DECCAN FINE CHEMICALS (INDIA) PVT....

DECCAN FINE CHEMICALS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. SURVEY NO. 63‐75, 80‐83, 84‐108 (KESAVARAM VILLAGE), 52‐56, 146‐150 (RAJAVARAM VILLAGE), VENKATANAGARAM POST, PAYAKARAOPETA MANDAL, VISAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT,

ANDHRA PRADESH

RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

Project No. 1016‐21‐01October 2016

Deccan Fine Chemicals (India) Pvt. Limited 8‐2‐293/82/A/74A, Road No.9, Jubilee Hills, Hyderababd‐500 033. Phone: 040‐23601037/35 Fax: 040‐23601071 E‐mail: [email protected], [email protected]

STUDIES AND DOCUMENTATION BY TEAM Labs and Consultants B‐115‐117 & 509, Annapurna Block, Aditya Enclave, Ameerpet, Hyderabad‐500 038. Phone: 040‐23748 555/23748616, Telefax: 040‐23748666

SUBMITTED TO MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, FORESTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA INDIRA PARYAVARAN BHAWAN, JOR BAGH ROAD, NEW DELHI

Deccan Fine Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd. Contents

CONTENTS

Section Description Page No. 6 Risk Assessment and Damage Control 6-1

6.0 Introduction 6-1 6.1 Objectives and Scope 6-1 6.2 Project Details 6-2 6.3 Process Description 6-13 6.4 Plant Facilities 6-13

6.4.1 Production Blocks 6-13 6.4.2 Utilities 6-13 6.4.3 Quality Control, R&D Lab 6-14 6.4.4 ETP and Solid waste storage 6-14 6.4.5 Ware Houses 6-14 6.4.6 Tank Farm Area 6-15 6.4.7 Cylinders storage Area 6-15 6.4.8 Administrative Office 6-15 6.4.9 Coal and Ash Storage 6-15

6.4.10 Facility Layout and design 6-15 6.4.11 Handling of Ethyl Mercaptan 6-16

6.5 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 6-21 6.5.1 Introduction 6-21 6.5.2 Hazard Identification 6-21 6.5.3 Fire & Explosion Index (F & EI) 6-27

6.5.3.1 Methodology 6-27 6.5.4 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 6-30 6.5.5 Hazard Factors 6-42 6.5.6 Common Causes of Accidents 6-44

6.6 Maximum Credible Accident and Consequence Analysis (MCACA) 6-46 6.6.1 Methodology 6-46 6.6.2 Identification of Vulnerable Areas 6-47 6.6.3 Representative Accident Scenarios 6-47

6.7 Consequence Analysis 6-49 6.7.1 Release Models and Source strength 6-49 6.7.2 Results of Consequence Analysis 6-51

6.7.2.1 Analysis of Hazardous Scenarios 6-51 6.7.2.1.1 Heat radiation effects 6-51 6.7.2.1.2 Toxic Dispersion 6-68 6.7.2.1.3 Overpressure effects 6-69

6.7.3 Observations 6-69 6.7.4 Recommendations 6-70 6.7.5 Toxic Management Plan 6-71

6.7.5.1 Handling of Toxic Chemicals 6-72 6.7.5.1.1 Tanker Loading and Unloading 6-72

6.7.5.2 Engineering Control Measures 6-73 6.7.5.3 Personnel Protective Equipment 6-74 6.7.5.4 Chlorine Handling in Chlor-Alkali Plant 6-74

6.7.5.4.1 Cell room 6-74 6.7.5.4.2 Chlorine Treatment and Storage 6-75 6.7.5.4.3 Safety System & Interlocks 6-76


6.7.5.4.4 Waste Gas De-Chlorination 6-77 6.7.6 Transportation 6-78

6.8 Disaster Management Plan 6-82 6.8.1 Introduction 6-82 6.8.2 Objectives Of Emergency Management Plan (On-Site) 6-83

6.8.2.1 Emergency Facilities 6-85 6.8.2.2 Emergency Procedures 6-88 6.8.2.3 Emergency Communication 6-89

List of Tables

S.No Description Page. No. 6.1 Manufacturing Capacity 6-3 6.2 Manufacturing Capacity – Before and After Expansion (Agro and Fine Chemicals 6-4 6.3 List of By-Products – Before and After Expansion (Agro and Fine Chemicals 6-4 6.4 Manufacturing Capacity – API’s 6-5 6.5 List of By-Products – API’s 6-5 6.6 List of Raw Materials and inventory 6-6 6.7 List of Utilities 6-14 6.8 Risk Control Measures 6-19 6.9 Applicability of GOI Rules to Storage/Pipeline 6-23

6.10 Physical Properties of Raw Materials and Solvents 6-25 6.11 Degree of Hazard for F&EI 6-28 6.12 Fire & Explosion Index for Tank farm 6-29 6.13 HAZOP of Xylene recovery 6-32 6.14 Failure Rate Data 6-45 6.15 Ignition Sources of Major Fires 6-45 6.16 General Failure Frequencies 6-48 6.17 Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensities 6-50 6.18 Radiation exposure and lethality 6-51 6.19 Damage Due to Peak Over Pressure 6-51 6.20 Heat Radiation Damage Distances – Tank Farm 6-53 6.21 Toxic Dispersion Damage Distances 6-68 6.22 List of Toxic/Carcinogenic Chemicals and Mode of Storage/Transport 6-71 6.23 Truck Incidents – Initiating and Contributing Causes 6-78 6.24 Transportation specific concerns 6-79 6.25 Control Measures for Accidental Spillage of Chemicals 6-80 6.26 List of Authorized Persons To Train Personnel On SCBA 6-99


List of Figures

S.No Description Page. No. 6.1 Schematic Diagram of Ethyl Mercaptan Handling System 6-17 6.2 Plant Layout of Deccan Fine Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd. 6-18 6.3 Steps in Consequence Calculations 6-50 6.4 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl 2,6 Diethyl Aniline Tank 6-55 6.5 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Carbon disulfide Tank 6-56 6.6 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Cylohexane Tank 6-57 6.7 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 40Kl Dichloromethane Tank 6-58 6.8 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Dimethyl Sulfide Tank 6-59 6.9 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 40Kl Ethyl Mercaptan Tank 6-60

6.10 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Hexane Tank 6-61 6.11 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Methyl Iso Butyl Ketone Tank 6-62 6.12 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Phenyl Hydrazine Tank 6-63 6.13 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Toluene Tank 6-64 6.14 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Xylene Tank 6-65 6.15 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 40Kl Dichloromethane Tank 6-66 6.16 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 30Kl Toluene Tank 6-67 6.17 Toxic Dispersion Radiation Damage – 63 m3 Liquefied Chlorine Tank 6-68 6.18 Toxic Dispersion Radiation Damage – 50 Kl Bromine Tank 6-69 6.19 Photographs of Chlorine Storage Tank with Interlock Systems 6-76 6.20 Emergency Organization (ON SITE) 6-84 6.21 Communication Flow during Emergency (ON SITE) 6-90 6.22 Communication Flow during Emergency (OFF SITE) 6-91

Deccan Fine Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd. Environmental Impact Assessment Report

6-1 Team Labs and Consultants

6.0 RISK ASSESSMENT AND DAMAGE CONTROL 6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the risk assessment study results for the plant operations, transport

and storage of raw materials, and identifies maximum credible accident scenarios to draw

the emergency management plan addressing various credible scenarios identified.

6.1. Objectives and Scope

The risks associated with the chemical industry are commensurate with their rapid growth

and development. Apart from their utility, chemicals have their own inherent properties

and hazards. Some of them can be flammable, explosive, toxic or corrosive etc. The whole

lifecycle of a chemical should be considered when assessing its dangers and benefits. In

order to ensure the health and safety of persons at or near the facilities, Govt. has

approved some regulations.The regulation requires Employers to consult with employees

in relation to:

- Identification of major hazards and potential major accidents

- Risk assessment

- Adoption of control measures

- Establishment and implementation of a safety management system

- Development of the safety report

The involvement of the employees in identification of hazards and control measures

enhances their awareness of these issues and is critical to the achievement of safe

operation in practice. In order to comply with regulatory authorities, M/s Deccan Fine

(India) Pvt. Ltd., have entrusted Team Labs and Consultants, Hyderabad to review and

prepare Hazard analysis and Risk assessment for their facility along with an approach to

on-site emergency preparedness plan asrequired under the acts and rules. (Manual on

emergency preparedness for chemical hazards, MOEF, New Delhi).In this endeavour, the

methodology adopted is based on;



• visualizing various probable undesirable events which lead to major accidents

• detailed and systematic assessment of the risk associated with each of those

hazards, including the likelihood and consequences of each potential major accident

event; and

• identifying the technical and other control measures that are necessary to reduce

that risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable

The strategy to tackle such emergencies,in-depth planning andperson(s) or

positionalresponsibilities of employeesfor implementation and coordinationoftimely and

effective response measuresare described in onsite detail inEmergency Plan.

6.2 Project Details Deccan Fine Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd., is located at Sy Nos. 63-75, 80-83, 84-108 of

Kesavaram village, 52-56, 146-150 of Rajavaram village, Venkatanagaram Post, Payakarao

Peta Mandal Mandal, Visakhapatnam District District, Andhra Pradesh. The site is

situated at the intersection of 170 17’ 56.75” (N) latitude and 820 35’ 25.04” (E) longitude.

The site elevation above mean sea level (MSL) is in the range of 5 - 8m. The site is

surrounded by open lands in south and west directions, road connecting Tuni and

Pentakota in north direction and road connecting Kakinada and Tuni in east direction.The

nearest habitation from the site is Gajapatinagaram located in NE direction. The nearest

railway station is Tuni at a distance of 8.6 km in NW direction. The access to the site is

Kesavaram to Pentakota. The National highway connecting Tuni – Visakhapatnam (NH 5)

is at a distance of 8.7 km in NW direction.Tandava River is at a distance of 1.2 km in NE,

flowing from NW to SE, Bay of Bengal is at a distance of 2 km in southeast direction.

Vempadu RF is at a distance of 4.5 km in NE direction. The additional land acquired for

proposed expansion is 190 acres in addition to existing 40 acres. The propsoed expansion

envisages expansion of agrochemicals and fine chemicals production capacity from 26.25

TPD to 140 TPD, inclusion of API manufacturing blocks with a capacity of 20 TPD, 87 MW

of captive co-generation plant, and 200 TPD chloralkali plant. The proposed projects are



implemented in two phases. The manufacturing capacity is presented in Table 6.1 List of

products for Agro/fine chemicals manufacturing before and after expansion is presented

in Table 6.2 and list of by-products is presented in Table 6.3. The list of API products and

byproducts proposed for manufacturing is presented in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5

respectively.

Table 6.1 Manufacturing Capacity (Terms of Reference No. 9)

S.No Description Units Capacity

Permitted Proposed Total After Expansion Phase I Phase II

1 Agrochemicals and Fine chemicals

TPD 26.25 43.75 70 140

2 Active Pharma Ingredients (API)

TPD --- 10 10 20

3 Co-generation Power Plant

MW --- 1 x 12 1 x 25

2X25 87

4 Chlor-Alkali --- a Caustic (100%) TPD --- --- 200 200 b Chlorine TPD --- --- 177.2 177.2 c Hydrogen TPD --- --- 5.14 5.14 d HCl (33%) TPD 280 280 e Sodium Hypo Chloride TPD 40 40



Table6.2 Manufacturing Capacity – Before and After Expansion (Agro and Fine Chemicals)

S.No Name of the Product Capacity TPD

Permitted After Expansion Phase I* Phase II

1 2- Cumaranone 2.12 2.12 4.24 2 Alaninester 0.91 1.27 1.27 3 Amicarbazone 2.12 3.18 3.18 4 Buprofezine 0.61 1.27 0.85 5 Clethodium 2.42 5.09 3.39 6 Daimuron 0.91 1.27 0.85 7 DEMBB (2,6-Diethyl-4-methyl-Bromobenzene) 0.15 --- --- 8 Difenconazole 0.76 4.24 8.48 9 Fenbuconazole 0.30 1.70 1.70

10 Flucarbazone 0.30 1.27 1.27 11 Flumetralin 0.45 1.70 2.12 12 Folpet 0.61 1.70 1.70 13 Methoxy A A 0.61 2.12 2.55 14 Metobromuron 0.38 1.70 1.70 15 Myclobutanil 0.76 2.12 2.12 16 N,N-dimethyl-4-nitro-2-sulfanoyl benzamide 0.15 --- --- 17 Para Benzoquinone 1.82 4.24 4.24 18 Pretillachlor 2.12 3.18 3.18 19 Prodiamine 1.52 3.18 4.24 20 Propiconazole 0.55 2.97 5.94 21 Pyraflufin ethyl (ET-751) 0.18 0.64 22 Pyridate 0.61 1.70 1.70 23 Sulfentrazone 0.61 10.61 -- 24 Tacsifun 1.21 2.12 1.27 25 Tebufenozide 0.15 4.24 8.48 26 Tricyclazole 1.52 4.24 4.24 27 Vulkalent –E 2.42 2.12 1.27 Total 26.25 70 70

* Including permitted capacity

Table6.3 List of By-Products – Before and After Expansion (Agro and Fine Chemicals)

Name of the Product Stage Name of the By-Product Capacity (TPD)

Permitted After Expansion Phase I* Phase II

Pyraflufin Ethyl (ET-751) V Sodium Bisulphate (30%) 16.4 57.40 ---- II Sodium Bisulphite (30%) --- 0.67 ----

Tacsifun I Sodium Bisulphite (30%) --- 3.40 2.04 Sulfentrazone IV Spent Acid containing

Sulfuric acid (60%) --- 168 ---

From Scrubber HCl Solution (20%) 14.20 37.67 21.24 * Including permitted capacity



Table 6.4 Manufacturing Capacity – API’s

S.No Name of the Product Capacity (TPD) Phase I Phase II

1 Atorvastatin Calcium 2.0 2.0 2 Candesartan Cilexetil 1.0 1.0 3 Cinitapride Tartrate 0.5 0.5 4 Clopidogrel Bisulphate 1.0 1.0 5 Ketorolac Trimethamine 0.5 0.5 6 Levocetirizine Dihydrochloride 0.5 0.5 7 Terbinafine Hydrochloride 1.0 1.0 8 Valsartan 1.0 1.0 9 Vardenafil HCl Trihydrate 1.0 1.0

10 Voriconazole 0.5 0.5 11 Zafirlukast 0.5 0.5 12 Ziprasidone Hydrochloride 0.5 0.5 Total 10.0 10.0

Table 6.5 List of By-Products – API’s Name of the Product Stage Name of the By-Product Capacity (TPD)

Phase I Phase II Candesartan Cilexetil IV Tert-Butyl Carbonchloridate 0.51 0.51

V Stannic Chloride 0.83 0.83 VI Tributyl Tinchloride 0.92 0.92 IX Trityl Chloride 0.46 0.46

Clopidogrel Bisulphate VIII Camphor Sulfonic Acid 0.55 0.55 Valsartan V Tributyltin Chloride 0.93 0.93 From Scrubbers HCl Solution (20%) 12.3 12.3



Table 6.6 List of Raw Materials and Inventory (Terms of Reference No. 9 & 11) S

No Raw Materials Max Storage

Quantity (Tons)

