Dealing with Recession and Inflation · Dealing with Recession and Inflation 133 ment any longer...

This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from theNational Bureau of Economic Research

Volume Title: The Business Cycle in a Changing World

Volume Author/Editor: Arthur F. Burns

Volume Publisher: NBER

Volume ISBN: 0-870-14200-3

Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/burn69-1

Publication Date: 1969

Chapter Title: Dealing with Recession and Inflation

Chapter Author: Arthur F. Burns

Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1177

Chapter pages in book: (p. 129 - 150)

FOUR

Dealing with Recession and Inflation

THE PRESSURE for economic improvement, whichis now being felt everywhere in the world, has been a dom-inant force throughout our nation's history. The typical Amer-ican worker has not been content with a good income ora decent standard of living. He has striven to improve hisskills, to increase his income, and to raise the standard of livingof his family. The typical business manager has not been con-tent to run an efficient enterprise. He has striven to equip itwith the most modem contrivances, to improve its products orservices, and to expand sales. The typical investor has not beencontent with a modest return on a safe investment. He haswillingly risked capital to create economic opportunity—byexploring new processes, experimenting with new products,building new facilities, and developing new markets. Oureconomy has grown rapidly because we had faith in ourselves,because we have developed institutions that encourage enter-prise and reward efficiency, and because we have believed inprogress sufficiently to put enough aside from our current in-come to expand the productive plant and build the knowledge

Millar Lecture at Fordham University, October 15, 1957. Reprinted, bypermission of the publisher, from Prosperity Without inflation, FordhamUniversity Press, New York, 1957, pp. 23—42.

130 The Business Cycle in a Changing World

that would be needed by a venturesome and growing popula-lion.

Americans today preponderantly believe in economic prog-ress through free and competitive enterprise, just as our fathersdid. But we have also come to believe that progress need notproceed as fitfully as in the past. Between 1854 and 1954 oureconomy experienced twenty-four full waves of expansion fol-lowed by contraction. Most of these setbacks to economicgrowth were brief and mild. However, some were severe, as in1857—58 and 1907—OS, and others were protracted as well assevere,, as in the 1870's, the 1890's, and the 1930's. Wheneveran economic depression developed, people generously sharedwhat they had with their less fortunate neighbors. Privatewelfare agencies supplemented these personal efforts by dis-tributing provisions to the needy, and local governments oc-casionally provided work relief. Such measures, however,failed to reach many needing assistance. Sometimes theyadded to the feeling of degradation produced by unemploy-ment itself; and they did nothing to prevent the occurrence ofeconomic slumps. They could not long satisfy the requirementsof a society which, in the process of undergoing rapid industri-alization, was also learning how to express its aspirations for abetter life through the ballot boxes of democracy.

I

The concept of governmental responsibility for moderatingeconomic fluctuations developed gradually and in response tohard experience. At the beginning of the century, public offi-cials were already searching for ways of dealing with the mostdramatic phase of the business cycic—that is, the prevention offinancial crises such as had occurred in 1893 and in 1907. Theviolent movements of the price level between 1914 and 1921

Dealing with Recession and Inflation 131

stimulated the authorities of our newly organized Federal Re-serve System to concern themselves during the twenties withthe moderation of price fluctuations, in the hope that the busi-ness cycle itself might to some degree be tamed in the process.After the stock market crash of 1929, business activity kept de-clining for many months, unemployment reached proportionshitherto unexperienced, and general discontent mounted. Ex-tensive governmental measures to stimulate recovery of em-ployment, production, and prices became unavoidable. Theywere put in motion, first under the Hoover Administration,later—and on a broader scale—by the Roosevelt Administra-lion.

Unemployment finally vanished during World War II, butthe memory of its ravages during the thirties remained vivid. Asthe war approached a close, great apprehension was felt thatmass unemployment might return once millions of men werereleased by the armed forces and by the civilian establishmentsthen engaged in producing war goods. To register the nation'sdetermination that this must not happen, the Congress passedwith an overwhelming vote of the members of both our majorparties the Employment Act of 1946, which solemnly declaredthat the federal government has a continuing responsibility touse all practicable means to foster free competitive enterprise,to prevent or moderate economic fluctuations, and to promotemaximum employment, production, and purchasing power.

