REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES~anbi ganbapan

Quezon City

FOURTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SB-10-AIRJ0009Plaintiff-Appellee,

For: Violation of Section 3(e),R.A. No. 3019

- versus - Present:Quiroz, J.,Cruz, J.Jacinto, J.

PETER GEORGE CABURAO yGOPILAN, Promulgated: 11

Accused-Appellant. OCT 02 2017 If--l

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DECISION

JACINTO, J:

This is an appeal from the Decision' of the Regional Trial COUli(Branch 3) in Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 21699-R entitled "People ofthe Philippines versus Peter George Caburao y Gopilan, Accused," findingaccused-appellant guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No.3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," asamended.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Frederick Farres filed a sworn letter-complaint dated 24 March 1999, with the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue(BIR) regarding the alleged under-declaration of the actual selling price of aparcel of land that was the subject of a deed of sale that he and his wifeentered into with the spouses Benito and Lydia Areola. Farres claimedtherein that the spouses Areola defrauded the government of a substantialamount by paying a lesser capital gains tax.

Farress letter-complaint was forwarded to the BIR's Baguio Officefor investigation. However, owing to the perceived inaction by the BIR,FaITes filed a complaint against Peter George Caburao, then RevenU(ir

J Records, pp, 14-27,

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DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-IO-A/R-0009Page 2 of 14

Intelligence Officer Ill, and Hernando Cortez, Revenue Special InvestigatorofBIR-Baguio City with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB).

On 18 June 2003, the OMB issued a Resolution, dismissing Farres'scomplaint as against Cortez, but finding probable cause to indict PeterGeorge Caburao for violation of Section 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019.2 Thereafter,an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of BaguioCity, which reads: 3

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer 11, Office of theDeputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses PETER GEORGE CABURAOwith violation of Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:

That sometime from June 30, 1999 to January 1,2002, in Baguio City, Philippines and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused PETERGEORGE CABURAO, then the Revenue IntelligenceOfficer Ill, Bureau of Internal Revenue, CordilleraAutonomous Region, Baguio City, while in theperformance of his official function, taking advantage ofthe same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully andcriminally cause undue injury to the government throughgross inexcusable negligence, for unreasonably delayingthe investigation of the tax evasion case of Spouses Benitoand Lydia Areola, to the damage and injury of thegovernrnent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

During trial, Farres testified as the prosecution's lone witness. His

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testmony may be summarized as follows:" he filed a letter-complaint withthe BIR Commissioner regarding the under-valuation made by the spouses

'\ Areola of the purchase price of the property that he and his wife bought froml: /.1 them; the spouses Areola's fraudulent scheme resulted in the under-payment1I i of the capital gains tax due for the transaction; his letter-complaint was

I J forwarded to the Special Investig~tion Divisi~n of the BIR Baguio OfficeV:. headed by the accused, but he did not receive any update thereon and,

\\ because of BIR's inaction, he filed a complaint against the BIR personnel~ concerned before the OMB.

It2 Records, pp. 10-13.3 Rollo, p. 14-27.4 TSN, January 24, 2006.

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DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-1O-A/R-0009Page 3 of14

Only accused-appellant, Peter George Caburao, testified in hisdefense. His testimony may be summarized as follows:" he was not theChief of the Investigation Division during the period relevant to the Farrescomplaint, but he was an Intelligence Officer III assigned as a supervisor inthe said Division; on 22 April 1999, Farres's complaint was assigned to himby Arthur K. Pengosro, the Chief of the Special Investigation Division;thereafter, he immediately commenced his investigation by writing to otheroffices such as the BIR Revenue District Office in Baguio City, CityAssessor's Office, and the RTC; and, on 25 May 1999, or 33 days after theFarres complaint was assigned to him, he submitted his MemorandumReport to the Regional Director with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing discussion, your investigator herebyrecommends that this case be referred to the Regional Director, Chairman,Regional Tax Fraud Committee for proper evaluation and issuance of thecorresponding Letter of Authority to investigate the Areola Spouses basedon the above-mentioned findings.