Physical Nature

Type of Hazard Mode of Storage

Mode of Transport

Agro and Fine Chemicals 1 (2-chlorophenyl)acetonitrile 289 liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 2 1-(2-chloroethoxy) Propane 83 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 3 1,2,4 Triazole 40 Powder Irritant Bags By Road 4 2,4 Dichloro Acetophenone 148 Solid Non-Hazard Bags By Road 5 2,4 Trichlorobenzotrifluoride 150 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 6 2,6 Diethylaniline 101 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 7 2,6 Dimethyl Aniline 126 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 8 2-Chloro-6-fluoro benzyl chloride 51 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 9 2-Chlro propnyl hydroxyl amine HCl 105 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 10 2-Methoxyethanol 55 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 11 30% Hydrochloric Acid HCl 933 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 12 35% Mono Methyl Hydrazine (MMH) 3 Liquid Flammable & Corrosive Drums By Road 13 4- Chlorophenyl Acetic Acid 82 Powder Harmful Bags By Road 14 4-Methylaniline ( Para Toluedine) 26 Powder Toxic Bags By Road 15 50 % Hydrogen Peroxide 163 Liquid Oxidizer & Corrosive Drums By Road 16 Acetaldehyde 45 Liquid Flammable & Corrosive Drums By Road 17 Acetic acid 115 Liquid Flammable, Corrosive Drums By Road 18 Acetone 3 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 19 Acetophenone 70 Liquid Combustible Drums By Road 20 Acetyl Chloride 80 Liquid Flammable & Corrosive Drums By Road 21 Alpha Methyl Styrene 30 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 22 Ammonia Gas Gas Corrosive Cylinders By Road 23 Ammonium Thiocyanate 33 Powder Irritant Bags By Road 24 Benzyl Cyanide 50 Liquid Poison Drums By Road 25 Bromine 423 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 26 Butanol 76 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 27 Butyl acetate 51 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 28 Carbon Disulfide 48 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 29 Caustic Lye 48% 2050 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road



30 (2-chloro-1,3-dinitro-5-(trifluoro methyl)benzene)

110 Solid Toxic Bags By Road

31 Chlorine Gas Gas Toxic Tonners By Road 32 Chloroacetamide 6 Solid Toxic Bags By Road 33 Chloroacetyl Chloride 80 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 34 Crotonaldehyde 61 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 35 Cyclohexane 3 Liquid Highly Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 36 Di ethylmalonate 111 Liquid Irritant Drums By Road 37 Di Methyl Formamide 1 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 38 Di methyl sulphate 59 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 39 Dichlorobenzene 153 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 40 Dichloromethane 39 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 41 Dimethyl Sulfate 65 Liquid Poison Inhalation Hazard

Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road

42 Dimethyle Sulfite 40 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 43 Dipropyl Amine 72 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 44 DMIC (3,5-Dimethylbenzoyl chloride) 188 liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 45 Dimethyl Sulfoxide (DMSO) 9 Liquid Poison Bulk Storage By Road 46 Ethyl acetate 41 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 47 Ethyl Mercaptan 19 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 48 Ethyl-4-Chloroacetoacetate 122 Liquid Toxic & Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 49 Ethylene Glycol 15 Liquid Irritant Drums By Road 50 Formic Acid 99% 76 Liquid Corrosive & Flammable Drums By Road 51 Glyoxalic Acid 43 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 52 Hexane 54 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 53 Hydrazine Hydrate 301 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 54 Hydrogen Gas Flammable Gas Cylinders By Road 55 Hydroquinone 265 Powder Toxic Bags By Road 56 Hydroxyl Amine Acid 59 Solid Corrosive Bags By Road 57 Hydroxylamine Sulphate 81 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 58 Isopropyl alcohol 5 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 59 Iso Butyric Acid 80 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 60 Isopropyl alcohol 76 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 61 Isopropyl amine 14 Liquid Flammable & Corrosive Drums By Road



62 Methane Sulfochloride 44 Liquid Toxic & Corrosive Drums By Road 63 Methane Sulfonyl Chloride 116 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 64 Methanol 9 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 65 Methoxy Acetyl Chloride 40 Liquid Flammable & Corrosive Drums By Road 66 Methyl Acetoacetate 97 Liquid Combustible Liquid Bulk Storage By Road 67 Methyl Iso Butyl Ketone 7 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 68 Methylene Dichloride 1 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 69 Methyl Iso Butyl Ketone 52 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 70 MMT 25 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 71 Mono Chloro Benzene (MCB) 88 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 72 Nitric Acid 98% 162 Liquid Corrosive & Oxidizer Bulk Storage By Road 73 N-Methyl Pyrollidone 2 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 74 N-Methylaniline 24 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 75 N-Phenyl Benzene Sulfonamide 63 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 76 O-Toluidine 177 Solid Toxic Bags By Road 77 Parachlorophenyl Acetonitrile 69 Solidified

mass Toxic Drums By Road

78 p-chloro phenol 133 Solid Toxic Bags By Road 79 P-Chlorostyrene 59 Liquid Non-Hazard Drums By Road 80 Pentane-1,2-diol 81 Liquid Non-Hazard Bulk Storage By Road 81 p-Ethyl benzoyl chloride 220 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 82 p-Fluorophenol 7 Solid Non-Hazard Bags By Road 83 Phenyl hydrazine 108 Solid crystals Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 84 Phenyl Isocyanate 59 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 85 Phosphoric acid 100 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 86 Phosphorus trichloride 50 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 87 Phthalimide 55 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 88 Potassium Carbonate 100 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 89 Potassium Hydroxide 19 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 90 Potassium Hydroxide ( flakes) 47 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 91 Potassium Hydroxide (90%) 4 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 92 Potassium Hydroxide solution (90%) 93 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 93 Propargyl Alcohol 26 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 94 Propionic Anhydride 97 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road



95 Propylene Glycol (C3H802) 76 Thick liquid Non-Hazard Drums By Road 96 S-Methyl Lactate 40 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 97 Sodium (Metal) 16 Solid bricks Dangerous When Wet Drums By Road 98 Sodium Carbonate 27 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 99 Sodium Cyanate 147 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 100 Sodium Hypochlorite 85 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 101 Sodium Methoxide 42 Powder Combustible & Corrosive Drums By Road 102 Sodium Thiocyanide 35 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 103 Sulfuric Acid 195 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 104 Sulfuryl Chloride 8 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 105 Sulphuric Acid (96%) 7 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 106 t-Butyl hydrazine HCl 164 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 107 Tert Butyl alcohol 17 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 108 Tertbutyl Alcohol 64 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 109 Tertbutyl Isocyanate 81 Liquid Flammable Toxic Drums By Road 110 Thionyl Chloride 56 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 111 Toluene 36 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 112 Trans-1,3-DCP 89 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 113 Triphosgene 87 Powder Toxic Bags By Road 114 Xylene 94 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road

Active Pharma Ingredients 1 1-(2,4-difluorophenyl)-2-(1H-1,2,4-triazol-1-

yl)ethanone 6 Solid Non-Hazard Bags By Road

2 1-Methyl indoline-3-(3-methoxy benzoyl chloride)-5-Cyclopentyl Carbamate

5 Solid Irritant Bags By Road

3 2-Chloroethanol 1 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 4 2-Chloro-N-(2-chloroethyl) ethanamine

Hydrochloride 3 Powder Irritant Bags By Road

5 2-Chlorophenyl acetic acid 9 Crystalline Irritant Bags By Road 6 2-Hydroxy Benzonitrile 5 Solid Irritant Bags By Road 7 2-Methyl benzenesulfonamide 2 Powder Irritant Bags By Road 8 3-Cyclohexene-1-methanol 2 Liquid Non-Hazard Drums By Road 9 3-Methoxy-4-methyl benzoic acid 3 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 10 3-Nitrophthalic acid 13 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road



11 4'-(Bromomethyl) biphenyl 2-Carbonitrile 10 Powder Irritant Bags By Road 12 4-Chloro Benzophenone 8 Crystalline Non-Hazard Bags By Road 13 4-Methyl-biphenyl-2-carbonylnitrile 9 Powder Irritant Bags By Road 14 5-Fluorouracil 6 Powder Toxic Bags By Road 15 6,6-Dimethyl-5,7-dioxaspiro [2,5] octane-4,8-

dione 3 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road

16 6-Chloro Oxindole 4 Solid Irritant Bags By Road 17 Acrolein 3 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 18 Activated Carbon 4 Solid Flammable Bags By Road 19 Aluminium Chloride 3 Solid Corrosive Bags By Road 20 Liquid Ammonia 3 Liquid Irritant/Corrosive Drums By Road 21 Azobisisobutyronitrile 1 Powder Flammable Bags By Road 22 Benzene Sulfonyl chloride 3 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 23 Benzoyl Chloride 4 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 24 Bromoethane 5 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 25 Butyryl Chloride 5 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 26 Calcium Acetate 3 Solid Corrosive Bags By Road 27 Camphor Sulfonic acid 7 Solid Flammable Bags By Road 28 Chloro Acetylchloride 3 Liquid Combustible Drums By Road 29 Chloro Ethyl Chloroformate 4 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 30 Chlorosulphonic acid 3 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 31 Cyclohexanol 3 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 32 Cyclopentyl chloroformate 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 33 Di Ethyl Sulphate 7 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 34 Dimethyl Sulfate 3 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 35 Ethyl Oxalyl Chloride 5 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 36 Ethylchloroformate 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 37 EDTA Disodium Salt 1 Solid Non-Flammable Bags By Road 38 DL Alaninie 4 Powder Non-Hazard Bags By Road 39 Formaldehyde (40%) 4 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 40 Formamide 2 Liquid Non-Flammable Drums By Road 41 Hydrochloric Acid 32 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 42 Hydrazine 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 43 Hydrazine Hydrate 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road



44 Hydrobromic acid 2 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 45 Hydrogen (Gas) 1 Gas Flammable Cylinders By Road 46 Hydroxylamine Hydrochloride 5 Solid Corrosive Bags By Road 47 Hyflow 2 Solid Non - Flammable Bags By Road 48 Ketorolac 4 Solid Non-Hazard Bags By Road 49 Liquid Bromine 7 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 50 L-Valine 7 Solid Non-Hazard Bags By Road 51 Morpholine 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 52 N,N-Diisopropylethylamine 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 53 N,N-Dimethylaniline 4 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 54 Caustic Lye (40%) 111 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 55 Naphthalene 7 Solid Irritant Bags By Road 56 N-Bromo Succinimide 26 Solid Corrosive Bags By Road 57 N-Carbethoxy-4-Piperidone 5 Liquid Irritant Drums By Road 58 N-ethylpiperazine 3 Solid Irritant Bags By Road 59 Nitric acid 2 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 60 N-Methyl Morpholine 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 61 Phosphorous Oxy Chloride 28 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 62 Pinacolone 6 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 63 Pivalic Acid 1 Crystalline Corrosive Bags By Road 64 Potassium Carbonate 25 Crystalline Irritant Bags By Road 65 Potassium Hydroxide 4 Solid Corrosive Bags By Road 66 Pyrrole 1 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 67 Raney Nickel 3 Solid Flammable Bags By Road 68 Silver Oxide 5 Powder Oxidizing Bags By Road 69 Soda Ash 1 Crystalline Irritant Bags By Road 70 Sodium Acetate Trihydrate 3 Crystalline Non-Hazard Bags By Road 71 Sodium Azide 8 Crystalline Toxic Bags By Road 72 Sodium Bicarbonate 3 Crystalline Irritant Bags By Road 73 Sodium Carbonate 25 Crystalline Irritant Bags By Road 74 Sodium Metabisulfate 1 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 75 Sodium Monochloroacetate 2 Crystalline Irritant Bags By Road 76 Sodium Nitrite 1 Solid Oxidizing Bags By Road 77 Soidum Sulfate 5 Granules Non-Hazard Bags By Road



78 Stannous Chloride 7 Crystalline Corrosive Bags By Road 79 Sulfuric Acid 22 Liquid Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road 80 Tartaric Acid 4 Crystalline Irritant Bags By Road 81 Tetra butyl Ammonium Bromide 4 Solid Irritant Bags By Road 82 Tetraethyl Orthocarbonate 7 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 83 Thionyl Chloride 23 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 84 Thiophene-2-Ethylamine 6 Liquid Irritant Drums By Road 85 Tributyltin Chloride 20 Liquid Carcinogenic Bulk Storage By Road 86 Trityl Chloride 7 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 87 Valeryl Chloride 4 Liquid Corrosive Drums By Road 88 Zinc Chloride 2 Powder Corrosive Bags By Road 89 Zinc Dust 1 Dust Toxic Bags By Road 90 1,4-Dioxane 1 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 91 Acetic Acid 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 92 Acetone 13 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 93 Acetonitrile 1 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 94 Chloroform 3 Liquid Carcinogenic Drums By Road 95 Cyclohexane 9 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 96 Diisopropyl Ether 1 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 97 Dimethyl Formamide 5 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 98 Dimethyl Sulfoxide 1 Liquid Non-Hazard Drums By Road 99 Ethyl Acetate 9 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 100 Ethylene Dichloride 2 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 101 Isopropyl Alcohol 16 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 102 Methanol 19 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 103 Methylene Dichloride 27 Liquid Carcinogenic Bulk Storage By Road 104 n-Hexane 3 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 105 Ortho Xylene 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 106 Petroleum Ether 3 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 107 t-Butanol 1 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 108 Tetrahydrofuran 2 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 109 Toluene 19 Liquid Flammable Bulk Storage By Road 110 Trifluoro Acetic acid 1 Liquid Flammable Drums By Road 111 Chlorine (from Chlor-Alkali Plant) 64 Liquefied gas Toxic Bulk Storage By Road



6.3 Process Description

The manufacturing process for all the products is presented in Chapter 2.(Page No. 2-4 to

2-203) of the report.

6.4 Plant Facilities

Proposed expansion manufacturing facility shall be provided with

1) Production blocks 2) Utilities 3) Quality Control, R&D lab 4) Effluent treatment plant 5) Warehouses

6) Tank farm area 7) Cylinder Storage 8) Administrative Office 9) Coal and Ash Storage area

The production facilities shall be designed for proper handling of materials andmachines.

Safety of operators, batch repeatability and process parameter monitoring shall be

themajor points of focus in the design of facility. The current GoodManufacturing

Practices (GMP) guidelines shall be incorporated as applicable toagro chemicals

manufacturing facilities.

6.4.1 Production Blocks:

The Production blocks will consist of equipment such as SS and glass lined reactors,

storage tanks, shell&tube heat exchangers, evaporators, vacuum pumps, packed columns,

Agitated Notch Filter and Dryers, crystallizers,layer separators etc. The area shall be

provided with proper containment facility and all process facilities shall be performed

under protectiveenvironment.

6.4.2 Utilities:

The following utilities are required for power and steam generation, coal fired boilers, for

emergency power back up; DG sets.The list of utilities is presented in the following Table

6.7.



Table 6.7 List of Utilities

S.No Description Unit Permitted Proposed After Phase II Phase I Phase II

1 Coal Fired Boiler TPH 1 x 20 1 x 160 2 x 160 3 x 160 1 x 80 1 x 75 1 x 80 1 x 75 2 x 75

1 x 20 2 Thermic Fluid Heater K.Cal/hr 1 x 1.5

Million 5 x 3 Million

5 x 3 Million

10 x 3 Million 1 x 1.5 Million

3 Incinerator Kg/hr 300 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 300 4 DG Sets* kVA 4 x 1000 10 x 2500 10 x 2500 20 x 2500

2 x 2000 2 x 2000 4 x 1000

*DG sets will be used during load shut down periods only.

