Decolonisation and Local Government in Namibia: The Neo-Apartheid Plan, 1977-83

Decolonisation and Local Government in Namibia: The Neo-Apartheid Plan, 1977-83Author(s): David SimonSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 507-526Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160663 .

Accessed: 09/05/2014 14:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Modern African Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.253 on Fri, 9 May 2014 14:07:08 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

http://www.jstor.org/stable/160663?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


The Journal of Modern African Studies, 23, 3 (1985), pp. 507-526

Decolonisation and Local Government in Namibia: the Neo-Apartheid Plan, 1977-83

by DAVID SIMON*

NAMIBIA is distinctive in Africa for at least three significant reasons. First of all, it remains the continent's last colony in defiance of world

opinion and the United Nations. Secondly, it has experienced Africa's

longest armed liberation struggle apart from South Africa, with no end

yet in sight. Thirdly, and most importantly, that conflict is not being waged against some distant metropolitan power, but Namibia's dominant and pariah neighbour. Just as this geographical contiguity has facilitated South African attempts to retain control over Namibia, it seems certain to impose severe constraints on the scope for pursuing independent policies once Namibian sovereignty is finally achieved.

South Africa's prolonged efforts to incorporate Namibia were thrown into reverse by the Portuguese coup of April I974, which precipitated Angolan and Mozambiquan independence and accelerated the decolonisation process in Southern Africa a as a whole. The Turnhalle Constitu- tional Conference in 1975-8 provided the first evidence that the Nationalist Government perceived the impossibility of persisting with orthodox apartheid and bantustans in Namibia. Out of this realisation developed what Don McHenry, President Carter's special African envoy, termed Pretoria's 'two-track' policy. At one level the South African authorities embarked upon protracted yet inconclusive international negotiations with the U.N. and the so-called 'Western Contact Group', during which they recognised the need for eventual Namibian independence. With the Territory, however, they simultaneously instituted a series of arrangements with the object of pre-empting independence under a hostile regime dominated by the South-West Africa Peoples Organisation and installing a neo-colonial solution inimical to internationally acceptable sovereignty.1 This article focuses on an important

* Research Fellow, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds. 1 Richard Moorsom, 'Namibia in the Frontline: the political economy of decolonisation in

South Africa's colony', in Review of African Political Economy (Sheffield), 17, 1980, pp. 7I-82; Kenneth Abrahams, 'Namibia: independence negotiations or a transition to neocolonialism?', in



but little known aspect of this process - the evolution of plans at

municiple level to entrench urban apartheid under a faCade of change. The appointment by South Africa of an Administrator-General in

September 1977, apparently to lay the foundations for U.N.-supervised elections and internationally recognised independence, heralded the

repeal of much racially discriminatory legislation. Although these

measures, coupled with significant administrative reorganisation, have moved Namibia away from the apartheid model, there have been

comparatively few changes to the underlying political economy or relations of production.

The late I g7os and early I g80s in Namibia may thus be characterised as part of the inevitable transition between the end of colonialism and the beginning of independence.' Gary Wasserman defines such a 'transition' as the period during which the new status is implicitly accepted by the parties involved as the outcome of their bargaining, whether peaceful or accompanied by violence.2 Typically, some colonial

politico-legal constraints are relaxed to defuse tension and indicate

goodwill. In Namibia, the primary legislative changes have been the abolition of influx controls on black rural-urban migration, urban

segregation, and the ban on blacks owning freehold urban property.3 Having fought and lost a rearguard action against these changes, conservative white municipalities sought to minimise their impact on white society and space by promoting racially fragmented apartheid-style local authority structures legitimised by the vocabulary of change.

A FAILED NEO-COLONIAL EXPERIMENT, 1977-83

Before attempting a detailed analysis of the proposals for restructuring local authorities, we need to consider briefly the wider context of overall

governmental reorganisation since 1977. The thrust of these changes

The Namibian Review (Windhoek), 23, December 1981, pp. I-4; John Seiler, 'South Africa in Namibia: persistence, misperception, and ultimate failure', in The Journal of Modern African Studies

(Cambridge), 20, 4, December I982, pp. 689-7I2; and David Simon, Contemporary Namibia: the

political geography of decolonization (Oxford, 1983), Oxford University School of Geography Research

Paper No. 31. 1 David Simon, 'Aspects of Urban Change in Windhoek, Namibia, during the Transition to

Independence', D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford, I983. 2 Gary Wasserman, Politics of Decolonisation: Kenya Europeans and the land issue, i96o-i965

(Cambridge, 1976). 3 David Simon, 'Desegregation in Namibia: the demise of urban apartheid?', in Geoforum

(Oxford), forthcoming, and 'Urban Squatting, Low Income Housing and Politics in Namibia on the Eve of Independence', in Robert A. Obudho (ed.), Slum and Squatter Settlements in Africa: towards a planning strategy (New York), forthcoming.

