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8/10/2019 De Janvry and Lynn Ground-Source,Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America(1978)
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8/10/2019 De Janvry and Lynn Ground-Source,Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America(1978)
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TYPESANDCONSEQUENCESF LAND EFORM
INLATIN MERICA
by
Alain de Janvry nd Lynn Ground*
Since the Mexican revolution nd in particular the Punta del Este charter
of the Organizationof American States
in
1961, the issue of land reformhas
been raging
n Latin America.
Most countries
of
the continenthave
had
at least
some
kind of land
reform,
nd in
many cases
it
has led to significant ocial
change. Yet,
no
literature xists that analyzes systematicallythe process of
land
reform
n terms of the
dynamics of the global social system n which it
occurs. That is one need which this paper seeks to meet. The other s to sys-
tematically lassify
and
reforms n Latin
America accordingto
a
theoretically
consistentmodel based on the concepts of modes of production and social
classes and to discuss
the
consequences
of the
different ypes of reforms ela-
tive
to a
set of
criteriaderived
from he
ogic
of
public
reforms.
The key aspects of the nature of capitalism n Latin America are first peci-
fied. This permitsus to identify ts major economic and social contradictions
and
hence the logic
of state
intervention hroughpublic reforms
n
an
attempt
to counteract
hese
contradictions.
We
focus,
n
particular,
n the
problems
of
stagnation of
food
production relative
to
effectivedemand
and of social ten-
sions associated withrural poverty, or which resolutionby programsof land
reform
as been sought. By identifying hierarchy f factors hat explain stag-
nation and poverty,we then construct a typologyof land reformsbased on
these factors.Seventeen land reform
rograms
n
ten countries
are thus classi-
fied.
Their impacts
on
production
and
poverty can then be
derived fromthe
extent to which different
ypes
of reforms
ffect
he
factors that are the root
causes of these contradictions.
ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL
PROBLEMS OF LATIN AMERICAN
AGRICULTURE:
THE LOGIC FOR
REFORM
The social-class structure f peripheral capitalism in Latin
America
and
the economic and social contradictions hataccompany theprocess of capital
accumulation provide
a
convenient analytical framework
to determine both
the
ogic
and the imitsof
reformsAmin, 1976;
de
Janvry
nd
Garramon,1977).
Under
domination of the class alliance that includes the dependent bourgeo-
*The
authorsare
respectively
memberof
the
facultyofthe
Departmentof
Agricultural nd Re-
source
Economics
at the
Universityof
California,
Berkeley, nd an
economist
at the
Economic
Commissionfor
Latin
America,
Santiago, Chile.
This article s
a
revised
version
of
Giannini
Foun-
dation
Paper No. 530.
90
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8/10/2019 De Janvry and Lynn Ground-Source,Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America(1978)
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DE JANVRY
AND GROUND:TYPES
AND
CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND REFORM
91
isie, compradorclass,
and
landed elite,
the patternof accumulation
is funda-
mentally"socially disarticulated."
n this case, the marketfor ndustrydevel-
ops principally
either abroad (in export-oriented conomies)
or in the con-
sumptionof the upper classes, originatingn profitsand rents (after mport
substitutionndustrialization) Pinto,
1976:114).
This
impliesthat wages are not
a significant
ource of effective emand and that the logic of capitalist accu-
mulation
requires
cheap
labor and an
increasinglyregressive
distribution f
income.
The
economy
is
also
"sectorally
disarticulated" since backward link-
ages
in raw materials
and
industrialproduction re largely bsent. This implies
that
the
balance of
payments
s an
effective
onstraint
n
the developmentof
the
production
apacity.
Disarticulated
accumulation is marked by serious contradictions and
in
particularby
a
limited domestic market, ow savings capacity,
and foreign x-
change
bottlenecks.
The
objective
for
cheap
labor also
implies that food prices
must be maintained ow. The result s a tendencyfor the productionofwage
foods
to
stagnate.
And the cost of
labor power is also reduced by "functional
dualism"
whereby semiproletarianization
f
large segmentsof the peasantry
allows
for
part
of
subsistence
needs to
be
produced
in
peasant agriculture
nd
hence wages
to
be collapsed below
the cost of maintenanceand reproduction
of
the
households. In this
process, peasant
agriculture
s both functionalized o
the
needs
of the
capitalist
mode
of
production
and
increasinglydestroyedas
producer
of
commodities,
s it is
dispossessed
of
control
of means of produc-
tion
by
transformation
f the social relationsof
precapitalist griculture
nd by
competition
with
capitalist agriculture.
And it
is from
among
these
impover-
ished ruralmasses thatpolitical demands for and and the possibilityof a de-
stabilizingpeasant-worker
lliance
emerges.
Agricultural
tagnation
s
explained
by
a
variety
of factors
hat nclude
the
land-tenure
system
dominated
by large-scale
estates with absentee manage-
ment,
ontrol
of
the
state
by
the
agrarian
oligarchy,
nd
cheap
food associated
with
the
logic
of
cheap
labor under
socially
disarticulated accumulation. For
increased food
production
to
obtain, progressive entrepreneurial
behavior
must
exist
(land tenure), technology
and
public
services must be available
(control
of
the
state),
and
the terms
of trade
must
permitprofitability
f invest-
ment
n
yield-increasing
nnovations
cheap food). Any
of
these factors
s nec-
essary
but
not
sufficient:
ufficiency equires
all three to
obtain
simultaneous-
ly. Yet,there s a hierarchyn the determination f thesefactorson theproduc-
tion
performance
f
agriculture
hat
runs,
n
decreasing
order of
importance,
fromcheap food,
to control of the state
by
its
landed
elites,
and
to the
land-
tenure
system:
cheap
food blocks
productive
nvestments
nd
reproduces
the
need
forcontrol
of the state
by
the traditional lites
in
order to derive
compen-
satory
nstitutional
ents;
and
institutional
ents,
under
cheap food,
nsure
the
superiorprofitability
f the extensive
atifundio
which
also
rests on
functional
dualism
with
peasant
agriculture.
The
impact
of land reforms n food
production
can be derived from
peci-
fying
which of
these
limiting
actors can be relaxed
by
different
ypes
of
re-
forms.
We,
consequently,
construct
n the next section a
typology
of land
re-
formsbased on these factors.
All land reforms
n Latin
America
during
the twentieth entury, xcepting
the
Cuban,
have
had the
purpose
of
fomenting
he
development
of
capitalism
in
agriculture.
n all these
cases,
the
purpose
of and
reforms
was to counteract
some
of the economic
and social contradictions hat
characterized,
t
particu-
lar
points
in
history,
he
development
patterns
of
Latin American
countries
under
the
logic
of social disarticulartion.
et,
the
origins
of
land reforms
nd
the
particular
forms
hey
have
assumed have
varied
enormously
over time
pe-
Latin
American erspectives:
ssue
19,
Fall
1978, Vol.
V,
No. 4
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92
LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
riods and countries.
The social origin of
land reforms hanged dramatically
n the late 1950s
with the emergence of
surplus labor. Prior to this date, the scarcity of labor
which prevailed in most parts of Latin America conflictedsharply with the
objective need forcheap
labor
in
commercial agriculture.
he resolutionof this
contradiction
equired
that rural abor be
prevented
fromgetting ccess to land
as freeholders
nd from
capturing ts opportunity
ost on labor markets.The
precapitalist
atifundio erved this
purpose ideally
by monopolizingthe bulk of
the land
and
by bonding abor
to the
estates through
debt peonage and extra-
economic
coercion.
As a
result,
the
origins
of
land
reformmovements during
this
period
were found
primarily
n
the exercise of subjective forces by intel-
lectual
and
peasant groups
n reaction to the severe social
contradictions sso-
ciated with the colonato
and aparceria forms of labor
exploitation. All these
reforms
were
initiated
from utside
the
traditional
nstitutional rocess, usual-
ly afterviolent outbursts.This was true of and reforms n Mexico (1917),Gua-
temala
(1952),
Bolivia
(1952),
and to some extentVenezuela
(1959).
By the ate 1950s,
the emergenceof a labor surplusin agriculture roke the
logic
of the
internal ubsistence
economy colonato
and
aparceria)
and
provid-
ed the
objective
basis for
intervention
y
the state
to
eliminate remnants of
precapitalist
social relations
through egal
reforms.The economic
purpose
of
unleashing
the
development
of
capitalism
in
agriculture
was to increase food
production
and
agricultural xports
in order to
meet
the
cheap
food and for-
eign exchange requirements
f
industry.