6.4.3 Quality Control, R&D Lab

The QC department shall comprise of an in-process lab with instruments like HPLC,GC

etc. It will be maintained by highly qualified and trained people. The activitiesinclude:

• In-process quality check during manufacturing • Validation of facilities • Complaint handling

Also a process development laboratory shall be provided for in-house

processdevelopment, initial evaluation of process technology in case of technology

transfer,back-up for production department to address any issues arising during

commercialproduction

6.4.4 ETP and Solid waste storage

The total effluents segregated into two streams High COD/ TDS and Low COD/ TDS

streams based on TDS/COD concentrations of 15000 mg/l.These effluents are treated in

effluent treatment plant and the treated effluentwill be disposed to sea by using marine

outfall system.

6.4.5 Ware Houses:

The plant shall have sufficient storage facility for safe handling of raw materials. Allsolid

raw materials shall be stored in marked areas with proper identification. Liquid raw



materials and solvents like which are available in drums will be stored according to

material compatibilitiesand flammability. Adequate fire fighting facilities shall be

provided as per NFPA norms.

6.4.6 Tank Farm Area:

A separate tank farm area shall be provided for storing liquid raw materials,

especiallysolvents with high inventory and also for toxic, corrosive chemicals. Dykes shall

be provided to ensure safety in case of tank failure. Acid proof lining for the dykes shall be

provided for acid storage tanks. Condensers for low volatile solvent storage tanks vents.

Risk control measures are presented in Table 6.8.

6.4.7 Cylinders storage Area:

Gas cylinders storage should conform to SMPV-Unfired rules-1981.Hydrogen cylinders

should be stored in approved Gas Storage pad. Chained and capped when not in use.

Operational cylinder should befirmly secured. Pressure regulator, metal piping, non-

return valve, and saferesidue bleed off arrangement should be incorporated in installation

design.Strict hot work control and display of danger signs should be ensured.

6.4.8 Administrative Office:

An Administrativeoffice shall be provided at the entrance of the factory to ensure the entry

ofauthorized personnel only into the premises.

6.4.9Coal and Ash Storage:

Coal will be stored under covered shed with water sprinkler system in emergency. Ash

silos will be provided for storage and handling of ash generated from combustion of coal.

Water sprinkling system shall be installed on stocks of coal in required scales to prevent

spontaneous combustion and consequent fire hazards. The stack geometry shall be adopted

to maintain minimum exposure of stock pile areas towards predominant wind direction.



6.4.10 Facility layout and design:

The layout of all the various areas required for the facility, as mentioned above is

considered.In laying out the above areas, isolation of the various process areas from the

utilitiesand non-process areas is considered in view of both containment and cGMP. A

tentativeplant layout is shown inFig 6.2.

6.4.11 Handling of Ethyl Mercaptan:

Ethyl Mercaptan will be imported in insulated iso-containers. These iso containers are

specially designed to handle substances with low odor threshold value. Ethyl Mercaptan

required for the reaction is directly transferred from the ISO container to the Reactor.

The Iso container contains two nozzles on the top. One nozzle is for applying Nitrogen

pressure and other nozzle is used for transfer of liquid through dip pipe in the ISO

Container. The following design philosophy will be followed to eliminate possibility of

leakage of ethyl mercaptan leading to odor nuisance:

Stainless steel hose pipe with special imported “EMCO wheton dry break

couplings” connected between the liquid line of the container and pipe line of the

Reactor. These couplings ensure zero liquid hold up during connection and

disconnection.

The Reactor is of 10 KL capacity. Two stainless steel condensers of 50 sq.m and 30

sq.m area are provided on the vapor line with chilled water and chilled brine as

utilities to condense ethyl mercaptan vapors during charging. The secondary

chilled brine condenser of 30 sq.m is arranged slightly inclined towards the Reactor

as indicated in the block diagram so that ethyl mercaptan condensed will flow back

to Reactor. Reactor is also chilled with chilled brine before charging ethyl

mercaptan.

Vapor line of chilled brine condenser is connected to Hydrogen Peroxide scrubber

to oxidize traces of uncondensed mercaptan if any from the chilled brine condenser.



Outlet of Hydrogen Peroxide scrubber is connected to two stage hypochlorite

scrubber to completely eliminate the possibility of even minute quantities of

mercaptn.

Out let of secondary hypochlorite scrubber is connected to a blower of 3000 N cum/

hr capacity with a pressure differential of about 600 mm water column.

The entire system consisting of Reactor,condensers, hydrogen peroxide scrubber

and sodium hypochlorite scrubbers are kept under slight negative pressure to

completely eliminate the possibility of mercaptan gas in the event of minute leakage

from flange joints.

Ethyl mercaptan is the limiting reactant. The other reactant crotanaldehyde is

charged in excess to ensure complete conversion of ethyl mercaptan.

Block diagram of ethyl mercaptan handling is presented in Fig 6.1.

Fig 6.1 Schematic Diagram of Ethyl Mercaptan Handling System



Fig 6.2 Plant Layout ofDeccan Fine Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd.

PLANT OFFICES &CANTEEN

TRANSFORMERYARD

MULTIPLEEFFECT

25 MW POWER PLANTSTACK FOR

EVAPORATORSWATER

TREATMENT & STORAGE

QC , QA & R&D LABS

25 MW POWER PLANTSTACK FOR

22

26

14

24

7

8

9

25

19

6

5

28

27

1

2

34

18

11

10

75 MT/HR BOILERASH SILOSSTACK FOR

STEAM BOILER75 TON/HR



Table 6.8 Risk Control Measures Significant Risks Control Measures

Solvent Tank Farm and Chemical Tank Farm

Fire/ Explosion • Solvent Tank Farm licensed by PESO. • Restrict inventory to licensed quantities in Solvent Tank Farm. • Fenced Solvent Tank Farm. • Fenced Solvent Tank Farm capable of being locked when not in use. • Access Control and control of visitors • Control of ignition sources. • All electrical equipment and fittings to be flameproof as per area

classification. • Provision of foam cover to cover the largest dyke area • Water spray cooling arrangements for all tanks • Fire hydrants and fire monitors • Solvent Storage Tanks to have N2 blanketing • Earthrite system for earthing of tankers carrying solvents. • Spark arresters on vehicles • Wetting of road and tyres before unloading • NO dry grass inside the fenced area • No parking inside/ near the tank farm. • No obstruction on the road for free movement of fire tender. • No solvent pumping in night shift – Daytime operations only.

Loss of Containment and Spillage

• Dykes for all tanks (Dyke capacity to be min. 110% of tank capacity and dyke distance from tank to be min half the tank height).

• Tanker unloading area (road) to be dyked. • Availability of the Spill control kit.

Injury at the time of loading/ unloading

• Provision of PPE to stores personnel. • Operations by trained stores personnel only.

Bulk Materials Store (liquid chemicals) Drum Yard and Special Chemicals Store

Fire/ Explosion

• Fenced area, Access Control and control of visitors • Building capable of being locked when not in use. • Control of ignition sources. • Control of inventory to minimum possible • Segregation of materials. • Smoke/ Heat detection system (non-electricity based) • No water based fire fighting setup around the store. • Adequate CAUTION displays • Fire hydrants and fire monitors • Provision of foam • No electrical installation inside the Store • Adequate natural light and ventilation. • Daily night inspection by Shift Manager.



Significant Risks Control Measures • No dry grass inside the fenced area • Emergency exit.

Loss of Containment Spillage

• Arrangements of drums in rows of two (two levels max) and a gap of at least 2 feet between rows and from the walls all around.

• Storage in open area on hard impervious floor surrounded by a dyke/ sill. (For Bulk Materials Store and New Solvent Drum Shed)

• Availability of the Spill control kit

Ergonomics – Poor posture leading to illness/ injury. Injury at the time of loading/ unloading

• Provision of PPE to stores personnel. • Loading/ unloading only by trained stores personnel.

Raw Materials Warehouse, Finished Goods Warehouse, Packing Materials Warehouse, and Engineering Store

Fire

• Access Control and control of visitors • Fenced area • Building capable of being locked when not in use. • Control of ignition sources. • Control of inventory to optimal levels • Segregation of flammable materials. • Segregation of materials. • Battery charging not to be done inside the warehouse except for

penicillin warehouse, that too during daytime only. • Installation of Smoke/ Heat detectors • Adequate hydrant points outside/around the building • NO dry grass in open areas. • Daily night inspection by Shift Manager. • Emergency exit. • Availability of DCP, Foam and CO2 fire extinguishers, Spill Control

kit.

Spillage • Availability of the Spill control kit Falling Objects

• Mandatory head and foot protection when inside the warehouse.

Ergonomics – Poor posture leading to illness/ injury. Injury at the time of loading/ unloading

• Provision of other PPE to stores personnel. • Loading/ unloading only by trained stores personnel.



6.5Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment

6.5.1 Introduction.

Hazard analysis involves the identification and quantification of the various hazards

(unsafe conditions) that exist in the plant. On the other hand, risk analysis deals with the

identification and quantification of risks, the plant equipment and personnel are exposed

to, due to accidents resulting from the hazards present in the plant.

Hazard and risk analysis involves very extensive studies, and requires a very detailed

design and engineering information. The various hazard analysis techniques that may be

applied are hazard and operability studies, fault-tree analysis, event-tree analysis and

failure and effects mode analysis.

Risk analysis follows an extensive hazard analysis. It involves the identification and

assessment of risks; the neighboring populations are exposed to as a result of hazards

present. This requires a thorough knowledge of failure probability, credible accident

scenario, vulnerability of population's etc. Much of this information is difficult to get or

generate. Consequently, the risk analysis is often confined to maximum credible accident

studies.

In the sections below, the identification of various hazards, probable risks, maximum

credible accident analysis, consequence analysis are addressed which gives a broad

identification of risks involved in the plant.

6.5.2 Hazard Identification

The Hazard identification process must identify hazards that could cause a potential major

accident for the full range of operational modes, including normal operations, start-up,

and shutdown, and also potential upset, emergency or abnormal conditions. Employers

should also reassess their Hazard identification process whenever a significant change in

operations has occurred or a new substance has been introduced. They should also

consider incidents, which have occurred elsewhere at similar facilities including within the

same industry and in other industries.



Hazard identification and risk assessment involves a critical sequence of information

gathering and the application of a decision-making process. These assist in discovering

what could possibly cause a major accident (hazard identification), how likely it is that a

major accident would occur and the potential consequences (risk assessment) and what

options there are for preventing and mitigating a major accident (control measures). These

activities should also assist in improving operations and productivity and reduce the

occurrence of incidents and near misses.

The chemical and process industries have been using a variety of hazard

identificationtechniques for many years,ranging from simple screening checklists to highly

structured Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis. Each technique has its own

strengths and weaknesses for identifying hazards.It is impossible to compare hazard

identification techniques and come to any conclusion as to which is the best. Each

technique has been developed for a specific range of circumstances taking many factors

into account including the resources required to undertake the analysis, expertise available

and stage of the process. While HAZOP is primarily a tool for hazard identification, the

HAZOP process can also include assessment of the causes of accidents, their likelihood

and the consequences that may arise, so as to decide if the risk is acceptable, unacceptable

or requires further study.. Moreover, a formal guidance for applying this technique is

available. Collaboration between management and staff is fundamental to achieving

effective and efficient hazard identification and risk assessment processes.

After identifying hazards through a qualitative process, quantification of potential

consequences of identified hazards using simulation modeling is undertaken. Estimation

of probability of an unexpected event and its consequences form the basis of quantification

of risk in terms of damage to property, environment or personnel. Therefore, the type,

quantity, location and conditions of release of a toxic or flammable substance have to be

identified in order to estimate its damaging effects, the area involved, and the possible

precautionary measures required to be taken.



Considering operating modes of the facility, and based on available resources the following

hazard identification process chosenare:

a) Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FETI) Approach; b) HAZOP studies; c) Maximum Credible Accident and Consequence Analysis (MCACA); d) Classification of Major Hazard Substances; e) Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 (GOI Rules,

1989); f) Identification of Major Hazardous Units.

The physical properties of solvents used in the process are presented inTable 6.10 which

forms the basis for identification of hazards during storage and interpretation of the

Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 (GOI Rules, 1989)

The interpretation of “The Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous chemicals”

issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOI, which guides the preparation of

various reports necessary for safe handling and storage of chemicals shows that the

present project requires preparation of safety reports before commencing operation and

risk assessment is not mandatory. The applicability of various rules is presented in Table

6.9.

Table 6.9 Applicability of GOI Rules to Storage/Pipeline S.

No

Chemical Inventory KL

Threshold Quantity (T) For Application of Rules Applicable Rules 5,7-9, 13-15 10-12

1 (2-chlorophenyl) acetonitrile 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 2 2,6 Diethylaniline 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 3 2-Methoxyethanol 40 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 4 Acetaldehyde 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 5 Acetone 30 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 6 Butanol 40 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 7 Butyl acetate 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 8 Carbon Disulfide 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 9 Cyclohexane 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15

10 Di Methyl Formamide 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 11 Dichloro Ethane 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 12 Dichlorobenzene 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 13 Dichloromethane 40 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 14 Dimethyl Sulfite 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15



15 Dimethyl Sulfoxide (DMSO) 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 16 Dipropyl Aniline 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 17 (3,5-Dimethylbenzoyl

chloride) 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15

18 Ethyl Mercaptan 40 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 19 Ethyl-4-Chloroacetoacetate 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 20 Hexane 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 21 Hydrochloric Acid 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 22 Isopropyl alcohol 40 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 23 Methanol 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 24 Methyl Acetoacetate 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 25 Methyl Iso Butyl Ketone 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 26 Mono Chloro Benzene 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 27 N-Methyl Pyrollidone 10 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 28 Pentane-1,2-diol 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 29 p-Ethyl benzoyl chloride 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 30 Phenyl hydrazine 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 31 Tert Butyl alcohol 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 32 Toluene 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 33 Tributyltin Chloride 30 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15 34 Xylene 50 1500 10000 4 (1) (a), (2), 5,15



Table 6.10 Physical Properties of Raw Materials and Solvents

S.No Name of Raw material

TLV (ppm)

Toxicity Level Flammable Limit Chemical Class (As per MSIHC

Rules)

LD50 LD50 LC 50 (mg/1) Oral

(mg/kg) Dermal (mg/kg)

LEL (%)

UEL (%)

FP (OC)

BP (OC)

Class (As per Petroleum

Classification 1 1,4-Dioxane 100 5200 7378 46000 1.7 25.2 11 101.5 B Flammable 2 Acetic Acid 10 3310 1060 88 4.0 19.9 39 118 B Flammable 3 Acetic anhydride 5 1780 4320 4200 2.0 10.2 49 138 B Corrosive 4 Acetone 1000 5800 20000 5540 2.6 13.0 <-20 56.2 A Highly Flammable 5 Acetonitrile 40 3800 988 1000 3.0 17.0 2

