DEFENCE Force JOURNAL...Women in Combat Dear Editor, Articles by Lieutenant Sarah Chapman, RAN...

NO.141

MARCH/APRIL

2000

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DEFENCEForce

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier Steve H. Ayling, AM (Chairman)Group Captain Allan CroweCaptain James V.P. Goldrick, RANColonel Michael GoodyerBronwen GreyKaren Griffith

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© Commonwealth of Australia 2000ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 2000

Colonel Di HarrisDr Ron HuiskenLieutenant Colonel Neil F. JamesColonel Paul McGraneGrant ThompsonRussell Walls

NO. 141

MARCH/APRIL

2000

DEFENCEForce

JOURNAL

Managing Editor

Michael P. Tracey

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

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Front Cover

Night Exercise

Photograph courtesy of Defence Public Affairs

Printed in Australia

by National Capital Printing,

Fyshwick, ACT 2609

CONTENTS

3. Letters to the Editor

5. Are We Going to Fight Again?Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Orme, CSC

11. Cooperative Security: A China Perspective?Lieutenant Commander W. Heron, RAN

19. The Measurement of Stress in AustralianDefence PersonnelLieutenant Sarah Chapman, RANR

29. Indonesian Islamic Fundamentalism andAceh in the Twentieth CenturyLieutenant Commander P. Flynn, RAN

37. The Rise and Fall of the Imperial JapaneseAir ForceRodrigo C. Mejia, Defence Analyst to theOffice of the Armed Forces AttachePhilippine Embassy, Canberra

45. What’s the Matter? – A Due DiligenceReportAllan Hawke, Secretary Department of Defence

53. Reflections on LeadershipAdmiral Chris BarrieChief of the Defence Force

57. Reviews

A U S T R A L I A N

Inspection of Federation Guard at Parliament House during the INTERFET Welcome Home.Photograph by LSPH K. Bristow – Navy Photographic Unit

Women in Combat

Dear Editor,Articles by Lieutenant Sarah Chapman, RAN

Reserve and Kathryn Spurling, ADFA, publishedin the Australian Defence Force Journal Nov/Dec1999, suggesting combat roles for women is pie inthe sky.

During WWII, in all services, womenperformed magnificently in signals, administration,nursing services to mention just three importantduties, releasing a significant number of men forservice in combat areas.

But combat is another matter. I’ll confinecomment to the Army where I spent six yearsfrom 1939-45.

Imagine a female as a member of an infantrysection during the Owen Stanley campaign in thesecond half of 1942. She would be wet through,soaked to the skin, day and night. If lucky shemight get a change of clothing every six weeksand would go without a wash for up to threeweeks. The personal hygiene materials she wouldneed to carry would be perpetually wet andrenewed supply would be a lottery. Because of somany razor back ridges to attack or defend, whenthe trench was only a few feet wide withprecipices on either side, she would have tourinate and defecate within a few feet of hercomrades. She would know starvation andmalnutrition.

Let’s get real. Close combat is no place for awoman certainly so far as the Army is concerned.

I have a granddaughter officer recentlyreturned from East Timor where she had anarduous, tiring job in supply. Women in this sortof posting can undoubtedly serve at least as wellif not better than men.

But combat, never – they would prove anawful liability.

M.L. Roberts, Captain, (Retired)Cadet Scheme

Dear Editor,After reading the well researched article by Dr

W.H. Jones in Australian Defence Force JournalNo. 140 of January-February 2000 on the valueof Cadet Forces training at the present time and inparticular the AIRTC I feel that as a person whoinstructed and supported the AIRTC both beforeand after 1975 my thoughts and experience maybe of some help or value in supporting Dr Jones.

When No. 28 flight was formed in 1955 we hada Flight Commander (the late Wing CommanderWarren Bishop), who was a resident Doctor at theBathurst Hospital and in the CAF Reserve at thetime, three other civilians, two of which had

wartime experience in the RAAF and myself whohad gone from the Army to the RAAF then joinedthe CAF Reserve in 1951 and was the initialinstructor with the wartime rank of Sergeant. Forthe first year or so all staff were ex-servicemen,mostly RAAF.

Over the years we developed a fine Flight ofCadets and Reserve personnel with the guidanceof permanent RAAF officers and cooperation ofRAAF Bases for camps and flying whichsometimes carried a joint staff of ten Reservistsand up to 150 Cadets who always seemed toenjoy the break from school work and showedinterest in flying and shooting plus other outdooractivities.

When on the advice of the Millar Report, theGovernment withdrew support for all Cadet forces,No. 28 Flight elected to carry on despite the loss ofactive Government support and relied on parentsupport plus recycling of uniforms and conductinglocal camps for the Cadets plus local money-raising efforts to keep us going.

With the elected change of Government thesupport of Cadet training both from theGovernment and the personal angle resumed muchas it had been, we had support from the RAAFboth in camps and in flying but the numbersallowed into regular camps slowly diminishedalthough from experience the cooperation of thosecadets who were lucky enough to attend seemed tobe just as enthusiastic as before. However over theyears the outlay from the Government hasdiminished, no doubt due to other circumstances,and parent cooperation has increased. As regardsstaffing levels they have decreased from three tofour officers and two NCO’s with No. 28 Flight toone officer and very infrequent support from otherpeople. As an example, pre 1975 rifle shoots withNo. 28 Flight would involve 90 per cent of thecadets once a month but now when I called forsupport to re-establish shooting in the early 1990s Iwould be lucky to get 25 per cent of cadets toattend. No doubt the rapid advances in electronicequipment has resulted in young people of cadetage devoting their weekends to earning money inorder to buy whatever they require and also there isquite a varied supply of entertainment over the saidperiod which they can attend. It is beyond myability to suggest alternative methods ofencouraging young people to support the cadetsystem as most not already involved have a readyanswer when questioned on joining, however, Isupport Dr Jones’ article, it is the first which I haveseen relating to cadet training and I trust there willbe more forthcoming.

Hubert (Hugh) Brennan

Letters to the Editor

Are We Going to Fight Again?Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Orme, CSC

Is Australia going to fight again? This fundamental question lies at the heart of our nationalsecurity planning. We speak of peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, contributing toregional security, establishing confidence building relationships, fulfiling a leadership role in ourregion, and all the issues that accompany any serious debate of our security environment andfuture; yet for all that, do we address the most fundamental issue of all – are we going to fightagain? If the answer is yes then we will need a defence force which is capable of fighting as part ofa joint, coalition, and multinational force in a range of environments. If the answer is no, then weneed to understand what it is we want our defence force to do and how we are going to organiseourselves to do it. But to answer the question we need to understand the relationship betweensecurity and human nature, and approach the problem realistically, not optimistically.1

Through a Glass Darkly2

In 1899 Jean de Bloch wrote an ambitiousbook titled The Future of War3 in which he

argued that “war has become impossibleexcept at the price of suicide”.4 He outlined indetail why it was not rational for nations to goto war. His argument was not based onmilitary logic, but on the logic of the politicaleconomist. He stated that “the soldier bynatural evolution has so perfected themechanism of slaughter that he has practicallysecured his own extinction. He has madehimself so costly that mankind can no longerafford to pay for his maintenance, and he hastherefore transferred the sceptre of the worldfrom those who govern its camps to those whocontrol its markets.”5 His logic was sound; hisassessment of human nature was flawed.

The 20th century can be seen as the apex ofman’s potential for both civilisation andbarbarity. No century so completely reveals theduality of the human spirit; from the rise ofdemocracy and man’s ability to makephenomenal medical and scientific advances; tohis apocalyptic capacity to wage a nuclear war,kill millions on the conventional battlefield,and hack and slash his way to an ethnicallycleansed purity in any number of countries inany number of decades of the last century. Theonly deduction that we can safely make is thatman has not yet proven himself to be sological, rational, reliable, predictable and stable

for us to be able to say with any degree ofconfidence that we will enjoy peace in ourtime. Of course this leads us to our fundamentalquestion; are we going to fight again?

The future can be seen only “through aglass darkly”. There are as many alternativefutures as there are futurists. However, fourwriters stand out as offering some view of thefuture from which we can draw broadindicators of the way ahead.6 The Tofflersargue that developed,7 Western societies areundergoing a transformation from the secondto the third wave of development; thatcountries like USA, Britain and Australia areheading into the information age, away fromtheir industrial and agrarian roots. Their futureis one of globalism, homogeneity, andinformation and technological superiority.Kaplan sees the world more pessimistically,8

with his darker predictions of environmentaldisasters due to overpopulation, deforestation,water salination, and natural resource abuse.Huntington sees the future in terms ofcivilisational conflicts with clashes occurringalong cultural and civilisational fault lines,9

which have, and always will, exist. And finallyPeters suggests that the new enemies will bewarlords, terrorists, charismatic demagogues,international criminals and the militaries ofrogue states.10 Peters’ new battlefields will beurban landscapes and information jungles. Sowho is right?

5

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 141 MARCH / APRIL 20006

Our Quest for CertaintyThe answer cannot be found with any one

prophet. We should accept that the future isimpossible to predict. Heisenberg’s uncertaintyprinciple supports this view when it argues thatthe very act of observation influences theoutcome of an experiment.11 As soon as wethink we know the future, it immediatelychanges. Couple this with the concepts ofChaos Theory which argue that even the mostminute change in any of the variables of aprocess may result in an enormous change tothe predicted outcome,12 and we see that anyattempt to predict the future is flawed. Weneed only think back to de Bloch’s veryrational argument of 1899 to see that even themost painstaking research and logicalarguments are defenceless against the ravagesof the future and human nature.

So, are we going to fight again? If we arethe difficulty is that we cannot with anyconfidence predict where, when, or why. Thisis Heisenberg’s chaotic conundrum; whateverwe prepare for will not occur because we haveprepared for it. When one nation goes to warwith another it is generally at a time and aplace and in a manner which the other was notexpecting. Surprise, deception, and duplicityare not new and will be the hallmarks of futureconflict. Compounding this problem is one thatAustralia has faced since 1788 – we are morelikely to become involved in conflicts ordisputes outside Australia than we are to havethreats to our physical sovereignty. To believethat our sole security threat is one of invasionor raids on our soil is to fail to see the newmillennium and the trends it portends.

In a country as lucky as Australia,13 weoften fail to reconcile our desires andaspirations with the harsh realities that areeverywhere to be seen. The world shouldunderstand de Bloch’s rational logic; “therewill be no war in the future… for it has becomeimpossible, now that it is clear that war meanssuicide.”14 But it would appear that for someunknown, illogical, irrational and intenselyhuman reason, the world does not know it. So

where does that leave Australia at the dawn ofthe new millennium and the beginning of oursecond century of independence?

Our Security ChallengesOur security challenges demand that we

think in clear, logical, and realistic terms inorder to understand what the future mighthold. We must discipline ourselves to avoidoptimistic assessments and focus on what isthe fundamental nature of society and theworld. Even after the lessons of The Great War,and World War II, we entered the last decadeof the 20th century at the end of the Cold Warwith an impetuous optimism that was dashedby harsh reality. There was no peace dividend.For a decade that offered so much it deliveredso little. The Gulf War, Somalia, Rwanda, theFormer Yugoslavia, Kosovo, continuedtensions in Iraq, China’s rhetoric across theTaiwan Straits and the Spratlys, Chechnya Iand II, Kurdestan, North Korean recalcitrance,African crises, nuclear testing in India andPakistan, drug wars in South America, EastTimor, terrorism, any number of smallerinternal wars, and ethnic cleansing and humanrights abuses are cumulatively taking their tollon world optimism; and rightly so. Optimismneeds to be tempered by realism; and it is froma realistic view that our security needs must beaddressed. Of course this realism must alsoinclude the ability to pay for our security.15

The nature and fabric of society is evolvingaway from the natural, concrete and tangibleartifacts which have defined it until now.Australian society, and those of what may becalled the “information age” nations, areevolving to a point where the physical is onlyan enabler to reach into the cyber world.Information, knowledge and data arebecoming the currencies of our society, andalthough very much in the early stages of thisevolution our future lies in this direction.However, for the foreseeable future Australiawill rely heavily on our first wavefundamentals and natural resources to allow usto live in an information-age society. Therefore

ARE WE GOING TO FIGHT AGAIN? 7

our approach to security must encompass andembrace this. But embracing this does notmean that the nature of security totallychanges with it. Rather, our security problemsexpand to include the information dimensionwhile preserving our industrial and agrarianbases. Future Australian security concepts willrely on us being able to protect the physicaland tangible, those critical enablers, while alsoprotecting the information element. This doesnot appear to be widely appreciated.

A Developing ParadigmThe answer does not lie in our current view

of the world. The world does not begin justbeyond our 12-mile coastal borders; nor doesit end at a 1,000 kilometre radius from oursovereign soil. The world for all its problems isnow so totally integrated, linked, joined andtransfused among all nations and regions thatany concept which sees a regional orgeographic foundation as its basis is flawedand inadequate to meet the demands of the21st century. Geostrategic imperatives willcontinue to inform our security policy; butthey are not the only determinants.

An enduring theme of Australian securityis that it has always been provided within thecontext of an alliance with a major partner;either Britain or the US. This will continue inthe future and should be a core planningimperative. We must retain our sovereignrights and independence, but be cognisant ofthe economies and advantages offered bycommonality of systems, doctrine andprocedures. Our interests coincide so closelywith the US that while we may be caricaturedas a deputy, we are in fact pursuing our ownagenda. The truth is that our aspirations, goalsand interests complement those of the US. Ourmutual interests therefore demand we take abroader perspective.

The seeds of change have been sewn andwe are seeing fundamental shifts from the ColdWar paradigm. We are beginning to see achange in posture in Europe, China, India andPakistan, Japan, the Korean Peninsular, and

importantly Indonesia; all of which affectsAustralia.

The fall of the USSR and the consequentremoval of the unifying threat against WesternEurope is beginning to have an effect. We areseeing a fundamental though slow shift fromEuropean reliance on an Anglo/US dominatedNATO as the major security mechanism, to agreater sense of European independence. Theconcepts being developed for a European crisisresponse capability, being driven very much byan irascible and precocious France, is a firstand early step toward the “deYankification” ofEuropean security. The key issue for Britain isto determine whether its future lies with the USor with Europe. The US needs to determinewhether it is willing to compromise its role inEuropean security. The call for greaterEuropean modernisation of its military maybackfire on the US.

Europe remains extremely important toAustralia for a host of reasons. The EU isAustralia’s largest merchandise trading partnerand our commercial, cultural, and historicallinks with Europe,16 the US and Britain ties usto the outcomes of a change in Europeandynamics; whatever impacts on them willaffect us. Also, it is important to note that ourAsian neighbours tend to see us as moreEuropean than Asian, and link us to trendsthere. Events in Europe will impact onAustralian security and should not beunderestimated.

China enters the new millennium as amajor concern to the US and Australia. Simpledemographics dictate that Australia mustfollow events in China closely. A regionalcountry with 1.26 billion people at the start ofthe century and a growing economy, both as asupplier and a consumer, makes it formidableenough. Couple this with the growth andmodernisation of China’s military, theincreased rhetoric over Taiwan, theirincremental occupation of the disputed SpratlyIslands, their recent loose language concerningthe use of nuclear weapons, and concerns overcloser Chinese–Russian17 and Chinese-Indian


relations; and Australia and the world has aclear security challenge. China can only beexpected to grow over the next decades andwill represent our most significant securityissue for the 21st century.

Japan is also undergoing major, thoughsubtle change. The peace generation whoinherited Japan after World War II is passingand the economic generation who have sorecently brought Japan such major structuraland ethical economic dilemmas are beingreplaced slowly by a new guard whoseaspirations are changing. The notion ofreliance on economic power alone to sustainthe nation has been challenged and it is likelythat some of the restrictions on the use ofmilitary power may be lifted.18 This is not tosay that Japan will become more militaristic,although it is false to assume Japan hasmaintained a pacifist approach to defence.With the fourth largest defence spending andone of the most modern militaries in the world,Japan has both economic and military power.Once the problems with its current economiccrisis and constitutional limitations areresolved we will see a different Japan; a moreconfident and outward looking Japan.

India and Pakistan are wildcards because oftheir nuclear capability. But to focus only onthe nuclear issue is to miss some of thefundamentals of each country. For Pakistan thenuclear issue is more than just a response toIndia. It is a demonstration of Islamicachievement. Having said that, Pakistan underits current military dictatorship represents areasonable bastion of stability in an otherwisevolatile region.19 Although recent demands thatthe country develop an Islamic, non-interestbased economic system sees a shift towardsfundamentalism, its location at the intersectionof one of Huntington’s Muslim/Hindu/Sinicfaultlines is more significant for its potentialinstability.

Of all nations, India has perhaps thegreatest potential for gain in the developingpost-Cold War paradigm. Often resentful of theworld’s lack of respect and appreciation, it has

the demographic power and the intellectualaspirations to be a major contender foralternate influence in the world. Its populationalone demands respect,20 and its internalpressures serve to make external solutions todomestic intransigence more attractive. Indian rhetoric, supported by increasinglyhegemonistic ambitions, will need to bewatched very closely. India’s relationships withChina and Russia also need to be monitored.21

While having much in conflict with China, itmay be mutually beneficial to create analliance of interests between India and Chinato gain leverage over the US, especiallythrough the World Trade Organisation.

Perhaps one ray of light on the horizon isthe hopeful reunification of the KoreanPeninsular. This is unlikely to occur quicklybut the South Korean “sunshine policy” isintended to draw North Korea back into thefold although at some considerable expense.The Korean Peninsular is one of the lastremnants of the Cold War and no longercontains the relevance it once held. While thereare many in the US defence establishment whorely on the continued threat from Kim Jong Ilto justify large forward deployments of troops;and the Peninsular provides one of the twomajor theatres of war which underpin the USNational Security Strategy;22 it is more likelythat reunification will occur over time than aninvasion from the North.

Finally, Indonesia and its future is of vitalconcern to Australia. The world’s fourth largestnation; the largest Muslim state; its control ofthe vital Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits;and its vast natural resources, remain constantswhich make Indonesia critical to the world, notjust Australia. Fundamental economicproblems have yet to be solved. East Timor andthe success it represents for other disgruntledprovinces such as Aceh and Irian Jayademonstrates the instability of the nation andits vulnerability. East Timor was eventuallyallowed to leave, Aceh and West Irian withtheir vast natural resources may not be solucky. The future for a free and democratic

ARE WE GOING TO FIGHT AGAIN? 9

Indonesia will be sorely tested over the nextdecade. The economic, social and politicaldifficulties it faces will require solutions whichit is not presently structured to provide.Indonesia faces a tough period requiring strongleadership and it is questionable whether thiscan be provided.

So What?So what does this mean for Australia; are

we going to fight again? Given the instabilityof the post-Cold War world; the volatility ofour region; the global trend towardspolarisation along Huntington’s cultural andcivilisational fault lines; the resourceconstraints and potential for disaster revealedby Kaplan’s travels; the rise in asymmetric andnon-conventional threats identified by Peters;and the unpredictability of human nature; it isvital that we be prepared to fight again. Butalso given Australia’s trend towards theTofflers’ third wave, it is likely that we will failto see the writing on the wall as we retreat intoa cyber world of information abundance andvirtual blue skies.

Defence forces are not built overnight; norare they mobilised as they were in Blamey’sday. The world can be a peaceful and stableplace but that stability does not come throughweakness. Australia, whether it likes it or not,is increasingly a member of the global society;we cannot opt out. Therefore the onlyconclusion we can draw is that we will fightagain and must be prepared for it. It wasconvenient in the 1930s to ignore theunpleasant and politically incorrect Lavarackwhen he signalled the threat to Australia. Hadour politicians listened to him then ourpreparations for war in the Pacific would havebeen different. Whilst we cannot rewritehistory we can prepare honestly andrealistically for the future.

ConclusionAre we going to fight again? The demands

on Australia’s defence force are going to growin the next decade and will be regional andglobal in nature. We will keep and enforce

peace around the globe, but especially in ourregion; and we will fight war in the nextcentury at a place and at a time and for areason that we cannot even begin to imaginenow. If we do not make some hard decisionsabout funding, doctrine, capabilities,equipment, force structure, andinteroperability, we will not be ready.23 Yes,Australia will fight again, and it is ourresponsibility to ensure that when we do weare on the winning team!

NOTES1. Since 1945 there have been 250 wars with 23

million killed and tens of millions homeless. 2. “Through a Glass Darkly,” is from the Apostle

Paul in 1 Corinthians 13:12, “For now we seethrough a glass darkly; but then face to face:now I know in part; but then shall I know evenas also I am known.”

3. de Bloch, J; The Future of War: copyright 1899,translated by R.C. Long and published Boston,1914 by the World Peace Foundation. de Blochwas a Polish Jew who grew up in Warsaw. Hestudied in Berlin and returned to Warsaw wherehe developed a reputation as a banker, aneconomist, and a sociologist. He was intimatelyinvolved in the development of Europeanrailways and saw that the key menace to futureEuropean prosperity was war. To signal thisthreat he wrote The Future of War.

4. ibid., p. xxxi.5. ibid., p. xvii.6. While I mention only four writers, there are

numerous authors who could be mentioned.Many others are worthy study for those withthe time, in particular Francis Fukyama, StevenMetz, and Robert Leonhard.

7. Alvin and Heidi Toffler are well known andindeed may be considered a cliche. Their workshave had significant impact and include FutureShock, War and Anti-War, and The Third Wave.Of the authors discussed the Tofflers’ view of thefuture is probably the most optimistic.

