry 1nt,o EEC. fl. looked on th.·,~

.c,cord as • m••nsof'pr-aerving'lth., rapprochltment wlthFranee. )

pa.st the time wh.n h.wouldturn the ottice ot' ohanc'el1or

over to someone els••,1 But the rujorltY' ot aerm.n opinion

w,e:s<)pposed. EEe CommiastQn Pr.e1dtnt Hallst.• in claimed

Ita~bot.g.d th.splrlt ot' the Treaty of Ro~. by" fts·'bl­

llt-ral natur. rath.r$ban USillg' th. Oommun~ty fr.un"work.2, . • .

,Th. French veto of Brlt'·l~ ,took placo only &w••k b.fore

Ad.tllu.r* s visit to F.rls·~~.nd th. aerman chanc,.11orrC9c,,1v.d

shat:p eritlclsxrl ,r:or signing th- tre.ty i.n· th_ r.ce ot,

F;'-'at1oe' s r~ j .:0 tlon otl~1'1t.:ln.3 'lb.. tv.at,.· W.~8 only-rat t1­

fj,edbec.tuiJ. 1. t eouldb'us.d as • mod.l for-mult11.teI'al

coop.ration with oth_x- eo'Ul'ltr18s.4 B.tor.-AOoepting,it,

t-h.G.rmans add_d It pr••rtlbl. which oall-d tor clos.

co(;rp.r.tlon b"tw••n tb.Unit.d st. tes and Europo, ,corrmlon

d.r.nsa in NATO withlnt_gration or member,. arm.dforces,

end unification ot Europ••long Commun1ts,. lines, including

th••ntranc. of Gr.at B:rit6n. Thus th. Bund.svat sp.l1od

1 '. 2 ',"F.ckl.~, 26.- Willis, 312.

4Alfred Grauer, The Federd ae~Ubl,lC .2.!,.Ge:rmllnz(N.wYorkt Frederick A." Pr••ger, 19 4), 120,

3q

out th. issults W:11oh divided ~TJ.nc. and Oerrru"ny in the very

op.ning lin.s of II treaty-meant to 'symboliz. olos. oooper...

• tlon. 1

The terms or nhatr•• ty are being o.rri.dout. Th.

for_lgn arfairs conferences b..v. tak.n :place as perscrlb.d

but not much in th. w.y of oommon pOlioy has resulted.

PrGsidentd. G.ulle t s crt tleisttl of NATO 1l1,sunde:rmlned ohances

or olos.:r,' d.r.na. po11oy.2 Only in th••rel of youth and

_duoa'tlon h.$ there b.en what could b- o.ll.d eucc.ss. On­

evldtne. of thl8 success 1s th. rae t that in 196'+ ov.r

279,000 youth.s hav_ crossed 1m. tront1.ra both wliys. But

art.r six months. ev.n d. GaUlle" when sp••klng o:f tn. t:r••. ty,

acknowl.dged that "this proj.at, .v.ryone knows, has not

oom. to anything. f~.)

Th. ..rly ',"1 ft lira that h.ld sO much hope fot' Franco­

G_rman diplonlllcy look.d just as .ncourliging for th. Europ••n

Eoonomic Oommunity. Living up to 1ts .arly' promis., th.ttEC

acted •. s • stimulus to eoonoll11c growth in, France and Germany.

a.tw••n 1958 and 1962 Germ.lln industrial prod'Uotion climb.d

35" and P'rench 2.3%_ Fr.nch and German trad_ wi th Oommol1

'M"rk.t partn.ra do~bl.d.. whil. Fr.noO.,;.aermlin trade tlltrloet

tr1pl~d. Oollaboration betw••n Frenoh and a.:rman industry.

t.king th. form 08 lic.rlsing agr.,nu@lrd;s, mark_tins; _gr••mente,

~~,.,...---~~-"""""--'....._------lw111iS, 313.'

.lind joint 8ubaidiarl.e, markedly Incr~.s.d.;.l German rai th

in Fr~neh ll'ltontlons to l1v. up to th. 't~rms of the ~'1'.Ulty

of .Horn.e r~c.iV8d Q boost during EEC's tiret YOQr by P'r4inee '8

m~kingsaerlfie.s to m•• t th. first tariff de&dll11.. In

order to m•• t th. schedul.d 10% tariff'r.duotion for all Emoountriea by Januery 1.. 1959,radic4ileconornle r",forms were

r_quired in F1rsno_. D. Gaulle m.t this n••d by d.v~1'UQt1:ng

the .franc, r$nJ.ovi-ng quotss on 90% of Fr~nc.ts imports" from

OEECeountrifls, In¢r... slng taxea, euttltlg ex.penditures; &rid

1.ow.rlngsoc1Ql security paym.nts.,2 Ind••d, iiu:fu.r.-nce to

the Common Msrket s.~m.d to signify thQt Franc. was _rlding

QtrQdition ore-nti_ring her 1ntec;rnatlonal economic policies

. on domestIc pX'-otection!sm. Most of: the opposltiontoEEC

cQm.rJ:'onl indus-trt.ssuch a$ th. Frenoh textil. industry

that feared comp.tit1on~1th other Oornmun1 t1 nQtlorls Qftor

tariff reduotions came Into .rract. Eneour$lge1.ngly, th_

EEe justifi.d lts.lf to th. Pronch textil. industry by show­

ing ., jump in 1ta px-oduotlon ind-x from 95 in 11,59 to 118 in

1963, using 1958 a8 a bas. YltaX' of 100.3

Although friotions :tn:Uo ox1sted from the start, they

did not becom. evident until th. oommuni ty was WCtll under"­

wfil.y .. " OVl»rt ditrerenc.s I1PPfHU".d on li1Qtt~rs of tariff r ...