508 DAVID SIMON



DECOLONISATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NAMIBIA 509

was to create a three-tier administrative structure headed by a supposedly autonomous central regime. This came about through the transfer back from Pretoria of legislative and fiscal responsibilities removed in I969, and also the granting of additional powers never before held by the state in Windhoek. South Africa intended this to become the acquiescent government of a neo-colonially independent Namibia. The Admin- istrator-General, while empowered to act by proclamation, remained

responsible to the South African President as Head of State. In May I978, ten Directorates were created in Namibia in order to

administer functions transferred from Pretoria, as well as others which were not the responsibility either of the various bantustan authorities or the pre-existing white Legislative Assembly. South Africa then

proceeded unilaterally to hold elections for a 50o-seat Constituent

Assembly in December 1978, despite their denounciation by the United Nations and their boycott by S.W.A.P.O. These elections were won by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (D.T.A.), formed by 12 explicitly ethnic parties after a white breakaway from the National Party of South-West Africa which had for many decades monopolised the white Legislative Assembly. Despite widespread allegations of intimi- dation and coercion, South Africa consistently held the Constituent

Assembly to be the 'democratically elected representatives of the people of S.W.A./Namibia', and thus sought to increase their authority domestically, while claiming simultaneously to abide by their wishes in matters relating to international negotiations on the Territory's future. In I979 the Administrator-General transformed the Constituent into the National Assembly as the supreme legislative body of the Territory, the enactment of laws being subject only to his approval.

During 1980 a S.W.A./Namibia Government Service was created which was apparently to be, for the first time, distinct from that in South Africa. Senior officials are still South African appointees, however, while much important data analysis and technical planning continue to be undertaken in Pretoria. Overall South African control has thus not in

reality ended. The Directorates were transformed into full Departments when the Administrator-General's Council became the Ministers' Council as the executive arm of government. Simultaneously the former S.W.A. Administration was downgraded to the status of a second-tier

body to look after the interests of the white population. ' Representative Authorities' were created in terms of Proclamation AG 8 of 1980 for each of the 11 officially defined ethnic groups, and they became the func- tional successors to the various bantustan authorities. But whereas the latter had been geographically defined, representative authorities were



intended to be responsible for all members of their respective ethnic

groups throughout the Territory. The functions delegated to these bodies include primary and secondary

education, cultural promotion, health and social services including pensions, supportive agricultural and forestry services, sub-economic

housing, and traditional law. However, individual authorities can decline direct responsibility for one or more of these functions and

negotiate for another authority, most often the central Government, to carry them out on an agency basis. This arrangement was designed to assist the smaller authorities who might lack the resources or skilled

personnel to handle their full range of responsibilities. Although such a structure was claimed necessary in order to guarantee the maintenance of individual ethnic identities as a basis for peaceful coexistence, it has

given rise to numerous problems, contradictions, and conflicts, not least because of the division of functions between the first and second tiers. While designed to create strong representative authorities, this has in fact split particular functions, notably agriculture, education, and

health, so that each tier has responsibility for particular aspects. Furthermore, the representative authorities have been racked by

corruption and financial mismanagement - the long-running Thirion Commission of Inquiry is currently substantiating many allegations. In

addition, a number of the representative authorities are controlled by parties opposed to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, causing fundamental contradictions between ostensible moves to abolish discrimination by the D.T.A.-controlled central Government before

January 1983, and the simultaneous institutionalisation of the important functions, just mentioned, along ethnic lines.1 This is particularly true as the various groups vary widely in size, access to the means of

production and reproduction, and hence their ability to provide resources for the respective functions.

Existing discrepancies have thus inevitably tended to widen, given the per capita budgeting procedures, thereby exacerbating existing tensions. The logical outcome would be a further entrenchment of the

racial/ethnic class hierarchy with whites at the apex. Additional

impracticalities arise from problems in identifying ethnic groups for administrative purposes. While the basis of allocation is supposedly self-ascription and social acceptance, it frequently becomes a bureau- cratic decision in practice. Nor are ethnic groups endogamous: frequent intermarriage and cohabitation create absurd situations in the admin-

1 Simon, Contemporary Namibia.

5IO DAVID SIMON




istration of levies, payments, and services in the respective health, education, and social welfare systems.

The third tier, comprising municipalities and the Peri-Urban De-

velopment Board, which has responsibilities for areas not large enough to be given that status, remains so far unchanged. Nationally the D.T.A. regime progressively lost credibility after suffering defeat at the hands of the National Party and the Damara Council in the December 1980 ethnic elections, and because of its demonstrated inability to alter

substantially the inherited status quo. In addition, the contradictions inherent in the government structure just referred to, exacerbated the situation. South Africa proceeded to play down the role of the Ministers' Council and the National Assembly, forcing the Chairman, Dirk

Mudge, to resign as a face-saving measure in January I983. The South African Prime Minister subsequently dissolved the National Assembly, and all its functions reverted to the control of the Administrator-General.