8. Robert Kaplan has travelled widely and writtenabout problems facing the world, especially inunderdeveloped regions and warring areas.Three works of note are Balkan Ghosts, TheComing Anarchy, and an interesting analysis ofcontemporary America, Empire Wilderness. Hehas been criticised for making sweepingassertions based on discredited theories(Malthus in particular), but he provides aninsightful approach to the realities of worldproblems on the ground.

9. Samuel Huntington is the grand old man ofcontemporary security analysis. From his


powerful The Soldier and the State (1960) toThe Clash of Civilisations (1994) he has been atthe forefront of international security debate.In many ways Huntington is the antithesis ofde Bloch – war will be a natural outcome ofthe cultural difference, regardless of how muchwe develop.

10. Ralph Peters is a relatively recently retired USArmy officer (Intelligence) who does notappear to be in favour with the US Militaryestablishment. His book Fighting for the Futureoutlines the changing nature of the securitylandscape, away from conventional symmetricmilitary relationships to a future of asymmetricthreats. He is contentious for his criticism ofthe ability of the current US military and theirability to adapt to the new environment.

11. First stated by Werner Heisenberg in 1927. Itarose from some careful thinking byHeisenberg about a very simple fact, namelyyou cannot measure any property of an objectwithout interacting with it in some way. Twokey deductions from his work with sub atomicparticles were that the very act of observationchanges the system’s properties; and the visionof a perfect, rational, objective observer findingthe truth cannot be fulfilled.

12. See articles by LTCOL Ian Wing in previouscopies of this journal for excellent discussion ofthe influence of Chaos Theory. There isenormous potential for the application of theprinciples of Chaos Theory to the developmentof warfighting concepts; especially for the ADF.

13. Australia’s “luckiness” has been the topic oftwo of Donald Horne’s works, The LuckyCountry (1964), and The Death of the LuckyCountry (1976). Horne’s view of our luck is lesssanguine than might appear on the surface;many Australians still use the expression as adescription of Australia as the land of milk andhoney. Horne saw our luckiness as being amyth based on optimism and hope, not on thehard realities of our nation; hence thecounterpoint in 1976 to his first work and itswidespread misinterpretation. The real issue is;has anything changed?

14. de Bloch, p.xxxi.15. The Government appears to have recognised

the shift to greater security demands with itsrecent indication of a modest increase in thedefence budget in 2001-2002.

16. The EU is Australia’s largest merchandiseexport market. Trade in merchandise for 1998-99 was worth A$34.9 billion. Australian

merchandise exports to the EU (primarilyincluding non-monetary gold, coal, wool andalcoholic beverages) totalled A$11.6 billion in1998-99. The EU is also Australia’s largestsource of merchandise imports (mainlymedicaments, passenger motor vehicles,telecommunications equipment and paper)which was A$ 23.3 billion in 1998-99. Bilateraltrade in services is also very healthy with theEU being Australia’s largest overseas marketfor services with exports worth A$4.8 billion in1998. As a source of imported services, the EUagain ranks first, with A$ 5.6 billion worth ofservices imported in 1997-98. Investment inAustralia from EU countries was worthA$193.1 billion at end June 1998, making theEU our largest source of foreign investment. Inaddition, the EU is the second largest foreigndestination for Australian investors, withinvestment totalling A$60.8 billion at end June1998. (Source: DFAT)

17. In China on 2 March 00 the state-run People’sDaily ran several articles touting the benefits ofstrategic partnership between Russia andChina. Moscow and Beijing are exchangingtop-ranking officials in preparation for asummit involving oil and weapons. It appearsthat a more vigorous strategic partnershipbetween Russia and China is beginning to takeshape. (Source: Stratfor.com)

18. Japan is currently undergoing a five-yearreview of its constitution with a view toadjusting restrictions on the use of theJapanese Self Defence Force.

19. This perhaps controversial view was expressedby General Anthony Zinni, US Commander inChief Central Command in early March 00.

20. It is assessed that India will surpass China andhave the world’s largest population by 2020.

21. Agence France Presse has reported that anIndian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated thatthe Indian and Russian Governments will signa strategic partnership later in 2000. Thepartnership is to coincide with a planned post-election Russian presidential visit.

22. US National Security Strategy, December 1999,p.19.

23. If the sentiments of this article apply toAustralia, then New Zealand should take asober look at its security strategy. Ourcollective future is so closely linked thatunilateral policies which do not mesh are notonly grossly inefficient but culpable, regardlessof political ideology.

Lieutenant Colonel Orme is the Australian Exchange Instructor at the US Command and General Staff College. Hisprevious appointment was the Australian Liaison Officer to the Coalition Joint Task Force in Kuwait.

11

Within this article it will be argued that the emerging multipolar security

environment post-Cold War is providingconsiderable scope for China to participate in acooperative security regime, based on thenormative changes transpiring in China. It willbe argued that the post-Cold War worldprovides increased stability for China, allowingthe Chinese leadership the opportunity todevelop alternative security arrangements tothe Realpolitik paradigm which prevailed priorto 1989. It will be demonstrated that there is a normative link between economicliberalisation, and China’s participation inmultilateral fora, providing scope for China’seventual inclusion into a cooperative securityregime.

Normative change will be discussed fromthe perspective that traditional Marxist normshave been transformed to accommodatebroader policy choice, as China gainsexperience in international fora. Finally, it willbe argued that while the Chinese leadershipmay be willing to consider cooperative securityas an approach to its security problem, thereare normative constraints associated with thenorm of sovereign dignity and China’s ownhistorical experience which may hamper policymovement in a more cooperative direction.

Realpolitik is defined as a policy usingpractical power considerations as its basis over

moral or ethical considerations. The attainmentand maintenance of state security in a hostileworld through power or balance of powerpolitics is viewed as the primary goal ofleaders.1

Cooperative security is defined as “amultidimensional, gradual security approachpromoting reassurance over deterrence,emphasising the value of creating habits ofdialogue between potential antagonists whileproviding for peacekeeping and enforcement”.2

The use of norm here is that which iscommon to most current definitions inInternational Relations, norms are “collectiveexpectations for the proper behaviour of actorswithin a given identity. They evolve throughsocial practice, through conscious promotionby actors in political interaction, and throughdeliberate negotiation among actors. Normsinfluence behaviour.”3

BackgroundChina was a revolutionist state during the

period 1949-1971. During this period herdogmatic, Marxist approach to foreign policytogether with her “dual adversary strategy”towards both superpowers hindered her abilityto gain international experience in multilateraldiplomacy via the UN. This was because from1949-1970 China was refused entry from allInternational Organisations including theUnited Nations. China proclaimed herself to be

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Cooperative Security: A China Perspective?By Lieutenant Commander W. Heron, RAN

With the dismantling of Cold War bipolarity there is an acute need to find new methods to solvesecurity problems in an emerging multipolar world, where the dyads of conflict and cooperation arepotentially more numerous than they were within a bipolar, balance of power arrangement. China’shistorical experience has translated into an independent foreign policy which has not augured wellfor long-term cooperative engagement with other states other than on a short-term self-interestedbasis. This is a reflection of the Marxist based core of norms reflecting a compulsion for sovereigndignity developed as a result of China’s own historical experience. Since China’s acceptance intothe United Nations (UN) in 1971, the seeds of change have been sown within the minds of Chinesesecurity analysts. The aim of this article is to explore the prospect of cooperative security in thelight of China’s normative needs.


a self-styled moral state, “an independent G1in the global group of politics”.4

After the success of the Chinese communistrevolution, symbolised by the establishment ofthe People’s Republic Of China, came theKorean and Vietnam Wars. These wars sawChina at odds with US and UN forces. Duringthe Cold War period China was enmeshed in abipolar balance of power arrangement betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union, inwhich China formed the third arm of astrategic triangle, first siding with the SovietUnion on ideological grounds and thenbreaking with the Soviets when China felt thather sovereignty was being threatened fromwithin.5 In 1962 Soviet policy was deemedrevisionist by China which, according to Mao“precluded any meaningful relationship”,6 withthe Soviet Union. After China’s breakaway thesuccess of Chinese socialism was deemed todepend upon a “total opposition to the SovietUnion”,7 and thus the Soviet Union was totallyabandoned as an ideological ally forrapprochement with the US.

The Post-Cold War Security EnvironmentThe end of the Cold War in 1989 facilitated

a reduction of nuclear tensions with thedissolution of the Soviet Union and therefore amarked reduction in the prospect for globalnuclear war. Additionally, the change in abipolar balance of power (between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union) to a unipolarworld with a single superpower, has facilitatedthe emergence of a more multipolar securityenvironment, after the fall of the Berlin wall.The collapse of the Soviet Union has allowedChina to become the pre-eminent power inmainland East Asia.8 While US democracy hastriumphed over Soviet socialism, China hasbeen able to modernise its armed forces andgeostrategically transform its focus from apurely continental perspective to oneincorporating both continental and maritimestrategies, on its southern and eastern maritimefringe.9

Multilateralism is synonymous with theemergence of a new world order in the AsiaPacific. This includes the gradual establishmentof bilateral, sub-regional and regional security-ensuring mechanisms.10 As a result of thismove from a distinctively bipolar basis, thereare new transnational and transterritorialcooperative opportunities arising. These areeven occurring in Communist China, where,for example, the Chinese domestic sector isactively embracing multilateralism in its questfor economic development.11 The linkagebetween multipolarity and multilateralism issupported by Job. Job uses an example ofmultilateral action in a post-Cold War worldbetween states with divergent nationalinterests, to illustrate the potential ofmultilateral security action. For example, acollective action to preserve regional stabilityprompted China, the US and Japan, to conductmultilateral action in order to “prevent NorthKorea from developing a deployable nuclearweapons capability”.12 In this case multilateralaction was considered to be more effectivethan unilateral or bilateral action.

The Chinese leadership is of the opinionthat the emergence of multipolarity is in itsnational interest. This is because China is nolonger the junior military power between theUS and the USSR. The disappearance of theUSSR has meant China’s sphere of influencehas widened. “Encouraging multipolarity is ameans by which China sees its quest for greatpower status advanced”.13 This augers well forfuture cooperative security relations within theAsia-Pacific. Some commentators suggest thatChina is ready to deepen cooperation withJapan, noting that the Chinese economy isbeing modelled along similar lines to theJapanese economy, and that economicrelations between the two states have vastlyimproved. For example, Japan is supportingChinese entry into the World Trade Order(WTO). Furthermore, dyads of cooperation arenow emerging in the Sino-Russianrelationship, both from a military and from an

13COOPERATIVE SECURITY: A CHINA PERSPECTIVE?

economic perspective, which assists with morepeaceful cooperation in the East Asian region.

It is worthy to note that a strong and stableChina assists US regional interests, and withthe exception of the Taiwan problem, paves theway for greater regional cooperation. Forexample it may soon be the case that Japaneseand Chinese troops are working side by side inmultinational theatres as part of UN forces.East Timor has the potential to achieve this.This level of peacekeeping is unprecedentedbetween these traditional rivals. According to Rozman “the Chinese since 1993 have been dropping their reservations aboutmultilateralism... and are now keen to find aregional approach (to security) that woulddiminish the role of the US – Japan alliancewithout prompting a Japanese militarybuildup”.14

Taiwan is still the major hurdle formeaningful security cooperation betweenChina and US. Specifically, China sees thedeployment of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)system in Taiwan by the US as a major threatto the reintegration of Taiwan.15 The fact thatthe US have in the past dispatched aircraftcarriers to the Taiwan Strait to act as adeterrent to China over Taiwan,16 does notauger well for security cooperation over theTaiwan issue. Conversely, the United States haspressured Taiwan not to push for totalindependence and therefore exacerbatetensions with China. While this does notresolve the issue it goes some way towardsmaintaining the status quo.17

Normative ChangeDespite the Taiwan issue, normative change

began to occur in China upon her entry intothe UN in 1971. Interaction with the globalcommunity has created new understanding ofinternational matters among Chinesestatesmen, facilitating the appearance of somenew dyads of cooperation, initially ineconomic matters, however, also moving intothe security arena. While the security

environment presents a different set ofnormative challenges to Chinese reformersthan the economic sphere, it can be arguedthat future security cooperation could parallelthe economic cooperation already achieved inthe post-Cold War environment.

According to Samuel Kim, “participation inthe UN has enabled the Chinese leadership togradually accept the principles of the commonheritage of mankind, broadening conceptualunderstanding of the sources of internationallaw...”18 A similar sentiment on the changing ofnorms through participation within Westerninstitutions is expressed by Stuart Harris.Harris views normative change within Chinaoccurring because of an acute need foreconomic development. A pragmatic Chineseleadership took a major policy decision whenthey decided to “abandon many deeply rootedassumptions about the nature of theinternational economic environment andconcluded that ... trade, rather than beingexploitative as Marx had indicated, could bemutually beneficial”.19

The abandonment of deeply rooted Marxistprinciples puts Chinese government policy intension with Marxist doctrine. This phenomenaplaces pressure on traditional Marxistinstitutions within China. That being the case,China has attracted vast amounts of foreigncapital through Foreign Direct Investment(FDI). Again, this has been in directcontradiction to traditional Marxists policy.Mao style Marxism forbade the use of foreigncapital based on a fear of normativeinfluence.20 To illustrate the extent ofborrowing once the policy was changed, FDIrose from absolute zero in 1975-79 to 3.5 percent in 1990-94.21 According to the WorldBank, this is the sixth most rapid rise of the120 countries studied.22 FDI has been attractedto China by the large, low wage labour pool.FDI is increasing employment opportunitiesand reducing poverty, achieving a level ofdevelopment and growth of phenomenal


proportions. This type of growth rate was notpossible before Deng modified the laws ofFDI.23

Based on Deng’s work, China, still aMarxist state is now highly vulnerable toWestern normative change through ongoingeconomic interaction with the West. Long-termreliance on FDI is causing China to become astrategic dependent of the US, at least from aneconomic perspective. Up until 1977, China’sMarxist-based, self-reliant economic, militaryand political theory, precluded use of foreigncapital specifically because of a fear of Westernnormative influence.24 The pragmatic Deng,however, reinterpreted the norm of self-reliance to become “a more Utopianprinciple”,25 opening traditional markets tointernational capital flows.

The Chinese Government’s self-interestedapproach both in security and economicmatters, gradually led to a confrontation withtraditional Marxist thought. According toWilliam Tow the dilemma was “how to forgelinks with Western industrial powers...withoutsubsuming its (China’s) strategic identity to thepolitical agendas of its new found suppliers”.26

Domestically, there is now greater pressure onthe Chinese leadership to integrate faster withinternational financial markets and instigatefurther reforms. The argument follows thatfaster integration would facilitate thedismantling of traditional state economicinstitutions so that greater trade liberalisationcan be achieved.27 Further trade liberalisationwould ensure a wider introduction of Westernnorms into the Chinese community, andbroaden the degree of normative changealready occurring in the domestic sphere.

The Chinese Communist Party has notalways coped well with this change. TheRealist, George Segal, paints a rather uglypicture of how well equipped the ChineseGovernment is to cope with this phenomena.Segal’s view is that China has always struggled to understand its place in the

world community. Furthermore, that Chinasometimes shows resistance to the logic ofinternational interdependence, evidenced in theTiananmen Square catastrophe. Segal is of theopinion that China has been at times frustratedwith its place in the global community,28 withthe belief that no country enjoys surrenderingsovereignty and power to the “westerndominated global system”.29 The fact remainsthat the poorly equipped Chinese leadership“believes that it is able to learn what it mustfrom the outside world and still retain controlof its destiny”.30

While the Chinese leadership may believethat they are ultimately in control, from the USperspective the issue of the translation ofeconomic power into projection of hegemoniccapability is raised. Just how well can Chinacontrol its destiny with the power ofglobalising forces ravaging within China?Moreover it is the currently widely acceptedview that “economic development andmercantile success precede a would-behegemon’s ability to project military andpolitical power”.31

There is however an alternative viewemerging, that “international systemic power isbecoming less fungible, less coercive and lesstangible”.32 Nye supports the view thatinternational systemic power is becoming lesscoercive and less tangible because of fivetrends in the international economic system:economic interdependence, nationalism inweak states, the spread of technology, thechanging determinants of political behaviourin the international environment and finallymultinational corporate behaviour.33 It appearsthat there is correctness in both perspectives.While the US as the remaining superpower isinfluencing the future direction of China to adegree, there is also evidence that globalisingforces are also having an impact on China’sfuture direction. In light of the fact that asuperpower balance of power arrangementdoes not exist and the fact that globalising


forces are impacting on traditional Chinesenorms, this may give rise to tolerance of amore ad hoc and cooperative securityarrangement within China, reflecting the sumof these post-Cold War changes.

Cooperative Security PotentialIn the early days of multilateral security

dialogue, China was a reluctant participant,viewing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) asa mechanism to constrain China. With thepassage of time through Chinese academicsand strategic “think tanks” have been activelydiscussing new approaches to security,emphasising interdependence, commoninterests and a widening of the concept ofsecurity.34 This view of renewed interest inmultilateral policymaking is shared by otheranalysts. For example, Johnson notes that theChinese initially viewed the multilateraldialogue within the ARF sceptically, lookingfor developments which may have impingedon China’s domestic security or internalpolitical issues. Over time though, these sameanalysts have become more relaxed. Now itappears that these observers see their ARFinvolvement as “a means of educating theirown government”. One observer has notedthese individuals are... groping towardvariations of... cooperative society”.35 Perhapsthe penultimate achievement of this processwas at the fifteenth CCP party congress, whenChina formally endorsed multilateralism,“stressing of the need for China to participateactively in multilateral forums”.36

A strong and stable China assists USregional interests, and with the exception ofthe Taiwan problem paves the way for greaterregional cooperation. China has alreadyparticipated in UN activities. It has supportedrecent US initiatives on North Korea and is asignatory to the nuclear Non ProliferationTreaty. The Chinese polity has sent personnelas part of UN inspection teams working in Iraq.In recent times China contributed a People’sLiberation Army (PLA) peacekeeping

contingent under an Australian UNCommander in Cambodia.37 In recent times,Chinese troops have been committed to a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force in East Timor.This inventory of participation in internationalfora has been facilitated by the ongoingbroadening of the Chinese IR perspective, andaffirms the view that greater participation ininternational fora is promoting normativechange within Chinese policymaking circles.

Cooperative security offers a viable securitysolution for China. It is a security mechanismwhich can replace or coexist with bilateralalliances. It promotes both military and non-military security.38 It is compatible withChinese security norms including bilateralism,and avoidance of hegemony because all actorswithin the regime are of equal parity.Cooperative security is a vehicle from which to“develop multilateralism from ad hoc, informaland flexible processes until the conditions forinstitutionalised multilateralism become morefavourable”.39 It advocates movement frombilateralism through trilateralism evolving intomultilateralism. This formula encapsulatesChina’s security requirements and is alsoaccommodating of China’s normative needs.

Normative ConstraintsChina is an ancient civilisation which has

been historically embarrassed by foreignimperialism. The Boxer Rebellion, was anexample of the exploitation of Chinesesovereign territory and Chinese nationalinterests by foreigners. Reparations were paidto Imperialists for 40 years by the ChineseGovernment, after the rebellion by a Chinesenationalist group to overthrow WesternImperialists.40 The legacy of this event is aChinese cultural norm reflecting “a powerfulnationalistic determinism never to be humbledagain by Western imperialists”.41 The aftermathof the Boxer Rebellion has been the vehementmaintenance of this norm to uphold sovereigndignity against imperialism. Recovery of lostterritories including Taiwan, Hong Kong and


Macao and even the Spratly Islands is viewedas a mechanism to undo the effects of thehumiliations, suffered at the hands of the West.

There is also some resistance to liberalnorms within China. Total liberalisation of thedomestic sphere is highly unlikely. When theChinese Government felt that liberalisation hadgone too far, they had no hesitation in usingoverwhelming force to crush liberalising forces.The lesson here is that despite the normativechange which had occurred in the domesticsphere, normative change had not occurred inthe polity. The result was Tiananmen;liberalisation was seen by the Government as asubversive force. This in turn constituted athreat to regime security, which provoked aRealpolitik response by the CCP.42

The Chinese Government has repeated anormative pledge never to act like asuperpower. Additionally, it has maintained aconstant anti-hegemony rhetoric ininternational organisations.43 China has eventurned down leadership of the developingworld on that basis - that her actions may bemisunderstood and therefore that China maybe viewed as a hegemon. This behaviour is alsolinked to China’s historical experience underhegemonic influence from the imperialistpowers. China believes the line between anactive and a bullying role to be “in the eyes ofthe beholder”.44

In terms of the success of a future securityarrangement involving China, it is apparentthat hegemonic acts by other states againstChina is likely to be interpreted through thisnormative lens. Moreover, imperialist actionfrom the US or other Western nations “is likelyto precipitate a crisis”, mainly because “Chinahas instilled a nationalistic determinism not tobe humbled again and therefore will never“kowtow”.45

While existing normative structures may beconstraining China’s security behaviour, it isapparent that China is reluctant to removethose structures which may be achieving someform of resistance to outside imperialist forces.

