Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Table of Contents

1 Overview

2 Deepwater Horizon

3 Explosion and fire

4 Casualties and rescue efforts

5 BP Investigation

6 Magnitude of the spill6.1 Government assessment of the leak

6.2 Ongoing debate about the leak

7 Geographic extent of the spill7.1 Extent of surface oil

7.2 Extent of oil in the water column

8 The "spillcam" phenomenon

9 The Spill in Context9.1 Natural seeps

10 Attempts to stop the leak

11 The cleanup

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Lead Author: Cutler J. Cleveland (other articles)Article Topics: Pollution, Marine ecology, Fisheries and OceansThis article has been reviewed and approved by the following Topic Editors: C Michael Hogan (other articles) andPeter Saundry (other articles)Last Updated: June 10, 2010

Revised 10 June 2010; 5:32 PM EDT

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also known as the Gulf ofMexico Oil Spill or the BP Oil Spill) is a large ongoing oil spillcaused by an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon offshoreoil platform about 50 miles southeast of the Mississippi Riverdelta on April 20, 2010 (28.74°N, 88.39°W). Most of the 126workers on the platform were safely evacuated, and asearch and rescue operation began for 11 missing workers.The Deepwater Horizon sank in about 5,000 feet (1,500 m)of water on April 22, 2010. On April 23 the U.S. CoastGuard suspended the search for missing workers who areall presumed dead.

BP was principal developer of the Macondo Prospect oilfield where the accident occurred. The Deepwater Horizon,owned by Transocean Ltd., was under a contract with BP todrill an exploratory well. BP was the lessee and principaldeveloper of the Macondo Prospect oil field in which the rigwas operating. At the time of the explosion, BP andTransocean were in the process of closing the well inanticipation of later production. Halliburton had

Deepwater Horizon oil spill - Encyclopedia of Earth http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill

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11.1 Controlled burns

11.2 Chemical dispersants

11.3 Construction of sand berms

12 Paying for the clean up

13 Ecological concerns13.1 Fish and Wildlife Collection Report

14 Antecedent events14.1 Exclusion from environmental review

14.2 Questions about Blowout Preventers

14.3 Questions About Cementing

15 Government response15.1 Timeline of key actions

15.2 Drilling moratorium

15.3 The Obama Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Legislative Package

15.4 Problems in the Minerals Management Service

15.5 Criticism of the Administration Response

15.6 The Response by Congress

16 Economic Impacts

17 BP environmental and safety record17.1 Exxon Valdez oil spill

17.2 California oil refineries

17.3 Texas City refinery disaster

17.4 Prudhoe Bay oil spill

17.5 BP and low carbon energy

18 Endnotes

19 Sources

The Deepwater Horizon oil platform ablaze on April 21, 2010. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.

recently completed cementing of casings in the well. TheU.S. Government has named BP as the responsible party inthe incident and will hold the company accountable for allcleanup costs resulting from the oil spill. BP has acceptedresponsibility for the oil spill and the cleanup costs butindicated that the accident was not their fault as the rig wasrun by Transocean personnel.

The sinking of the platform caused crude oil to gush out ofthe riser — the 5,000-foot pipe that connects the well at theocean floor to the drilling platform on the surface. Attemptsto shut down the flow, first estimated at about 1,000 barrelsof oil a day, failed when a safety device called a blowoutpreventer could not be activated. On April 28, governmentofficials said there were three leaks and the well was spillingover 5,000 barrels of oil a day — over 200,000 gallons —nearly a mile below sea level. The exact spill flow rate isuncertain and is part of an ongoing debate. Someindependent estimates made in the initial days of theaccident put the spill rate as in the range of 20,000 to100,000 barrels per day.

On May 27, 2010, a U.S. government team of expertsannounced its determination that the overall best initialestimate for the lower and upper boundaries of flow rates ofoil is in the range of 12,000 and 19,000 barrels per day. ByJune 7, this amounted to between 564,000 barrels (23.7million gallons) and 893,000 barrels (37.5 million gallons)released since April 22, making the Deepwater Horizon byfar the worst accidental release of oil in U.S. history. OnJune 3, BP installed a containment system on the leakingwell that was capturing 11,000 barrels per day by June 7. Live video feeds from the well site a mile beneath the water'ssurface show a sizable amount continues to escape fromthe area of the containment cap.

Prior to the Deepwater Horizon, the largest oil spill in U.S.waters was in 1968 when the tanker Mandoil II spilled about300,000 barrels into the Pacific Ocean off Columbia Rivernear Warrenton, Oregon. The 1989 wreck of the ExxonValdez released about 261,905 barrels (11 million gallons)of crude oil into Prince Williams Sound in Alaska. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused a spill of eight million gallons of crude and refined oil productsfrom many different point sources into the southern corridor of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. In 1979-80, the Ixtoc 1 exploratory welloperated the PEMEX, the Mexican national oil corporation, experienced a blowout and ultimately released about 3.3 million barrels (140 milliongallons) of crude oil into the Bay of Campeche in Mexico.

The oil slick produced by the DeepwaterHorizon oil spill has covered as much 28,958square miles (75,000 square kilometers), anarea about the size of South Carolina, withthe extent and location of the slick changingfrom day to day depending on weatherconditions. By the first week in June, oil hadcome ashore in Louisiana, Mississippi,Alabama and Florida, with significant wildlifefatalities in Louisiana. In the weeks followingthe accident, scientists discovered enormousoil plumes in the deep waters of the Gulf ofMexico, raising concerns about ecologicalharm far below the surface that would bedifficult to assess.

The surface slick threatens the ecosystemsand the economy of the entire Gulf Coastregion. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Servicereported that up to 32 National WildlifeRefuges could potentially be affected by thespill. Concerns haver also been raised aboutthe environmental impacts of chemicalsknown as dispersants that have been used todissipate the oil slick. By June 2, 2010, theNational Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA) had banned fishing in

about 37% of federal waters, or 88,522 sq mi (229,270 sq km) of the Gulf.

By June 9, BP stock had lost close to half its value, more than $82 billion, in the seven weeks since the spill started, and the company had spent


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The Deepwater Horizon before thedisaster. Credit: Transocean.

Firefighters combat the fire on theDeepwater Horizon. Credit: U.S. CoastGuard.

$1.43 billion, including the cost of the spill response, containment, relief well drilling, grants to the Gulf states, claims paid, and federal costs.

With oil still flowing from the leak seven weeks after the accident, it was clear that the oil industry's impressive ability to extract oil from ever deeperoffshore environments had not been accompanied by an equally effective capability to predict and respond to accidents. As drillers pushed theboundaries, regulators didn't always mandate preparation for disaster recovery or perform independent monitoring. Documents and testimony fromCongressional hearings revealed a series of potential failures and warning signs at the well site in the hours leading up to the rig explosion, as well asquestions that had been raised years earlier about the reliability of deepwater technology and the ability of the industry to deal with "worse-casescenarios" of accidents. The Minerals Management Service, the government agency with lead oversight of offshore oil and gas activity, came underheavy criticism for lax environmental planning and for sacrificing sound stewardship of a public natural resource for the narrow economic gain toprivate industry.

Deepwater Horizon was an ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, column-stabilized,semi-submersible mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU). The rig was 396 feet (121 m) long and 256feet (78 m) wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet (2,400 m) deep, to a maximum drilldepth of 30,000 feet (9,100 m). Built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea and completed in2001, the rig was owned by Transocean Ltd. and leased to BP until September 2013. At the time ofthe explosion, the rig was on BP's Mississippi Canyon Block 252, referred to as the MacondoProspect, in the United States sector of the Gulf of Mexico, about 41 miles (66 km) off the Louisianacoast. The rig commenced drilling in February 2010 at a water depth of approximately 5,000 feet(1,500 m). The well was planned to be drilled to 18,000 feet (5,500 m), and was to be plugged andabandoned for subsequent completion as a subsea producer.

The fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon reportedly started at 9:45 p.m. CST on April 20, 2010.Survivors described the incident as a sudden explosion that gave them less than five minutes toescape as the alarm went off. Video of the fire shows billowing flames, taller than a multistory building. After burning for more than a day, DeepwaterHorizon sank on April 22, 2010.

The precise cause of the explosion and fire that led to the oil spill are under investigation. Thecurrent hypothesis about the chain of events is as follows. Transocean, Ltd., representatives saidworkers had been performing their standard routines with "no indication of any problems" justprior to the explosion. At the time of the explosion the rig was drilling but was not in production.Production casing was being run and cemented at the time of the accident. Once the cementingwas complete, it was due to be tested for integrity and a cement plug set to temporarily abandonthe well for later completion as a subsea producer. Halliburton said that it had finished cementing20 hours before the fire. Interviews with rig workers suggest that a bubble of methane gasescaped from the well and shot up the drill column, expanding quickly as it burst through severalseals and barriers before exploding. Transocean chief executive Steven Newman stated: "therewas a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both."

At the time of the explotion there were 126 people on the Deepwater Horizon platform; of these, 115 individuals were evacuated. Most of the workersevacuated the rig and took diesel-powered fiberglass lifeboats to the M/V Damon B Bankston, a workboat that BP had hired to service the rig; somewere then evacuated from the workboat by helicopter to regional trauma centers. The United States Coast Guard launched a rescue operationinvolving two cutters, four helicopters and a rescue plane. After a three-day search covering 5,300 miles, the Coast Guard called off the search forthe 11 missing persons, concluding that the "reasonable expectations of survival" had passed. Officials concluded that the missing workers may havebeen near the blast and not been able to escape the sudden explosion.

On May 24, 2010, BP announced that its internal investigation of the Deepwater Horizon event suggested that the accident was brought about by thefailure of a number of processes, systems and equipment. BP's internal investigation is focused on the following seven mechanisms.

The cement that seals the reservoir from the well;1.

The casing system, which seals the well bore;2.


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A video of the oil leak taken by aremotely operated underwater vehicle.Credit: PBS.

Oil from the Deepwater Horizon spill pools against the Louisiana coast along Barataria Bay. Credit: Associated Press

The pressure tests to confirm the well is sealed;3.

The execution of procedures to detect and control hydrocarbons in the well, including the use of the BOP;4.

The BOP Emergency Disconnect System, which can be activated by pushing a button at multiple locations on the rig;5.

The automatic closure of the BOP after its connection is lost with the rig; and6.

Features in the BOP to allow Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) to close the BOP and thereby seal the well at the seabed aftera blow out.

7.

