·.

. .

L

v.

1

-

I I

~/NOOIS DECAPTiONEO

Cf

l ' 1

p.m.

Vienna

I

, Interpreter

A. A. Gromyl<o

. .

i t rt::r i t h.X} ti . t of

L or.g na resiuent: p,

t d ve

interests our

es our allies. t u.s. U.S.S.R. and d disc and frankly.

this a some of scuss ,unpl • ident beli that it would to discuss on a frank

sincere basis. There were some/areas~in the world where the s. and i

all had absolutely vital/interests, for example, the Arabian peninsula and

Persian Gulf. In areas li these, which were sensitive, we should exert maxi-

mum efforts on the rt of both si to avoid conflicts which could become

serious. In other troubled areas peaceful resolution was always preferable.

He was referring to such areas as the. Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Sou

Africa and Southeast Asia. In these areas it was important for both of us to

try to discourage combat and bloodshed, and to encourage peaceful resolution

of 1 di The ive military activi of Cuba were of

concern to the American people. We regarded Cuba as a proxy of the

Un , a or 1 an al , which was ' were some li

increasi 1 i-

we on

i

i

r s i

ti a more ve

in nava 1 acti ti us il i es. t

was concern to us.

rea 1 i our two es di ves

wi that et

Union <•~ .s ot:,

d 6~pc 1ae t;e· wtH:>ro I-to~ _l 0

ible, we ~ deal

. . th we were to ieve U.N.

a wi a of its choice. In ia we

were w-to Masolve the proplem to the sati ion the people of that

• area in a way and without t. On the Middle

'~ I~ .-t vr_.,,...' t #f' v f had of opinion in the past and the present. We,he& tt iee~the

President personally, had tried to bring together all parties in Geneva,

includi the Soviet Union1with a view to fi ng a solution to the differences

in the Middle East. This was some two years ago, but Syria and a number of

other countries refused and no progress had been ident

an initiative ab8~~-- i dent v1oul d that this was without

on em.

so was and s was consi with U.N.

, as as nt

I

I n

1

ve same.

l

. .

... ~ ~

i1 r., J/L s u. ;~. rces.

the u.s .• in interests a di

tE!rna ve on if was ill. T

rvis~ N. ~d~ll Israel's 1

i Uni tes had an in in Ti

in this ire area of world. In the we al had good wi .. ~E'CO/l~,/

Iran. though now they were not nearly as close as u; W.:he pawt. We had no . /

intention of interfering 1n

would the i

internal affairs of Iran or Afghanistan. but W2

of both these countries. It endangered U.S. lives

that the ·Soviet Union was ng allegations to the contrary. is

was concern us.

The President, turning to the People's Republic of China, said that he

was aware of the Soviet concerns as Brezhnev had stated on several occasions

in his letters, but we felt that after 30 years norrnali ion of relations

and e*s Republic of China was long overdue. believed

that this new relationship would contribute to peace and stabili and it

was i es worl an

d

listen heat

;r

u

tru:t our i i r. wa r to

in to et concerns sure

ut d

U.S.S.R. i would th

just said.

t setti s consi ions on i

y to ti

ea ier s roorni further ons on T 1-1( ('t'JI-'!:tr;(~ ...:~" t'""'-fi

_,

to ~.-he had a 1 ready cv1nr4:•<= in enna. He did want to / "

il all the questions rai by the President. There could

of view on all of them and it was difficult at this point to

solution with regard to negotiations. However, it was

the that before these negotiations developedfully

to consi a number of questions of principle. For one thi '- /"-' vOt. vr

low-on agreement had to~;ftela~e not U. S. , but

nuclear

follow-on

, there must be full clarity the ~elude these systems, including

rPt:•mPrlT must ~. S. forward-based systems 1

not· only I!. F (' Fl V S fC "'f :I W' 'I !> \N I •">c <! ';) I<! NO..._,,.,_,

• @ua Jlllit t:Jf:::::a:maci uan~$49 'fttUS e nm::ct uu; ::ou1£, j

lies.

t

low-on

. .