duotlon, common ,,-griau.ltu,rQl pollcy, politic&ll unlon~ and

m.mb~rship for Grlturt Bl."l tQ1n .}.f.. HQvlng b••n refused a rr••---~--------------------,--------.......-..---,----

lWl11iS, 2e.l. 2!~~q.,2-78. 4Ibid ., 282.-

32

zon. wlthEEC memb.,rs, Brit&lln org4l,ulzed th. Eur"OpeiUl Fr••

Trade AssociGtlon (EFTA) with D~nm~rk, Horwsy'" Swed.n,

Austria, Portugal, Qnd SwitzerlQnd to COInl;H.to wi thEE~O. To

nl&et this ch9,11enge ]~1~C d.cid.ed to acoererQt. its't~rift

reg.D.c·tions. Fr~nc. favo:r*d this step; aermany, slwQYs a••k­

ing wider n18rk.ts, 0pPQsedi t~ in the .ndtth.y oompttomised.1

HQ.d not the 1nteriortarifts b ••n roduc.d and it cprnmon .x-

t.r'fo:r tQr~ifr b.lJlu agr••dupon, EFTA might ha"'. 'had'" great...

,_r"tl?Rding QdVanitage toott.r WI1t$t Germany thatl th. Oom~

:munlty,. In that! 81 tu~,~'j,()n the F.d..ralaepUb.l,!oml,ght'w.l1

hRY,'., ,bel&o drawn :to 8e:Los.~ aeoord with Britain. Ins~.Qd

.rlo;ti~h to prevent OorlTlanl b.lng led aatr81 h1Br1t,all1.2. :~" ..-: :'; , : " :, ' ': ~.":' -' . -. - - '. - ',', ' '

, The EFTA d1s0ord,-·'h>1~light.d th. d:t:ft.r~ntplin$ f~vor$d

by Fps:rlce and G.rmtiny. Wll,. h.neh endors.d c8.r.ful /plann­

In.g;~ndd.v.lopm.nt wi 'chIn:< the S1x) and opposed th. c'ompllc­

$itlons brought on bY' Iherejs1ng th. s1z.otthe Community.

ErhQrd,as SpOk.Sll'UUl ofthi Oarman .oonomlc group. 1"0 j.ct~d

tight plQnning AS Cornrn:uni$tio and boclli.ua. 1t sh.ut Sri tleh. .

and Amer1canxnark.ts toG.:rman goode.) H. &".n us_dsuch

terms .$ ·'Europ.4ln incest" a.nd tt.oonomic absurdi ties'· to

describe th. French m•.rk,ting outloOk.4

rLlbld., 286.-3Gro EHiflr, "Franoellnd G~rnlanY',u 572.

J"'Wolfe tv. Schms,k01, ftaftrmfl.ny ~ndth. nommonCurr.nt Histor:y, XLV (Nov.mber, 1963), 285.

.J3

Proba,bl:r the moe t difriettlt ~conomlc stum.bling block

in F:E1C was th.., oommon9_griculturQlpollcy, th. 'lUllS tfo:r

which b$g~n in Januat·Y' 1962.1 Wi th .IDQst G.;.rnl~.ny (th.

natur-a.l proouc.x- or ~gricultur~l p:rodu~cts I·or West o-.,~m~ny)

cut off,France- $ surplusasrioul tU!'lil.l produce would find

a natural !nark.t in food~d.tiol.nt irJ$$t a.rtrlQny. But

GellmSiny's l.ss .rf1ci.nt tarnl popul,tlon enjoy.d a pro­

tected position in ih. West C.h,rmQrt economy. 'This prot.otlon

was due to' the powerful voice or tht farm vote. Both '~T~no.

md Ge:rmany had *stabllsh.d .l.bo~at. subsidy systems

d.licllt.ly balanc.d tneaoh country's itlt.rn~l *conomy. In

ord.r to enable EEe to begin its s_ooxld stag. on tim8 in

January 1962, G.rmGny made tn.jar oone.salone in agriculture,

doing away with quotas, govern.mc.nt stoc,t(piles, tUld national

tariff bQrri-rs j.n ct:r.als. Po~k,••ggs Qnd poultry W8re to

b. p:rotetlted by 1.v1.s and ~ minimum prioe whlch w~rfl! tifJQ

to th*, c-r",g,ls agr••m.nt~ Anoth.-:r agricultural sa,cri-

fie. Gft;rnumy mAd. WQ8 Qn8.grcunnent to op.~ <llJOtliS ,for wilute

to tl'U.mbor st~t.s. The other mtlmb_rs or n:mc r.eogniz&d the

eoa t of thcrr contributions whieh a,,:rmany was milk ing and 88

Q. rl'isul t th-y too wore willing to n'J,fik. eOl1.c_ssiOllS whioh

would.•58. th6 organlzat1on t $ progr.ss. 2

~h.r. were pollt1c.al ditf.ren(HIS as w~ll 88 .oon.om1c

on.a. Although the EEC had only b.g~~ funotionll1g in 1958,

r~d.r4)l,11st groups soon urged a oombinat1on of the High

Author! ty 'wi th the Oommissions of l1lura tom tmd 'BEe iind th.

