Debate on the Developmental State: By Ethiopian Scholars

8/6/2019 Debate on the Developmental State: By Ethiopian Scholars

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Debate on the

Developmental State

By Ethiopian Scholars

Compiled by

Geza Hayet

http://hayet11.blogspot.com
http://hayet11.blogspot.com/http://hayet11.blogspot.com/http://hayet11.blogspot.com/


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Contents

Meles Zenawis Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit... 2

Messay Kebede

Mind the Jump: A Brief Response to Prof. Messay Kebede .............................................. 17

Abiye Teklemariam

A rejoinder of Prof. Messay Kebede's article: Meles' political dilemma........................ 20

Seid Hassan

A short reply to Messay's paper - specifically on the power of dictators ....................... 22

Girma Moges

Another rejoinder of Messay Kebede's article: Meles Zenawi's dilemma...................... 24

Minga Negash

Demobilizing Ethiopians will never be the solution to Ethiopias existential problems : A

response to Prof. Daniel kindie and to Prof. Messay Kebbede....................................... 28Wedi Samre

Messay Kebede and his "Manifesto" ............................................................................. 46

Tekola Hagos

Some remarks on Messay's article ................................................................................. 52

Demeke Taye

A few points on democracy vs development................................................................... 54

Wondemhunegn Ezezew

COMMENTS FROM READERS .......................................................................................... 65

Selected Coments


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Meles Zenawis Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit

By Messay Kebede June 14th, 2011

This paper can be taken as a manifesto of an individual who has pondered on the tragedy ofEthiopia for many years and whose specific features is that he is passionate about the country,

has no political ambition or affiliation, even though he is firmly anchored in the opposition

camp, and feels no grudge is worth nursing if it stands in the way of a much higher cause.

These features possess the virtue of providing a vantage point, not only to analyze the

problems of Ethiopia, but also to approach them from the perspective of the best way out for

everybody. In a sense, the paper is a mental reenactment of the 2005 election triggered by the

question of what would have happened if its outcomes were used to institute a grand coalition

instead of exasperating mutual suspicion and the desire to oust or suppress the opponent. In

conceiving the election as a lost opportunity, the paper attempts a theoretical construction

whereby what came through the ballot box could be recreated through the learned decision of

the ruling elite and opposition groups. Not that it entertains any illusion about the

predictability of the future, but because the constant availability of different choices in history

allows us not to always expect the worst.

Narrowing of the Playing-Field

One cannot explain the circumstances and outcomes of the 2010 national election without the

aftermaths of the 2005 election, rightly considered as a watershed in Ethiopias recent politics.

In light of the opening of the political field for free and fair election in 2005, it is reasonable

to assume that Meles and his supporters had caressed the idea that they would easily emerge

winners. Meles allowed free election, not because he was ready to cede power after a fair

fight, but because he thought that the opposition was too weak and its popular support too

fragmented and numerically feeble to constitute a serious challenge. The underestimation of

both the opposition and the extent of the popular frustration alone explain the opening of a

competitive scenario.

From his electoral defeat that he had to reverse by a violent crackdown on protesters and the

imprisonment of opposition leaders, Meles drew the conclusion that only the path of

authoritarian politics can keep him and his supporters in power, a conclusion that,

unfortunately, opposition leaders failed to acknowledgedespite numerous signs indicating

the closure of the political fieldwith their declared hope of a repeat of the 2005 election.
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/33340http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/33340http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/33340http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/33340


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They badly missed Meless determination never to go back to the situation of 2005 and his

scheme to prepare the conditions for the institution of a de facto one-party state. His

resolution was all the firmer as a repeat of the 2005 election crisis would cripple his

leadership and end his ascendency within the EPRDF.

On the other hand, it was also clear that Meles would not go to the extent of banning political

parties, thereby going against the present constitution, which justifies the hegemony of the

EPRDF, and the international opinion favoring democracy and multiparty states. Meles could

not take the road of openly establishing a one-party state, not only because of the international

opinion, but primarily because outlawing political parties would entail the dissolution of the

EPRDF as a coalition of ethnic parties in favor of a single party, and hence the renunciation of

ethnic politics. Indeed, how could the EPRDF transform itself into a single party unless the

idea of ethnic groups having their own autonomous representation is done away with? And

how could Meles and the TPLF maintain their political hegemony without the fragmentation

of Ethiopia along ethnic lines, which becomes effective only through the existence of ethnic

parties representing ethnic groups? Without ethnic based elections, ethnic distinctions would

be simply linguistic and not political. Elections are thus an indispensable component of the

ethnicization of Ethiopia: they give primacy to ethnic entities over the larger notion of

Ethiopia as a single nation.

Another reason for maintaining a semblance of democracy is that the facade of open election

is an important tool for Meless repressive policy. In a country where opposition is forbidden,

people have no other choice than the violent overthrow of the regime, either through a popular

insurrection or an organized guerrilla movement. The recognition of the right to oppose and

compete for state power, in addition to detracting people from the idea of a violent overthrow

of the regime through the hope of a peaceful, democratic access to power, gives the ruling

party an arsenal of legal and covert means to harass and undermine opposition forces. The

state allows the existence of opposing parties, but makes sure that the electoral contest never

reaches the level of real threat to the ruling elite. Only through the establishment of a peaceful

order achieved through the weakening of the opposition could Meles prevail in his party and

retain the loyalty of the army. His political prevalence and his ability to retain the loyalty of

senior party members and army officers depend on his success in providing a safe and

extended environment for a tranquil enjoyment of preferential treatments and privileges.

Failure to do so brings about anxiety and frictions that will threaten his absolute power.


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That is why it is absolutely mistaken to interpret the rise of Meles to absolute power as his

own doing. No doubt, Meles had the temperament and the qualities needed to emerge as a

strongman within the TPLF and used his prominent position to alter the original egalitarian

tendency prevailing in the upper leadership of the party. However, individual dispositions are

not enough to create dictators or authoritarian leaders; social forces are also necessary. In

particular, the TPLFs persistence to retain a hegemonic position within the EPRDF and the

state despite its minority status in terms of regional weight compelled the organization to put

its fate in the hands of a strong man. When political hegemony is achieved through the

exclusion of rival elites, it calls, sooner rather than later, for the enthronement of a dictatorial

ruler as the best guarantee to preserve the hegemony. The only way by which the TPLF could

maintain its egalitarian tradition was to relinquish its hegemonic aspirations, thereby making

the recourse to a strongman unnecessary.

Toward the Developmental State

Faced with the dilemma of allowing political pluralism while ensuring the dominance of the

EPRDF, Meles opted for the strategy of using all the means of the state to cripple opposition

parties until such time his own power and the party he represents acquire a hegemonic status.

This new strategic choice is none other than the recourse to the theory of the developmental

state. The purpose of the policy is to create the conditions for a long-term rule of Meles and

his party by siphoning off popular support from opposition parties to the point of making

them irrelevant.

A word of caution: I am not saying that Meless love affair with the theory of the

developmental state dates from the 2005 election. As shown by his doctoral thesis, he has

reflected on the theory for quite a long time. Even so, what remains true is that the 2005

electoral crisis and its consequences turned the theory from a personal preference into an

indispensable strategy and provided him with the opportunity of convincingly presenting it to

his supporters as the only viable policy.

To begin with, Meles criticizes neoliberalism even before he has made any genuine effort to

apply it. The reason is that the application of the theory would simply result in him and his

followers losing power, as evidenced by the 2005 election. What made the theory of

developmental state a necessity is thus the single and overriding issue of Meless control of

absolute power. The theory, we know, has been praised and advocated by many scholars for


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its ability to promote rapid economic growth. As a model drawn from the successful and rapid

development of Japan and East Asian countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, etc.,

the theory has been prescribed as an efficient remedy for countries struggling against

underdevelopment. For Meles, the economic advantages are worth considering only to the

extent that they guarantee the control of state power. In effect, the theory is usually associated

with the presence of authoritarian states that reject the path of liberalism.