On Friday, April 23, two remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) began scanning the riser to determine if there were any leaks. The discoveryof two leaks was made Saturday morning. BP, and the Coast Guard initially reported that about 1,000 barrels of oil per day were coming from theleaks on the riser. On April 28, NOAA estimated the leak was likely 5,000 barrels (210,000 US gallons) per day due in part to the discovery of a thirdleak. The 5,000 barrel per day figure remained BP and government doctrine for a month after the accident.

On May 12, 2010, BP released a 30 second video clip of the leak that was taken by a cameramounted to an ROV, which ignited a debate over the magnitude of the leak. At the request ofSenator Bill Nelson (Florida) and Barbara Boxer (California), BP released four videos of the leaks.Multiple scientists reviewed those videos, remotely sensed data, and information on thesubsurface plume, and concluded that the leak rate was much higher than what BP and thegovernment had reported. In a U.S. Congressional testimony on May 19, 2010, Steve Wereley, aprofessor of mechanical engineering at Purdue University, reviewed the independent leak rateassessments and reported a range of 20,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. These estimates are fargreater than the rate of 5,000 barrels per day cited by BP and the U.S. government. At the higherleak rates, it would take a few days, at most a week, for the spill to exceed the Exxon Valdez oilspill's record.

On May 21, 2010, the New York Times published the estimates made by a group of independentscientists. The group included Steve Wereley from Purdue University, Ian R. MacDonald, anoceanographer at Florida State University, John Amos, a geologist and remote sensing expert atSkytruth.org, and Timothy Crone, a marine geophysicist at Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,Columbia University. Contrary to BP's claim that the spill rate was impossible to measure, thisgroup argued that there are at least two ways to measure the rate of the spill. The first methoduses computer image analysis of satellite photos and data to measure the spread and thickness of oil on the ocean surface. Remote sensing imagesexamined by Amos and MacDonald indicated that at least 26,500 barrels of oil have been reaching the surface each day.

The second method is to measure flow rates at the site of discharge using optical image analysis. Using video released by BP, Wereley and Croneestimated 60,000 to 75,000 per day. The scientists acknowledge that because the video released was of poor quality, and information regarding theimage scene is sparse, the uncertainties in these measurements are large.

Note that these estimates pertain only to the oil coming from the broken riser pipe resting on the ocean floor. There is a second leak point on the topof the blow-out preventer whose magnitude is unknown, but it will only increase the estimate of the total flow escaping.

These scientists conclude that the discharge is at least 40,000 barrels per day and could be as much as 100,000 barrels. Their assessments suggestthat BP’s stated worst-case estimate of 60,000 barrels has been occurring all along.

Otherindependentanalystssuggest thanany estimatehigher thanabout 25,000barrels perday isinconsistentwith actualproductionrates from oilwells in theregion. BruceBullock,Director of the Maguire Energy Institute at Southern Methodist University, observed that the recorddaily production rate for an unimpeded well in the Gulf is 41,352 barrels per day in BP's Troikaproject, and that the discovery well in that project produced only 27,000 barrels per day. Single well


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maximum rates now approach 30,000 barrels per day. Production rates in other new deep waterrange from 6,000 to 25,000 barrels per day.For the first month after the spill, BP and the government repeatedly rejected estimates higher than 5,000 barrels per day, arguing that there is noway to estimate the flow coming out of the pipe accurately. Instead, they relied on measurements of oil on the sea surface made by the Coast Guardand NOAA. But on May 20, 2010, BP acknowledged that the spill rate was greater than 5,000 barrels per day because its own recovery effort wascapturing that amount and more was still leaking out. BP's admission bolstered criticism that the government had been lax in measuring the true extentof the spill and its impacts. Confusion over the spill rate was heightened on May 21, 2010 when BP backed off of its statement that it had begunsiphoning up 5,000 barrels per day, saying instead that the recovery rate was about 2,000 barrels per day.

BP was subject to intense pressure and criticism that it was impeding independent scientific inquiry into the leak. Rep. Edward J. Markey(Massachusetts) sent a direct request to BP America’s CEO Lamar McKay to release more video footage. Bowing to this pressure, BP announced onMay 19, 2010 that there will be a live feed of the oil spill made publicly available on the web--an oil gusher webcam. BP said they would release thefeed, which went live on May 20, 2010 at the web site of the U.S. House of Representatives' Select Committee for Energy Independence and GlobalWarming. Heavy traffic caused the web site to crash.

On May 20, 2010, Jane Lubchenco, head of NOAA, said that a government task force is working "around the clock" to determine the actual flow rate. On May 21, 2010, Admiral Thad Allen, the National Incident Commander for the Deepwater Horizon Response team, formally established the FlowRate Technical Group (FRTG), a multi-agency federal effort to determine oil flow rates from the BP spill. BP continued to maintain that third-partyestimates did not factor in the amount of natural gas escaping from the well, or the damage to the riser and drill pipes after the April 20 explosion,factors that could depress the amount of oil escaping.

The FRTG announced on May 27 that the overall best initial estimate for the lower and upper boundaries of flow rates of oil is in the range of 12,000and 19,000 barrels per day. The FRTG used three separate methodologies to calculate its initial estimate:

A mass balance approach analyzed how much oil is on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico using data that was collected from NASA’sAirborne Visible InfraRed Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS), an advanced imaging tool. Based on observations on May 17th, the FRTGestimated that between 130,000 and 270,000 barrels of oil are on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. The FRTG also estimated that asimilar volume of oil to the amount AVIRIS found on the surface has already been burned, skimmed or dispersed by responders orhas evaporated naturally as of May 17th. This corresponds to a release rate in the range of 12,000 to 19,000 barrels of oil per day.

The Plume Modeling Team used video observations of the oil/gas mixture escaping from the kinks in the riser and at the end of theriser pipe alongside advanced image analysis to estimate fluid velocity and flow volume. This Team made an initial range estimate of12,000 to 25,000 barrels of oil per day.

A lower limit was calculated based on the amount of oil collected by the Riser Insertion Tube Tool (RITT), plus the estimate of howmuch oil is escaping the RITT, and how much oil is leaking from the kink in the riser. The RITTI Team calculated that the lowerbound estimate of the total oil flow is at least 11,000 barrels of oil per day, depending on whether the flow through the kink isprimarily gas or oil. The lower bound estimate calculated by the RITT Team is more than twice the amount of the earlier flux estimateof 5,000 barrels of oil per day and is independent of any calculations or model assumptions made by either team above.

Seven weeks after the disaster, the magnitude of the leak remained the subject of intense debate. Some analysts suggested that the leak rateincreased sharply when BP sliced through the riser to install its new collection device on June 3, perhaps much more than the 20 percent increasethat government officials warned might occur when the riser was cut. BP said that the containment cap it placed on the BOP was recovering about15,000 barrels of oil per day by June 9. That amounts to a significant fraction of the 12,000 to 19,000 barrels a day being released according togovernment estimates. However, the video feed of the leak revealed significant quantities still being released, suggesting that the government estimatewas too low.


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Estimates of the size of the surface slick in the Gulf of Mexico formed by oil fromthe Deepwater Horizon accident. Data from Skythruth.org.

NASA satellite image surface slick in the Gulf of Mexicoformed by oil from the Deepwater Horizon accident. Credit:NASA.

Estimates of the extent of the surface oil slick werederived from data on wind and ocean currentforecasts, as well as analysis of aerial photographyand satellite imagery from a variety of sources. Usingthese data, New York Times produced a daily map of(1) the “observed extent” where oil was visible on thesurface of the water during aerial surveys of the Gulf,and (2) the “probable extent” of the oil slick asestimated by NOAA of where oil is most likely to go.The extents may vary widely from day to day becauseof changes in wind patterns and ocean currents. Onemonth after the accident, the surface slick covered anarea of about 16,000 square miles (41,424 squarekilometers), an area about twice the size of the stateof New Jersey.

By May 12, 2010, the Louisiana Department ofWildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) had confirmedshoreline impact at the South Pass and WhiskeyIsland. On May 18, 2010, Louisiana officialsconfirmed that surface oil had reached andpenetrated the marsh ecosystems at the Head ofPasses, the region where the main stem of theMississippi River branches off into three distinctdirections at its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico:Southwest Pass (west), Pass A Loutre (east) andSouth Pass (center). By May 20, 2010, theLouisiana Department of Environmental Quality hadconfirmed shoreline impact on the ChandeleurIslands, Whiskey Island, Raccoon Island, SouthPass, East Fourchon/Elmers Island, Grand Isle,Trinity Island, Brush Island, and the Pass a Loutre area. Marsh Island was added on May 23. On May 20, NOAA, set the total amount of Louisianashoreline with oil impact at 34.52 miles; by May 23 the affected coastline was more than 65 miles.

The arrival of the oil onshore was different than the iconic images from the Exxon Valdez spill where crude oil from a tanker spilled onto the surface ofan enclosed body of water close to a rocky, static shoreline. Instead, the BP spill is pouring millions of gallons from the floor of the Gulf 5,000 feetbelow in an open sea, and 50 miles from the nearest land, which is composed of broken marshes, river deltas, open bays and barrier islands. The oilarrived in thin lines on the Louisiana coasts, and some scientists predicted a series of "rolling skirmishes" that will last for months, if not years, evenafter the well is finally capped.

On June 1, 2010, red-brown oil is first appeared on Dauphin Island off the coast of Alabama near the mouth of Mobile Bay, and Mississippi Gov.Haley Barbour said a strand of oil about a meter wide and two miles long has been found on Petit Bois Island near the Mississippi-Alabama border.

On May 19, NOAA concluded that some portion of the oil had reached theLoop Current in the form of "light to very light sheens". The Loop Currentis a warm ocean current in the Gulf of Mexico that flows northwardbetween Cuba and the Yucatán peninsula, moves north into the Gulf ofMexico, loops west and south before exiting to the east through the FloridaStraits. Once in the Loop Current, oil could be carried into the FloridaKeys and the Atlantic Ocean. By May 27, 2010, a change in the currenthad trapped a slick of oil in a huge circular eddy that scientists saidappears likely to push slowly west instead of pumping the oil south into theFlorida Keys.

On June 3, scientists at National Center for Atmospheric Researchreleased the results of a computer modeling study that indicates that oilfrom the spill in the Gulf of Mexico might soon extend along thousands ofmiles of the Atlantic coast and open ocean as early as the summer of2010. The computer simulations indicate that, once the oil in theuppermost ocean has become entrained in the Gulf of Mexico’sfast-moving Loop Current, it is likely to reach Florida's Atlantic coast withinweeks. It can then move north as far as about Cape Hatteras, NorthCarolina, with the Gulf Stream, before turning east. Whether the oil will bea thin film on the surface or mostly subsurface due to mixing in theuppermost region of the ocean is not known.