Reform
was
also
spurred by subjec-
tive
forces
originating
n:
peasant militancy
timulated
by
the
example
of the
Cuban revolution thatgeneratedthreats and fears of agrarian revolutions n
many countries;
he extension of the
social
contradictions ssociated with
sur-
plus rural
labor to the urban sectors under
the form of
rapid migration
nd
extensive
marginality;
nd
in
the nternational
ressures
derived from he Pun-
ta del
Este
charter f the
Organization
ofAmerican States in 1960.
LAND REFORM
IN LATIN
AMERICA
A
Typology
of Land
Reforms
Corresponding
to the
contradictionsof disarticulated
accumulation, land
reforms
have both
political
and
economic
purposes. The political purpose is
fundamentally
o
further
nd
stabilize the social
relations of capitalism by
changing
the
class
structure
n
agriculture o
eliminate the landed elite from
thosegroups controlling hestate,creating pettybourgeoisie from mong the
peasantry,
and
eliminating
emifeudal forms of labor exploitation. The eco-
nomic
purpose
is fundamentally o develop the forces
of production n agricul-
ture
by putting
dle
lands
in
production, ncouraging he reorganization f pre-
capitalist
estates
on
a
capitalist basis, inducing
their
modernization, nd trans-
formingunker
estates
into
medium-size
commercial farms.A typology f and
reformsmust reflect hese varied purposes and means of achieving them t t s
to be useful
for
valuating
their uccess.
It
is
important
o
distinguish,
s
a
first
tep,
between
lands that become
incorporated
n
the
"reform"
nd
"nonreform" ectors
in
the
process
of
land
reform.
The
reform ector
is
composed
of lands
appropriated usually expro-
priated)from heformerandlordsand adjudicated on a variety f nstitutional
bases
(familyfarms,
ooperatives,
and
state
farms)
to
the beneficiaries
of the
reform.
t is in the reform ector
that
peasants
are
given
access to
land
and that
a
petty bourgeoisie
is
eventually
created.
The nonreform
ector
includes the
unexpropriated
ands retained
or sold
privately
by
theirformer
owners,
the
lands
that are
subdivided
by
their owners
to
avoid
expropriation through
a
restriction
n
maximum size
(hijuelas),
and the
"reserves"
which the
former
owners
are allowed to retain
or sell.
The nonreform ector
can
thus
nclude
the
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DE JANVRY
AND GROUND:TYPES
AND
CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND REFORM
93
lands of
theprecapitalist anded elite, the
unker anded elite,or the capitalist
farmers, epending
on thetype of reform.
Reform
nd nonreform ectors
play
different conomic
and political roles
in the process of land reform.While land reformshave usually been analyzed
in termsof
the
creation
of a reform
ector
(the more glamorous and visible
aspect
ofreform),
we will
show
this
to be
only one, generally econdary,aspect
of
land reform nd the impact
of
the reformon the nonreform
ector
to be
another mportant,
ftenprincipalaspect of
any reform.
The
typology
f and reforms
n
Table
1
is
based
on the impact of different
reforms
n the two determinants f stagnationthat can be
affectedby a
land
reform:
1)
the and-tenure ystem, haracterized by the dominant
mode ofpro-
duction
in
agriculture precapitalist
or
capitalist)
and typeof farm enterprise
(latifundioor commercial
farms);and (2) the social class
that has hegemonic
control
over the
state (landed
elite or
bourgeoisie).
This gives three categories
of agrariansystemsbefore the inititation f land reform: hose dominatedby
precapitalist atifundios, y
capitalist
atifundios, rby commercial
farms.The
precapitalist
atifundio
s,
of
course,
found in
precapitalist
agriculture
while
the
capitalist
latifundio and commercial farms both correspond
to
capitalist
agriculture.
On the other
hand,
control of the state by
a
landed
elite
obtains
under
a structure
haracterized
by predominance
of
either
the
precapitalist
or
thecapitalist atifundio.
Under
a
structure
n which the commercialfarmpre-
dominates,
he state s controlled
by
the
bourgeoisie
at
large.
Each of these
three
systems
can be transformed hrough
and reform
nto
either
of
the other two. In Table
1,
there
consequently
exist nine
paths
that
relate
the
agrarian systems
before
and
afterreform.'
n
all of these reforms,
reform ector is added to the dominanttypeof farmenterprise hrough and
expropriation
and
redistribution
n the form of collective
or
family
farms.
While some
reforms o so
far
as to change
both the dominant farm type
and
control
of the
state,
the
major
determinant f
stagnation cheap
food
-
re-
mains
in
all
cases
a
given
constant that
they
cannot affect.This
implies
that
functional
dualism
(the
transfer f
cheap
food into
cheap semiproletarian
a-
bor)
also remains
as a derived constant.
Land reforms re thus
severely
con-
strained
n their
mpact
on either
production
by cheap food)
or
poverty
by
functional
dualism)
due
to the
permanence
of
the
logic
of accumulation under
social
disarticulation.
The typologyof reforms ontains threemajor types,all of which are un-
dertaken
with
the
capitalist
mode of
production
dominant in the
country
at
large: (1)
reforms
hat
imply
some redistribution
f land but do not
challenge
the
precapitalist
atifundios'
domination
of
agriculture,2)
reforms hat
pro-
mote the
transition o
capitalism
in
agriculture
oward either
unker
or
farmer
roads
of
development,
and
(3)
reforms
within
capitalist
agriculture,
ither to
induce
a shiftfrom
unker
to farmer
roads of
capitalist
development
or to re-
distribute
he
land within
unker
or farmer oads.2To each
type
of reform
hat
Table
1
is
to
be read
as a
matrix
of
transitions
mong
states
ofthe agrarian
structure
efore
and
after
and reform.
A same
country
can thus
re-enter
he
matrix
more than
once,
as
land
reform
programs
re
redefined
over time,
but
it
must
always
re-enter
he
matrix
n the state
to
which
it
was transformedy theprevious and reform.
2The unker
or Prussian)
and
farmer
oads
correspond
to the
patterns
of
development
of
capital-
ism
in
agriculture
dentified
yLenin 1974).
In
the
unker
road,
the anded
elites
become
the
capi-
talists
nd
hence
maintain
controlover
the state.
The social
relations
of
production
on
their
states
are
redefined
from
nternal
peasant
labor,paying
debit
in labor
services
and
kind
and
subject
to
extra-economic
oercion,
to external
proletarian
abor.
In
thefarmer
oad,
some
peasants
concen-
trate
he
means
of
production,
hire abor
power,
and
become
a rural
bourgeoisie
while the
majority
loses
control
of
themeans
of
production
and
is
increasingly
emiproletarianized
nd
proletarian-
ized.
In this case,
the rural bourgeoisie
hares
control
of the
state
with
the
bourgeoisie
at
large.
LatinAmerican erspectives:
ssue
19,
Fall 1978,
Vol.
V,
No.
4
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94
LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
implies
either transition mong
modes or a shift mong roads,
there also
cor-
responds
the
possibility
f counterreform.
Undoubtedly,
he classification
of
many
of the reforms
n Table
1
will
be
questioned. Each is based on data and descriptionsof modes of production,
land tenure,
nd the distribution
f
public
resources
and services
among
differ-
ent
farm nterprises nd social
classes (todetermine
ontrolofthe
state)
in
the
pre- and
post-reformeriods.
Empirical
nformation n each reform
s given
n
Table
2. The
specific
allocation of one or more cases
to each
type
of
reform
will be briefly
iscussed.
Redistributive
reforms.The three
types
of
reform
on the diagonal
of
Table
1 leave both
the dominantmode
of
production
n
agriculture
nd
the
classes
in
control of the state
unchanged,
affecting nly quantitatively
the
land-tenure
ystemby changing
the distribution
f land
among
different
ypes
of enterprises.
These
reforms re
thus,
n
essence,
redistributive.
he
reform
itselfdoes not relax any of the fundamentaldeterminants f stagnation.Three
types
can be identified:
edistributive
eforms nder the
preserved
dominance
of
the
(1)
precapitalist
atifundio
Precapitalist
Redistributive
PKR)],
(2) capi-
talist latifundio
[Junker
Redistributive
JR)],
and
(3)
the commercial
farm
[Farmer
Redistributive FR)].