Provided reformers both within and outsideChina are aware that the pace of normativechange will be dependent on the degree ofresistance afforded it by the Chinese polity,then cooperative security remains a likelypossibility. Notwithstanding, the questionremains, just what lessons will China learn inthe coming years, and to what extent willChina abide by the lessons of the past? WillChina learn that great powers do not alwaysfeel the need to adhere to the internationalrules and norms, and therefore seek to changethose rules as others have done once she gainsgreat power status?46

In this article I have argued that the post-Cold War security environment providesincreased stability in the East Asian regionwhen compared with the Cold War period.Unipolarity has facilitated the emergence of amultipolar security arrangement, where dyadsof conflict still exist yet are being addressedthrough more multilateral means, rather thanthe historical bilateral balance of powerarrangements which were synonymous withthe Cold War. Emerging multilateralismtogether with a reduced security threat isgiving rise to increased cooperative securitypossibilities. In China’s case, the evidencepresented in this article supports China’sincreasing engagement with internationalsociety, caused through participation inmultilateral fora as well as through economicliberalisation. There are parallels between thenormative change being experienced in Chinawithin the economic and security sectors. It isalso acknowledged that the Chinese leadershiphas accepted multilateralism, and thatcooperative security is in step with China’snormative needs. The current state of China’ssecurity relationships with the rest of the worldis best summed up in terms of Sun Tzu’sclassical writing:

“We cannot enter into alliances until weare acquainted with the designs of ourneighbours.”


NOTES1. M. Kauppi, and P.Viotti, Glossary: International

Relations Theory, McMillan: New York, 1987, p.590.

2. G. Evans, Cooperating for Peace - The globalAgenda for the 1990s and beyond. Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1989, p. 183.

3. B. Job, “Norms of Multilateralism in RegionalSecurity: The Evolving Order of the AsiaPacific”, in International Norms: Origins,Significance and Manifestations, Leonard DavisInstitute for International Relations, HebrewUniversity, 1997, p. 4.

4. S. Kim, “China’s International OrganizationBehaviour,” in T. Robinson, and D. Shambaugh,Chinese Foreign Policy Theory and Practice,Oxford University Press, New York, 1994. p.408.

5. For a more detailed explanation see S.Goldstein, “Nationalism and Internationalism:Sino-Soviet Relations”, in T. Robinson, and D.Shambaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy Theory andPractice, Oxford University Press, New York, p.238.

6. S. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 244.7. S. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 246.8. J. Anderson, “The Limits of Sino-Russian

Strategic Partnership”, Aldephi Paper 315,Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1997, p.73.

9. J. Anderson, op. cit., p. 22.10. W. Tow, “The International Strategic System”,

in T. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, ChineseForeign Policy Theory and Practice, OxfordUniversity Press, New York, p. 132.

11. S. Kim “China’s International OrganizationalBehaviour” in T. Robinson and D. Shambaugh,Chinese Foreign Policy Theory and Practice,Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p.413.

12. B. Job, op. cit., p. 15.13. S. Harris “The PRC’s Quest for Great Power

Status: A Long and Winding Road”, paper to anInternational Conference on the PRC After theFifteenth Party Congress, 1998, p. 11.

14. G. Rozman, op. cit., p. 392.15. G. Rozman, op. cit., p. 394.16. A. Whiting, “Chinese Foreign Policy: Retrospect

and Prospect”, in S Kim, Chinese Foreign PolicyFaces the New Millennium, p. 298.

17. I. Johnson “International Structures and ChineseForeign Policy” in S Kim, Chinese ForeignPolicy Faces the New Millennium, 1998, p. 73.

18. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 429.19. S. Harris, op. cit., p. 14.20. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 426. Mao’s self-reliance

theory was published in the People’s Daily aslate as 1977. It consists of the five nevers:never permit the use of foreign capital, neverrun undertakings in concert with foreigners,

never accept foreign loans and never join theinternational capitalist IGO’s, and never incurdomestic or external debts.

21. World Bank report “China 2020 – Integrationwith the global economy”.http://www.worldbank.comAccessed: 10Jul99

22. ibid.23. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 426.24. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 426. Kim explains also that

Mao’s 3 conceptual pillars – self-reliance,minimising dependency, and transforming thecapitalist world economy has been repudiated.

25. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 426.26. W. Tow, “The International Strategic System”

in T. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, ChineseForeign Policy Theory and Practice, OxfordUniversity Press, New York, p. 131.

27. op. cit., China 2020, p. 3.28. G. Segal, “Does China Matter”, in Foreign

Affairs September/October 1999.29. ibid.30. ibid.31. W. Tow, op. cit., p. 118.32. ibid.33. ibid.34. S. Harris, op. cit., p. 14.35. A. Johnson, op. cit., p. 74.36. S. Harris, op. cit., p. 15.37. S. Harris., op. cit., p. 15.38. G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the anatomy of an

institution”, in International Organization 46,3Summer 1992, Massachussets Institute ofTechnology, 1993, p. 564.

39. ibid.40. J. Fairbank, E. Reischauer, A. Craig, East Asia

Tradition and Transformation – New Impression,Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1978, p. 640.

41. C. Johnson “In search of a new Cold War” inThe Bulletin of Atomic Scientist,September/October 1999, p. 49.

42. A. Johnston, “Realism versus Realpolitik:Explaining Chinese Security Policy in the PostCold War period”, ISA-JAIR Joint Conventionon “Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism:Asia in Search of its Role in the 21st Century,1996, p. 50.

43. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 408.44. S. Kim., op. cit., p. 409.45. C. Johnson p. 49-50. China sees Japan as

kowtowing to US interests and is opposed tothis behaviour.

46. S. Harris, op. cit., p.16.

REFERENCESAnderson, J. (1997) “The Limits of Sino-Russian

Strategic Partnership”, Aldephi Paper 315,Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press.


Evans, G. (1989) Cooperating for Peace – The globalagenda for the 1990s and beyond, Allen andUnwin, Sydney.

Fairbank, J., Reischauer, E., Craig, A. (1978), EastAsia Tradition and Transformation – NewImpression, Houghton Mifflin, Boston.

Goldstein, S. “Nationalism and Internationalism:Sino-Soviet Relations”, in T. Robinson, and D.Shambaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy Theory andPractice, Oxford University Press, New York.

Harris. S. (1998) “The PRC’s Quest for Great PowerStatus: A Long and Winding Road”, Paper toan International Conference on the PRC Afterthe Fifteenth Party Congress.

Kauppi M., and Viotti., P. (1987) Glossary:International Relations Theory, McMillan: NewYork.

Kim, S. (1994) “China’s International OrganizationBehaviour,” in T. Robinson and D. Shambaugh,Chinese Foreign policy Theory and Practice,Oxford University Press, New York.

Job, B. (1997) “Norms of Multilateralism in RegionalSecurity: the evolving order of the Asia Pacific.”International Norms: Origins, Significance andManifestations (Leonard Davis institute forInternational Relations, Hebrew University).

Johnston. A., (1996) “Realism versus Realpolitik:Explaining Chinese Security Policy in the Post

Cold War period,” ISA-JAIR Joint Conventionon “Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism:Asia in Search of its Role in the 21st Century”.

Johnson, I. (1998) “International Structures andChinese Foreign Policy” in S Kim ‘ChineseForeign Policy Faces the New Millennium,Westview Press, Oxford.

Kauppi, M, and Viotti, P, (1987) Glossary:International Relations Theory, McMillan, NewYork.

Ruggie, G. (1993) “Multilateralism: the anatomy ofan institution” in International Organization 46,3 Summer 1992, Massachussets Institute ofTechnology.

Segal, G. “Does China Matter”, in Foreign AffairsSeptember/October 1999.

Tow, W. “The International Strategic System: in T.Robinson and D. Shambaugh, Chinese ForeignPolicy Theory and Practice, Oxford UniversityPress, New York.

Whiting, A. (1998) “Chinese Foreign Policy:Retrospect and Prospect” in S Kim, ChineseForeign Policy Faces the New Millennium,Westview Press, Oxford.

World Bank Report “China 2020 – Integration withthe global economy”,http://www.worldbank.com Accessed: 10 Jul 99.

Lieutenant Commander Heron is currently posted in Canberra as the Operations Officer to the Director GeneralCoastwatch. He is completing a Master’s degree in International Relations at the Australian National University.

19

The Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel:

A DiscussionLieutenant Sarah Chapman, RANR

This article discusses the use of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) in the AustralianDefence Force. It is concluded that (a) prior to the widespread administration of a questionnairedesigned to determine stress levels amongst ADF personnel, the Defence research community shouldattempt to define stress in a conceptual, strategic and operational fashion; (b) that only after anoptimal conceptual definition of stress has been operationalised can the Defence researchcommunity attempt to accurately determine whether (and how) current stress levels are affectingthe performance of personnel and begin to impart effective stress management techniques to thosein need; and (c) that no one measure can replace the GHQ, which in itself has been inappropriatelyapplied to the ADF population in an attempt to measure the extent to which personnel experiencethe debilitating effects of physiological and psychological distress.

In addressing the issue of reporting andaccountability in stress management within

the Defence environment, Gilbert (1996) notedthat in recent years the Department has begunto experience the negative impact of increasedstress levels amongst employees in the form ofincreased compensation payments. This findingis concurrently validated by data indicatingabnormally high stress levels amongstuniformed personnel from each of the Services(see Grieg, 1997; McIntyre, 1998; Timmins,1998).

The 12-item version of the General HealthQuestionnaire (GHQ-12; Goldberg, 1972) wasoriginally selected for use in the Australianmilitary by 1 Psychological Research Unit inan attempt to measure levels of work-relatedor occupational stress amongst members of theAustralian Regular Army. It was considered anaccurate and rapid measure of psychologicaldistress with robust and well-establishedpsychometric properties. Subsequent to itswidespread administration in the ADF, theGHQ has come under increased scrutiny. Theaim of this review is to determine theappropriateness of the GHQ in providing asuitable metric for measuring stress levels in

ADF personnel and to assess the potential forother instruments to replace this measure.

A Brief Description of the ScaleThe GHQ has primarily been used as a

screening device to detect psychiatric illness orto estimate the prevalence of psychiatricdisorder within a sample of individuals. It maybe administered as a 60-, 30-, 28- or 12-itemmeasure in which subjects respond to anumber of statements regarding the state oftheir psychological health (for example, “Haveyou recently been feeling sad and gloomy?”).Scoring methods vary depending on thedesired outcome of the administrator. Thebinary method involves assigning a score ofzero to the responses Less so than usual andNo more than usual, with response optionsRather more than usual and Much more thanusual assigned a score of one. Subsequent tothe selection of a cut-off score, this allowsdetermination of psychiatric “caseness”. TheLikert method employs an interval scoringmethod, respondent scores ranging from 0 (Nomore than usual) to 3 (Much more than usual)for each item. This provides a linear index ofthe severity of disruption to normalfunctioning.


Receiver operating characteristic (ROC)analysis is designed to determine which cut-offpoint (using the binary scoring method)maximises both sensitivity (the proportion oftrue positives: independently diagnosed caseswhich the test correctly identifies) andspecificity (the proportion of true negatives:non-cases which the test correctly identifies).Sensitivity and specificity have been found tovary considerably depending on the sampleunder investigation. Banks, Clegg, Jackson,Kemp, Stafford and Wall (1980) note that thebinary method best discriminates between“cases” and “normals”.

One of the most hotly debated issuessurrounding the use of the GHQ is its inabilityto detect the longevity of respondent symptoms(Newman, Bland & Orn, 1988). That is, giventhat GHQ items are phrased to emphasise recentchanges in psychological functioning, the GHQ tends to misclassify individuals withchronic symptoms. Conversely, “individualsexperiencing acute stress-related symptomsmay be erroneously included as clinical casesbecause they report sudden changes insymptomatology” (Goyne, 1998: 11).

Many researchers have also debated themerits of the different versions of the GHQ.Whilst some researchers caution thatrespondents are more likely to give affirmativeanswers to the GHQ-12 (see van Hemert, denHeijer, Vorstenbosch & Bolk, 1995), othersendorse all versions of the GHQ for rapid andaccurate determination of general psychiatricstatus (Lo Bello, 1995). Reynolds (1995)discourages the use of all but the GHQ-60,claiming that the shorter measures fail towithstand psychometric scrutiny. Further tothis he asserts that the GHQ is best (andperhaps solely) suited to providing the generalpractitioner a clear and objective measure toassist him or her in referring a patient forpsychiatric assessment (see also Winefield,Goldney, Winefield & Tiggemann, 1989).

Gureje and Obikoya (1990) confirmed theuse of the GHQ-12 as an initial screening

instrument in the detection of psychiatricillness1; however note with concern the paucityof research examining the validity of theshortest version of the GHQ (although seeBanks and colleagues, 1980). Conversely,Goldberg and colleagues (1997) assert that theGHQ-12, when scored in a binary fashion,provides as accurate an indication ofpsychiatric morbidity as do the longer versionsof the instrument and the more complexmethods of scoring. Additionally, Banks andcolleagues (1980) have confirmed the internalconsistency and unidimensional factorstructure of the GHQ-12 across three differentsamples.

The brevity of the GHQ-12 makes itattractive for use in busy clinical settings andamongst those of limited literacy (Goldberg etal., 1997). The implications for administrationof the GHQ-12 within the ADF are clear: In anoperational setting the respondent will be eagerto complete the required questionnaire andreturn to their normal duties; it is unlikely thatthe 12-item measure will tax the attentionspan of the respondents; and the simplelanguage and low comprehension level of themeasure aids in its administration to thosemembers of the ADF whose educationalattainment may predispose them to readingdifficulty.

Given the more sophisticated awareness ofstress and its deleterious effects amongstemployees in the modern workplace, the facevalidity of the GHQ and the tendency forsubjects to distort their responses is worthy ofmention. Schei (1994), in administering theGHQ-12 to a sample of Norwegian Armyconscripts, queried the extent to whichconscripts had suffered under training orwhether the high scores obtained during hisresearch merely reflected a “widespreadcomplaining attitude” (Schei, 1994: 43). Whenthis question was put to them, almost a third ofrespondents agreed with the proposition thatthey had adopted a negative attitude without

21THE MEASUREMENT OF STRESS IN AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PERSONNEL: A DISCUSSION

due cause. This finding is equally pertinent tothe Australian military context. Furthermore, itis plausible to suggest that personnel in anoperational environment, with an enhancedawareness of diminishing resource allocation,may be highly suspicious as to the purpose ofthe questionnaire and attempt to “fake bad” inorder to achieve a favourable financial ormateriel outcome.

Winefield, Goldney, Winefield andTiggemann (1989) assert that the GHQ isresistant to the potential differential effects ofsex, socioeconomic status and culturalbackground on the scores of respondents.Despite this, however, earlier researchers haveclaimed that differential response profiles areindeed observable. For example, McCabe,Thomas, Brazier and Coleman (1996) foundthat GHQ-12 scores were affected by age,whilst Hobbs, Ballinger, Greenwood, Martinand McClure (1984) found that the GHQ wasmore accurately and reliably applied to menthan women. Furthermore, and despite theassertion from Goldberg and his colleagues(1997) that education level did not affect GHQvalidity, Mari and Williams (1986) found thatpoorly educated respondents were more likelyto give positive replies to the questionnairewhich were not subsequently validated duringinterview.

The Utility of the GHQ in the Australian MilitaryPerhaps the most definitive paper

addressing the utility of the GHQ in measuringstress levels amongst military personnel is thatof Goyne (1998). She notes that the GHQ wasfirst administered to Army personnel by wayof the annual soldier and officer attitude andopinion surveys, but that research is yet to beundertaken to determine an appropriate cut-offscore to determine caseness for an AustralianArmy population.2

Prior to the development of a new tri-service attitude survey, the single services wereadministering the GHQ to personnel on abiennial basis. The question now remains

whether to continue administering the GHQ-12or to adopt another more expansive measure.Currently, there are a number of reasons tocaution the use of the GHQ in an Australianmilitary environment. These include:a. the current lack of consensus in the

literature regarding the most appropriate oraccurate scoring method;

b. the lack of substantial normative datawithin the ADF which has been validatedby concurrent administration of adiagnostic clinical interview;3

c. the lack of research attempting to definethe most appropriate cut-off score within the ADF population to determinepsychiatric caseness;

d. that the GHQ measures transient or reactivestress. The GHQ does not provide anindication of the number of personnelsuffering chronic disruption to normalpsychological functioning, which isarguably a far more useful statistic forDefence management purposes;

e. that whilst the shorter version of the GHQis more appropriate for administration in aDefence context (for the reasons previouslydiscussed), longer versions of theinstrument provide a greater behaviouralsample and therefore greater reliability inmeasurement;

f. that the GHQ screens for psychiatricmorbidity which may or may not be relatedto work-related stress (determination ofwhich is the primary reason for theadministration of the GHQ by Australianmilitary researchers);

g. that a number of GHQ items mayencourage those with tendency towardhypochondria and psychosomatic illness orthose with a cynical attitude as to theintended purpose of the questionnaire todistort their responses; and, finally,

h. that the use of the GHQ to demonstrate theexistence of a stress epidemic does notelucidate the nature of the distressexperienced by personnel (are they


predominantly suffering depression,experiencing generalised anxiety, or someother problem?) and is therefore of limitedutility in assisting those responsible for theemotional well-being of personnel toaddress the problem.

General Issues Surrounding Stress Managementin the ADF

In order to more accurately determine theconstruct validity of the GHQ and to determineits comparative worth as a measure ofoccupational stress, further investigation ofinstruments such as the Occupational StressInventory (OSI; Osipow & Spokane, 1981)needs to be undertaken. A cursory perusal ofthe relevant literature suggests that the abilityof current measures to determine levels ofoccupational stress is heavily dependent onitem content. That is, items must correctly andexplicitly identify sources of occupationalstress to allow respondents to attribute theirdistress to the appropriate source (see Terry,Nielsen & Perchard, 1993). This is particularlythe case in the military environment, whereitems referring to an office environment or jobsharing are inapplicable to personnel serving atsea aboard a submarine.

Evidently, the necessary criteria forselecting a measure to accurately determinestress levels amongst ADF personnel arereliability (the degree to which an instrumentdemonstrates internal consistency inmeasurement); validity (the extent to which aninstrument measures that which it intends tomeasure); practicality (that is, time efficiencyand ease of self-administration); theavailability of normative data for comparativepurposes; and utility (the availability of othermilitary, or paramilitary data; the ability of thedata to determine areas of weakness and/orneed in existing policy and resources).

Further to this, the following issues areconsidered particularly pertinent to theconsideration of stress measurement within theADF:

a. should stress measurement be undertakenin a similar fashion to the collection ofattitude and exit survey data (on an annualor biennial basis)?

b. should the emphasis in stress measurementbe on the concurrent administration ofstandard health measures (a symptomchecklist and a measure of life satisfaction)and the collection of data pertaining tohealth service utilisation (statisticsregarding medical and psychologicaltreatment, suicide rates, compensationclaims)?

c. should the Defence research communityendorse a stress measure as “the instrumentof choice” for researchers examining work-related stress in specific contexts, or shouldresearchers identify the best means ofdetermining stress levels on a case by casebasis consistent with their research designand preferred methodology?

d. is it preferable to measure stress in anobjective fashion (visits to healthprofessionals, physiological indices) or toobtain data from the individual based ontheir appraisal of the number and impact ofstressors within their work and/or personallife?

e. is it preferable to obtain a measure ofcoping behaviour (thereby obtaining ameasure of the frequency and perceivedsuccess with which individuals employcoping techniques) than to have arespondent provide an assessment of thedegree to which they experience thedebilitating physiological symptoms ofstress?

f. should the ADF focus on occupationalstress to the exclusion of others forms ofstress (which may impact upon their workperformance, such as life satisfaction orfinancial difficulties)?

g. if we are to assume that we can accuratelymeasure stress, which factors are bestindicative of the military respondent’sperceived level of stress and his or her


ability to cope with the stressors s/he isexperiencing?If we are to focus more exclusively on

occupational or work-related stress, the picturebecomes only slightly clearer than if we wereto focus more broadly on life and jobsatisfaction. The Office of the Surgeon General(Senate Legislative Committee Brief, 7-8 Jun99) has identified the following factors asindicative of occupational stress:a. work characteristics (task design; work

quantity, diversity and complexity;resources and equipment; time availability;deadlines);

b. the physical work environment (noise,light, ventilation, temperature, space,working hours);

c. the nature of the work and its relation toemployee temperament, training skills andexperience; and

d. the human environment (organisationalstructure, management styles, methods andpractice, clarity and perceived fairness ofconditions, conflict resolution, direction,communications, training and support,relations with peers and clients, the clarityof roles, reasonableness of exceptions andoutcome, the usefulness of the work andstability of employment).Obviously the ability of any one measure,

or indeed any one research design, to measureeach of these potential contributors tooccupational stress is limited. Further to thisassumption, a cursory perusal of the relevantliterature suggests that the ability of currentmeasures to determine levels of occupationalstress is heavily dependent on item content.That is, items must correctly and explicitlyidentify sources of occupational stress to allowrespondents to attribute their distress to theappropriate source (see Terry, Nielsen &

Perchard, 1993). It seems that measures such asthe Occupational Stress Inventory (Osipow,1998) and the Occupational Stress Indicator(Cooper, Sloan & Williams, 1988) are the mostappropriate measures to achieve this aim.