The Employment Act reflects a revolutionary change in eco-nomic and political thought. Only a generation ago, men con-cerned with economic aft airs typically held the view that it wasbest to allow storms of business depression to blow themselvesout. They knew, of course, that unemployment and businessfailures at times increased sharply. They deplored such devel-opments, and therefore persistently argued for monetary sta-bility and the prevention of booms. But once a business reces-


sion got under way, they were inclined to oppose any largegovernmental efforts to check the economic decline. In re-sponse to such proposals, they often took the position that eco-nomic adversity stimulated people to practice thrift and indus-try, that it served to redirect or weed out inefficient workmenand inefficient enterprises, and that economic progress was fur-thered in the process. Let the government raise enough taxesto cover its expenditures, let the banks maintain pressure onbusiness firms to liquidate excessive inventories and avoidhazardous undertakings, let the financially weak firms takedown theft shingles and put up their shutters, let the generalpublic practice greater frugality—incredible though it maynow seem, these were the measures for curing a business de-pression that were widely and effectively advanced a meretwenty or thirty years ago.

The Great Depression of the thirties and the internationaltroubles of later years forced most of us to reexamine our eco-nomic ideas. From personal observation or experience we havelearned that self-reliant workers as well as the shiftless losetheir jobs when business activity falls off appreciably, and thatat such a time well-managed enterprises often follow the ineffi-cient into bankruptcy. We have learned that in the course of adepression many men lose faith in themselves, and that somelose faith even in our economic and political institutions. Wehave learned that economic progress is a powerful weapon inthe ideological struggle that of late has been stirring men'sminds in distant lands, and that the continuance of prosperityis our best answer to the Marxist prophecy of crisis and col-lapse of free economies. We have come to recognize that in anage of international turmoil such as ours, federal tax revenues,expenditures, and debt transactions are bound to be very large,and that it therefore is unrealistic to suppose that the govern-


ment any longer either can or should be a neutral factor in theeconomy.

Although our ability to limit recessions and prevent depres-sions has not yet been fully tested, we have made considerableprogress in understanding economic fluctuations and we havelearned to profit from the mistakes of the past. No governmentnowadays would tolerate the destruction of one-third of thenation's money supply during a period of depressed economicactivity and prices. Yet that is precisely what happened be-tween the fall of 1929 and the spring of 1933. No monetary au-thority is likely to repeat in the near future the blunder of theFederal Reserve System in the autumn of 1931 when, in theface of widespread economic fear and trouble, a tightening ofcredit was allowed to occur. Nor has the ineffectiveness of theliberalizing actions that followed in early 1932 escaped the at-tention of experienced observers. It is not enough to increasethe availability and reduce the cost of credit during the declin-ing phase of a business cycle. If such action is to be effective, itmust come when the level of business and consumer confi-dence is high. This condition is much more likely to prevail inthe early than in the advanced stage of a business contraction,particularly if the government pursues policies that otherwiseencourage individual enterprise.

If prosperity is to flourish, people must have confidence intheir own economic future and that of their country. This basictruth was temporarily lost sight of during the 1930's in theprocess of grafting new economic ideas and practices onto theold. In the five years from 1932 to 1936, unemployment at itslowest was nine million or 17 per cent of the labor force; at itshighest it was thirteen million or 25 per cent of the labor force.The existence of such vast unemployment did not, however,deter the federal government from imposing new tax burdens.