In
every
case a
reform ector
s
created
by
expro-
priating
ither
dle
lands
(PKR),
or lands
already
under
capitalist
unker JR)
or
farmer FR)
use.
An example
of
a
precapitalist
redistributive eform
s the 1962-1967
and
reform
n Chile.
It
was intendedto induce
a more ntensive
pattern
f land
use
on theprecapitalist
atifundioswithout
altering
he social relations
of
produc-
tion
in
agriculture
r
affecting
he
privileged
position
of the
landowning
class.
In fact,no land was expropriatedunderthe 1962 law untilFrei assumed office
in
1965
see
Table
2).
In
the
decades since the expropriation
of the latifundia
class in the
1934-1940
period,
the
land
reform
n
Mexico
has
redistributed
and from
com-
mercial
farms to the
ejidos
and is thus classified as a
farmer redistributive
reform.
Transition
from
precapitalistmode to
unker road. These reforms
nduce a
transition
rom
precapitalist
o
capitalist
agriculture itherby threats
f expro-
priation
f
and
remains underutilized
or by making emifeudal
social relations
illegal.
The internal subsistence economy
is
eliminated,
a reform
sector
is
created,and theprecapitalist atifundio s thustransformedntoa large-scale,
capitalist
"junker") enterprise
hiringwage
laborers
often emiproletarians.
The landed
elite retains controlof
the
state
and,
hence, only the
thirddetermi-
nant of
stagnation,
rchaic land
tenure,
s eliminated.Both the
1968 land re-
form
n Colombia and the 1964 reform
n
Ecuador provide
clear examples of a
reform
which
affects
a transition
from
precapitalist
to
capitalist
relations of
production.
Following
the 1961 redistributive
eform,
he 1968 legislation in
Colombia
prohibited
parceria (rents
n
exchange
for
usufruct
f
and)
and ex-
propriated
the land farmed under
aparceria
and
distributed t to
the
occu-
pants.
The 1964 reform
n
Ecuador
similarly proscribed
huasipungaje (labor
services
n
exchange
for
usufruct
f
and)
and
titled he plots to
the occupants.
The classificationof the 1953 land reformn Bolivia as a transition o the
junkerway (as opposed
to a farmer
way)
is based on the fact
that, with
the
important xception
of the
Cochabamba
region,
most andowners
were
able
to
retain
part
of all
of
their
holdings.
Of the
11,426 properties
ffectedby expro-
priation
proceedings
through 970,only
1,441
were classified
as
latifundios
nd
suffered
partial
or total
expropriation
Ergueta,
1973:68).
The
remaininghold-
ings
were
either lassified as
"medium
properties"
nd
thus
were
entitled
o be
retained
n the amout of 80-350hectares
n
the
Altiplano,
24-200hectares
n
the
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DE
JAN
VRY
AND
GROUND:TYPES AND
CONSEQUENCES
OF
LAND
REFORM
95
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96
LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
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8/10/2019 De Janvry and Lynn Ground-Source,Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America(1978)
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DE'IANVRY
AND
GROUND:TYPES AND
CONSEQUENCES
OF
LAND
REFORM
97
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98
LATIN
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Yungas (valleys),
and
180-600
hectares
in
the Oriente;
or classified as "agri-
cultural enterprises" nd
thus entitledto be retainedat 400 to 800 hectares
in
the Altiplano,
80-500hectares n the
Yungas,
and
2,000
hectares
n
the
Oriente.3
Also, cattle
ranches were allowed an exemption
of
50,000 hectares
in
the
Or-
iente.At the same time,most observersagree thatthe colonos (peasants who
provided
rents
nd labor services
to
landlords n exchangeforusufruct f and)
received titlesonly
to
the
plots
they occupied at
the timeof the reformHey-
duck, 1974;Burke,1974; Carter,
1964).
That
is, although
the colonato
was
abol-
ished,
the
productive
resources used by peasants were not generally
ncreased
bythe and
reform.
Also, many
of the
agricultural
policies applied
after
the
reform
ctually
strengthened
he economic
position
of
the landed
elites, particularly
hose
in
the
Oriente.These included
price
supports,
ubsidized creditsand machinery,
and
the construction
f
a
sugar refinery
n
Santa Cruz
(Heath,
Erasmus,
and
Buechler,1969;Clark, 1974).Peasants, by contrast,have receivedonlyminimal
credit
nd access to
public
services
FAO, 1968).
Transition
from precapitalist
mode to farmer road. This type of reform
promotes
a
transition n
both
the
agrarian
mode
of
production
and
the
classes
in
control
of the state.
Agriculture
s
transformed rom
precapitalist o capital-
ist,
thus
changing
the basis of the social relations
of
production
from
nternal
to
external
semiproletarianization.
he
precapitalist
atifundio s
replaced
by
commercial
farms as size limits are
imposed
on
landownership,
and
a reform
sector
is
created. The urban and rural
bourgeoisies displace
the landed elite
from ontrol
of the state.
With
this transfer
f
class
power,
these reforms hus
remove
the
second
(control
of the
state)
as well
as the
third determinant
f
stagnation.Examples ofthistypeof reform re providedby Chile (1967-1973),
Mexico
(1934-1940),
nd Guatemala
(1952-1954).
The 1967
legislation
in
Chile
gave
the state
the
power
to
expropriate
the latifundia
class,
a task
completed
under
the
same law
by
the Allende
government.
At the same
time,precapitalist
relations
of
production
were
prohibited.
Large capitalist
commercial
farms
of
no
more than
80 hectares of basic
irrigated
and
were
thus created. These were
also the salient features
of the ndicated
reforms
n
Mexico and Guatemala.
Shift
from
unker
road
to farmer
road.
These reformsoccur within
the
capitalist
mode of
production
and
bring
about a shiftfrom the
junker
to
the
farmer oad
of
development.
Since
they
are aimed
at
transforming
he basis
of
the
agrarian
structure
rom
apitalist
atifundio o commercial
farms,
ceiling
on landholdings s imposed.The landed elite is eliminated, nd thebourgeoisie
assumes
control of
the
state. The second determinant f
stagnation
s
relaxed.
The
military's
and
reform
n
Peru
(1969) provides
the
only example of this
type
of reform.
Under
the
1964
land
reform, recapitalist
relations of
produc-
tion
(yanaconaje)
had been
prohibited.
The
military ffectively estroyed
the
landed
elite
class
by imposing
and
enforcing
limiton the size of
andholdings
to
50
irrigated
hectares
on the coast and
30
in the
Sierra
or
to
their
productive
equivalent
of rainfed and
(Caballero,
1977).
Transition
from
unker
road to
precapitalist
mode. These counterreforms
induce
a transition rom
apitalistagriculture
ack to
noncapitalist griculture.
There is clearlyno objective basis for such a counterreform hen surplus la-
bor
is
prevalent,
s is the
case in
most
Latin American
countries
oday.
If abor
were
scarce,
such
a
counterreform
ould be
conceivable; indeed,
isolated inci-
dents of such
reversals
can
be uncovered
in
the
history
of
the Bolivian land
reform
Clark,
1974).
Transition from farmerroad to precapitalist mode.
Such counterreforms
3The survivial of the
landowning class has
been treated by Graeff 1974), Heath, Erasmus,
and
Buechler
1969),
and Clark 1974).
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DE
JANVRY
AND GROUND:TYPES
AND CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND
REFORM
99
also
induce
a
transition
ut of the capitalist
mode ofproduction
s commercial
farms
are transformed
nto noncapitalist
latifundio.
A concrete
example is
provided
by the
events
in
Guatemala
afterthe
overthrowof
the Arbenz
gov-
ernment nd reversalof the land reform n 1954.At thetime of the counterre-
form,
Guatemala was
not yetcharacterized
by surplus
labor. As a result,
not
only
did the counterreform
eturn ractically
all expropriated
ands but it
also
reinstituted
he
colonato system.
The second
and
thirddeterminants
f
stag-
nation
were thereby estored.
Shift
fromfarmer
oad to unker
road.
These counterreforms
ccur
within
thecapitalist
mode of
production
and create
a shiftbetween
roads of develop-
ment
from
farmer o
junker.
Commercial farms give
way to capitalist
atifun-
dios. This type
of counterreform
ccurred
in
Chile after the
military unta
seized power
in 1973.While the
reform ector ncluded 39 percent
of thetotal
agricultural
and
area in
1973,
it had been reduced
to only
9 percentin
1975
(Fazio, 1978;Fenner,1977).
