Declassified Documents Proving the US Knew Saddam had and was ready to use Chemical Weapons

7/30/2019 Declassified Documents Proving the US Knew Saddam had and was ready to use Chemical Weapons

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Iran-Iraq: Situation ReportNumber 27(As of 0830 EDT 29 July 1982)

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1 Military SituationDI .'DOl 'I .

Iran la s t night launched the third phase of i t s invasion ofIraq by attacking Iraqi defenses along the central portion of theBasrah front . \'\

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- ~ T h e at tack, which began a t dusk l a s t night ( local t ime),centered around and just north of the area of the Iraniansal ient . Fighting continued a l l ni ht and into ~ - - ~morning L - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~- - Iran claims i t s forces overran t ~ e f i r s t l ine of Iraqidefenses and cross minefield.the in i t i a l o Ject ve of the~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ e ~ z ~ e ~ t ~ r ~ a ~ n ~ g ~ u ~ l a r strongpoints that anchorl ine of defense. I j .

--JI I he Iran1an attack by thls morninghad been contained af te r a penetration of up to 5kilometers. An I raqi pincer counterattack by twoa i ~ ~ f o n s was proceeding well and the Iraqis expectedthat the Iranians would be pushed back to thei r s tar t i rgpoint by this afternoon (local t ime). J _~ - - - - - - ~ = = = = = = ~ ~reliminary analys.isindicates t h a ~ ~ ~ ~ = r - ~ ~ < k . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - r = - - - - - - ~

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~ o ~ _ c _ u _ r _ e ~ d hy dust , and the batt le l ine cannot bedetermined. Elsewhere along the Basrah f ront there i s no .

- I t7G I .change in the front l ines .Comment: Irans chances of success in this phase ofthe i r 1nvasion are slim as .long as they ~ n s i s t on usingunimaginative heavy infantry assaults head-on againstheavily fort i f ied I raqi defenses backed by armoredreserves. ~ r a n has again chosen to attack along thecentral portion of the Basrah front where I raqi physicaldefenses are"strongest . Plans for the second-prong ofthe attack along the Shatt probably wil l not be executed

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unless forces involved in -l a s t night ' s breakthrough areable to withstand the strong I r ~ q i counterattack. Iraqiintell igence had warned Iraqi forces .of the day, theplace and probably. the hour o'f the Iranian assaul t ,0 allowing time to plan the counterat tack. j

both sidescontinue to prepareIraqi i r regulars were recently issued ,protectlve masksand I raqi ar t i l l e ry units wereordered to submitrequirements f ~ r resupply of ~ h e m i c a l e q u i p m ~ n t . IIranian units continue9 to request addit ional protectivemasks because of anticipated Iraqi use of chemicalweapons. . .Comment: The I raqis used tear gas effect ively two w e e k ~ .ago to break up Iranian infantry assaul t s . I raqi .ar t i l le ry units probably were resupplied with t ear gas. . . :.for possible use a a ins t Iran s current in fan try:.. ed . .at tack. . o "

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IRAN'S LIKELY !REACTION TO IRAQI l!J:SE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS4 November 1983

Summar'!/

tile war

UN.i f .

Backgreund

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Unl,ess the I r aq i s are able to improve t f ie i r use of mustardayent--wnich i s l i ke ly as they become mo Fe fami l i a r with i t - - [ r a ni s not l i ke ly to seek l e t h a l chemica! weapons. I f th e I r aq i sproduce or ace:Juire lar.ge new suppl ie s of mustatrd agent , theyalmost ce r t a in ly would use it aga ins t Irarnian t roops and towns, ~ ~ ~ t h e border . I f use e in l a rge q ~ a n t i t i e s ever a smal l a rea ,~ w e a p o n s preba;bly would crea te a l arge number of I ran iancasua l t i e s and, more important l y, cou l d a f f ec t I ran ian t roopmorale . Thus fa r th e I r aq i s appear to have used the wea onnaphazaraly , with i n su f f i c i en t safe ty p r e c a u t i o n s . ~ - - - ~


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the prospect of Iraqi supply of agents to other ~ r a Bstates or to terrorists

[0 . Actions:

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MEMORANDUM IT @R:MArr' ROM

Offi eer for Wa rrningMonthly W a r n i M e e t ~ n g s FeBruar.M 1984

1. Summary of key issues:Soviet L e a d e r s ~ i p


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Ndgeria

Chi ff e

E! a k i st artlA f ghan i stan IUS SR_l Ln d i a


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T 0 R S E @ R E if

Mugoslavia

USSR

Chi 1 eInstability is increasing

NigeriaCeup potential centinues

S_d_nThe insurgency in the south ee ntinues tegrow.""" /..Issues of nuclear Hevelopment tn Pakistandn d g e n t ~ n a ana shemical weapons in theIran/Iraq war, Kampuchea and Afghanistan are


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/ ~ o . c . : z o s o s

Nerve Agent Use

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Effectiveness


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It is unlikely that Ayatollah Khomeini

u-


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The I s l ~ m i ~ Bomb:

6 September 1!984

Nuclear?1982rraqi

This brings to 16 the total number of countries having an ofrfien.sivechemical warfare capability. In addition to the growth number over thelast 20 years, there also has been a dramatic shift in nations BOSsessingoffensive CW eapaB11ity from the i n d u s t r i a l i z ~ the developing n a t i o n s ,primarily in the Middle East and East Asia. [ J

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cc: VC/NICNIO/NESAI JPO/NIC


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CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATUREREMARKS:

COPY Of_________FROM: NAME , ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE

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~-AA"'fiONAL SECURIT INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions. . . . .


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The Iraqi CkeD11Gal Wea onsProgram in P e r s p e e t ~ v e

An Intelligence Assessment

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The Iraqi ChomiGal Wu:al l r o g r a m in P e r s p e c t i v e

An Iotelligeoce Assessment

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~ h e Iraqi Chemical W ~Program in Perspectiv\ .___j

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The successful use of lethal chemical weapons by ltaq in a conventionalwar is the culmination of 20 years of effort by Baghdad to acguire ordevelop such weapons. The past decaae has witnessed the success of theirsustained and systematic effort -to develop a state-of-the-art capability tomanufacture chemical weapons,against great !POlitical odds and despiteeconomic sanctions in acquisition of requisite technology. The chemicalwarfare program has been a relatively cheap investment for Iraq. Weestimate the program has cost slightly above $200 million in capitalexpenditures during the _past decade, less than 2 percent of Iraq's militaryexpenditures over the same period. The program occupies about the sameorder of magnitude in dollars and research and reve]opment effort as theIraqi nuclear program! 25X1Iraq has managed to obtain needed assistance in research, training, andprocess technology from Soviet, West E uropean, and other Middle Easternsources. Without this foreign, particularly West European, assistance, webelieve the Iraqis could not have developed chemical wea ns. Hel b theWest @e ilman fi bas been especially critical

25X1 supP,lied teclinical expertise and equipment and bas f a c i l i t a ~ ....'""..., ,.... 25xcontacts 'With other West Europeg:tl suppliers. Despite their continuing

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heavy involvement in Iraq's chemical protective programs, we do notbelieve that the Soviets have been involved in the Iraqi effort to developchemical weapons since the mid-1 70s .At that time, the ~ excludedtt\e.Soviets from the I raqi weaPQns P-rogram because of< their dissatisfactionwith Soviet prices a.nd caglJ.iP.mefit lln because the [ ra is bad adequatesupport from w;est European 'firms 25X1

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Chemiclll warfare probably will play an increasingly important role in theIran-Iraq war. The [raqis have successully used chemical weapgns in three~ oattles beginning in AUgyst 1983 and will use chemif al we_appnson a wJde scale in the event of another major Iranian attack. As !ragacquires a larger stockpile o( chemical weapons and more experience intheir use, it will become extremely difficult for Iran to mount large-scaleattacks against Iragi territory. As a result, we r lieve Iran is m ~ a ma-jor effort to develop its own chemical weapons _ 25X1

The Iraqis have been careful to use chemical weapons only when theIranians were on Iraqi territory. We believe :Itaq wiUshow restraint inusing chemical :weaPQns outside its l f o ~ e r s , particulaf)y against-states suchas I srael or Syria, which have chemical wea ons stockPiles and adequate

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The publicity accompanying Iraq' s use of chemical weapons and theirrelative cost-effectiveness probably will spur other Third World countriesto develop chemical weapons. Iraq probably would be willing to providechemical weapons or t e c h n o l o g ~ to friendly Arab states, althoygh somecountries, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in par-ticular, would be unlikely to seeksuch weapons( ] 25X1The lack of success in stopping the [raqi program suggests that efforts tohalt foreign chemical weapons programs must be taken early in thedevelopment phase. Qnce major equipment is delivered, the Iraqi experience suggests suppliers will forestall effective controls until their involve-ment in the program is completed.j I 25X1

