DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA FEBRUARY 2010 DSI VOLUME 2 ISSUE 4 Rs 250 MODERNISATION THE CHALLENGE TO CHANGE The armed forces need cost effective solutions to enhance their combat edge I AIR CHIEF MARSHAL FALI H. MAJOR SECURITY NEEDED: PERSPECTIVE PLANNING Twelve years down, the office of the NSA is still a work in progress I SIDDARTH VARADARAJAN POLICING THE SEAS Despite attacks by terrorists from the sea, the focus on maritime security remains inadequate I C. UDAY BHASKAR COVER STORY CAMOUFLAGED MANOEUVRES The countries may play down their strategic and military links but today Israel is India’s second largest arms’ supplier I RAHUL BEDI
Transcript
DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA
FEBRUARY 2010
DSIVOLUME 2 ISSUE 4 Rs 250
MODERNISATION
THE CHALLENGE TO CHANGEThe armed forces need cost effective solutions to enhancetheir combat edge I AIR CHIEF MARSHAL FALI H. MAJOR
SECURITY
NEEDED: PERSPECTIVE PLANNING Twelve years down, the office of the NSA is still a work in progress I SIDDARTH VARADARAJAN
POLICING THE SEAS Despite attacks by terrorists from thesea, the focus on maritime securityremains inadequate I C. UDAY BHASKAR
COVER STORY
CAMOUFLAGED MANOEUVRESThe countries may playdown their strategic andmilitary links but today Israelis India’s second largestarms’ supplier I RAHUL BEDI
Today, there is a routineexchange ofhigh level visitsbetween thetwo countries’military-politicalestablishmentscompletelyupturningIndia’s earlierreluctance tohave relationswith Israel.
Mannika ChopraEDITOR
Defence & Security of India
ndia’s resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 has come as a boon toits defence industry which was flagging after the end of the Cold War. Today, Israelis India’s second largest weapon supplier after Russia. In fact, India’s record procurement of arms has been one of the main reasons behind Israel’s emergence asone of the top five exporters of defence equipment in the world.
Today, there is a routine exchange of high level visits between the two countries’military-political establishments completely over turning India’s earlier reluctance to
have relations with Israel. This unparalled cooperation is underpinned by–sometimes–hiddendiplomatic,military and intelligence equations between India and Israel. DSI provides an insightinto this new security reality.
As the year rolls on, DSI authoritatively analyses the modernisation impetus of the Indianarmed forces looking particularly at maritime security and the digitisation programme of theIndian Army. Overall, the prognosis is not good. While the quest for technological advantagecontinues, it has not kept pace with basic defence requirements. But a push to seek cost effective solutions to enhance India’s combative edge through technological superiority will bean essential driver to transform the armed forces.
It’s been twelve years since the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) was instituted.With a new incumbent in place its time for a little stocktaking. Over the years, the high profileappointment has become slightly controversial. We look at whether the NSA has managed tofulfill its original mandate of being a prime mover of a long-term, planning structure connected to the National Security Council which is headed by the Prime Minister.
The recent elections in war-scarred Sri Lanka were seen as an opportunity to start a newchapter in the troubled island nation’s life. But the first elections, after the defeat of the TamilTigers, have been acrimonious and the verdict is not without its share of doubts. The re-electionof President Mahinda Rajapaksa may well alienate the very people he wanted to win over.
Aware that March 8, International Day for Women, is around the corner, DSI takes a bird’seye view of what it means for women to be part of the country’s Border Security Force. ForBasanti Mondal, Putul Murmur and Sharbano Kazi entering the BSF has been a life-changingforce. And as for the protection of our international borders—the induction of these newwomen recruits has not only broken down barriers but stemmed the tide of women involvedin extremist activities.
As usual, we look forward to your suggestions and feedback. You can send your comments [email protected]. Should you want to subscribe, please contact us at [email protected] our marketing team will do the rest.