(CC) 81.6 B Highly Flammable

6 Chloroform 50 908 50 >50 NA NA --- 61 C Carcinogenic 7 Cyclohexane 300 12705 2000 13900 1.2 8.2 .-18 81 A Flammable 8 Diisopropyl Ether 250 8470 14480 162000 1.0 21.0 .-28 67 A Flammable 9 Dimethyl Formamide 10 2800 1500 15 2.2 16.0 58 153 B Flammable 10 Dimethyl Sulfoxide 50 14500 5000 40250 1.8 63.0 95 189 B Non-Hazard 11 Dimethylacetamide 10 5680 2240 2475 1.7 11.5 70 165 B Carcinogenic 12 Ethanol 1000 1720 1025 20000 2.1 11.5 .-4 77 A Highly Flammable 13 Ethyl Acetate 400 5620 18000 2500 2.1 11.5 .-4 77 A Highly Flammable 14 Ethylene Dichloride 10 670 2800 1000 6.0 11.4 13 84 B Flammable & Toxic 15 Formic Acid 5 1100 --- 15000 12.0 38.0 18 101 B Corrosive 16 Isopropyl Alcohol 400 5045 12800 100000 2.0 12.7 12 82.4 A Highly Flammable 17 Methanol 200 5628 15800 64000 5.5 36.5 11 64.5 A Flammbale 18 Methylene Dichloride 50 670 2800 2270 6.0 11.4 13 84.1 B Carcinogenic 19 Methyl Iso Butyl

Ketone 100 2080 16000 8.2 1.2 8.0 14 117 B Flammable

20 n-Heptane 400 15000 9750 4900 1.0 7.0 .-4 98.4 A Highly Flammable 21 n-Hexane 50 28710 2000 >20 1.0 8.1 .-22 69 A Flammable 22 Ortho Xylene 100 3567 12126 4595 1.0 7.6 30 144.4 B Flammable 23 Petroleum Ether 300 2000 2000 3400 1.0 7.4 <-21 70 A Flammable 24 Pyridine 5 891 1121 28500 1.7 12.4 17 115 B Flammable 25 t-Butanol 100 2733 2000 --- 2.3 8.0 14 83 B Flammable



26 Tetrahydrofuran 200 1650 2000 2160 1.5 12.4 .-21.5 66 A Highly Flammable 27 Toluene 200 636 12124 313 1.2 8.0 4 110.6 A Highly Flammable 28 Triethylamine 5 730 580 7.1 1.2 9.3 .-11 90 A Flammable 29 Trifluoro Acetic acid 15 NA NA 10000 NA NA NA 72 C Corrosive 30 N-Methyl-2-

Pyrrolidine 540 3914 7000 8000 1.3 9.2 91

(CC) 202 B Highly Flammable

31 Dichlorobenzene 10 500 >10 9.2 2.2 66 180 B Toxic 32 Dimethyl sulfide 10 3.3 5 102 19.7 2.2 35.99 38 B Flammable 33 Diisopropyl aniline 3.204 - - - - 117 257 B Flammable 34 Ethyl mercapten 10 682 - 4420 2.8 18.2 44.99 35 A Flammable 35 Mono aceto acetate 3.228 - - 3.1 16 70 169 B Combustible 36 Monochloro benzene 75 1.11 - - 1.3 7.1 27 132 B Flammable 37 Pentane 1, 2 diol 12.7 - - - - 105 206 B Non-Hazard



6.5.3 Fire & Explosion Index (F & EI):

6.5.3.1 Methodology

Dow Chemical Company issued a guideline for hazard determination and protection. By

this method a chemical process unit is rated numerically for hazards. The numerical

value used is the Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) which is most widely used for hazard

evaluation in chemical process industries.

The guide applies to process unit only and not to auxiliary units such as power

generating stations, plant water systems, control rooms, fired heaters, structural

requirements, corrosive nature of material handled and personal safety equipment. These

are regarded as basic features that do not vary according to the magnitude of the fire and

explosion hazard involved. The guide also does not cover the processing and handling of

explosives such as dynamite, TNT etc.

Computation of F&EI

The F&EI is calculated as a product of Material factor, General process hazard factor, and

special process hazard factor The Material factor is a measure of the intrinsic rate of

potential energy release from fire or explosionof most hazardous material or mixture of

materials present in significant quantity,whether it is raw material, intermediate, product,

solvent etc, by combustion orchemical reaction. “In significant quantity” here means such

quantity that the hazardrepresented by the material actually exists. The National Fire

Protection Agency ofUSA (NFPA) have specified standard values for material factor

which should be usedfor F&EI calculations and are available in Dow’s Hazard

Classification Guide. In case itis not readily available, it can be calculated using the heat

of combustion, flammabilityindices etc.

General process hazards are factors that play a primary role in determining

themagnitude of loss of incident. It takes into account the nature of the reaction,

ventilationof the unit, accessibility of the unit, drainage facilities etc., Special process

hazards are



factors that contribute primarily to the probability of a loss of incident. They consist of

specific process conditions that have shown themselves to be major causes of fire

andexplosion incidents. It takes into account toxicity of the material, operating

pressure,operation near flammable range, quantity of material, joints and packing, use of

hot oilexchange system etc., The F&EI index is calculated as a product of Material factor,

General process hazardfactor, and Special process hazard factor.

Hazard Ranking

The hazard ranking based on F&EI value is presented in Table 6.11.

Table 6.11 Degree of Hazard for F&EI F&EI Index Range Degree of Hazard 1 – 60 Light 61 – 96 Moderate 97 – 127 Intermediate 128 – 158 Heavy 159 & above Severe

The estimated values of F&EI and hazard ranking are given in the Table 6.12.The radius

of exposure is determined by 0.26 meter x respective F&EI.The estimated values of F&EI

reflect light hazard in view of the low volume of chemicals.

The fire and explosion index evaluation can be very useful in developing plant layouts or

adding equipment and buildings to existing plants. Evaluation of the F&EI calculations

and layout considerations will result a safe, operable, maintainable and cost-effective

arrangement of equipment and buildings.



Table 6.12 Fire & Explosion Index for Tank farm

S.No Name of the Solvent Tank

Capacity (Kl)

Fire & Explosion

Index (F1*F2*MF)

Radius of Exposure (m)

F&EIx0.26

Degree of Hazard

Agro and Fine Chemicals 1 (2-chlorophenyl)acetonitrile 50 26.3 6.8 Light 2 2,6 Diethylaniline 50 91.1 23.7 Moderate 3 2-Methoxyethanol 40 111.7 29.0 Intermediate 4 30% Hydrochloric Acid 50 8.0 2.1 Light 5 Acetaldehyde 50 180.5 46.9 Severe 6 Bromine 50 9.6 2.5 Light 7 Butanol 40 104.5 27.2 Intermediate 8 Butyl acetate 50 104.2 27.1 Intermediate 9 Carbon Disulfide 50 157.9 41.1 Heavy 10 Caustic Lye 48% 50 8.0 2.1 Light 11 Cyclohexane 50 137.7 35.8 Heavy 12 Di Methyl Formamide 50 26.3 6.8 Light 13 Dichloro Ethane 50 110.9 28.8 Intermediate 14 Dichlorobenzene 50 70.5 18.3 Moderate 15 Dichloromethane 40 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 16 Dimethyl Sulfite 50 65.1 16.9 Moderate 17 Dimethyl Sulfoxide 50 26.3 6.8 Light 18 Dipropyl Aniline 50 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 19 3,5-Dimethylbenzoyl chloride 50 65.1 16.9 Moderate 20 Ethyl Mercaptan 40 167.8 43.6 Severe 21 Ethyl-4-Chloroacetoacetate 50 79.9 20.8 Moderate 22 Hexane 50 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 23 Isopropyl alcohol 40 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 24 Methanol 50 104.5 27.2 Intermediate 25 Methyl Acetoacetate 50 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 26 Methyl Iso Butyl Ketone 50 112.8 29.3 Intermediate 27 Mono Chloro Benzene MCB 50 70.5 18.3 Moderate 28 Nitric Acid 98% 50 111.9 29.1 Intermediate 29 N-Methyl Pyrollidone 10 70.5 18.3 Moderate 30 Pentane-1,2-diol 50 112.0 29.1 Intermediate 31 p-Ethyl benzoyl chloride 50 92.1 24.0 Moderate 32 Phenyl hydrazine 50 92.1 24.0 Moderate 33 Sulphuric Acid (96%) 50 111.5 29.0 Intermediate 34 Tert Butyl alcohol 50 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 35 Thionyl Chloride 50 8.4 2.2 Light 36 Toluene 50 112.8 29.3 Intermediate 37 Xylene 50 112.0 29.1 Intermediate



S.No Name of the Solvent Tank

Capacity (Kl)

Fire & Explosion

Index (F1*F2*MF)

Radius of Exposure (m)

F&EIx0.26

Degree of Hazard

Active Pharma Ingredients 1 Hydrochloric Acid 50 8.0 2.1 Light 2 Caustic Lye (40%) 50 8.0 2.1 Light 3 Phosphorous Oxy Chloride 30 70.3 18.3 Moderate 4 Sulfuric Acid 50 111.5 29.0 Intermediate 5 Thionyl Chloride 50 8.4 2.2 Light 6 Tributyltin Chloride 30 74.7 19.4 Moderate 7 Acetone 30 94.3 24.5 Moderate 8 Isopropyl alcohol 40 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 9 Methanol 50 104.5 27.2 Intermediate 10 Dichloromethane 40 105.3 27.4 Intermediate 11 Toluene 30 112.8 29.3 Intermediate

F& E index value is found to be moderate except for Ethylene Dichloride (intermediate)

reflecting the threshold limits as prescribed in MSHC rules. Both MSHC rules and F & E

index indicate that the present facility does not require a detailed risk assessment.

6.5.4 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a highly structured and detailed technique,

developed primarily for application to chemical process systems. A HAZOP can generate

a comprehensive understanding of the possible ‘deviations from design intent’ that may

occur. However, HAZOP is less suitable for identification of hazards not related to

process operations, such as mechanical integrity failures, procedural errors, or external

events. HAZOP also tends to identify hazards specific to the section being assessed, while

hazards related to the interactions between different sections may not be identified.

However, this technique helps to identify hazards in a process plant and the operability

problems. It is performed once the engineering line diagrams of the plantare made

available. It is carried out during or immediately after the design stage. The purpose of

the study is to identify all possible deviations from the way thedesign/operation is

expected to work and all the hazards associated with thesedeviations. A multi-

disciplinary team was constituted with chemical, mechanical andinstrumentation

engineers, R&D chemist and production manager. It is important to keep the team small



enough to be efficient, while retaining a sufficient spread of skills and disciplines for all

aspects of the study to be covered comprehensively. The group discussion is facilitated

by a Chairman and the results of the discussion are recorded by a Secretary. Every

investigation must be led by Chairman who is familiar with the HAZOP study technique,

which is primarily concerned with applying, controlling the discussions and stimulating

team thinking.

The preparative work for HAZOP studies consisted of four stages i.e., obtaining thedata,

converting into usable form, planning the sequence of the study and arranging

thenecessary meetings. The documents referred to for the study include process

description, process flow diagrams, P&I diagrams plant layout, operating manuals

including startup & shutdown, safety instructions etc., The parameters such as

temperature, pressure, flow, level were investigated for deviation and hazard situations

are identified.

Some basic definitions of terms frequently used in HAZOP studies are deviation, causes,

consequences and guide words etc., Deviations are departures from the design intent

which are discovered by systematically applying the guide words. Causes are the reasons

why deviations might occur. Consequences are the reasons why deviations should they

occur. Guide words are simple words used to understand a particular plant section in

operating condition in order to guide and simulate the creative thinking process and so

discover deviations. NO, less, more, as well as, part of, reverse, other than are guide

words used.

Potential problems as represented by the consequences of the deviation should be

evaluated as they arise and a decision reached on whether they merit further

consideration or action. Except for major risk areas where a fully quantitative assessment

is required this decision is made semi-quantitatively on the consequence (usually scaled

as trivial, important or very probable). HAZOP reports are prepared for various

products during detailed engineering. Typical HAZOP report for Xylene recovery is

presented in Table 6.13.



Table 6.13 HAZOP of Xylene Recovery Design Conditions/Parameters:

Equipment no. Capacity Type/Model MOC Design pressure Design temperature

Remarks

18A11 12.5 KL Recovery Reactor SS 316 6 bar / FV 0BT17 15 KL Xylene collection horizontal tank SS 304 3 bar / FV 6AT10 2 KL Aq.Layer collection tank SS 3 bar / FV 30 AT 6 8 KL 48% Caustic tank SS 3 bar / FV 30AT3 8 KL RO water tank SS 3 bar / FV Drawings: Notes:

Deviation Cause F Consequence Potential

Risk Safeguards N Mitigated

Risk Recommendation S P R S P R

1. High Pressure Nitrogen purging is ON VF Tank, condenser and whole

venting system get pressurized. Nitrogen maximum pressure is 4 bar. The reactor and Condensors are designed for minimum 3 bar. Seperation pot will break

L 1 2 L 1 2 Consider SS seperation pot

Vent valve of tank is closed Or high flow of nitrogen

F

High Pressure Xylene MLs

transferring is ON VF Overpressurisation up to pump discharge pressure AND Glass pot will break AND External fire

H 2 1 Level transmitter and interlock with all RM inlet valves

0.5 H 4 3

Vent valve is closed

F

Level switch is available and interlock with all RM inlet valves

0.5

BPCS check level in the reactor before transferring the mass.

0.5

Ignition source is present

R Transferring reactor capacity (10.0 KL) is less than xylene

0.5



recovery reactor (12.5 KL)

High Pressure Heating is ON VF

Overpressurisation of vessel AND Leakage from the weak joints

H 1 1 Two stage condenser is placed which will reflux the solvent

1 H 4 3

Vent is closed F SRV / RD are installed for reactor 1

Steam ON-OFF valve CLOSES if Reactor pressure is greater than >0.3 bar SIL 1

1

High Pressure Heating is ON

VF Overpressurisation of vessel AND Leakage from the weak joints AND External fire

H 3 2 Two stage condenser is placed which will reflux the solvent

1 H 5 3

Vent is closed F PTW is placed 1 Ignition source is present R

2. Low Pressure Not relevant 0

3. Vacuum Not relevant 0

4. High Level Xylene MLs transferring is ON VF

Material fills the column, Condensors & scrubber AND External Fire (Worst case)

H 3 2 PTW system and Electrical fitting according to zone classification

1 H 5 3

Previous batch left over material is present

F BPCS check level in the reactor before transferring the mass.