Thus, by 1983 the situation again resembled that which had obtained

prior to 1978. South Africa has persistently refused to proceed with

implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 until the estimated

25-30,000 Cuban troops in Angola are removed. This so-called 'linkage' of two ostensibly separate issues has stalemated negotiations and

accompanied efforts by South Africa to destabilise her neighbours in the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference over recent years. This policy has the twin aims of (i) maintaining the economic dependence of S.A.D.C.C. members on South Africa's infrastructure and agricultural exporting facilities to ensure the Republic's continued dominance in the region, and (ii) ensuring that no attempt by these countries at socialist transformation is seen to be remotely successful lest there be fundamental ramifications for South Africa's

oppressed population. Against this background, then, the South African authorities have

sought over the last two years to find some alternative method of

achieving the desired neo-colonial solution within Namibia, and this culminated in the installation of a 'Government of National Unity' from the Multi-Party Conference (M.P.C.) inJune 1985, amid much

publicity. However, South Africa will, as in the past, retain control over

defence, foreign affairs, and internal security, and it is unlikely that this new regime will have additional powers or enjoy any more success than its predecessor, the National Assembly. S.W.A.P.O., as well as several small internal parties, are boycotting this new Administration, as they did the previous one. A protest meeting held simultaneously with the M.P.C. inauguration ceremony was violently dispersed by the



police with the help of a counter-insurgency unit, apparently without the knowledge or approval of the M.P.C.,1 thereby providing a clear illustration of South Africa's not-so-hidden controlling hand.

The changes and trends to be analysed here cover the period from

I977 until the Administrator-General resumed full direct control in

January I983. The Multi-Party Conference has expressed the intention of abolishing the representative authorities on grounds of incompetence and inordinate cost, but no detailed proposals or alternative policies have yet been framed. There appear to be serious divisions ab initio within the M.P.C. 'Cabinet' over this and related issues involving the

integration of social services.2

THE PROPOSED REORGANISATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

It immediately became evident in 1977 that the maintenance of

apartheid local authority structures would be incompatible with the

nature of even the limited national politico-administrative reforms instituted by the Administrator-General and then by the National

Assembly. Coupled with rapid urban growth, these changes created

strong tensions which implied the need for third-tier authorities to be

reorganised. The existing arrangements, rooted in the British colonial administrative model as subsequently elaborated in South Africa, are

overwhelmingly conservative, and it will be argued here that the

proposed changes aimed essentially at retaining the status quo as far as

possible in a neo-colonial format. Successive measures to incorporate Namibia more directly into South

Africa before the mid- I 970s involved the transfer of numerous functions from the S.W.A. Administration to Pretoria, together with the establishment of bantustans. They did not directly affect the organisation of

local authorities, however, since municipalities and village management boards had never existed outside the 'white' areas. Similarly the

various permutations of post-1977 change have bypassed the third-tier

bodies almost completely. Even the now-discredited Representative Authorities Proclamation qf 1980, which entrenched non-geographical

1 Max du Preeze, 'Namibia's New Regime: no honourable peace', in Work in Progress Johannesburg), 36, I985, pp. I4-17; The Guardian (London), i8 June I985; Namibia in Focus

(London), I 5, 1985; Namibia News Briefing (London), 24, June, 25, July/August, and 26, August I985; and The Observer (London), i6June I985.

2 Namibia News Briefing, 24-26.

5I 2 DAVID SIMON




ethnic administrations at second-tier level, affected only the source of

capital finance for municipal development. The provisions of the Municipal Ordinance, No. I3 of 1963, as

amended, apply essentially to the former white and coloured urban

segments, as black townships are administered by municipalities on an

agency basis for the central Government in terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation, No. 56 of I95I, and other statutes. Namibian

municipalities closely resemble those in South Africa and, indeed, most

pre-independence British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa.' They are

responsible primarily for the provision of essential remunerative (water, electricity) and non-remunerative services (sewerage, health control, cemeteries, etcetera); for urban planning; for running limited commercial activities; and they are empowered to build, buy, or let property.

Windhoek, the capital, has by far the largest and most complex municipal structure - see Table i. Since this major city has also been the prime focus of efforts to reconstitute third-tier authorities, many of the issues are illustrated here with reference to the crucial role played by this Municipality. The policy of the City Council, and its actual

implementation by municipal officials, is thus of direct concern in the context of socio-political change, particularly with respect to the

provision of services and the racial basis on which access to them is determined. The fundamental impact of apartheid urban planning is well illustrated by the fact that Khomasdal and Katutura, the previously segregated coloured and black townships respectively, are administered

separately from former white areas. While Katutura is controlled by an

entirely separate Department, Khomasdal falls under the City Secre-

tary's Department, a position consistent with its legal status, being more akin to a white area.

The conservative elected white City Council, and particularly its

Management Committee, holds ultimate policy and financial authority. However, the Town Clerk, as the senior official with responsibility for overall co-ordination and day-to-day management, is extremely powerful. Two toothless advisory bodies for coloured and black people, the Khomasdal Consultative Committee and the Katutura Advisory Board respectively, can make non-binding recommendations to the Management Committee. The latter generally accepts them only when no conflict arises with City Council (or white) interests. The bodies

1 E. H. Ashton, A Tale of Three Cities (Harare, 1977), University of Zimbabwe, Centre for Applied Social Studies, 'Issues in Development', Reprint 3; and Alan Greenwood and John Howell, 'Urban Local Authorities', in William Tordoff (ed.), Administration in Zambia (Manchester and Madison, 1980), pp. I62-84.