I
DSIFEBRUARY, 2010
1
Letter from the Editor-IInd time.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 08/02/10 9:49 AM Page 2
DSIFEBRUARY, 2010
CO
NTE
NTS
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TECHNOLOGY 16
LIGHT,LETHALAND WIRED?NOT YETThe Indian Army is well equipped to defend the country’s borders but thecomplexion of warfare haschanged. The Army needsto modernise by upgradingits capabilities for bothconventional and sub-conventional conflict and prepare itself for a digitised battlefield.
THE ISRAELICONNECTION Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 Israelhas become India’s second largest weapon supplier after Russia.The defence relationship has helped Israel’s emergence as one ofthe top five defence exporters in the world.
COVER STORY 8
Contents-FEB 2010-IInd time.qxd:contents-feb-R.qxd 08/02/10 11:49 AM Page 1
POLICING THE SEASThe trauma of 26/11 hascompelled the IndianGovernment to move withurgency to redress the manygaps in its maritime security.But these steps are yet to befully implemented.
MODERNISATION 24
CHALLENGE TO CHANGEA nuanced modernisationand capability programme,spread over the next three Plan periods, is on the cards. If the militarymodernisation process isfollowed through it willplace the Indian armedforces on a new trajectory.But capability building is not a simple task and easier said than done.
NEIGHBOURS 48
PROMISES ANDBETRAYALS The verdict of the recent elections have made it clear that PresidentMahinda Rajapaksa has alienated theTamils in a post-war, nationalistic Sri Lanka and underscores that it stillremains a divided nation.
SECURITY 42
NEEDED:PERSPECTIVEPLANNINGGiven their immediate responsibilitiesand the absence of a proper supportstructure, successive National SecurityAdvisers have failed to deliver on thelong-term,planning front.
BORDER SECURITY FORCE 56
ARMS AND THE WOMAN By joining the BSF, women are not onlybreaking gender barriers but deterringwomen who are indulging in cross-border criminal and extremist activities.
Cover: Indian Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma (left)with Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli Navy, ViceAdmiral Eliezer Marom during the latter’s official
visit to India in January 2010/AFP
Contents-FEB 2010-IInd time.qxd:contents-feb-R.qxd 08/02/10 11:50 AM Page 3
SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]
SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN
Siddharth Varadarajan is theStrategic Affairs Editor and
Delhi Bureau Chief of TheHindu and a leading
commentators on foreignpolicy. He has reported
extensively from Pakistan,Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,
Nepal, Bangladesh,the former Yugoslavia as well
as Kashmir and theNortheast. He has edited a
book on the Gujarat riots,Gujarat: The Making of a
Tragedy in 2005. An economist, he has taught
at New York Universitybefore returning to India towork as a journalist in 1995.
He is currently writing a bookon the Indo-U.S. relationship.
Ameen Izzadeen is DeputyEditor with the Colombo-
based Sunday Times. A visiting lecturer at the
Bandaranaike DiplomaticTraining Institute in Colombo
and the Defence StaffCollege at Batalanda, he
holds a Master’s degree inInternational Relations from
Colombo University. Acolumnist on internationalaffairs in Sri Lanka’s Daily
Mirror newspaper he looks atthe region from a Third
World perspective.
AMEEN IZZADEEN
Ajitha Menon is the KolkataBureau Chief of Asian News
International. In a careerspanning sixteen years, shehas covered politics, as well
as defence, internationalrelations, insurgency andMaoist operations across
eastern India and theNortheast. Her abiding
interest, however, iscovering development
issues which she has done inBhutan, China and
Bangladesh. A regularcontributor to the Women's
Feature Service she has written extensively on
women’s issues.
AJITHAMENON
Commodore C. UdayBhaskar, currently Director,
National MaritimeFoundation, New Delhi
retired from the Indian Navyin early 2007 after 37 years of
service. He is currentlyContributing Editor, South
Asia Monitor and a columnistfor Reuters. He has
contributed over 60 researcharticles to leading defence
publications and editedbooks on nuclear, maritime
and international securityrelated issues.