Exemptions under the individual income tax were loweredfrom $3,500 to $2,500 for married persons. The minimum rateof the tax was raised from 1.5 to 4 per cent, and the maximumrate from 25 to 79 per cent. The exemption of dividends fromthe normal tax was repealed. The tax rate on capital gains ofhigh income recipients was increased. The basic tax rate oncorporate profits was raised from 12 to 15 per cent, besides thelevying of a capital stock tax. An undistributed profits tax wasimposed, with a maximum rate of 27 per cent. The exemptionunder the estate tax was sharply reduced, while the maximumrate of the tax was raised from 20 to 70 per cent. A new gift taxwas enacted, with a maximum rate of 52½ per cent. A widevariety of new excise taxes was imposed—on automobiles andparts, cameras, phonograph records, sporting goods, furs,jewelry, radios, refrigerators, gasoline, electrical energy, tele-phone and telegraph messages, and toilet preparations. For atime, even candy, chewing gum, and soft drinks carried ex-cises, as did checks drawn on bank accounts.

The Revenue Act of 1932 imposed the heaviest of these in-creases of taxation, but later legislation added new burdens inquick succession—in 1934, 1935, and again in 1936. Peoplewere unprepared for tax measures of such severity. The newtaxes encroached on the spending power of both consumersand business firms at a time when production and employmentwere seriously depressed. Worse still, they spread fear that thetax system was becoming an instrument for redistributing in-comes, if not also for punishing success. Greatly increased fed-eral spending and borrowing, which accompanied the new andhigher taxes, stirred further doubt in the minds of many busi-nessmen and investors about the country's economic future. Inthe prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty, much of the con-structive legislation of the time—as in the case of banking, the


stock market, housing, public utilities, and social security—waspoorly understood and likewise viewed with suspicion. Innova-tion and investment therefore languished. The effectiveness ofthe government's extensive recovery program was reduced. Al-though economic conditions on the whole improved, businessremained sluggish and the unemployed still numbered overeight million as late as 1940.

From the storm and stress of the 1930's our economy hasbeen able, however, to draw new strength in more recentyears. The insurance of bank deposits and of savings and loanaccounts, the long-term amortizable and insured mortgage, an-employment insurance, and tax revenues that respond sensi-tively to changes in the national income—all these automaticdevices for curbing the rapidity with which a recession cumu-lates are an inheritance from that decade. More important stillis the emergence of an attitude of mind which refuses to ac-cept passively the antics of the business cycle or ways of deal-ing with recession that have been fried and found wanting.

The present generation looks to the government for leader-ship in reducing economic instability; and the basis for thisconfidence has been improving. To be sure, if the business orconsuming public chooses to speculate widely in inventories, ageneral curtailment of production is bound to follow sooner orlater. Or if plant expansion proceeds with great rapidity inmany lines of activity at the same time, a temporary conditionof overcapacity may easily develop and require correction. Norare these the only developments that can cause general eco-nomic activity to contract. The essential objective, however, isnot to prevent all contractions, but rather to maintain an en-vironment that curbs excesses from which recessions oftenspring and to keep such recessions as do occur from degenerat-ing into severe depressions. Recent history indicates that our


public policies can be shaped so as to powerfully promote thisbroad objective.

IIIn contrast to earlier generations, which stressed developmentsin financial and commodity markets, the modem tendency is tothink of business recessions largely in terms of unemployment.Of course, not all of the unemployment that exists in our dy-namic society is a grave social evil or problem. Some unem-ployment reflects the fluctuations of the seasons or the frictionsof the labor market, where the search of enterprising menand women for better work opportunities is always important.This minimum of unemployment is practically irreducible overany short period, although not in the long run. No good mea-sure of it is available, but in recent years economists havecommonly taken it to be something like 4 per cent of our laborforce. In other words, a condition of practically full employ-ment is believed to exist when the unemployment rate is about4 per cent or smaller. In our latest encounter with recession,however, the government did not allow this crude yardstick orany other convention to get in the way of prompt counter-cyclical action.

When economic clouds began to gather in the late spring of1953, the government was alert to the possible danger of de-pression. A sizable accumulation of inventories by retailers andwholesalers was one of the first visible signs of impendingtrouble. A decline in the length of the work week in manufac-turing was another. By mid-year it became clear that the build-up of stocks had been involuntary. Retail sales were sluggish,business expenditures on inventories began declining, andthese developments were soon aggravated by the drop of mill-taiy spending which followed the cessation of hostilities in


Korea. The efforts of businessmen to adjust inventories to cur-rent sales led to some reduction in output, and so too did thedecline of governmental expenditure, particularly for defenseoutlays. In consequence, employment fell off appreciably inmanufacturing industries, and to some degree in other parts ofthe economy. But the depression that many feared or expecteddid not develop.