I know that some scholars, Meles himself, and his ideologues maintain that the developmental

state is not incompatible with the defense of democracy and human rights, that the new state

can be democratic and developmental at the same time. This kind of approach ignores, mostly

for political reasons, the defining character of Asian developmental states. Countries that

seriously engage in the path of the developmental state do so because they think that the

liberal paradigm of development has failed in Africa and elsewhere. Born of a critique of

neoliberalism, it is inconsistent to assume that the theory is compatible with democratic

principles. Had it been the case, the difference with liberal policy would become difficult to

establish. The truth about the theory is that authoritarianism is conceived as the best and most

efficient way to achieve rapid development, especially for lagging countries. Witness those

countries that are cited as examples were or still are defined by an authoritarian state. Rather

than being both democratic and developmental, this model of development promises the

gradual institution of a democratic state once economic progress is put on a firm footing.

The prescription of authoritarianism as a remedy to achieve the goal of rapid development

vindicates that all authoritarian states are not developmental. They become so only when they

harbor the clear goal of using a strong state to achieve growth. It is, therefore, a mistake to

argue that popular insurrections in the Arab world testify to the failure of the authoritarian

model of economic progress at the expense of democratic rights. None of the Arab states has

sincerely applied the Asian model of development, given that authoritarianism was used to

defend the interests of predatory elites rather than to accelerate national development.

In the case of Ethiopia, the economic dimension must be emphasized as it is the key to the

project of a long-term rule of Meles and his cronies. Like most people, Meles has observed

that people living in regimes that show robust economic performances are little prone to

protests and insurrections. What essentially drives people is not so much the pursuit of

freedom in the abstract sense of the word as their ability to satisfy their most basic needs.

Freedom becomes mobilizing when it is invoked to overthrow regimes that have lamentable


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economic records. Accordingly, a regime that succeeds in providing bread and butter for its

people is guaranteed for a long rule. Of course, elections will be held in such a regime, but

they are more about popular consecration or approval than genuine contests. In a situation of

economic progress, the ruling party need not use fraud and intimidation to win elections; it

prevails because the economic success of the regime makes opposition groups irrelevant.

Such is the course that Meles would like to take in order to institute the conditions for an

indefinite retention of power. The developmental state promises the defeat of the opposition

achieved no more by suppression and rigged elections, but based on the economic

achievement of the regime. In this way, contests for power become less threatening as the

regime will draw its legitimacy from popular approval, which is not concerned with the

conquest of state power. This popular approval guarantees a long-term rule, the very one

needed by Meless cronies and military elite to entrench their interests and privileges, thereby

transforming them into permanent acquisitions. The establishment of a firm but silent and

condescending rule is what they want in exchange for allowing Meles the exercise of absolute

power.

Characteristics of Developmental States

The whole question is to know whether Meless new strategy can be successful in the

conditions of Ethiopia. Since success entirely depends on the ability to furnish appreciable

economic growth to the Ethiopian masses, we need to say a few words about the basic

characteristics of the developmental state. According to many scholars, some crucial and

commonly held features define the developmental state or the Asian mode of development.

Market Economy: The commitment to free market must be unwavering even if the state is

called upon to play a leading role both in terms of planning, investments, and directives. Theeconomic role of the state, though decisive and extensive, is not tantamount to running the

economic machine, as was the case with the socialist policy; rather, it is to render a helping

hand for the establishment of vibrant private enterprises and a capitalist class. Besides actual

economic functions, the developmental state supports capitalism by providing a lasting

political and social stability together with the rule of law and the protection of property rights.

The fact that the state assumes a supporting role significantly reduces rent-seeking activities,

such as government extracting revenues by the control of land and natural resources, the


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imposition of exorbitant tax and restrictive regulations affecting free enterprise, or

government agents demanding bribes and other payments from individuals or firms in

exchange for preferential treatments. The net outcome of such rent-seeking activities is, of

course, the prevention of economic growth through the falsification of market economy and

fair distribution. The national wealth cannot grow in a country where rent-seeking behaviors

prevail, since the imposition of restrictive controls hampers economic activity and an

important part of the wealth goes to a sector that makes no contribution to productivity.

Clearly, in light of most underdeveloped countries being held back by states that have grown

into rent-seeking systems, the supportive role of the developmental state to market economy

constitutes a major shift.

That the state limits its role to supporting private business does not mean that we are dealing

with a weak state, in the liberal sense of the state confined to providing law and order. The

developmental state requires a strong and authoritarian state, that is, a state that enjoys

financial autonomy, is free of internal cleavages and frictions, and faces a disabled opposition.

It is also endowed with effective institutions so that it is able to soar above particular social

forces. Only thus can it direct economic forces toward national development and have enough

leverage to prevail over adverse forces.

Bureaucratic Autonomy: The strength of the state is actually a condition for the other defining

character of the developmental state, namely, the autonomy of the bureaucracy. Indeed,

bureaucrats rather than the political elite supervise and direct the economy, with the

consequence that, unlike the ruling political elite, the bureaucracy is established on the basis

of merit, efficiency, and high skills. What is required of the bureaucrats is less political

allegiance than efficiency in exchange for handsome remunerations. The advantages enjoyed

by the bureaucrats are, therefore, not due to rent-seeking activities but to their contribution to

economic growth.

Development-Oriented Elite: What makes the autonomy of bureaucracy possible is the control

of state power by development-oriented political elites. Instead of using the state to sideline

rival elites, as is often the case in underdeveloped countries, such elites are motivated by the

desire to increase the national wealth. As they make political legitimacy conditional on

economic achievement, they allow an autonomous functioning of the bureaucracy, given that

autonomy is how bureaucracy can function efficiently. Such is not the case in rent-seeking

states: government is used to undermine rival elites for the simple reason that the dearth of


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economic growth entails the extraction of revenues through political exclusion and illegal

means.

Nationalist and Elite Education: The strategy of using skill and merit to perpetuate the rule of

a political elite fosters the other necessary component of the developmental state, to wit, the

centrality of education. Not only does the strategy advocate the expansion of education so as

to increase human resources in all areas of social life, but also insists on providing a quality

education, especially an elite education at the higher level of university. The provision of

highly trained people is a component part of the policy of rapid economic growth and hence

of direct interest to the ruling elite.

Needless to say, education is also geared toward nation-building: in conjunction with thevalues of meritocracy, it promotes national consciousness and unity. Obviously, the

promotion of nationalism is necessary to justify the prerogatives of a strong state and

inculcate discipline, just as it is necessary to galvanize and mobilize people around the

national goal of development. Without the inculcation of the values of loyalty, unity,

dutifulness, meritocracy, and the drive to learn, the developmental state cannot achieve the

mobilizing power it needs to lead the country into the road of rapid development.

The Ethiopian Situation

In thus exposing the main characteristics of the developmental state, we secure the ability to

see whether Ethiopia under Meles has the required attributes for a successful move. It must be

admitted that, once again, we find a repeat of the mistake of Ethiopias previous modernizing

regimes, namely, the attempt to copy a model of development and apply it in a country

lacking the necessary prerequisites.

Most observers acknowledge that market economy in Ethiopia not only operates under

unfriendly conditions, but has also taken a skewed form. For instance, despite the primacy

given to improving agricultural production, the entire agricultural activity is hampered by the

states control of land. The absence of private ownership of land does not allow peasants to

use their allotted land for transaction purposes. Nor does it encourage them to invest so as to

improve productivity. The states ownership of land and its subsequent disincentive effect on

agricultural production represent a major disparity with East Asian countries that is not likely

to be removed any time soon. State ownership of land is necessary to keep control over the


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peasantry and protect the ethnic boundaries. If land becomes a commodity that peasants can

sell and buy at will, the confinement of people to ethnically defined areas would be seriously

jeopardized.