direot -l.ctlon of th_Europ.litl1 I~&rllam.nt.1In the f€itco

otth1st.ndency th. President of th. FlfthRepublic mad.

cl.~rh. could n.ot 8.0cept anything that woUld :tntring. on, ,

'r-Ilobnil tlonal sov4r.lgnt,. Instead, in Octob.r 1~~9 i

P:r,m1.r Michel Deb.t*'sugg.$hd that th..' 81xllold p.r-fbdl0

¢onit".r.notls' on poll tic,l nil. tt.rs and. $stllbJ.+sha pol.t~loQl. ';,',

$.~~it.:rl·at in Pa'r1s t ,;·Although th. EECt paI'~n.~s' wj,r*sus-

I11~¥#uS 91' 1m athmpt\'~~7~d.rll!ln. th41 COIllln~l.ty:, s u1~img t.

go.~}or ~11mlt.d tun(it1Ql'~8)':but r.al pow.rs,'f,tht,. Qgr~,d to

q);1i##,,~J.Y Ill..t ing.. (> t t()~.lgn min.1i!lhl'l!l .to1',oonl!lu~'t;~t;:1onon ;:~t:~l1'lgn po11el.2

, . -

'Xh.: po11 tloa.l 1$,~.::"~fl:$ not an 1tern ofmomel1td1Jn1ng

1Il;l,.l'!rost stag. of ~'(£~*8"'1962)i but th.l'•. wllll nodouot

of~b..p.d. Gaull. stoQd'rigard1ng 1t. In at't-lev'1$_d

8p.-~'¢h t.ri tJI-.y 1960, h.~<bll1.1.(l foxt .. w.s,~.rn.Etu:-op.Qn,Unlon".;',;,'V ". ", " :.;, ,. :

Qsjn 'f imposing conf.ao'vaAJ1,on" which 'W()ul,~ b 91.nce }f;listem

Europe tand. male_ possibl,•.aEurop.an .nt.nt*.'f.fromt-h.

tctliirltif)- to th. U2'9,1$_" In. JurJ,e otthtt yefi1r·,Debr'.x­

plAlltl.dthat hanc.eU.driot cons1d.r meJ?ging, the Comrnunity

4Jxecu.tj.v4tS nec.ssary,sinc. Qnly gov.rtltlHitntooop.rtii tion

W4fS ntHtd.ed. 3 Th. Freneh governm..nt co:n,sidered the present

Community structur. tight enough ~rld any further cohesion4 .. ,- ~......-~

n••ded could come frolnr.glilar gov'ftrnm.nt chann-ls. A

th1.:rd tim. in th. saUlS yflar,.t his September $pttoas eon­

t.j.nc., d. Gault. lnad.el«uIP tihat h1svision of unlt_d

E:ut';o.p. w.sbas.d on sOvor-olgn st~t.s" not a sU'pranatlonal

community,l

.N' ev.~tl'+.l.ss, in ap1t- of d. Gaulle' a dIsapproval,

v.:ritious proposi,ls torf\1ttther1ng poll tiC8l 1nt~gra1;lon were

mad.. to th- Study" Commlssl,on .atilo11shed b9~P;O. As the

Oomm.on f-iarket mov.d. intOfts El4tcondph$,se, cone.mav.r its

d.Y.loptrJ.~nt b.esm. rnor••out,. The Fr.nch gov.rnm.nt

;$u.ggoat*d tht formation or a council of h.,.dtJofstat. having

powo:rswhleh would reduOsthe rol. of theOommul'llty Ass.m­

bly. l~aul..H.nrl $paQkof Belgium. :vtj_oted this proposal

19n(ionoa mor- urg.d t'h.ftl.rg~r of •.x.outiv.-e. 2 Thelssua

,nd.d. in d••dlock in th*,March 1962 m••t~n8·Or for.lgn

m1nist.rs.

Another difficult is!ru. on the study OOrnmiss1on t s

~.g.hd. was th. problem ofEri t1sh -m.m'bereh1.p in EFJO .•

In July 1~61,Prl:m. ~tlnl$t..r Harold»-iaamil'1an '.n". ." . . .

nouno.d the Gp,n1ng ot'll.gotiat1ons torSrltlsh.ntr1 'into

E:gO, .which th. EECCommlsslon gr•• tttd war-rol" Th.N~th.·r­

langsj B'lgltun. Luxembouvg, Qnd Italy .sp.cielly w.lcomcd ..

pot,.ntlijl count.rbalsnc.to a Bonn-Pltr1a axis; and Gormany

w~s »180 plm~s.d at th. prospoct of Britain joining :REO.

119M _, 295.

It would b. Iii further consolidation' o.fth. W.stern ~llianc.

a,nd pr8se,nt » mor~ solidly tthi t.d west.rn, .front to the Sov1.t

U:nio.n.• 1 G,.rrn~ny alr~.dyh~d .. eonslder.:bl••mount oftrad.

with Sri tr;1n end this move would .nl;,J;'g_ tha.t mar:ket .v.n

mor., Co.mp.tl tion with EiFTA WQuld end Qnd most of its

rorm.r membars would' become _ssoeiat. m.mb~rs or EE:C tnus

providing Y'fttw1dermarkets. 2 Pr.nc. b.Qwev$r was 1*88 en...

thu.slastio sino. she was not 1ntfU'Jest.d in trsdewi thth.