0.5

Ignition source is R Level switch is 0.5



present available and interlock with all RM inlet valves

4. High Level RO water transferring is ON VF

Material fills the column, Condensors & scrubberANDExternal Fire (Worst case)


1 H 5 3



0.5


R Level switch is available and interlock with all RM inlet valves

0.5

4. High Level 48% caustic transferring is ON VF

Material fills the column, Condensors & scrubber AND External Fire (Worst case)


1 H 5 3



0.5


R Level switch is available and interlock with all RM inlet valves

0.5

4. High Level Distillation is ON

VF

Excessive distillation AND Overfill of Hexane collection Tank 1st cut 12FT 3KL


1 H 4 3 High level switch of Hexane collection tank interlocked with heating service

Human error / LT malfunction F


R



4. Low Level Not relevant

6. High Temperature

Heating is ON VF Overheating AND Decomposition of xylene AND Overpressurisation of vessel AND Rupture of vessel NOTE: Decomposition temperature of residue - 202 degC, Heat liberated - 26 J/g

H 1 1 Water is present in the process which will not allow the residue to dry unless long overheating

0.5

H 4 3

Human error / TT malfunction

F SRV / RD are installed for reactor 1

Steam ON-OFF valve CLOSES if Reactor pressure is greater than >0.3 bar

0.5

Steam ON-OFF valve CLOSES if Reactor temperature is greater than > 110 degC SIL 1

1

6. High Temperature

Heating is ON VF Overheating AND Decomposition of Hexane AND Overpressurisation of vessel AND Rupture of vessel NOTE: Decomposition temperature of residue - 120 degC, Heat liberated - 902 J/g

H 1 1 Trained operator/BPCS Monitoring

0.5 H 4 3

No refluxing back water in the reactor ( Separator bottom valve is CLOSED)

F SRV / RD are installed for reactor 1

Steam ON-OFF valve CLOSES if Reactor pressure is greater than >0.3 bar

0.5

Steam ON-OFF valve CLOSES if Reactor temperature is greater than > 110

1



degC SIL 1 Monitor the reflux

flow is water is come back in the reactor. If the flow meter reading is zero then close the heating valve

0.5

7. Low Temperature

No Safety Consequence

8. High Flow Not relevant 0

9. Low / No Flow

Xylene MLs transferring is on

VF

Dry running of pump OR churning of the xylene AND Leakage from seal AND Operator exposure

M 2 2 PPE - Hand gloves + googles

0.5

M 3 3 Common interlock of pump will not start if suction discharge valve is not open

Suction or Discharge valve is not opened

F Low current device will stop the pump

0.5

10. Reverse Flow Not relevant

11. Error in Source

Not relevant 0

12. Error in Destination

Not relevant 0



13. High Composition

Reactor is ready to strat for opeartion

VF High composition of residue AND Acculation of residue

M 1 2 4 eye principle to unload the residue

1 M 3 3 Consider interlock to ensure reactor is empty before starting the bacth / charging ( Level interlock)

Human error ( Previous batch residue is not unloaded)

F SRV is placed for the reactor

1

14. Low Composition

RO water - 1 charging is ON

VF Poor seperation L 1 2 RO water charging is ensured in BPCS

0.5 L 2 3

Human error or Flow meter error (No/less Water is not charged)

F Trained opeartor + SOP

0.5

14. Low Composition

48% caustic charging is ON

VF Formic will not neutralized AND Corrosion issue at high temperature

L 1 2 Caustic charging is ensured in BPCS

0.5 L 2 3

Human error or Flow meter error (No/less Water is not charged)

F IPC check to conform pH

0.5

14. Low Composition

Distillation is ON VF Distllation rate is low M 1 2 RO water charging is ensured in BPCS 0.5 M 3 3

Less quantity of RO water is charged Human error or Flow meter error (No/less Water is not charged)

F Steam ON-OFF valve CLOSES if Reaction mass temperature is >110 degC SIL 1

1

Monitor the reflux flow is water is come back in the reactor. If

0.5



the flow meter reading is zero then close the heating valve

Minimum level interlocked with heating service. IF level is low in the reactor then CLOSE the heating service

0.5

15. Other than / Contamination

Not relevant

15. Other than / Contamination

Not relevant

16. High / Low Viscosity

Not relevant 0

17. High / Low pH

Not relevant 0

18. More agitation

Not relevant 0

19. Less / No agitation

Heating is ON VF Sudden release of the heat M 1 2 BPCS monitors the distillation operation 0.5 M 3 3

Power failure ( Agitator failure, cooling failure)

F SRV is placed for the reactor 1

Steam ON-OFF valve 0.5



CLOSES if Agitator fails

19. Less / No agitation

Heating is ON VF Accumulation of the heat AND Sudden release of the heat AND Overpressurisation of vessel

M 1 2 BPCS monitors the distillation operation 0.5 M 4 3

Mechanical failure ( Agitator) F

Two stage condenser system with reflux back the solvent vapors

1

Proximity switch for agitator and interlock with heating valve

0.5

SRV is placed for the reactor 1

20. Utility Failure Heating is ON VF Uncondensed water + xylene vapors will escape to atmosphereANDDecompostion of mass

H 1 1 Power back up, redundant compressors and pumps

1 H 4 3

Power failure ( Cooling failure to condenser)

F Annouciation of power failure / utility failure in DCS room

0.5

Minimum level interlocked with heating service. IF level is low in the reactor then CLOSE the heating service

0.5

Monitor the reflux flow is water is come back in the reactor. If the flow meter reading is zero then close the heating valve

0.5



Temperature Transmitter at the outlet of the condenser. Interlock TT to stop steam valve at Reboiler if TT temperature is >45 Deg C

0.5

21. Mechanical Failure

Not relevant

22. Corrosion / Erosion

Not relevant 0

23. Static Electricity

Xylene MLs charging is ON

VF Accumulation of static energy AND Internal fire

H 3 2 N2 purging is ON while charging the mass

1 H 5 3

Earthing continuity breaks

F Earthing continuity and charged through dip pipe

1

Oxygen presence R

24. Startup / Shutdown Hazards

Not considered

25. Maintenance Hazards

Not relevant

26. Emergency Situation Hazards

Distillation is ON VF Over heating of reaction vessel H 2 1 Steam ON-OFF valve CLOSES if temperature of reactor is greater than >110 degC SIL 1

1

H 4 3 Define emergency actions to DCS for safe shutdown



Emergency near by area

R Nitrogen blanketing during distillation

1

Stop Heating, Collection, Chargings and continue nitrogen purge

27. Adjacent Equipment Hazards

Not relevant 0

28. Sampling Hazards

Xylene is Present VF Exposure to operator L 1 2 PPE worn during sampling

0.5 L 2 3

Sampling is DONE VF Low quantity of sample

0.5

29. Personal Protection Hazards

Residue unloading is ON

VF Exposure to operator L 1 2 Trained operator 0.5 L 2 3

Spillage leakage F PPE - Hand gloves + googles

0.5



6.5.5 Hazard Factors

A study of past accident information provides an understanding of failure modes and

mechanisms of process and control equipment and human systems and their likely effects

on the overall plant reliability and safety.Some of the major contributing factors for

accidents in chemical industries are:

S. No Contributing Factor Percent Loss 1 Equipment design faults 41 2 Process design faults 10 3 Operator errors 31 4 Maintenance deficiencies 12 5 Material hazards 6

A study by AIChE (1972) indicates that majority of equipment of component failures

involve compressors, furnaces and heat exchangers as there are lesser opportunities to

take them off for maintenance. The frequency of equipment or component failures is

observed as follows:

S. No Equipment Frequency (%)

1 Compressors 30 2 Furnaces 18 3 Heat Exchangers 17 4 Process Vessels 18 5 Others 17

However, failures of storage vessels and those during transportation have been reported

more frequently than cases of plant failures. The failure rate of various equipment in a

typical power plant is provided in the following table.

Equipment Failure Rates Failure rate Failures 10-6/h Electric motors (general) 10 Transformers (<15 kV) 0.6 (132-400k V) 0.7 Circuit breakers (general, <33k V) 2 (400kV) 10 Pressure vessels (general) 3 (High standard) 0.3 Pipes 0.2



Failure rate Failures 10-6/h Pipe joints 0.5 Ducts 1 Gaskets 0.5 Bellows 5 Diagrams (metal) 5 (Rubber) 8 Unions and junctions 0.4 Hoses (heavily stressed) 40 (Lightly stressed) 4 Ball bearings (heavy duty) 20 (Light duty) 10 Roll bearings 5 Sleeve bearings 5 Shafts (heavily stressed) 0.2 (Lightly stressed) 0.02 Relief valves leakage 2 Blockage 0.5 Hand- operated valves 15 Control valves 30 Ball valves 0.5 Solenoid valves 30 Rotating seals 7 Sliding seals 3 ‘O’ring seals 0.2 Couplings 5 Belt drives 40 Spur gears 10 Helical gears 1 Friction clutches 3 Magnetic clutches 6 Fixed orifices 1 Variable orifices 5 Nozzle and flapper assemblies: Blockage 6 Breakage 0.2 Filters: blockage 1 Leakage 1 Rack-and-pinion assembles 2 Knife-edge fulcrum: wear 10 Springs (heavily stressed) 1 (Lightly stressed) 0.2 Hair springs 1 Calibration springs: creep 2 Breakage 0.2 Vibration mounts 9



Failure rate Failures 10-6/h Mechanical joints 0.2 Grub screws 0.5 Pins 15 Pivots 1 Nuts 0.02 Bolts 0.02 Boilers (all types) 1.1 Boilers feed pumps 2.5 Cranes 7.8

6.5.6 Common Causes of Accidents

Engineering and Instrumental

Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of major chemical

plant accidents are identified as:

• Poor house keeping • Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities • Unsafe or defective equipment facilities • Lack of proper procedures • Improving unsafe procedures • Failure to follow prescribed procedures • Jobs not understood • Lack of awareness of hazards involved • Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities • Lack of guides and safety devices • Lack of protective equipment and clothing

Failures of Human Systems

An assessment of past chemical accidents reveals human factor to be the cause for over

60% of the accidents while the rest are due to other plant component failures. This

percentage will increase if major accidents alone are considered for analysis. Major

causes of human failures reported are due to:

• Stress induced by poor equipment design, unfavorable environmental conditions, fatigue, etc.

• Lack of training in safety and loss prevention. • Indecision in critical situations. • Inexperienced staff being employed in hazardous situations.



Often, human errors are not analyzed while accident reporting and accident reports only

provide information about equipment or component failures. Hence, a great deal of

uncertainty surrounds analysis of failure of human systems and consequent damages.

The number of persons/materials are potentially exposed to a specific hazard zone is a

function of the population density and distribution near the accident location. The failure

rate data and ignition sources of major fires are presented in the following Tables 6.14

and 6.15.

Table 6.14 Failure Rate Data

S.No Item International Data 1. Process Controllers 2.4 x 10-5 hr-5 2. Process control valve 2.0 x 10-6 hr-1 3. Alarm 2.3 x 10-5 hr-1 4. Leakage at biggest storage tank 5.0 x 10-5 yr-1 5. Leakage of pipe line 1 x 10-7 m-1 yr-1 6. Human Failure 1 x 10-4 (demand)-1

Table 6.15 Ignition Sources of Major Fires

S.No Ignition Source Percent 1. Electrical (wiring of motors) 23% 2. Smoking 18% 3. Friction 10% 4. Over heated material 8% 5. Burner flames 7% 6. Combustion sparks 5% 7. Spontaneous ignition 4% 8. Cutting & welding 4% 9. Exposure (fires jumping into new areas) 3% 10. Incendiarism (fires maliciously set) 2% 11. Mechanical sparks 2% 12. Molten substances 1% 13. Chemical actions 1% 14. Static sparks 1% 15. Lightening 1% 16. Miscellaneous 1%



6.6 Maximum Credible Accident and Consequence Analysis (MCACA)

The potential hazards due to toxic and inflammable nature of the raw materials, process

streams and products can be quantified. However, it is necessary to carry out a hazard

analysis study to visualize the consequences of an unexpected release from chemical

plant, which consists of a number of process units and tank farm facilities. The present

study provides quantified picture of the potential hazards and their consequences

6.6.1 Methodology

MCACA aims at identifying the unwanted hazardous events, which can cause maximum

damage to plant and personnel. At the first instance, all probable accident scenarios are

developed. Scenarios are generated based on properties of chemicals, physical conditions

under which reactions occur or raw materials stored, as well as material strength of

vessels and conduits, in-built valves and safety arrangements, etc. Creating a scenario

does not mean that it will occur, only that there is a reasonable probability that it could. A

scenario is neither a specific situation nor a specific event, but a description of a typical

situation that covers a set of possible events or situations.

This is the basis of the risk study; it tells us what may happen so that ways and means of

preventing or minimizing the possibility can be devised. The next step is estimation of

the probability of each accident scenario. A credible accident is one within the realm of

possibility and is likely to be severe enough to cause significant damage. This concept

comprises of two parameters- probable damage caused by an accident and probability of

occurrence of an accident .There may be types of accidents that may occur frequently, but

would cause very little damage. And there may be other types that may cause great

damage, but would have a very low probability of occurrence. Both are important and

need to be considered, even if they are later discarded. A host of probable accident

scenarios are visualized examined and credibility of probable events is established based

on engineering judgment, past accident data and expertise in the field of risk analysis.



The following steps are involved in identifying the maximum credible accident scenarios.

a. A detailed study of the process and plant information including process flow diagrams

and piping & instrumentation diagrams.

b. Hazard classification of chemicals, operations and equipment.

c. Identification of representative failure cases of vessels and pipelines and the resulting

release scenarios

d. Establishment of credibility of visualized scenarios based on past accident data.

6.6.2 Identification of Vulnerable Areas

The unit operations in the process and storage areas involve mass and energy transfer

operations to effect the necessary physical changes. Nature of chemicals and the

operating conditions create special hazardous situations. In the present case the chemicals

handled are flammable and toxic in nature. With these factors in mind a thorough

examination of the process information is carried out and a list of inventories of the

hazardous chemicals is prepared to identify the hazardous situations. Based on the raw

material consumptions determined from the pilot scale studies, experience in handling

commercial scale processes and logistics in procurement of raw materials, the inventories

to be maintained for each of the raw material and its mode of storage is determined. High

inventory liquid raw materials like solvents are usually stored in tank farms, while solids

and other low inventory liquids are stored in ware house based on compatibility,

reactivity, toxicity etc. with appropriate safety and fire fighting facilities to handle any

kind of emergencies. The solvent tank farm and the capacity of each tank is mentioned

in table 6.4.

6.6.3 Representative Accident Scenarios

A study of past accidents, which took place in similar process units and the present plant,

provides reasons and course of accidents and there by focusing on most critical areas. A

thorough examination of engineering details indicated many possible scenarios like

gasket leak, pinholes in pipes and vessels apart from rupture of pipelines and vessels



and catastrophic failure of vessels resulting in a pool. Heat radiation damage distances

for Pool fire was considered.

Failure Frequency:

The release scenarios considered above can be broadly divided in to two categories

(i) Catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and

(ii) Ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency

Vapor or liquid release from failure of gasket, seal and rupture in pipe lines and vessels

fall in second category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of

pipe lines etc., fall in to first category. Typical failure frequencies are given in Table 6.16.

Table 6.16 General Failure Frequencies Item Mode of failure Failure frequencies Pressure Vessel

Serious leak 1.0*10-5/Year Catastrophic 3.0*10-6/Year

Pipe lines =50 mm dia

Full bore rupture 8.8*10-7/m.year Significant leak 8.8*10-6/m.year

>50 mm =150 mm dia


>150 mm dia


hose Rapture/Failure 4.0*10-5/hr Unloading arm Rapture/Failure 3.0*10-8/hr Check valve Failure on demand 1.0*10-4/on demand motor operated valve Failure on demand 1.0*10-3/ on demand Flange Leak 3.0*10-4/ Year Pump seal Leak 5.0*10-3/ Year Gasket failure Failure 5.0*10-5/ Year Process safety valve(PSV)

Lifts heavily 4.0*10-3/ Year Blocked 1.0*10-3/ Year Lifts lightly 6.0*10-2/ Year



6.7Consequence Analysis

The accidental release of hazardous chemicals leads to subsequent events, which actually

cause the damage. The damages are of three types.

1) Damage due to heat radiation.