Other measures that are worthy of furtherconsideration are the Coping in StressfulSituations measure (CISS; Endler & Parker,1994), the Ways of Coping Questionnaire(WCQ; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988) and theMaslach Burnout Inventory (Maslach, Jackson& Leiter, 1996). The CISS and the WCQ areperhaps more appropriate for enabling thepractitioner to work with the client instrengthening weaknesses in his or her copingbehaviours and in attempting to broaden his orher repertoire of coping behaviours. However,these measures may also be used to determinethe preferred coping styles of operationalpersonnel for whom restrictions in thebehaviours accompanying their preferredcoping strategies are necessarily associatedwith their employment (cf. Brown, 1999). Thiswill enable health professionals such asmilitary psychologists to fulfil their duty ofcare and assist in the development ofappropriate stress management training. Incontrast, the Maslach Burnout Inventory hassignificant potential for administration topersonnel in “high risk” (high stress)occupations, such as senior officers andpersonnel employed in particularly demandingoperational settings.

The Occupational Stress InventoryThe Occupational Stress Inventory (Osipow

& Spokane, 1998) is comprised of threequestionnaires that may be administeredindependently. These are:a. the Occupational Roles Questionnaire (for

which an example item is “My job requiresme to work in several equally importantareas at once”);

b. the Personal Strain Questionnaire (forwhich an example item is “My eatinghabits are erratic”); and

c. the Personal Resources Questionnaire (forwhich an example item is “I avoidexcessive use of alcohol”).Reliability and validity. The OSI contains a

significantly greater number of items than the


GHQ. Whilst this may be an impediment toensuring its completion by respondents with alimited attention span or low reading ability, itis advantageous insofar as it provides a greaterbehavioural sample and therefore potentiallygreater reliability in measurement.

The OSI boasts modest validity, concurrentvalidity having been demonstrated between theOccupational Roles, Personal Strain andPersonal Resources Questionnaires with jobsatisfaction (Bunda in Conoley & Impara,1995), burnout, locus of control andabsenteeism and other nonproductivebehaviours (Cochran in Conoley & Impara,1995).

Availability of normative data. The manualprovides both paramilitary and military normsfor the purpose of scoring and interpretation,however the lack of normative data for theinstrument in its entirety is cause for concern.

Utility. Arguably the most significantadvantage of the OSI in relation to the GHQ asa potential measure of stress in the ADF is thatthe former explicitly measures occupationalstress, whilst the latter merely provides ageneralised index of stress which is dependantupon respondent acknowledgement andexperience of physical symptomatology.Specifically, the results obtained from the OSImay provide policy-makers and humanresource professionals with a clear indicationof deficiencies in organisational resources andpractices (“I have the resources I need to getmy job done”; “I have divided loyalties on myjob”), job design (“I have more than one persontelling me what to do”) or personnel selectionprocedures (“I find that I need time to myself towork out my problems”; “I am bored with mywork”).

Despite these advantages, it is notrecommended that the questionnaire beadministered on an annual or biennial basiseither within or between Services, but ratherthat it be applied for the purpose of morefocused research. This is because the itemcontent is sufficiently specific as to become

meaningless were the OSI to be applied topersonnel employed throughout the ADF andgeneralisations made as to the nature andextent of occupational stress associated withmilitary employment in Australia.

The Occupational Stress IndicatorThe Occupational Stress Indicator (Cooper,

Sloan & Williams, 1998) is a measure designedto “clarify the nature of stress in organisationsby identifying sources of stress, interveningfactors and the effects of stress on employees”(Conoley & Impara, 1995: 620). The Indicatoris a 167-item measure comprised of thefollowing subscales:a. sources (intrinsic to job, managerial role,

relationships with other people, career andachievement, organisational structure andclimate, home-work interface);

b. individual characteristics (attitude to living,style of behaviour, ambition, broad viewType A, organisational forces, managementprocesses, individual influences, broad viewof control);

c. coping (social support, task strategies, logic,home and work relationship, time,involvement); and

d. effects (achievement value and growth, jobitself, organisational processes, personalrelationships, broad view of jobsatisfaction, mental ill health, physical illhealth).Witt (in Conoley & Impara, 1995) has

questioned the scope and veracity of thevalidation research which has been undertakenand recommends that further research beconducted before the instrument is endorsed asa measure for use in industry. However, he hasno such reservations for its continued use as aresearch tool, arguing that it has significantpotential in that regard.

The initial Indicator scale, “How you feelabout your job” may be appropriate foradministration on an annual or biennial basisin addition to some of the more genericattitude survey items that are currently


administered to ADF personnel. Whilst itemsfrom the latter instrument attempt to measuresimilar constructs to those contained withinthe Indicator scale (such as job satisfaction andtask autonomy), they do so with a view toobtaining a more global measure of“organisational satisfaction”. The Indicator isdesigned to measure the degree to which therespondent is experiencing occupational stressand may prove a useful measure when appliedto the ADF for that purpose.

The Maslach Burnout InventoryThe Maslach Burnout Inventory (Maslach,

Jackson & Leiter, 1996) is a 22-item measurecomprised of the following three sub-scales:a. emotional exhaustion;b. (reduced) personal accomplishment; andc. depersonalisation.

As noted earlier, the Maslach BurnoutInventory has significant potential foradministration to senior officers and personnelworking in high-stress and/or operationalsettings. Despite this, its use in conjunctionwith a measure of occupational stress (such asthose outlined above) is not recommended, dueto the problem of criterion contamination.Whilst occupational stress and burnout mayprove overlapping constructs, concurrentadministration of instruments designed tomeasure each of these constructs will result incontamination of the stress criterion used inthe research design. This, in turn, does notenable policy-makers and human resourceprofessionals to apply the research findingsand address deficiencies in organisationalpolicy and resources.

The Ways of Coping QuestionnaireSome researchers consider it preferable to

obtain an indirect measure of stress and stressreactivity by determining the frequency andperceived success with which an individualemploys coping techniques. Two of the morepromising instruments measuring copingbehaviour are the Coping in StressfulSituations measure (CISS; Endler & Parker,1994) and the Ways of Coping Questionnaire

(Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). The CISS is a 48-item self-report measure designed to assess thefrequency with which the respondent employstask-oriented, emotion-oriented andavoidance-oriented coping strategies, the latter“To identify the thoughts and actions anindividual has used to cope with a specificstressful encounter” (Conoley & Impara, 1995:1012). The CISS boasts particularly impressivereliability and validity data.

Despite the conceptual and psychometricvirtue of these measures, their use for thepurposes of stress measurement on an ADF-wide basis is limited. Neither instrumentmeasures the experience of occupational stressnor identifies its source, necessarily focussingon the stress management of the respondent.These measures are therefore unable to providepolicy guidance on stress management. TheCISS and WCQ are only recommended forfurther consideration in the stress measurementdebate with respect to specific stress andcoping research focussed on a discretepopulation (cf. Brown, 1999). They are deemedto have significant potential in that regard(refer Conoley & Impara, 1995).

ConclusionThe preceding discussion has canvassed a

number of questions that are pertinent to theconsideration of stress measurement in theADF and the identification of a replacementmeasure for the GHQ. The GHQ was originallyselected for use in the Australian military forthe purpose of rapid and robust stressmeasurement. However, subsequent towidespread endorsement of the GHQ aconsiderable body of literature has suggestedthat it may be appropriate to seek an alternatemeasure.

The following conclusions are drawn from(an albeit) brief consideration of issuessurrounding stress measurement in the ADF:a. researchers tasked with stress measurement

in the ADF should avoid criterioncontamination by attempting to measure


stress using a combination of objectivephysiological data (for example, healthservice utilisation), self-report ofpsychological and/or physiologicaldebilitation and sources of occupationaland/or organisational stress (such as lack ofhuman, materiel or financial resources andworkplace conflict);

b. annual or biennial stress measurementwithin the ADF is only recommended fordata pertaining to objective indices (such ashealth service utilisation and compensationclaims), however further examination ofmeasures such as the job satisfaction scaleof the Occupational Stress Indicator iswarranted;

c. it is not advisable that the Defence researchcommunity endorse a stress measure as“the instrument of choice” for thosewishing to obtain a measure of the extent,prevalence and type of stress experiencedby ADF personnel as the requirements of a given researcher will vary according to their research design, preferredmethodology and target population; and

d. it is preferable to measure the prevalenceand incidence of stress throughout the ADFin an objective fashion (visits to healthprofessionals, physiological indices) than to obtain data from the respondents on preferred coping style and stressmanagement, as this enables policy-makersto focus on addressing deficiencies inorganisational policy and resources.Prior to the widespread administration of a

questionnaire designed to determine stresslevels amongst ADF personnel, the Defenceresearch community should attempt to definestress in a conceptual, strategic and operationalfashion. It is only after an optimal conceptualdefinition of stress has been obtained,operationalised and tested that we can attemptto accurately determine whether (and how)current stress levels are affecting theperformance of personnel and begin to impart

effective stress management techniques tothose in need.

The four instruments identified in thisarticle appear able to assist in obtainingconceptual, methodological and operationalclarification in the stress measurement debate.However, caution is warranted in relying solelyon self-report measures of stress in the absenceof more objective data such as health serviceutilisation and other physiological indices.

NOTES1. Concurrent validation was determined using

the World Health Organisation CompositeDiagnostic Interview (CDI).

2. See Tomlinson, Gilks & Chapman (1998) for anobjective analysis of working hours andconcomitant stress levels amongst Armypersonnel.

3. This is problematic insofar as it deviatessomewhat from the application of the GHQ inthe Australian military context (group levelanalysis and determination of the prevalence ofwork-related stress), however it remains thebest means of validating the measure.

REFERENCESBanks, M.H., Clegg, C.W., Jackson, P.R., Kemp, N.J.,

Stafford, E.M. & Wall, T.D. (1980). The use ofthe General Health Questionnaire as anindicator of mental health in occupationalstudies. Journal of Occupational Psychology. 53:187-194.

Brown, L. (1999). Stress and Well Being inSubmariners. DSPPR Research Report 2/99.

Chapman, S.E. (1999). The General HealthQuestionnaire: A Review and Discussion.DSPPR Technical Note 1/99.

Conoley, J.C. & Impara, J.C. (1995). (eds.) TheTwelfth Mental Measurements Yearbook. BurosInstitute of Mental Measurements, Nebraska.

Cooper, C., Sloan, S. & Williams, S. (1988).Occupational Stress Indicator. NFER-Nelson,Australian Council for Educational Research.

Endler, N.S. & Parker, (1990). Coping Inventory forStressful Situations (CISS): Manual. Multi-Health Systems, Toronto.

Folkman, S & Lazarus, R.S. (1988). Ways of CopingQuestionnaire. Mind Garden, Australian Councilfor Educational Research.

Gilbert, J. (1996). Failures in reporting andaccountability in stress management inDepartment of Defence. Defence ManagementDiploma Program. Unpublished dissertation.

Goldberg, D.P., Gater, R., Sartorius, N., Ustun, T.B.,Piccinelli, M., Gureje, O. & Rutter, C. (1997). The

27THE MEASUREMENT OF STRESS IN AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PERSONNEL: A DISCUSSION 27

validity of two versions of the GHQ in the WHOstudy of mental illness in general health care.Psychological Medicine. 27: 191-197.

Goyne, A. (1998). Use of the GHQ in an AustralianArmy population. DSPPR Research Report 4/98.

Grieg, J. (1997). Preliminary report on the 1997RAAF General Attitude Survey: Stress andOrganisational Change. Directorate ofPsychology-Air Force, Defence PersonnelExecutive.

Gureje, O. & Obikoya, B. (1990). The GHQ-12 as ascreening tool in a primary care setting. SocialPsychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology. 25:276-280.

Lo Bello, S.G. (1995) in J.C. Conoley & Impara, J.C.Mental Measurements Yearbook, 12th ed. TheBuros Institute of Mental Measurements.University of Nebraska Press.

Mari, J. & Williams, P. (1985). A comparison of thevalidity of two psychiatric screeningquestionnaires (GHQ-12 and SRQ-20) in Brazil,using Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC)analysis. Psychological Medicine. 15: 651-659.

Maslach, C., Jackson, S.E. & Leiter, M. (1996).Maslach Burnout Inventory. Australian Councilfor Educational Research.

McCabe, C.J., Thomas, K.J., Brazier, J.E. & Coleman,P. (1996). Measuring the mental health status ofa population: A comparison of the GHQ-12 andthe SF-36 (MHI-5). British Journal ofPsychiatry. 169: 517-521.

McIntyre, A.T. (1998). Senior Army officer attitudesand opinions: An insight into stress andorganisational factors. 1 Psychological ResearchUnit, Defence Personnel Executive.

Newman, S.C., Bland, R.C. & Orn, H. (1988). Acomparison of methods of scoring the GeneralHealth Questionnaire. ComprehensivePsychiatry. 29(4): 402-408.

Office of the Surgeon General (1999). Stress in theADF. Senate Legislative Committee Brief, 7-8Jun 99.

Osipow, S.H. & Spokane, A. (1998). OccupationalStress Inventory. Psychological AssessmentResources, Inc.

Piccinelli, M., Bisoffi, G., Bon, M.G., Cunico, L. &Tansella, M. (1993). Validity and test-retestreliability of the Italian version of the 12-itemGeneral Health Questionnaire in generalpractice: A comparison between scoringmethods. Comprehensive Psychiatry. 34(3):198-205.

Psychological Assessment Resources Inc. (1981).Occupational Stress Inventory. Odessa, FL.

Reynolds, C.R. (1995) in J.C. Conoley & Impara, J.C.Mental Measurements Yearbook, 12th ed. TheBuros Institute of Mental Measurements.University of Nebraska Press.

Schei, E. (1994). A strengthening experience?Mental distress during military service: A studyof Norwegian Army Conscripts. SocialPsychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology. 29:40-45.

Terry, D.J., Nielsen, M. & Perchard, L. (1993). Effectsof work stress on psychological well-being andjob satisfaction: The stress-buffering role ofsocial support. Australian Journal ofPsychology. 45(3): 168-175.

Terry, D.J., Nielsen, M. & Perchard, L. (1993). Effectsof work stress on psychological well-being andjob satisfaction: The stress-buffering role ofsocial support. Australian Journal ofPsychology. 45(3): 168-175.

Timmins, P. (1998). The report on the RAN EmployeeAttitude Survey 1998. DGNSM Report.

Tomlinson, L., Gilks, D. & Chapman S. (1998). Acomparative study of Army working hours April1992-March 1997. DSPR Research Note 2/98.

van Hemert, A.M., den Heijer, M., Vorstenbosch, M.& Bolk, J.H. (1995). Detecting psychiatricdisorders in medical practice using the GeneralHealth Questionnaire. Why do cut-off scoresvary? Psychological Medicine. 25: 165-170.

Winefield, H.R., Goldney, R.D., Winefield, A.H. &Tiggemann, M. (1989). The General HealthQuestionnaire: Reliability and validity forAustralian youth. Australian and New ZealandJournal of Psychiatry. 23(1): 53-58.

Lieutenant Chapman is currently working as the Submarine Squadron Psychologist at HMAS Stirling using herresearch background and professional training in Industrial/Organisational Psychology to examine issues pertaining tosubmariner fatigue and watch-keeping. The aim of this research is to establish a fatigue management policy for theSubmarine Squadron that is tailored to the RAN COLLINS-class submarine.

2929

Indonesian Islamic Fundamentalism andAceh in the Twentieth Century

By Lieutenant Commander P. Flynn, RAN

There are many variations of Islamic practice throughout the sprawling Indonesian archipelago,and consequently many highly localised versions of Islamic fundamentalism in addition to thosewhich have had a general effect throughout the national socio-cultural structure. No region is moreindependent, stubborn or troublesome to the national government than that of the northernSumatran province of Aceh where, for some six centuries at least, the local people have practisedan unusual form of Islam based on fierce loyalty to their traditional leaders and a real sense ofhistorical connection with their independent past. Probably the site of the first permanent Islamiccommunity to develop in the Indonesian archipelago, Aceh is yet one of the most distant provincesfrom the national capital of Jakarta, and consequently is less susceptible to the winds of change,cultural and religious, which have moved through the general population, particularly in the 20th century.

It has frequently been observed that becauseof their constant exposure to travellers and

traders, and observance of different culturaland social behaviour, the inhabitants of coastalareas have a wider world view and acceptanceof change than those who live inland. Thisobservation is particularly valid in Indonesiawhere, over the past two millennia, waves ofHindu and Buddhist influence entered theislands through seaborne travellers and,gradually mixing with local animist beliefs,came to create a mosaic of belief systems, witha plethora of local variations, radiating outfrom the major population centre of Java. Thearrival of Islam in about the 13th century wasprobably accelerated by an increase in tradebetween the region and the Arabian peninsula,as the demand for the “exotic” produce of theislands began to grow in increasingly wealthyWestern Europe. As Arab traders monopolisedsea-borne trade to the West, more and more ofthem settled in the region to establish tradingcentres; they would have bought their own lifestyles with them, including their religion.

Heavily influenced by Sufism, the mostcolourful and tolerant variant, the brand ofIslam introduced into the islands proved to bepopular with local people who, not surprisingly

given their syncretic approach to religion, inmany cases simply added aspects of the newreligion to their existing practices. Thus Islampenetrated and influenced local religiouspractices to varying degrees, in some placessimply as a thin veneer of quasi-Islamicfolkloric behaviour scarcely distinguishablefrom previous practices, and in others to adepth and breadth worthy of the most piousproponents of Islam; Aceh was one of thelatter, far from Java and less affected byHindu-Buddhist religious penetration.Established as a Sultanate and growing inmilitary power and wealth, Aceh became apower to be reckoned with in the region, andconstantly went to war, usually over tradeagainst its neighbours, particularly the otherIslamic power centre nearby, Malacca. Just asimportant as trade though was the pre-eminentrole Aceh played in regional Islam as “… the‘Gate to the Holy Land’ the point of departurefor the pilgrimage to Mecca”.1

The arrival of the European colonial powersin the 16th century, first as traders and laterwith imperial ambitions, did nothing to changethe attitudes and behaviour of the Acehnese,who continued to fight – and usually win –against all comers until they were finally


contained in the 19th century. Even then Acehwas a name which continued to hold a specialplace in the hearts of Muslims and, althoughthe Sultanate was to disappear, the conceptremained alive in the hearts and minds of thepopulation who simply lowered theirallegiance to the next surviving level of power,the traditional chieftains who, along with thevillage ulama, provided the leadership thepeople required. The resultant amorphousstructure owed nothing to state interferenceand the Acehnese, so different in language andethnicity and so far from Jakarta, continued toexist in an environment of their own makingin which for centuries there had existed a “…close relationship between religion andpolitical authority”.2

The big difference with the Acehnese, thenand now, is that both their secular andreligious lives are indivisible, truly in the spiritof Islam, but not necessarily for the samereasons as others because their leaders are allindigenous and the Acehnese will notvoluntarily acknowledge any outside authority.While Islam continued to spread through thearchipelago, first in patches but later withincreasing effect, centres of Islamic learningbegan to be established, and one of the firstwas in Aceh. It was from there that studentswent to Mecca, Medina, Cairo and othercentres of Islamic education to expand theirknowledge and later return to the islands tocontinue teaching. This process continued forcenturies, with Islam still having an uneveneffect on the general population. Johns definesthe occasional spurts of growth and change inIslam which came over the centuries, eitherfrom internal or external sources, as “pulses”,each of which led to further developments, notall of which were positive for Islam.

Johns goes on to explain though that “…the sheer diversity and extent of the regionrenders impossible the formulation of anysingle theory of Islamization, or pattern ofIslamic life, or any periodization common tothe region as a whole”.3 What is important to

recognise here is that the process whichoccurred then, and is still relevant today, didnot affect all of the inhabitants to the samedegree; indeed, outside of the centres of Islamiclearning and the homes of the pious there wasvery little effect on the peasant masses as faras the intricacies of theological dispute wereconcerned. Hall sums up the result as one of“… Islamization, not conversion”,4 and goes onto explain that in Malaya and Indonesia,unlike other Muslim countries, customary law,or adat, rather than Sharia law continues tohold sway over everyday lives.

What is known is that Islam in the islands,as with every other part of the Muslim world,suffered a decline in purity and motivationwith the decay of the Ottoman empire from the16th century, its subsequent collapse, and theseemingly inexorable rise to global influenceof the Western powers with their novel viewson the creation of the nation state and thesubsequent separation of church from state inmatters secular. For two centuries Islamlanguished and lost its momentum, with manyfollowers slipping back into pre-Islamicreligious practices or, worse still, twisting thepurity of Islam into a barely recognisablegibberish. The capture of Mecca by the purist,reformist Wahhabis in 1803 signalled the startof a movement to re-invigorate Islam at itsheart and, as the 19th century progressed, thereligion began to pulse with life once again.New schools of reformist thought sprang up,many with the dual aims of restoring thefaithful to the path of correct worship, and ofputting an end to the decay so evident inMuslim society. It was from this point thatfundamentalism commenced in IndonesianIslam, although the current model is theproduct of many more modern influences,particularly the political, social and culturalchanges which have occurred, or beenprevented from occurring, in the modern stateof Indonesia.