DAVID SIMON

TABLE I

Windhoek's Municipal Structure, 1980-8I

Departments Sections

I. City Secretary

2. City Treasurer

3. City Engineer

4. Director of Katutura (formerly Non-White Affairs)

5. City Electro-Technical Engineer

6. City Health Officer

Administration Valuation Khomasdal (management of) Personnel Traffic Internal audit Work study Civil defence Legal

Architecture and works Cemeteries Parks and recreation Building control (approval of plans) Fire Brigade Ambulance services Surveying Garages/workshops Road planning, design, and traffic engineering

Town planning (development control, research)

Water works (including sewerage and purification)

Electric wiring, street lighting, electricity supply

Inspections, trading licences/ registrations, dairy and meat products, pest control, sanitary services

complain regularly of being bypassed on important issues, while

outspoken members have been removed in the past. These Boards thus command little popular support, being widely regarded as comprising stooges' or 'sell outs'.

I. Initial Proposals

In October I977, the Khomasdal Consultative Committee formally requested the Administrator-General to grant it separate municipal status, a move supported in principle by the City Council and the white

5I4



DECOLONISATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NAMIBIA 5I5

S.W.A. Administration, subject to adequate research being done into 'the practical and financial implications of such an important step'.l There had been prior discussions with the Municipality, the officials of which supported the creation of' sister-towns' and offered wholehearted

co-operation. A detailed memorandum, drawn up by the Windhoek Town Clerk in June I977, set out the basis of an agreement between the 'City Councils of Windhoek and Khomasdal' on the assumption of municipal status by the latter, and implied that there would be few

problems, apart from the need for minor legislative changes. Separate municipalities for the three racially and spatially segregated

areas are the logical consequence of apartheid policy, and it is thus

hardly surprising that the white Municipality supported these moves for economic as well as political reasons. The representativeness of the Khomasdal Committee has already been questioned. Of particular significance, moreover, is the fact that the formal application for

separate status was made less than two months after the Administrator- General's assumption of office, just when the first racially discriminatory legislation was being abolished, and the move was thus almost certainly intended to beat the U.N.-supervised independence process that the A.G.'s arrival was supposed to herald.

The Administrator-General responded by appointing a committee to investigate the desirability or otherwise of creating a separate municipality. The members were the Town Clerk, City Secretary, and

City Treasurer of Windhoek, the Chairman of the Khomasdal Consultative Committee, and two officials from the South African

Department of Coloured, Rehoboth, and Nama Relations. Their

report, tabled in November I978, was not publicised at the time, but

proved to be seminal to the formulation of later proposals for local authorities in Namibia as a whole. The document suggested that

popular support for the Consultative Committee and its action existed in Khomasdal, despite resentment that it was not an elected body. The idea of a single municipality for the entire urban area was rejected on the grounds that one population group would always be in the

minority against the other two, and that it would not permit the maximum say of each in its own affairs. Khomasdal was considered a potentially viable entity, on the basis of an estimated population of 10,700, an annual operating budget of Ri million (both items being larger than some existing S.W.A. municipalities), 880 tenant- and 503 property-owning families, one high and three primary schools, a

1 City of Windhoek, Verslag van Sy Edelagbare die Burgemeester, Raadslid Ds. A. G. C. Yssel, vir die Burgelike Jaar Geeindig g Maart 1978 (Windhoek, 1978). p. 7.



teacher's training college, 12 businesses, two petrol stations, one hotel, and available adjacent land for future expansion.

The shortage of suitably qualified coloured personnel could be overcome by employing whites in the interim, while training courses for potential councillors was deemed essential. There would be a

proportion of the population unable to afford rates and service charges, but

Khomasdal's income and financing ability will depend on the willingness of its management to take unpopular decisions to tax the community and make necessary and timely tariff adjustments. This level will in turn be dictated by the ability and willingness of the community to pay... On account of the relatively low income level of Khomasdal's inhabitants, the Committee foresees that Khomasdal will initially have to get by without certain tarred roads, a swimming bath and library of Windhoek's standards, parks, etc.1

In consequence, the needs of the better-off inhabitants would not be

satisfied, and these (coloured) people would press for the right to use

(white) Windhoek's facilities, or even live there. But

If these demands were to be acceded to, Khomasdal might be reduced to a permanently less well-off community and thereby the argument for Khomasdal's right of existence as a

separate local authority with a say over its own affairs would be nullified.2

Nevertheless,

The fact that Khomasdal's finances have been administered separately since its establishment, and that it has till now remained self-sufficient, is adequate indication that Khomasdal will be able to function as a financially viable entity.3

Certain functions and services would inevitably have to be provided for the whole urban area, by virtue of interdependence and Khomasdal's

inability to support its own skilled planners, legal advisors, treasurers, etcetera. An overhead planning and co-ordination committee was

suggested for the three future municipalities. Practical issues set out in the 1977 memorandum were still valid, but would need detailed consideration if the 'go-ahead' were given. The report concluded that Khomasdal should be declared a separate municipality as soon as

possible, to be administered, like all others, by the S.W.A. Administration in terms of the Municipal Ordinance of 1963, with the necessary amendments.