The ethnic borders add further restrictions on economic activity in that they prevent the free

mobility of labor and capital. People isolated behind ethnic borders and increasingly turned

into alien groups by a denationalized education, the nurture of animosity over past treatments,

and a separatist language policy, are understandably little inclined to move from region to

region in search of opportunity. The hampering effect of internal borders is no less true for

capital owners: their ethnicity can restrict their freedom to invest wherever they like or can

cost them heavy losses in the form of bribes to local agents to get the necessary permission.

Another major distortion to market economy is the fact that the Ethiopian economy is

increasingly dominated by conglomerates that have close ethnic and political ties with those

controlling state power. Directly owned and managed by senior members of the TPLF, the

conglomerates extend their activities in numerous and crucial agricultural and industrial

productions as well as in service areas, such as banking, insurance, import/ export, etc. There

is no denying that the provision of political support to these TPLF-controlled businesses

structurally distorts the operation of free market. The distortion encourages the wide practice

of corruption and embezzlement, given that enterprises owned by businessmen non-ethnically

related to the ruling elite cannot hope to operate without bribing officials of the regime.

The weight of political intervention undermines efficiency and quality in all spheres of

business and bureaucratic activities. Not only does political protection foster the wide practice

of corruption, but it also erases free competition, the result of which is that merit and the

norms of efficiency and quality are set aside. Likewise, it creates insecurity since the lack of

the rule of law, basically manifested by the complete subordination of the judicial system to

the ruling elite as well as by the ethnically charged social atmosphere, gives property rights a

precarious status, to say the least. Insecurity, wide corruption, and the absence of free

competition, all conspire to discourage investment and block the improvement of productivity.

In short, the characteristics of the Ethiopian economy are at the antipode of what is needed to

launch a process of development that could be branded as an application of the Asian model

of development.


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Another crucial disparity is that the cumbersome weight of political intervention does not

allow the autonomy of the bureaucratic sphere which, as we saw, is a defining feature of the

Asian model of development. Far from allowing autonomy, Meles and his cronies are using

the bureaucracy as an extended organ of the political machinery, thereby undermining

impartiality and professionalism, and distributing favorable treatments on the basis of political

patronage, ethnic affiliation, and bribes. What must be emphasized here is that the ethnic basis

of the Ethiopian state, as fashioned by the TPLF, is structurally adamant to the autonomy of

the bureaucracy. In order to build a competent and professional bureaucracy, recruitment and

promotion must be based on merit rather than on ethnic affiliation and political patronage.

The whole ideology and political goal of Meles and his followers are thus directly opposed to

the establishment of a professional bureaucracy.

One necessary condition for creating a competent bureaucracy and improving the human

capital in terms of skills, knowledge, and expertise is, of course, education. In this regard, the

records of the Meles regime show some improvement, but alas an improvement that is only

quantitative. We can even say that the quantitative improvement is obtained to the detriment

of quality. The tense relationship of the regime with students and teachers further weighs on

the regimes inability to raise the standard of education. Also, the lack of political

accommodation and material improvement cause a systematic brain drain that further

impoverishes the country of skilled people. If the regime cannot find incentives by which it

retains the services of the people it educates, then it can never attain the level of human

capital needed to launch a developmental state.

Another obstacle disabling the educational policy is the lack of nationalist themes extolling

Ethiopia. Civic education is polarizing in that it is not directed toward national integration and

the development of national consciousness; rather, it exalts ethnic identity and fragmentation.

It reiterates past grudges, but does little to create a new national consciousness based on the

inheritance of the past. Whatever nationalism the educational system or the regime is

propagating, it is an exhortation to a clean slate, start-from-zero nationalism. This futuristic

nationalism answers every question except the most important one, which is: Why an Oromo

person, for instance, would prefer the construction of a new Ethiopia to the creation of an

independent Oromia? The futuristic nationalism lacks the excitement and commitment

flowing from continuity, from the sense of belonging to a historical and transcendental


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community. The future generates excitement when it connects with the past so that it tells a

story, a saga by assuming the mission of looking after and moving forward a legacy.

Interestingly, Meles knows that the developmental state needs a nationalist theme, that

popular mobilization around national goals is one of its strengths. That is why he is now

fanning the theme of war on poverty and the Abay dam project. Especially, the latter project

is highly nationalist: (1) it enables Meles to blame Western countries for their reluctance to

support the project; (2) it revives a longstanding grudge against Egypt over the control of the

Nile; (3) it appeals to the contribution of each Ethiopian, thereby supplying a common

national goal, regardless of ethnic belonging, and allegedly able to pull Ethiopia out of

poverty.

In his address during the 20th anniversary of the victory of the TPLF, Meles made a short

speech about the Abay dam project that was saturated with nationalist slogans and boastings.

The themes of unity, common goal, and eradication of poverty promised the renaissance of

Ethiopia, the restoration of the eminent place it had in the past. Not once was the ethnic issue

mentioned, rather, the historical identity of Ethiopia was back to the forefront.

One would be tempted to shout Alleluia were it not for the fact that this tardy nationalist

discourse does not agree with the actual ideology, political structure, and economic policy of

the regime. This brings us back to the fundamental issue, to wit, the question of knowing

whether the Ethiopian ruling elite has the characteristics of a development-oriented elite, as

forcefully required by the theory of the developmental state. As we saw, the non-predatory

character of the ruling elite is the sine qua non of the whole theory: in addition to being

nationalist, the ruling elite must draw its legitimacy and its retention of state power from its

ability to deliver economic growth rather than through the use of repression.

To the question of whether Meles and his cronies are anywhere close to being a

developmental elite, the answer is, of course, no. This negative answer does not, however,

mean that they are unable to become developmental. I am not saying that some such

transformation will occur or that it is inevitable. As a strong skeptic of determinism in history,

I am simply referring to the possibility inherent in the human person to finally make the right

choice and laying some conditions necessary to effect the transformation. Since my position

will certainly cause an array of objections, even angry attacks, it is necessary that I set out the

arguments liable to back it up.


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Conditions for the Emergence of Developmental Elites

Serious studies on the rise of developmental states agree that threat to power is the reason

why authoritarian elites decide to initiate reforms promoting economic growth. The reforms

are meant, not to satisfy any sudden democratic aspiration, but essentially to preserve power.

The threat can be internal or external or both; the point is that it is clearly perceived that the

ruling elite will soon lose everything unless it initiates reforms. Such was the case with Japan,

which adopted drastic reforms toward modernization in order to counter the threat of

colonization. Such countries as Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and South Korea undertook

reforms to weaken the menace of communism. If we take the case of some Latin American

countries, we find that their modernization is a response to the danger of internal insurrections

led by Marxist groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution. In the face of serious threats, ruling

elites adopt either a repressive policy as the right response or opt for reforms as the best way

to ensure their long-term interests. History testifies that, of the two methods, the avenue of

reform has best served ruling elites.

Additionally, the wise policy of reforms is perceived as a way of getting out of the political

stalemate caused by authoritarian regimes. When traditional elites engage in the process of

modernization, they initiate the formation of a modernizing elite, especially through Western

education, whose interests and outlooks clash with the traditional system of power legitimacy.

This conflict is easily translated into a competition for the control of political power.

Authoritarianism is then used as a repressive power to maintain rising elites in a subordinate

position. All the same, the assessment of the ruling elite could also be that a policy of

repression brings about neither economic development nor ensures peace and political

stability. The expectation of an indefinite and inconclusive political conflict creates a

rapprochement between the authoritarian elite and aspiring modernizing elites. Stated

otherwise, both parties realize the existence of a political stalemate and take the decision to

engage in negotiations. The decision means the renunciation of repression on the part of the

ruling elite and the withdrawal of the call for the overthrow of the regime on the part of

aspiring elites. These decisions show their respective readiness to compromise on reforms to

the system.