The typology
presented
here can be contrasted
withalternative
ypologies
of
and
reforms
eveloped
by
Griffin
1974:chapter
),Frank 1969:
chapter17),
Barraclough 1973),
Warriner
1971), Flores
(1972),
and Feder
(1965). None
of
these
typologies
uses the
concepts
of mode
of
production
transitions)
or of
social
class structure
nd
control
of the
state (shifts
mong roads
of develop-
ment).
Redistributive and economic reforms
are
usually
characterized
as
"modernizing"
or
"technocratic"while socio-economic
and social reforms
re
classified
as
"reformist."
n
these
typologies,
he Cuban
experience
is charac-
terized
as
a "radical" reform.This is, in our
view, incorrect:
he Cuban
land
reform
was
executed
in
the context
of a transition
o socialism
and, as such,
was not a reform ince it was not aimed at reproducing he dominantsocial
relations
n the national economy,
those of peripheral
capitalism.Such
typolo-
gies
are,
in
addition,
nsufficient o
explain
the
expected consequences
of
re-
forms
because
the criteria n
which
they
are based are
specified
ad hoc rather
than derived
from theoreticalframework.
hey
also often rroneously
onsi-
der
together
and reforms
hat
occur
in central and
peripheral
countries
al-
though
he
contradictions f accumulation
and
hence the
purpose
ofreformism
are
markedly
different
n the two
cases.
Consequences
of
Land Reforms
The major economic and political impacts of land reforms an be summa-
rized
in the
following
ive observations:
-
Observation
: The
role of land
reforms
n
expanding
the domestic
market
for
the
modern ndustrial
ectorand thus
contributing
o social articulation
via
increased
peasant
consumption
xpenditures
s
insignificant.
This
observation
s
important
ecause land
reformhas
often
been viewed
by
the
national
bourgeoisie
and the
political
forces
promoting
national
bour-
geois
revolution
s
a means
of
transforming
henational
economy
from
ocial-
ly
disarticulated
to
articulated.
For this
to
happen,
however,
the
resulting
m-
ployment
nd
income
effectswould
have
to
be
sufficient
o
permit
benefited
peasants
to have
access to the
consumption
of modern-sector
ndustrial
goods.
Clearly, peasant incomes before and reformswere far below the neces-
sary
evels
to allow
for
nysignificant
onsumption
of
modern-sector
urables.
In Chile
the
average
monthlyper
capita
incomes, ncluding
the
imputed
value
of
wages
in
kind,
of
peasants
and landless
agricultural
workers
prior
to
the
reform
qualled $108
(or $65
cash
per capita
incomes) [CIDA-Chile,
1966].
In
Ecuador the
per
capita
income
forthe same
groups
was
$33.50
CIDA-Ecuador,
1965),
and
in Peru
from
17
to
$47 (CIDA-Peru,
1966).
Land
reform
rograms,
however,
tended
to have a limited
mpact
on
peas-
LatinAmerican
erspectives:
ssue
19, Fall 1978,
Vol.
V,
No.
4
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100
LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
ant
incomes. First,
hey
produced
a small
net employment
ffect.On
the
one
hand,
fewof those
who
actually
received
land
were landless
or external
peas-
ants,
most
having
been
laborers
on the latifundio.
On the
other hand,
during
and afterthe process of land reform, ome peasants were expelled fromthe
latifundio
as the
number
of
permanent
and seasonal
workers
was
reduced
(Bayer,
1975:33-34,
3).4
And
the
abor
force
was
often lashed when
latifundios
were
privately
ubdivided
to
avoid
expropriation
by
size limitations
Harding,
1973; Barraclough
nd Fernandez,
1974).
The employment
ffect f
the reform
program
n
Ecuador
on
the internal
peasants
-
the
supposed
beneficiaries
of
the reform
illustrates
another
negative
social
impact
of
land
reforms
s
well as
the
objective
logic for
de-
stroying
he
internal
ubsistence
economy
when
surplus
labor
exists.
Because
internal
emiproletarian
abor
was
nearly gratuitous,
t was
overemployed
re-
lativeto
actual
labor requirements
n the
latifundio.
Forthis
reason,
the
inter-
nal peasants were fullyemployed and relativelybetteroffthan the external
peasants.
In commenting
n theeffects
f
the
reform,
IDA
stated:
... the patron
s no longer
obligated
to theworkers.
When
they
were
[internal
easants]
they
enjoyed
habitual
work assignments;
now,
in contrast,
they
must
compete
in the
labormarket,
which
allows
the
patronsto
tailoremployment
o their
abor
requirements
(CIDA-Ecuador,
1965:451).
In other
words,
the
expropriation
of the
internal
subsistence
economy
transformed
abor from
fixedto
a
variable
cost and
thus
made
employment
opportunities
ependent
on
market
conditions.
While
this
may
have
had
a fa-
vorable
impact
on
production,
CIDA
foundthat
twas
notuncommon
for
the
haciendas to reduce employmentby as much as 50 percentafterthe reform
(CIDA-Ecuador,
1965:450).
The Costales
citecases
in
which
employment
f
for-
mer
nternal
peasants
was reduced
by
25 to 50
percent
Costales
and
Costales,
1971:
64
and
282).
The
form
n
which
the reform nterprises
re organized
may
also
create
negative
employment
ffects.
he
cooperatives
established
in
Peru
by
the
mili-
tary's
and
reform
1969-1975)
nd in Chile
underFrei 1967-1973)
provided
real
incentives
to
reduce
or limit
employment.
ndeed,
in the
cooperatives
estab-
lished
on
the
former
ugar
plantations
n
Peru,
members
were extremely
eluc-
tant
to incorporate
new
members,preferring
nstead
to hire temporary
aborers
who
would
not share
in the social
benefits
of the
cooperative
(Horton,
1975).
The same phenomenon was observable in Chile (Zemelman and Petras,
1972:138)
where,
in
addition,
the substitution
f capital
for
abor
on the
land-
reform
ooperatives
was
particularly
ntense.5
On
the other
hand,
the
organization
of the reform
ector
into family
and
subfamily
units,
as
occurred
in Venezuela,
implies
a limited
contribution
o
employment.
n the Venezuelan land-reform
ettlements,
nly
2.1 percent
of
the
total
labor
input
was contracted
from outside
(Wing,
1970:46;
CIDA/
CENDES, 1967).
4The
negative
employment
ffects
f and
reform
re oftenmagnified
by
the reaction
of
landown-
ers to
new
labor
codes
commonly
contained
n
the and
reform aws.
For
instance,
n the
Peruvian
Sierra, andowners expelled the permanentworkersand rehiredthemas temporaryworkersfor
whom
the
minimum
wage
and social securityegislation
did not
apply.
Another
xample
is provid-
ed by
the reaction
of landowners
to the
increase
of
the
minimum
wage
contained
in
the
reform
law
inColombia
(CIDA-Colombia,
1966:
chapter
6 and appendix
5).
"Between
1970and
1972,
the mportation
f
machinery
ncreased
306
percent
while the
mportation
of
fertilizers
eclined
29
percent Barraclough
and
Fernandez,1974:132).
This
strong
rend
of
labor
displacement
n
the
reform
ector
was in great
part
a
consequence
of,
on
the
one
hand,
the
contin-
uing
subsidization
of
capital
and,
on
the
other,
the
policy
of
boosting
the
living
standards
in
the
reform
ector
with
statecredit.
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DE JANVRYAND
GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND
REFORM
101
The income effectof land
reformhas
been equally ambiguous. Reforms
that induce
a
transition
fromthe precapitalistmode to the
farmerroad have
the argestpotential
ncome effect ecause theyentail the eliminationof abso-
lute rents and unremuneratedabor and providefor the diffusionby the state
of yield-increasing echnologies.
Under a
family/subfamily
rganization
n the
reform
ector,
the
implied
net income effectover time is near zero, although
there
may
be a "one shot" increase. Under commercial
or
cooperativereform
units,
he
pontential
net ncome effect s
greater
ince a surpluscan be generat-
ed. Ultimately,
he
impact
on the marketfordurable
goods
will depend on the
general distribution
f the income effect
mong those directly nd indirectly
benefited nd those directly
nd indirectly armed. Given
the absolute
income
transfer,
he more
unequal
the
distribution f
the
transfer,
he greater hepo-
tential mpact
on the market
for
durable
goods.