C. UDAYBHASKAR
Fali H. Major, commissionedin the Indian Air Force in 1967
as a Wing Commander, hasheld several important staff
and field appointments. As aWing Commander, he
commanded the IAF’s firstMi-17 Squadron and was
awarded the Vayu SenaMedal (Gallantry) for his
leadership. A recipient alsoof the Shaurya Chakra, he
took over as the Air OfficerCommanding Leh (Ladakh),
in the aftermath of the Kargilconflict in 1999. A graduatefrom the National Defence
College and Army WarCollege, he is the first
helicopter pilot to becomethe Chief of Air Staff in 2007.
He is also President, AirForce Association.
FALI H. MAJOR
Gurmeet Kanwal is Director,Centre for Land Warfare
Studies, New Delhi. Hecommanded an infantry
brigade during OperationPrakaram on the Line of
Control in 2001-03. A soldier-scholar, he has authoredseveral books including
Indian Army: Vision 2020 andNuclear Defence: Shaping the
Arsenal. He is a well-knowncolumnist and TV analyst on
national security issues.
GURMEETKANWAL SINGH
Contributors-final-IInd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 08/02/10 10:07 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
8
INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS
9
Israel’s strategic,military and intelligencelinks with India have become possibly its most significant in Asia, following
the establishment of bilateral diplomaticrelations in January 1992.
Prior to 1992 there were informal andclandestine security ties between NewDelhi and Tel Aviv, but over the pastdecade Israel has, after Russia, emergedas India’s second largest supplier ofmateriel annually valued by armamentindustry officials at around $ 1 billion.
But despite this rapidly proliferatingassociation, it is one that remains deeplyshrouded in secrecy operating in anundefined smoke-and-mirrors environ-ment. Both sides go to great lengths toplay down this strategic Freemasonry forfear of stirring up anti-Jewish sentiments
amongst India’s sub-stantial Muslim minori-ty and straining ties with Arab states uponwhom India dependsfor nearly 70 percent ofits hydrocarbon imports.
Reciprocal visits toDelhi and Tel Aviv byService, security andintelligence officers,Defence Research andDevelopment Organi-sation (DRDO) techni-cians and scientists andarmament company
executives are kept strictly under wrapswith neither side willing to comment onthe burgeoning defence relationship andrelated military commerce.
But in a surprising revelation that some-how managed to slip through taut bureau-cratic cracks, former Defence MinisterPranab Mukherjee told Parliament inAugust 2005 that Delhi had concluded mil-itary contracts with Tel Aviv worth $ 2.76billion since 2002. Thereafter, this traffichas multiplied manifold even with Israeli
KEY POINTSn Over the past decade Israel has, afterRussia, emerged as India’s secondlargest supplier of materiel annuallyvalued by the armament industry ataround $ 1 billion.n The emergent defence relationshipis multi-tiered and not dependententirely on local agents or facilitatorswho have effectively entered thecountry’s military establishment.
India and Israel may play them down but the strategic, military andintelligence links between the countries are deeply embedded
THE ISRAELICONNECTION
RAHULBEDI
DefenceMinister A.K. Antony (in white) withIndian Air Forceofficers andcrew of theAirborneWarning andControl Systemequipped IL-76aircraft in New Delhi inMay 2009
AFP
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:17 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
8
INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS
9
Israel’s strategic,military and intelligencelinks with India have become possibly its most significant in Asia, following
the establishment of bilateral diplomaticrelations in January 1992.
Prior to 1992 there were informal andclandestine security ties between NewDelhi and Tel Aviv, but over the pastdecade Israel has, after Russia, emergedas India’s second largest supplier ofmateriel annually valued by armamentindustry officials at around $ 1 billion.
But despite this rapidly proliferatingassociation, it is one that remains deeplyshrouded in secrecy operating in anundefined smoke-and-mirrors environ-ment. Both sides go to great lengths toplay down this strategic Freemasonry forfear of stirring up anti-Jewish sentiments
amongst India’s sub-stantial Muslim minori-ty and straining ties with Arab states uponwhom India dependsfor nearly 70 percent ofits hydrocarbon imports.