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Contents

/'ageKey Judgments ii i

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Dependency on Foreign Sources 6Agent Use in theWar With Iran 11The Western Embargo 13Possible Future Targets for Iraqi Chemical Weapons 1415

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AppendixesA. Program ost 17B. @ompar:ison of the hemical War-fare Program 19

With 0ther Iraqi Military Programs~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . = - ~ ~ = = ~ - - ~c. 21e-

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11be Iraqi GhemicaJ W ~ o o n sProgram in e ~ ~ t i v ~'-----'

Oligins and MotiYatioosThe Iraqi chemical warfare program originated in1961 with the establishment of a chemical aefenseschool. In 1964 Iraq establishetl a Chemical Corps asa separate branch of the Army. The effort to acquirechemical weapons bas since then been motivated oyBaghdad's perception of military threats, particularlyfrom Israel and Iran, and also by [taq's desire to playa major role in the Middle East. The ongoing war . ----------,

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2with 1ran has provided a major i m p e t u ~ for thecontinuation and acceleration of the program. Baghdad's initial focus was on establishing a chemical

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training from the USSR, and developing tacticalplans for offensive use of riot control agentsj__ __ .

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iraq began toperceive a chemical weapons threat from Israel, eventhough no chemical weapons were used durin thefig!tlingc

Moreover, the USSR and the United States wereaggressively pursuing development of chemical weapons in the 1960s. Other Arab countries such as Egypt

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2 ~ 1By the mid-1970s, political stability and the end ofthe Kurdish rebellion freed Baghdad to devote major25X1efforts .to J o n g - ~ n g e planning in a valliety of fields'ncl d' hemical warfare 2 5 ~ 1many o t h ~ r imp_or n rag1 programs a sog e mid-1970s including a major convention-al ar.ms buildup, establishment of a significant domes-tic arms industr-y, the Iraqi nuclear program, andmany lax:ge economic development projects.I I 2 s ~ 1At the same time, in our judgment, Iraqi motivationsto pursue a chemical warfare program were growin&stronger. !rag's poor performance during the 1973Arab-Israeli war=its first real exposure to s ~ s t a i n e d

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conventional combat-and its expressed desire to playa larger role in any future conflict with Israel sparkedan across-the-board effort to improve military capabilities. Moreover, Iran, Baghdad's other o t e n t i ~ lmilitary opponent, alSO began a major arms buildup inthe mid-1970s. As Iran modernized its armed forces,Iragi leaders publicly expressed concern that theywere falling behind and began a major arms buildupof their own. In addition, the oil price hikes followingthe 1973 Ara&-Israeli conflict provided Iraq withincreased revenues with which to pursue its militarybuildup, including its chemical warfare program. Oilprovided it with the economic leverage and revenuesto gain access to Western technology that o r m a l lmight have been restricted by u p p l i e r 1____ __,Program Development

e Sarnarra site ts the centra msta attonor t e raqi program to produce chemical warfareagents. The SAA.D (expansion unknown) GeneralEstaBlishment is responsible for supervising construction of this facility. SAAD is subordinate to the State

Organization1or Technical Industries (SOTI) andboth are ostensibly civilian organizations run by theMinistry of Industry. SOTI is an umbrella organization set up to supervise lraqj arms i n d u s ~ projectsand is directly subordinate to the Director for Mili-tary Industries in the Ministry of Defense. In 1980the director of SOTI was an Iraqi Army generalO

L IIn 1978 direction of the program was shifted to theDirectorate of Chemica] Warfare in the Ministry ofDefense (see figure Two years l a t ~ r the State

Iraqi leaaers ecid m 1 to eve op a -sea e .EStablishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP) s s o c i -c h e m i ~ l weapons program. 17he following year the ated with tlie MiniStry of Chemical Industries waschemical warfare program was transferred from the crearea cover organization to run the facility andintelligence section of the ruling Ba'th Party to an obtain precursor Cltemicals for actual chemical agentostensibly civilian organization , the General Engi- productionneering Services. A. research ana oevelopment project , , - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - ~ - - - -was established through two front organizations, tlie with the large-scaleA:l Haun Institute ana theN HasanBin Haytham involvement o West European, .particularlY. WestFoundation. The institute and foundation acted as German, firms in the program during the m.id-1970scover organizations for contact witli Western com- Baghdad began to phase out the limited Soviet in-mercia! firms to agguire specialized engineel!ing and volvement in the program. A Soviet engineering dele-equipment to begin a research and development ef- gation arrived in late 1976 to negotiate a contract onfort. :nbey also made the initial contacts with West the design and construction of a central laboratory forEuropean commeccial rums for construction o{ a chemical warfare agent manufacture. The Iraqis,central facility to produce chemical w e a p o n however, terminated the negotiations because of prob-1 I lems with price and equipment specifications andIraqi fears that the Soviets would provide obsoletee.quipment. Moreover, w:ith construction on the Sa