2) Damage due to Over pressure effects subsequent to explosion

3) Damage due to toxic effects

The type of damage and extent of damage depends on nature of chemical, the conditions

of release, atmospheric conditions and the subsequent events. The sequence of probable

events following the release of a hazardous chemical is schematically shown in Figure

6.3. The best way of understanding and quantifying the physical effects of any accidental

release of chemicals from their normal containment is by means of mathematical

modeling. This is achieved by describing the physical situations by mathematical

equations for idealized conditions and by making corrections for deviation of the

practical situations from ideal conditions. In the present study ALOHAsoftware from

USEPA. These models for various steps are described in the following sub-sections.

6.7.1 Release Models and Source strength

This depends on the nature of failure of the unit and the content of the unit and operating

temperature and pressure of the unit. The release may be instantaneous due to total

failure of storage unit or continuous due to leakage or rupture of some component of the

storage facility. The material discharged may be gas or liquid or the discharge could be

manifested through two phase flow. The models that are used to calculate the quantity of

liquid/vapor released are:



Fig 6.3 Steps in Consequence Calculations

The following criteria tables present heat radiation intensities (Table 6.17), radiation

exposure and lethality (Table 6.18), and damage due to peak over pressure is presented

in Table 6.19.

Table 6.17 Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensities S. No Incident

Radiation (KW/m2)

Type of Damage Intensity Damage to Equipment Damage to the People

1 37.5 Damage to process Equipment 100% lethality in 1 min.

1% lethality in 10 sec.

2 25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposurewithout a flame

50 % lethality in 1min.

Significant injury in 10 sec.

3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation intensity allowed n thermally unprotected adjoining equipment.

---

4 12.5 Minimum energy to ignite with a flame, melts plastic tubing

1% lethality in 1 min.

5 4.0 -- Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec, however blistering is unlikely ( First degree burns)

6 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on Longer exposure

Source: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards by World Bank



Table 6.18 Radiation exposure and lethality

Radiation Intensity (KW/m2)

Exposure Time (seconds)

1% Lethality Degree Burns

1.6 -- 0 No Discomfort even after longer exposure

4.5 20 0 1st 4.5 50 0 1 st 8.0 20 0 1 st 8.0 50 <1 3 rd 8.0 60 <1 3 rd

12.0 20 <1 2 nd 12.0 50 8 3 rd 12.5 -- 1 -- 25.0 -- 50 -- 37.5 -- 100 --

Table 6.19 Damage Due to Peak Over Pressure Human Injury Structural Damage

Peak Over Pressure(bar)

Type of Damage Peak over Pressure(bar)

Type of Damage

5 – 8 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90%Damage) 3.5 – 5 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable (10%Damage) 2 – 3 Threshold lethality 0.03 Damage of Glass

1.33 – 2 Severe Lung damage 0.01 Crack of Windows 1 – 11/3 50% Eardrumrupture - -

Source : Marshall, V.C.(1977)’ How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes. 6.7.2 Results of Consequence Analysis

The damages due to the accidental release of chemicals are of three types. a) Damage due to heat radiation b) Damage due to Over pressure effects subsequent to explosion c) Damage due to Toxic effects 6.7.2.1 Analysis of Hazardous Scenarios

The hazardous chemicals involved are stored within the threshold limits of storage and

hence few representative chemicals mainly solvents were studied.

6.7.2.1.1 Heat radiation effects

When a non-boiling liquid spills, it spreads into a pool. The size of the pool depends on

the availability of the bund and obstacles. The heat load on objects outside a burning pool



of liquid is calculated with the heat radiation model. The average heat radiation intensity,

the diameter-to-height ratio dependent on the burning liquid, geometric view, distance

from the fire, relative humidity of air, horizontal or vertical orientation of the object

radiated with respect to fire are factored. All storage tanks in tank-farm area are provided

with dykes. For each of the hazardous chemicals involved various scenarios such as pipe

line leaks of 5mm or pipeline ruptures or catastrophic vessel ruptures of the inventories

as outlined have been considered and damage distances for Lower Flammability Limits

(LFL) and heat radiation effects for the three levels of intensity are calculated and

presented in Table 6.20. Heat radiation damage distances for most of the scenarios are

not occurring in the case of release from 25 mm holes at a height of 0.1 m from the bottom

of the tank for one hour, in the solvent storage tanks. In case of pipeline leaks, 5 mm leaks

are considered for 15 mm and 50 mm pipe sizes. The release rates from 5 mm leaks are

observed to be low, and these leaks have low incident hazard. The concentration of the

flammable material in the vapor cloud was found to be below the lower flammability

limits. Heat radiation damage distance (Pool Fire) is presented in Fig 6.4 to Fig 6.16.



Table 6.20 Heat Radiation Damage Distances – Tank Farm S.No Name of Raw material Tank

(KL) No.s Diameter

(m) Height

(m) Volume

(m3) Hole Dia

(mm)

Release Rate

(Kg/min) (Kg/sec)

Heat radiation damage distances in m for

KW/m2 37.5 12.5 4.0

Agro and Fine Chemicals 1 2,6 Diethylaniline 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 24.5 <10 <10 11 2 2-Methoxyethanol 40 1 3.20 5.00 40 25 24.3 <10 <10 <10 3 Acetaldehyde 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 3.84 <10 <10 <10 4 Butanol 40 1 3.20 5.00 40 25 22.8 <10 <10 <10 5 Butyl acetate 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 23.7 <10 <10 <10 6 Carbon Disulfide 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 160 <10 12 18 7 Cyclohexane 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 22.3 <10 <10 11 8 Dichloro Ethane 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 47.1 <10 <10 <10 9 Dichlorobenzene 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 29 <10 <10 <10 10 Dichloromethane 40 1 3.20 5.00 40 25 218 <10 11 12 11 Dimethyl Sulfite 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 155 10 11 17 12 Dipropyl Aniline 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 23.8 <10 <10 <10 13 Ethyl Mercaptan 40 1 3.20 5.00 40 25 169 <10 10 18 14 Ethyl-4-Chloroacetoacetate 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 27.1 <10 <10 <10 15 Hexane 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 20.5 <10 <10 11 16 Isopropyl alcohol 40 1 3.20 5.00 40 25 22.4 <10 <10 <10 17 Methanol 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 22.5 <10 <10 <10 18 Methyl Acetoacetate 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 26.3 <10 <10 <10 19 Methyl Iso Butyl Ketone 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 22.8 <10 <10 11 20 Mono Chloro Benzene 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 26.6 <10 <10 <10 21 N-Methyl Pyrollidone 10 1 2.00 3.20 10 25 22.7 <10 <10 <10 22 Pentane-1,2-diol 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 25 <10 <10 <10 23 Phenyl hydrazine 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 26.6 <10 <10 10 24 Tert Butyl alcohol 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 22.4 <10 <10 <10 25 Toluene 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 23.6 <10 <10 11 26 Xylene 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 23.8 <10 <10 11



Active Pharma Ingredients 1 Acetone 30 1 3.00 4.30 30 25 22.4 <10 <10 <10 2 Isopropyl alcohol 40 1 3.20 5.00 40 25 22.4 <10 <10 <10 3 Methanol 50 1 3.60 5.00 51 25 22.5 <10 <10 <10 4 Dichloromethane 40 1 3.20 5.00 40 25 218 <10 11 12 5 Toluene 30 1 3.00 4.30 30 25 23.6 <10 <10 11 6 Hydrogen Gas Cylinders

(Pressure: 350 Bar) 2.3 <10 12 20



Fig 6.4Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) -50Kl 2,6 Diethyl Aniline Tank



Fig 6.5 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Carbon disulfide Tank



Fig 6.6 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Cylohexane Tank



Fig 6.7 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 40Kl Dichlormethane Tank



Fig 6.8 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 50Kl Dimethyl Sulfide Tank



Fig 6.9 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 40Kl Ethyl Mercaptan Tank



Fig 6.15 Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 40Kl Dichloromethane Tank



Fig 6.16Heat Radiation Damage (Pool Fire) - 30Kl Toluene Tank



6.7.2.1.2 Toxic Dispersion:

The storage of toxic chemicals was evaluated with respect to failure of containment

resulting in toxic dispersion and the toxic damage distances were calculated using

ALOHA software. The results of the same are presented in Table 6.21. Toxic Dispersion

damage distances for Chlorine storage tank and bromine are shown in Fig 6.17 and 18.

Table 6.21 Toxic Dispersion Damage Distances

S. No.

Scenario Description

IDLH (ppm)

Release Rate

Kg/sec

Distance (m)

Storage Tank Details Height

(m) Dia (m)

Total Volume

(m3)

Storage Pressure

1 Chlorine (Liquid Storage)

10 14.63 4900 10.5 2.8 63 Atmospheric

2 Chlorine Tonner 10 0.30 640 2.1 0.8 1 7atm 3 Ammonia (20%) 300 0.48 187 3.2 2.0 10 9.68atm 4 Bromine 3 5.13 3500 5.0 3.6 50 Atmospheric 5 30% Hydrochloric

Acid (Puddle) 50 0.01 42 5.0 3.6 50 Atmospheric

Fig 6.17 Toxic Dispersion Radiation Damage – 63 m3 Liquefied Chlorine Tank



Fig 6.18 Toxic Dispersion Radiation Damage – 50 Kl Bromine Tank

6.7.2.1.3 Overpressure effects:

When an unignited gas cloud mixes with air and reaches the flammable range and if the

cloud ignites wither a flash fire or flash fire explosion can occur. Since the burning time is

shorter, instead of heat radiation from a flash fire, peak overpressure as a function of

distance from the centre of the cloud is derived. In case of pipeline leaks, damage

distances due to overpressure effects are not observed. The values are found to be similar

as there are no pressurized storage tanks in the tank farm, and the over pressure

distances are contingent on the tank capacity.

6.7.3 Observations:

From the previous incident records published in literature and hydrocarbon release data

bases, it has been observed that pinhole leaks contribute highest percentage where as the

second cause is small sized leaks of 25 mm diameter in tank farm. Accordingly the

consequence analysis was carried out for 25 mm sized leaks in the tank farm.It may be

noted that the heat radiation is limited to a maximum distance of 18 mts in the case of

Ethyl Mercaptan for a heat radiation of 4KW/m2. It may be noted that the heat radiation

distances fall within the plant boundary.



The toxic dispersion distance in case of catastrophic failure of bulk storage tank of liquid

chlorine is 63 Kl. However various engineering controls, work practices and personal

protective equipment shall mitigate the emissions and exposure of the same resulting in

reduced risk.

6.7.4 Recommendations:

The following are the recommendations to minimize the hazards and improve the safety

of the proposed plants. Plants of this nature, which handle a variety of chemicals, face

problems of fire and vapor cloud explosions. It has been observed that for the proposed

expansion the damage distances are more or less confined to the plant area only. Taking

precautionary safety measures as outlined below can further minimize these effects.

• In view of hazardous nature of operations, it is recommended to adopt best practices

with respect to design, operation and maintenance.

• It is recommended that all flammable areas and process area be maintained free of

ignition sources. Ensure that sources of ignition, such as pilot lights, electrical

ignition devices etc., at strategic locations like solvent storage areas are avoided.

• All electrical fittings involved in and around the pipeline and operation system

should conform to flame/explosion proof regulations.

• Strict hot work control and display of danger signs should be ensured.

• It is recommended to provide one fire hydrant point in the tank-farm area to take

care of any emergency. Installation of fire water hydrant net work is suggested.

• It is suggested to provide fire extinguishers in process plant at solvent storage area

and the vents of solvent tanks to be provided with PESO approved flame arrestors.

• Fire protection equipment should be well maintained so that it is available when

required. They should be located for quick accessibility. Provide carbon dioxide fire

extinguishers and DCP extinguishers for Electrical fires.

• It is suggested to have a periodical review of safety awareness and safety training

requirements of plant employees with respect to hazards present in the plant.



• In general, all pipelines carrying flammable liquids/vapor are periodically checked

for their integrity. Spillages have to be avoided and disposal should be done

quickly.

6.7.5 Toxic Management Plan (Terms of Reference No. Add. TOR 11 & 12))

The list of chemicals identified to have toxic or carcinogenic nature is presented in Table

6.22.

Table 6.22 List of Toxic/Carcinogenic Chemicals and Mode of Storage/Transport S

No Raw Materials Max

Storage Quantity

(Tons)

Physical Nature

Type of Hazard

Mode of Storage

Mode of Transport

1 (2-chlorophenyl) acetonitrile

289 liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road

2 2,6 Dimethyl Aniline 126 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 3 4-Methylaniline ( Para

Toluedine) 26 Powder Toxic Bags By Road

4 Benzyl Cyanide 50 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 5 (2-chloro-1,3-dinitro-5-

(trifluoro methyl)benzene) 110 Solid Toxic Bags By Road

6 Chlorine Gas Gas Toxic Tonners By Road 7 Chloroacetamide 6 Solid Toxic Bags By Road 8 Dichlorobenzene 153 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 9 Dichloromethane 39 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 10 DMSO 9 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 11 Ethyl-4-Chloroacetoacetate 122 Liquid Toxic &

Corrosive Bulk Storage By Road

12 Hydroquinone 265 Powder Toxic Bags By Road 13 Methane Sulfochloride 44 Liquid Toxic &

Corrosive Drums By Road

14 Methylene Dichloride 1 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 15 N-Methyl Pyrollidone 2 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 16 N-Methylaniline 24 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 17 O-Toluidine 177 Solid Toxic Bags By Road 18 Parachlorophenyl

Acetonitrile 69 Solidified mass Toxic Drums By Road

19 p-chloro phenol 133 Solid Toxic Bags By Road 20 Tertbutyl Isocyanate 81 Liquid Flammable

Toxic Drums By Road

21 Triphosgene 87 Powder Toxic Bags By Road 22 5-Fluorouracil 6 Powder Toxic Bags By Road 23 Benzene Sulfonyl chloride 3 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road



24 Butyryl Chloride 5 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 25 Chlorosulphonic acid 3 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 26 Cyclohexanol 3 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 27 N,N-Dimethylaniline 4 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 28 Sodium Azide 8 Crystalline Toxic Bags By Road 29 Thionyl Chloride 23 Liquid Toxic Bulk Storage By Road 30 Tributyltin Chloride 20 Liquid Carcinogenic Bulk Storage By Road 31 Zinc Dust 1 Dust Toxic Bags By Road 32 Chloroform 3 Liquid Carcinogenic Drums By Road 33 Ethylene Dichloride 2 Liquid Toxic Drums By Road 34 Methylene Dichloride 27 Liquid Carcinogenic Bulk Storage By Road 35 Chlorine 64 Liquefied gas Toxic Bulk Storage By Road

6.7.5.1 Handling of Toxic Chemicals: Storage & handling in compliance with MSDS. The

transfer of solvents shall be mainly by closed pipeline systems, while solvents are

transferred from drums by using air operated diaphragm pumps in closed hoods. Solid

phase raw materials are charged by using closed hoppers to avoid dust emissions and

hazard of static electricity. SOP’s for better operational control.