Among the major influences on IndonesianMuslims were the reformist ideas of al-Afghani

31INDONESIAN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ACEH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

and Muhammad Abduh, taught to twogenerations of students from South-East Asiaby a remarkable native of the islands, al-Nawawi al-Bantani, who settled in Mecca from1829 for more than 40 years. His pupilsreturned to spread the ideas they had absorbed,and Muslims in the islands grew to understandthat things could be changed, and that theirreligion had a new lease of life. While thisrevivalism was growing, the colonial powershad increased their physical power over theregion to such an extent that, by the end of the19th century, there were no truly independentstates, only those that gave up all real secularpower were allowed to exist, and then only asshadows of their former selves. As always,Aceh proved to be an exception to this ruleand, although no longer a military or tradingpower, the people refused to be subdued by theDutch who by that stage had conquered therest of the Indonesian archipelago, and a longand costly war ensued from 1873 to 1908.Finally defeated in battle, the Acehnese neverreally accepted Dutch rule and remainedfiercely independent in their behaviour.

In 1942, little more than a generation afterthe final triumph of Dutch arms, the invadingJapanese encouraged the people of South-EastAsia to develop their own brands ofnationalism; thus, as the religious aspects ofMuslim’s lives were gradually developing, theirability to think as nationalists rather than atthe village level was spurred into action. In thecase of Indonesia though the post-wargovernment of the newly independent countrywas not about to preside over an Islamic state,but rather a secular state which did not evenrecognise Islam as the state religion. It was theactivities which led up to the declaration ofindependence, particularly the infamous“Jakarta Charter” incident which involved theomission of the seven words which would havemade Indonesia an Islamic state, that causedthe more militant Muslims to eventually takeup arms against the Government in the hopeof creating an Islamic state.

From 1948 to 1962 Aceh and other westernSumatran provinces existed in a state ofrebellion against the central government asthey tried to establish an Islamic state or DarulIslam. These activities caused a deep divisionwithin the Muslims of Indonesia which is stillfelt today and, just as importantly, led theGovernment to ban religion from politics, andthen to de-politicise the population as a whole.Various Muslim or Islamic social and politicalgroups or parties started to be formed in thefirst decades of the 20th century, but they hadlittle in common, no united front or agreedfocus, and were rendered easy prey to first theDutch, then the governments of Sukarno andSuharto, who all relied upon the “divide andconquer” principle to render Islam politicallyimpotent. The term “Islamisation” became asymbol for “… the use of ethnicity inarticulating the organisational functions ofinterest groups that for one reason or anothercannot organise themselves formally”.5

From 1910 onwards socio-cultural orpurely religious organisations such as theMuhammadiyah, originally founded as areligious revivalist group, deliberatelyeschewed anything to do with politics. In thesame vein Sarekat Islam started as an anti-Chinese traders league with, once again, littleevidence of any political ambition. Theseorganisations, and the many variations theyspawned both during the colonial period andafter independence all eventually became toolsto one degree or another of the politicallyambitious, and all were either destroyed,amalgamated into meaningless coalitions runby government puppets, or emasculated byother means. Given the all-embracing natureof Islam it was only a matter of time,particularly when fundamentalist energies wereunleashed, before an issue (any issue really)espoused by these organisations brought themup against the authorities; and they lost everytime. They had all crossed “… the thin andartificial dividing line between the religiouslytolerable and the politically intolerable”.6


Fear of religious strife has been a constant for Indonesian governments sinceindependence because they inherited a societywhich “… was sorely lacking in unity becauseit was a matrix of communal, ethnic, religiousand cultural segmentation”.7 Essentially, thoseIndonesian Muslims who practice their religionseriously (the santri), as opposed to thenominal Muslims (the abangan), have had toaccept the fact that, because of general apathyin the masses, any fundamentalist changesthey may wish to introduce will only have aneffect on a small number of Indonesians. Atthe same time the santri are up against theentrenched power and authority of the priyayi,those mainly Javanese descendants of the oldHindu-Buddhist kingdoms of that island whostill control the nation and its organs of state.The santri have no political power base worthyof the name and, even in free or controlledelections over the years they have watchedtheir share of votes decrease at a steady rate,and it has become obvious that the people ofIndonesia are largely hostile to the concept of areligion that has a political role.

The current crop of fundamentalists are stilllargely concerned with removing theindigenous embellishments from Islam, andreturning to the original purity of the teachingsof the Prophet. In addition to the problemsthey face because of the holistic nature ofIslam, which would of course include apolitical dimension as that is an integral part oflife, this course of action also brings them upagainst the Traditionalist ulama, those whoowe their status and very livelihood to theirpositions as leaders of the abangan masses andwho, quite understandably, have no intentionof giving up their perks of office to someonewho would have no use for them in the future.Emmerson points out the major pitfalls facingfundamentalists because “In Indonesia, Islam isan active minority – within a numericalmajority – inside a pluralistic society under anauthoritarian government engaged in seculardevelopment”.8

This paradigm is most unlikely to changeand, to borrow from Emmerson again, as thereis no chance of Islam gaining political power,or of disappearing, then both Muslim leadersand the Government have to come to someform of compromise, hopefully lessantagonistic than the current model. “Religionis like a nail. The harder you hit it, the deeper itgoes into the wood”.9 The causes of Islamicrevivalism and fundamentalism vary for everycommunity but Esposito lists four commonthemes, all of which are relevant to Indonesianfundamentalism:

(1) an identity crisis precipitated by a senseof failure, loss of identity and lack of self-esteem; (2) disillusionment with the West; thefailure of many Muslim rulers and their Western-inspired governments torespond adequately to the political andsocioeconomic needs of their societies; (3) the newfound sense of pride and powerthat resulted from military (Arab-Israeliwar) and economic (oil embargo) success in1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1978-79; and (4) a quest for a more authentic identityrooted in an Islamic past.10

The virtually impenetrable society createdin Aceh over the centuries has not beenaffected quite in the same way by Esposito’sfour common themes; for the Acehnese andtheir “… peculiar, Muslim-tinged Patriotism”,11

little has changed in the last century. Theyrejected the revivalist concepts espoused by theMuhammidayah in the earlier part of thecentury because they regarded them as alien,or not of Aceh or the true Muslim world.Unique in the archipelago, the Acehneseversion of Islam does not fit with any ordinarydescription, it is violently patriotic, all-pervasive, clan and tribe based and, withoutexaggerating it would probably be true to saythat they identify more with their Malay ethnicbrethren and the Arab world than with thenational government. The Dutch pursued a


policy of keeping politics in the outer islands ata very low level, preferably the village, so thatwith the demise of the Sultan of Aceh themasses were kept in ignorance and, as long astheir highly parochial needs were met theywere at least less likely to rise in revolt (no onecould ever say that they were passive).

The Indonesian Government has followed asimilar policy but, as with the Dutch, they havefound that the Acehnese have simply turnedtheir backs on them and focused inwards,deepening and strengthening their sense of“otherness” and social cohesion to theexclusion of outside influences; Islam has beenonly one among many factors in this process.The implacable hatred of the Acehnese of allthings Indonesian is only fueled by theconstant imposition of “foreign” troops, policeand government officials into their society, towhich they react savagely. This should notcome as any surprise though, because that ishow the Acehnese have lived for centuries; thecurrent state of affairs is only one morechallenge to them – and they love a challenge.

One of the big benefits of their behaviourfor the Acehnese has been the virtual exclusionof the Chinese from business in the province;the overseas Chinese, with their vast financialresources, have never been able to penetratethe web of Muslim trading concerns andfamilies that connect the province with the restof the world, and consequently the Acehnesehave been protected from the worst of thecrony capitalism which is so evident in the restof Indonesia. The current troubles in Aceh arefueled more by economic reasons thanreligious, as the oil and gas rich province seeslittle of that capital or profit invested orreturned in the form of government goods andservices. The fact that Islam is used as arallying call to rebellion is simply the way theAcehnese react in any crisis because of the rolethat religion plays in their lives. The last wordon Aceh goes to Benda who, discussing theformation of the nation state of Indonesia,opines that “Under the banner of a distinctly

Islamic local and ethnic patriotism, Aceh thusentered independent Indonesia as a virtuallyautonomous Imperium in Imperio”.12, 13

ConclusionWe can see that the causes and nature of

Islamic fundamentalism are many and varied,with both external and internal influencesplaying their parts to one extent or another.Islam in Indonesia has undergone practicallythe whole range of experiences seen and felt inother Muslim societies; perhaps not at thesame time or with the same intensity, or evenwith the same results, but still the learning anddevelopment process has many universalparallels. A vigorous religion, still largelyconfined to the socio-cultural sphere,Indonesian Islam is alive and well, but notdoing well at the polls – a fact which does notseem to worry too many Indonesians, whohave always regarded religion as an intenselypersonal aspect of their lives. The currentjockeying for political power, fundamentalistor otherwise, is a very long way fromproducing a consensus with which the vastmajority of Indonesians can live comfortably,and it will be many years yet before there is acomfortable equilibrium or even relationshipbetween religion and state.

As for Aceh, which in its time honouredway is now engaged in a savage rejection ofall things Indonesian while the world watchesevents in East Timor, it will take more than achange of government for relations to improve.Both parties need to take a good hard look attheir own peculiar paradigms before too long,otherwise we may well find that the long-dreaded unravelling of the Indonesian politystarts in the north of Sumatra rather thanelsewhere. Given the depth of religious feelingamongst the Muslims of Aceh, and the way inwhich it is intertwined throughout every aspectof their lives, there is little chance that thesenatural fundamentalists are going to suddenlyfind cause with those they regard as foreignoccupiers, usurpers of power, stealers of wealth


which rightly belongs to the province and, to adegree, heretics – or at least largely non-believers or nominal Muslims.

NOTES

1. D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia,(fourth ed.), Macmillan, 1981, p. 235.

2. A.H. Johns, “Islamization in Southeast Asia”,Southeast Asian Studies, vol.31, no.1. June1993, p. 51.

3. A.H. Johns, “From Coastal Settlement to Islam’sSchool and City: Islamization in Sumatra theMalay Peninsula and Java”, in J.J. Fox (ed.),Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, Indonesia:The Making of a Culture, Canberra, RSPS, ANU,1980, p. 166.

4. Hall, op. cit., p. 234.5. C. Dobbin, “Islam and Economic Change in

Indonesia circa 1750-1930”, in J.J. Fox (ed.),Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, Indonesia:The Making of a Culture, Canberra, RSPS, ANU,1980, p. 258.

6. H.J. Benda, “Southeast Asian Islam in theTwentieth Century”, in P.M. Holt et al (eds.),The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 2A,Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 1188.

7. Yong Mun Cheong, “The Political Structures ofthe Independent States”, in N. Tarling (ed.), TheCambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 2,Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 407.

8. D.K. Emmerson, “Islam in Modern Indonesia:Political Impasse, Cultural Opportunity”, in P.H.Stoddart et al (eds.), Change and the MuslimWorld, Syracuse University Press, 1981, p. 159.

9. ibid., p. 160.10. J.L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path,

(expanded ed.), OUP, 1991, p.158.11. Benda, op. cit., p. 198.12. ibid., p. 204.13. Imperium in Imperio (Latin), a sovereignty

within a sovereignty; an absolute authoritywithin the jurisdiction of another.

BIBLIOGRAPHYBenda, H.J., “Southeast Asian Islam in the Twentieth

Century”, in P.M. Holt et al (eds.), TheCambridge History of Islam, vol. 2A, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1970, pp. 182-207.

Crouch, H., “The New Order: The Prospect forPolitical Stability”, in J.A.C. Mackie (ed.),Indonesia in Australian Perspectives: Indonesia:The Making of a Nation, Canberra, RSPS, ANU,1980, pp. 657-667.

Deliar Noer, “Islam as a Political Force inIndonesia”, in J.A.C. Mackie (ed.), Indonesia inAustralian Perspectives: Indonesia: The Makingof a Nation, Canberra, RSPS, ANU, 1980, pp.633-645.

Dobbin, C., “Islam and Economic Change inIndonesia circa 1750-1930”, in J.J. Fox (ed.),Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, Indonesia:The Making of a Culture, Canberra, RSPS, ANU,1980, pp. 247-262.

Drake, C. National Integration in Indonesia: Patternsand Policies, University of Hawaii Press, 1989.

Emmerson, D.K., “Islam in Modern Indonesia:Political Impasse, Cultural Opportunity”, in P.H.Stoddart et al (eds.), Change and the MuslimWorld, Syracuse University Press, 1981, pp.159-168.

Esposito, J.L., Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics andSociety, OUP, 1987.

Esposito, J.L., Islam: The Straight Path, (expandeded.), OUP, 1991.

Esposito, J.L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?,(revised ed.), OUP, 1995.

Hall, D.G.E., A History of South-East Asia, (fourthed.), Macmillan, 1981.

Harrison, B., South-East Asia: A Short History,London, Macmillan, 1960.

Haynes, J. Religion in Third World Politics,Buckingham, Open University Press, 1993.

Johns, A.H., “From Coastal Settlement to Islam’sSchool and City: Islamization in Sumatra TheMalay Peninsula and Java”, in J.J. Fox (ed.),Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, Indonesia:The Making of a Culture, Canberra, RSPS, ANU,1980, pp. 163-182.

Johns, A.H., “Indonesia: Islam and CulturalPluralism”, in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam inAsia; Religion, Politics and Society, OUP, 1989,pp. 202-229.

Johns, A.H. “Islamization in Southeast Asia”,Southeast Asian Studies, vol.31, no. 1, June1993, pp. 43-61.

Mackie, J.A.C., “Integrating and Centrifugal Factorsin Indonesian Politics Since 1945”, in J.A.C.Mackie (ed.), Indonesia in AustralianPerspectives: Indonesia: The Making of aNation, Canberra, RSPS, ANU, 1980, pp. 669-684.

Mortimer, R., Showcase State: The Illusion ofIndonesia’s “Accelerated Modernisation”,London, Angus and Robertson, 1973.

Nawawi, M.A., “The Regions and NationalDevelopment under the New Order”, in J.A.C.Mackie (ed.), Indonesia in AustralianPerspectives: Indonesia: The Making of a Nation,Canberra, RSPS, ANU, 1980, pp. 685-598.

Osborne, M. Southeast Asia: An IntroductoryHistory, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1979.

Race, J. “The Political Economy of New OrderIndonesia in a Comparative RegionalPerspective”, in J.A.C. Mackie (ed.), Indonesia in


Australian Perspectives: Indonesia: The Makingof a Nation, Canberra, RSPS, ANU, 1980, pp.699-709.

Ruthven, M., Islam in the World, London, Penguin,1991.

Schwarz, A., A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the1990s, St. Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1994.

Steinberg, D.J. (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia: AModern History, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1989.

Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge History of SoutheastAsia, vol. 2, CUP, 1992.

Taylor, J.G. & Turton, A. (eds.), Sociology of“Developing Societies”: Southeast Asia,London, Macmillan, 1988.

Lieutenant Commander Flynn is the Assistant Defence Attache at the Australian Embassy in the Philippines. He issoon to complete his Graduate Diploma in Islamic Studies.


The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Carrier Fleet temporarily crippled the United States Pacific Fleet.

37

The Rise and Fall of the Imperial JapaneseAir ForceBy Rodrigo C. Mejia

Defence Analyst to the Office of Defence and Armed Forces AttachePhilippine Embassy, Canberra

Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, air unit commander of Fleet Carrier Akagi from Pearl Harbor tothe Battle of Midway succinctly summarises Japan’s defeat in these terms…

“I am firmly convinced that the Pacific War was started by men who did not understand thesea, and fought by men who did not understand the air. Had there been a better understanding ofthe sea and air, Japan would have pondered more carefully the wisdom of going to war. And evenif she had then decided that no other course was possible, many of the blunders she made couldhave been avoided. Because she judged the sea by land standards and applied to air warfare theconcepts of sea fighting, Japan’s tragic fate was foreordained.”1

The rise of Japanese Air Power started whenJapan launched a devastating air attack on

Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Except forthe absence of the three carriers of the fleet(Saratoga, Lexington and Enterprise), the entirePacific fleet was present at Pearl Harbor whenthe first wave of Japanese planes passed overshortly before 7:55 am. with the help of localintelligence operatives in Hawaii,2 the Japaneseknew the precise position of their victim andwasted little time completing their missionsuccessfully, sinking two battleships theArizona and the Oklahoma and badlydamaging the other six battleships in port, theCalifornia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,West Virginia and the Nevada which hadmanaged to get underway before being hit. Thetotal was grotesquely impressive. In less than120 minutes, the Pacific fleet of the UnitedStates had been neutralised. The United Stateslost 311 aircraft while the Japanese lost only29 aircraft during the fighting.3 The Japaneseattack was a tactical success. The second waveof attack was the destruction of the B-17 forcein Clark Air Base, the Philippines wherein theUnited States lost 18 of its 35 B-17s, 53fighters and 25-30 other aircraft. In this attackon the Philippines only seven Japanese fighters

were lost. The third wave of attack occurredthe following day when the British battleshipHMS Prince of Wales and its sister battlecruiser HMS Repulse were sunk off theMalayan coast on 10 December. Withoutsufficient air cover they were sitting targets forthe Japanese.4

After brilliantly executed advances in thefirst six months of the Pacific War, theImperial Japanese Navy (IJN) suffered its firstcrushing reverse at Midway in June 1942. TheBattle of Midway was regarded as the turningpoint of the Pacific War. It gave a strikinglesson in the vulnerability of aircraft carriers toair attacks. At Midway, the United States fleetinflicted an enormous defeat on AdmiralIsoroku Yamamoto’s task force. The Battle ofthe Coral Sea was the first naval battle wagedsolely by the use of air power with both fleetsmore than 250 kilometres apart. The result ofthe battle indicated that the battle betweencarrier fleets was a war of attrition. This battlealso strategically ushered in the decline ofJapanese air superiority. This was followedlater by the decisive battles in the Philippines,particularly the Battle of Leyte where theImperial Japanese Navy suffered heavycasualties. By fall of 1944, American aircraft


were flying freely over the Japanese homelandand it was virtually incapable of defending thenation.

This article will examine the reasons whythe Japanese air power gained a headstart inthe initial stages of war. It will study the causesof its downturn and why it was virtuallyincapable of defending the Japanese homelandby 1945.

Overview of the Japanese Air PowerAt the start of World War II, Japan had two

separate air forces, the Imperial Japanese NavalAir Force (IJNAF) and the Imperial JapaneseArmy Air Force (IJAAF). In terms oforganisation the Army organised aircraft insmall specialised groups called sentai. Whilethe Navy organised their aircraft in naval aircorps called kokutai usually of one aircrafttype and attached either to a fleet or an area asthe tactical situation demanded. Military cadetsand officers both in the Army and the Navywere heavily indoctrinated in the ImperialRescript of Emperor Meiji which emphasisedloyalty to sovereign and country.5 TheJapanese Army was authoritarian andconservative while the Navy was morecosmopolitan and less political.6 The Armylooked to Germany while the Navy looked toBritain. The two services had also differentstrategic outlook with the Army looking to themainland of Asia while the Navy focused onSouth-East Asia and the Pacific. This rivalryseverely constrained the early development ofthe Japanese air power capability. By the early1930s the Japanese Army and Navy pilotswere gaining valuable combat experience inChina and Manchuria.7 The war with Chinahad given much experience to both Army andthe Navy in establishing air tactics and inorganising air force to achieve its maximumeffect. The use of bombers and dive-bomberson both sea and land targets had beenperfected over China and in the China Sea. By1934, it was under the tutelage and commandof Admiral Yamamoto that brought about the

proficiency in night flying and carrier flyingoperation.8 In addition to their role as supportof surface forces, Japanese aircrews had carriedout long-distance transoceanic bombing raids,sometimes in poor weather, from bases inJapan and Formosa against a target aroundShanghai, Nanking and Hankow.9 By 1936,Japan’s military budget was increased almost50 per cent as a result of coup d’ etat that wasstaged by a group of young military officers.10

A comparison of air force strength at thestart of the Pacific War indicated the Japanesesuperiority in first line aircraft, carriers andcombat experience of aircrew. By December1941, the Japanese Army and Navy air forceshad a combined strength of 3,000 first-lineaircraft as compared to 668 of the allied. TheImperial Japanese Naval Air Force had 3,500first-line pilots while the Imperial Army AirForce had 2,500 averaging 500-600 flyinghours. Japanese Navy aircraft carriersoutnumbered the US Navy carriers ten to three.The Japanese possessed a clear-cut superiorityover the air force of the three allied nations inthe Pacific and a decisive margin in aircraftcarriers.11

The Early TriumphsThe Japanese air power was so impressive

at the beginning of the Pacific War that withina span of five months Japan had crippled theAmerican, British and the Dutch battle fleetsand air forces in the Far East. It had capturedtwo of the greatest fortresses in Asia,Corregidor “Rock” of the Philippines and theimpregnable fort of Singapore. At this point itis significant to identify the key reasons whythe Japanese gained a headstart in the initialstages of the war.