marra complex under way, Baghi:lad did not need theSOviets. fn i 978, fhe tJSSR refused to provine Ifagwith 10erve agent samples that the Iraqis wanted toestaQlisn production and quality standards. The refusal seems to have severed direct Soviet involvement inthe Iraqi (!rogram to prOO.uce & emical weapons,although tlie Soviets rem.ain heavily involved i ~ I r a g i Ieffor.ts o acquire defensive c h e m i c ~ ! equipmen

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Milestones in 1raq's Developmento fChemical W e a p o ~1961 Chemical iJtifense school established.1964 iJraqi Chemical Corps established as a

separate 'branch of Army service.1966 Iraq requests Arabs explore feasibilitya!supplying it with chemicals to devel-

OJ! toxic agents.1968 Director Qfl. Iraqi Military Intelligence

recommends development of chemicalweapons1.or. use against Israel.1970 Military study recommends establish-ing a research center for producingchemical wegpons.1972 Research and development ~ o r t begun

at >t he Iraqi Engineering Institute.Small amounts of tabun produced un-iler Soviet direction.

IJ 974 Iraq obtains critical components fromFrench and British firms anli precursorchemicals from Swiss.1975 Construction begins at Salman Pakresearch ana development facility andon the full-scale production complex atSamarra. Retired 'Egyptian generalhired to heqd dfort.

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1977

1978

1980

1981-82

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Iraqis terminate negotiations with So-viets for design ana construction ofaproduction complex.Salman Pak Rilot Plant complete andoperational.Soviets rtifuse to supply nerve agentsamples.Samarrafacility largely complete butinsrdficient equipment available !!orrlarge-scale production.Contracts with West Germanf irms toinstall at:/ditional equipment at Sa-marra. Iraq uses nonlethal chemicalqgents against Iranians.'Iraq uses mustard agent against Iranon a timited scale./rag makes widespread use of mustardqgent q'M limited use of ne nerve agen1tabun against lrqnianforces near AIBasr.ah.

A decision to upgrade and expand the production 25Xprogram resulted in 19811 ana 1982 contracts withW.est ([Jerman firms e o u i o m e n t and en1zineermg service$!

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Figure tltiqi Organizations for Chemical Warfare Production

Front element for Ministry of Defense

Ministry ofJndustries

Director ofMilitaryIndustries

Slate Organizationfor TechnicalIndustries(SOlll)

SAADGenernlEstablishment

Salman PakR & D facility

304158 12-84

Ministry ofDefense

Director ofChemicalWarfare --------. f . l l l [ l { l ' ! ~ m l i l L l

U ~ ' . f t l l l i i li i i @ . r o ~ T t l-------

Samarraproductionfacility

Ministry ofChemicalIndustries

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-------liml : : . m i i l ' l i f l l m ~ 1 llffli !ft\>.ffuMtlf M r : ! C . ~ J i f ! i m_ j ~ ~

ordered by SBPP indicate the Iraqis are using thesep a ~ n t e d p r ~ s e s in their chemical weapons effort.

The Iraqis also contracted for several l i e m i c a l l a ~oratories from tile Swiss -to produce tabun during July1982. We beli e the tabun ~ u i p m e n t was installedin the S8:m'am1 faCility. Despite some early developmental problems, this equipment bas now been25X1

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Blister agents are used primarily to cause medicalcasualties. They may also 'Oe used to restrict use afterrain, to slow movements, n i ~ ~ to hamper use ofmaterial ana installations. 'llhese agents affect theeyes antJ, lungs ana 'blister the skin. During World Imrptard was the only blister agent in major use. 'It was recognized by a distinctive odor and had a a i r / ~long duration Qf 'dfectiveness under normal weathercofiilitions. Since then, blister agents have been developed that are odorless and tha vary in duration afd f e ~ t i v e n e s s . The development af casualties can bedelayed up to 14 hours. Protection/rom blisteragents is extremely difficult. We believe some 0/ hemustard being used by 1raq is in a dry or, powderform in a silicate mixture and is more rapid actingand more t/fective in causing injury andjor death.[ _ ]Nerve agents denote a class Cifchemical compoundsthat disrupt the nerve impulse transmission in thebot}y. These gases, such as tabun and sarin, areextremely rapid acting (within minutes) and may beabsorbei/ through the skin or through the respiratory