1 South-West Africa, 'Verslag van die Komitee van Ondersoek na die Instelling van 'n Munisipaliteit vir die Kleurlingdorp Khomasdal', Windhoek, unpublished report, 1978, pp. 6-7, my translation.

2 Ibid. p. 7, my emphasis. 3 Ibid. p. 5.

516 DAVID SIMON




These quotations reveal the inherent contradiction within the report, in that financial viability is claimed while admitting the inadequacy of facilities and infrastructure which would enable Khomasdal to become self-sufficient. To regard I 2 businesses, mostly small grocers and corner

cafes, and 500 mainly low- and lower-middle-income houses, as an

adequate rate tax base, is unrealistic. Several small existing munici-

palities - for example, Aus and Witvlei - had, in fact, recently been deproclaimed precisely because they were proving increasingly unviable. Khomasdal was not designed or developed as a potentially self-sufficient unit, but as a racial dormitory for part of Windhoek's

working class. Although municipal investment in, and geographical cross-subsidisation of, its townships has been restricted to levels necessary for fulfilment of this role, it is difficult to see how separation at this stage would benefit the majority of Khomasdal's inhabitants.

The italicised quotation above provides concrete evidence that the nub of the issue, as perceived by the report's compilers, was the need to maintain racial, rather than class, exclusivity. Only by retaining a coloured middle class in Khomasdal could its self-sufficiency be claimed and white Windhoek thus spared the cost of supporting and upgrading Khomasdal as would inevitably be required if a single municipality continued to exist after independence. This amounts, therefore, to a strategy for externalising the costs of coloured people's social reproduction away from Windhoek, which has consistently extracted surplus value from its domination of the local political economy under apartheid, and onto the relatively deprived people themselves.

The Khomasdal issue received priority, with the Administrator- General's Office and other parties concerned attempting to have the report officially approved by the respective bodies, and the necessary legislative amendments provisionally formulated by March 1979. Of

particular interest was the insistence by the Department of Coloured, Rehoboth, and Nama Relations in Cape Town that the envisaged municipality should possess at least the minimum level of services and facilities for viability. Similar studies by the Yeld Committee in South Africa's coloured townships had revealed the general absence of satis-

factory facilities,1 most of which require large capital outlays which would be beyond the means of poor fledgeling municipalities if not provided beforehand. To overcome this it was suggested that revenue from rates on industrial and commercial property in the white city be

1 This Committee was investigating the feasibility of separate municipal status for coloured townships in South Africa during I978-9.



allocated to Khomasdal in terms of a fixed formula, e.g. gross salaries/wages or pro rata purchasing power, which could be reviewed at 5-year intervals.

These suggestions were rejected by the Khomasdal Consultative

Committee, Windhoek's Town Clerk, and the City Council's Manage- ment Committee on the grounds that Windhoek's coloureds had not been

exploited, and were prospering, despite the lull in the construction

industry, their traditional sphere of activity. The report was, however, approved by all the bodies concerned, including the S.W.A. Admin-

istration, and referred to the Administrator-General.

2. Elaborating the Plan

Notwithstanding the objections raised above, Khomasdal and Katu- tura are certainly in a better position than other coloured and black

townships of other municipalities, by virtue of their size and relative

development. Conditions in smaller towns are frequently worse. The S.W.A. Municipal Association resolved at its special congress in August

1979 to appoint a committee of experts to investigate the issues broadly and in-depth before the Administrator-General and politicians made their decisions.' It was felt that any arrangement in respect ofKhomasdal

ought to be based on nationally applicable principles, and should not be primarily 'political'.2

The Committee formed by the Municipal Association used the earlier memorandum and report as points of departure, and recommended that local government be autonomous with respect to the functions

constitutionally delegated to it. Homogeneous local communities (in terms of their nature, needs, and financial capacity) should form the core units of local government irrespective of size, wealth, or geographic proximity. Those communities which are financially and administratively viable units should become autonomous municipalities, while a 'general local

authority' should administer the others on behalf, and at the expense, of the central Government.

It was recommended that the functions of local authorities should

be divided into obligations - e.g. the provision of water and environmental health services - to which communities are entitled; additional powers (as set out in the 1963 Municipal Ordinance, e.g. electricity); and agency functions, which may be provided at the financial cost and on behalf of

1 This is an umbrella body for Namibian municipalities, which send delegates to its conferences. 2 The eight committee members were Windhoek's Town Clerk (Convenor), City Secretary, City

Treasurer, and Legal Advisor, and four officials from other municipalities. The Director of Katutura and the Secretary of the Peri-Urban Development Board were later included.

5i8 DAVID SIMON




the authority with primary responsibility for them. Other proposals related to the limiting of external control measures, legislation against corruption, arbitration procedures, etcetera.

Frequent reference was made in the report, as well as in other documents and discussion, to concepts of' regionalisation' - i.e. the idea of geographical configurations being devised, taking physical and human homogeneity into account - and their relevance to urban

regions. This is of little validity, though, seeing that even Windhoek, the primate city, occupies a small, clearly defined area, and officially had under oo100,000ooo inhabitants. The stress on 'homogeneous' local communities over geographical proximity and economic factors was thus a clear, though more subtle, reference to race, and shows the

consistency of thinking with the earlier reports. This change in termin-

ology was necessary because the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination

(Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Act, No. 3 of I979, became effective just before the Committee's appointment.