On June 4, 2010, the first significant amount of oil arrived on the Floridacoast. State and local officials reported that gooey blobs of oil tar werewashing ashore in growing numbers on the white-sand beaches of theFlorida Panhandle.


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A frame from the high resolutionvideo of oil and gas being releasedfrom the severed riser pipe on June3, 2010. Credit: BP

On May 12, scientists at the National Institute for Undersea Science and Technology (NIUST) discovered why they described as large oil plumes inthe deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, including one as large as 10 miles long, three miles wide and 300 feet thick in spots. The plumes wererecorded at depths of 1,000–1,400 meters. Initial reports suggested that the plumes are depleting the oxygen dissolved in the water column, whichcould pose a threat to marine life forms at varying trophic levels.

On May 27 2010, scientists from the University of South Florida and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Research Institute reported a new, wide area of“dissolved hydrocarbons” that is about six miles wide, and extends from the surface down to a depth of about 3,200 feet. The plume stretches 22 milesnortheast of the blown wellhead toward Mobile Bay, Alabama. Yhey discovered the plume while they were taking water samples in the DeSotoCanyon off the Florida Panhandle. The plume is clear, with the oil entirely dissolved. Scientists need to do more tests to determine whether thosehydrocarbons are from the chemical dispersants used to break up the oil, or the emulsification of oil as it flowed away from the well.

A month after the accident, some scientists criticized the government of failing to conduct an adequate scientific analysis of the damage and ofallowing BP to obscure the spill’s true scope. They point to a 2003 study by the National Academy of Sciences, which suggested that the oil in adeepwater blowout could break into fine droplets, forming plumes of oil mixed with water that would not quickly rise to the surface. Critics charge thatNOAA should have been better prepared to assess the fate and transport of oil below the surface.

On May 30, 2010, scientists from the University of Georgia reported the existence of the underwter plume based on two pieces of evidence. First,data from their Conductivity, Temperature, Depth (CTD) Sensor indicate a plume that extends from about 1100m to 1300m in the water column.Second, oil was clearly visible in water samples taken within the plume, but absent from samples taken above and below the plume.

On June 8, 2010, NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco announced that tests on the samples taken by the University of South Florida research teamconfirmed "very low" concentrations of subsurface oil at sampling depths ranging from the surface to 3,300 feet at locations 40 and 42 nautical milesnortheast of the well sites, and another sampling station at 142 nautical miles southeast of the wellhead. Chemical "fingerprinting" confirmed that theoil 42 nautical miles from the well site was from the BP oil spill source.

One of the most important forces driving the response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster was the "spillcam"--live video footage of the leak andrecovery operations that was taken by cameras mounted on the ROVs and streamed live on the Web. Video from the spillcam shaped scientificdebate about the extent of the oil release, fueled public outrage towards BP, and emboldened politicians to pressure BP for more data and a fasterresponse.

On May 12, 2010, BP released a 30 second video clip of the leak thatwas taken by a camera mounted to an ROV, which ignited a debateover the magnitude of the leak. At the request of Senator Bill Nelson(Florida) and Barbara Boxer (California), BP released four videos ofthe leaks. Rep. Edward J. Markey (Massachusetts) sent a directrequest to BP America’s CEO Lamar McKay to release more videofootage. Bowing to this pressure, BP announced on May 19, 2010that there will be a live feed of the oil spill made publicly available onthe web--an oil gusher webcam. BP said they would release the feed,which went live on May 20, 2010 at the web site of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives' Select Committee for Energy Independence andGlobal Warming. Heavy traffic caused the web site to crash.On May 21, 2010. PBS’ “Newshour” was among the first to convert the video feed to make it work on most Web browsers; subscribers to the“Newshour” channel on YouTube doubled in 24 hours. Since then thousands of web sites have linked to the video supplied by BP. Within a few days,“BP oil spill live feed” was close to the top of a list of searches on Google.

On June 8, 2010, BP released the first high-quality video if the leak after Sens. Barbara Boxer and Bill Nelson requested "full access to all video" tohelp independent experts determine the exact rate of oil flowing from the well. The high-resolution video shows the ruptured well two days after robotscut the well's riser pipe in preparation for the containment cap. Some scientists and politicians criticized BP for withholding all the high quality videothat would increase understanding of the extent of the leak.

Oil enters the marine environment from a variety of natural and human sources. The largest sources from human activity originate in the exploration,production and transportation stages of the oil and gas industry. These include offshore oil platforms, tankers, pipelines, barges, railroads, trucks andvarious oil storage facilties. The ten largest individual releases of oil from accidents in the U.S. are:

April 22, 2010, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, off Louisiana: 564,000 - 893,000 barrels (through June7, 2010)

1.

February 29, 1968, Mandoil II, Pacific Ocean, off Columbia River, Warrenton, OR: 300,000 barrels2.

March 24,1989, Exxon Valdez, Prince William Sound, Valdez, AK: 261,905 barrels3.


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Estimates on the quantity of oilreleased from the DeepwaterHorizon accident, from natural oilseeps in the entrie Gulf of Mexico,and from some notable historic U.Soil spills. Data sources: DeepwaterHorizon: this article; natural seeps:Schmidt Etkin, 2009 and NRC,2003; U.S. oil spills: Schmidt Etkin,2009

November 1, 1979, Burmah Agate, Gulf of Mexico, off Galveston Bay, TX: 254,762 barrels4.

February 8, 1968, Pegasus (Pegasos), Northwest Atlantic Ocean, off U.S. east coast: 228,500 barrels5.

March 26, 1971, Texaco Oklahoma, Northwest Atlantic Ocean, off U.S. east coast: 225,000 barrels6.

November 5, 1969 Keo, Northwest Atlantic Ocean, SE of Nantucket Island, MA: 209,524 barrels7.

December 12, 1976, Argo Merchant, Nantucket Shoals, off Nantucket Island, MA: 183,333 barrels8.

April 4, 1975, Spartan Lady, Northwest Atlantic Ocean, off U.S. east coast: 142,857 barrels9.

October 24, 1966, Gulfstag, Gulf of Mexico: 133,000 barrels10.

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused a spill of about 190,000 barrels (8 million gallons) of crude and refined oil products from many different pointsources into the southern corridor of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico.

Except for theDeepwater Horizon, all of the accdients in the list involve oil tankers. Prior to the Deepwater Horizon, the largest release of oil from aplatform accident was the Alpha Well 21 Platform A disaster in 1969--also known as the Santa Barbara oil spill--which released about 100,000barrels of oil. The Deepwater Horizon passed that mark in the first six to nine days.

Natural seeps can be thought of as natural springs from which liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons (hydrogen-carbon compounds) leak out of theground. Oil seeps are fed by natural underground accumulations of oil and natural gas. Satellite images have identified hundreds of areas in thewhere oil is likley to seep from the Earth's crust into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. These seeps occur over a wide range of the 615,000 mi² (1.6million km²) Gulf. A 2003 study by the National Academy of Sciences and a 2009 report by oil spill expert Dagmar Schmidt Etkin indicate thatbetween 560,000 and 1,400,000 barrels per year (1,534 to 3,835 barrels per day) seep into the Gulf of Mexico from natural sources, and presumablyhave been doing so for millennia. Dozens of natural seeps have been identified off the coasts of Louisiana and Texas, some in the region of theDeepwater Horizon site.

These natural seeps are quasi-continuous or chronic inputs that represent a "background" rate of oilinput that have been in existence for hundreds or thousands of years. As the term "seep" implies, therate of release from these sources of oil is much smaller than human spills that often release large,concentrated pulses of oil. One of the largest and most intensively studied seepage areas lies off CoalOil Point, in Santa Barbara County, California. Individual seeps in this area release an estimated 80 to100 barrels (3,360 to 4,200 gallons) of oil per day; Deepwater Horizon is releasing 12,000 to 19,000barrels per day.

The Deepwater Horizon site releases 3 to 12 times the oil per day compared to that released bynatural seeps across the entire Gulf of Mexico. By May 30, the Deepwater Horizon site had releasedbetween 468,000 and 741,000 barrels of oil, compared to 60,000 to 150,000 barrels from naturalseeps across the entire Gulf of Mexico over the same 39 day period.

Natural seeps are not constantly active; the volume of oil released can vary considerably throughoutthe day and from day to day. As a result, only a small area around the source is actually exposed to"fresh" non-degraded oil, which is its most toxic state.

Marine and coastal organisms and ecosystems presumably have adapted to the natural rate of oilinput. Indeed, most organisms living in the regions near natural oil seeps have no special adaptationsto the oil. Researchers at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute and the University of California/SantaBarbara studied natural seeps off the coast of California. They found that as the oil moved upwards inthe water column, a wide range of microbes consume the oil and produce intermediate products, andthat those intermediate products are then converted by another group of microbes to natural gas andother compounds. Their research suggests that oil from natural seeps normally stays in the water forbetween ten hours to five days.

Oil that does make it to the surface from natural seeps can spread out very widely. One gallon of oilcan spread out to cover more than a full square mile, forming an extremely thin film on the surface,about one-hundredth of a millimeter thick. Under these conditions, the oil is not hazardous. Some of the oil in that thin sheen evaporates withinseconds or minutes after it reaches the surface.

A sudden, concentrated and massive pulse of oil from an event such as the Deepwater Horizon disaster presents a fundamentally more acute stressto marine and coastal systems. The amount, rate and spatial concentration of crude oil released from such an event overwhelm the naturalmechanisms of oil dispersal and breakdown, producing the significant ecological effects that we observe.

BP's long run plan is to complete so-called relief wells that will intercept the existing wellbore at approximately 12,800 feet below the sea floor. Oncethat is accomplished, heavy fluids and cement can be pumped down hole to kill the well. BP estimated this process will take at least 90 days. On May2, 2010, BP began drilling the first deep-water intercept relief well, which is located one-half mile from the Macondo well, in a water depth of roughly4,990 feet. A second relief well was begun on May 16.