En its new role of responsibility for the maintenance of thenations's prosperity, the federal government deliberately tookspeedy and massive actions to build confidence and pave theway for renewed economic growth. In May 1953, the FederalReserve System moved to ease credit conditions by embarkingon extensive purchases of securities in the open market. In lateJune and early July, a bolder step was taken, namely, the re-serve requirements of member banks were reduced. This shiftto a policy of credit ease was made before economic activity,viewed in the aggregate, had begun declining. In September,the Secretary of the Treasury removed any doubt about earlytax cuts by announcing that the Administration would relin-quish the excess profits tax and accept a reduction of the per-sonal income tax, both of which were scheduled by earlier leg-islation for the end of the year. This unequivocal declaration oftax policy, like the earlier moves in the credit sphere, wasmade when the reported rate of unemployment was less than2½ per cent. By January 1954, when the President submittedhis Economic Report to the Congress, economic activity hadalready been receding for six months. The latest figure of un-employment then stood at 3 per cent. New and revised statis-tics which showed more serious deterioration were not as yetavailable. But, anticipating some extension of the economic de-cline, the Economic Report counseled the Congress that it"makes a vital difference whether an unemployment rate of 3per cent is reached by rising up to that figure or declining to


it," and that "prudence as well as zeal for economic improve-ment require that public policy contribute both to the immedi-ate strength of the economy and to its long-term growth."

The President therefore recommended a broad program oflegislation. High on the list were tax proposals which, besidescorrecting various personal inequities, would serve to stimulatebusiness enterprise—through liberalized depreciation allow-ances on new investments, through fuller treatment of researchand development outlays as current expenses, through partialtax credits to recipients of dividends for the income taxes al-ready paid by corporations, and through the extension of thecarryback of losses in reckoning income for tax purposes.These reforms of the tax structure were intended to supple-ment the removal of the corporate excess profits tax and the re-duction of the personal income tax averaging about 10 percent for most taxpayers, which had just become effective. ThePresident also requested legislation to expand the scope andraise the benefits provided by the old-age and unemploymentinsurance systems, to extend and liberalize credit facilities forhome ownership, to foster more energetically the clearance ofslums and the rehabilitation of blighted neighborhoods, and toimprove the nation's highways. Over the next few months theCongress largely adopted the President's recommendations. Italso added a sizable cut in excise levies which, even after al-lowing for an increase of 1.3 billion dollars in social securitycontributions, brought the various tax reductions for individu-als and businesses that became effective in 1954 to the hugefigure of 6.1 billion dollars on a full-year basis.

These major steps to create an atmosphere favorable to theresumption of economic growth were reinforced by other ac-lions, largely of an administrative character. The Federal Re-serve authorities lowered the discount rate early in 1954 andlater again reduced the reserve requirements of member


banks. Governmental aid was projected for some hard-pressedindustries—notably, to shipbuilding through a new construc-lion program, and to zinc and lead mining through a revisedstockpiling program. Some effort was made to assist hard-pressed localities by channeling government contracts to themand by boosting the allowable rate of accelerated amortizationon such industrial investments in these areas as served tostrengthen the nation's defense base. The ordinary housekeep-ing activities of government were managed with an eye to theimmediate needs of the economy. For example, the VeteransAdministration speeded up the processing of loan guaranty ap-plications, the Federal Housing Administration did likewisewith applications for loan insurance, the Department of Agri-culture expedited arrangements to stimulate private construc-lion of grain elevators, the Internal Revenue Service made ad-vance payments to taxpayers who had been overassessed priorto final determination of the overassessment, the Bureau ofPublic Roads lost no time in implementing its expanded finan-cial authority, and so on from one governmental bureau toanother. Beyond these housekeeping steps, the Administrationsought to check the decline in governmental spending, whichin the case of the Defense Department had gone considerablyfurther in the first half of 1954 than had been either planned oranticipated. A modest rescheduling of expenditure within thetotal set for fiscal year 1955 was adopted, with a view to rais-ing somewhat the government's planned spending for the firstsix months of the year and thus reinforcing the processes ofeconomic recovery which, while already visible on numerousfronts, were as yet of uncertain strength.