A
survey
of direct reform eneficiaries
n Venezuela revealed that
37 per-
cent had lower cash incomes after hereform hanbefore, 8 percentremained
unchanged,
and 35
percent
had
higher
ncomes
(Wing,
1970:50).
The
per capita
incomes
of
reform eneficiaries
veraged $129
of
which
$105
was in
cash.
The
sources
of this
income were: 19
percent, onsumption
of
home
production;
35
percent,
ales
of farm
production;
and 46
percent,
outside employment.
This
high degree
of
semiproletarianization
eflects he subsistence nature of the
re-
form
ector. Data
on the
prereform
ncome levels of the beneficiaries
were not
supplied.
In
any event,
t is
clear
that the absolute income levels attained
were
too low
to
permit
significant urchase
of industrial
goods. Indeed,
according
to
Kirby,
n Venezuela
". .
.
the most serious criticism f the and reform o
far
is that
the settlers
beneficiaries)
have been able
to
increase
their purchasing
power to a very imited xtent" Kirby, 975).
A
study of
several of INCORA's
land-reform
rojects revealed similarly
limited
nd often
negative
ncome effects n beneficiaries.Thus
in
the Atlanti-
co #3
project,
production ctually
declined during he first hree years, and
68
percent
of the
rural families had sufferednegative ncome effects n the
first
five years
of
operation Howard,
1976).
A
1966 study on consumption
habits of land-reform eneficiaries
n theLa
Paz region
of
Bolivia
showed
that,
while
nominal consumptionexpenditures
had increased
substantially
433
percent
n
14
years
-
the absolute level
of
familyexpenditures,
101 (or $17 per capita),
was still
far
too
low
to include
purchase of durables (Clark, 1972). And, yet,the groupsurveyedwas among
the
greatest
beneficiaries
f the reform ue to
its
close
proximity
o the La Paz
market.
The most
privileged
beneficiaries
of
the military's
and
reform n
Peru
the
permanent
workers of the
expropriated
ugar plantations
who
became
the
members
of
cooperatives
-
saw
their annual
nominal
wages (advanced
against year-endprofits)
ncrease from
$377
to
$662
between 1968 and 1972,
representing
n
increase
of 33
percent Horton,
1973:69).Again,
however,
the
absolute
income levels of even these most
privileged
reformbeneficiaries
re-
mained too low
to
permit ignificant articipation
n the marketfor ndustrial
goods.
Land reform oes have an impacton themarketforfood and some nondur-
able industrial
goods,
however.6
Nevertheless,
a
significant
hange
in these
markets
would
require
a substantial increase
in
incomes,
a
development
not
ensured
by any type
of
land
reform
er
se. In
addition,
where rents nd
forced
deliveries
at
semigratuitous
rices
are
eliminated
through
and
reform
e.g.,
Bo-
livia
and
Peru), consumption
of
home-produced
food increases.
Thus,
while
diets
improve,
he marketed
urplus
of
food
may
decline
immediately
fter he
6See
the
data on
Bolivia
discussed above.
LatinAmerican
erspectives:
ssue 19,
Fall
1978,
Vol. V, No. 4
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102 LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
reform.
And
obtaining ocial articulation n the basis
of this
effective
emand
would
require
transformation
f
the modern industrial sector
away
fromthe
productionof durable goods, a change beyond the reach of
a
land reform.
In the case of land reforms hatestablish the farmer oad, the elimination
of the
landed elites from ontrolof
the
state
opens
the
way to
the
diffusion f
land-saving techniques and infrastructure evelopment. The resultant
in-
creased
demand
for means of
productionmanufacturedby the modern ndus-
trial sector usually dominatedby
transnational
corporations may be im-
portant.
This does
not, however,
ead
to
social
articulation.Sectoral disarticu-
lation further mplies that increased derived demand for capital goods will
largely
be translated nto ncreased
imports.
Observation II:
The
greatest potential impact on production is obtained
from reforms
hat
promote a transitionto the farmerroad, followed in de-
scending
order
by
those
that nduce
a
shiftfrom
unker
to
farmer,
transition
to unker, nd byredistributive eforms.
This theoreticalordering
s
derived from he effect f each type of
reform
on
the
hierarchy
of
determinants
f
stagnation:
reforms hat
induce
a
transi-
tion
to the farmer oad remove the second and third
determinants; eforms hat
induce
a shift
from
unker
to farmer
remove the
second;
while reforms hat
create
a
transition
to the
junker
road
eliminate the third.
Redistributive e-
forms
do not affect
ny
of
the determinants f
stagnation.
Unfortunately,
or
numerous
reasons this
specific ordering annot be verifieddirectly: he initial
land-tenure
ystems
have been
different
rom
country
o
country;
he
land
re-
forms
have occurred
at
different
imes;
several
countries have
experienced
more
than one
type
of land
reform
e.g., Colombia, Chile,
and
Peru);
land re-
formsthatpromotea transition o the farmerroad have more often than not
been reversed
(e.g.,
the counterreforms
n
Guatemala and
Chile). Finally,
the
expected
effectsof
policy changes
in
terms
of
production performancemay
become
apparent only
after
relatively ong period
of time.
However,
it is
possible
to
verify
hat
government olicy aimed
at increas-
ing production changes
under those land reforms hat induce
either a transi-
tion to
farmer
r a shiftfrom
unker
to
farmer,
oth of
which
imply
control
of
the state
passing
to
the
bourgeoisie.
After he
landed elites were
expropriated
n
Mexico
during
the 1934-1940
period,
the
Mexican state embarked
on a
massive
program
of
agricultural
de-
velopment.The primary mphasis of thisprogramwas on extending he agri-
cultural
frontier
hrough rrigation rojects
and
on
the diffusion
f
biochemical
(land-saving) technologies Hertford, 971). Similarly,
n
Peru,
after
xpropria-
tion
of
the
landed
elite,
the
government
nitiated
the
construction f
massive
irrigationworks,
one of which
will
irrigate 50,000
hectares
USDA, 1977:22).
With
respect
to
production performance,
he
contrasting xperiences
of
Bolivia
and
Mexico
-
the
only
two countries which have
undergone
a
long
and
uninterrupted rocess
of and reform do tend to confirm
he
hypothesis
that
the
potentialproductiongains
are
greatest
when both the second and third
determinants
of
stagnation re
relaxed.
In Mexico
betwen
1934-1938
and
1950-1951,
otal
agricultural output
increased 4.3
percent annually;
between
1948 and 1963, t increased at an annual rate of 6.3 percent;and between 1960
and
1970,
5.8
percent.
For
Bolivia,
the
annual
growth
rates after the reform
were
only
1.2
percent 1951-1964)
nd 1.7
percent 1960-1970) FAO).
Observation III:
The
production
effectof
land
reform s
soughtthrough
the
development
of
capitalism principally
n
the nonreform ector. The func-
tion
of
the nonreform ector
is to increase
the marketed
surplus
of both food
and
exportables
n
order
to reduce
pressure
on
wage
costs
and
relieve the defi-
cit
in the balance
of
payments.Conversely,
he
impact
of
land
reforms
n
pro-
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DE JANVRY
AND GROUND:TYPES
AND
CONSEQUENCES
OF
LAND
REFORM
103
duction forthemarket
hrough he reform ector s
slight.
This
observation follows
from a study of the provisions of land
reform
laws as well as from the
contrasted productionperformancesof reform
nd
nonreform ectors.
The development of
capitalism in the nonreform ector is
encouraged by
law in a variety f ways:
1)
Patterns f extensive and use are
discouraged through hreatsof
expro-
priation
and
incentives for
adoption of more intensive production
methods.
This
approach is typical of all
land reforms nd is
the primarymethodapplied
under reforms
hat seek to
induce the transition o unker agriculture.
2)
Indirect
formsof farm
management absenteeism) are prohibited
or re-
stricted
to corporateholdings. This encourages
direct management and
pre-
sumably
promotes greater
productivity.This provision is typical of
most
reforms.
3) Many land-reformaws dictate the rental or sale of idle lands, thus
promoting more ntensive
pattern f and use.
4)
Through expropriation of the
internal peasant plots,
prohibition of
bonded
labor,
and
institution f
minimum
wage laws, labor is
transformed
from fixed
to a
variable
cost,
and
the social relations of noncapitalist
atifun-
dio
are
transformed nto those of
a
capitalist
enterprise.This is typicalof the
transition eforms.