My contention is that the Ethiopian situation precisely exhibits a political stalemate, itself

fraught with dangerous possibilities. The tangible repressive tendency of the regime after the

2005 election has forced opposition forces and leaders to opt either for an armed conflict, with


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all the uncertainties that are attached to this form of struggle, or pursue a peaceful struggle

whose success depends on Meless guarantee of democratic rights, which, I believe, is no

longer likely. The third possibility is the path of popular uprising of the kind shaking up the

Arab world. The likelihood of a popular uprising in Ethiopia cannot be underestimated even if

no one can tell when and how it is going to materialize. One thing is sure, though: unless

something is done, it will occur and, given the political structure established by the TPLF, it is

not set to be peaceful and probably will invite dangerous confrontations. What is likely is not

the Egyptian situation of the army refusing to shoot demonstrators, but the Libyan or Syrian

scenario of bloody confrontation and civil war.

Redoubtable though Meless repressive power may be, he is not likely to marginalize the

opposition and achieve a final victory. The fact that the state becomes a repressive power

blocks the economic progress that he needs to sideline the opposition. On the other side, the

challenge of the opposition is bound to grow but without endangering Meless hold on power,

that is, so long as it sticks to a peaceful form of struggle. This stalemate can implant nothing

else but the seeds of an angry popular insurrection that no one can seriously claim to control.

In other words, the present situation is deepening the political stalemate, which can only

develop into a dangerous state of affairs for everybody unless a mood for compromise soon

emanates from all parties concerned.

Toward a Transitional State

The only way by which the present ruling elite can begin its transformation is through the

establishment of a grand coalition materializing a power-sharing arrangement among various

elite groups, especially with those representing opposition forces. This grand coalition brings

a major change: it means the forging of a national political elite and, more importantly, the

rejection of the embedded practice of using the state to exclude rival elites.

I say embedded because the practice goes back to Haile Selassie . It was taken up and

amplified by the Derg; under the TPLF, it took an open ethnic form. In all these cases, the

principle is the same: all the means of the state are used to marginalize and exclude rival elites,

be they ethnic, religious, or class-based. The practice of exclusion instead of integration or

coalition denotes the lack of development-oriented elites and the preponderance of rent-

seeking, predatory elites. The use of the state to keep out rivals betrays a quest for wealth that

is not based on growth but on political entitlement and predatory practices.


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The call for a grand coalition may seem utopian since it amounts to asking the TPLF to

abandon its hegemonic position in favor of a shared leadership. However, the utopian

character decreases as soon as we see it from the perspective of the long-term interests of all

the players and as the only viable way out from a dangerous situation. As we saw,

developmental elites emerge not so much from an ideological or moral conversion to

democracy as from an existential dilemma. The dilemma applies to opposition forces as well:

it means competing elite groups renounce the principle of conditioning change on the

overthrow of government. Instead of positing change in terms of one group losing and another

group winning, they espouse the idea of change occurring as a result of coalition formation or

power-sharing with the ruling elite, which amounts to a win-win outcome. I hasten to add that

the EPRDF should not be cited as an example of grand coalition, given the hegemonic

position of the TPLF.

The idea of a grand coalition is workable because it contains a valuable incentive for

everybody, that is, the incentive to effect changes so as to avoid dangerous developments. Let

me clarify: change cannot be an incentive for Meles and his cronies if it is coined in terms of

them giving up power. There is no incentive for the opposition, either, if compromise is

posited in terms of maintaining the status quo. Each camp must come half way so that they all

meet where power-sharing arrangement takes form.

The interesting thing about power-sharing is that it creates the conditions needed to apply the

developmental state. Meles is thus taken at his word and provided with the incentive of being

able to preserve the long-term interest of himself and his group. Indeed, we have indicated

that the developmental state requires the dismantling of the rent-seeking state, the

consequence of which is that elite rivalry for the control of the state is significantly

diminished. The rivalry has its source in the fact that the control of power gives an exclusive

access to wealth through various legal and illegal means. The establishment of a genuine

market economy removes the incentive of state control as a privileged access to wealth.

If the road of earnest reforms is rejected, what else remains but the maintenance of the

political structure of the TPLF, the consequence of which is that Meles has to adhere

indefinitely to a repressive policy and the practice of electoral fraud? The expectation that he

will be able to marginalize the opposition by offering to the masses tangible economic

betterment cannot happen if the present political structures and practices are preserved. The


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developmental state cannot be a reality so long as the state is used as an instrument of

exclusion.

One outcome of Meless rise to absolute power that could turn out positive is his ability to

dismantle the rent-seeking state. I venture to say that absolute power has given Meles some

autonomy vis--vis his followers; I even suggest that a disparity between his interests and that

of his followers is inevitable. The passion of Meles is power; the goal of his followers is

enrichment. The rent-seeking activities that they use to enrich themselves prevent Meles from

achieving the economic growth by which he can justify his control of absolute power. He has

now the choice of maintaining the old structure, with the consequences that his power will

become increasingly fragile, or resolutely dissolve it through reforms. In order to do the latter,

he needs the support of the opposition.

The dissolution of the rent-seeking state means that Meles takes the opportunity to lay the

foundation of the developmental state by promoting integration or coalition instead of

exclusion. This enormous contribution is the manner he protects his long-term interest and

that of his followers. Is there a better way of effectively guaranteeing his assets and a great

place in history than by becoming the great benefactor, the architect of Ethiopias final entry

into the road of modernization? He is entitled to keep whatever he and his followers have

amassed if the reforms he realized say to Ethiopians: you owe me.

Meless goal to use authoritarianism to bring about economic growth so as to marginalize the

opposition thus faces one major stumbling-block. The projected growth cannot occur unless

the state is reformed. The only exit is to present the change in terms of a win-win option, that

is, in terms offering incentives for both Meles and the opposition to come to an agreement.

The problem is none other than the design of an agreed transition allowing the ruling elite a

constitutional guarantee of continuity and an effective control of power while including the

opposition in a genuine system of power-sharing. For example, a strong presidential power

that retains the control of the armed forces and the right to nominate the prime minister

working with a parliament elected by the people could do the job. In this way, the prime

minister becomes accountable both to the president and the parliament, thereby incarnating

the rule of consensus that animates the entire political system.

To sum up, to solve the present political stalemate of Ethiopia, one prescription is for

democratization to occur gradually and under the sponsorship of an authoritarian ruling elite.


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Various systems of power-sharing guaranteeing the interests of the ruling elite and of the

opposition can be designed. The point is that the movement toward greater democratization

begins, no more through the overthrow of a ruling elite, but through a formula of power-

sharing and the building of trust among various elite groups. This type of democratization is

not uncommon: the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is not only the trajectory of

the Asian countries that applied the formula of the developmental state, but also of other

countries, such as Turkey, Spain, Brazil, Chile, etc. The truth is that the birth of democratic

states from an evolution of authoritarian regimes is no less a historical trend than the

establishment of democracies as a result of the violent overthrow of authoritarianism.

(Messay Kebede, Ph.D, can be reached at [email protected])


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Mind the Jump: A Brief Response to Prof. Messay Kebede

Abiye Teklemariam Megenta June 15, 2011

Professor Messay Kebedes challenging essay, The fallacy of TPLFs developmental state,makes a lot of fresh arguments and suggestions. Some of them are deeply unsettling to many

of us who consider ourselves to be part of a pro-democracy struggle in Ethiopia. To the extent

that we believe Messay himself is a member of our community a towering intellectual

figure at thatit is hard to escape a sense of deep disenchantment with what appears to be

his abandonment of our deepest convictions. But that is not a good enough reason to react

negatively towards the article. I agree with American political philosopher Michael Walzer

that the internal critics, the incrementalists and foot-draggers, the prophets that are honored in

their own city, are better in achieving the goals of their criticism than the external hammer-

on-the-skull critics. But the axe and the furious witnessing (to use Kafkas phrase) are needed

if communities are not to stagnate beyond reprieve, as ours seems to be heading towards. It is

refreshing to see that Messay is willing to stick his neck out in service of reason and progress.