These actions to curb the decline of economic activity didnot express the unfolding of any master plan in which all de-tails had been worked out in advance and every contingencyprovided for. Not only is this sort of thing practically impossi-


ble, but any determined attempt to realize it could invite disas-ter. No two recessions ever run the same course; unforeseendevelopments are bound to occur; and measures that workwell in one situation may work badly in another. A wise gov-ernment will therefore seek to maintain flexibility in its ap-proach and be prepared to do more in one direction and less inanother, besides trying new measures. It will not entrust thenation's fate to a categorical economic forecast or to a rigideconomic program.

There are, however, major principles suggested by experi-ence that can usefully guide governmental efforts to check arecession. The first principle is that when the economy showssigns of faltering, prompt countermoves are required. Evenmild measures on the part of government can be effective inthe early stages of an economic decline. On the other hand, ifaction is withheld until a recession has gathered momentum,strong and costly measures may prove insufficient. Second,efforts to check a recession have to be coordinated, so that thesteps taken by different agencies of our far-flung governmentmay reinforce one another. Third, as far as possible every itemof legislation or administrative action, whether it be of short-or long-range character, should encourage consumers andbusiness firms to look with hope and confidence to theft ownand theft country's economic future. Fourth, the actions takenshould be on a sufficient scale to give reasonable promise ofchecking the recession, yet not so powerful as to stimulate ex-tensive speculation or other excesses that may create troublelater. Fifth, while monetary, fiscal, and general housekeepingmeasures must to some degree go together, they need to bespaced so as to give the private economy a reasonable oppor-tunity to carry out necessary adjustments and to muster itslatent strength. Sixth, and by way of partial corollary from thethree preceding principles) the emphasis at the start of a reces-


sion should ordinarily be on the easing of credit conditions,later on tax reductions for both individuals and businesses, stilllater on rescheduling of federal expenditure within totals setby long-term considerations, and—only as a last resort—onlarge public works programs. Of course, advance planning isessential, if public works expenditures are to be acceleratedwhen they may be urgently needed to bolster the economy andif they are to be concentrated, as they should be, on projectsthat can be completed in relatively short periods and that willserve to support rather than to restrict the opportunities forprivate enterprise. Seventh, since no two recessions are alikeand since they occur under different circumstances in a na-tion's life, the policies of government must be sensitively ad-justed to the individual case. Thus, international factors andconsiderations of national security may at times justify givingearly and preponderant emphasis to expansion of governmen-tal expenditure.

These are the broad principles that guided governmentalthought and policies during the recession of 1953—54 and im-parted a certain unity and strength to the government'sindividual actions. That, of course, does not mean that all themeasures taken proved fruitful. For example, the program foraiding depressed localities accomplished little beyond demon-strating a need for stronger or at least different measures.Again, the rescheduling of expenditures for the fiscal year 1955was delayed in execution and became effective when it was nolonger needed. But the program as a whole worked out reason-ably well. A crash program such as many urged at the timewas avoided. Governmental enterprises were kept from multi-plying. Yet the contraction in economic activity never reachedserious proportions and lasted only a year. At its lowest point,employment in nonagricultural establishments was only 3½per cent below the preceding peak. Personal income declined


still less, while disposable income—that is, personal incomeafter taxes—defied the recession by actually increasing.

Natural forces of economic recovery, the continuance ofprosperity abroad, and the safeguards provided by earlierlegislation—all had a part in this outcome and in the greateconomic advance that followed. But the government alsoplayed its part. It did not leave the fate of the economy to theautomatic stabilizers or to good fortune. It intervened activelyand its measures proved effective—in large part because theywere disciplined by general principles which had roots in expe-rience and therefore commanded wide assent both within andoutside the government.