5) Landlords affectedby
expropriationunder the clause of farm
size are
allowed to
retain
a land
"reserve"
of
maximum
egal
size on which fixed and
variable
working apital
are
concentrated.
Consequently,the ratio ofcapital to
land increases
substantially
on
these farms.This is
typical of the reforms
hat
aim at establishing farmerroad in the nonreformector. The size of the re-
serves
may
also
vary
with
ntensity
f
land
use, thus encouraging he
develop-
mentof the
productive
forces.
6)
To
escape expropriationunder the clauses
restricting he size of
hold-
ings,
latifundios
are
encouraged, informally
or
officially, o subdivide into
smaller
units with the
objective
of
mproving
arm
management
nd
increasing
the
ntensity
f and
use.
These
provisions
of
the
law and
the manner
in
which the law is
applied
thus aim at
promoting
he
development
of the
productive
forces
n
the nonre-
form sector
while
using
the reform ector as an
instrument or this
purpose
morethanas a locus forproduction ncrease.This can be observedthrough he
following
data:
Exemptions
from
expropriation
on
the
basis
of size
-
the so-called "re-
serves"
-
have
generally
been
quite liberal,
as can
be
seen
fromTable
2,
col-
umn
5,
even
under the
Mexican, Chilean,
and Peruvian reforms hat nduced
a
transition
r
a shift o
the farmerroad. Since landowners were
invariably
al-
lowed to
choose the
location of
reserves, they
were
established
on
the best
lands of
the
former atifundio. n most
cases,
since neither
working
capital
(including ivestock)
nor
water
rights
were affected
by
the
reform
Table
2,
column
6),
the and
incorporated
nto the reform ector had been
decapitalized
and lacked
guaranteed
access
to
water while the
capital/land
ratio
had
in-
creased substantially n thereserves.7 here are also innumerableobstacles to
expropriation
contained
in the land-reform
aw,
and
the
enforcement f the
law
was
usually delayed,
thus
allowing
time
to
decapitalize expropriated
ands
and
capitalize
reserves.
Land
which is
intensively
utilized
was
entirely transition
to
junker)
or
partially transition
nd
shift
o
farmer) xempt
from
xpropriation.
Generous
7For
Chile,see
Barraclough nd
Fernandez
(1974:43);
for
Peru,see
Bayer
1975:9); for
Colombia,
see
INCORA
(1972),Wing
1970:44), nd
Soto
(1973:80).
Latin
American
erspectives:
ssue
19,
Fall
1978,
Vol.
V,
No.
4
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104
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
delays were often given
to
allow
for
ntensification
f land use as well as to
subdivide
atifundios nd
escape expropriation
n the basis of size.
The result s that
the effective
uantity
of and under
controlof the landed
elitewas only marginally educedunderprecapitalistredistributive nd transi-
tion to junker reforms.As Table 2, column 3,shows,
the
nonreform ector still
includes
99
percent
of
the
land
in
Ecuador,
90 percent
n
Colombia, 84 percent
in
Venezuela,
and
82
percent
n
Bolivia. Under
reforms hat
create the farmer
road,
the nonreform
ector is reduced to a smaller fraction of total land: 57
percent
n
Mexico,
58
percent
n
Peru,
and 60
percent
in Chile
(1973). These
lands, however,are usually thebest in the country, eceive the bulk of public
services
in
credit, nfrastructure,xtension,
nd
research,
and
produce
most
of
the
commodified
gricultural roduct.
For instance,
n Mexico where the reform
ector
s
proportionally arger
n
termsof
land and
labor force than in
any
other
country,
he
nonreform ector
monopolizes thebulk of institutional ervices. Duringthe 1956-1969period,al-
though
the
private
commercial-farm ector
encompassed
55
percent
of total
agricultural ands,
it received 85
percent
of
public
agricultural
redit.
In Chile under
Allende,
where the reform ector
was
enlarged
to the maxi-
mum
allowed under
the 1967 reform
aw,
the nonreform ector still received 69
percent of state credit n 1971-1972 Barracloughand
Fernaindez,
974: 134-135).
Also
while the 1967 land reform onferredupon the state controlof all irriga-
tion
works, neitherFrei nor Allende exercised that power and, as a result, he
nonreform ector, and, in particular the remaining
arge landholders, retained
control of
77.1 percent of the capacity of the
country's rrigationworks (Bar-
raclough and Fernandez, 1974:39).
In Bolivia, where 18.2 percentof agricultural ands and 39 percentof the
peasantry
have been
incorporated
nto the
reform
ector,
ll
sources
agree
that
the
smallholders,
both withinand without he reform
ector,
have
received
vir-
tually
no credit
FAO, 1968:13).
The
limited
vailable production
data do
suggest
hat the
production ffect
of land
reform
was
obtained
in
the
nonreform
ector,
not the
reform
ector.
Appropriate
data
exist
only
for Bolivia and
Mexico,
the two
countries
with the
longesthistory
f
and
reform
n Latin
America.
In
Bolivia,
the
production
of
potatoes
and cereals
can
be taken
as a
proxy
forthe
performance
f
the
reform ector
and that of
sugar
cane and cottonseed
forthe nonreformector.8 etween 1952-1953 nd 1974,theaverage annual per
capita
increase
in
the
production
of
potatoes
and cereals was 2.3
percent
And
0.5
percent,respectively.
For
sugar
cane and
cottonseed,
the
figures
were
37.1
percent
nd 94.6
percent, espectively.9
In
Mexico,
there
s a
rough equivalence
between
the area
contained
in the
reform
ejido)
and
nonreform ectors.
The
private
commercial farms sector
contains
55
percent
of all cultivable
ands and 49
percent
of all
irrigated
ands.'0
It is however
clear
that
these data
overestimate he
effective ize and contribu-
tion
to
production
of the
nonreform ector as an
important
raction f the
ejido
8Potatoes
nd
cereals
are
produced
mainly
n
the
Altiplano
where
most
ofthe
and
reform
ctivity
tookplace,
while
sugarcane
and
cottonseed
are
produced
mainly
n
the
Santa
Cruz
region
which
was
relatively
unaffected
by the land reform. t is true,of course, thatthe disparate production
performances
n these
commodities
could
be due
to
factors
other
than
a
"plan"
designed
to
favor
the
nonreform
ector.
However,
the
design
of
government
programs
with
respect
to
agricultural
development
did indeed
favor
thenonreform
ector;
see,
for
nstance:
Heath,
Erasmus,
and
Buech-
ler 1969:290),
Antezano
(1970,:157-162),
uhl
(1975),
and
Clark
1974).
9For ottonseed,
he
figures
over
the
1961-1965
o
1974
period;
see FAO
(1961
and
1975).
"'There
re essentially
three
sectors
in
Mexican
agriculture:
he
ejido,
the
private
capitalist
sector,
and
theprivate
mallholder
ector.
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DE JANVRY
AND GROUND:TYPES
AND CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND
REFORM
105
land
which is
not
used for
ubsistence production
has been illegally
rented
out
to large
landowners.
According
to NACLA,
"for
most ejidatarios,
whose
in-
come
average
less
than $50
a month,
hemost viable
solution
today
is to
rent
theirplotto a largelandowner and thenwork full timeas a day laborerin the
tomato
or cotton
fields.
In Sonora,
about
70
percent
of
the ejidos
are
rented,
especially
in the rrigated
reas
ofNavajoa
and the Valle del Yaqui,
while
esti-
mates
for
the
percentage
of
rented
ejidos
in
Sinaloa
range
between
40 and
80
percent"
NACLA,
1976:18)
Under precapitalist
redistributive
nd
transition
to
junker
reforms,
he
bulk
of the
and
incorporated
ntothe
reform
ector
s often
found
on the
agri-
cultural
frontier
nd,
consequently,
s not only
of
low
quality
but is
also
hob-
bled by poor
infrastructure
nd limited
access
to
effective
demand.
For
in-
stance,
in Colombia
the
World
Bank
found
that
"the land
resources
[acquired
forthe
reform
ector]
are
largely
those
which
have been
ceded
by
previous
holdersbecause itwould be impossibleforthemtomake thenecessaryinvest-
ments
to
bring
and
into
production.
Consequently,
much
of the
land
held
by
INCORA
[the
land-reform
nstitute]
s marginal
whereas
extensive
good
land
resources
continue
to be underutilized"
(World
Bank,
1972:235).
The
same
problem
characterizes
much
ofthe
lands
distributed
o
peasants
in
Venezuela,
leading
to
poor
economic
conditions
and
a high
rate
of abandonment
and
re-
consolidation
of these lands.