At the Municipal Association's special congress in November I979, called to consider the report, the Mayor of Windhoek was minuted as

having said:

... I see in the Committee's recommendations the greatest possible opportunity for each group to find its richest expression in the neighbourhood in which it matches the lifestyle, economic demands and ability of the dominant group. I would still have preferred closed neighbourhoods because I am so convinced that each group could then be happiest in its own town. I also believe that a person is happiest living among his own people and that that minimises the danger of conflict. For me it is not an argument to say that, on account of economic considerations, there will then be resentment if the white town performs better than the others. There are nice houses in Khomasdal and Katutura, and modest, even poor, little houses in Windhoek. Poverty has nothing to do with where you live.1

In explaining the report, the Committee's convenor said:

I have heard many comments from many people on these proposals. The nicest was that the system rests on Christian principles and must thus be good. The criticism was that the Committee hadn't made that clearer. This criticism is justified. ..2

After some discussion, the congress approved the report unanimously and resolved to bring it to the attention of other interested parties and the Administrator-General. His response, as earlier envisaged, was to

1 Unpublished minute, my translation. The Mayor is apparently a member of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond; see Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom. The Broederbond (New York and London, I979), p. A6. 2 Unpublished minute, November 1979.



appoint two Commissions of Inquiry in January I980. The first was charged with drawing up draft legislation for a system of local

government in Namibia, including its funding, and taking into account the principles contained in the report of the Municipal Association. Its Chairman was the Town Clerk of Windhoek, A. C. Arnold, who had been instrumental in compiling all three earlier documents. Other members were the Chairman ofthe Khomasdal Consultative Committee, an expert in municipal administration at Pretoria University, the

Deputy Chairman of the Katutura Advisory Board's Management Committee, the Chief Official of the Peri-Urban Development Board, the Mayor of Otjiwarongo, and the Director of Katutura.

This Commission of Experts on Legislation for Local Authorities received submissions from a variety of individuals and organisations, some of whom were seeking exemption from rate assessment. Its four-volume report was submitted to the Administrator-General during I980 and 1981 but not published until late I983, having become

politically too sensitive because its key proposals conflicted with the

policies of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance-controlled central Govern- ment. The fact that it was then published after the National Assembly's abolition is perhaps indicative of the Administrator-General's intentions while he again held full power over Namibia. The document is largely consistent with the earlier reports, envisaging a general municipal authority for the smaller townships, and three separate municipalities in autonomous urban centres - one each for the predominantly white, coloured, and black concentrations of population. This was justified by the homogeneity argument, but with an express denial that the

municipalities would be racially defined, since all residential areas are now legally open:

With the opening of all residential areas to all races, all talk of Black, Brown, or White towns has lapsed. There will be towns where one or other of these groups - also Herero, Damara, Rehoboth Basters or whoever - will be numerically dominant and where their customs, needs, and abilities will dominate. Each more or less homogeneous local community, measured in terms of its needs, abilities, and the standard of environmental services accepted by it, is entitled to its own local management. The degree of say it will have over its own affairs will depend solely on the question of whether it can afford to manage itself.1

All residents of a municipality would be entitled to vote there, but the idea was to make conditions in the townships more attractive, in order to minimise the flow of blacks and coloured into white areas.

1 South-West Africa/Namibia, Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na Munisipale Wetgewing (Windhoek, I18o-I), V.I, p. 7, my translation.

520 DAVID SIMON




The division of total assessment rate revenue between the three new

municipalities to compensate the townships for their lack of a

commercial, industrial, or administrative property base, was rejected on the grounds that the 'mother' municipality alone incurred the costs of establishing and servicing such areas and providing other non- remunerative services essential to them. Much attention was devoted to strengthening overall municipal finance in line with envisaged functions. However, only in the division of General Sales Tax proceeds, which, the Commission argued, should accrue to third- rather than first-tier authorities as at present, was any weighting proposed to redress the unfavourable balance for the townships. Existing inequities would thus not be reduced. Several important proposals on finance in the final

report had, in fact, been significantly revised from draft versions in order to accord with recommendations of the van Eeden Commission.

Another significant point is that the Commission proposed that the three separate municipalities should be defined geographically, rather than explicitly ethnically. While clearly quasi-racial, it does, nevertheless, directly contradict the categorical statement in the report of the 1978 Committee that the only justification for having separate municipalities was in retaining racial, rather than socio-economic, exclusivity. This

change of emphasis was necessitated by residential desegregation in the interim.