BP's engineers sought to cut off the leak by using ROVs to activate the blowout preventer (BOP), a massive five story, 450 ton stack of shut-off


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A blowout preventer. Credit:Cameron-Nautronix.

valves, rams, housings, tanks and hydraulic tubing that sits on top of the well. The BOP is designed to quickly shut off the flow of oil or natural gas bysqueezing, crushing or shearing pipe if there is a sudden, unexpected spike in pressure. This procedure failed. Early speculation suggested that gashydrates formed in the BOP, causing it to malfunction. A gas hydrate is a crystalline solid consisting of gas molecules, usually methane, eachsurrounded by a cage of water molecules. It is similar to ice, except that the crystalline structure is stabilized by the guest gas molecule within thecage of water molecules. Gas hydrates are common when gas and water mix, and are found on the ocean floor where there are low temperaturesand high pressure.

On May 7, 2010, BP maneuvered a 98-ton steel containment dome over the worst of the leaks, andplanned to funnel the oil through a pipe to the surface, where it would be collected by a drill ship. Thisprocedure failed when the dome’s opening was clogged with gas hydrates. The dome was moved offto the side of the wellhead and is resting on the sea floor.

On May 12, 2010, BP abandoned plans for a second, smaller containment dome or “top hat"cofferdam, a 5-foot-tall, 4-foot-diameter structure that weighs less than 2 tons and would be injectedwith alcohol to act as an antifreeze to keep its outlet clear of gas hydrates.

The first significant success at reducing the release of oil came on May 17, 2010 when robotsinserted a four-inch diameter Riser Insertion Tube Tool (RITT) into the Horizon’s riser (21-inchdiameter pipe) between the well and the broken end of the riser on the seafloor in 5,000 feet of water.The RITT was expected to work like a straw, sucking the leaking oil into a tanker waiting on the surfacewhere the oil would be separated and then shipped ashore. BP initially stated that the RITT wasrecovering 5,000 barrels per day, but on May 21, 2010, BP reduced that estimate, stating that thedevice was recovering an average of about 2,200 barrels of oil a day. Additional oil continued to flowfrom the leaks. BP subsequently reported that from the period from May 17th to May 23rd, the dailyoil rate collected by the RITT had ranged from 1,360 barrels of oil per day (b/d) to 3,000 b/d, and thedaily gas rate has ranged from 4 million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) to 17 MMCFD. The oil is beingstored and gas is being flared on the drillship Discoverer Enterprise, on the surface 5,000 feet above. The RITT was disabled on the evening of May 25, 2010 in preparation for the "top kill" procedureinitiated the following day.

On May 26, 2010, the U.S. government gave BP the approval to proceed with a "top kill" operationtoday to stop the flow of oil from the damaged well. The procedure is intended to stem the flow of oiland gas and ultimately kill the well by injecting heavy drilling fluids through the blowout preventer on theseabed, down into the well.On May 29, 2010, BP engineers said that the “top kill” technique had failed. Despite successfully pumping of over 30,000barrels of heavy mud, in three attempts at rates of up to 80 barrels a minute, and deploying a wide range of different bridging materials, the operationdid not overcome the flow from the well.

Simultaneously with the top kill, BP attempted what is known as a “junk shot.” This method involves debris such as shredded tires, golf balls and similarobjects being shot under extremely high pressure into the blowout preventer in an attempt to clog it and stop the leak. The process was carried out "anumber of times" with the U.S. Coast Guard before BP concluded that it had failed.

After consultation with government officials, BP then decided to move on to another option. The company said its next attempt will be a custom-builtcap known as the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) Cap Containment System. This first involves cutting and then removing the damaged riserfrom the top of the failed Blow-Out Preventer (BOP) to leave a cleanly-cut pipe at the top of the BOP’s LMRP. The cap is designed to be connected toa riser from the Discoverer Enterprise drillship and placed over the LMRP with the intention of capturing most of the oil and gas flowing from the well.

In the wake of BP's unsuccessful attempts, on June 1, 2010, Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen said that efforts to plug the well were over for thetimebeing, and that effort will focus on containing and directing most of the oil to tankers on the surface. Allen acknowledged that this will may notcapture all the oil, but the hope is it will capture most of the spill until relief wells cap it permanently.

The next move was a "cut-and-cap" approach. On June 3, 2010, a cap was succesfully placed on top of the BOP after a 20 foot pair of shears hadsevered the riser from the BOP. About 6,000 barrels were recovered on June 4 and pumped to a recovery ship on the surface. According to BP, byJune 7 rate of recovery had risen to about 11,000 barrels per day.

On June 8, the Coast Guard directed BP to develop contingency plans for the collection of oil brought to the surface in the event of an operationalfailure or severe weather.

BP assumed responsibility for the initial clean up and mitigation efforts. According to BP Chief Executive, Tony Hayward, "we are taking fullresponsibility for the spill and we will clean it up and where people can present legitimate claims for damages we will honor them." On April 28, theU.S. military announced it was joining the cleanup operation.

The U.S. government established a "unified command" structure to coordinate the response to the spill. The stated purpose of the unified command isto link the organizations responding to the incident and to provide a forum for those organizations to make "consensus decisions." The DeepwaterHorizon Unified Command include BP, Transocean, and the following federal agencies: Minerals Management Service, NOAA, the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA), Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the Department of Defense,the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and theOccupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

As of June 9, the Unifed Command identified these resources employed to respond to the spill:

Total response vessels: 4,500

Total boom deployed: more than 4.77 million feet (regular plus sorbent boom)

Oily water recovered: more than 16 million gallons

Dispersant used: more than 1.14 million gallons (798,000 on surface, 346,000 below surface)


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A controlled burn of surface oil from the Deepwater Horizon oilplatform. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.

Overall personnel responding: more than 24,000

17 staging areas are in place and ready to protect sensitive shorelines, including: Dauphin Island, Ala., Orange Beach, Ala.,Theodore, Ala., Panama City, Fla., Pensacola, Fla., Port St. Joe, Fla., St. Marks, Fla., Amelia, La., Cocodrie, La., Grand Isle, La.,Shell Beach, La., Slidell, La., St. Mary, La.; Venice, La., Biloxi, Miss., Pascagoula, Miss., and Pass Christian, Miss.

On April 28, BP performed the first controlled burn of surface oil, alsoknown as an in situ burn. Fire booms, U-shaped devices that aretowed behind two boats and used to pull oil away from the main spillfor safe burning, can be used when seas are below 3 feet and whensufficient amounts of oil can be "corralled." Controlled burnscontinued to be used at the Deepwater Horizon spill site throughmid-May, 2010 when conditions were right. This represents the firston-water in-situ burning at a spill since the 1989 test burn during theExxon Valdez oil spill, which was the first time a fire-resistant boomwas used at a spill. The amount of oil burned at the DeepwaterHorizon spill site is unknown.

The EPA and Coast Guard approved the use of dispersants, a groupof chemicals designed to be sprayed onto oil slicks to accelerate theprocess of natural dispersion. The dispersants used in the DeepwaterHorizon clean-up are Corexit 9500 and Corexit EC9527A, also knownas deodorized kerosene. The EPA has pre-approved both foremergencies that are three nautical miles (roughly five kilometers ) offthe shoreline and in water depths greater than 30 feet (10 meters). Inthe weeks following the spill, surface dispersants were applied byaerial means by BP and various federal agencies. By May 30, 2010, 920,000 gallons of total dispersant have been deployed—720,000 on the surfaceand 200,000 subsea—by far the largest ever use of dispersant in a U.S. oil spill.

Corexit 9500 is known in prior scientific studies to pose a high level of toxicity to primary producer biota in the water column; in addition, it has beenshown to accelerate the uptake of certain likely carcinogenic minority components present in petroleum such as napthalene. The dispersants usedare approximately 10,000 times more lethal to biota than crude oil itself. Corexit 9500 and Corexit EC9527A, manufactured by an Illinois company,both contain 2-butoxyethanol, a chemical known to cause respiratory and skin irritation effects in humans. These dispersants have been banned foruse by the United Kingdom, due to known biological effects on people and natural systems.

Oil spill dispersants do not actually reduce the total amount of oil entering the environment.1 Rather, they change the inherent chemical and physicalproperties of oil, thereby changing the oil’s transport, fate and potential effects. Small amounts of spilled oil naturally disperse into the water column,through the action of waves and other environmental processes. The objective of dispersant use is to enhance the amount of oil that physically mixesinto the water column, reducing the potential that a surface slick will contaminate shoreline habitats or come into contact with birds, marine mammals,or other organisms that exist on the water surface or shoreline. Conversely, by promoting dispersion of oil into the water column, dispersantsincrease the potential exposure of oil to fish and bottom dwelling biota such as clams or oysters. Dispersant application thus represents a consciousdecision to increase the risk to one component of the ecosystem (e.g.,the water column) while reducing the load on another (e.g., coastal wetland).Decisions to use dispersants, therefore, involve trade-offs between decreasing the risk to water surface and shoreline habitats while increasing thepotential risk to organisms in the water column and on the seafloor.


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Aerial application of chemical diserpsant to urface oil from the Deepwater Horizon oil platform. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.

A 2005study by

the National Research Council (NRC) on the ecological effects of dispersants concluded that there is insufficient scientific data to assess the neteffect of chemical dispersants on marine and coastal ecosystems. The NRC stated: "In many instances where a dispersed plume may come intocontact with sensitive water-columns or benthic organisms or populations, the current understanding of key processes and mechanisms is inadequateto confidently support a decision to apply dispersants." EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson acknowledged this point in a testimony before the U.S.Senate Committe on Environment and Public Works on May 18, 2010, when she stated "...the long term effects of dispersants on aquatic life areunknown..."

During the first weeks of May, BP applied dispersant at the sea floor during EPA-sanctioned tests. On May 7, 2010, after having deployedapproximately 15,354 gallons of subsea dispersants, EPA halted subsea dispersant operations, awaiting additional test results in order toresume. Initial studies by EPA indicated that the subsurface application of approximately 10,000-15,000 gallons of dispersants have the equivalenteffect on the oil as the surface application of approximately 50,000 gallons of dispersant. Thus, in principle, the subsurface application of dispersantsis more efficient than surface application and could result in less dispersant being released into the environment.

On May 15, 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard and the EPA authorized BP to use dispersants undersea. Government officials stated that preliminary testingresults indicate that subsea use of the dispersant is effective at reducing the amount of oil reaching the surface – and can do so with the use of lessdispersant than is needed when the oil does reach the surface. Some scientists are concerned that this practice may contribute to the formation ofthe underwater oil plume by shaping the oil into smaller droplets. On May 17, U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey (Massachusetts) sent a letter to EPAAdministrator Lisa Jackson asking EPA to respond to concerns about the potential ecological impacts of dispersants.