British Commonwealth and f.lt she hId littla to gain from

aca~pti:ng EFTA memb.rs &,sJ!rEC associates'. N.verthelsss,

Is negotl&tlons w.ro .bout to begin, President d. Gaulle

stat-a that h. had Ualwfiys dos1red that others, Qnd G:r••. t

Bri tftin in pAlrt1eul",r', .OC1Jpt the Tr.aty. of Rome. tt,3

By October 1961,- .8 negotiations tor British entry to

FUOO beg8n to tak. rorrn,the numb4rr of concessions n••ded

tOilccomodat. the probl"ms ofConmlQnw.fal thtrl.de b.c,une

I,ppillrent, Sargaining continuod into »1.1 1962 wh.nth.

serious hurdle of th. stand.l'd.s und.r whioh t.xuperat.

t"ood$tuffs would .nt_r the Oornmon' 1'1ar'ket, wh.r. they could

cOnlp.te w'i th French produce_, wa.. taek16d;this problem r.­

mtllned unsolved.4From Ootober to Dec"unbar 1962, ntttgotl­

.,tiona dealing with d:tr.otBr:1tlsh sUb$ldl~s and gUtirsnt••d

"'--,"',......., ---------,..-""----_.~.--""'----,-----.,...."lTerencGJ Pritt!., nTh. P_rie-Bonn A.Xis, ~.w 116pUb!.!,£,

eXLII! (Fobru.ary, 1963), 9.

2Willls.. 300. 3Ibid., 307. !~~biq., 301.

p;rtic.$ iti Qgrioul ture v ls"'!,l-vis the ElSe corrtmon a.grioultura,l

poltQyb$o1Jme d.adlock.d,which rH"e.ssi,t~ttid th...ppoint­

mst1t of a faot find1l'lg oom11iitt•• ) ;)ut Prfts,1d_nt d« Gaulle

, put an end to th. discussion wh.n he announced to • press

conferano_ on J~.nua:ry 14, 196.3, that" in his view, B!'itain

w&lsnot r®ady for entry into lEO and in fact did not fit

into the' Europ.an pictur_. A,w••k'lat.r,Frano. moved tbat, 1

,n.got1Rtlons tor Sri t • .1n t $ adxn1ttanoe to EEO b••ndtd.I'

~j,. F;renoh baX'rlng of Sri t.1n from E~1J bad Ilv1.o1 ..nt

.rr.at on Franco--Germah rel,tions. :publlc 9plnlon polla

in Germany reflect.dth.dx*as'tiechange 1n G_rman f ••lings,

German raltot1on to Fr.nch for.lgn poliey' dropp.d from 61%

:ravorable in. Oetc.fb.r1962 ,to 38~ in l~ov·.mb.r 1963~2

attrma.ns .r*lt InEfult.d that th. Fr.nQh pr.al,~.nt h3d not

w._lt~d even on. w.ek, th. tim. that the C;.rman chancellor

would b- inPa:rls toslgn th. Tr•• tf of 19~';, to oonsult

'hinlon ,. illatter of: such 1mport.nt mutu.al Int'..;r.st. There

the:re was bitter r.s.ntment against Ad.nau.x-forhavlrig

signed .. treaty in th. t ..~~ of d. Gaulle t:l indepond.nt

action which $ ••mod a betrayal or th. spirit of consul­

t.tton tn. tr•• ty was supposed to r.pr,.s.n t. As1d8 from

th.ttl. tt.r or national prl<i_. Gertllan businessm.n and in­

dustr1ltllsts b,118>v-.d tha~ Ft-~no$ had d~prlv.d thom ot th•

• conotnie advantQg.s otBri.tish •.nd Oonm1onw.~lth mark.ts.,. '.1sAW

l~Nillis, 302.

Wha.t caused de Gaulle to deal such e blow to' his care­

.fully nurtured Franoo..,Garman rapprochement? The safeguard­

ingot French agrictlltural lntereets was not the only,; not

even the pr lmar-y, res.son for )'trance ' s re ject10n of Bl'i taln ..

De Gaulle did not wish to see Great Bri taln in JJ;EC because

Br1ta1nwould be a way tor the United states to In.fluenc&

and possibly threaten European independenoe, His sus-

.p1cions ot American plans to use Br1tain as a Trojan

horse were aroused by the assurance given by President

Kennedy to Prime .Minister" Macmillan thattbe "speoial

relationship" between Brltal11 and the United states would

not" be changed.1 The United states thought thttt Brit&~n

would glveEEO greaterstab111tYt an Atlantic outlook, end

a pos! tlol'l more in line w1thAlner1can views on m.aJor issues.2 .

Press releases, such 88 the fQllowl:ng, convincingly implied

that the Un1ted States 1n tended to use Sri ta.fn 8S 8 mad.!a to

dominate the Oommunity:

A Plurope oxYganlzed wi'thout the United States would bea Europe organized agairlst the United states. This 18why Weare push1ngbard tor joining the Common l~larket.

• • •. We njed Britain as a broker end to ensure anopen door. . . .

It 1s likely that de Gaulle did n.ot want Britain to enter

the Common plarket as a .full member during 1ta forma tlve

lMa~ ~~loft, The Unite4 S~.tee and the Unlp: of ~f:\ro£!(Washington, D.a.:'he 13rookIngs InStItutIon, 96J), 101.