!Details af raditional chemical war! re agents areshown in the following tabulation:Mustard

Delayeil,hours to daysPhysiolojji- Blisters, destroyscal action tissue, ifl}ury toblood vessels,arul may causedeath With sW/icitnt concentration.WeapongstenuUst

Shells arulbombsDt/ayedaction casualty agent

Tabun

Shtlls qrulbombs

SarinGB

Sht/Ls arulbombs

10C, rainy, moderate Wirul.b /5 C. suney, light breeze.tract. The appearance af symptoms is faster for Estimated.absorption through the respiratory tract than through Lskin. Some af he symptoms for nerve gas poison-

ing are pin-pointingaf the pupils, tightness in thechest, sweating, 'nausea, diarrhea, easy fatigue, andmuscular twitching. Deaths from nerve gas poisoningcan be attributed to respiratory and circulatory failure. Nerve gas is used to create a short-term r.espira-tory hqzqrd on the. b a t t l d i e l d Ibrought on line to give tbe Iraqis a tabun production~ p a b i l i c y (they used t3bun against the Iranians JnMarcli 1984)j 1

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the Iraqi chemical warfare prggram immediatelytraveled to Egypt to meet with his counterparts in tbeEgyptian chemical warfare program for assistance inproducing tabun. The visit of an Egyptian aelegationto the Samar:ra facility, in early; !1983 lea& us toticlievet he Egyptians provided Iraq wiffi tbe r ~ u e s t -ed assistancej I 25X1

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Production CapabilitY and Facilities

ifhe smaller facility 'at Salman Paconsists of tWo areas that contain _ . . . - - - , . . . Jneering buildings, laboratories, and pilot-scale plantsfor making CW agents, as well as bunkers for agentstorage. The initial quantities of mustard and tabunused by Iraq probably were produced at Salman Pak.Construction on the main area began in early 1975and was completed and probably operational by mid-1977. Construction began on an adjacent area in 1979and was probably operational in 1981. Support structures continue to be added to both arel\s.r

._______ ~ - - - . . . . . , . . . - ~ _ _ J B o t h areas atSalman Pak have heavy security with at least threefences, patrols, and conU"olled access ana servedby only a single road!Program CostWe judge the chemical ~ a r f a r e program thr.ougbmid-1984 bas cost Bajhdad approximately $200 million. However, new construction at Salman Pak indicates continued expansion at an as yet undefined rl!te

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of x ~ n d i t u r e . We,]jave solar iaentified at least Si25million in confirmea expenditures. Our estimate isbased on Western experience in modern chemicalengineering, the sophisticated operating componentsana elaborate toxic chemical rocessin ui mentinvolved 25X1an e cos s o c elDlca s om avariety of sources worldwide. llhe Iraqi program also 25encomP@sses state-of-the-aft research and develop-ment expenses, large tonnages of precursor chemicalsobtained circuitously at llbove-market prices, andpersonnel services of Iraqi and foreign contractors fordesip, construction, and operation. Also i_volved arespecial services training, specialized maintenance,services and chemical weapons filling and 25X1

25X1Dependency on Foreign SourcesThe Iragi chemical war;fare effort is heavily dependent on foreign sources for technology, c h e m i ~ 1 defense, training, construction, equipment, and chemicals. The U ~ S R is the main supplier of chemicaldefensive equipment to Iraq. West European firmshave been the main suppliers of fra "'s offensivechemical warfare capabilityThe Iraqi Chemical Corps, like most of the Iraqi L .,military, is modeled on that of the USSR. & a resdft,Iraq bas been purchasing protective clothing, masks,decontamination equipment, and probably prophylaxis from the Soviets since the 1960s. In the early 1970s,the Soviets provided modern chemical warfare defensive equipment that we have identified at 19 militaryinstallations in Irag. 'Based on special intelligence, \\Imow