On May 19, 2010, the EPA informed BP that the company had to immediately identify and use less-toxic forms of chemical dispersants, suggestingthat federal officials were concerned that the unprecedented use of chemical dispersants could pose a significant threat to the Gulf of Mexico'smarine life. On May 20, 2010, the EPA began to post data from BP on the company's monitoring and sampling programs at the EPA web site. Someof the monitoring parameters include: 1) identification of dispersed oil, 2) oil droplet size, 3) dissolved oxygen (DO) and other physical characteristicssuch as conductivity, temperature and depth (CTD) and, 4) toxicity information.

On May 20, 2010, BP told the EPA that it cannot find a safe, effective and available dispersant to use instead of Corexit, and will continue to use thatchemical application to help break up the spill. BP told EPA that Sea-Brat 4, a proposed alternative dispersant, was rejected in part due to concernthat it may degrade to a nonylphenyl, a suspected endocrine disruptor.

Some environmental scientists have criticized BP for keeping secret some of the "alternative" chemical ingredients it is using in the oil spilldispersants in its May 20 response to EPA. The EPA says BP and several of the dispersant manufacturers have claimed some sections of BP'sdispersant response contain confidential business information (CBI). EPA stated that "by law, CBI cannot be immediately made public except with thecompany's permission," and that the "EPA is currently evaluating all legal options to ensure that the remaining redacted information is released to thepublic."

On May 24, 2010, the EPA directed BP to "significantly scale back the overall use of dispersants," because their data demonstrated that sub seadispersant application was having an effect on the oil at the source of the leak, and thus far has had "no significant ecological impact." By rampingdown on the amount of dispersant used, particularly on the surface where the EPA expected less un-dispersed oil because of the sub sea application,the amount of dispersant applied could be reduced by as much as half, and possibly more. By May 27, 2010, BP had reduced daily use ofdispersants to 12,000 gallons from 70,000. EPA and U.S. Coast Guard continued to view BP’s scientific analysis of alternative dispersants asinsufficient, stating that BP seemed " more interested in defending their initial decisions than analyzing possible better options."

On May 27, scientists that participated in a two day conference on dispersants concluded that, to date, the effects of dispersing oil into the water


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Shoreline modification in coastal Louisiana to reduce oil impact on wetlands. Credit:U.S. Coast Guard.

column has generally been less environmentally harmful than allowing the oil to migrate on the surface into the sensitive wetlands and near shorecoastal habitats. The meeting was co-sponsored by the Coastal Response Research Center at the University of New Hampshire, NOAA, EPA and theU.S. Coast Guard.

Louisiana state officials proposed theconstruction of about 80 miles of sand bermsalong barrier islands and wetlands to capture oilfrom the spill. The proposed berms would runalong the Chandeleur Islands chain, along federaland state wildlife refuges at the mouth of theMississippi River, and would block oil fromentering back bays and wetlands to the west ofthe river, all the way to the Isles Dernieres nearthe center of the state. The idea is that the oilwould collect behind these walls of sand socleanup crews could suck it up before it reachesthe marshes.

The plan requires a permit from the U.S. Corps ofEngineers and from the U.S. Coast Guard whichoversees the government response. But federalofficials and some scientists expressed concernabout the plan. Some experts question whetherdredging companies could build up the barrierislands quickly enough to save the marshes.There is also concern that the kind of sand bermsenvisioned in the plan might wash away quicklyafter a couple of storms, wasting scarce sand inthe region. In addition, the underwater borrowpits proposed by the state could be too close tothe berms, and thus could cause greater erosionto existing barrier islands or other environmentalproblems. Some scientists are concerned that the berms could block inlets that carry water to the wetlands on shore and interfere with the movementof organisms that depend on tidal flushing.

The feasibility and cost of the berm project is a point of contention between state and local officials. On May 23, 2010, Louisiana Attorney GeneralBuddy Caldwell sent a letter to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Sunday advising them that the State of Louisiana was within its rights to rebuildbarrier islands in order to combat the Gulf of Mexico oil spill if the Federal government did not do so first. Caldwell advised Lt. Gen. Robert L. VanAntwerp, commanding general of the Corps, that under the U.S. constitution the federal government does not have the legal authority to deny a statethe right to conduct such emergency operations to protect its citizens and territory.

On May 27 the U.S government approved the state's proposal to build a 6-foot-high sand berm just south of Scofield Island, west of the MississippiRiver, as a temporary barrier to oil from the Deepwater Horizon spill reaching wetlands in Barataria Bay. The cost of construction will be borne byeither BP or the federal government. The island is one of six oil-protective sand berms proposed by the state that were granted an emergency permit by the Army Corps of Engineers. The other five -- including two east of the Misssissippi River and three more to the west -- would have to be paid forby the state, with no guarantee that BP or the federal government would pick up their cost. State officials criticized the delay in approval, and for thedecison not to fund the construction for all six berms.

On June 1, the U.S. government BP directed BP directed BP to pay for five additional barrier island projects in addition to the one approved on May27. BP announced that it supports that decision, and that the company will fund the estimated $360 million it will cost to construct the six sections. Thesix approved barriers -- four west of the Mississippi River and two to the east -- would rise 6 feet above sea level. They would be 300 feet wide at theirbase and 25 feet wide at their crown.

The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), established in the Treasury, is available to pay the expenses of federal response to oil pollution under theFederal Water Pollution Control Act, and to compensate claims for oil removal costs and certain damages caused by oil pollution as authorized by theOil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The law requires that disbursements under the OSLTF be recovered from responsible parties liable under OPA whenthere is a discharge of oil to navigable waters. Aggressive collection efforts are consistent with the “polluter pays” public policy underlying the OPA.BP and Transocean have been named as responsible parties, although all claims are being processed centrally through BP.

The OPA requires that responsible parties pay the entire pricetag for cleaning up after spills from offshore drilling, including lost profits, destroyedproperty and lost tax revenue, but the statute caps their liability for economic damages at $75 million. In a letter to Homeland Security Secretary JanetNapolitano and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar on May 16, 2010, BP Chief Tony Hayward said the company believes claims related to the spill willexceed the limit. Howard stated that "we are prepared to pay above $75 million on these claims and we will not seek reimbursement from the U.S.Government or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund."

Democratic legislators tried to speed a bill through Congress that would increase the liability cap for oil spills from $75 million to $10 billion. BillS.3305, the "Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act" would have capped BP's liability at $10 billion, even if damages from the spill surpass that


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A sea turtle covered in oil from theDeepwater Horizon site. Credit:Louisiana Fish and Wildlife.

Pelicans in the Breton NationalWildlife Refuge, Louisiana. Credit:Louisiana Fish and Wildlife.

amount. The bill was killed on May 13, 2010 by Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), a key oil industry ally.

On June 9, BP said cost of the response to date is approximately $1.43 billion, including the cost of the spill response, containment, relief well drilling,grants to the Gulf states, claims paid, and federal costs. BP said that 42,000 claims have been submitted and more than 20,000 payments alreadyhave been made, totaling over $53 million.

Transocean, the world's largest offshore drilling contractor which owned the Deepwater Horizon, filed papers in a Houston court on May 20, 2010,seeking to limit its legal liability to $27 million.

The negative effects of oil on organisms and ecosystems are well-documented. Oil causes harm to wildlife through physical contact, ingestion,inhalation and absorption. Floating oil can contaminate plankton, which includes algae, fish eggs, and the larvae of various invertebrates. Long termdamage to lower trophic levels is difficult to assess, but could pose ecological risks in the Gulf of Mexico for years, based upon interference withmetabolic functions of thousands of species; benthic organisms in the inner and outer continental shelves could be affected from oil coating ofsubstantial portions of the ocean floor. Birds can be exposed to oil as they float on the water or dive for fish through oil-slicked water. Oiled birds canlose the ability to fly and can ingest the oil while preening. Sea turtles such as loggerheads and leatherbacks can be impacted as they swim to shorefor nesting activities. Turtle nest eggs may be damaged if an oiled adult lies on the nest. Scavengers such as bald eagles, gulls, raccoons, and skunksare also exposed to oil by feeding on carcasses of contaminated fish and wildlife.

Oil has the potential to persist in the environment long after a spilland have long-term impacts on fish and wildlife, interacting with theenvironment. Long-term effects on birds and marine mammals areless understood, but oil ingestion has been shown to causesuppression to the immune system, organ damage, behavioralchanges, skin irritation and ulceration.The area affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill has some of the world's most productive marineand coastal ecosystems. Southern Louisiana has about 40% of the nation's coastal wetlands. Thesewetlands provide a range of goods and services, including flood control, water purification, stormbuffer, wildlife habitat, nursery grounds for aquatic life, and recreational areas. Louisiana wetlandshave been heavily degraded by human activity. In particular, marsh has been lost--converted to openwater--for decades due to oil and gas development, dredging and levee construction for navigationand flood control, and other human disturbance. Louisiana has lost 1,900 square miles of land sincethe 1930's. Between 1990 and 2000, wetland loss was approximately 24 square miles per year- that isthe equivalent of approximately one football field lost every 38 minutes. Degradation by oil of the marsh grass, that is essential for holding sediment inplace, could accelerate wetland loss.

The location of the spill site is in the ocean zone known as the Bathypelagic, a depth which has pressure as great as 160 atmospheres andtemperatures of merely a few degrees Celsius. This depth is almost devoid of sunlight and hence offers virtually no primary production, but there area variety of bioluminescent and soft muscled creatures, many of which we know little about. Due to pelagic mixing, the crude oil will migrate verticallyand affect all depths of the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, including the shallower waters, where substantially more biodiversity and biologicalproductivity is present.

Scientists at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi recently completed a comprehensive survey of the Gulf's biodiversity. They found that that the NNEoctant of the Gulf (that area containing the Deepwater Horizon site) contains 8,332 species of plants and animals. Including only the major taxa ofanimals at all depths in the region of the spill, there are 1,461 mollusks, 604 polychaetes, 1503 crustaceans, 1,270 fishes, 4 sea turtles, 218 birds and29 marine mammal species.

Scientist's familiar with the Gulf of Mexico cite a number of concerns about the timing of the spill:

Breeding Season: Invertebrates, sea turtles, and birds will be facing the brunt of the spill just as they are laying eggs or caring forthem in important wildlife areas.

Trans-Gulf Migration Season: Tens of millions of birds cross the Gulf of Mexico from the Yucatan Peninsula and South America tothe U. S. Gulf Coast (Texas to Florida). The spill occurred near the peak of the Trans-Gulf Migration Season.

Hurricane Season: A big storm could complicate recovery and cleanup efforts and spread oil throughout the Gulf. The first of June isthe official start of hurricane season. NOAA and others are predicting a particularly roughyear for Atlantic storms.