IIIWe began to make progress as a people in solving the problemof depression only after we became su.fflciently aroused to seekworkable solutions. In recent years, many citizens have cometo feel that we have been preoccupied with the need to pre-vent the miseries of depression, when in fact that matter wasalready being handled fairly well, while we have slighted theinjustice and hardships that flow from inflation, when in factthese have been multiplying for a generation. Concern over in-flation has been increasing. It has not yet become articulateenough to wring from the Congress a declaration of policy thatwould have a moral force such as the Employment Act exer-cises with regard to unemployment. On the other hand, any re-turn to the pegging of yields on government securities, whichcontributed materially to the sharp rise in the general pricelevel during the years immediately after the war, has today be-come almost unthinkable. With increased understanding ofthe need to curb inflation, the classical remedies for inflation—credit restraints and a balanced budget—are again in good re-


pute and have of late been diligently applied. These are considerable advances. They have surely helped to keep the riseof the consumer price level since 1954 within moderate bounds.But just as surely they have not sufficed to stop inflation.

The application of credit restraints began early in the newexpansion. Government officials knew that the measures thathad been taken during 1953 and 1954 to build confidence, par-ticularly the actions taken with regard to credit and taxes,carried the risk of exciting overconfidence and subsequentreaction. Already in the closing months of 1954 the sharp riseof stock prices and the financial methods used by builders topush sales of new homes caused some concern. Signs of specu-lation multiplied during the early months of 1955 as expansionof both credit and economic activity proceeded rapidly and ona widening front. Therefore, starling in January 1955, the gov-ernment adopted one measure after another with a view tochecking economic exuberance.

Although the demand for bank loans was abnormally high,the Federal Reserve authorities reduced their holdings of gov-ernment securities, as they usually do in the early months ofthe year. Commercial banks therefore found it necessary to sellgovernment securities or borrow at the Federal Reserve Banksto maintain their lending. The Federal Reserve authorities alsoraised stock margin requirements and the discount rate. TheTreasury decided to tap the long-term capital market and putout a substantial issue of forty-year bonds. The Federal Hous-ing Administration and the Veterans Administration reducedthe maximum maturity and raised the minimum down pay-ment on governmentally underwritten mortgages. Both agen-cies also put an end to the occasional but highly dubiouspractice of including the closing costs on the purchase of ahome in the face value of underwritten mortgages. The Fed-eral Home Loan Bank Board imposed limits on lending by the

144 The Business Cycle in a Changing Work!

Home Loan Banks to savings and loan associations. Covern-ment officials warned lenders that their progressively moreliberal terms for financing instalment sales of automobiles werefraught with danger; and, to emphasize the government's con-cern, the several bank supervisory authorities added a sectionon consumer credit to their regular examination forms. Theseand related actions to restrain credit expansion were all takenby the late summer of 1955. In the meantime, the clamor toreduce taxes was successfully resisted, and the fiscal year 1955ended with federal expenditures 3.2 billion dollars below fiscal1954 on an administrative basis and 1.4 billion below on a cashbasis.

Thus, as this recital indicates, the government moved ratherpromptly to curb the inflationary forces that gathered during1955. Moreover, the effort to restrain general credit expansionhas since then been continued unremittingly. The discount ratewas raised lime and again. Pressure on the reserves of com-mercial banks became more intense. As a result many peoplefound it harder to obtain loans, and credit became more costlythan it has been in a long generation. Nor were the restrictivemeasures taken by the government confined to monetary ac-lions. In 1955 the stockpiling program was adjusted within thelimits permitted by law and defense requirements, so as to re-lieve the shortages of vital materials felt by the civilian econ-omy. Earlier plans to finance the new Interstate Highway Pro-gram by borrowing were abandoned in 1956, and additionaltaxes on gasoline and other automotive products were enactedto make this program self-financing. Proposals to cut tax ratescontinued to be resisted successfully. And the higher tax reve-nues, which the advance of prosperity kept generating, permit-ted a modest reduction of the federal debt in fiscal year 1956and again in fiscal 1957, despite the recent increase of federalexpenditures.