But alas, most of his arguments, at least the arguments which matter, are far from persuasive.

The main point in Messays article is that it is not beyond Meles Zenawi to establish a

developmental state provided that the present political structure is reformed in such a way that

leaves, at least for some time, the ruling elite in power, but does not exclude the opposition

from participating in the act of governing. This is an authoritarian scheme, insofar as its

grounding is elite agreement, not voter choice. But Messay takes a hopeful, if not an

overconfident, view that democratization is possible under the tutelage of these power sharing

authoritarian elites.

The relevant literature in political science and political economy shows that this

overconfidence is misplaced. There are diverse explanations of the democratization process,

and Messay is on point to claim that elite-conceded or to a lesser degree elite-imposed

democracies are not implausible. But there are few places where these democratization

processes have started with power-sharing arrangements among competing political parties.

As Harvard Political Scientist Pippa Norris argues, there is little evidence that power sharing

serves the long-term interests of democratic consolidation and durable conflict management.

As it turns out, the bulk of literature points to an opposite conclusion: that power sharing

arrangements in full-scale authoritarian systems unravel quite quickly since the currency of
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trust and strength of agreement-enforcing political institutions on which the effectiveness of

these arrangements rely are very low, or even worse, they lead to exclusionary bargaining

systems and political culture that frustrate the emergence of democracy. It is good to note that

in the very few cases where power sharing schemes have positive democratization effects,

including some of the examples mentioned by Messay, the authoritarian states happened to

have strong selectorate accountability, or they were less than full-scale authoritarianisms. In a

simple language: the more the scale of authoritarianism, the less the actual democratization

effect of power sharing arrangements. If what Messay says about the nature of Meles

Zenawis rule is true, it makes his idea hopelessly mistimed.

It seems to me that what prompts Messay to consider this path to democratization is his

enthusiasm for the developmental state. In a way, his aim is to kill two birds with one stone.

But accepting elite authoritarian tutelage would not have been necessary had Messay been

less dismissive of the concept of a democratic developmental state. Messay insists, plausibly

enough, that the concept ignores the defining characteristics of Asian Developmental States.

But that is not a good reason to reject altogether its realizability. Indeed, the histories of post-

war Germany, Botswana, South Africa and many other countries suggest that a developmental

state can be democratic. I do not know the serious literature on this issue to which Messay

refers, but my understanding is that a good many developmental scholars agree that such

states are possible, in both an ideal and non-ideal sense. If such agreement exists for political

reasons as Messay contendswhich I think is an implausibly strong claim he fails to offer

any evidence.

Also, Messay makes two rather common errors both of the conflating sort when he

constructs his argument. First, he takes it for granted that neo-liberalism = liberalism. I think

it is fair to say that this is a troublesome position. Philosopher John Holbo rightly calls the

general tendency to conflate the two as strawman-ing liberalism. Some of the most

vociferous critics of neo-liberalism an economic philosophy that is best represented by

the Washington consensus including Joseph Stiglitz, Meles Zenawis unabashed

champion, are self-proclaimed liberals. The dominant thought in liberalism qua philosophy (to

which such egalitarian stalwarts as Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson and John Rawls belong)

doesnt prima facie reject a developmental role for the state since the underpinnings of this

thought are not property rights. Second, Messay seems to think that democracies are ipso

facto liberal. I am sympathetic to the view that no democracy can be illiberal. This is not,


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A rejoinder of Prof. Messay Kebede's article: Meles' political dilemmaBy Prof. Seid Hassan | June 16, 2011

I am writing this brief note as a rejoinder to Professor Messay Kebedes article titled as

Meless Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit and do so

without overshadowing the points that Professor Messay has made and without repeating

them here. My rejoinder stems from two perspectives:

1. That the ideas advanced by Professor Messay represent out-of-the- box thoughts, and I

strongly believe that such bold out-of-the- box thoughts encourage discussions, which in

turn could (hopefully) open the door for new thinking and new approaches/paradigms. I call

upon other intellectuals, concerned citizens, opposition party members and their supporters,

and even the ruling party members and its supporters to come up with new ideas of this kind

(of their own), and/or entertain them, all geared towards the emancipation of Mother Ethiopia

and the well-being of its people.

2. That, as I argued and stated elsewhere (see, here and here for example), if the last 18

years that Ethiopia has been under the EPDRF are any witness, this country is neither in a

position to mimic these countries (that is, Southeast Asia) and bring about measurable

economic change, nor is the political and economic phenomena of Ethiopia comparable to

those countries In that specific article, I listed, using a few references, particularly the

extensive study made by the World Bank, the common practices of those particular countries.

In short, the common policies and practices of those countries included, among other things: a)

Shared Growth which encouraged all citizens to cooperate with the ruling parties and which

raised everyones hopes thereby encouraging them to work hard. In contrast, Ethiopia is

engulfed with a highly discriminatory system that is dangerously widening the income gaps

between the haves and the have-nots, the major beneficiaries being EPRDF leaders andregional kingmakers. The others are: b) Increased accumulation of human capital; c)

Rapid accumulation of physical capital; d) Rapid growth of manufactured exports; and

e) Targeting Specific Industrial Policies and Avoiding Rent-Seeking; f) Stable

Macroeconomic Environments.

None of these are being replicated in Ethiopia, nor does Mr. Zenawis highly corrupt system

fit Developmental State that was applied Southeast Asia. What is created in Ethiopia is a

rather peculiar (opaque) rent-seeking and highly greedy system which has completely stifled
http://addisvoice.com/2011/06/a-rejoinder-of-professor-messay%E2%80%99s-article-%E2%80%9Cmeles%E2%80%99s-political-dilemma%E2%80%A6%E2%80%9D/http://addisvoice.com/2011/06/a-rejoinder-of-professor-messay%E2%80%99s-article-%E2%80%9Cmeles%E2%80%99s-political-dilemma%E2%80%A6%E2%80%9D/http://addisvoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Meles-political-dilemma.pdfhttp://addisvoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Meles-political-dilemma.pdfhttp://addisvoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Meles-political-dilemma.pdfhttp://addisvoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Meles-political-dilemma.pdfhttp://ethiomedia.com/accent/yes_to_democracy.htmlhttp://ethiomedia.com/accent/yes_to_democracy.htmlhttp://www.abugidainfo.com/?p=5578http://www.abugidainfo.com/?p=5578http://www.abugidainfo.com/?p=5578http://ethiomedia.com/accent/yes_to_democracy.htmlhttp://addisvoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Meles-political-dilemma.pdfhttp://addisvoice.com/2011/06/a-rejoinder-of-professor-messay%E2%80%99s-article-%E2%80%9Cmeles%E2%80%99s-political-dilemma%E2%80%A6%E2%80%9D/


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free enterprise and freedom, where the TPLF owns and operates numerous key business

sectors, the sole beneficiaries being party leaders and their followers, including the members

of the military leadership.

One more point is in order here: As I understood from the segment of his analysis that deals

with the Developmental State, I do not believe, as some readers may be mistakenly inclined

to think, that Professor Messay believes Mr. Zenawis Developmental State theory and

practice is either the preferred method to other alternatives or the panacea for Ethiopias ills.

I, for one, do not believe that authoritarian systems, particularly as exemplified by the practice

of Zenawis Developmental State ideology and practice, do a better job of promoting

economic growth and stability, for the empirical evidence testifies otherwise. It is just that,

given the political and economic circumstances and realities that Ethiopia is in, one cannot

jump to the Promised Land without understanding these realities and creating the necessary

conditions for the transitions.


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A short reply to Messay's paper - specifically on the power of dictators By Girma Moges | June 18, 2011

Messays assertion that elections or popular revolts are not going to either work or to be

controllable by anyone is, I think, a wrong assertion.