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Tile training for many of the Iraqi personnel nowinvolved in the chemical warfare program was provided tiy both tlie USSR and the Western countries. Areliable repQrt indicates that early in the 1960s [raqiofficers were sent to the USSR and the United Statesfor militacy cnemical warfare training. The .officerstrained in the USSR received specialized cnemical-. logical-r-adiological war fare training at military" hools. Some officers and many promising civilianstudents were sent to the USSR, the United States,and West Europt


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Although Iraq' s use of chemical weapons has causedconsiderable international publicity, their use has sofar not been essentiQ,l to Iraqi success on tbe battle-front. The use of tabun and mustard, however, en-a6led lfttqi troops to drive back the Iranians moren]idly ana with fewerr Iraqi casualties than might

troops are sufficiently well trained to operate success-fully in the face of a n r e - s ~ l e Iraqi chemical agentattacksj I \ 25X1

otherwise tiave been the case. j I!Iraq continues to stockpile nerve and mustard agent insignificant quantities. Its chemical warfare capabili-ties probably will have a major impact on the war,especially during major offensives. Iranian infantry,particularly the poorly trained militia troops thatconstitute approximately half of Iran's forces at thefront, are especially susceptible to chemical agentattacks. Although Iran bas devoted considerable ef-fort since March to acquiring protective chemicalgear, we doubt it has sufficient quantities or that its

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The Western EmbargoThe Iraqi chemical warfare production program willbe slowed but not stopped by the recent US decisionto place precursor chemicals on the embargoed listand to convince Western su1mliers to stop aiding theprogram. We believe tlie ~ program is so faradvanCed that; 'barring a successful airstrike on theS ~ r f a c i l i t y , Itaq prooably will nave a significantstoc ile ofmustard ana 'Dcrve agents by late 1985.

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Ma,ny different technigues have been used to circum-vent the embargo. For example, a US companyattempted to ship some of the precursor chemicals toIraq, but US Customs agents stQpped the shi mentbecause of the e m b a ~cTo mitigate negative effects on the CW program, inthe event that Iraq cannot obtain traditional precursor

c h e m i ~ l s in the future, research elements have begunto explore nontraditional methods of producingagents. Iraq has ordered pesticides and nonembargoedchemicals similar in structure to chemical warfareagents to determine i f hey could be converted to suchagents. Researching alternative metbotls of producing

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chemical warfare agents indicates Iraq's determina-tion to continue sucn production. If the embargo iseffective and its research efforts fail Ir a could turnto the USSR as a last resort

Possible Future Targets for Iraqi Gbemical WeaponsWe are unaware ofr Iraqi plans to employ chemicalweapons after the current conflict is over. Nonethe-less, there are certain ooservations tliat can oo madeon probable future targets for ifraqi chemical weaponsbased on the ir use in the Iran-Iraq war: Iraq will use chemical weapons against any invader. Iraq will be restrained in using chemical wea. t=-==--......,outside its border, particularly against Israel.The Ii'aqis have been careful to use chemical weaponsduring the war only when the Iranians have actuallypushed across the bor


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ermca weapons are a maJor new

Iraq also may develop al ternative chemical weaponsystems. In ~ r t i c i . J l a r , the development of a rocket ormissile warhead for a long-range delivery systemwould complement existing systems. Th e objectivewould be to extend the range of an attack past theimmediate battlefield while reducing the risks associated with aircraft delivery. Iraq already has Scudsurface-to-surface missiles with a range of 500 kilometers. Iraq may try to moUif some of its existingSCud w a r - h ~ d s t9 cam chemical weapons within thenext decad9 I

a t1on tot e !Iraqi inventory-, and we believe Baghdad views these weapons as an important tacticaladvantage. Their use probably r!!Quires direct approval from Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. We believe

l r ~ M I also would be reluctant to provide chemicalweapons to any other Middle Eastern state thatsomeday might become a mil itary opponent. ltaq,however, probably would be willing to provide somedetails on manufacturing processes and possibly samples to friendly states that have supported it duringthe war, such as l ordan, Egypt, or, possibly, SaudiArabia. However, we view it uiilikely that Jordan orSaudi Arabia would seek such weaponsj I

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Future Prospects

Implicatiom for Ute United StatesThe success and publicity of the Iraqi chemicalweapons progt:am probably will spark "renewed determination" by Thailand, South Korea, Pakistan, andIndia as well as other countries to develop chemicalweapons. The Iraqi experience suggests that attemptsto stop a chemical weapons program once facilities are

. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , built and most major production equipment or precur-

r - - - - - - - , ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ - r - ~ r - - _ JJ Tbe current Iraqi chemtcal war-fare aaent production is nearing full-scale operation.The eutfen t production facilities at Samarra for thelarge-scale manufacture of the vesicant mustard andsarin shoura be completed by the end of 1985. Th eIraqis already have at least a limited capabi lity forfilling artillery shells and aerial bombs. Consequently,by the eno of 1985, Iraq could have a stockpile of2,500 to 3,000 tons of chemical a g e n L - - - - - - l

sor cnemicals are in place will be ineffective. Moreover, controls on shipments of precursor chemicals canbe circumvented if the purchaser is willin to payprices well above market ratesTo have stopped the Iraqi cliemical weapons, it wouldhave been necessary to take preventive action early inthe process. Th e program probably could have beenstopped in the middle 1970s when the Samarra andSalman Pa k facilities were under construction. Intervention in 11981 oF 1982, when the Iraqis were stillacquiring the production ~ u i p m e n t for t'he facilities,also might have been effective in at least slowingmomentum of the program enough to prevent die

Moreover, we believe Iraq is conducting research into establishment of the current production capability, ifother types of chemical agents not the actual use of the agents against Iran.among th e possibilities are r ! T " ' r . . , . . . , . . . ~ - - _ ]analo&Ye of VX, an unspecified toxin, and a psycho-chemical such as BZ. We do not expect Iraq to Th e publicity that West Germany received over thedevelop new agents, bu t to exploit the work done by association of West German private firms with theth e United States and the USSR. We believe, there- Iraqi program was instrumental in forcing Bonn andfore, that Iraq will add aoditional a&ents to its other West European governments to initiate o n t r ~stockpile within the next 10 years. Limited b::or 'cal Similar publicity at an earlier stage of a chemicala ent research also rna be under w ~ I r orogram could play a usefUl role tn sfoPp..!tf'--------___,.-__.. ....,,;.. : ! ! . . . . ,h . . . , ! . . ! S ; , . . , . Pllk it. Iand Samarra facilities 2!

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Appendix AProgram Cost

Only some of capital expenditures for the chemicalwarfare effort can be estimated with confidence.Some of the costs for tlie production equipment areknown or can be estimated, but most of the cost of thephysical facilities can only be projected. Little information is available on the 10-year research anddevelQpment effort, price of the precursor chemicalspurchased since 1973, personnel services, supportequipment, and operating costs. Insufficient information is known on the costs of special processing andsupport equipment such as materials used in the watertreatment plant, the toxic materials disposal plant,chemical cold storage buildings, research laboratories,weapon filling lines, and special vehicles. No information is available on j unition and weapon costs.

We estimate the physical facilities at the Samarraand Salman Pak sites cost over $60 million (1983dollars).j

The value of the construction for the two Salman Pakareas is estimated at about $19 million and for theSamar:ra facility at about $43 million. 'Fhe values areconsidered to have an er-ror factor of plus or minus 10percent. No projections have been made for the airdefense systems now deployed around the Samar-rasite because these would be covered under a standardmilitary budget, separate from the chemical warfareagent production programj IWe also have identified at least $60 million in expenditures for bhe t ~ r o d u c t i o n ~ u i p m e n t installed in theSamarra and Salman Pak facilities. This probablyrepresents only a fraction of total e x J ; ~ C n d i t u r e s for

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production equipment at the two facilities. 'llhe specific equipment necessary was derived from a computermethodology used to estimate chemical warfare agentproduction. Most of the production equipment used inthe chemical warfare program has been obtained fromvarious West European firms and represents state-ofthe-art chemical engineering practices and techniques. On the basis of standard equipment costspublished in US chemical engineering literature, thetwo mustard plants and two tabun proouction linesbelieved to be installed at the Samarra site would costa total of about $10 million. A security and fireprotection system obtained in 1983 was valued atabout $1 million., J 25X1We e s t i m ~ t e the minimum of 200 million US dollarequivalents includes current installation costs as wellas basic requirements, such as fabrication, specialengineering techniques, and quality control. Theequipment used in the Sama rra facility is not typicalfor a chemical plant, however, and probably was moreexpensive. Because the equipment was based on USequipment costs and because Iraqi installation costwould be different, the estimate probably has an errorrange of from minus 20 percent to plus 40 percent.Moreover, an early 1983 contract with a West Ger-man Jirm to add another mustard line and anothertabun line was valued $40 million. This contractprobably includes advance technical and consultantservices, as well as ancillary materials. An equipmentestimate could not be made for the production of sarinbecau e of the I ck of production capacity data j...._- - - '