This is an impressive record. All the same, when governmen-tal policies are viewed in their entirety, it is clear that theefforts to resist the inflationary pressures that developed after1954 neither ranged as widely nor carried as much weight asthe measures that had previously been adopted to resist reces-sion. Nothing that was done to curb inflation matched thedramatic tax cuts of 1954 or the reduction in bank reserve re-quirements of both that year and the preceding year. No gen-eral increase in taxation was enacted by the Congress. No in-crease in reserve requirements was ever ordered by theFederal Reserve authorities. No issue of long-term bonds wasput out by the Treasury between the summer of 1955 and thefall of 1957. The lifting of the discount rate was carried out ina series of small steps. The increase of minimum down pay-ments in connection with federally underwritten mortgagescame merely to 2 per cent of the purchase price. Even the se-curity holdings of the Federal Reserve System had their ups aswell as their downs, and they were practically as large at theend of 1956 as at the end of 1954.

Beyond this, the restrictive measures taken by the govern-ment were accompanied by other actions of an expansivecharacter which culminated in 1956—a year during whichwholesale prices rose sharply while consumer prices also re-sumed their advance. Increases in the pay of federal employ-ees were enacted in 1955 and became effective in July of thatyear. An increase in the hourly minimum wage from 75 centsto a dollar became effective in March 1956, increasing directlythe wages of two million workers in private industry. Pricesupport levels for various agricultural crops were raised in1956. Special export programs for agricultural products werepushed energetically. A new Soil Bank Program was enactedand government purchases for the school lunch and relatedprograms were increased. Lending by the Small Business Ad-


ministration was stepped up. Various of the special restrictionson housing credit that had been adopted during 1955 wereeither relaxed or dropped, and massive support of the mort-gage market was extended by the Federal National MortgageAssociation. The old-age insurance program was liberalized,with effects on the flow of incomes that were delayed, how-ever, until 1957. Expenditures increased in connection withnumerous other programs. Between July 1956 and July 1957,total federal expenditures on a cash basis rose 7.4 billion dol-lars over the preceding fiscal year, while cash receipts roseonly 5.1 billion. In consequence, the cash surplus declinedfrom 4.5 to 2.1 billion dollars.

Viewed individually, many—if not all—of the expansive ac-tions taken by government during 1955 and 1956 were meri-torious in high degree. They were inspired partly by considera-tions of the national defense, and partly by the concern withpeople's welfare which must go hand in hand with the en-couragement of private enterprise in our times. With thenation's prosperity increasing, it seemed only natural to takesome constructive steps in behalf of the sectors of our economythat had failed to participate in the nation's general progress orthat felt the impact of credit restraints most severely. Withwages rising rapidly in the private economy, it seemed onlyprudent to raise the pay of governmental employees. With taxrevenues growing abundantly, it seemed only proper to use aportion of the increased wherewithal to reduce somewhat theoutstanding public debt, and yet leave enough to increase de-fense outlays and expand other programs that seemed essentialor socially desirable. All this was done. The increase in federalexpenditures thus helped to swell the nation's aggregate mone-tary demand at a time when physical resources were alreadybeing strained by the rising demands of business firms, con-sumers, and state and local governments, many of whom also


felt that their augmented spending was only natural, prudent,and proper. With the economic community at large, includingthe several levels of government, striving to add to consump-lion or to capital investment more quickly than the nation'sworkshops could add to production, some advance of both thewholesale and consumer price level became unavoidable.

It is true that federal spending increased much less rapidlythan did the nation's total expenditure after 1954. It may justlybe held, however, that there was a need for special restraint onthe government's part at a time when the rest of the economywas displaying extreme exuberance. In the process of raisingits expenditures and taking other expansive actions, particu-larly with regard to agriculture and wages, the policy of thefederal government for containing inHation came to rest in-creasingly on the general credit restraints administered by theFederal Reserve System. This was a heavier burden than ourmonetary authorities could of themselves properly handle.