Flawed Cultural Perceptions

Japanese air power was seriouslyunderestimated by both the British and theAmericans. There was evidently a flawedcultural perception before the war started.According to one British instructor, Japanesepilots were, fifth-rate, inconsistent and showed

39THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE AIRFORCE

very bad judgment. The best Japanese aircraftwere thought to be a European design ratherthan the Japanese. Western intelligenceregarded Japanese pilots as inferior to theirWestern counterpart and were pictured asmyopic, night-blind, poor at dive-bombing andaccident prone. Japanese warplanes were alsodescribed by Western intelligence as shoddy,technologically inferior, made of flimsymaterials like plywood and glue paper andhaving a limited operating range. The Zerofighter clearly was more superior to anyAmerican aircraft in many ways. It was fullyappreciated over the Pearl Harbor attack andwas looked upon as nearly invincible becauseof its speed and manoeuvrability.12 Indeed,Japan had reached and in many cases,exceeded the aviation technology of that of theWestern powers for that time of the war.13

Japan also went to great lengths to ensure thatas little detail as possible of the advances madeduring the 1930s reached the Western powers.In fact, they displayed only obsolete andobsolescent weaponry and equipment to thepublic.14 They also propagated the slogan“every foreigner is a spy”.15

Underestimated Japanese War Machine

Before the beginning of the war in the Pacific,the Far East had a low priority forreinforcements and modern equipment,reflecting the weakness in Allied strategiccalculations.16 The United States and Britainhad agreed in 1941 on a Germany first strategybecause Germany was considered the moredangerous opponent. They underestimated thecapability of Japanese carriers to protect airpower as far as Hawaii. The range of Japanesebombers were likewise thought to be limited to515 kilometres which led the Americans tobelieve that Clark Air Base in the Philippineswas beyond the reach of Japanese land basedbombers. The capabilities of the Japanese Zerowere likewise misjudged until its performancein aerial combat proved superior over Alliedfighter aircraft then in use.17 This excellent

performance of experienced Japanese combatpilots was not anticipated and resulted inheavy losses to Allied air crew particularly inthe attack on Pearl Harbor and in thePhilippines. The United States losses wererelated more to their unpreparedness. Also, thelack of adequate defences especially radars forearly warning of air attack was a greatblunder.18 The United States Army was aneglected service, starved of funds. Only 2 percent of the national budget was allocated forresearch and development even though therewas a clear indication of Japan’s emergence asa military threat in the Far East.19

Air Power Training

By the early 1930s the Japanese Army andNavy pilots were gaining valuable combatexperience in China and Manchuria.20 The warwith China had given much experience to bothArmy and Navy in establishing air tactics andin organising the air force to achieve itsmaximum effect. The use of bombers and dive-bombers on both sea and land targets had beenperfected over China and the China Sea. By1934, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto the architectof the Pearl Harbor attack brought aboutproficiency in night flying operations.21

Japanese aircrews had gained experience incarrying out long distance transoceanicbombing raids, sometimes in poor weather,from bases in Japan and Formosa againsttargets around Shanghai, Nanking andHankow. The strong emphasis by the Japaneseof 300 hours of flying training before postingpilots is another factor compared to the USArmy Air Corps pilots who received only 200hours basic training.

Setbacks and Defeat

Japan did not Envisage a Total or a Prolonged War

The Japanese Master Plan was to advancetowards the intended area of conquest, theAmericans in the east and the British in thewest which had to be attacked simultaneouslyat the outset to secure the flanks of Japanese


forces and to protect Japanese lines ofcommunication to Japan. Japanese warstrategy was simply to destroy the British,American and the Dutch forces in the Pacificas quickly as possible and to secure a strongdefensive perimeter that was calculated to keepAllied forces beyond striking distance of theJapanese homeland. This was to be followedby the phased landing of seaborne land forcesto occupy Allied colonies in South-East Asiaand Southwest Pacific. The Japanese SupremeCouncil did not really envisage engaging in atotal or prolonged war with Britain and theUnited States. The long-term aim was to weardown Allied forces’ resolve and means offighting until the weight of struggle and lossesin Europe and the Pacific would bring aboutacceptance of the reality of Japanese conquestsand an eventual Allied overture for peace.However, it was a war Japan thought could beinitiated and then later limited in its conductand aims.22

Lack of Oil Supply

Japan had extended its operation farbeyond the distances that it could logisticallysupport. The extent of conquest and the greatinterdiction of the sea lines of communicationwere extensive. Imperial Japan certainly wagedmilitary operations on a grand and massivescale. Dispersed Japanese forces were scatteredaround the Southwest Pacific and South-EastAsia. During 1943 and early 1944, theJapanese were losing their momentum in everycorner of their operation in the Pacific and thiswas primarily due to the shortage of oil supplyand aircraft spare parts. Japan depended onoverseas supplies of oil for 90 per cent of itsrequirements. Aware of this weakness, supplylines were virtually cut by Allied submarines orair interception. US forces gave priority tosinking oil tankers. The number of USsubmarines on patrol rose from an average of13 in 1942 to 18 in 1943, to 27 by January1944 and to 43 by October. After March 1945no oil entered Japan.23 As a result, Allied sea

blockade had completely cut off all outsidesources of supply thus crippling the keyeconomic and military pillars supportingJapan’s strategy. Also, Allied forcessuccessfully developed a supply and trainingsystem for replacements while the Japaneseremained very limited in this area.

Decrease in War Industry Production

At the start of the Pacific War, Japan hadan edge with its superior Zero fighter planesand longer distance torpedoes. During the firsttwenty-one months of the war, Japaneseindustry production decreased significantly.America then pulled ahead, developingstrategic materials such as new aircraft, radar,homing torpedoes, proximity fuses and newmedicines and eventually the atomic bomb. ByJanuary 1943, American front-line air strengthin the Far East already exceeded that of Japanand by January 1944 reached 11,442 against aJapanese strength of only 4,050.24 TheJapanese could not match the Americancapability of mass production as Japanesemilitary factories were targeted by Americanbombers.

Massive Loss of Combat Pilots

The loss of great numbers of skilled pilotsparticularly in the decisive battle of Okinawaand the Leyte Gulf in the Philippines wasamong the foremost reasons for the collapse ofJapanese air power. Having began the warwith some 3,500 Army and 2,500 Navy pilotsin 1942 and 5,400 in 1943, the losses of10,000 pilots between 1942 and 1943developed a severe shortage. New pilots weretherefore sent into battle with 60 to 70 hoursof flying against American pilots in betteraircraft with five time more experience.25 Thisresulted in a greater attrition rate with theeventual decision to go “Kamikaze”. By June1944 the operational lost rate of pilots in theJapanese Navy had reached 50 per cent andthe losses amounted to about 1,000 aircraft.26

The use of the American B-29 “superfortress”which was beyond the altitude reach of

41THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE AIRFORCE

The Arizona burning after the great explosion.

Casualties of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor – The West Virginia.


Japanese fighter planes was another blow tothe Japanese.27 As a result of an early Germansurrender in Europe, these heavy bombers (B-29) were diverted to Japan to conduct high-level bombing of Japanese industry. As a resultof massive losses in the Battle of Leyte andimpending defeat in Okinawa the use of specialattack operations Tokubetsu Kogekitai (tokko-tai), also known as “Kamikaze” – the DivineWind,28 was used in the latter part of 1944 as adesperate measure to counter Allied naval andair superiority. On October 20, 1944, theJapanese 201st Air Group in the Philippineswas constituted into the first Kamikaze unit.29

By October 25, 1944, Imperial Headquarters inTokyo announced the formation of theKamikaze Special Attack Force – named afterthe “divine wind” that had saved Japan fromMongol invasion centuries before. In the nextfew months, in a frenzy of desperate courage,1,228 Japanese pilots tried to plunge theirbomb-laden planes onto the decks of US ships,sinking 34 and damaging 288 with heavy lossof life.30 The cost of Kamikaze operationsfurther depleted Japanese air power of aircraftand trained aircrew. Their losses in aircraft forspecial operations was 560 in the secondPhilippine campaign and 1,890 in Okinawa.While the Kamikaze more than adequatelydemonstrated its potency as a precision guidedweapon of terror, its use was not sufficient toreverse the strategic outcome of the war. ToWestern culture it was perceived as suicide butto the Japanese it was the supreme sacrifice ofone’s life in the performance of a sacred dutyfor his country and the emperor.

Conclusion The elements of surprise, secrecy, intense

training and prejudiced and flawed perceptionswere critical factors in the success of Japaneseair forces in the early stages of the war. Thiswas brought about by Allied prejudice on thecapability of Japanese pilots, ignorance of thecombat characteristics of Japanese aircraftparticularly the Zero and the lack of

appreciation of the potentials of aircraftcarriers for long-range projection of air power.It enabled the use of pre-emptive strikesagainst Allied air and naval targets.

The causes of the downturn was primarilybecause Japan was not prepared for aprolonged war nor had envisaged a total warwith Britain and the United States. Secondly,the vital role of industry and the economy inwinning the war never clearly established itselfin the mind of the Japanese Supreme Council.31

The Japanese were unable to competetechnologically and replenish the losses ofsoldiers and aircraft. And lastly, Japanextended its operation far beyond the distancesthat could be logistically supported. It was inthis logistic war that Japan’s war machine was exposed for the hollow shell it was.Without supplies, food, ammunition, medicineor reinforcements, no modern military can maintain even a semblance of capabilityfor very long. Japan’s military positiondisintegrated precipitately.

NOTES1. Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya,

Midway, United States Naval Institute,Annapolis, Maryland, 1992, p. xxii.

2. Although it was an awesome demonstration ofthe power of aircraft carriers, the Japanesevictory was incomplete. Admiral OsamiNagumo’s refusal to allow his pilots to make afurther attack against an alerted enemy had leftthe vital infrastructure of Pearl Harbor virtuallyunscathed. The base was able to begin repairsimmediately and to continue operating itssurviving ships – notably the Pacific Fleet’sthree aircraft carriers, the Saratoga, Lexingtonand the Enterprise. At the time of the raid,Saratoga was on the dry dock on America’swest coast while Lexington and Enterprise wereon missions to Pacific outposts. Cited in EricGrove, World War II: The Pacific War, inRichard Holmes (eds), The World Atlas ofWarfare: Military Innovations that Changed theCourse of History, Mitchell Beazley Publishers,London, 1988, p. 211.

3. R. Higham, Air Power – A Concise History, StMartin Press, New York, 1972, p. 83.

4. Sydney L. Mayer, MacArthur, Ballantine Books,New York, 1971, pp. 72-73.

43

5. Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies,The Royal Navy and the Imperial JapaneseNavy: Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1981, p. 268.

6. ibid, p. 268.7. Alvin D. Coox, “The Rise and Fall of the

Japanese Imperial Forces,” in Alfred F. Hurleyand Robert C. Ehrhart (eds), Air Power andWarfare, Government Printing Office,Washington D.C., 1979, p. 90.

8. Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: TheAmerican War with Japan, Viking,Harmonsworth, 1985, p. 305.

9. Alan Stephens, The War in the Air 1914-1994,Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, p. 70.

10. Richard H. Pelvin, Japanese Air Power 1919-1945: A Case Study in Military Dysfunction,Canberra, 1995, p. 19

11. H.P. Willmott, Empires in Balance, OrbisPublishing, London, 1982, p. 116.

12. Robert C. Mikesh, Broken Wings of Samurai:The Destruction of the Japanese Air Force,Shrewsbury, 1993, p. 19.

13. Mikesh, ibid., p. 19.14. Coox, op. cit., pp. 84-85.15. Pelvin, op. cit., p. 13.16. Pelvin, op. cit., p. 10.17. Martin Caidin, Zero Fighter, Ballantine Books

Inc., New York, 1970, p. 140.18. R.J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945, Europa

Publications Limited, London, 1980, p. 88.19. Pelvin, op. cit., p. 11.20. Alvin D. Coox, “The Rise and Fall of the

Japanese Imperial Forces,” in Alfred F. Hurleyand Robert C. Ehrhart (eds), Air Power andWarfare, Government Printing Office,Washington D.C., 1979, p. 90.

21. Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: TheAmerican War with Japan, Viking,Harmondsworth, 1985, p. 305.

22. Willmott, op. cit., p. 74.

23. Robert A. Pape, Bombing To Win: Air Powerand Coercion in War, Cornell University Press,New York, 1996, p. 100.

24. Overy, op. cit. p. 93.25. Overy, op. cit. p. 44.26. During an aerial battle the American flyers

called the Marianas Turkey Shoot, the Japaneselost 370 aircraft. Cited in Walter J. Boyne,Clash of Wings, Air Power in World War II,Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 24.

27. American B-29 bombers operated above 20,000feet which created difficulties for the Japaneseaircraft reaching the bombers and maintainingtheir height and aircraft balances. Japaneseaircraft were designed to give optimumperformance at 15,000 feet, with higher altitudeperformance causing malfunctions andincreasing the need for engine overhauling.Cited in Alan Stephens, The War in the Air1914-1994, Royal Australian Air PowerStudies Centre, Canberra, 1994, p. 23.

28. In 1281 Kublai Khan organised a mightyMongol armada to invade and conquer theislands of Japan. The success of this venturewas all but assured when a great typhoon offthe Japanese coast destroyed or dispersed theMongol ships. The Japanese people consideredthis fortuitous storm an evidence of heavenlyprotection and have ever since credited thesalvation of the Empire to Kamikaze – theDivine Wind. Cited in Rikihei Inoguchi, TadashiNakajima and Roger Pineau, The Divine Wind,Ballantine Books, New York, 1958, p. ix.

29. Denis and Peggy Warner, Kamikaze: TheSecond Warriors 1944-1945, OxfordUniversity Press, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 74-75.

30. Inoguchi, op. cit., p. i.31. Coox, op. cit., p. 92.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE AIRFORCE

Rodrigo Mejia is a Defence Analyst to the Philippine Defence and Armed Forces Attache Office inCanberra. Previously he was an Honorary Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centreat the Australian Defence Force Academy. He was also a Visiting Scholar both in Stanford andHarvard University. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science and Bachelor of Laws inSaint Louis University. He also completed his Post-graduate studies in Strategic Studies at theAustralian National University and Master in Defence Studies at the Australian Defence ForceAcademy.

Australian Defence Force Journal - Mail Order - A Feeling of BelongingPlease send order to The Australian Defence Force Journal, R8-LG-003, Russell Offices, Canberra, ACT 2600

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Poems of peaceand conflict

45

Iwant to start with a very big bouquet by placing on the record my utmost admiration forDefence’s professional performance in East Timor, an admiration shared by all Australians.

Defence’s performance was based on good intelligence, sound implementation and logisticalsupport.

That’s not to say our execution was perfect – we will be undertaking quite a few “lessonslearned” studies and feeding them back into the system. That’s as it should be. But, we should allbe impressed by the talents of our uniformed colleagues in the field.

After six years’ absence, I return to Defence to find that its greatest strength continues to be itspeople – a committed, loyal bunch of professionals with a “can do” attitude and a capacity todeliver, while recognising the need for significant change in the way Defence business isconducted. These strengths plus our current capability, community support for Defence, and the USalliance provide a platform that we can build on.

The Australian Defence Organisation has been through massive change that is often not wellappreciated. Let me give you a few figures.

Fifteen years ago there were more than 70,000 people in the ADF and around 40,000 on thecivilian side. Today, there’s some 50,000 in the ADF and around 16,000 in the Department.

In the last ten years, over 11,000 positions (military and civilian) in around 100 functions havebeen market tested with average savings in excess of 30 per cent.

This is large scale change by any measure.The reality today, however, is that there is widespread dissatisfaction with Defence’s

performance in Canberra – from ministers, central agencies within the public service, industry, andeven from within the Defence organisation itself. In essence, we have a credibility problem.

Being from Transport (and Regional Services), my “road test” of a sample of Defence’s peopleabout our mission, vision and values demonstrates that they are not well understood – even atsenior levels within the Organisation.

Nor are all in Defence sufficiently seized with the importance of serving the nation through itsministers and the government of the day. It is far too inwardly focussed.

A major focus for myself and other leaders in Defence must therefore be to restore confidence –both externally and internally. Improving our performance will be fundamental to this.

What’s the Matter? – A DueDiligence Report

Edited version of an Address by Allan Hawke, SecretaryDepartment of Defence to the Defence Watch Seminar,

National Press Club – 17 February 2000

Dr. Allan Hawke Secretary for Defence


PlanningSome argue that the three-year electoral cycle and two-year staff postings in the ADF

combined with an annual budget leads to a short-term focus and is not conducive to goodplanning. Posting turbulence needs attention in its own right, to help combat increased turnover.

One of the first things I looked for after arriving at the end of October last year was Defence’splanning regime. I hoped to find an overarching corporate plan, derived from government policyand objectives, setting out our purpose, our future directions, our priorities and our values. I hopedto find a succinct document which people in Defence were committed to and owned – which gavedirection and meaning to the work they did.

I hoped to find a business plan for each functional unit, derived from and clearly linked to theCorporate Plan – what’s to be done, by whom and by when.

I hoped to find something like each person’s “plan on a page”, derived from their group’sbusiness plan, clearly articulating what they were expected to contribute. A cascading frameworkfrom the top down, where each of the key people at the top level met with me to agree theirobjectives for the next quarter; discuss their plans, priorities, development and aspirations; and howthey intend to go about achieving them. And, for them in turn to do the same with their next levelreports, and so on.

I hoped to find the record of achievement and progress against the Government’s policyplatform and priorities.

And, I hoped to find an understanding of how we serve the Government of the day through ourMinisters, the Parliamentary Secretary and their private offices – including what they consider thecharacteristics of good advice on policy options to be, and an appreciation of the fundamentalimportance of establishing and maintaining good working relationships.

I’m not saying there’s no planning in Defence. Far from it. Some areas are better than others.Some have bits of the jigsaw, but not the whole puzzle. What I do find, is that we fail to make themark on three fundamental criteria:• planning which is clearly derived from our raison d’etre;• planning which is logically linked, and • planning that is not only understood but owned.

It is, in my view, a CEO responsibility (which I share with the Chief of the Defence Force) to putthis framework into place and to shape and share a vision which gives meaning to the work ofothers. So that’s another area I’ll need to spend a bit of time on.

This is an appropriate point to say something about what’s called the diarchy – theunconventional vesting of authority in two equals – Admiral Barrie as Chief of the Defence Forceand myself. While we each have particular responsibilities our joint roles might be compared to agood marriage – where there’s synergy at the top.

Performance and the BudgetPerformance, achievement – outputs if you like, in the new jargon – should be reported against

the plan. Businesses do so through their annual report. Interestingly, I note that the definition ofDefence’s outcome in the Portfolio budget statement is not the same as the Defence mission.

Financial performance is reported in financial statements. The Auditor General and his seniorstaff have left me in no doubt that Defence’s financial statements are at risk of being qualified nextyear in relation to the valuation of Defence assets. This tends to focus the mind a bit!

While there are significant costs involved in the current deployment of our defence forces,nationally and internationally, defence spending (or put another way, what Australians spend on

47WHAT’S THE MATTER? – A DUE DILIGENCE REPORT

defence through their taxes) is essentially focussed on conducting current operations and buildinga contingent capability – the capacity of Australia’s defence forces to fight and win if called on.

I would expect to be able to report on what activities were undertaken and what capability wasin place for the $11 billion or so cash budget expended each year in the defence of our nation.

I would expect to be able to advise the impact on that capability of an additional investment ofx per cent or a reduction of y per cent.

I would also like to be able to do this for our preparedness – that is, the readiness of the ADF toconduct and sustain operations.

I am not in a good enough position today to do so to my satisfaction. That must change.My recollection is that, when the Coalition came to office, its platform commitment was to

match the previous Government’s forward estimates projection. That’s what was promised – that’swhat was delivered!

The current state of Defence’s financial situation against the Forward Estimates might best bedescribed as parlôus. I don’t make that statement lightly – considerable pain will be required to getus back on track. The plain fact is that Defence has not been able to match the ends it is trying toachieve with the means it has been given to do so.

This goes to the fiduciary duty of a Secretary – something which is sometimes overlooked inthe public sector. Not only am I responsible for delivering the “Defence product” to theGovernment (Government wearing its purchaser hat), but I am also responsible for ensuring thefinancial and other sustainability of the Government’s investment in the business (Governmentwearing its owner/shareholder hat). In the words of the Commonwealth’s Financial Managementand Accountability Act, Secretaries are responsible for managing in a way which promotes theproper use of Commonwealth resources – i.e. efficient, effective and ethical.

Perhaps it should come as no surprise then, that soon after I started, a team of Department ofForeign Affairs officials arrived in the Department to work full-time on our financial position. Theyand their central agency colleagues will be applying a wire brush to our position and our processes.

As the Minister has made abundantly clear to me, the Government will need to be satisfied thatDefence is managing its affairs properly and that they are getting value for money beforeconsidering any increase in Defence funding.

There are many reasons why Defence is now confronted with this most unpalatable situation. One of these I’m told, is that over the last five years, our new investment commitment has

increased markedly (96-97 $1.4Bn; 97-98 $7Bn; 98-99 $1.8Bn; 99-00 $2.3Bn). That new projectshave been approved at a rate significantly higher than what is affordable in the long-term – andthat’s just in terms of the acquisition costs.

The number of approved major capital projects has increased from around 160 in 1991 to 240today.

Many of these projects represent either a big increase in capability or are totally new. AirborneEarly Warning & Control (AEW& C) aircraft, ANZAC helicopters, the LPA Amphibious Transportships, missiles, Electronic Warfare (EW) systems, the new Coastal Minehunters, additional LightArmoured Vehicles, and the Bushranger Infantry vehicles, to name a few.

All of these projects bring with them a big downstream liability in terms of personnel andoperating costs. Adding up all the projections is enough to badly frighten the horses. In his speechat the recent Pacific 2000 Conference, the Minister signalled the intention to address this issuethrough a proper whole-of-life capability process.


Then we need to add to this, significant bids for more support costs for existing capability, forsorely needed corporate Information Technology systems and the seemingly relentless growth inper capita personnel costs.