La Niña: Moderate El Niño conditions are expected to dissipate by June. Thatphenomenon, which means warmer Pacific waters, creates so-called wind shear in theAtlantic that helps break up hurricanes as they form. So without El Niño, June stormsmight be more likely to form. In its place, say several climate models, is a La Niña period,which means warmer temperatures in the southern areas of the United States andgenerally more powerful storms.

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service identified 32 National Wildlife Refuges at risk from the DeepwaterHorizon oil spill that line the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. Of particularconcern are Refuges in the Southeast Louisiana (SELA) Refuges Complex, including Breton NationalWildlife Refuge, the second oldest refuge in the country. The coastal wetlands in this complex supportsome of the nation's most abundant wildlife, including nesting wading birds and seabirds, passerine


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An oiled pelican in coastalLouisiana. Credit: Carolyn Cole,Los Angeles Times.

birds (songbirds), raptors, as well as wintering shorebirds and waterfowl. For example, coastal wetlands are relied on by all 110 neo-tropical migratorysongbird species— as many as 25 million can pass through the area each day during the breeding season.

The wetlands in the Refuges and other coastal regions also support a diversity of fish and shellfish species, including Speckled trout, redfish,flounder, blue crabs and shrimp. These coastal wetlands are extremely important nursery areas for both fresh and saltwater fish species.Endangered and threatened species at risk from the spill include West Indian manatees, whooping cranes, Mississippi sand hill cranes, wood storksand four species of sea turtles.

Widespread impacts on wildlife were observed beginning the week of May 16. By May 24, 2010 two rookeries for brown pelicans in Barataria Bayshowed signs that oil had breached the protective booms. By the first week of June, reports of death and injury to birds, sea turtles and dophins wererising sharply across the Louisiana coast.

The possible impacts of crude oil and chemical dispersants in the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico are largely unknown and extremely difficult toassess. Another area of concern is the Pinnacles Region, an extensive deep (~100 m) reef tract on the Mississippi-Alabama outer continental shelf(OCS). Most of these formations are fossil reefs that are no longer actively accreting, and do not support true reef-building algae or corals. Theynonetheless support a well-developed community of reef-dependent and reef-associated organisms and a relatively diverse population of fish andfauna when compared to surrounding soft sediments.

On May 2, 2010, BP announced commitment of up to $500 million to an "open research program" studying the impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill,and its associated response, on the marine and shoreline environment of the Gulf of Mexico. BP stated that it will appoint an independent advisorypanel to construct the long term research program.

In the weeks after the accident, coastal and marine scientists from Texas to the Everglades collected soil and water samples as well as tissue frommollusks and coastal marine life that could be affected if the effects of the spill spread. This information will provide the baseline data needed toassess any impacts that do occur.

On May 30, 2010, the Unified Area Command published its first"Consolidated Fish and Wildlife Collection Report." These are theconsolidated numbers of collected fish and wildlife that have beenreported to the Unified Area Command from the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service (USFWS), National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA), incident area commands, rehabilitationcenters and other authorized sources operating within the DeepwaterHorizon/BP incident impact area. These data reflect only the initial,field-level, evaluation and they do not reflect a final determination ofthe cause of injury, or death. Not all of the injured or dead fish andwildlife reflected in these numbers were necessarily caused by theDeepwater Horizon/BP incident. On the June 8 the report included:Birds: 1,002 birds collected, with 514 of these visibly oiled. 622 birds were dead; 380 were captured alive.

Sea Turtles: 315 collected; 265 were dead; 50 were alive.

Mammals, Including Dolphins: 38 collected in the spill zone; 36 of those were dead. Determination whether oil was the cause of death is pending fordolphins.

Wildlife biologists believe that many more wildlife will ultimately be killed by the oil, but their toll is hidden because their bodies have sunk in the openocean, or been eaten by scavengers.

By way of comparison, the Exxon Valdez oil spill killed between 350,000 and 600,000 birds, along with thousands of sea otters and other marinecreatures.

Several events leading up to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill may be germane in understanding the context of this incident. These matters includetrends in deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico; permit processing; and preparedness steps.

The Wall Street Journal reports that in the year 2009, deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico increased over 2008 (and the average for the previousten years) by fifty percent, or a jump of 150 million barrels per annum of crude oil. The New York Times on May 13 reported that over 300 offshoredrilling permits had been issued by the U.S. government without proper approval by NOAA in the prior year to the incident. The New York Timeselaborated: "Federal records indicate that these consultations ended with NOAA instructing the minerals agency that continued drilling in the gulf washarming endangered marine mammals and that the agency needed to get permits to be in compliance with federal law."


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During the Bush Administration in 2004, the MMS granted a “categorical exclusion” from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to certain oiland gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico, including individual exploration plans. The MMS essentially said that it will not thoroughly review theenvironmental impacts of certain activities, including such activities as the exploration phase for the Deepwater Horizon site. Some legal analystsargue that this was wrong because the 2004 MMS Departmental Manual explicitly stated that a categorical exclusion should not be issued if the leaseor exploration is: (1) In areas of high seismic risk or seismicity, relatively untested deepwater, or remote areas; or (2) Within the boundary of aproposed or established marine sanctuary, and/or within or near the boundary of a proposed or established wildlife refuge or areas of high biologicalsensitivity; or (3) In areas of hazardous natural bottom conditions; or (4) Utilizing new or unusual technology. The Deepwater Horizon project wasdeep and it used new technology.

Mark Chernaik at the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide notes that the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for a cluster of 11 oil andgas lease sales that included Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206, the site of the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and oil spill was seriously flawed. Preparedby the Minerals Management Service, the DEIS never assessed the impact of a catastrophic spill, limiting its focus to spills no larger than 4,600barrels. The DEIS also failed to propose the use of one safeguard — an acoustic control system for blowout prevention — that might have promptlycontained the spill when the manual blowout preventers failed. Such systems are required in some countries, but they were not even proposed in theDEIS. BP's 52 page exploration and environmental impact plan for the Deepwater Horizon well stated that it was "unlikely that an accidental surfaceor subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activities" and that "due to the distance to shore (48 miles) and the response capabilities thatwould be implemented, no significant adverse impacts are expected."

Early in 2009, BP sought approval of the exploration plan for this well, whose flaws might have been detected by a full blown review under NEPA. Thatdid not occur due to the categorical exclusion, so when the MMS approved the exploration plan for this well on April 6, 2009, it did so in compliancewith the 2004 policy decision to limit environmental review of oil and gas activities in the Gulf.

The MMS' own environmental assessements downplayed the potential for environmental damage. In a 2007 environmental impact statement for theWestern and Central Planning Area Sales, which covered oil drilling leases from 2007-2012 for the region that included the Macondo Prospect wherethe Deepwater Horizon operated, the MMS assessed the potential impact of oil spills and blowouts on wetlands, marine mammals, commercial fishing,economic impacts, and water quality. MMS stated:

"Offshore oil spills resulting from a proposed action are not expected to damage significantly any wetlands along the Gulf Coast...Overall, impacts to wetland habitats from an oil spill associated with activities related to a proposed action would be expected to below and temporary."

"At the expected level of impact, the resultant influence on commercial fishing activities from a proposed action would be negligibleand indistinguishable from variations due to natural causes."

"Since LWC [loss of well control] events and blowouts are rare events and of short duration, potential impacts to marine water qualityare not expected to be significant."

On May 17, 2010, the Defenders of Wildlife and the Southern Environmental Law Center filed suit against the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS)for "lax oversight of oil drilling operations, including its failure to require a thorough examination of spill risks from exploratory drilling operations likethe Deepwater Horizon." The suit seeks to prohibit the MMS from continuing to exempt from environmental review new exploratory drilling operationsin the Gulf of Mexico. The suit argues that the MMS’ continued exemption of over 20 new structures and exploratory wells—including four at almosttwice the depth (over 9,000 feet) of the Deepwater Horizon (almost 5,000 feet)—from environmental review of the risks after the current oil spill is aviolation of the National Environmental Policy Act.

The Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer (BOP) was not equipped with a remote control shut-off failsafe switch required in two other majoroil-producing nations as last-resort protection against underwater spills. Both Norway and Brazil require such a device, which costs about $500,000.U.S. Federal regulators had specifically exempted the Deepwater Horizon from having such a remote shut-off switch partially on the grounds of thecostliness of the device (less than one percent of the Deepwater Horizon capital cost).

The failure of the BOP was foreshadowed by a 2003 paper by Deepwater Horizon owner Transocean that highlighted problems with hydrauliccomponents of BOP control systems across the industry and suggested equipment was being rushed into the field with limited testing. Other studieshad noted that a part of the BOP called a shear ram —the last line of defense that is intended to cut and close a drill pipe when all else fails — can'talways slice through the thick pipe used in deepwater drilling. A 2004 study commissioned by federal regulators found that only three of 14 newly builtrigs had shears powerful enough to cut through pipe at the equipment's maximum water depth.

In 2001, the U.S. Minerals Management Service proposed rules that would have required emergency backup control systems on BOP systems. Theproposed rules were not yet law at the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident.

An Associated Press report published on May 24, 2010 suggested that lax federal regulation oil well cementing--a suspected cause of the accident--contributed to the disaster. Federal regulators don't regulate what type of cement is used, leaving it up to oil and gas companies, who are "urged" tosimply follow guidelines of the American Petroleum Institute, an industry trade group. Far more stringent federal and state standards and controls existon cement work for roads, bridges and buildings. Reports by the MMS named cementing as a factor in 18 of 39 well blowouts at Gulf rigs from 1992to 2006, and five of nine out-of-control wells in the year 2000 were related to cementing problems.


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A boom on the Louisiana coastcollecting oil from the DeepwaterHorizon accident. Credit: LouisianaFish and Wildlife.

The Coast Guard responded to the explosion and fire on April 20, 2010, treating the event as a Search and Rescue (SAR) operation. The next day,on April 21, 2010, the Coast Guard continued its search for the missing eleven people.

Concurrent with the SAR, efforts began to assess the containment of the oil release. The federalgovernment's response to such an event so governed by the National Contingency Plan (NCP) ablueprint for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance releases. Pursuant to the NCP, theAdministration named Rear Admiral Mary Landry the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. A RegionalResponse Team was established, including representatives of the Coast Guard, Department ofHomeland Security (DHS), Department of Commerce (DOC)/NOAA, Department of the Interior (DOI)and the EPA, as well as state and local representatives.