2Ibid • 3Ibid • 109.- -

political per1.od. Only atte;r Franoe has been able to shape

and set the form of El00 W01.l1d S:x-i ctls.h. entr&noe be feas.able

-for de Gaulle. 5.1nee the co~~ of the vJe$tEuropean unif'io­

atlon was to be Bonn and paris, de Gaulle would prefer not

toh$ve aaompetl tor -of: equal strength to balecnoeli"'ranee

wi thin the commun1 tYt·1. " -,

ot cou:r'se there were more factors in the oooling

Fre.noo-Germao relations than the Frenchretusal to allow

Britain to enterEEC. Ii. new chancellor began leading the

Federal Germerl RepUbllopo11oy a:nd placing emphasis. on

othe~ goals, Even greater divergencies or-policy were

develop1ng in BEe and NATO. 'rench natlon$llsm found tm

echo: in Germany, and-Sonnano. paris developed different

piotures ot Mosoow•

.The first conferenoe between Pves1d.entde Gaulle and

Ch$~cel1or 1P.1rhard in July 1964 wal notausploious. ~he

:Freri'oh president announc'$clthat they had sp<>k:erf with "ex­

treme rranKrlSss", and1t\iuis leaked to the p~~ss that

de G$ulleorlt101.edE~hard·s support ot theArtle:r-1oti~polioy

in '-~~uthea$1'; Asia .1~on:.lder1ngErhard' $- statements in the

Bund~et'e.t in October 196j~$ ooolness betweerithe two headsI

ot state was not surprisIng. tt.The security of the Federal. -

German .Republic can be guaranteed only through NATO;w1th

thecooperatlon at OUJ:'Eu~0peQn end Noz-th Ame'rioan pB.%'tners

1nboth poll tical and military fields,·l he had stst'ed.

1~ak1ngeV'en moredefln1teWes~German comm1 tment to the

Uhlt~d States, Erharddeelared thet h1sgovernment .would

con.tinue nto decide al1qu~stl()ns or common- interest inI

close and friendly eonsultatio!l with t:q.e Ame:r1can govern­

ment; n he 8.1so vJ:tshed to reopen r:.egotlatlo:ns for Brltl$h

:4tpinoers on h"rhard, rt The r~conomi8t,OOXII (July 11, 1964),132.

4~,:

Entry into EEe, and to work tor a "wider Co111tUunity.ul

'Ear,liar dltferenQ,6~within rJA'I'O had. not $bated by

196,3, and it was madecle~:rthat F;ranoe w8a1n the process

ofwlthdrawal. De Gaqlle predicted tl?-at; by 1969, ttWe shall

end the subordination that is described 'as il1t$gpatlon,

whioh 1sp;ro,v1dedfQ.l:t 1.>y W'.A110 and whic~ put$OUI' dest;lnl

:i.ntne hands ,ot .fo~elgner$...2 To th, contrary. the Federal

Germ.an a.publio l'¢newe<.i its 1018.11;1 tQ NATO and this added

to the Frenoo-(le;rman l"lt~, For eXQmple. Erhard accepted

the ML!'''3 ,s a means to further Germarf md,.litary l:nteg,ra,tlon

intoth..e Atlantic alliance, e,ven though., suoh integration

w.Qs a direot blow to de GaUlle fa vi .i,on of an independent

Europe.4 It did not wQrtnrelatlons between thelrtwQ

c01xntries when tiPhard.ennounced that while he ttraspeot$u

th.e French n"uolear tore~.he "feels more 8Jecu~e~' under

the Amari (Uln • S

As Bonn fottg$(l etronger bonds between West Germ.fffiY

and the Un! ted Statesbysueh linksaa ML'I de- Gaulle de-

olded to ule E~EO •• one means of applying pr5Seure on Erhard,.,...,.,.,.

:lW111is_ 316.

2ttDe Gaulle.8 }{:urope," Am~r1ea,OCIII (8epternber 25;196~) I. 308.

3f1iLF represents multilateral nuclear force, &. .fleet ofsurfaoe ships arl'rlEtd wit'hpola:rl $ missiles and operated bymixed~m&lned orews from NATO oountries. (Willis, 321).

4"The Oeneral Picks. His Sattlefield l " The Economist,OCXIII(N'ovember 7" 1964>, 592. _. ·

5... "...1.... lrold Him" rrhe 1'1eonom1st.... CC!X (December 7; 1963.1,997,·' , ---"

pa~t1eularly through the issue or grain prioes. l Always

a thorny problem, agricultural policy was the first major

hitch in EECafter Erhard took o£.flc.~. De Gllul1e wIshed

to have a solid i'·uropean agricultural fI·ont to present to

the UnIted States at the Kennedy FtOUIld of Tariff negotl~

stions which waa 5ch$duled foX' spring 1964. 2 P:rogress on

reaching EEe agreements on agrioultural products was slow

during the summer of 1963. In October 1963 Q French ul­

timatum demanded t~t 8. d~ciB1on be madf) or FX-aIlce would

qu~tEEC. F'1ns.lly 1n December. 1963 some mutual ooncessions

permitted a common po.llcy-to be drawn up lnbeef; milk

p:rociuets'Qnd r1ibe, buto,(t;t.·:tal deo1elons wer$ posiipori$Q

until April 1964. The aooord reaohed on 'beef and1'rll),.k pro­

dup;C'j 1s more significant When it 1s l'ea112HJd ,~hJlt,,:pro­

duets have more va~u.,:·~:c!: .'~re.ter produetlontn.an all·'the'., -'. -";.;' ':',.': ,.:",.-" ."-:':,',:.,::,'

CottlmdnMarket 1 a mfjtal~o:rltl~g industriaa. i:nc,ludlng 8nip.

bulldina, and 'l'u tomobl1e'rtta#ufac 'Cur1ng. JanUtx~y·· 1_1970

We.~'l,~e'ba8 thetQrgetq~te by wh1ch ell' prioe's t46uldbe

(jl1.~ed. Arriving at'. GC6trbon price, a specific taX'g'et

da.te and the meat!. to ach.lev$ that goal requires slow and

palti~taking negot 1&tiona. However. France $a.sued I).nother

\f±c~;~#atUln in 00tobel' 19.61li.~h1'eatening thet t1rl~~a l!I 'llhl!!'