If that’s not enough, what about the block obsolescence which is predicted to begin around2007?

The state of Defence’s financial situation may well come as a shock to you, just as it has to theMinister and the Government.

Getting the budget/FYDP into balance is a, if not the, most critical issue we face. We have noexpectation that Defence resources will be increased in 2000-01, beyond the promised funding forthe East Timor deployment.

We have, therefore, been undertaking a comprehensive review of all expenditure andinvestment priorities. This will help us to provide the Minister and Government the widest possiblerange of options for their consideration.

In relation to major capital equipment projects, these considerations include already approvedprojects which are not yet under contract, as well as projects which are yet to be approved byGovernment.

No recommendations have, however, yet been made to Ministers and no decisions have beentaken, either in relation to particular projects or the overall allocation of resources within Defence.The Minister’s clear aim is to maintain the maximum possible flexibility in terms of possible futureprojects while seeking to minimise any resulting disruption to industry.

Providing for Australia’s defence is a long-term undertaking. It is therefore important thatdecisions on future defence capability and related projects are taken within the wider policyframework which the Defence White Paper will provide. We will be seeking to consult andcooperate with industry to maintain the necessary flexibility while the White Paper is developed.

I also take this opportunity to mention that the $380m reduction in the 1999-2000 Defenceequipment investment program effected during last year’s Additional Estimates process wasdesigned to accommodate cost pressures at that time, particularly in relation to increased readiness,the Y2K issue and maintaining a Defence Force of 50,000 people. Contrary to press speculation, noprojects were cancelled as part of these investment program adjustments.

We must shift the concentration of Defence’s management and decision making from a short-term cash driven input-based approach to a focus on outputs and financial sustainability. Accrualbased output budgeting and better cost accounting will help here, but we’ve still got some way togo to get our associated systems in place and operating effectively.

The forthcoming strategic outlook, Defence White Paper and budget/FYDP deliberations shouldprovide a firmer base for Defence funding and the force structure for the foreseeable future.

In my experience, organisations that perform well regularly report performance internally; thisis normally linked to their external reporting mechanisms and some means of frequently checking“organisational health”. While such mechanisms exist in many functional areas within Defence,there is no coherent ongoing corporate performance assessment.

Perhaps this, combined with poor communication, and the internal focus I spoke of earlier, hascontributed to Defence’s capacity to deliver “surprises” to its owners, the Government. Experiencetells us that few surprises past childhood are pleasant ones.

Planning, measurement and striving for better performance are part and parcel of an approachthat anticipates issues and problems and actively controls them rather than being controlled bythem.


GovernanceMany elements of Defence’s structure are sensible, but there are issues which need to be

addressed. The separate acquisition and logistics organisations are both engaged in procurement. The role

of the Service Chiefs must be clarified – they have essential responsibilities. The functional splitwithin Defence Headquarters is not clearly understood by many within it, let alone those outsidewhom it is intended to support. The so-called corporate support groups are not seen by theircustomers as sufficiently responsive to their needs.

More importantly, our top structure is not consistent with the previous 14 functional groups orwith our 22 outputs. As you will have guessed, I’m not a fan of matrix management.

When I asked our senior military and civilian staff to identify Defence’s strengths andweaknesses, one of the most significant areas identified was lack of clarity in direction; in roles,responsibilities and structures; together with blurred and poor performance accountability – inother words, accountability, responsibility and authority are not aligned.

Let me quote to you from an internal minute (to me) from a senior manager. Referring to anumber of organisations, he identifies “certain characteristics as transcending apparent differencesin business types. Each of these large, diverse and complex organisations are characterised by: • a genuine and demonstrated commitment to strategic management, guidance and planning;• a business plan regime displaying rigour, discipline, documentation and accountability;• an integrated cascade of subordinate planning and accountability throughout the organisation,

including personal performance agreements; and• effective, open and frequent internal communications.”

My due diligence diagnosis would suggest that Defence is presently lacking against elements ofthese characteristics. While in some cases, such as purchaser-provider arrangements, a foundationhas been set upon which to build and improve the current relationships, it is fair to say that thosecomponents that do exist are usually partial, uncoordinated and/or poorly understood by most.

CDF and I recently spent some time with our senior executives discussing the role of the ServiceChiefs and their relationship with other executives. Issues relating to the headquarters structure androle will be resolved by new top structure arrangements. Structure and outputs will be aligned withthe accountability /responsibility chain.

Acquisition and logistics reform are among the Minister’s highest priorities. He has soughtadvice on moving to a single procurement organisation. And he is determined to engineerfundamental reform of the way the Defence Acquisition Organisation conducts its business.

The Submarine Program remains our biggest project risk – a subject the Minister is monitoringclosely. He has also asked us to review and report to him on the next 15 most costly acquisitionprojects in an endeavour to prevent similar problems arising.

The Chief of Navy’s proposals regarding a new Navy structure based around force elementgroups (e.g. Major Surface Combatants, Submarines, Minewarfare, Patrol Boats etc.) have beenendorsed. Army and Air Force will test their structures against the new Navy arrangement.

Admiral Barrie and I will be putting in place a set of commissioning or charter letters clarifyingroles and responsibilities, accountabilities, authorities and priorities for the members of the DefenceExecutive, starting with the Service Chiefs.

Much of this will be settled during March. The role of the Defence Executive needs to be clarified and we have to review the associated

committee structure and our corporate governance framework. All of this, and much more, will besettled and in place by 1 July 2000.


PeopleWhen one thinks of Defence, one is often tempted to think of tanks, aircraft and ships. Yet

people represent about one-third of our investment in capability. As I mentioned earlier, one of themajor strengths identified by Defence’s senior staff was our people. Our workforce is highlycommitted. It’s highly skilled. It’s educated and developed to deliver.

We have already reviewed and refined the Defence Force career management scheme – CDFand I are taking a keen interest with the Service Chiefs in developing our senior uniformed peopleas part of succession planning. A civilian equivalent has been introduced but needs quite a lot ofdevelopment to get it up to scratch.

People and their intellectual capital are Defence’s value added. They are our future. So it’simportant that we identify, attract, recruit, develop and retain talented people. The right peoplewith the right skills in the right job at the right time. And, most importantly, people with the rightattitude.

Putting the budget/financial situation to one side, the most significant organisational issue weface relates to leadership. Not to put too fine a point on it, too many of our people lack confidencein many of Defence’s senior leaders. Justified or not, Defence’s leadership is seen as lackingcoherence, as failing to accept responsibility and as reactive. Issues such as visibility and caringarise.

Far too often, it seems that wherever one sits in the hierarchy, all the problems besetting theorganisation in terms of its management and leadership come from higher up the ladder.

There are certainly elements of what I would call a culture of learned helplessness among someDefence senior managers – both military and civilian. Their perspective is one of disempowerment.This may, of course, reflect the inadequacy of our performance framework.

ChangeAs many of you will know, the defence reform program sought to transfer up to 10 per cent of

the budget to the operational “sharp end” through cost reductions and other efficiency measures. It has already achieved a substantial proportion of those savings and the resultant resources

have been reinvested in improved operational capacity including the substantial cost of providingincreased readiness. At the end of this financial year, we will have achieved recurrent annualsavings of $482m against the estimate of $403m at this stage of the game. The further realisablesavings, yet to be harvested, have already been programmed and spent in our Five Year DefenceProgram. We’ve confirmed that we can still achieve $730m of the original estimate of $773m.

There have also been problems here: in change management; implementation; communicatingthe purpose and intended results; tracking the savings and most especially where those savingshave gone.

In the assessment of those who recently reviewed the program, it has been less than successful asa vehicle for cultural change in the organisation as originally envisaged by the authors of theDefence Efficiency Review. Many in Defence continue to see the results of this review as one-offchanges, to be ridden through before things return to their normal state.

As you will gather from my earlier comments, Admiral Barrie and I are seeking to create amore adaptable defence organisation – one which is more effective and efficient, and one which istherefore comfortable with an ongoing program and philosophy of continuous improvement. Onewhich is not so reliant on major externally-led reviews as a spur to change.

Macro change can be awfully seductive. In my opinion, enabling people throughout anorganisation to improve the processes in which they are intimately involved is far more powerful.


Most of you will recall the publicity earlier this year surrounding Defence’s use of consultants –$16.8m in 1998-99. We do seem to have had more reviews than Gone with the Wind and Defencehas been a lucrative hunting ground for consultants.

One of the great management gurus, Deming, considered that only about 4 per cent of peoplein any particular organisation were likely to be brain-dead. The vast majority want to give a fairday’s work for a fair day’s pay. The ingredients to create this environment are, of course, oftenmissing. But there are lots and lots of bad systems and processes that we can simplify, make moreefficient and effective, and less costly. Involving the front-line people in this is a key step, asDefence’s market testing program has demonstrated.

We are establishing two small units to help address this:• an organisational effectiveness unit led by a one star military officer; and• an organisational renewal unit led by a SES Band 1 civilian.

CommunicationDefence is probably the biggest and most complex organisation in Australia – second only to

Coles Myer as Australia’s largest employer. Historically, we’ve been a little secretive, due to thenature of some of our business. In areas like intelligence, high levels of security continue to beimportant, but in a modern democratic society, an overall approach of secrecy can no longer beused as an “easy way out”.

There is no doubt that the Government – and taxpayers – should know what Defence is doing,where it is heading, and where their money is being spent. This transparency is a vital ingredient toinform decisions about priorities and the balance between competing resource demands – it’s alsoessential to maintain community trust and backing so that we can fulfill our crucial responsibilityof defending Australia’s security.

In these days of instant global communications, successful military operations relyfundamentally on the ability to communicate. It’s not good enough to have exemplary military

Leaders must know how the processes of renewal may be set in motion.


plans, if they are not complemented by a coordinated whole-of-government plan that carries our –and the international – community with us.

As Australia’s strategic environment becomes increasingly dynamic – as we come to crunch –time on some crucial decisions about the future role and shape of Australia’s Defence Organisation– this becomes even more important.

With the many, and sometimes vociferous, competing demands on Government and ourpeople, Defence can no longer take for granted that the community it serves understands why theyneed a Defence Organisation. And having to “sell” ourselves in a modern society is not somethingwe are used to doing.

Defence has a mixed track record with its communications, borne out by the wide range ofperceptions held by both the Government and our community. On the one hand, perceptions aboutthe operational record and professionalism of the Australian Defence Force have never been higher,both at home and internationally – while on the other, Defence’s reputation continues to bedegraded by stories of poor project management and isolated but unacceptable behaviour by someof our people.

We are addressing the communications issue by implementing the findings andrecommendations of a report that found shortcomings in our strategic approach, ourcommunication focus, and the structures we employ to support our communications activities.

ConclusionsDefence is a great place. It has so much to commend it. It is fair dinkum about wanting to

improve its performance. But, we need to devote much more energy and effort to getting our corporate processes and

systems right – that will enable and sustain a substantial improvement. We need to focus on communication – both outside and within the organisation, on planning,

on performance, on governance and especially on people, particularly leadership. At the end of theday, it’s all about getting results through people – a simple phrase that reflects my leadershipphilosophy.

In a book called On leadership John Gardner writing about change, says:“Institutions that have lost their capacity to adapt pay a heavy price. Continual renewal is

necessary. Leaders must know how the processes of renewal may be set in motion.”That’s the essential task for Defence leadership – fundamental renewal of our organisation from

within.I have been pretty candid with you in my necessarily short study of these issues and the

potential solutions. How do I know that these are the key issues, I hear you ask? I know because the people in the

organisation and other stakeholders have told me so. And, I know from my own observation andanalysis at the end of nearly four months back in the place.

Many things have changed for the better in the six years I’ve been away. The issues identifiedtoday are capable of resolution and I believe there’s a head of steam, a will and the capacity withinthe staff to do so. I will not be walking alone. I know there’s a substantial constituency which seekschange – a constituency that is eager to be part of the process.

53

It gives me great pleasure to talk to you about leadership, especially when it is such a topicalsubject around this town right now.

Our new Secretary, Dr Allan Hawke, put his finger right on this issue at his address to theDefence Watch Seminar.

And let me say I fully support his views. It is refreshing for me to be joined by a new partner at the top of one of Australia’s largest and

most complex organisations – one who shares my vision and is as determined as I am to continueto drive through the changes that we need to ensure Australia’s security into this new century.

It’s probably worth pointing out at this stage what this mysterious and unconventional diarchyat the top of Defence means in real terms for the management of Defence business. It can best bedescribed as a “marriage”.

Broadly speaking I command the ADF. I have particular responsibilities for ensuring that thethree Services skillfully undertake joint operations and are effectively and efficiently administered.

I think a lot about my command responsibilities too, in ways which are not noted in legislation.Firstly, to the people of Australia through the Government for providing the forces needed for oursecurity. Secondly, to the young men and women in our Defence Force for ensuring that they arewell trained, have the right equipment and all the tools they need to be successful in carrying outany missions I assign to them.

I also have particular responsibilities for establishing a network of bilateral relationships withother Chiefs of Defence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Secretary, on the other hand, has particular responsibilities under the financial and auditacts, and as the head of a public service department. The Secretary signs the accounts.

Together the Secretary and I are responsible to the Minister for a range of matters. We adviseon force structure requirements. We jointly run the intelligence organisation and are responsiblefor providing strategic assessments.

And we are responsible jointly for the administration of the entire Defence Organisation, as wellas effective liaison with other Government Departments for the provision of national security.

So if you had a Venn diagram, you would see a large lump in the middle jointly sharedbetween myself and the Secretary, and you would see at the side two particular sets ofresponsibilities that we do not share.

Reflections on LeadershipEdited version of an Address by Chief of the Defence Force,

Admiral Chris Barrie to the Australian Institute ofManagement – 22 February 2000 – Canberra

Admiral Chris A. Barrie AOChief of the Defence Force.


I fully subscribe to the view that to be a good leader these days, you must also be a goodmanager.

I was interested to read about Frank Blount and Bob Joss’s comments on this subject in theirrecently published book, Managing in Australia.

Mainly because most of the attributes they talk about of a successfully led and managedorganisation have been vindicated in my mind by the outstanding performance of our young menand women in East Timor.

They talked about their view that good leaders were made by:• knowing the tasks that need to be done and the best way to do it;• belief and passion in what the individual is contributing to the greater whole;• rigorous training through experience, not sitting in classrooms but getting in the water;• knowing and aiming for world class standards; and• developing a culture of leadership and teamwork at all levels.

Frank Blount also noted that when he came to Australia he found a workforce which waspound for pound more capable than the US workforce – dynamic, positive, multicultural, welleducated. However, he also found that they didn’t seem to aspire to leadership.

Well, I hope that those days are well and truly over, and the Australian Defence Force in EastTimor has just demonstrated very successful leadership to both the international community andour community.

For the first time in our history we have taken the lead, put together a coalition in record timeand managed it successfully to provide a good foundation for security to the people of East Timor.

To bring this about, required foresight and planning, as well as a number of improvements inthe way Defence did business over the last few years. We have been implementing reforms at anever increasing pace.

However, these improvements are patchy so far. We need much more corporate coherence tomake sure that we have the plans, the structure and the right people in the right jobs with the rightskills to create the adaptable organisation we are seeking.

The most important element for success that we need is an ongoing program and philosophy ofcontinual improvement.

It is not entirely fair for people to draw the conclusion from Allan Hawke’s speech that this waslacking from the organisation. This is not the case.

What we have to do in this very profound change process is identify those leaders who are ableto perform in the new environment as well as those who cannot measure up. This aspect requiresserious cultural change in the way Defence does its business. It also requires a lot of work inidentifying the variety of skills required at different levels within the organisation.

We should keep in mind that cultural change requires constant and long-term commitment andaction before there are perceptible results – and certainly from my point of view, it is hard workbut we are getting there.

So what has changed in our overall environment to create the tensions now being played inour Defence as far as our operations, capabilities, strategies and budget are concerned?

Our productivity has increased dramatically by any measure. There is now what I callexpectation creep, which has resulted in a marked increase in our strategic tempo. As an indicator,the operational tempo set in 1999 surpasses that set in any year since 1972.

Put simply, those jobs the Government wants done today rather than sometime in the future.

55REFLECTIONS ON LEADERSHIP

But there has been no change in the policy framework to support this increase in demand,which the Government now recognises – and this is driving the White Paper process where we willbe fundamentally examining the future role and shape of the ADF.

And this brings risk management issues to the forefront. It is really a case of improving ourbusiness processes to meet the demands of our core business – being able to fight and win whencalled upon by the Government.

But the reality is that we need more robust business systems to solve our investment versuscurrent tasking conundrum. But it would be irresponsible for me to recommend the paying off ofDefence capability to the Government unless I am absolutely certain that we are an efficient as wellas an effective organisation.

We have still a fair way to go before reaching this point in my view, and as events of the lastsix months show me, Australia does need a balanced force structure if it is to be able to play itspart in building peace and stability in our region.

Let me point out that you don’t get the outstanding results we have demonstrated in East Timorwith a completely inadequate organisation.

Nobody can now doubt the excellence of the Australian Defence Force’s operationalperformance. Now our departmental processes need to catch up to match.

Turning to the improvements that are needed in our Headquarters, I think that theorganisational and structural issues are simply the result of the need to create flexibility to matchthe demands of our increased strategic tempo.

The essential task for Defence Leadership is fundamental renewal of our organisation from within.


We are now more than two years down the track from the Defence Reform Program. Thisprogram has transferred up to 10 per cent of the budget to the operational sharp end and increasedthe market testing program throughout the organisation. However, this alone will not be enough tomeet the cost-crunch we are facing.

We all expected that more adjustment would be needed, especially to embed the right attitudeand skills that our people require to enable them to improve the processes in which they areintimately involved.

So there will be a number of changes that Allan Hawke and I will be pursuing this year. Theseinclude:• making sure we have an overarching corporate plan derived from Government policy and

objectives that cascades down to a clear articulation of what each person is expected tocontribute;

• expanding our performance framework so that our people can take responsibility;• refining our corporate management information so we can quickly and easily make critical

decisions such as balancing our investment between the future and the current force;• moving to a single procurement organisation and fundamentally reform the way Defence

Acquisitions conducts its business;• clarifying the role of the Service Chiefs – they have essential strategic responsibilities which

need to be adjusted to the new environment;• aligning the top structure arrangements with the accountability/responsibility chain – it lacks a

framework and consistency at the moment;• taking a keen interest in senior succession planning – this is important. We have a quickly

improving system for the ADF, but this needs to be spread throughout the organisation;• improving our communications both externally and internally – this needs to be strategic,

constant and consistent;• and we are intending to do most of this by July this year.

In fact, the area of leadership and management change – particularly accountability andresponsibility – has been one of my top priorities since assuming command of the ADF more than18 months ago.

In conclusion, I’d like to emphasise that many things have changed for the better, but this isstill not good enough for the challenges that face us.

The essential task for Defence leadership is fundamental renewal of our organisation fromwithin. And this will only happen through strong direction and our people owning the process. Wehave come a great distance, but as you all know it never ends.

We need to improve our performance across the board, get our corporate processes and systemsright, focus more on communications, planning, and people and their intellectual capital asDefence’s “capability edge”.

Both the Secretary and I are sure that there is a substantial constituency for change in Defencewhich is eager to be part of this vital renewal process.

ReviewsBooks

THE OTHER ENEMY, by Glenn Wahlert,Oxford University Press, 1999

Reviewed by Allan McKay

Generally, in today’s modern Army mostsoldiers do not like or trust their MilitaryPolice. Ask a soldier and they probably wouldnot be able to accurately describe why theyfeel as they do towards the Military Police.What the author of The Other Enemy, GlennWahlert has done is explain in detail whyAustralian soldiers have held the AustralianMilitary Police in such low regard. The authortakes the reader on a journey from the landingof the First Fleet in 1788 through to theconclusion of the Second World War. Alongthe way he describes in detail the genesis andformation of the Australian Provost Corps in1916 and the methods of policing Australiansoldiers in two World Wars.

In this narrative historical work the authormakes use of personal letters and interviewswith soldiers who were involved in policingthe 1st and 2nd AIF. He also uses similarsources to give the viewpoint of the diggerswho were being policed. You do not have toread too many pages of The Other Enemy torealise that Australian soldiers and particularlythose of the 1st AIF were no angels away fromthe front-line. Highlighted throughout thebook are instances whereby Australia’s proudbattlefield behaviour was sullied by soldiers’ill-discipline behind the lines. The authorpoints out that the Australians had the worstdisciplinary track record of any Empire troops.Between January 1917 and December 1918 theANZAC Provost Corps in England dealt withmore than 26,000 cases of Australian soldiersfor either desertion or absence without leave.

The book relates how the experience andskills learnt through the First World War were

whittled away and lost after the ANZACProvost Corps was disbanded in 1920.

Many of the hard won lessons of that warhad to be re-learnt in the first years of theSecond World War. Wahlert states thatgenerally the Australian Military Police ofWorld War Two were better accepted than theirpredecessors. He believes that this is due in themain to a greater civil police influence in the2nd AIF. This new breed of Military Policewere certainly more professional, proactive,less confrontational, more tactful andpragmatic when carrying out their duties. Therole of the Military Police changed from that ofprimarily being concerned with administeringdiscipline to a combat support role that oftenincluded front-line service.