In the weeks following the spill, a number of government probes were announced into the DeepwaterHorizon explosion and oil spill. These included probes by the Marine Board of Investigation (CoastGuard and Minerals Management Service), Interior Department Outer Continental Shelf Safety Board,National Academy of Engineering, House Energy and Commerce Committee, House Oversight andGovernment Reform Committee, and House Natural Resources Committee.

On April 22, 2010, a National Response Team (NRT), an organization of 16 federal departments andagencies responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardoussubstance pollution events, convened its first daily meeting with leadership from across the federalgovernment. Participants in the meeting included the White House, U.S. Coast Guard, the Departmentof Defense, DHS, DOC, DOI and EPA, among others.

On April 23, 2010, the Unified Area Command was formally stood up in Robert, La., after three daysof informal operations and planning. The U.S. Coast Guard announced that the Deepwater Horizon righad been found upside down approximately 1,500 feet northwest of the blowout preventer at thewellhead. At 5 p.m., the Coast Guard suspended the search for the 11 missing workers.

On April 29, 2010, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano declared the event aSpill of National Significance (SONS), indicating that the government would designate more forces tocontain the spill. This designation also led to the naming of U.S. Coast Guard Commandant AdmiralThad Allen as the National Incident Commander on May 1, 2010, which provided additional authority and oversight in leveraging government assets tocombat the spill.

The Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of the Interior announced a review of the National Environmental Policy Act procedures forthe Minerals Management Service (MMS), the bureau in DOI that manages the nation’s natural gas, oil and other mineral resources on the outercontinental shelf (OCS). The review will examine the MMS NEPA procedures for OCS oil and gas exploration and development.

On May 17, 2010, the Small Business Administration deployed staff to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida to meet individually with businessowners, answer questions about the Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, issue loan applications, and provide help in completing the loan formsvia business outreach centers.

On May 21, 2010, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order that created the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spilland Offshore Drilling. The Commission will be chaired by former two-term Florida Governor and former Senator Bob Graham and formerAdministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency William K. Reilly. The seven member commission was intended to be bipartisan with "broad anddiverse representation of individuals with relevant expertise." No currently serving government employees or elected officials will sit on thecommission.

On June 1, 2010, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced that the Justice Department had begun civil and criminal investigations. Holder said they were reviewing violations of the Clean Water Act, which carries criminal and civil penalties and fines; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which can beused to hold parties responsible for cleanup costs; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act, which provide penalties for injuryand death of wildlife.

On June 8, 2010, the Department of the Interior issued a directive to oil and gas lessees and operators on the Outer Continental Shelf implementingseven stronger stronger safety requirements. The new requirements focused on greater independent review and verification of safe operatingprocedures for offshore drilling.

On June 8, 2010, the Department of Energy started online access to schematics, pressure tests, diagnostic results and other data about themalfunctioning blowout preventer. There is also a timeline of key events and detailed summaries of the Deepwater well configuration, the blowoutpreventer stack tubes, and the containment system

On May 27, President Barack Obama rescinded his March 31, 2010 proposal for expanded offshore drilling, and instituted a temporary halt to drillingand new safety requirements. Key details of the moratorium and licensing changes include:

No new drilling will be allowed in water depths greater than 500 feet for six months, including sidetracks and bypasses of currently-drilling wells.

Drilling on 33 wells will be suspended at the first safe stopping point.

Workover activities, well completions, abandonment activities, interventions, and waterflood, gas injection, and disposal wells will notbe affected.

Drilling offshore Alaska will be postponed until at least 2011.


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The Nansen production platformoperates in about 3,500 feet ofwater off the Texas coast. Credit:Devon Energy.

Oil-soaked hands of a worker fromthe Deepwater Horizon clean-up.Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.

Western GoM Lease Sale 215 and the proposed Virginia Lease Sale 220 have been cancelled.

The three other remaining GoM lease sales in the 2007 – 2012 OCS Leasing Program are subject to review.

New standards for equipment and procedures will be implemented, with a focus on blowout preventers (BOPs), well control systems(fluid displacement procedures), casing and cementing.

On May 28, 2010, Interior Secretary Salazar issued a memorandumto the Director of the MMS that directed the MMS to not process anynew applications for permits to drill consistent with that directive.Confusion arose in the following week regarding whether themoratorium covered all wells, or just "deep" wells. A regional office ofthe MMS issued two drilling permits for shallow wells off the coastsLouisiana and Mississipi on June 2, but the permits were rescindedon June 3. An Interior spokeswoman said that the MMS rescindedthe permits "out of caution" and "to ensure that new drilling activitiesare consistent with" new federal safety requirements.The oil industry was highly critical of the drilling moratorium. The American Petroleum Institute, anindustry trade group, stated that an extended moratorium "would create a moratorium on economicgrowth and job creation--especially in the Gulf States whose people and economies have already beenmost affected by the oil spill--by undercutting our nation's access to affordable, reliable, domesticsources of oil and natural gas." The Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association estimated thatthe idle drilling rigs would reduce commerce by $16.5 million per day, and that wages lost lost by those who work on the idled drilling platforms couldreach as high as $330 million per month.

The moratorium was also criticized by members of a panel of experts identified by the National Academy of Engineering who had been asked toreview a draft of Secretary Salzar's report on measures to improve offshore safety. The final version delivered to President Obama on May 27included the drilling moratorium, but angry panel members and some others who contributed to the Salazar report said they had reviewed only anearlier version of the secretary's report that suggested a six-month moratorium only on new drilling, and then only in waters deeper than 1,000 feet."We broadly agree with the detailed recommendations in the report and compliment the Department of Interior for its efforts," a joint letter from thepanelists to various politicians says. "However, we do not agree with the six month blanket moratorium on floating drilling. A moratorium was addedafter the final review and was never agreed to by the contributors."

New rules issued on June 8, 2010 by the Interior Department tightened standards for barriers at underwater wells and blowout preventers. The newrules also shifted the cost and accountability of verification, certification and inspection from the government directly to the leaseholder by requiringsafety inspections by professional engineers and other independent analysts — rather than having Interior Department investigators sign off on wellplans and equipment. The new rules required that CEOs must certify, under penalty of criminal prosecution, that their operations comply with allregulations, equipment has been tested and all personnel are trained. Drilling operations were allowed to resume in less than 500 feet below thesurface of the sea once the new standards were met; the drilling ban remained in effect for sites in deeper water.

President Barack Obama sent a legislative package to Congress on May 12 whose purpose was to"continue expeditiously, speed assistance to people affected by this spill, and strengthen and updatethe oil spill liability system to better address catastrophic events." The package proposed funding forsmall business loans, oil spill unemployment assistance, nutrition assistance, disaster relief forfishermen and communities, and grants to state and local communities. The President's plan wouldfund the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to monitor and respond to the environmental impact of theoil on seafood fished from the gulf and surrounding areas. It also increased funding to the Secretaryof the Interior for additional inspections, enforcement, studies and other activities that are outside ofthose recoverable from the responsible parties or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. The bill wouldextend the time allowed by statute for the Minerals Management Service to review and approve oil andgas lessee exploration plans to allow additional time for the required review. The legislation would alsoprovide funding to the EPA and NOAA for various environmental studies that improve the federalresponse to the spill.

The Obama bill would raise the statutory expenditure limitation for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund from$1 billion to $1.5 billion and the cap on natural resource damage assessments and claims from $500million to $750 million. The proposal would also raise the caps on liability for responsible parties, andincrease the tax that oil companies pay to finance the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund from 8 cents per barrel (per 42 gallons) to 9 cents per barrelstarting this year.

In the wake of theDeepwater Horizon accident, the Minerals Management Service came under heavy criticism for alleged conflicts of interest amongits competing missions. The agency was tasked with collecting royalties from oil and gas produced on federal lands and issuing energy leases; at thesame time it also is responsible for policing offshore drilling and setting regulations for the industry. Indeed, in the wake of the spill President Barack


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Oil industry executives testifyingbefore Congress about theDeepwater Horizon accident

Obama noted a "cozy relationship" between federal regulators at the MMS and the industry they police. Investigations revealed, for example, thatsome employees at the minerals service accepted lavish gifts from oil companies and allowed companies to fill out their own inspection reports. OtherMMS employees lobbied for jobs at the companies they were supposed to regulate. Minerals Management Service officials can receive cash bonusesin the thousands of dollars based in large part on meeting federal deadlines for leasing offshore oil and gas exploration

MMS regulators repeatedly ignored warnings from government scientists about environmental risks in its push to approve energy exploration activitiesquickly. In a 2009 response to MMS' proposed five-year plan for oil and gas leasing, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)said that MMS understated the scale of oil spills. NOAA concluded that MMS some statements "seem to directly conflict with studies of major spills,"and that the MMS did not fully evaluate oil spill modeling.

According to a report by theWashington Post, a review panel with NOAA issued a scathing critique of Shell Exploration and Production's plan toconduct an open-water marine survey in Alaska's Chukchi Sea, finding "... no clearly stated 'scientific objectives.' " The Post report described "a warbetween the biologists and the engineers" in which MMS regulators frequently changed documents and bypassed legal requirements aimed atprotecting the marine environment.

Several government watchdog groups have criticized the "revolving door" through which drilling regulators move from government to industry and backagain, sometimes on multiple occasions. The Associated Press reported that one MMS employee who was critical of industry drilling regulations in2005, later became an employee of BP and argued against more stringent environmental regulation of the industry.

On May 19, 2010, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar announced a plan for breaking the MMS into three separate bureaus:

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, which would be responsible for development of conventional and renewable energyresources on the outer continental shelf.

The Office of Natural Resources Revenue, which would be responsible for collecting and distributing royalties from oil and gasproduced on federal lands and waters.

The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, which would be tasked with broadly overseeing energy production andimposing safety and environmental regulations on all offshore energy activities.

On May 27, 2010, Elizabeth Birnbaum, the director of the U.S. Minerals Management Service, resigned. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar praisedBirnbaum as "a strong and effective person and leader" and said she "resigned today on her own terms and on her own volition," but White Houseofficials made clear that Birnbaum had been forced out. On May 28, 2010, Bureau of Land Management Director Bob Abbey was named as actingdirector of the MMS.

A month after the accident, the Obama administration came under increasingly sharp criticism for underestimating the size of the discharge, for thelack of transparency in its response efforts, and for being too easy on BP and the oil industry. Scientists have been especially critical of theAdministration for not forcing BP to fund and make publicly available more data from subsurface analysis of the leak, aerial surveillance of the oceansurface, the extent and impact of the subsurface oil plume, and the fate and impact of chemical dispersants. Scientists criticized the EPA for notreleasing its finds from offshore water sampling, and they questioned why NOAA was so slow to investigate the magnitude of the spill and the damageit is causing.