6.7.5.1.1 Tanker Loading and Unloading: Solvents and liquid raw materials are stored in

bulk storage tanks. Imported liquid raw materials in ISO tankers and indigenous raw

materials in tankers are transferred to bulk storage tanks as indicated below;

1. Material of construction of tanks is SS , MS , Glass Lined depending on the

compatibility with the liquid raw materials stored. All tanks are above ground

with impermeable concrete floors. Dykes are provided to contain leaks if any from

storage tanks. Volume of the Dyke is 20 % more than that of Storage tanks

2. All liquids are transferred from tankers to Storage tanks using centrifugal pumps

with mechanical seals. SS , PEFE pipe lines and SS Flexible hoses with high

pressure rating are provided to transfer liquids under completely closed

conditions

3. Dip pipes are provided inside bulk storage tank to avoid accumulation of static

electricity. Earthing provided to all storage tanks . Earthing is also provided with

earthing clips for tankers before unloading. Experienced persons trained in the



area handling of Hazardous chemicals are available round the clock to personally

supervise compliance with all safety issues such as earthing , proper connection of

metallic hoses to tanker , operation of the pump , Nitrogen Blanketing etc.

4. Markings are made on all Bulk Storage tanks indicating the name of the raw

material stored.

5. Nitrogen blanketing is provided to all bulk storage tanks containing flammable

materials.

6. Breather valves with flame arrestors are provided for bulk storage tanks

containing volatile organic chemicals. Breather valves are set at high pressure to

minimize breathing losses.

7. Raw materials from Bulk Storage tanks are transferred to day tanks in the process

plant using pumps with mechanical seals through Pipe lines. All pipe lines pass

through the pipe bridge above ground.

8. Dip pipes and earthing provided for day tanks as well.

9. Level transmitters with high level switch and automatic tripping of pumps at high

level provided for all day tanks to prevent overflow.

10. Products in liquid form are filled in ISO Tankers or drums. The product is stored

in a bulk tank under nitrogen blanketing and with earthing arrangements. ISO

container is flushed with Nitrogen and the finished product is transferred to the

tank with a pump. High precision level transmitters , flow meters are provided to

storage tanks with isolation valves on the transfer line to fill precise quantity in

ISO tanker. After filling the set quantity , isolation valves on transfer line

automatically closes and transfer pump also trips.

6.7.5.2 Engineering Control Measures: The engineering controls proposed for reducing

occupational hazards are; provision of scrubbers, condenser systems for process

equipment, piping systems, AOD pumps, trolleys for transfer of drums or bags, closed

hoods for charging raw materials, dip pipe provision for solvent and liquid raw material

charging, level indicators, pressure and temperature indicators, barrier guards on



moving machine parts, Solid phase raw materials are charged by Powder Transferring

System (PTS) to avoid dust emissions and hazard of static electricity. Breather valves

shall be provided to storage tanks, optimization of chemical inventory, control switches

and emergency stop devices to mitigate and avoid physical, chemical, electrical and

mechanical hazards.

6.7.5.3 Personnel Protective Equipment: Personal protective equipment shall be provided

to all employees including contract employees. All the employees shall be provided with

gumshoe, helmet, masks, goggles. The other equipment like ear muffs, gloves, respirators,

aprons etc., will be provided to employees depending on the work area allocated to them.

The PPE selection shall strictly follow the prescribed guidelines of MSDS.

6.7.5.4 Chlorine Handling in Chlor-Alkali Plant

6.7.5.4.1 Cell room: The entire caustic soda manufacturing is monitored and controlled

from centralized DCS control room.

Control valve to maintain the pressure of chlorine in chlorine line.

In case of excess pressure, chlorine is released to waste gas de-chlorination unit

automatically by opening the control valve in waste gas line.

Chlorine gas detectors with alarm system in cell room to detect any leakage of chlorine.

Emergency push buttons for safe shut down of plant in case of an emergency.

Nitrogen purging to remove residual chlorine in case of shut down or tripped.

Automatic open of control valve in waste gas line to direct all residual chlorine from

system to waste gas de-chlorination unit.

Interlocking system to reduce chlorine generation equivalent to chlorine compressor

capacity in case of chlorine compressor tripping or equivalent to HCl synthesis unit

capacity in case of HCl synthesis unit tripping.

Control valves in the Chlorine pipelines at different locations to divert excess pressure

in the chlorine system to waste gas system to protect the piping and equipment from

over-pressure.

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The suction hoods with flexible hose are provided at storage tank operating platforms to suck chlorine from leaking point and sent to waste air de-chlorination unit.

6.7.5.4.4 Waste Gas De-Chlorination

The waste gas de-chlorination system acts as a safety system of the plant and cleans up

the chlorine and traces of HCl contained in the waste gases generated at various points

in the chlorine plant.

The de-chlorination of the waste gas stream is accomplished by scrubbing with 18%

NaOH solution in two stage absorbers connected in series followed by a final absorber.

The resultant product is bleaching lye (sodium hypochlorite) solution.

The waste gas treatment system is designed for following modes of operation.

In emergency situation the system is designed to absorb total chlorine production

equivalent to 200 TPD caustic (100%) for 10 minutes. During normal operation of the

plant, it is capable to continuously absorb the 0.3% of the total chlorine production.

Health Monitoring of Employees: The pre employment screening and periodic medical

examination shall follow the guidelines of factories act. The pre employment screening

shall obtain medical history, occupational history followed by physical examination and

baseline monitoring for specific exposures.

Pre employment check up will be made mandatory and following test will be conducted:

• Plan of evaluation of health of workers

Chest x rays ECG Haemogram (examination of the blood) Urine (Routine and Microscopic) Complete physical examination

- Musculo-skeletal disorders (MSD) - Backache - Pain in minor and major joints - Fatigue, etc.



Frequency of Health Monitoring Occupation Type of evaluation Frequency Process area Chest X-ray, spirometry and vision testing,

complete blood count, ECG, platelet count, and measurement of kidney and liver function, and medical examination with focus on liver, kidney, nervous system and skin,

Every 5 years to age <30; every 4 years to age 31 – 40; and every 2 years to age 41-50; Once a year above 50 years.

6.7.6 Transportation (Terms of Reference No. Add. TOR 5)

All the raw materials and finished products are transported by road. Dedicated parking

facility is provided for transport vehicles. The nearest highway is NH 5 is at a distance of

8.7 km in NW direction. There will be 150-180 truck trips per day to the factory. Safety

signageis placed at various locations in the battery limit. The drivers of the vehicles will

be provided with TREM cards and will be explained the measure to be adopted during

various emergencies.

Transportation of raw materials may result in accidents due to high speed collision, low

speed collision, overturning and non-accident-initiated release. The initiating and

contributing causes are presented in Table 6.23

Table 6.23 Truck Incidents – Initiating and Contributing Causes Human Errors Equipment Failures System or Procedural

Failures External Events

Driver Impairment

Non-dedicated trailer Driver incentives Vandalism/ Sabotage

Speeding RR crossing guard Driver training Rain Driver Overtired Failure Carrier selection Fog Contamination Leaking Valve Container Specification Wing Overfilling Leaking Fitting Route selection Flood/washout Other Vehicle's Driver

Brake Failure Emergency response training

Fire at rest areas/parking

Taking Tight Insulation/Thermal Protection Failure

Speed Enforcement Earthquake

Unsecured Load Relief device failure Driver rest periods Existing accident Tire failure Maintenance Inspection Soft shoulder Overpressure Time of day Restrictions



Material defect Steering failure Sloshing High center of gravity Corrosion Bad Weld Excessive Grade Poor Intersection design Suspension system

The scenarios presented for storages are calculated for transport related

incidents/accidents and presented in Table 6.24.

Table 6.24 Transportation Specific Concerns Concern Road Spill on Water Over or near a body of water Unconfined Pools In an undisturbed flat area BELVE-Induced catastrophic vessel failure

Possible if sufficient quantity in car with small leak to feed fire or if double tank trailer or burning fuel leak

Toxic products of combustion or reaction

Dependent on material and whether ignition occurs



The chemical spillages are managed by following the measures as advised in MSDS. Typical measures for few chemicals is

presented in Table 6.25.

Table 6.25 Control Measures for Accidental Spillage of Chemicals Name of the Chemical Stored

Storage Details Hazard Rating Systems Type of Hazards Involved Persons Effected

Control Measures Quantity

(KL) Pressure/

Temp TLV

(PPM) STEL (PPM)

FP (OC)

Acetone 30 NTP 1000 500 -20 Highly flammable liquid and vapor. Causes serious eye irritation. May cause drowsiness or dizziness.

Operators Maintenance Technicians

Keep away from heat/sparks/open flames/hot surfaces. - No smoking. Avoid breathing dust/ fume/ gas/ mist/ vapors/ spray. IF IN EYES: Rinse cautiously with water for several minutes. Removecontact lenses. Continue rinsing.Safety board’s displayed on the tank.Effective ventilation must be provided. For accidental contact if you feel unwell, seek medical advice immediately.Handling of Acetone with Safety gloves and protective clothing

Methanol 50 NTP 1000 1000 14 Highly flammable liquid and vapor.


Keep away from heat/sparks/open flames/hot surfaces. Use personal protective equipment. Avoid breathing vapors, mist or gas. Ensure adequate ventilation. Remove all sources of ignition. Evacuate personnel to safe areas.

Methylene Dichloride

40 NTP 50 13 Limited evidence of a carcinogenic effect.


Do not breathe gas/fumes/vapour/spray. Avoid contact with skin and eyes. Wear suitable protective clothing and gloves.Store in cool place. Keep container tightly closed in a dry and well-ventilated place. Containers which areopened must be carefully resealed and kept upright to prevent leakage

Ethylene Dichloride

50 NTP 200 13 Limited evidence of a carcinogenic effect.

Operators Maintenance

Do not breathe gas/fumes/vapor/spray. Avoid contact with skin and eyes. Wear



Technicians suitable protective clothing and gloves.Store in cool place. Keep container tightly closed in a dry and well-ventilated place. Containers which areopened must be carefully resealed and kept upright to prevent leakage

Toluene 20 NTP 200 4 Highly flammable liquid and vapor. May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways. Causes skin irritation May cause drowsiness or dizziness. May cause damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure


Keep away from heat/sparks/open flames/hot surfaces. - No smoking. Avoid breathing dust/ fume/ gas/ mist/ vapours/ spray.Use personal protective equipment as required. IF SWALLOWED: Immediately call a POISON CENTER or doctor/physician.Do NOT induce vomiting. Use PPE. Avoid breathing vapors, mist or gas. Ensure adequate ventilation

Cyclohexane 50 NTP 300 300 -18 Flammable liquid and vapor. Carcinoghenic and irritant in contact with skin. Causes serious eye irritation Harmful if inhaled


IF INHALED: Remove victim to fresh air and keep at rest in a position comfortable for breathing Call a POISON CENTER or doctor/physician if you feel unwell If skin irritation occurs: Get medical advice/attention IF ON SKIN (or hair): Take off immediately all contaminated clothing. Rinse skin with water/shower Wash contaminated clothing before reuse Store locked up Store in a well-ventilated place. Keep container tightly closed.

Monochlor Benzene

20 NTP 75 27 Flammable and limited Evidence of a carcinogenic effect.


If breathed in, move person into fresh air. If not breathing, give artificial respiration. Consult a physician. Wash off with soap and plenty of water. Consult a physician. Do NOT induce vomiting. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person. Rinse mouth with water. Consult a physician



6.8 Disaster Management Plan (Terms of Reference No. Add. TOR 13)

6.8.1 Introduction

A disaster is a catastrophic situation in which suddenly, people are plunged into

helplessness and suffering and, as a result, need protection, clothing, shelter, medical and

social care and other necessities of life.

Disasters can be divided into two main groups. In the first, are disasters resulting from

natural phenomena like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storm surges, cyclones, tropical

storms, floods, avalanches, landslides, and forest fires. The second group includes

disastrous events occasioned by man, or by man's impact upon the environment.

Examples are armed conflict, industrial accidents, radiation accidents, factory fires,

explosions and escape of toxic gases or chemical substances, river pollution, mining or

other structural collapses, air, sea, rail and road transport accidents and can reach

catastrophic dimensions in terms of human loss.

There can be no set criteria for assessing the gravity of a disaster in the abstract since this

depends to a large extent on the physical, economic and social environment in which it

occurs. However, all disasters bring in their wake similar consequences that call for

immediate action, whether at the local, national or international level, for the rescue and

relief of the victims. This includes the search for the dead and injured, medical and social

care, removal of the debris, the provision of temporary shelter for the homeless, food,

clothing and medical supplies, and the rapid re- establishment of essential services.

An emergency may be said to begin when operator at the plant or in charge of storage of

hazardous chemicals cannot cope up with a potentially hazardous incident, which may

turn into an emergency. The emergencies could be a major fire or explosion or release of

toxic gas or a combination of them.

The proposed plant will store fuels, which are flammable in nature, and the storage will be

as per the Controller of Explosives and OISD norms. The hierarchy of the employees is



yet to be determined and the project is still in the initial stages of designing. Hence a

tentative disaster management plan is prepared to be suitably modified before

commissioning of the plant.

6.8.2 Objectives of Emergency Management Plan (ON-SITE)

Elements of On Site Emergency Plan

The important elements considered in this plan are

- Emergency organization. - Roles and Responsibilities. - Communication during emergency. - Emergency Shutdown & Control of situation. - Rescue & Rehabilitation. - Emergency Facilities. - Important Information. - Startup after emergency.

Methodology

The consideration is an emergency planning includes the following.

- Identification and assessment of hazardous incidents and risks. - Alarm and communication procedures. - Identification, appointment of personnel & Assignment of Responsibilities. - Identification and equipment Emergency Control Center - Identifying Assembly points/ / refuse rooms, Rescue points, Medical facilities. - Developing Emergency plant shutdown procedures. - Training, Rehearsal & Evaluation. - Action On-Site.

Person Giving Information Mr. KVLP Raju Director – Technical M/s Deccan Fine Chemicals (India) Private Limited, Kesavaram Village, Venkatanagaram Post, Payakaraopeta Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh -531127 Phone: +91 8931 – 204045 (Office) 99896 23456 (Mobile)



Fig 6.20 Emergency Organization (ON SITE)

SITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

EXTERNAL EMERGENCY SUPPORT

SITE CONTROLLER (Director, Emergency management team)

Area supervisor

Incident Controller

Chief / Deputy Emergency Coordinator

Chief of / Deputy Communication

Chief of / Deputy Data &

Documentation

Chief of / Deputy Logistics

Experts / Advisors / Technical support

Fire-fighting team

Mutual aid (fire-

fighting)

Gas leak Mgmt. team

Emergency rescue team

First aid teamMedical teamLocal fire fighting

Hospital / Ext.

ambulance

Police & local

authority

Security team

Chief / Deputy Evacuation/ reliefsystem



6.8.2.1 Emergency Facilities I. Emergency Control Centre (ECC) It is a location, where Emergency management team can assemble which includes, all

key personnel like Site Controller, Incident Controller etc. can assemble in the event of

on site of emergency and carry on various duties assigned to them. All necessary

facilities are made available at ECC.

It is marked as EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) and a set of keys were

provided and covered with breakable glass nearer to the door of ECC for emergency

use. Emergency Coordinator (Manager-Safety) is responsible for up keeping and

maintenance of Emergency Control Center.

Facilities at Emergency Control Centre (ECC)

ECC has Telephone for communication including internal and external communication facilities

The following information and equipment would available in the ECC. Telephone directories (Internal & External) Factory layout, Plan indicating locations of hazard inventories, Source of safety equipment within plant and outside. Assembly points/ / refuse rooms details, Evacuation routes, List of Key personnel, List of First Aiders List of emergency must be communicated members & government authorities phone number List of Emergency management team (Refer to new structure & update actual copies in ECC) Emergency response team members (fire fighters, first aiders, gas leak management team etc. ) Addresses with Telephone numbers of key personnel. Important addresses and Telephone numbers including Government Authorities. Material Safety Data Sheets Personal Protective Equipment Fire proximity suits Self contained breathing apparatus Mega phone On Site Emergency Plan

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House, Boiler House, Effluent treatment plant and lab buildings.