Between
1967
and 1975,
the
contribution
f
the
reform
ector
to
national
crop production
has
declined
from
32
percent
to
20
percent
while that
of ivestock
declined
from
to
3.4
percent
between
1967
and
1972
Cox,
1978:table
27).
Growth
n national
production
has been
achieved
by
a
small
number
of
medium
and
large
commercial
farmers
n
the
nonreform
sector,theemergenceof which has been stimulatedby the threatsand incen-
tives
of
the agrarian
reform
Cox,
1978:54-55).
The
organization
of
the
reform
ector
nto subfamily/family
nits
Table
2,
column
7)
proscribes
access
to cheap
labor
and
thereby
relegates
the reform
sector
to
stagnation,
s it is
unable
to
compete
with
the
nonreform
ector.
The
small
size
of
theunits
n
thereform
ector
often
requires
that
heads
offamilies
seek outside
employment.
Reform-sector
and gradually
becomes
appropriated
by
the nonreform
ector n
spite
of egal
constraints."
The
social
behavior
ofpeasants,
in reflecting
he
productive
operations
at
which they
abored
prior
to land
reform,
s
also
an important
determinant
f
thesuccess orfailureofproduction n thereform ector Lehmann,1976).
When the
preland
reform enure
consists
ofdecentralized
productive
oper-
ations
characteristic f the
latifundio
employing
the aparceria
form
of
labor
exploitation,
he
subsequent
organization
of the
reform
ector nto
cooperative
or collective
farms
s generally
precluded
in the
absence
of
strong
ncentives
that are unlikely
to come
under
domination
of the
capitalist
mode
of
produc-
tion. The consequent
atomistic
organization
of the
reform
ector
implies
little
use
of new technology,
tagnant
production,
nd
a
declining
marketable
sur-
plus (e.g.,
Bolivia
and parts
of the
Peruvian
highlands).
Even
when
thebulk
of
productive
operations
is
centralized
prior
to
the reform,
he
strong
desire for
individual
proprietorship
ends
to
frustrate
he
formation
feffective
oopera-
tivesor collectives e.g.,Chile).
Experience
shows
that,
when
productive
operations
are
completely
cen-
tralized
before
the
reform,
s in plantations,
cooperative
enterprises
e.g.,the
production
cooperatives
created
from
the
expropriated
plantations
in
Peru)
can
be most effective.
Observation
V: Political
stabilization
function
f and
reforms:
"This
problem
has
been
particularly
cute
in Mexico.
See
the CIDA-Mexico
study (CIA/CIDA,
1970)
and
Restrepo
Fernandez
and
Sanchez
Cortes n.d.).
LatinAmerican
erspectives:
ssue
19, FaIl 1978, Vol.
V, No.
4
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106
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
A)
With the
production trategy
f the
land reform entered on the nonre-
form ector,the
primary ole of the reform ector s political. Its function
s to
stimulate the
development
of
a conservative agrarian petty bourgeoisie
and
thus reduce the threat f social instability nthe countryside.
This
observation s clearly illustrated n
the philosophy of the Colombian
Land Reform
nstitute INCORA). In an article it authored for USAID,
IN-
CORA stated that
"INCORA was founded
and its funds and staffwere system-
atically
built
up
to levels which enabled it to invest substantially n
land-tenure
modifications,and
improvements, redit, nd other ervices for new
class of
campesino
landowners. Politically, t [land
reform] ffers he hope ofreducing
the
threat f
nstability
n
the
countryside"
INCORA, 1970).
The
goal of
political stabilization s implementedby a dual strategy:
oop-
tion
and
patronage
of reform
beneficiaries,
nd repression of the
uprisings of
peasants excluded
from
he
reform.
By creatingupward mobility, and reforms an constitutepowerfulpoliti-
cal cooptive forces on the mass of peasants.
However, since land reformsdo
not
reach the
bulk
of
peasants but are usually confinedto the upper
peasantry,
the
generation
of
expectations among those
not benefited s likely to negate
political
stabilization
if
strong peasant organizations exist.12 easant
frustra-
tions
can become
powerful destabilizingfactors, as in Peru during the
last
years
of the
Belaunde
reform
nd
in
Chile
under Frei.
B)
Reforms hat
attempt
to establish the farmerroad are
potentially
the
most
destabilizing
due
to the
political
reaction of
expropraited anded elites
and to the frustrations
f
the
arge
mass
of
peasants
excluded
from
he reform.
Preservation
f the
bulk
of
the
and in
the nonreform
ector imits ccess to
the and to a small fraction f thepeasantry.The frustrations f those excluded
can be
a
destabilizing
force that
pushes
through
trikesand land
seizures
for
an
acceleration,
mplification,
nd
radicalization of the and
reform. his
pres-
sure
is
particularly
cute in reforms
hat
aim
at a farmer
oad since the bour-
geoisie requires
political
allies
to
successfully
xecute
a
land reform
gainst
the
landed
elite.
Thus,
in
an electoral
context,
as in
Chile,
the
peasants
must be
mobilized.
However,
while
over
100,000
Chilean
peasants joined
unions
between 1965 and
1970,only 21,000gained
access to
the
and
by
the
end
of this
period (Chile,
1973:
272).
Frustrated
by
limited
concrete
benefits,
work-
ers'
strikes
n
the latifundios ncreased
from
142
in
1965
to
1,580
n
1970,
and
land invasions
multipliedfrom
7
to
456
(Klein, 1972; Affonso, 1970).
Mean-
while, the landed elite's strongopposition to the land reform nd fear that it
threatened
their
property
n other sectors
of
the
economy
led to
a
rupture
of
the
conservative-liberal lliance which
had
brought
he Christian Democrats
an electoral
victory
n
1964.
n
the 1970
presidential
ampaign,
the combination
of
these
two
forces,
division between liberals and conservatives
and
the
in-
creasing radicalization of thepeasantry,
brought
he left
Unidad
Popular (UP)
to
power.
The
political
destablization unleashed
by
the
land reform
nder
Frei
intensified
under Allende until the
military
ntervened
on
the side
of
the
propertied
lasses.
In
Guatemala, peasants
were
also
mobilized
by
the
government
o
carry
out theexpropriation fthelanded elite.However, theexpropriated andown-
ers,
with
backing
from
he U.S.
government,
egained political control;
he
and
reformwas
completely
reversedafter
Arbenz was
deposed
in 1954.
Observation
V.
With
the
need for
cheap
food
maintained
by
the
objective
2Criteria
for election
of those
to
be benefited
by land reforms
re usually
that
they
were
internal
peasants
and/or
possess
some
education,
"management
kills,"etc.
Internal
peasants
are
generally
the
better-off
egment
of the peasantry
due to
stable
employment
and
access
to
the
resources
(pasturage,
ometimes chools,
medical attention,
indling,
tc.)
of the
atifundio.
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DE JANVRY
AND GROUND:TYPES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF LAND REFORM 107
logic of cheap labor under social disarticulation,no land
reform an eliminate
functional
dualism with a
semiproletarianizedpeasantry.Thus, irrespective f
the typeof land reform, he subsistencesector is maintained as the necessary
source of cheap labor.
The proportion f the peasantry benefitedby different
and reforms s giv-
en
in Table
2,
column
4. Even
the most extensive and reform
n Latin Ameri-
can
history,
hat of
Mexico,
after 0
years
still has not incorporatedmore than
50
percent
of
the
peasantry
nto
the
reform ector. Similarly, n Peru as of No-
vember1976,
68
percent
of
the potentialbeneficiaries the
subsistence peasants
and
landless agricultural aborers existing n 1964)
remained outside the reform
sector; and, according
to
government igures, he maximum percentage to be
incorporated
nto the
reform
ector s 39
percent Caballero,
1976:11). n Chile,
during
the
government
f
the
UP,
the
proportion
f
potential
beneficiaries x-
cluded from
he reform ector reached 80
percent.
Thus, although thesocial relations of production re redefinedunder tran-
sition
reforms nd
the argeestates eliminatedunder the reforms hat establish
the
farmer
road,
the minifundio
lways remains;
this
permits
the continued
transfer
f
the
cost
of
cheap
food
and
of
generally
unfavorable
agricultural
prices
to
semiproletarian
abor.