Government critics point out that BP also has ties to the Department of Energy. Steven Chu was the head of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratoryat the University of California, Berkeley, when the Lab received the bulk of a $500 million grant from the British oil giant BP to develop alternativeenergy sources through a new Energy Biosciences Institute. Dr. Chu received the grant from BP’s chief scientist at the time, Steven E. Koonin. Dr.Chu is now the Secretary of the Department of Energy, and Dr. Koonin, who followed Dr. Chu to the Energy Department, now serves as undersecretary of energy for science. No one has accused Dr. Chu or Dr. Koonin of direct conflict of interest or questioned their scientific credentials,and the Department of Energy has no direct responsibility for the cleanup. Dr. Koonin is recused from all matters relating to the disaster because ofhis past ties to BP.

Main article: Congressional hearings on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

The U.S. Congress reacted swiftly to the accident, holding nine hearings and three briefings onthe oil spill in the first few weeks, with many more planned. A month after the accident, 10different House and Senate committees were probing the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Thehearings were part political theater, but they also produced important breakthroughs in theinvestigation. For example, Reps. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., and Bart Stupak, D-Mich., used theirleadership roles on the House Energy and Commerce Committee to persuade BP andTransocean to turn over timelines and test data from the damaged well. Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass.,used his committee chairmanship to successfully pressure BP to release live video of the leak.Hearings in the House also helped pressure EPA to force BP to investigate alternatives to itschoice of dispersants to break up the oil


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Shrimp harvest in Louisiana. Credit: Louisiana Fish andWildlife.

Cleanup in Prince William Sound,Alaska, after the Exxon Valdezaccident in 1989.

The economic impacts from the spill originate in the communities affected bythe spill, but then ripple throughout the entire nation. Commercial fishermenin the Gulf harvested more than 1 billion pounds of fish and shellfish in 2008.In addition, there are approximately 5.7 million recreational fishermen in theGulf of Mexico region who took 25 million fishing trips in 2008. Fisherman inareas closed to fishing, or whose catch are harmed by the spill, feel theimmediate effects, as do hotels, restaurants and other businesses that aretied to tourism, conventions and recreation in the Gulf Coast. The reductionin the harvest of oysters, shrimp and other seafood caused prices to risesharply in the weeks following the spill, which in turn caused food prices torise in restaurants as far away as New York City. The mere threat of oilcaused thousands of hotel cancellations in the run-up to the usually hecticMemorial Day weekend.

Florida's Department of Tourism tried to alleviate public concern about itsbeaches by posting information about Florida’s destinations on its Web sitein real time with beach Webcams, Twitter feeds and photos. Gov. CharlieCrist said he had secured $25 million from BP to finance the tourismadvertising campaign after an initial $25 million went to disaster preparationand response.

On May 24, 2010, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke declared a"fishery disaster" in the Gulf of Mexico due to the economic impact oncommercial and recreational fisheries from the Deepwater Horizon accident.The affected area includes the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama.The declaration makes it easier to mobilize federal relief efforts.

The oil spill clean-up also generates economic benefits. Cleanup crews and reporters covering the spill have replaced oil field workers and fishermenin some hotels and restaurants, and some fishermen could use their boats in spill clean up. Companies that specialize in booms, chemical dispersant,hazardous materials training and other spill-related services experienced a significant boom in business.

In a preliminary assessment of the economic dmamage released on May 17, 2010, Moody's Investors Service suggested that while Louisiana,Mississippi and Alabama may experience short-term economic booms related to clean-up efforts, that will give way to longer term deterioratingrevenue for coastal communities. Cities and counties in those Gulf states are likely to experience a decline in property tax values, which will mean areduction in services or a necessary increase in revenue to maintain current credit rating levels. The long-term economic and financial impact onthose states may be manageable, however, especially since there is a short-term economic boom and BP has pledged to pay cleanup costs anddamage claims, Moody's said. But it's likely there will be a more severe impact on communities in Florida, which is highly dependent on tourism andsales tax.

The Department of Energy announced that its national laboratories were working with the Department of Homeland Security's National InfrastructureSimulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), which is modeling the economic costs and societal impact of the oil spill on energy and other industries inthe Gulf and along the coast to support the response efforts of the National Incident Commander and the Unified Area Command. NISAC is amodeling, simulation, and analysis center within DHS that leverages national expertise to address infrastructure protection.

The Deepwater Horizon disaster is widely expected to send insurance costs higher for deepwater drilling.

On June 1, 2010, led by a drop in energy stocks, the Dow Jones industrial average fell 120 points shortly after the Obama Administration announcedits criminal investigation into the disaster. BP lost 15 percent of its market value during the day’s trading

On June 8, 2010, Sean Snaith, an economist at the University of Central Florida, said that a worst case scenario--i.e., Florida beaches suffer amassive, direct hit from the Gulf oil spill--could cost $10 billion and put about 195,000 people out of work.

BP was heavily criticized for its role in the response to the ExxonValdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989, one of the largest in the nation'shistory. BP owned a controlling interest in Alyeska, the Alaska oilindustry consortium that was responsible for designing, constructing,operating, and maintaining the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS).The pipeline stretches from the Arctic Ocean to the Valdez terminalon the Pacific. Alyeska was required to write the Oil Spill ResponsePlan (OSRP), and to respond to the spill. The Alaska Oil SpillCommission's report dedicated an entire chapter to failures byAlyeska, who essentially ran the first days of containment efforts inPrince William Sound, an inlet on the south coast of Alaska. TheCommission found that Aleyska failed to make good on its own plan in numerous ways: slow


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The BP Texas City refinery afterthe explosion and fire in 2005.Credit: AP.

Workers clean up an oil spill froma BP oil pipeline near Prudhoe Bay,Alaska in 2006. Credit: Blooomberg

response, and an overall lack of skimmers, barges to store captured oil, helicopters, and crews onstandby.

A ProPublica study reported that in 2002, California officials discovered that BP had falsified inspections of fuel tanks at a Los Angeles-area refineryand that more than 80 percent of the facilities didn't meet requirements to maintain storage tanks without leaks or damage. Inspectors were forced toget a warrant before BP allowed them to check the tanks. The company eventually settled a civil lawsuit brought by the South Coast Air QualityManagement District for more than $100 million.

The BP Texas City Refinery suffered one of the worst industrialdisasters in recent U.S. history. Explosions and fires killed 15people and injured another 180, and resulted in financial lossesexceeding $1.5 billion. According to the U.S. Chemical SafetyBoard, the Texas City disaster was caused by organizational andsafety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation. Warningsigns of a possible disaster were present for several years, butcompany officials did not intervene effectively to prevent it.After the disaster, BP agreed to pay out $1.6 billion in private settlements and then plead guilty tolesser criminal violations. BP Products North America agreed in 2007 to plead guilty to a felonyfor failing to have adequate written procedures and for failing to inform contractors of the hazardsrelated to their occupancy of temporary trailers located near the refinery’s isomerization unit. BP

Products agreed to a $50 million fine and three years probation. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on Friday imposed an$87 million fine against BP for failing to correct safety hazards after the 2005 disaster. The fine - at the time the largest in OSHA's history - cameafter a 6-month inspection revealed hundreds of violations of the settlement agreement to repair hazards at the refinery.

On October 25, 2007, the British Petroleum Exploration (Alaska ),Inc., (BPXA) agreed to plead guilty to a criminal violation of the CleanWater Act to resolve its criminal liability relating to pipeline leaks ofcrude oil onto the tundra and a frozen lake in Alaska. The firstpipeline leak, discovered on March 2, 2006, resulted in more than200,000 gallons of crude oil spreading over the tundra and a nearbyfrozen lake. This was the largest spill ever to occur on the NorthSlope. The second leak occurred in August of 2006, but was quicklydiscovered and contained after leaking approximately 1,000 gallonsof oil onto the tundra. As part of the guilty plea BPXA agreed to atotal of $20 Million of which $12 million is criminal fine, $4 million iscommunity service payments to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) for the purpose ofconducting research and activities in support of the arctic environment in the State of Alaska on theNorth Slope, and $4 million is criminal restitution to the State of Alaska. BP also served a three-yearterm of probation.

BP was among the first major oil corporations to publicly acknowledge that global warming was "real."In 1997, John Browne, Group Chief Executive, British Petroleum (BP America) stated: "To beabsolutely clear - we must now focus on what can and what should be done, not because we can be


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The BP corporate logo.

certain climate change is happening, but because the possibility can't be ignored."BP Amoco changed its name to BP in 2000, and introduced a new corporate slogan: “BeyondPetroleum.” It replaced its “Green Shield” logo with the helios symbol, a green and yellow sunflowerpattern that was supposed to highlight the company’s interest in "green" fuels.

BP has supported research in "low carbon" energy and climate change at Scripps Institution,Princeton University, and the California Institute of Technology. BP is investing $500 million over 10years to establish the Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI) hosted by the University of California atBerkeley with its associated strategic partners University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign andLawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

In its biofuels operations and planning, BP claims to apply a series of global standards and processessuch as undertaking environmental impact assessments that cover issues such as waterandbiodiversity. For example, BP claims it will not produce biofuels from areas of high conservationvalue as defined by the High Conservation Value Network.

BP was one of the first major energy companies to develop solar energy, and BP Solar is one of thelargest solar manufacturers in the world with manufacturing plants in Australia (Sydney), Spain(Madrid), USA (Frederick, MD), India (Bangalore) and China (Xian).

BP began investing in wind power in 2005, and by 2010 had gross generating capacity of more than1,200 megawatts (MW), enough to provide electricity for a city the size of Washington DC. BP hasinterests in operating wind farms in Fowler Ridge, Indiana, a large wind farm in the U.S. Midwest(600MW); Cedar Creek I, Colorado (300MW); and two projects in Texas (more than 200MW).

1 This section is drawn directly from a National Research Council (2003) report.

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27 May 2010.

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CitationCutler J. Cleveland (Lead Author); C Michael Hogan and Peter Saundry (Topic Editor);. 2010. "Deepwater Horizon oil spill." In:Encyclopedia of Earth. Eds. Cutler J. Cleveland (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Information Coalition, National Council forScience and the Environment). [First published in the Encyclopedia of Earth May 24, 2010; Last revised June 10, 2010;Retrieved June 13, 2010]<http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill>

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