Upon the evidence submitted by the parties, the court a quo renderedjudgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Accused Peter George Caburao y Gopilan ishereby found GUlL TY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime ofViolation of Sec. 3 (e), of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofImprisonment from Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor asMinimum to Thirteen (13) Years of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum atthe National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, withAccessory Penalty of Perpetual Disqualification from holding a PublicOffice, and he is also ordered to pay Actual Damages to the Republic ofthe Philippines in the amount of EIGHTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDREDSIXTY ONE PESOS AND SEVEN CENTAVOS (P80,161.07), with legalinterest from ]999 until the amount is fully paid, plus costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.6

It is from the said judgment that accused has interposed the presentappeal based on the following assignment of errors: 7

A. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED INFINDING THE APPELLANT-ACCUSED GUILTY OFCOMMITTING GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCECAUSING UNREASONABLE DELAY IN INVESTIGATION

5 TSN, March 23, 2010, April 28, 2010, May 4,2010, and June 15,2017.6 Rollo, pp. 14-27.7 Appellant's Brief dated 7 February 201 I; Rollo, p. 125.

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DECISION

People of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-l 0-AIR -0009Page 4 of 14

OF THE TAX EVASION CASE OF SPOUSES BENITO ANDLYDIA AREOLA, TO THE DAMAGE AND INJURY TO THEGOVERNMENT.

B. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERREDIN FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS INJURED INTHE AMOUNT OF EIGHTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDREDSIXTY ONE PESOS AND SEVEN CENTAVOS (P80,161.07)DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TOPROVE THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

C. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERREDIN FINDING THE APPELLANT-ACCUSED GUILTY BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OFSEC. 3(E), OF R.A 3019 OR THE ANTI-GRANT (SIC) ANDCORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

Accused-appellant essentially argues that: (i) the trial court erred infinding that he was grossly negligent in the performance of his duties,thereby causing unreasonable delay in the investigation of the tax evasioncase against the spouses Areola and causing damage and prejudice to thegovernment in the amount ofP80,161.07.8

On the other hand, the appellee argues that:"

A.

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THEACCUSED-APPELLANT GUlL TY OF GROSS INEXCUSABLENEGLIGENCE DUE TO THE UNREASONABLE DELAY IN THEINVESTIGATION OF THE TAX EVASION CASES AGAINSTSPOUSES BENITO AND LYDIA AREOLA, TO THE DAMAGE ANDPREJUDICE OF THE GOVERNMENT

B.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO DID NOT ERR IN FINDINGTHAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS INJURED IN THE AMOUNT OFEIGHTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS ANDSEVEN CENTA VOS (P80,161.07)

C.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THEACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBTFOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019,AS AMENDED.

8 Id., pp. 143-146.9 Appellee's Brief dated 4 Apri I 2011; Rollo, pp. 195-213.

DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-1O-A/R-0009Page 5 of]4

RULING OF THE COURT

To begin with, the Court notes the patently erroneous manner bywhich the trial court adjudged accused-appellant's guilt. It found him liableunder Section 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 based on the elements of Section 3(f) ofthe same law. The pertinent portion of the assailed Decision reads:

According to Sec. 3(e) of said Act - "Corrupt practices of publicofficers in addition to acts of omissions of the Public Officers alreadypenalized by existing Jaw, the following shall constitute corrupt practicesof any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful x x x x (f)Neglecting or refusing after the demand or request without sufficientjustification to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending beforehim for the purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly, from' any personinterested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage infavor of or discriminating against any other interested party". Threeleading elements of the crime are present: (l) Neglect of duty of the PublicOfficer, (2) demand by the complainant, and (3) damage or prejudice tocomplainant.

The trial court apparently misquoted the text of Section 3(f) of R.A.No. 3019 as if it were a continuation of Section 3(e) thereof, and proceededto hold accused-appellant liable using as basis therefor the elements of thelatter section.

The Court is not persuaded by appellee's argument that the finding ofthe trial court must be accorded great respect, and further, that thedispositive portion of the decision must prevail over the discussion in itsbody, that in any event, the case must be decided based on facts and law.