!<-

' ...

in hi L scu:..

maki scv~ra 1 aencra 1

same carrmon

in world irs. gni

cance s was p to act in

~This it wh were

preventi this. al had 1Jad occas note 1

and, to an even ion between our states, includi

cooperation in international ~-H~

affairsf~as greatly hampered~ one of the si

was attributing in the/world. movements for national liberation and M11t: f'voz :r ~ r

independence, as well as for social progress, to the ~~will of one of the si

Brezhnev had to 1 d that a rathe rstrange theory had ined currency in the

United States, a theory known as the arc of crisis, according to which the ,...._p

Soviet Union~ llegedly reaching from Western Africa to Southern Asia,

seeking to surround the Middle East,to the detriment of the United States

and western countries in genera 1. Brezhnev wanted to that this entire

theory was an absol iry tale. ven such an to international

, it was hardly ble to progress in international relations,

i world problems in which our es

i

as it was.

was sure u.s.

n

UECAPTiONEO

i • wou' r to io.1a 1

connect , it wa al necessary--not in wo in

to i ri not !: vrf · ·rc l;.rf ,: l=f?T:,.:;:;c,...c:F

t c)~ eit poHeF an atti (f'A!I'Ltin 11 a l SllJ'll" I tn 4-ty-, in li wi ' '

to

et to i with u.s. in inter-

national if carri out--

an a at was sure t

d no lack areas on of onal and worldwi i

/ "' said that it. h'a~ J'OI"'t'ieu1al"~)' impM- the Soviet Union attached

to irs. That was understandable, of course.

a la rt the Sovi Union was located in Europe and because

its history was closely ti to '.t.r5~

Moreover, ~ location in Europe

in

nei

always exerted a major. at times a decisive influence on the situation

entire world. It was the chi

the Soviet e nor

So vi

te was

-

concern of the Soviet leadership that

in the

s

e in Europe ever live through

World War II as a people and the o~f. fhe1Sovi 1

e

t i

t

in i

icy .n

to

et

et

.at ion~

1 •

1

on was

was an

a si

and i

7

rn c:ountries 0 i

ion did not p'lrsue ar 'V'ti

i , r:rrcJ::":>t,..,c; ai.umiaotifltg

ry or an enemy

on

i

Uni

et

of U.S. wi

can course

certai y

that

to

nued that European situation did, of course. include

el which raised concern, such es efforts aimed at lop-sided, Brezhnev

would even say self-serving(, interpretations of the provisions of the Final

Act of the European security conference, when some provisions were emphasized "' ~-

,_.. o p!:: T ftPN

at tlie eJ!EJ1ertse ef others in order to -~ tM!m use them as part of an effort

to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In Brezhnev's view,

it was in our mutual interest to implement all the provisions of the Final

Act and to do so in a spirit of constructive cooperation and good will.

After

of adopted at that It was in this spirit that

si planned to approacr

d d a similar

d on ence

in

r

i

. .

litar} '"' it a 11 ies

were no lo, sati ii t•l a b.'i 1 anc» t t i to

n 1 i If was si on. T ..,

, what was~? That d mean a new

in 1 i et ion, its rt, i t

only way of ng in was retain

the ng balance of on wi

balance. y. et ion was in favor 1 itary

Brezhnev continued by sayiog that it was his particular wi that

States-Parties to the ~nf~rence on ty and Cooperation in Europe

conc1 a treaty on refraining from first use of nuclear or conventional arms "T u,.

each other. Was it not clear~

in Europe and between our two countries?

<=<'"'"'P~E

s would create a healthier ~tMiipRer ~at objection~

To be quite honest~there

a~ eh~eet~efts to that? In this area, in addition to the Vienna discussions

h........._submi ttedJ

that had been ~feFFea~ discussed, the U.S.S.R. and its allies a~

a package of specific proposals to the Western countries. All proposals

on

was 1

in,

t

. .

i t o~ ero:;ic a

t. .ev .;a ._I .€: ident was

1 wi et e in its isal of

i that score. tten to dent about

t. s rsonal ng wanted to ize this. The

197K Sovi . s. understandi on joint act in the Middle

and supplanted by an anti-Arab policy d not bode well

in that area or for the relations between us. Brezhnev thought

that it was clear to everyone new that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty had failed :::-

~ to resolve tHe M'iddle Eastern situation and had sharpened

i

tion of

dangers. It sufficed to look at the indignation and determina­

Arabs and to note the war which Israel, protected by Egypt,

was/wagi in lebanon. This could at any time turn into a very serious

confl i It was necessary to prevent a resumption armed conflict along

the lines of the 1967 war, to prevent a major conflagration. Therefore,

the itions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. fundamentally

di this time and not through any fault of the>Soviet Union. To

frank, the Sovi Union was resolutely opposed to efforts to use •

U.N. a and it by using U.tL

i or in some on

e same as it

S"r p-rtt: r own ea tm I i:y, :tr

on, i

i

ier .N.