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Appendix BComparison of the ChemicalWarfa-re Program Wiitb OtherIraqi Military Programs

The chemical warfare pFogram is oiily a small part ofa much broaiier liagi military buildup that has beenunder way since the middle 1970s (see figure 5). Aftera decade of steady ~ r r o w t l l , the Ifaqi Army is thelargest in the Middle East, larger than the combinedArmies of Egypt, Syr-ia, :Jordan, and lrag during the1973 Arab-Israel war. The motivations for this armsbuildup are the same as for the chemical warfareprogram; that is, rivalries with Israel and Iran andIra 's desire to play a leading role in the Arab world.

At an estimated expense of $200 million, the chemicalwarfare program has cost only a small portion of thea p p r o x i m a t e ! ~ $75 billion we estimate Iraq bas spenton its armed forces during the past decade. lragi armsimports from the USSR in 1983 alone amounted toabout six times the ent ire cost of the chemical warfarep r o g r a m , ~ e n when aross estimates are made forintangibl IThe chemical warfare program is similar to manyother Iraqi military programs in its structure andmode of operation. The Iraqi milita ry regularly makesuse of numerous suppliers, both to avoid dependenceon a single supplier and to circumvent controls onparticular types of equipment. Also major Iraqi militarY programs often use government-run civilian enterprises as purchasing agents in order to avoidforeign commodity controls. The program to establisha domestic arms industry and the nuclear programboth operate in this fashion! :

Figgre 5Comparison of Costs of lragi Mlli(3ryProgramsBilfion dollars1.41.2

program programSerrpt

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the haqi effort to establish a domestic arms industry.the West German firm responsible for

.__,...,..,rnr"lrrrrlfhe chemical weapon factories, was in-volved' in minor aspects of the Iraqi arms industryprogram in 1975. The main ~ f t i c i p a n t s are Yugosla-via and an Austrian consortiumj j

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Domesdc: Aftos Industry Nudear Program 25X1.Since the middle 1970s, Iraq has invested at least abillion dollars in establishing a domestic arms industry. The effort is run by the State Organization forTechnical Industries through the SAAD GeneralEstablishment. These are the same organizations rem9nsible for managing the construction of the chemical waifare plants. Companies from at least 19 countries have been contacted or are directly involved in

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Approximately 100 different companies have beeninvolved in the Iraqi nuclear p r o ~ mhas been involved in minor ~ t s ' = ' : ; : - ; c . r . e a r - - 'program that we so far has cost Iraq at least$400 millionj I

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/09: CIA-RDP90iT01298R000300670Q01-8~ 25X1'lllie Iraqi nuclear program is directed by the IraqiAtomic !Energy Commission, a mainly civilian organi-zation, bu t is tightly controlled by the regime. At leastone mili tary officer involved in the nuclear programalso was instrumental in tlie early 1970s in setting upthe CW programj jLike the chemical warfare program, the Iraqis haveused numerous subterfuges to acquire nuclear equip-ment subject to supplieJ; export o n t r o ~ . Iraq bas usedWest Europel!n intermediaries and subsidiaries of UScompanies to procure equipment that the UnitedStates would no t have supplied directly. Th e Iraqisalso have placed orders for quipment subject toexport controls in small increments that, taken indi-vidually, no t subject to reiUlationi 1We also estimate that th e Iraqi nuclear communityhas been able to add to its stock of technical knowl-edge and equipment by carefully exploiting trainingand research exchange opportunities with West Euro-pean nuclear research centers. Iraqi contacts withmajor research centers in West Germany precededthe emergence of West German firms as Iraq's mostimportant sources of nuclel}r laboratory equipment.Similar research contacts 1between Iraqi chemists andtheir counterparts in Western Europe probably arefacilitating the Iraqi chemical warfare programSome observations about the Iraqi nuclear programare useful in evaluating the Iraqi chemical warfareprogram. First, the Iraqis identified their goal asdeveloping an advanced nuclear program with a viewtoward attaining a nuclear weapons option. Next theyorganized management groups within the govern-ment, selected scientists and military officers fortraining in foreign countries, established a researchand development program with the help of foreigners,and t:rained local technicians and engineers. Theywere consequently able to modify Western equipmentto meet their pui'PQlles. Above all, they m a i n ~ n e d acover for thei r covert programsj \

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