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The assailed decision does not involve a situation where the finding ofthe accused's culpability was made to conform to the evidence submitted bythe parties, as contemplated in Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.!"Neither does it involve a situation wherein an offense is necessarily includedin another crime, as envisioned in Section 5 of Rule 120.11 Rather, accused-

; appellant was charged and convicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.V

10 Which reads: "SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof-When there isvariance between the offense charge in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense ascharged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of theoffense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in theoffense proved."11 Which reads: "SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.-An offense chargednecessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, asalleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily includedin the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of thoseconstituting the latter."

DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-IO-A/R-0009Page 6 of 14

No. 3019, based on the elements required under Section 3(f) of the samelaw, because the latter was quoted and considered by the trial court as partof Section 3(e) of the Act, which is inappropriate to say the least.

The evidence submitted by theprosecution cannot sustain afinding of guilt for violation of Sec.3(e) of R.A No. 3019, which is theoffense charged in the Information:

On the merits, the prosecution's evidence cannot sustain a convictionfor violation of Section 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019, which provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to actsor omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, thefollowing shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and arehereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue Injury to any party, including theGovernment, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,advantage or preference in the discharge of his officialadministrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provisionshall apply to officers and employees of offices or governmentcorporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or otherconcessions.

The essential elements of the said crime are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer dischargingadministrative, judicial, or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,or inexcusable negligence; and,

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, includingthe government, or giving any private party unwarrantedbenefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of hisfunctions. 12

12 Consigna v. People, G.R. No. 175750-51,2 April 2014; Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 162314-17, 25 October 2004, citing Jacinto v, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84571, 2 October 1989. r

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DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-l 0-AIR -0009Page 7 of 14

Only the first element is present in this case - and only because of theadmission made by accused-appellant.

The Information specifically alleges that accused-appellant committedthe crime by means of inexcusable negligence, causing damage to thegovernment. In this regard, Sison v. People,13 defines "gross negligence" asfollows:

xxxx "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligencecharacterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting toact in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently butwillfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference toconsequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is theomission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless mennever fail to take on their own property. " (citations omitted;underscoring and emphasis in the original)

The prosecution's evidence consists only of two letters to the BIR anda letter-complaint to the OMB - which, incidentally, should not even havebeen admitted, for lack of proper identification during trial - and Farres'suncorroborated assertion that the entire period of delay is attributable toaccused-appellant. The same, however, critically falls short of the requisitequantum of evidence to establish accused-appellant's culpability.

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, was able to show that his task,as directed by Mr. Pengosro, Chief of the Special Investigation Division ofBIR Baguio City, was only to conduct an initial investigation - to verify thetruth of the allegations in the Farres complaint. He was not expected to acton his findings since the same was to be the subject of a separateinvestigation as seen from the tenor of his Chiefs 22 April 1999

Referred to you herewith is a denunciation letter sent to this Officeby a certain Frederick Farres, Jr. against the above-mentioned taxpayers

; incorrect Capital Gains Tax.

~ A thorough preliminary investigation is hereby intstructed to beconducted for purposes of determining the veracity of the aforesaidallegation.

13 G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403,9 March 2010.14 Exhibit "3", Records, p. 38.

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DECISION

People of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-I O-AlR -0009Page 8 of14

As a matter of policy, no direct or indirect contact with the subjecttaxpayer or his representative shall be made until the regular Letter ofAuthority to investigate shall have been issued by this Office.

Thus, upon the submission of his 25 May 1999 Memorandum Report,accused-appellant already fulfilled his duty as directed in the 22 April 1999Memorandum of his immediate superior. Verily, by no stretch ofimagination can he be considered as having been negligent in theperformance of his duties.

The trial court, however, faults accused-appellant for the delay ingoing after the Areola spouses thereby delaying the collection of the unpaidportion of the capital gains tax and payment of Farres's informant's fee, thus

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Clearly, the Government was damage (sic) and prejudiced forAlmost Three (3) Years in being unable to collect the said Capital GainsTax due to the Dereliction of Duty of the accused xxxx. The saidunreasonable delay caused the Government uncollected taxes in theamount of P80, 161.07 which in effect also denied the private complainantof his share of the informant fee to the Tax Fraud xxxx.