SECRET/ ION EO

1

hnev JSt i was in

1nt . i st icy

i to

on inst Viet WhHe-UtA I

i e to to s the Chinese were to

leave not all it, of the ic

Viet Nevertheless. Peking was once again

. . another lesson. evidently having failed to learn ;:: r . ~ I

as there was any to such ~nterv~ntion, there would remain a M~Y

danger of war, especi ly ffi Southeast Asia. In fact. Peki no secret

that its goal is to involve the world in a war in which it would remain on

the sidelines. This time the people of Viet Nam have heroically rebuffed

the Chinese In this instance the Soviet Union had mani C /{CT( i) Vf It~- j if?.

great restraint and 1r<ease ef(respons1b~n its actions. However, there ........ l>lf

~a limit to all patience. The Soviet Union had assumed obligations with

respect to Viet Nam under its treaty of friendship with that country. He

was sure if Chinese 1 were firmly told of dictation,

bl il and were inadmissible in international rel and that

Chinese , there would to

a. i

i

' a

. .

to

i

of all

SECRET/

11

;m i n~w was

a i situation with

s area were

overcoming the £FCF'r'A

itical :il'\ht:t i ta.Me of coloni i

iet Union. it has consi y spoken out for full liqui .:

colonialism and racism in Africa and it respect~

peoples of Africa,without to ~A peace and i

on

Union did not pursu~any other goal. The President should not believ(

absurd tales to the c<;mtrartf. "The Soviet Union did not economic or

c advantages in Africa. The Sovi Union did not strive to infringe

on ts-~1.

's interests. This applied equally to Southern Africa.~~herever

coloniali violateFthe rights of people, the victims ha~the right \

to support of the Soviet Union~•" Hris. By~e same token,

no one could accuse the Soviet Union of being opposed to peaceful solutions,

provi that they were real, not fictitious,and fully consistent with the

i Africans themselves. et Union ""'a:s in f"<h'Bf'·ef 1

neocolonialism byrformer colonial and raci regi~s.

I

our

d

. .

SECRET/~APTIONED

1

with i _an w.._s inst •d cotJnlrv. :1 coun

a StA .. 1 d l re , u t i or. which, as v had occasion

hip first lea

wire • that is way it was.

of revo 1 uti ons a was taki place

old regime. But this did not provi for

or provoke anti riots. Unfortunately. such

interference was occurri Brezhnev wanted to hope that the United

would not partici in such aetions; that instead it would develop normal

relations with Afghanistan./ /

Brezhnev said that again and again the U.S. was raising the matter of

Soviet relations with Cuba. He wanted to say that the Soviet Union complied

strictly with the 1 understanding. It ~ had not undertaken and was

not undertaking anything that would be contrary to that understanding. This U""" C>f!: 11 C r ,.,.._ PI 1'- 4 r'O

~should be continued and"one should~ resort to arbitrary interpretations

Sel!ll!: ~ee15te-e1a: fm tt.et Here and there it was asserted that the Soviet Union

was usi to i in other areas. Nothing could be further from

the truth. Cuba was an independent country and as an i coun.try

which were Cuba the of legiti

i

1

1 i ry bnil in \tiet U"' on 1 nc

a concern. 1 et ion no no intention

i Soviet i Vietnamese court'fcs"' .:-~,,s;.

r iness for&lis;t3 of flitnd!!rrtfl. I vidual Soviet ai 1

at Vietnamese ai el that was normal lly

in i ona 1 rela It was not ai inst interests of

U. or its allies. threat to came from China. which al

ca out ~blatant ion inst Viet Nam and which was now openly

ing to teach VietNam a/new lesson. As for Soviet assistance to Viet . / ;

Nam,W*'-Ad.P.e,...l"'~tt:.JA~e"-"ff;..,f-t;.,..eRmt4~tts-rik't'i;HoJ'~'--~ it was being prov5under the fri

treaty with that countrY,@ a victim of aggressiofand was designed to

p

na to cease its expansionist policy, to in its senses and to refrain

ions.

Brezhnev continued that there was one other destabilizing factor in the

Far did not ori nate with the Soviet Union. He was referring

to the/military in Japan, South

were being ntai

on. Aircraft carriers and nuclear

near li at

and the Philippines. Many

U.S. near the borders of the

nes were cruising the seas

li

,t'oC4'175D es S;;e,. near

1 i

14

te , we 'in hi ew

i r. s: inQ o an

d serve as a r p

issues. to

note 4tk i e(, hei bee~~t- discus s roorni (

s d ter. we d

nue that we would reach reement, though SJ.~Ont:r>

in ~~"ti was for II