This book provides a compelling insightinto the mind-set and behaviour of theAustralian digger over the course of two WorldWars. The author highlights the fact that boththe 1st and 2nd AIF were not squeaky-clean assome historians have made them out to be andthat the Military Police were both an importantand necessary adjunct to the fighting in bothwars. The Other Enemy is easy to read andcontains a range of interesting photographs.The book is not only for those involved in theprofession of Military Police work but foranybody that is interested in Australia’smilitary heritage and history.

THE BATTLE AFTER THE WAR: The Story ofAustralia’s Vietnam Veterans, by AmbroseCrowe

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope (Rtd)

Intrigue, double-dealing, duplicity,disinformation, distortions of the facts and ofthe truth for the sake of ideological“correctness”. Add a few deaths in unusualcircumstances and you almost have a John LeCarre spy thriller. Unfortunately, the reality of


this book is a little more mundane and factual.The author has achieved the feat of producinga very readable (almost enthralling) book on asubject that is neither exciting nor topical.Most Australians, public servants andpoliticians would much prefer that the subjectwould just fade away.

However, the aftermath of this particularwar will not go away as too many of thosewho served in Vietnam have already suffered(and continue to suffer) a range of ailmentswith exceptional rates of occurrence. In somecases, for particular types of cancer the rate ofoccurrence is ten times the national average.Yet politicians and those public servantsappointed to assist veterans often behavetowards the veterans as if they are dealing witha criminal gang trying to rort and rob the“system”!

The book does not try to analyse why theveterans of the Vietnam War apparently suffera greater degree of psychological trauma thantheir counterparts of previous wars. The Battlesimply recounts the events that have occurred,warts and all. This is one of the fascinations ofthis book. It neither hides the problems ofindividuals (though some are protected fromidentification by the use of nom de plumes) norof the veterans’ organisation itself. Within theveterans there are equally bitter divisions aboutthe war, its effects, the actions which should betaken to rectify the treatment meted out byboth Government and the public and how totreat those most affected. It is equallyrefreshing in its honesty in naming thoseconcerned with both the good and the badaspects of its arguments. Most books tend tohide behind the bland “a spokesman for theGovernment/Department/organisation said...”,whereas the Battle names the politicians andpublic servants concerned. Surely some of thethings the politicians and public servants said,and which are quoted in the book, may havebeen expedient at the time but must hauntthem now? One would like to think so. Morelikely, for the public servants promoted for

their compliancy (now either in comfortableretirement on an indexed pension, orapproaching Departmental Head status) thesacrifice of justice and of the rights andentitlements of a few disaffected soldiers is asmall price to pay for their own advancement.

Do not expect to find these pages linedwith heroes, except for the veteransthemselves, who sustained a battle with anunfeeling bureaucracy for more than ten yearsagainst exceptional odds. I think the irritatingpart is the realisation (actually it is more a caseof “reinforcement”) that some governmentdepartments are so internally focused that their“clients”, i.e. those they are supposed to serveare but incidental to them. How the fewdedicated veterans who solely focused on thechemical poisoning issue for so long in theface of constant rejection is a study indedication. Even though they were convincedthey were right, their resources, when matchedagainst those of the Department of Veterans’Affairs (DVA) (and frequently the RSL!), wereso puny as to surprisingly lead me to draw acomparison of their bureaucratic fight withthat of their enemy, the Viet Cong, taking onthe might of the USA. In both cases, byperseverance and stamina, each David defeatedtheir Goliath.

This is not a book that will appeal to thegeneral public, and it is not intended to do so.It is a book for veterans and their families, forthose interested in the machinery ofgovernment and for those sons and daughtersinterested in understanding yet another aspectof their veteran father’s (or mother’s) struggle.This book stands as a record of a fight forrecognition and justice against great odds. Itreveals the nature of many people who, forpersonal or professional reasons, neither hadthe courage or the character to reveal whatthey knew and risk their jobs. Yet by standingby they allowed an injustice to be perpetratedand then perpetuated. Ambrose has the courageto identify them. On the other side are thosewho argued their case and lost, who picked

59REVIEWS

themselves up and argued again, and again,and again, until finally they won. For many,this was not about winning or losing, but aboutfinding out why they now have exceptionalphysical and psychological problems andgetting help to alleviate them. The fight wasessential because it was not just a fight for theveterans themselves but for their childrencongenitally affected by the chemical poisoningpassed on to them. The Vietnam War mayremain with Australia for generations to come.Recognition of that fact makes this book wellworth retaining by our children as a baselinedescription of the level of determination andunderstanding they may have to develop whendealing with the next generation of politiciansand public servants likely to oppose them.

ISSUES IN REGIONAL MARITIME STRATEGY:Royal Australian Navy Maritime StudiesProgram – Department of Defence, CanberraAustralia, October 1998, p. 65. David Wilson(Editor). Features: Illustrations, maps, tables,graphs.

Reviewed by Naji Najjar, Department of Defence

This volume (No. 5) in a series published byRAN Maritime Studies Program, consists oftwo papers written by visiting naval officersfrom Indonesia and the Philippines. They focuson issues that are of maritime significance tothe Asia-Pacific region – maritimeenvironmental management and maritimesurveillance.

The first article concerns the MalaccaStraits – the second busiest waterway in theworld. The author argues intelligently for theurgent establishment of industry, shipping andenvironmental laws to halt the ecologicaldegradation of the Malacca Straits. He reviewsthe experience Australia has had with concernto the environmental protection andmanagement of the Great Barrier Reef, andsuccessfully draws lessons from thatexperience which could be applied to theMalacca Straits. His discussion encompasses

international environmental marine law,diplomacy and environmental management.

The second article concerns thePhilippines. The authors contend that thePhilippines needs to develop a viable maritimesurveillance, monitoring and enforcementregime so as to effectively halt ecologicaldegradation, halt resource and mineraldepletion and halt illegal activities. Theconsequences of such a policy would be tomanage the maritime environment and theabundant resources provided in a sustainablefashion. They analyse Australian, Indonesianand Malaysian models of maritimemanagement to provide possible solutions thePhilippines Government can adopt. Theirconvincing case is sustained with an abundantnumber of maps, graphs and tables.

This volume of discussion papers focusingon maritime environmental management andsurveillance should be of great value tointernational legal practitioners, environmentalconservationists, and naval personnel. Suchmaterial that is easily read and understandableis worthwhile reading.

BROTHERS FROM BATAAN: POWs, 1942-1945, by Adrian R. Martin, SunflowerUniversity Press, Kansas, USA, 1992. 334pages, soft cover, illustrated, maps.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret’d) Noel Sproles

The author has re-constructed the experienceof his uncle, First Sergeant“Addie” Martin, who wascaptured at Bataan in 1942and subsequently died inJapan in 1945 while still aPOW. The reconstructionhas been made by meansof searches of the archives

as well as interviews of former AmericanPOWs, some of whom knew Sergeant Martinpersonally.

Addie Martin enlisted in the PermanentArmy in 1940 and was posted to a Coastal


Artillery unit of the New Mexico NationalGuard. An immediate reaction is that someonemust have had a wry sense of humour to forma coastal artillery unit in New Mexico but infact this was an anti-aircraft unit. Within ayear, Addie and his unit were in thePhilippines given the task of defending ClarkField just north of Manila. A potted history ofthe Philippines Campaign is given and adefinite impression is one of an ill-preparedforce with inadequate equipment and training.The story proper commences once the force onBataan Peninsula surrenders to the Japanese.

Along with several hundred of hiscomrades, Sergeant Martin is put to workbuilding an airstrip at Las Pinas near where theManila International Airport is currentlylocated. This work finished in late 1944 but inSeptember of that year the airstrip wasdestroyed by US Navy carrier based aircraft.After this, Sergeant Martin was sent to Japanto work in a copper mine at Hanawa in thenorthern end of Honshu Island where, insteadof the tropical heat of Manila, they had tocontend with 40 foot snowdrifts. On 8 June1945, Sergeant Martin died at Hanawa oftuberculosis, about two months before VJ Day.

This is a story of brutality and inhumanityas the prisoners are subjected to beatings,malnutrition, and such privations that onewonders how they could possibly havesurvived. A particularly inhumane episode isthe story of how the POWs were transported toJapan deep in the holds of unmarked freightersrunning the gauntlet of US Navy submarinesand aircraft in the South China Sea. The authordescribes these barbarities but does not dwellon them as the interest is more in uncoveringthe likely story of his uncle as a POW.Interspersed in the narrative are anecdotes suchas Japanese flying instructors standing up inthe rear cockpit of their aircraft beating studentpilots over the head for their errors. Again,there is the incident of a twin-engine transportladen with Japanese VIPs coming for the

official opening of the Las Pinas airstrip. Ontouchdown, the aircraft broke through thesurface and flipped onto its back. In the wordsof one veteran, “Unfortunately, it did not burstinto flames!” Once the war was over, the POWsat Hanawa had to wait for over a month to berescued but in the meantime they were air-dropped food and clothing by B-29 bombers inscenes reminiscent of the film version of“Empire of the Sun”.

Most Australians will be aware of the storyof our own POWs from the Pacific Campaignso it is of interest to be able to see that of USforces in similar circumstances. On the otherhand, this is a very narrow view beingconcentrated on developing what might havehappened to a particular individual It is notintended to be a comprehensive history of theUS experience but more of filling in themissing pieces of a family history – a search bya relative for the story of his namesake. It is astory of ordinary men in extraordinarycircumstances and there are no Weary Dunlopsto be found in this book. If you are interestedin adding depth to your knowledge of being aPOW under the Japanese, then this book willbe of some value.

SILENT MEN, by Peter Dornan, Allen &

Unwin, St Leonard’s, 1999. $24.95 rrp. ISBN 1 86448 991 X

Reviewed by Bruce Davey

Of the many superb Australian fightingbattalions of WWII, the 2/14th battalion canhardly have been surpassed. Since the end ofWWII few works have seen fit to drawattention to the efforts of this and the otherbattalions involved in the Syrian Campaign of1941. However in the last decade thanks to theefforts of a handful of authors and historians(some of whom are mentioned in the authorsacknowledgement), several books have beenpublished about that campaign and about thecritical New Guinea battles in which this

61REVIEWS

battalion participated – thereby elevatingpublic awareness.

Dornan’s book joins this group – for anumber of reasons it is a unique work. Itconcerns a section of the battalion and tracesits path through the war following the tacticallevel career of a section that had theastounding bad luck to be present for anumber of diabolical “shows” such as thehideous but fortunately brief campaign againstthe Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon andleading inexorably to the battle of Isurava inNew Guinea – an action that was by far thesingle most critical land combat everconducted in defence of the continent ofAustralia.

The book is a distillation of the oralhistories of a number of veterans and isessentially an “anecdotalised” account oftactical level action, soundly based on history.It contains a foreword by Sir Roden Cutler,several maps, a section dealing with furtherreading but lacks any reference to relevant andwidely available video productions whereinBissett, Avery, Bear, Saunders and Kingsburyamongst others are featured. An explanatorynote is included showing the organisationalconnections between the section underdiscussion and its higher formations. Theauthor also discusses the reasons why theAustralian 7th Division earned the sobriquet“the Silent Seventh” and whilst he dismissesany conspiracy of silence in favour of a kindof unity of ignorance – the reader must searchelsewhere for the solution to this mystery.

This book is another superb addition toAustralian military history published by Allen& Unwin. At a time when Australian soldiersare patrolling in Timor, it is fascinating that abook based on soldiering over 50 years agocan provide an insight to section level activitywhich has such a contemporary feel andappeal. Peter Dornan has succeeded in giving ameaningful voice to the Silent Men.

THE VICTORS, by Stephen E. Ambrose,Simon & Schuster USA, 1998. Reviewed by Lex McAulay

Stephen Ambrose had already written fourbooks on military subjects and seven on othermatters, and had decided to cease militaryhistory writings, but was prevailed upon by hispublisher to do one more. This is not the bestbasis upon which to base a book, and theresult shows it. Ambrose seems to haverecycled his earlier research to provide yetanother general view of the evolution of USand British units before, during and after D-Day, with a few comments thrown in from acouple of Germans. Once again we are ledthrough the preparations for OperationOverlord, what happened to the selected groupsand individuals on the beaches, then in thehedgerows, the breakout and the battles on theGerman border, then the final actions.Ambrose fails to acknowledge thatMontgomery's forces attacked continuouslyand drew onto their front the majority of theGerman Waffen-SS and panzer formations,making possible the great breakthrough to thesoutheast by Patton and Bradley. There is littleor nothing new in this book and it is anotherwritten by and for the insular US market.

THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE, by ChristopherAndrew & Vasili Mitrokhin; Allen Lane ThePenguin Press USA 1999

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

This large book, of 735 pages of main text,and another 230 pages of appendices, notes,bibliography and index, details only some ofthe enormous amount of material copied andsecreted by Mitrokhin during his duties as aKGB archivist, which, in an SIS operation in1992, was removed to Britain after Mitrokhin'sretirement, and defection to the UK.

The sheer volume and detail included in thecollection staggered Western intelligenceorganisations. The information included Sovietdiscussions and decisions about operationsagainst the West, front organisations, and the


identities of thousands of Soviet agents andthose foreign citizens recruited to work for theUSSR, at the highest levels of government,academia and society.

As well as revelations about operations inthe West, there is much detail on individuals,such as Philby, who was dismayed to find thathe had not been, and never was to be, givenofficer rank in the KGB, for the simple reasonthat he was a foreigner – no matter what heclaimed in his own writings. Mitrokhin'sinformation shows that none of the traitorswho fled to the USSR enjoyed life in theWorkers' Paradise.

The value of the information passed to theSoviets about all aspects of Western politicaland diplomatic matters, defence, research andtechnology, and personnel, was beyond price,and the revelations in this book, coupled withthe almost blatant activities of some of theagents and traitors involved, doubtless willappeal to those involved in security as a careeror as part of their departmental duties.

The book concentrates on Canada, theUSA, the UK and Europe; Australia and thePacific Basin receive little attention. However,read in conjunction with Breaking the Codes,by Desmond Ball and David Horner, probablerevelations about our region can beanticipated.

AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR, byMichael Tracey, Department of Defence,1999. Available from the Office of theAustralian Defence Force Journal, R8-LG-005, Russell Offices, Canberra 2600. 230pages, 120 plus photographs. Cost: $29.95.

Reviewed by Major Darren Kerr

Australian Prisoners ofWar is the 10th book in the outstanding series of commemorative booksproduced by the AustralianDefence Force Journal. Likeearlier works in the series

such as Australia Remembers 1939-1945, TheSpirit of ANZAC, and Return to Greece thisbook is another fine addition to Australia’sburgeoning military heritage.

Written by Michael Tracey, the ADFJ’snoted editor, Australian Prisoners of Warcovers the varied experiences of AustralianPOW in the Boer War, World Wars I and II, andthe Korean War (noting that no Australianswere captured during the Vietnam War). Inaddition to detailing specific POW experiences,each chapter provides a broad overview of eachconflict, concentrating of course on Australia’sinvolvement, as well as short vignettes ofmemorable incidents – such as Australia’s firstsubmarines and the development of theAustralian Red Cross. The chapters discussingeach war, despite providing only a cursoryoverview, are worth the price of the book alonefor the non-historian. The military history buffwill probably not find anything new, however,for the average reader these sections make for avery illuminating read.

A similar comment can be extended to theactual discussion of Australian POW. Althoughnot an exhaustive study of POW experiences, itis a very human-focused book that befits itssubject matter. The end result is very accessiblemilitary history that should appeal to a wideaudience. Quoting extensively from actualPOW records and diaries, and using numerouswell-chosen photographs, the book is at oncesweeping – covering several entire wars – butalso deeply moving at a very personal level.Not unexpectedly those who became prisonersof the Japanese during the Pacific War werethe most ill-treated and suffered accordinglythe highest death rate (with about 1 in 3 dyingin captivity). The use of POW diaries isparticularly effective in bringing this sufferingstarkly to life. The sections covering POW ofthe Japanese are particularly memorable andcan be uncomfortable to read, especially forthose whose relatives where POW – but it is astory that deserves to be told plainly andhonestly, as Michael Tracey has done.

63REVIEWS

Written in a clear and succinct style,Australian Prisoners of War is a powerful andmoving book. It is not a book about battlesand wars; rather it is about ordinary men andwomen placed in extraordinary situations andhow they struggled – and sometimes failed –to survive in often inhuman conditions.Despite having to operate on a broad canvas,Michael Tracy never lets the reader lose sightof the fact that being a POW was a uniqueexperience for each individual, no matter theshared conditions and suffering. It is unlikelythat any reader will be untouched by whatthese men and women went through andwonder if he or she could survive in similarconditions. And that is the power of the book.To dismiss it as a mere coffee-table bookwould be to miss the point of this memorableand poignant book. Its very accessibility iswhat makes it so powerful. This is a book thatevery Australian should own.

Videos

NIAGARA’S GOLD: The Epic Story of theGreatest Gold Salvage in History, adocumentary by Jeff Maynard anddistributed by Film Australia, 1994.

Reviewed by Major Jim Truscott

This fifty minute videoprovides an entertainingaccount of an operationfunded by the Bank ofEngland, to salvage eighttons of sunken gold from theRoyal Mail Steamer Niagara.On 18 June 1940, the ship hita mine laid by the GermanBlack Raider and it sunk off

the coast of New Zealand. In the followingeight months a private consortium operated inbetween long periods of bad weather toinitially locate the steamer, then blast anopening into its bullion room. The blastingrequired ten tons of explosives. Advancedtechnology for the day, in the form of a diving

bell, was then used as an observation chamberto direct a mechanical bucket into the bullionroom. Ultimately 555 out of 590 bars of goldwere recovered. A subsequent operation wasmounted in 1953 to recover thirty additionalbars; in the end only five were lost. It was thegreatest gold salvage in history, and theconsortium was to become the forerunner ofthe Commonwealth Salvage Board.

To put this salvage into a militaryperspective, it was ordered by Churchill to buyarms from America for the British war effort,and it was conducted in the middle of anunchartered minefield at great risk to the shipand crew involved. The Royal New ZealandNavy did not become involved until the bullionhad been located, at which point a piquet shipwas tasked. There is little then of anyconsequence for military viewers, other thanthe documentary providing a salient reminderthat wars must be paid for by politicians.

TIME LIFE VIDEOS FROM THE SERIES,“THE CENTURY OF WARFARE”: Four videoswere reviewed: Blitzkrieg; Air War 1939-45($24.90), Sea War 1939-45 and Jungle &

Ocean 1943-45. Time Life. $29.95.Reviewed by Lex McAulay

When the necessity to deal with the subjectin 52 minutes is kept in mind, the result mustbe broad-brush, and each video is a credit tothe editors. The narration, by Robert Powell, isexcellent: clear enunciation, unobtrusive, andprovides the necessary linking string on whichthe pearls are threaded.

The four videos reviewed were aimed at theNorth American and British/European markets,with Australian efforts mentioned once inpassing. The content and narrative is quiteimpartial, with Allied shortcomings andfailures presented in balance with successes,and the same treatment given the Axis. Onlythe most senior figures are named, or even onscreen, while the images present the campaign– the environment, the machines, and theaction.


The subjects are self-explanatory, and there islittle point in providing detailof each, but a resumé mightbe of assistance. Blitzkriegdescribes the evolution of thetheory, and its practice by theGermans, with good graphicsand some little-known film

footage, culminating with German films of thedestroyed British and French armies at Dunkirkand along the roads of France, ending withHitler's exuberance at thesurrender ceremony. Jungleand Ocean 1943-45 devotesroughly equal time to the USNavy's advance in the Pacific,MacArthur's isolation ofRabaul and liberation of thePhilippines, and the Britishcampaigns in Burma, withmuch attention to Wingate'sadventures. The Aussies are mentioned only inpassing; Borneo 1945 is not mentioned.

Sea War 1939-45 really is an example of good editing, covering the subjectsof battleships and theiremployment, aircraft carrierdevelopment and operations,submarine and anti-submarinewarfare, merchant shipping,amphibious warfare, and the

logistics aspect. Air War 1939-45 is another good result

from the editors, and describes the inter-warbombardment theories, the early campaigns,and progresses naturally to the A-bombmissions, along the way describing air defence,"the Blitz", ground-attack, night-fighting, day

fighting, bomber escorts,tactical and strategicbombing, "round-the-clock"bombing, airborne and glideroperations, and thedestruction of enemy citiesby Allied bomber fleets.

What became evidentwhile watching these videoswas the major role of theGerman Luftwaffe in Hitler's plans, first infrightening Germany's neighbours, and then inprojecting the power of the 3rd Reich ahead ofthe Wehrmacht into those countries, and lateronto the cities of Europe and the UK. Todayadulatory books and websites devoted to theLuftwaffe abound, but the German Air Forcewas literally first in the attacks on weakerneighbours.

These videos are quite suitable for someonerequiring an overview of the subject matter. Donot expect a lot of detail on any aspect, suchas Midway, D-Day, or the destruction ofDresden, for example.

Given that these are broad-brushtreatments of the campaigns, and presumablyan enormous amount of film was available, itis a little disappointing to see the same filmclips in the different videos. It might beconsidered nit-picking, but some myths arerepeated when post-war research has exposedthem, such as that of the “three Gladiators,Faith, Hope and Charity defending Maltaalone", in reality a public relations creativeexercise, because there were 10 Gladiators, andthat Hitler intervened in the development ofthe Me262 jet fighter with drastic results forthe Luftwaffe.

However, all in all, these are goodtreatments of very large subjects.

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