An anomalous situation has now arisen in that residential areas are

open to all on a freehold basis, and the Arnold Commission explicitly said that all residents of a given municipality would be eligible to vote in municipal elections there. Nevertheless, the Windhoek Municipality has still not been including races other than whites on the updated voters rolls, so that no practical effect could yet be given to this. There was some pressure during I 98 to hold new local elections, because they had been postponed annually since 1978 by the Administrator-General while the 'new dispensation' was implemented. Rumours in March 1981 of imminent elections were quickly denied, as they would have been for whites only, and besides, the Arnold report had not yet been

implemented.1 To date no new elections have taken place. The second Commission of Inquiry, chaired by F.J. van Eeden,

investigated financial relationships between the central, representative, and local authorities in the new dispensation. Its report was submitted to the A.G. in September 1980, and made available in April 1981, together with a document from the Ministers' Council that set out their

1 Die Suidwester (Windhoek), ii and 2 March 198I; Die Republikein (Windhoek), 12 and 13 March I981; and The Windhoek Advertiser, i8 March I981.



reactions.1 Although much of its content was not directly relevant to local authorities, this report clearly overlapped with that of the Arnold Commission. The van Eeden report accepted the three-fold municipal split, and foresaw a more important role for local authorities in the new dispensation. In addition to rates, General Sales Tax was seen as a logical source of revenue for local authorities and one which would ease the present financial pressures on them.2

In view of the spatial concentration of commercial and industrial

premises in specific parts of an urban complex, and the large proportion of public housing in certain areas, an objective allocation formula, based on pro-rata incomes or consumer expenditure, would be required - cf. the Arnold Commission's rejection of this idea. The rate of tax would be determined by the central Government. This additional revenue and the indirect multiplier effects of government activity would more than

compensate for the fact that no rates are payable on government buildings; and rates on the property of second-tier authorities should also be scrapped.3 The only other possible sources of revenue are income from municipal functions and loans. Full compensation must be paid for all work performed on an agency basis for other authorities. From a redistributive point of view the sales-tax revenue should keep pace with the needs of local authorities, while capital loans for specific economic infrastructural projects would be made for all authorities from a proposed 'finance bank', and for social infrastructure (low-cost housing, schools, hospitals) by the central Government direct.4

The Ministers' Council accepted many of the Commission's proposals, but rejected allocation of sales-tax revenue to local authorities, the status quo of which should be provisionally maintained. Capital loans should be seen in the context of national priorities and thus the central

Government, through the Department of Constitutional Development, would provide such funds to local authorities in the meantime.5 A

two-man Committee was then appointed to resolve certain conflicts between the reports of the two Commissions and to study the implications

1 South-West Africa/Namibia, Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na die Finansiele Verhoudings Tussen Sentrale, Verteenwoordigende en Plaaslike Owerhede (Windhoek, I98i); South-West Africa/

Namibia, Stellingname van die Ministersraad oor die Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na die

Finansiele Verhoudings Tussen Sentrale, Verteenwoordigende en Plaaslike Owerhede (Windhoek, 1981); Die

Republikein, 20 March and 3 April I98I; and Die Suidwester, 3 April 198I. 2 By contrast, the report of the Browne Committee in South Africa discounted such additional

revenue sources for local authorities. See The Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 24 October 1980, p. 382.

3 The Arnold Commission argued, conversely, that all government buildings should be rateable. 4 Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na die Finansiele Verhoudings, pp. 51 -6 and 68-9. 5 Stellingname van die Ministersraad, pp. 5-6.

DAVID SIMON 522




of redistribution of revenue from rates as proposed.1 As a result of these

delays, Khomasdal's Consultative Committee again pressed the Windhoek City Council to apply for Khomasdal to be declared a

separate municipality. In fact, this would require changes to both the

1963 Municipal Ordinance and the I 965 Establishment of Management Forms in Coloured Towns Ordinance, as no provisions for the election of councillors exist. The Arnold Commission's draft Municipal Act was designed to replace these Ordinances, as well as the I963 Village Management Ordinance and the remaining parts of the amended I95 I Native (Urban Areas) Proclamation.

In view of this move, as well as continued restrictions on entry of coloureds and blacks to certain facilities controlled by municipalities, the Ministers' Council announced its intention to take over control of local authorities from the Administration for Whites on I April 1982. This sparked furious reactions from the members of the Municipal Association who claimed they had not been consulted. The take-over was later postponed for three months, apparently because the necessary arrangements had not yet been completed and the Administrator- General's consent not yet obtained. A motion by some Windhoek City Councillors at the Council's April meeting, requesting the Admin- istrator-General to retain the status quo, failed dramatically.2 Inter- tier relations were thus strained and remained so as the respective groups sought to strengthen their vested interests in the face of un-

certainty and perceived threats to the existing order. The abolition of the Ministers' Council and the National Assembly in January 1983 sub- limated some of the tensions since the Administrator-General assumed direct control of all administration. None of the problems were resolved, however, and the status quo has been maintained to date.

As part of the author's survey of residential mobility after desegregation,3 45 respondents of all races- most being present or recent residents of Khomasdal - were asked their views on local authority status in Windhoek. The overwhelming majority (80 per cent) favoured one municipality, only 7 per cent wanted three, while 13 per cent 'did not know' or refused to answer. Up to three views per respondent were recorded and they were not ranked in any particular order, thus enabling simple aggregation: I2 gave one reason, I6 two,

1 Ibid. p. 6; and City of Windhoek, Mayoral Report I980: Councillor S. G. Beukes, (Windhoek, I98I), pp. i and 22-4. The Committee's report was not made public.