External subsistence peasants seldom gained access to
additional land re-
sources
under
any type
of
reform; nd, despite
the
popularity
of the
slogan,
"consolidaci6n de minifundios,"no serious or even marginal
attempthas ever
been
made to eliminate the minifundio. n
fact,
the
reformed ector is
usually
designed to extend,
rather han
curtail,functionaldualism. This is achieved by
tying
beneficiariesto
subfamily/family
nits
in
the reform
ector where they
become purveyorsof cheap labor to capitalist entrepreneursTable 2, column
7).
In Venezuela, reformbeneficiaries averaged 107 days
laboring in the re-
form sector
and
106
days
outside the reform
sector (Kirby,1975: 207; CI-
DA/CENDES, 1967). Kirby
observed
that:
"Far from
being
the foundationof an
improving
ocial welfare . in
many
cases the land
or
land
reformhas fixed
families in
a
position
where
they
can do little
more than inflate the pool of
cheap
labor"
(Kirby, 1975:209). Elsewhere,
he
adds: "it is . .
.
clear that the
reformhas stabilized
a
pool
of casual
laborers to be called on at the conveni-
ence
of
the
arge
andowners"
(1975:219).
In Colombia the planned distribution f land in the reform ector reprod-
uced
the functional
dualism
prevailing
n
the nonreformed
ector.
n
1968,
for
example, 7,037
families
were
given plots
of
10
hectares or
less, 7,125 received
between
10 and 50
hectares,
906
obtained from50
to 200
hectares,
nd
64 fami-
lies each received n excess of 200 hectares Felstehausen,1971: 173).
The
Mexican
ejido
is
particularly
llustrative of
a
contrived functional
dualism.
Under Cardenas
(1934-1940),
he
ejido
was viewed
as
a
collectivst
l-
ternative o
capitalist agriculture.
Over
time, however,
most
ejido
lands
have,
under
official
or
unofficial
pressures,
been
individuallyappropriated.
Conse-
quently,
he vast
majority
of the
ejidatarios
differ rom
private
peasants today
only
in
that
the
ejido plots may
not be
legally
sold or
transferred
n
any
manner.
Although
these
stipulations
re
ostensiblydesigned
to
avoid
the
reconcen-
tration
f
andholdings
and
protect
he reform
eneficiaries, heyeffectively
ie
them
to
plots
of land
insufficient
or
family
ubsistence.
Thus,
while the
ejido
was
initially"merely
a
response
to
the
political pressures
and land
hunger
of
the
peasants" (Stavenhagen, 1973),
t has
been
an
integral
part
of
agrarian poli-
cy
since
1940
and
serves
as a
purveyor
of
cheap
labor
to commercial
agricul-
ture
n a
regime
of
planned
functional
dualism.
And the
degree
of
semiprole-
LatinAmerican
erspectives:
ssue 19,
Fall
1978, Vol. V, No. 4
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108
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
tarianization
among ejidatarios
has been increasing continuously.
While
in
1950,
only
16
percent
of
ejido
families earned over half
of their ncome
outside
their
and, by
1960
this
percentage
had increased
to 34
percent Rello
and de
Oca, 1974:70). Stavenhagen
concludes:
On the one hand, the peasant
economy small ejido
and private mallholders)provides
a
minimum
ubsistence
ncome
to
its
members t
little
ost to
the national
economy,
nd it
helps to keep
the
process
of
rural to urban
migration
n check.
On the other
hand,
it
is
unable
to
really
ncrease levels of
living
substantially
withthe
poor
resources at
its
dis-
posal,
and thus
necessarily
forces
peasants
to seek complementary
ources of
income
elsewhere.
It constitutes,
hus,
a
reserve
of labour not only
for the
large agricultural
farms but
also for
ndustry, onstruction,
ervices
and so forth.. .
As
long
as labour
does not
constitute
scarce
or
expensive
element
among
the factors
of
production,
t
is
in the nterest f
the
system
to maintain
a
numerous
but unstable
peasantry
from
which
it can
draw
its inexpensive
labour
force for
the
process
of
capitalist
accumulation
(1973:32).
In conclusion,
no land
reform
an
eliminate the primary
determinant
f
stagnation
the
low
price
of food.
Consequently,
no land reform an
elimi-
nate
functionaldualism.
The
subsistencesector
remains the necessary
source
of
cheap
labor for
both
nonreform
nd reform ectors.
And
so, too,
remain
the
fundamental
conomic and social contradictions
f
peripheral
capitalism
n
ag-
riculture: global tendency
toward
stagnation,
harply
uneven
development
of
the
productive
forces,
nd massive ruralpoverty.
Conclusions
Today, theprecapitalist atifundiowith rent n labor serviceshas virtually
disappeared
in
Latin
America. Those
with rent
n kind remainimportant
nly
in
some Central American countries
nd
in partsof Brazil.
Otherwise,
precapi-
talist
social relationshave been
largely
liminated.
This has
resulted from
he incentiveof market
forces, he subjective
pres-
sures
exercised
by
internal
peasants,
and the coercion
of reformist olicies.
Particularly
ffective
were land
reforms
which threatenedprecapitalist
states
with
expropriation
f
they
would not modernize transition
o junker)
and took
control
of
the
state
away
from
he
landed elites to place it
in the hands of the
bourgeoisie transition
o
farmer).
Under
these reforms, romoted
against the
remnantsof feudalism,the conflictbetween production (accumulation) and
distribution
legitimation)
was
presumed
nonexistent.They, consequently,
of-
fered
an
attractive
common
rallying
cause for the national and
dependent
bourgeoisies
and
theirforeign
llies. Such reforms lso appealed
to those
radi-
cal
forces who saw
land
reform s
a step toward the implementation
f a na-
tional
bourgeois
revolution which
they
deemed
a
necessary first tage
in the
transition
o socialism.
As
a
result
of all
this
support,
hese transitional
eforms
were
actively mplemented
beginning
n the ate 1950s. Today,
theycan be con-
sidered
successfully
terminated ven
though
the
publicized
banner of expro-
priation
and redistribution
oward
formation
f a
reform
ectorhas generally
been
held to
a
minimum.
Futureland reforms redistributive nder capitalism and shiftto farmer
road) must,
with the
noted
exceptions,
be directed at capitalist
enterprises.
They are, consequently,
unlikely
to occur underthe hegemonic
domination
of
the
capitalist
mode
of
production
except
after
the most severe social
pressure
such
as Echeverria's 1977 land reform n
the
Valley of Sinaloa in response
to
peasant
invasions,
or under
exceptionally
favorable
fiscal
conditions,
s in the
swap
of
urban
properties
n
Trujillo's
personal
estate
for rice land
in
the Do-
minican
Republic.
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DE JANVRYAND
GROUND:TYPES AND
CONSEQUENCES
OF LAND REFORM
109
Not
only
do redistributiveeforms mply questioning
he conceptof private
propertyby taking
and
away
from ome capitalists to distribute
o peasants
and
landless workers,but the conflictbetween
production and distribution s
enhanced. Since large-scalefarms of the commercial sector, withfull backing
of state
services, tend to be highly
fficient withinthe confines of cheap
food
and with
a
consequent
bias
towards
the
production
of exportables,
nputs for
industry,
nd
luxuryfoods),
the family
or
cooperative
farmscreated by expro-
priationswill
generallynot be able to ensure delivery
of an equivalentnet sur-
plus on themarket, t least not
n the shortrun
or without drasticredesignof
agrarian policy
toward
servicingpeasants.
Reforms
that seek to shift the nonreform
ector from unker
to farmer
roads are also unlikely to
occur
even
though some
productiongains could
be
expected
from
this
change
in
tenure. The strongly
ntrenchedpositionof the
capitalist
landed elites as
part
of
the social-class
alliance
that supports
the
model of disarticulated ccumulationtendsto eliminate thepossibilityofsuch
reforms.
In
addition,
both the
problem
of deficient
nd uneven productionperform-
ance in agriculture nd the persistent
problemof rural poverty
ncreasingly
arise
from he first eterminant f
stagnation cheap
food
a
constraint
hat
derives directly
from disarticulated accumulation
and the associated logic of
functional
dualism.
A resolution of these contradictions
ies far
beyond
the
scope
of
and
reform.
For all these reasons,
new land
reforms
re
unlikely to occur
in the near
future
n Latin America,
even
though
and reform emains
an active
political
issue
for the elements
of
the
national
bourgeoisie
and
for radical
forces that
militateforrestructurationf the economic systemtoward a model of articu-
lated accumulation.
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