1ftDlplomatlc ~1an~..,J~~~,4; Nell1 Statesmen, LXV,I!;(Bchr.e$\"Iel'... (!}6 J·) 684 . " .....,.< -\1.7'+, .' '.••

43ag~icultu~al comtnon market, developed on schedule, France

would walk out). 'In De'oamber, Germany conceO,ed in part' be-'

cause the other lEO partners ooneider~d'rancEJt1;1' demand.s

on cereal prioes legltlmate.

Though compromise and OOl'lossslon might work out· dirt!...

culi economic difference. wi thin E:a:~, polt,tleal dirt~zt­

anoes remained irreconcilable. The idea. that de Gaulle'

would ecuttle the Common it'1arket ove:rthe poll tical issu.e

:Q.asbeend1soountfJd by some. French economy had become

deeply l~teg:r8.ted into' EECdur1.ng ita first s 1xyears.

The draft ot the tifth French economic plan (1966.1970) was

based on the assumpt10fi.'otEBC development. Halt France' $

tra,de outside the f:ranc ares. 'ia (,Hil'rled on 1n EWa, and she

was the greateat bel'leticiar~., 'ot the Comnt.on Market's agr1­

cul:t,uralpol.lcy.2 De Gau.lle hlm$slf lnApr11 1964 announced

1;hat tiLt;tleby 11ttle the,!uropean QOrrl$on Ma,l'ket is beco1l'l-

1nges$entlal to ourprQ.perl ty. t.t3 On the other hand ..

de G8.l111e hat' never indioated ths.'b he would sacrifice one

of h18~ajQX- goals,nat1onal 1ndepen4enoe, tQ1J $oonoml0

advantagt.

Juat as the issues qf, Sri tl«tb, membershl',: and. agrlcul­

turelprlcin,g had d1vl(.t~4'".:<!~ Gaulle and Erhard, 1n 1965

ltlThe General Picks Hia Sa ttlef1eld, ,. ,91"

~Godfrey. 12,.

3Willls, 314 ..

poll tical development becaTa8 the topic of debate. The

thl~d stage or E»;O maturity was due to come into being in

1966 and hinged on major steps towaz-d politieal integra­

tion. Majolllty voting, whioh would end national vetoes,

ultimate pa~11amente.r1 control ot EEe funds; direct elec­

tion otthe Parliament; all these measures embodied the15uprahatiotlal na.ture otEIC thai de Gaulle denied.

".,' .

D.Gaulle, .t' a countermove; p%'opoaed th.at thfJHigh

Autl'lor1 ty and the:~ Oonun1;as1one tor iura tom and REO be aom-"

bined but wi th eon.$lderabJ,;t leas than supran.ational qual1-

,

~mo~'t; serious or1.~e t):J.eEuropean Oommunity ~a,sexper:t~nced

; to :dtAte.2 June 30 f 1;965,~~,"the Frenoh goveX'l:llQerit1'eoal~ed

M.BQegrJ.e1' j 1t 8 am.baa!$,ad.()~:- to 'bhe European OQlt1l11utl tt,l# •.•·thus

$fte9tlng a Frenoh. boYcott 01 leaving an t1enil?~~t'Ch..l.;r.;tt, "

~~llliJulY through Deo"l»b." 196$ coxnmunityettortawe:rt*. dead.... , - .. '.. ,

looked, The reaul$ot·~b.necember 1965 FX'enoh electlon

indloatedan end. t-o the·boYOott ot EED. On the' f1~st

be.llRt 56% of tbe Frenchvot&d against de Gaulle.. This,. . ...• . . i

mt:1y'l:u~ve atrengthenedthe display of community oppoelt1on

lpeterJenk1rJs, u~:rope t sFreeze, t' (N.wStatesman.LXX (July 9, 196$), :;7"

2 .... .'. . ..Edgar Stephen eon FurniSS,. Jr.,.. ".FrenchForelgnP011CY, "

CU:J:'r'en t. fr1storl, L (Apr! 1, 196b), 213.