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

The foregoing pronouncement has absolutely no basis at all. For one,the subsequent investigations conducted by the BIR on the Areola spousesshould be treated as separate investigations, apart from the preliminaryinvestigation conducted by accused-appellant. To be sure, accused-appellanthad already acted upon Farres's complaint and had in fact submitted hisReport to his superiors within 33 days from receipt of the complaint.

".

Moreover, there is no evidence proving that the perceived delay in theBIR's investigation occurred at accused-appellant's level and for reasonsattributable to him. In this connection, it is important to note that accused-appellant's indictment in the first place appears to have been based on Mr.Farres's mistaken belief that he was the Chief of the Special InvestigationDivision of BIR Baguio City. IS However, accused-appellant was able toprove, without any controverting evidence from the prosecution, that it wasFidel P. Balesteros, Jr., and not he, who was assigned to examine the taxrecords of the Areola spouses under the Letter of Authority issued by the

15 TSN, January 24, 2006, p. 4.

DECISIONPeople ofthe Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-1 0- AIR -0009Page 9 of 14

BIR Regional Director. 16 Balesteros, in turn, was supervised by accused-appellant, who was also under Pengosro, the Chief of the SpecialInvestigation Division of BIR Baguio City. All of these personnel wereunder Delano M. Valera, Regional Director for Revenue Region No. 2. Inother words, accused-appellant was in the middle of the investigation andthe prosecution's evidence failed to pinpoint at which level of theinvestigation did the delay occur. Thus, under the foregoing circumstances,it would be unjust, to say the least, to impute all the blame on accused-appellant and convict him of the crime charged.

At this point, it is worthy to re-state the rule that:

xxxx Where inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible to two ormore interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of theaccused, while the others may be compatible with a finding of guilt, thecourt must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the testof moral certainty required for conviction. 17

Similarly, the prosecution failed to prove the injury or damage to thegovernment or to Farres.

Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,18 defines injury in the context of Section3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 as follows:

Perjuicio means prejudice, mischief, injury, damages. Prejudicemeans injury or damage, due to some judgment or action ofanother. Mischief connotes a specific injury or damage caused byanother. Indebido means undue, illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of equityand moderations. In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, the Court en banc definedinjury as any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, or inhis rights, reputation or property; the invasion of any legally protectedinterests of another. It must be more than necessary or are excessive,improper or illegal. It is required that the undue injury caused by thepositive or passive acts of the accused be quantifiable and demonstrableand proven to the point of moral certainty. Undue injury cannot bepresumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established.I!

C In Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, the Court en banc held that proofof the extent or quantum of damage is not essential. It is sufficient that theinjury suffered or benefits received can be perceived to be substantialenough and not merely negligible.

16 Annex "L" of accused-appellant's Counter-Affidavit; Rollo. p. 48.17 People v. Caete, G.R. No. 138400, 11 July 2002.18 G.R. Nos. 162314-17,25 October 2004.

DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-l 0-AIR -0009Page 10 of14

The trial court merely assumed that the government suffered injury byreason of the BIR's failure to collect the correct capital gains tax for thetransaction that was the subject of Farres's complaint, and that Farres wasalso deprived of his informant's fee by reason of accused-appellant' s allegedgross negligence. However, accused-appellant testified that the Areolaspouses already paid the deficiency in the capital gains tax, thus precludingthe element of damage to the government, which positive testimony has notbeen controverted by the prosecution. As to Farres, the prosecution alsofailed to establish that he was entitled to such an informant's fee in the firstplace. All told, the trial court's decision was devoid of any evidentiarysupport.