IvThe American people are nowadays broadly united on majorgoals of economic policy—a high and stable rate of employ-ment in relation to the labor force, expanding production, im-provement in living standards, and a reasonably stable con-sumer price level. The federal government has sought topromote these objectives. It has done this with increasing un-derstanding that prosperity cannot be ordered or guaranteedby government officials.

A nation's prosperity rests fundamentally on the enterpriseof individuals seeking to better themselves, theft families, andtheir communities. It depends far more on what individuals dofor themselves than on what the government does or can dofor them. The government may, however, significantly influ-


ence the course of our economy by pursuing policies that stim-ulate private citizens to act in ways which will tend to sustainprosperity. Considerable success has attended governmentalefforts in recent years to maintain an environment that favorshigher production, expanding employment, and rising livingstandards. The purchasing power of the consumer's dollar hasnot, however, been maintained. It is true that the rise in theprice level that has occurred since 1954 is moderate by histori-cal standards. However, in view of the rigidity which of latehas characterized the wage level and only to a lesser degreethe price level during economic contractions, still greatermoderation of price advances must be sought during economicexpansions in order to prevent a creeping type of inflation inthe future.

Although governmental resistance to inflation has signifi-cantly stiffened of late, it is difficult to avoid the conclusionthat the government is not yet prepared to act as decisively tocheck inflation as it is to check recession. In the event of a re-cession, the general attitude of government is apt to be thateverything which is at all reasonable must be done withoutmuch delay, and that if inflationary pressures develop later asa result of the stimulants that are applied, they will be dealtwith in due course. On the other hand, once inflationary pres-sures emerge, the government is unlikely to proceed in thespirit that if a recession develops as a result of its restrictivemeasures, that difficulty in turn will be dealt with in good sea-son. Rather, the attitude is apt to be that, 'while everythingwhich is at all reasonable must be done to curb inflation, re-strictive policies must not be applied on so vigorous a scale asto take any appreciable chance of bringing on or hastening arecession.

Such weighting of the scales of economic policy, however


slight, is probably unavoidable in the existing state of publicopinion. While the government has the broad responsibility ofleading the nation along sound economic channels, no Admin-istration that is too far removed from the prevailing sentimentsof the people can long continue to govern. When a threat ofunemployment develops, a clamor for governmental interven-tion comes from all directions. On the other hand, when theprice level begins rising, pressures for governmental action areless insistent. Not only that, but governmental steps to curb in-flation are sure to be loudly resisted by many, while measuresto curb unemployment are just as sure to be applauded in mostquarters. There can be little doubt that although people gener-ally and genuinely wish the consumer price level to remainreasonably stable, they also fear depression more than theyfear inflation. The catastrophe of the 1930's is still fresh in ourmemories and the sort of inflation that we have had is rightlyviewed as the lesser evil by comparison.

Our economic and political environment, however, has beenradically transformed over the past quarter century. Seriousdepressions are no longer the threat they once were, whilecreeping inflation has become a chronic feature of recent his-tory and a growing threat to the welfare of millions of people.Not only is a creeping inflation unnecessary to the continuanceof prosperity, but it can in time become a grave obstacle to it—either because the inflation may get out of hand or because,if inflation should continue for many years its gradual inroadson the pocketbooks of people, their concern over inflation maymount to a point where they will be unwilling in the event of arecession to support any large governmental efforts to hastenrecovery. These considerations are better understood todaythan they were only a few years ago. But they are not yet un-derstood widely enough. Nor, speaking broadly, have people


as yet developed the same sense of justice toward the sufferersfrom inflation that they have come to feel with regard to thesufferers from unemployment.

If we are to make better progress in dealing with inflation,the first requirement therefore is better and wider public un-derstanding of the need for a solution. But we must also recog-nize the shortcomings of our recent public policies and try toimprove upon them. However necessary and helpful a bal-anced budget and a restrictive monetary policy may be in theage-old struggle against inflation, it is doubtful whether theyalone can cope with the threat of creeping inflation.

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