It is completely wrong to assume that TPLF/EPRDF or any other dictatorship for that matter

is undefeatable. Dictators are dependent on the people they rule for their existence. It is this

dependence that creates their Achilles-heel. Thus dictators are defeatable if they are struck at

their Achilles-heel. (I have discussed these weaknesses of dictators in one of my articles under

posted on Ethiomedia).

Yes, it may take years to build a nation-wide millions-man strong army of peaceful struggle towage a successful nation-wide peaceful uprising. Yes, it may require a lot of work to bring all

or major opposition parties together, exposing the regime as well as building a nation-wide

election-result-defending millions-man strong army to force TPLF/EPRDF accept its defeats

following elections. Of course, if there is defeat!

I do not see any reason why Ethiopian pro-democracy force can not defeat its dictatorship

given all the required homework is sufficiently met before waging the peaceful struggle. Just

like the pro-democracy forces of any other countries, Ethiopian pro-democracy forces are also

good enough to stand up and defeat their own dictators when the time is ripe. That is, if there

is a clearly defined goal, a well-thought grand strategy and campaign strategies are calculated,

error-free tactics are planned as well as appropriate mass political defiance and mass non-

cooperation weapons of peaceful struggle are selected. Yes, Ethiopia may have its

peculiarities including ethnic issues within the army and between regions the regime would

love to exploit! Thus the peaceful struggle or uprising may not be as easy as was in Egypt.

However, the solution is not to declare defeat and surrender even before trying a single day

political defiance sit-in at Ethiopian change square or a single nation-wide non-cooperation

strike. Therefore the solution is simply to be prepared better not quit!

Regarding the idea of grand-coalition proposed by Messay, if he meant power sharing, I do

not think that dictators are in the business of sharing or rendering power at will. In addition,

that issue was raised by the opposition during 2005 post-election period and did not get

acceptance by Meles. I remember his answer was short to the demand: Coalition with the

opposition is unthinkable. I think he has also characterized coalition with opposition as
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undesirable debating club (I stand to be corrected if I am mistaken). So I think Meles is

beyond a point of return on that issue. Of courses, if TPLF/EPRDF was forced to accept its

election defeat by a nation-wide organized millions-man strong peaceful struggle army and if

also it believed that accepting defeat was the only best option left for TPLF/EPRDF to

continue staying on power it would have accepted the proposal. Alternately if Messay meant

the formation of an authoritarian grand coalition that simply focuses on developmental stuff

abandoning democracy, I doubt its feasibility.

In closing, I always believe that the power of the Ethiopian people is much more stronger than

the power of TPLF/EPRDF.

---Girma Moges has written extensively on the power of a non-violent form of struggle. He can

be reached at [email protected]


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short rejoinder I argue that the ruling party in Ethiopia has been incapable of providing the

required leadership for the development of the culture of an out of the box thinking. It has

missed several opportunities. Hence, if TPLF is to have relevance to the new environment, it

ought to have new vision and new leadership. New thinking cannot come from its present

leaders. It is also unexpected of Meles to return the country to the 2005 situation. As regards

his exit plan, if he has one, he has missed the opportunity of stepping down with grace. His

present efforts appear to be focused more on preventing the bubbles from bursting.

If one turns the clock back to 2006, the time when Mr. Meles Zenawi wrote the article entitled

African Developments: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, the reader would quickly realize

that the idea was not original. However, Meles is smarter than some of his Ambassadors. One

cannot accuse him of ordinary plagiarism. Leaving the intellectual debate to scholastic forums,

there were, as Professor Messay has shown, the developmental State argument, which was a

response to the 2005 election crisis. Since 2006, a number of unexpected political and

economic developments have occurred. First, within the TPLF/EPRDF, Meles Zenawi and his

wife were able to consolidate power. Every contender of power within the party was either

sidelined or purged without an event. The net effect of this power concentration was to

solidify Meles Zenawis authority and a build-up of cult within the party, and the entire

governance system. By May 2010 the consolidation of power within the party manifested

itself in an absurd election statistics. It resulted in a 99.6% control of the 547 seats in the

parliament. In other words, the space and time for an out of the box thinking within

TPLF/EPRDF and the country was completely closed, and the likelihood of reopening the

broader political space now is remote as the regime is even more threatened by the revolutions

of the Middle East and North Africa and hyperinflation.

Indeed, like most of the rulers who are threatened by youth revolutions, rather than dealing

with the root causes of the problems of governance, Meles unfortunately elected to label his

adversaries, including the legal opposition, as Eritreas agents and terrorists. On June 15, 2011

the House of Peoples Representatives (Parliament) regrettably failed to correct Meless

excesses. It labeled the regimes adversaries as terrorists. Hence, I argue that it is impossible

to exercise an out of box thinking within TPLF/EPRDF. Meless dilemma therefore appears

to be more on the modalities of extending his prolonged rule, evidently at all costs.

Consequently, one can argue that Meles is no exception to the ordinary dictators of Africa.

Secretary of State Hillary Clintons speech on June 13, 2011 at the summit of the African


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Union, in Addis Ababa, in the presence of Meles Zenawi, is interesting. Her speech contained

the following:-

.But, even as we celebrate this progress, we do know that too many people in Africa still

live under longstanding rulers, men who care too much about the longevity of their reign, and

too little about the legacy that should be built for their countrys future. Some even claim to

believe in democracydemocracy defined as one election, one time...

And on the link between revolutions Mrs. Clinton argued as follows:-

Every country in the world stands to learn from these democracy movements, but this

wave of activism, which came to be known as the Arab Spring, has particular significance for

leaders in Africa and elsewhere who hold on to power at all costs, who suppress dissent, who

enrich themselves and their supporters at the expense of their own people. To those leaders

our message must be clear: Rise to this historic occasion; show leadership by embracing a

true path that honors your peoples aspirations; create a future that your young people will

believe in, defend, and help build. Because, if you do not if you believe that the freedoms

and opportunities that we speak about as universal should not be shared by your own people,

men and women equally, or if you do not desire to help your own people work and live with

dignity, you are on the wrong side of history, and time will prove that."

Mrs Clintons speech might embarrass her host, Mr Meles Zenawi, but she also appears to be

fishing for an out of box thinking in the wrong waters. Her speech did not take cognizance of

the institutions that manufacture dictators. It is the presence of separation of powers in the

governance system and term limits that prevent the rise of autocracy. Notwithstanding this, if

the rulers of Ethiopia have the willingness to learn, there are still many ways to safely exit

from political power. Within the realms of the African experience, TPLF/EPRDF leaders canstill arrange an exit for Meles and his close associates. How the dominant ruling regimes in

Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania arranged safe exits to their

former leaders is an important reference point. The recent election histories of Ghana, Kenya,

Malawi, Zambia, etc also show that loss of government power does not necessarily lead to

retributions and loss of privileges. My sense however, is that the TPLF has lost both the space

and the time for an out of box thinking.


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Meles could have exited honorably from both party and State power just after the May 2005

election. He could have opted for sharing cabinet positions. He could have kept his words and

exited after the May 2010 election, however deficient the election might have been. Any one

of these missed opportunities would have earned him respect. It would have changed the

political landscape for the better. If he allows an out of box thinking within the secretive party

at this late hour, the process opens a major Pandora box. There is no known succession plan

and, the scandals are too many to be put under the carpet. There are also competitions among

the various wings of EPRDF. In other words he is at a point of no return. Meless dilemma

aside, if and when TPLFs out of the box thinkers come out, as was the case of the Afrikaner

intellectuals in the early nineties, the opposition and the broader Ethiopian society are duty

bound to give them the opportunity to succeed.