J-!-5

to him. l De Gaulle himself may have fe·l t e. need to o'btain

greeter 13upport in France b3' rejoining BEO. At any rate, in

Janua.ry- 1966 negQ'tit\tions resumed, though they only resulted

in agreeing to qieagree, and struoturally the E1J;c stalemate

continued. 2

In the last two or three ye$ra,' lome Westdl-ermana

haVe beeom., disillualGlled. wIth. interne. t1onallam.) Trade

outside th. Common P>'lark,et 11 mo~e important to Gerrtl8nythen

to France'. Was the EEe ,aIm of • oommon eeol"l'oml<l 'policy

IIeally'sole to aeoomodate, the be1&t1nt$re$te of hot1'lout­

wQ:rdlook1bg Germlnyandlrrward look\1ngFranee?' Some, .' . "

Germans btgan to wonder"lt REO ,w.,. nota d:rag on 'the 'Germany

ec,o.notny. 'Fort tne1'l1E}J;(j was,me:ant to give Germany 'apa,th back

toaoeept8.fte~ Ell 8. natlons.nd 0n.oe thQtwaaachieveq. the

appealwe.s. gre$tly dlmlnl$hed.4 Germanyin'1964 h.d >the

thtlid large.t g:rOlanat1opal produot!rl' the ',We"l'ld:~t,t 1$

-nowbnd.ar' th~t Wl111~';and~ has deelAX'ed;"W.·:cWe,s.t aetrm.ans

cannot' :be an econom1c·'gt..ritand a pollt1eal'dwarf'a·tthe

same, 'time.". ,

'1'0 de Gaulle; whocori$l$tentll,.*-,intait~(tdtnat'lnu.rope

(Deoember-'" ' ~'I~ ;,'t- ';_~'. ',~, ,~,.,)~

1ftHas It, ReallyChanged,ft'$conom1a,t, CCCXVI!11, ·1965), 1173. '. ','-"~

2FurnissJ "French For$:l..gn Policy," 2,31.

3lienr-y c. Wolfe, ttAWorr1ed Look et West Ger~many,n$aturdalR~view, XLIX (March 26, 1966), 22.

4scnmakel, 287. 5Wolfe, 48.

461s made up ot nation at. tea, there w•• nothing unusual or

unexpected in German nationalism coming to the fore. It

. a.lw.·Y's existed. German reunification wa, .. point or thll

natlon,lietl0 drive. It was the desire for Ge~m.n re-

unification that led Adenauer to ohoose alllanoewlth the

West in o:rder to be in • strong pos!tlon for flJvent'l.lal

negotiating with the eovlet Union. Erhard oontlnued

that polioy, but .1~h••ll.d the importanoe or the United

States, rather thIn F:tlropem integration, to German re­

unification. During the Adenauer year8, de atlulletrled

to establish Weet Germany'_ role ••• divided state,

oontrolled by the European Community, and .! an effective

ally in .trengthen1ng the West with. focus on France,l

Erhard ohallenged th~. European view and did not consider

independence trom the Un! ted St.~te. in the best intereat

of the Federal Republio. De Gaulle had uaed the crises

in EEO in an attempt to pressure Germany into loosening

tle$ with the United St.tel. Hie realization th.t Weat

Germany wae not going to play the role that he had eat

for he~ led de G.ull~ to consider a new Ge~man pollcy.

If • d.lv1d~d Germ.Tty would not eerve Franoe'. purpose,

pe:rhape ., reunified one would. At the Februa.Y' 4, 1965

presa oonfepenoe, President de Gaulle said that German

reunification was an objeot of French foreign policy, and

1Godfrey, 130.

47that the price ot Oe%'man x-eunlt1oatlon Wl.8 an agreement on

armaments and trontlere. The moat common 1nte~p~etatlon

put on de Gaulle's reference to armaments was that he meant

no nuolear weapon. for Germans; it was also alsumed that

when he spoke of frontiers he meant the Oder...N.,1e.e line. 1

In.addition, he demanded that Germany had to be 1m ttaaaurted

factor tor p.aoe and progre.s." But how could Germany be

kept assuredly peaceful within the boundaries oontaining

East and 'Weat Oermany a. they ex1.'.d. In 19651 E••tern

Europe had to be brought 1n'o <tont.in aermany 1n the e.st

while France ·provided thai ••rv1ce in the west, For this

purpo•• UJJ;agre,ement Lwlth the Sovl.' Un'ion wal neoesaary.2

Mutual Franoo-Ru•• ian d••ire to .ee nucl.ar arm. kept out

ot Germany and to .ee AmeJ"1omtJ"OOP.l~aveEuJ"ope provided

the basis toJ" the hope that .uch an asr~ement coUld be

reaohed. De Gaulle antic1pated thai d1.~.gr.ementa between~;

Peking ap.d fvloloo'W would make the SOV1.t1~ Un1onmor$ w1111ng'\

to seek the benetita to b. derived rromt cooperation w1th

France on a·mutual Germanpo11cy. De a.ulle ba.ed hi•

.design, on two .ssumptions t One was tha,t the Soviet Union

would part with East Germany; the leoond wa. that Germany

1ftGrPMykO Oome. to Pari.," The Econom1at, COX1I1(May 1, 1965), 510,

2Joeeph Kraft, "What Does de Gaulle Want?"- CurrentXXXV (May, J.966), 10,.