Single fire hydrant valves are available in production block – I & II.

Near fire hydrant valves hose boxes have been equipped with containing two hoses of

15mts long and one number branch pipe, those should be control of lock, the lock is

arranged at the adjacent of the Fire hose box.

The pumping network consist of fire water reservoir, Main pump (Electrical driven),

stand by pump (diesel Engine), Jockey pump (Electrical driven).

Modular type fire extinguisher

5 KM range siren

2 Km range siren



6.8.2.2 Emergency Procedures

• Whoever notices an emergency identified above or a grave situation or a situation

which has a potential to develop into an emergency should forthwith raise the

alarm by suitable means the person will also inform the shift In-charge of the area

affected.

• Essential Employees, if they are on plant rounds are to move to their place of work

and await instructions or carry out predetermined responsibilities such as taking

safe shutdown of equipment or entire plant during emergency as per the

instructions of incident controller procedure.

• If they are aware of nature of emergency, they take necessary steps to control

situation-causing emergency, by taking precautions to protect themselves and to

protect property, prevent spreading of emergency. If necessary or instructed by

Incident controller they take emergency shutdown of that plant.

• In the event of fire accident, electrical operator would switch off power supply the

concerned block enabling fire fighting operations as and when instructed by

Incident controller.

EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN PROCEDURE OF PRODUCTION BLOCK

The Production block safe with guidance of shift in charge and the chemists provided

they could do it without exposing themselves in to the risk.

Reactors / major equipment:

7.1.1.1 Stop any chemical additions/charging

7.1.1.2 In-case of distillation/ heating, stop heating by closing steam/ Hot oil

valve.

7.1.1.3 Switch off the stirring.

7.1.1.4 Drain steam/ Hot oil from jacket and apply R.T. cooling.

7.1.1.5 Keep the vents in open position to avoid pressure build-up

7.1.1.6 Nitrogen purging/ bleeding is to be applied to avoid flammable vapor-

air mixture



7.1.1.7 Stop any kind of material transfer by stopping pump/ compressed air

and close necessary valve/s.

7.1.1.8 Keep manhole closed.

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES (Utilities & services)

1000KVA DG Set:

o Remove load on DG Set

o Trip ACB (DG Incomer) at PCC panel

o Reduce RPM to 1000 and run for 5 minutes

o Turn off ignition key

o Switch ON Battery charger

Transformer substation (near DG room)

o Open the AB (air breaker) switch of respective transformer

o Trip the VCB (Vacuum circuit breaker) to cut off source supply.

6.8.2.3 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION

Any person, who notices an incident at site in any area or any other emergencies,

shall communicate to the area supervisor or incident controller (if available in near

vicinity through suitable means. Area Supervisor will immediately inform incident

controller available on site through suitable means.

Immediately after informing incident controller, the supervisor will inform to the

area manager and Chief emergency coordinator.

Chief emergency coordinator shall inform to Site controller & rest of the Emergency

management team. In absence of any of the chiefs, the deputies in the respective

functions are informed & they will assume the chief roles.



PARTICULARS TO BE INFORMED:

1.1.1 Identify yourself. (Name & department / company)

1.1.2 Location of the incident ( building / block / line / floor/ area/ location)

1.1.3 Type of incident & extent of incident (small or major fire etc.)

1.1.4 Injuries / casualties if any (first aids, major injuries etc.)

1.1.5 Any additional information which will help in better emergency response.

1.1.6 Route direction – shortcut way to reach based on wind direction.

6.21 Communication Flow during Emergency (ON SITE)

Incident Observer

Incident Controller

Area supervisor

Area manager

Chief Emergency Coordinator

Site controller

Emergency response

team

Chief of / Deputy Communication

Chief of / Deputy Data &

Documentation

Chief of / Deputy Logistics

External support (fire fighting,

ambulance etc.)

Site security leader / team

Experts / Advisor / Technical

support

Site log istics & transport team

Police, Local authority, F I&B,

AP PCB etc.



6.22 Communication Flow during Emergency (OFF SITE)

7.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES

7.1 CATEGORIZATION OF EMERGENCIES

CATEGORY I – Specific Area Emergency

Emergencies arise from an incident in any Manufacturing Block/ Raw material

store/ any section of the Factory and which are not likely to develop to a magnitude.

Evacuation of the personnel may be required from the particular section only. Such

emergencies can be controlled by the Section In charge& plant personnel only.

Category I Emergency can be controlled effectively using resources within the

factory.

CATEGORY II – On-Site Emergency


store/ any section of the Factory and likely to develop to other blocks/ sections to

have an impact on entire operation of the factory.

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A P P C B / E n g in e e r (E n v ir o n . )

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Such emergencies may be controlled using resources within the factory and resources

available in the surrounding establishments and requires initiation of “On-site

Emergency Action” by the Site Controller.

CATEGORY III – Off-site Emergency


store/ any section of the Factory and likely to have an impact on the surrounding

area. Resources from Local and State Government may be required to control such an

emergency.

Category – 1: SPECIFIC AREA EMERGENCIES

Specific emergency means emergency like fire, toxic gas leakage, hazardous material leakage/ spillage. It is developed for each block/ dept in small qty or minor problematic only. Identified hazards for specific emergency, which may controllable in within short span of time with limited people involvements

a) Fire b) Toxic gas leak c) Low boiling Hazardous chemical

leakage/ spillage d) Slips & falls e) Electric shock f) Chemical splash g) Fall of objects

h) Fall from height i) Contact with harmful substances j) Contact with hot substance k) Caught in between the objects l) Entanglement m) Struck by object n) Poisoning o) Utility failure

Command Structure: (Essential staff and their role) Normal Hours:

Incident Controller Manager/ Incharge of the area Leak control & shut down officer Engineering - Executive/ Supervisor Fire fighters Trained person / Safety Representative Gas leak controller Trained person on SCBA Shift controller Manager/ Shift in charge Evacuation officer Shift in charge of the block Communication officer Safety officer



First aiders Trained first aiders

Night Hours: Area controller Night Manager Leak control & shut down officer Engineering - Executive/ Supervisor Fire fighters Trained person / Safety Representative Gas leak controller Trained person on SCBA Shift controller Manager/ Shift in charge Evacuation officer Neighboring block/ Line Shift in charge Communication officer Safety/ EHS representative First aiders Block first aiders

CATEGORY – 2 - ON-SITE EMERGENCIES 7.2 ANTICIPATED EMERGENCIES

FIRE AND EXPLOSION

• Fire/ Explosion at manufacturing area. • Fire/ Explosion at Chemical Storages/ Warehouse • Fire at Tank farm area. • Fire/ Explosion at Hazardous Wastes Storage area [E.T.P. area] • Fire at General Laboratories & Chemical storage racks. • Fire at Offices/ Canteen/ General Buildings • Fire/ Explosion at Electrical panels or High Voltage areas • Fire at Boiler – coal yard

TOXIC / POISONOUS CHEMICAL LEAKAGE

• Toxic gas release into atmosphere (Ammonia) • Toxic gas release into atmosphere (Chlorine) • Toxic gas/ chemical release into atmosphere (Bromine) • Toxic gas/ chemical release into atmosphere ( carbon-di-sulfide) • Chlorine gas leak at Chlorine vaporizer • Bromine leak at the Bromine storage • Ammonia leak from utility building • Carbon-disulfide leak at CS2 tank & along the line • Tri-phosgene exposure at storage area and/or usage area • Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas generation and neutralization



CHEMICAL SPILLAGE

• Spillage/ Leakage of Flammable Solvents • Spillage/ Leakage of Acids/ alkali nature chemicals

OTHER EMERGENCIES

• Canteen Food Poisoning • Medical Emergencies • Floods/ tsunami • Building collapse • Heavy winds/ cyclones • Lightning • Earthquake

ACTION PLANS

Fire/ Explosion at Manufacturing area

Immediate response:

• Switch Off electrical power supply first to the equipment& UPS supply to be stopped.

• Rescue any personnel, who are in danger or imminent danger due to the incident.

• Alert the personnel by orally shouting like fire, fire or mantalu, mantalu.. or breaking the manual call point at the adjacent area

• Isolate the area immediately with available barricaders. • Contain the fire by removing nearest materials and by stopping air supply

etc. • Fight the fire with suitable extinguishers available in the area. • If extinguishing fire is not possible evacuate the area. • Switch Off electrical power supply to the total block. • ERT personnel will respond to control the emergency.



Preventive measures:

o FLP equipment’s installed.

o Electrical cable Glands of the push button, motor, sensor rod and vessel lamp

are fixed/ laid properly.

o All electrical equipments have double grounded.

o All bolts of Terminal box of FLP equipments have been intact and good in

condition.

o Static jumpers are fixed at all flange joints.

o Antistatic poly bags used for material operation and earth clamp connected to

the bag, while dumping the material.

o Anti-static/ Conductive Hoses used for charging the liquid material.

o Material should flow inside the reactor through bended blow leg along the

surface of the shell.

o Before conducting hot jobs in Zone 0 & 1 area, work permit will be raised

compulsorily.

o Storage of dispensed/ produced chemicals done as per the compatibility only.

o Solvent have been transferred through conductive lines with a specific flow

rate into vessels.

Fire/ Explosion at Chemical Storages/ Warehouse

Immediate response:

• Switch Off electrical power supply to the total area and UPS • Rescue any personnel, who are in danger or imminent danger due to the

incident. • Alert the personnel by Orally shouting like fire, fire or mantalu, mantalu or

breaking the manual call point at the adjacent area • Isolate the area immediately with available barricaders. • Contain the Fire by removing nearest materials and by stopping air supply

etc. • Fight the fire with suitable extinguishers available in the area. • If extinguishing fire is not possible evacuate the area. • ERT personnel will respond to control the emergency.




• FLP equipments installed.

• Electrical cable glands of the push button, weighing balances are fixed properly.

• All electrical equipments have double grounded.

• All bolts of Terminal box of FLP equipments have been intact and good in

condition.

• Static jumpers are fixed at all flange joints.

• Before conducting hot jobs in Zone 0 & 1 area, work permit will be raised

compulsorily.

• Storage of dispensed/ produced chemicals done as per the compatibility only.

Fire at Tank farm Area

Immediate response:

• Switch Off electrical power supply to the total area. • Rescue any personnel, who are in danger or imminent danger due to the

incident. • Alert the personnel by Orally shouting like fire, fire or mantalu, mantalu or

breaking the manual call point at the adjacent area • Contain the Fire by removing the nearest materials. • Fight the fire with suitable extinguishers available in the area. • If extinguishing fire is not possible evacuate the area. • Take assistance of ERT (Fire fighting) personnel to control the fire by using

Mobile Foam monitors.


• FLP equipments installed.

• Electrical cable glands of the push button and motors are fixed properly.

• All electrical equipments have double grounded.

• All bolts of Terminal box of FLP equipments have been intact and good in

condition.

• Static jumpers are fixed at all flange joints.



• Before conducting hot jobs in Zone 0 & 1 area, work permit will be raised

compulsorily.

• Solvent transferred through rigid & conductive lines with a specific flow rate.

Fire/ Explosion at Electrical panels or High Voltage areas :

Immediate response:

• Switch Off electrical power supply to the total area and UPS. • Rescue any personnel, who are in danger or imminent danger due to the

incident. • Alert the personnel by Orally shouting like fire, fire or mantalu, mantalu

or breaking the manual call point at the adjacent area • Contain the Fire by removing nearest materials and by stopping air supply

etc. • Fight the fire with suitable extinguishers available in the area. • If extinguishing fire is not possible evacuate the area. • ERT personnel will respond to control the emergency.


• Electrical cables are passing on cable trays in panel room without contact to the

panel board.

• All panel boards are earthed

• If any equipment/ instrument got fired/ burnt, immediately relay tripped in

panel, which leads to supply the power to the equipment/ instrument

• While conducting the cross checks to lugs condition, then LOCK OUT system has

being followed

• While working with high voltage lines, work permit will be followed

• Electrical panel room entry designed with double door system to avoid chemical

vapour inside it

• Authorised persons only enter inside the panel room



Toxic Gas Leakage (Ammonia tonners at Blocks/ Storage Point)

Immediate response:

• If Ammonia gas appears to be leaking or posing a danger to persons, in the judgment of the person or persons responsible for such materials, the following steps should be taken

• If any toxic gas suddenly escapes, the premises affected must be vacated in all haste

• Whenever a leak develops in a gas line or container, all personnel in the immediate vicinity should be evacuated towards upwind of the leak.

• Send the exposed persons of these gases to first aid and if necessary for medical treatment

• Only trained personnel/ ERT members with proper protective equipment (SCBA/ Ammonia cartridge full face mask, universal cartridge full face mask & Organic vapor masks, PVC/ Tyvek full body suit) should be allowed to control the leak at their source.

• Provide a water curtain on escaping gas/ vapors as to contain the used water in a bund. Collect the bounded water and send to ETP.


• Ammonia tonner are kept in horizontal direction and stored dedicated place

without getting any harm/ damage to the spindle valve of the cylinder

• Valve protection guards are available to the cylinders

• Ammonia tonners are handled by trained and experienced personnel.

Emergency Action Plan For Chlorine Shed – Leak at tonner area/ vaporizer area

Immediate response: • If chlorine gas appears to be leaking or posing a danger to persons, in the

judgment of the person or persons responsible for such materials, the following steps should be taken

• If any toxic gas suddenly escapes, the premises affected must be vacated in all haste

• Whenever a leak develops in a gas passing line or container, all personnel in the immediate vicinity should be evacuated towards upwind of the leak.

• Keep a ammonia vapor torch on the leak portion to know exact place of leak, if the leak is minor or not releasing so much of vapor, the test should be conducted by wearing all necessary PPE only.

• Alert the persons through walky-talky or by phone or orally



• Send the exposed persons of these gases to first aid and if necessary for medical treatment

• Close the shutters and doors • Only trained personnel/ ERT members with proper protective equipment

(SCBA/ PVC/ Tyvek full body suit/ recommended vapor cartridge mask or breathing air suit) should be allowed to control the leak at their source by using toxic gas leak control kit.

• Provide a water curtain on escaping gas/ vapors as to contain the used water in a bund. Collect the bund water and send to ETP.

• Automation of scrubbing system for chlorine leak detecting system to find at initial system.


• Chlorine tonners are kept in horizontal direction and stored dedicated place with

valve protection caps for without getting any harm/ damage to the spindle valve

of the cylinder

• Chlorine tonners are handled by trained and experienced personnel.

• The monorail is used to shift the tonners, that has been checked periodically by

third party and internal inspections are also carried out by mechanical dept.

Table 6.26 List of Authorized Persons To Train Personnel On SCBA [Self Contained Breathing Apparatus] Handling – Internally

S.No EMP Code Name Designation Department/Line 1. 0410 Jarugumalli Satyanarayana Manager Process Development 2. 0133 M.Venkata Subba Raju Jr. Engineer Projects 3. 0360 Srinivasarao Kurra Manager Mechanical 4. 0676 Chelikani Meeraiah Manager Safety 5. 0819 Madana Srinivas Executive Safety

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