---

Prof. Minga Negash can be reached at [email protected]


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Demobilizing Ethiopians will never be the solution to Ethiopias existential problems : A

response to Prof. Daniel kindie and to Prof. Messay Kebbede

By Wedi Samre June 18th, 2011

Post cold-war Ethiopia has been in the throes of existential crisis. It has been dismembered

and landlocked. Its territories have been stolen in broad day light and ceded to neighboring

countries. It was exposed to Eritrean invasion and wanton destruction.

Its national language has been relegated to the status of a regional language. Its people have

been played off against each other on the basis of region, religion and language. Of late, the

Ethiopian people have been victims of land grabbing. In a word, Ethiopia has been confronted

with unprecedented existential crisis in three thousand years of its history. Yet Ethiopianintellectuals and politicians have not risen to the challenge of the crisis. Two recent articles

published by two high-profile intellectuals, Prof. Daniel Kindies

(Abugida 12, june2011)and Prof. Messay Kebbedes Meless

Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit (Abugida, 13june 2011)

evince the inaptitude of Ethiopian intellectuals to be up to the challenge. The two gentlemen

avoid addressing the existential problems of the country and talk about minor issues which

deflect public attention away from the big one. Prof. Daniel talks about the enduring bonds

between Eritrea and Ethiopia and about his desire to see the formation of a North-East African

common market. Prof. Messay tells us barefacedly that Melis Zinwi is in a political dilemma.

He adds that Melis Zinwi thinks that developmental state can be a solution to his political

dilemma. But according to Messay, it has become a dead end for Melis Zinwi. In Messays

infinite wisdom, the developmental state can be an exit (and not a dead end) if and only if

Melis Zinwi accepts to share power with what Messay calls the opposition parties. Messay

says clearly to Melis Zinwi that Ethiopians are ready to acknowledge their defeat if he accepts

to share power with opposition parties. Unbelievable!

The thesis that I am going to defend is that the articles of the two gentlemen are defeatist and

have the devastating consequence of demobilizing Ethiopians. To put it bluntly, the message

of the two articles is Shabia (EPLF/TPLF) friendly. By talking about Ethio-Eritrean

relationship, Prof. Daniel Kindie obscures the truth that the cause of the existential problem of

our country is intimately connected to the desire of Shabia ( EPLF/TPLF) to guarantee the

Eritrean independence in the future. Likewise Prof. Messay Kebbede downplays Ethiopias

existential problems by saying without the slightest proof that Melis Zinwi is in a dilemma.
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Amhara intellectuals and politicians to collaborate with the enemy does not mean that the

TPLF is a Tigray organization. The position of Amhara intellectuals and politicians is

untenable all the more so since they have never ceased saying that the TPLF is an anti -

Ethiopian organization. If the TPLF is anti-Ethiopia organization, it should be a fortiori an

anti-Tigray organization. What is odd is that Ethiopian intellectuals and politicians refuse to

accept that the TPLF is an anti-Tigray organization. This is for example the case of Prof.

Messay Kebbede, the number one intellectual balkanizer of the Ethiopian nation and

demobilizer of Ethiopians. Some years ago, Messay described the TPLF as an anti -

Ethiopia Tigre group. Yet today, he argues that a developmental state under the leadership of

the anti-Ethiopia Tigre group could be an exit to the Ethiopian stalemate if the anti -

Ethiopia Tigre group accepts to share power with the opposition parties. Why the volt-

face prof. Messay? How on earth can there be a power-sharing arrangement between what

you call anti-Ethiopia Tigre group and the opposition parties? Are you advising

Ethiopians to collaborate with what you call an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group? Arent there

already legions of collaborators who rule the different regions of Ethiopia on behalf of what

you call anti-Ethiopia Tigre group?

If Messay is not advising Ethiopians to stop to defend Ethiopia and to collaborate with the

enemy in implementing its project of dismantling the Ethiopian nation, what is the point of

power-sharing? If power-sharing is a means to prevent the enemy to destroy our country, it is

unclear what has led Messay to think that the anti-Ethiopia Tigre group would be ready to

share power with patriotic Ethiopians. No patriotic Ethiopian can work with the sworn enemy

of their country. Messays manifesto is an exercise in intellectual mystification of the root

causes of Ethiopias existential problems. Melis Zinwi has never been interested in power for

the sake prestige and amassing unearned huge wealth. Melis Zinwi has a superior mission

which Messay feigns to ignore. If the desire of Melis Zinwi were only the retention of power,he would not have rendered Ethiopia landlocked; he would not have stolen Ethiopian

territories to cede them to Eritrea and to the Sudan. He would not either work to destroy the

national language of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo church. The life mission

of Melis Zinwi is clear for anyone who does not want to behave like an ostrich. The

destruction of the national language of Ethiopia is another way destroying Ethiopia politically,

socially, economically and culturally. Imagine how American economy would be totally

crippled if the different federated states were to have no common language of communication?

This is to say that Messay has sinned by his excessive unrealism since his manifesto for


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power-sharing does not give due consideration to Meliss satanic calculus. Messay is a

prisoner of his own perverse theory of Tigray hegemony. It leads him to obscure the mission

which Melis Zinwi set out to fulfill since he arrived at the age of 10 in Addis-Ababa. That

mission is the dismantling of the Ethiopian nation so that Ethiopian nationalism would never

represent again a threat for Eritrean independence.

Messay denies this (despite the facts on the ground) and has always said that the TPLF is not

an Eritrean organization. Messay tried to no avail to refute the declaration of Sebhat Nega that

the TPLF was an Eritrean organization and that it would defend Eritrea from any foreign

attack (read: they would do the best they could to destroy the Ethiopian nation once and for

all). That is why Messay says that the developmental state can be an exit out of what he

calls Meless political dilemma. Yet he knows that the TPLF is an Eritrean organization.

Didnt he mention once the possibility of activating the Eritrean connection if the TPLFs rule

of Ethiopia was to be threatened seriously? It was an indirect way of saying that if Ethiopians

were united and decided to destroy the TPLF, the Eritrean army would never hesitate to fight

on side of the TPLF against Ethiopians. This should have led him to exhort Ethiopians to rally

around the defense of their country. But he preferred to point the finger at Tigray rather than

making his own self-introspection.

Messay has also contributed to what he calls now Ethiopian stalemate by exhorting

Ethiopians to avoid describing the TPLF as an Eritrean organization or by saying that

TPLF would work for the modernization if Ethiopians stopped fighting to regain their

Assab Autonomous Administrative Region. Forgetting the great disservice he has been

rendering to the Ethiopian nation, Messay thinks that the developmental state can be an exit

for Melis Zinwis dilemma and for the Ethiopian stalemate. The problem of Messay is

that he does not explain how one can envision the existence of an Ethiopian developmental

state led by what he himself calls an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group? Messay, the philosopher,

draws conclusions without demonstrating his arguments. For the Ethiopian from Tigray, the

expression anti-Ethiopia Tigre group is a contradiction in terms because it is impossible for

an anti-Ethiopia group to be Tigrayan; describing an anti-Ethiopia group as Tigrayan is a

despicable attempt to tarnish the image of Tigray. But since the aim of Messay is to put a

Tigray label on the Eritrean organization, he talks about developmental state. This reminds me

the Amharic saying lam balwalechibet Kubet lekema. Because the reality of post-cold war

Ethiopia is that it has been without state, government and leader. Without showing first the


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existence of an Ethiopian state, Messay cannot talk about the possibility of a developmental

state as a solution to the countrys existential crisis which he calls euphemistically the

Ethiopian stalemate. Messay knows full well that the reason why there is neither state,

government nor a leader in Ethiopia is that Ethiopia has been occupied by a branch of the

Eritrean peoples liberation front calling itself TPLF. The EPLF branch has succeeded in

passing for a Tigrayan organization thanks to the unfailing help it enjoys from collaborationist

Amhara intellectuals and politicians in general and from Messay Kebbede himself in

particular. Messay says he belongs to the opposition camp. The reality is that Messay hates

Tigray. He does not hate Shabia (TPLF/EPLF). Messays earlier writings and his latest article

show in no uncertain terms that he is, in spite of himself, a Shabia (TPLF/EPLF) wedo geb.