2 The Windhoek Advertiser, i6 and I9 March, and 2 and 29 April I982; and The Windhoek Observer, 20 March, 8 April, and I May 1982.

3 Simon 'Desegregation in Namibia'.



DAVID SIMON

TABLE 2

Views Expressed on Municipal Structure, I98I

Number of Mentions Favouring

I Munici- 3 Munici- Reasons Given pality palities Total

I. Financially viable o o o 2. Alternative is financially I2 o 12

unviable 3. Would ease race tension 4 2 6 4. Would raise race tension I o I 5. Would train staff faster o o o 6. Unnecessary duplication of 9 0 9

facilities 7. Give each group more o o o

political autonomy 8. Give all more say in common I o I

area 9. Would eliminate cross 2 0 2

subsidisation Io. All would share wealth 6 0 6

they help generate I . One administrative unit best 17 1 7 12. Townships not balanced 3 0 3

economic areas I3. Decision best made by experts I o I I4. Othera I7 2 19

Total 73 4 77

a Of the 17 favouring one municipality, II felt that separation would merely represent a continuation of apartheid policies; 2 that a single authority would keep the community together; and i that separation would enable whites to shirk their responsibility.

and ii three, an average of two per reply - see Table 2. The major response categories, all in favour of a single municipality, were numbers I 11, I4, 2, and 6, which correspond to the arguments raised in this article. These results underline the unrepresentativeness of the Khomasdal Consultative Committee's views, and show a good level of

public awareness.

CONCLUSION

The present ethnically-based government structure is proving finan-

cially and administratively unworkable for the numerous reasons elaborated above. Existing proposals would, if implemented, compound current problems, duplicating at third-tier level the unwieldy bureaucra-

cies, corruption, and administrative absurdities characteristic of the

524




representative authorities. Tensions have existed between the tiers of

government since the present system was introduced, primarily as a result of conflicting interests. The effect has been to suspend the

implementation of changes affecting local authorities, while the

uncertainty has adversely affected planning and smooth operations.' The National Party-controlled Municipalities (including Windhoek) and the Administration for Whites have sought to dismember existing local authorities along broadly racial lines, as proposed in the reports of the Commissions. This was clearly a strategy to externalise the costs of social reproduction and upgrading onto the residents of the respective townships from white ratepayers. On the other hand, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance-controlled central Government, in an effort to be seen to be moving away from discrimination, stalled on the implementation of the plans and attempted to bring local authorities under its control before itself being abolished in I983.

It seems unlikely that much will change before independence, whatever the stance of the new 'Cabinet' formed by the Multi-Party Conference, and it is equally unlikely that the future government will favour municipal fission. Experience elsewhere in Africa, most recently in Zimbabwe, has shown that after independence township advisory bodies are generally abolished, city councils become predominantly black once municipal franchise is opened to all races (as a reflection of the urban population composition), and that attempts are made, with

varying success, to integrate the various parts of urban areas. Ultimately, the results reflect the nature of government policy, in particular the

degree of centralisation implemented, and hence attempts to undermine or bolster the position and role of local authorities.2 Whites are now a minority in Windhoek and there is every reason to expect that similar trends to those observed elsewhere will occur here. Some administrative

problems will undoubtedly arise in the short term, while new policies are being formulated, and through lack of experienced personnel if

many senior white municipal officials leave. However, the United Nations Institute for Namibia, currently located in Lusaka, has been

training Namibians for such an eventuality.3 1 The Windhoek Advertiser, 18 and 21 November i 981; and The Windhoek Observer, 21 November

I981. 2 John Howell, Local Government and Politics in the Sudan (Khartoum, I974); Ashton, op. cit.;

E. Gargett, Social Administration in a Changing Context (Harare, I977), University of Zimbabwe Centre for Applied Social Studies, ' Issues in Development', reprint 8; and Greenwood and Howell, loc. cit.

3 Cf. Christian M. Rogerson, 'A future "University of Namibia"?: the role of the United Nations Institute for Namibia', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, I8, 4, December 1980, pp. 675-83.



Although Katutura contains roughly half the capital's population, it has not featured significantly in this analysis because the authorities deem it still ill-prepared for autonomy. Although the housing policy there contains elements not yet applied in Khomasdal,l the overall situation and paucity of service infrastructure suggest that Katutura is the area likely to experience the greatest changes in the city of Windhoek after independence. Intra-urban residential mobility since

desegregation has facilitated a degree of integration in former white suburbs, although without altering the class characteristics of any area. The buffer strips separating Katutura and Khomasdal from the rest of Windhoek are deliberately being filled in by housing and infrastructural

developments. Existing accommodation is inadequate for the rapid growth of Windhoek's population, and peri-urban squatments are

growing. As the city becomes increasingly similar to other third-world

capitals, the imposition of a neo-apartheid administrative structure would be nonsensical, politically unacceptable, and developmentally retrogressive.

1 Simon, 'Urban Squatting, Low Income Housing and Politics in Namibia'.

526 DAVID SIMON



Date post:	09-Jan-2017
Category:	Documents
Upload:	david-simon
View:	217 times
Download:	2 times

Decolonisation and Local Government in Namibia: The Neo-Apartheid Plan, 1977-83

Documents