It is a time-honored principle that an accused's guilt must be provenbeyond reasonable doubt, and that the prosecution has the sole burden ofproving the same. Thus, in Macayan, Jr. v. People:19

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies therequisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminalcase, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guiltis shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyondreasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly.Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proofwhich produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing theguilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and notbanking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proofbeyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause ofthe Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumedinnocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is theconstitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon theprosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, itfollows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted. Asexplained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption ofinnocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless hisguilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must beacquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded bythe due process clause of the Constitution which protectsthe accused from conviction except upon proof beyondreasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

19 G.R. No. 175842, 18 March 2015 (citations in the original omitted).

DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-1 0- NR -0009Page 11 of 14

crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is onthe prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden theaccused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and hewould be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonabledoubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as,excluding the possibility of error, produce absolutecertainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree ofproof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.The conscience must be satisfied that the accused isresponsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction ofthe accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on thestrength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guiltbeyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.

As such, even conceding that the trial court had evaluated theevidence based on the elements of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, the requiredquantum of proof to overcome the accused-appellant's constitutionalpresumption of innocence has not been met.

The prosecution's evidencecannot sustain a convictionSec. 3(f) of RA No. 3019:

alsounder

In Conrado v. Sandiganbayan,20 the Supreme Court had occasion todiscuss the elements of the said offense and to stress the need to prove thatthere was intentional neglect on the part of the accused for the purpose ofderiving some benefit or advantage, if not to discriminate against anotherperson. It went on to explain that -

The pertinent provision of the law (Republic Act No. 3019) allegedto have been violated provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers: The followingshall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer andare hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demandor without sufficient justification, to actwithin a reasonable time on any matterpending before him for the purpose ofobtaining, directly or indirectly from anyperson interested in the matter some

20 G.R. No. 94955, 18 August 1993.

DECISIONPeople a/the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-l 0-AlR-0009Page 12 of]4

pecuniary or material benefit or advantage infavor of or discriminating against anotherinterested party.

Admittedly, the elements of the offense are that:

a) The offender is a public officer;b) The said officer has neglected or has refused to act withoutsufficient justification after due demand or request has been madeon him;c) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or requestwithout the public officer having acted on the matter pendingbefore him; andd) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of obtaining, directly orindirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniaryor material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, ordiscriminating against another.

We agree with Sandiganbayan that, indeed, there was failure on thepart of the petitioner, a public officer, to observe due diligence in hisassigned task; let us call it one of neglect, a broad term which is defined asa failure to do what can be done and what is required to be done (West'slegal Thesaurus/Dictionary, 1986). In its generic sense, it would not matterwhether such refusal is intended or unintended. But here is not the realissue. To warrant conviction for a violation of Section 3 (f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the law itself additionally requiresthat the accused's dereliction, besides being without justification, musthe for the purpose olea) obtaining, directly or indirectly, from anyperson interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit oradvantage in favor of an interested party or (b) discriminating againstanother interested party. The severity of the penalty imposed by thelaw leaves no doubt that the legislative intent is to consider thiselement to be indispensable. (emphasis added)

Hence, even if it is assumed that accused-appellant was somehowresponsible for the delay in the investigation of the Farres complaint, noevidence of benefit, or intent to cause disadvantage, was offered by theprosecution.

In light of accused-appellant's presumed innocence, the Court holdsthat the prosecution's evidence of his alleged culpability for the crimecharged falls critically short of the inflexible constitutional requirement ofproof beyond reasonable doubt. And, since a criminal conviction must reston the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of thedefense, accused-appellant is entitled to a verdict of acquittal.

DECISION

People of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-1O-AlR-0009Page 13 of 14

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing circumstances, the appealedDecision of the court a quo is SET ASIDE and a new one is enteredACQUITTING accused-appellant PETER GEORGE CABURAO yGOPILAN of the crime charged.

The bail bond posted by the accused-appellant for his provisionalliberty is ordered RELEASED, subject to the usual accounting and auditingprocedures and the Hold Departure Order issued against him is herebyRECALLED.

SO ORDERED.

BAYA I . JACINTOAs ociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

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~!/~'Associate JU~

Chairperson

DECISIONPeople of the Philippines v. Peter George CaburaoSB-10-AlR-0009Page 14 of14

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached inconsultation with the Justices of the Court's Division.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and theDivision Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the aboveDecision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned tothe writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

~0/AMPARO M. OT~JE-~G

Presi . g Justice