would acoept dominion by the ~eli of Europero~ the sake of

national reun1on. l

Theneoeseary px-erequls1te to de Gaulle's neW Germ.an

policy was. Franoo-Rusalan rapprochement. Khrulchev'a

I!IUCOeSBors', aware ot Franco-German dl seord, 'published two

messagee ana two editorial. in PraVda and Izvestia laying

th~ groundwork: tormbJ:'e oordial rela tiona between Jiloaoow

and Plri.~2 The tlrat odnoret. 'action wa•• Prenchgrlnt

ot seven year credit. to the Bovle' Union 10 a Franco­

Russian 'trade agreement in Ootob.~ 1964. Then de Gaulle's

speech on a.man reunification 11'1 1965wa. followed up bY'

a change ot'Ru.a1m atnb••••dor.:' the higher ranking

'Valerian Zor!n X'eplaoed 'SeztgeY' Vlnogradov .s arub.seador to

France, and'thl8 wa. taken to 1ndio.teau.sian 'reoeptivene8s

to French appro a oheI. On MaY' 1, 196$ Hu. .1. t. Fo:re1gn

Minister Andr.l Grom1ko visited Paria, ar.d Germany. wa. the

primary 1.iued1scu•••d during tnl. viali. At about the

.am. time there ooourred an int.rest1ng indireot 111u••

tration ot a posBible 'rapprochement: the Soviet Union

ohose the Fr$noh system of color telev1elon over those ot

west· Ge~any and the UnIted Statel, -.nd moet of Eastern

Tmrope, including East Germany followed the Soviet's lead;,' ,

1rtDe Gaulle's Golden Gate," Eoonomist, COXIV (Feb­ruary 1.3, 196.$) ,6$4..

, ,. 2"~r1ehdlY Breeie!," Eoonomist, COXIII (October 31,1964), 492.

49in that choioe. Th1a meant that if We8v Germany followed

through on 1'15 own 8"8tem or on the Amerioan system, it

would not be able to ~e·.c~ East German soreen$. In this

way, Fra~:UH'> and the Soviet Union quickly .howed west

Germany how effectively they oan work together.

Being in the middle, We.t Germany did not like the

turn French polioy! took, Welt Germany wa. pleased when

France approved the German propos.l that the United st.'.a,Br1tam and france tluSg•• ' to the Soviet Union the setting

up ot a permanent committee to study German reun1fleatlon.2

But later developmenta, beg1nn1ns with the long term credits

which Franoe' extended to the Soviet Union, aroused west

German hOltll1ty.

1Herbert Luthy, "De Gaulle: Pose and Policy," Foreign

Afta1ra, XLIX! (July, 1965),' $62,

2nLove in • Cold Olimate," Eoonomist, eCXIV (January23, 1965), 328~ I

v• OON CLUSI ON

In spite or the Ghange. that have taken place 1n hil

tactic., President de Gaulle'. long range go.la remained

unchanged. Whether hi. words were uttered in 1946 or 1965,

when de Gaulle spoke ot France he insIsted that her'dee­

tiny we•••• great uld 1ndep.ndent world power. To live

this part, F~.noe must be aecurely protected militarily,

soundly established economloally,and sutficiently re­

spected diplom•. tically. Any polIcy aL--necl at obtaining'

the•• Frenoh object!••• had to oonsider Germany'. position.

Frenoh government. tried to keep Germany unarmed or in a

subordinate po.ltlon ml11tax-11y through the demilitari­

zation plan. ot the post war year., through the EDe effort.

ot the early 1950's, and through NATO limit. in the 1960·s.

The l •• t trend dl.oernable in Frenoh pollcy, whioh became

clear in 1964 and 196$, WI' the lugg•• tlon or • cont.in­

ment ot Germany by France and Ea.tern Europe. Despite

the effort. ot French governments, however, Germlny by

1965 had. revived militarily a. evldencedby a nationll

army wholly committed to NATO and by involvement in the

'MLF projeot.

Eoonom1c dealings with w•• t Germany were inevit.ble

considering France and Germany's geographl0 position 1n

the heart of Western ~urope. 'l'he first postwar policy ot

e~plo1t.tion of Germany oeased to be the only French

51Approaoh when Marshall P18n aid became available. The

.moat durable contribution to Franeo-Germ.n rel•. tione W'.s

the establishment or the European Community. In spite or

Technioal diffioultlel end divergent viewpoints, the

European Community had accomplished mueh in European in­

duetrial recovery. Even de GaUlle, 'Who disagreed fund.·

mentelly with the lntegratlonlata aspeots ot the Com­

munity, oontinued French participation in EEC and worked

to implement BEe in order to advance French economio in­

tereeta. In partlcul.r in the rleld of agriCUlture there

was French advantage in aerm.n oooperation in EEC.

France _merged from World War II a. • power of

aecond,'not tlr_t rank. H.~ view. regarding postwar

Germany did not carry enough weight with her a111&8 to b,

effeotive. When French functionalist. plaoed France at

the tore of the Europe.n unlflca tlon movemen t, they took

the first step toward r~.toring French prestige. Through

leadership in the European Community Franc8 made her In­

fluence tel t in Germany •. s well as in other part! of the

world, But the Fourth Republio, for the moat p.~t, be­

lieved in a stl'ong Atlantio alliance as • means or present­

ing a d1plom.tlc.ll~· unified front,. When de Gaulle re­

tux-ned to leadership in Franoe, he e,tabllshed, on the

oontrary, an independent Frenoh foreign polioy which di­

reotly used the Community machinery to further French dip­

lomatic alma. When he decided that the l!:uropean bal moe or

$2power had ohanged, the Frenchpl'eeldent .fo:rmul.t~d his own

pollcy on hqwtod,eal with Germany, .eek1ng ne1 the%- .<1.v~se'

o:r con.eent -from ~r.nce'. allies,. Whatever twistlor tUM'

l'e+.at1o.ns w1th·:Germany m.y t.~e,.Pre.1dent de Gaulle e.­tabl1abed the tenent. that French polioy will be. lnde~

pen~f);no•• -lld that Germany mu.t aerv. that,tenent. 02:'

Frattoo.Qel'nlan, ~el.t1~n. wl1lnou,progre•• smoothly_

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