To describe the TPLF as an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group is to be a TPLF propagandist; it is a

subtle way declaring an intellectual war on the Ethiopian nation in general and on the Tigray

people in particular.

Besides, there is one thing which Messay does not seem to have thought over. If as he says

the TPLF is an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group, then it is impossible for him to say that he

belongs to opposition camp. Because there cannot be an opposition party in a country ruled

by its enemies (i.e. by what he calls anti-Ethiopia Tigre group). Could there be an opposition

party in the United States, in the United Kingdom or in any other Western country if the

group holding power were anti-America, anti-Britain, anti-Germany or anti Sweden group,

etc.? It seems that Messay and the so-called opposition parties have forgotten the crucial fact

that the very idea of politics is predicated on the dichotomous opposition between a friend and

foe, between a citizen and a foreigner. This means that if a country is ruled by foreigners

(enemies), it is conceptually and empirically impossible for politics to exist. So if Messay

says that the TPLF is an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group, he must accept (if he is consistent with

himself) that there cannot be an opposition party in Ethiopia. There can be only an Ethiopiannational liberation front which must fight to liberate the country from enemy rule. If we

accept that there is no politics in Ethiopia (because Messay and other Amhara intellectuals

have admitted publicly that those who rule Ethiopia are anti- Ethiopia Tigre group), then it

is impossible for developmental state to exist in Ethiopia. If Messay addressed the

problematic of the developmental state in Ethiopia from the angle of the Ethiopian concept of

mengist, he would realize that the very concept of Mengist militates against Ethiopia being

ruled arbitrarily let alone by her enemies (i.e. by what Messay calls anti-Ethiopia Tigre group).

But is Messay really interested in defending the causes of Ethiopia? If he were attached to the


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defense of the Ethiopian nation, he would plead for national unity and for a united national

resistance as the only solution to our problems and would tell Ethiopians that the discourse on

developmental state is an evil hoax which, like other evil hoaxes such as revolutionary

democracy, Melis Zinwi uses to mask the fact that he is Eritrean enemy at the helm of of

Ethiopia. Messay seems to forget that the only responsible factor for economic development

in Ethiopia is the Ethiopian people and never the collaboration of political parties with the

occupation force. Only when Ethiopia is led by patriotic Ethiopians and only when the

Ethiopian people are convinced that they have leaders committed to working for their well-

being, will they work for the development of their country. In the absence of such conditions,

talking about developmental state or simply about economic development is either a sheer

stupidity or a semantic manipulation.

Personally, I thought that Melis Zinwis discourse on developmental state could hoodwink

only the uneducated rank and file of the TPLF. But it seems that there are high-profile

educated Ethiopians who take it seriously. What interest does Melis Zinwi have to work for

the development of the country which he wants to destroy? As for Messay, I am not sure that

he really believes that developmental state through power-sharing can be a solution. I dont

believe that Messay is stupid. But since my aim here is not to correct Messay but to protect

Ethiopians from being mistaken by Messays esoteric talk about developmental state, I would

like to say a word or two on the subject. One reason why I say Messays manifesto is Shabia

(TPLF/EPLF) friendly is because he compares Melis Zinwi with the leaders of East Asian

countries without first showing whether the comparison is possible and desirable. The Asian

model of development, let it be said, is the result of a patriotic choice made with view to

enabling the countries in question to catch-up the Western world. That is why it was based on

the flying geese pattern development model developed in 1936 by the Japanese economist

Kaname Akamatsu to explain the catch-up industrialization by latecomer economy, i.e. hisown country Japan. In other words, it did not have, contrary to what seems to believe Messay,

anything to do with authoritarianism. The Asians came up with their own development model

after having studied Western economic history and rejected Western economic theory and

especially the neo-classical economic development model (they rejected the idea of the

invisible hand). They also rejected the dependency theory developed by Latin American

scholars because for Asians international trade (or what we call today globalization) is not an

end in itself, but a means to their industrial development. As we know, following president

Trumans 1949 inaugural address to the American Congress that the United States was duty-


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bound to to help back-ward countries achieve development, American leaders encouraged

the newly decolonized countries of the then called Third World to espouse free market

capitalism. The idea was to contain Soviet expansionism in the Third World. But following

the decolonization process which started in earnest the 1950s, some economists realized that

neither Keynesian nor neoclassical economics were pertinent for the newly decolonized

countries in their quest for development. This led to the birth of development economics. But

hardly was development economics born than the United States started to wage ideological

and diplomatic war against developmentalist economic policies. The developmentalist

policies were considered to be hostile to the interests of American multinational corporations.

So the United States leadership preached that free market capitalism accompanied by Western

development aid was the royal road to development. American leaders did not have a problem

in influencing African and Latin American leaders. That was not the case of Asia. The Asians

rejected the teachings of Western mainstream economics theory, but they abstained

themselves from being opposed publicly to the United States crusade against developmentalist

economic policies. Unlike Eritrean hero and imposter, Melis Zinwi, the Asians did not say

that they were for a developmental state and against free market capitalism (the only

exception was Japan which threatened (in the 1990s) not to finance the the world bank unless

the latter recognized the specificity of the Japanese development model). Melis, the born-liar,

says he is against neoliberalism while it is a public knowledge that he is politically,

diplomatically and economically hundred percent dependent on the support of his British and

American protectors. As for the Asians, they continued secretly implementing their

developmentalist policies while expressing in public their full adherence to the principles of

free market economy. Until the publication of Chalmers A. Johnsons book MITI and the

Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial policy, 1925-1975 in 1982 (Johnson was the first

to speak of the developmental state), it had been believed in Western academia, that free

market and international trade were responsible factors for Asias industrialization. But

Western academia had refused to accept Johnsons study of Japanese industrialization until

the publication in 1992 of other books concerning Taiwanese and South-Korean model of

development. Be that as it may, the United States leadership knew from the outset that the

Asians did not tell the truth when they presented themselves as adherents to free market

capitalism. But America was obliged to turn a blind eye because of the East-West rivalry

during the cold war. It was obliged to open its market to Asian products for geopolitical

reasons.


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I make this digression to show why Messay is wrong when he associates developmental state

with authoritarianism. To the contrary, the patriotic desire to efface the national humiliation

inflicted on Asians by Western domination was the driving force behind the invention of the

Asian model of development. When Chalmers A. Johnson coined the expression

developmental state, it was by way of contrast with what is thought to be the regulatory,

laissez-faire or night watchman state of the Anglo-Saxon world. Of course, I am not

saying that Asian leaders were convinced democrats. I am saying they were imbued by a

patriotic desire to work for the glory of their respective nations. That is why I doubt Messays

sincerity when he compares Melis Zinwi, the sworn enemy of Ethiopia with the patriotic

Asian leaders like Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, or with South

Korean and Taiwanese leaders . The authoritarian nature of Asian leaders is not surprising in

view of the history of the Western world. The history of the West from the 17th century to

1945 shows that authoritarian regimes (officially called parliamentary democracies) created

the market and the market in turn then gave birth to democratic oligarchic regimes. But one

should not confuse authoritarian regimes with unpatriotic, corrupt, arbitrary and incompetent

regimes. If authoritarian regimes play an active role in economic development, it is because

they are patriotic. The proof is that where there is an authoritarian patriotic regime, the

construction of a modern state becomes indispensable. Indeed, contrary to what is asserted by

orthodox economic theory, a modern state is by definition a developmental one. There has

never existed a state which is anti-development or which does not work development. For

example the question why the Industrial Revolution took place in England is still a moot point.

But it is safe to say that England would not have been the cradle of the industrial revolution

without the existence of an authorit

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Debate on the Developmental State: By Ethiopian Scholars

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