Reciprocal visits toDelhi and Tel Aviv byService, security andintelligence officers,Defence Research andDevelopment Organi-sation (DRDO) techni-cians and scientists andarmament company
executives are kept strictly under wrapswith neither side willing to comment onthe burgeoning defence relationship andrelated military commerce.
But in a surprising revelation that some-how managed to slip through taut bureau-cratic cracks, former Defence MinisterPranab Mukherjee told Parliament inAugust 2005 that Delhi had concluded mil-itary contracts with Tel Aviv worth $ 2.76billion since 2002. Thereafter, this traffichas multiplied manifold even with Israeli
KEY POINTSn Over the past decade Israel has, afterRussia, emerged as India’s secondlargest supplier of materiel annuallyvalued by the armament industry ataround $ 1 billion.n The emergent defence relationshipis multi-tiered and not dependententirely on local agents or facilitatorswho have effectively entered thecountry’s military establishment.
India and Israel may play them down but the strategic, military andintelligence links between the countries are deeply embedded
THE ISRAELICONNECTION
RAHULBEDI
DefenceMinister A.K. Antony (in white) withIndian Air Forceofficers andcrew of theAirborneWarning andControl Systemequipped IL-76aircraft in New Delhi inMay 2009
AFP
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:17 AM Page 1
diversifying its materiel imports, realisingthe danger of dependence on a single,unreliable source.
The establishment of formal diplomat-ic ties with Israel in 1992 under PrimeMinister P.V. Narasimha Rao enabled bothsides to explore and develop defence andstrategic ties on the basis of mutual secu-rity and commercial interests. But it stilltook another six years and the nationalistBhartiya Janata Party’s ascent to powerfor Israel’s defence machinery to defini-tively establish itself in India, second onlyto the Russians.
India’s deteriorating internal securityenvironment through the 1990s to threat-ening and, at times, alarming levels and
the availability ofmodern weaponsystems and lowintensity warfareknow-how to ter-rorists too spawnedthe requirement forupdated weaponryand sophisticatedsystems. To fulfillthat need too, Indiaviews Israel’s
evolved industrial-military complexfavourably and as one that answeredmany of its defence and security needs.
Israeli expertise in manufacturing andupgrading combat aircraft, anti-tacticalballistic missile systems, electronic war-fare (EW) and communication equipmentand security technology particularlyexcited India whilst military officials alsoindicated an interest in the Israel defenseforces’ successful warfare strategies andconcepts particularly with regard tocountering armed insurgencies.
Besides, the outright sale of weaponsand related force multipliers and retro-fitting varied outdated Soviet-Russian eramilitary equipment, Israel’s defence
involvement in India presently encom-passes limited joint production of con-ventional weapon systems like ballisticmissiles. Both countries perceive theirnon-conventional ambitions in the formof ballistic missiles as an integral part oftheir objective to be regarded as threshold nuclear powers.
Limited technology transfers for EW-related systems to augment network-centricity amongst all three Services,which remains the Indian military’s long-desired but unrealised goal, intelligencesharing on terrorism issues and Israelimilitary training assistance to India’sSpecial Forces (SF) comprise an integralpart of the bilateral strategic and defence relationship.
Israel and India share similar unpubli-cised concerns over threats posed notonly by a nuclear-weapon capable andincreasingly Islamised Pakistan but therapid radicalisation of its society andarmed forces. And, as Pakistan strugglesunder the weight of its regional and trib-al tensions there is the apocalyptic fear ofits strategic weapons cache falling intothe hands of radical Islamic groups, aparanoia shared by many Western coun-tries including Israel’s closest ally, the US.
Revelations in 2004, surrounding thesale of nuclear secrets and centrifuges byPakistan’s atomic scientist A.Q. Khan toIran—and to Libya—to help them withtheir respective weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) programmes, severelyalarmed Israel further underpinning theneed for Tel Aviv and Delhi to cementbilateral military and strategic ties toshare information and construct fail safeoptions to neutralise this threat.
Pakistan’s atomic devices, tested inresponse to rival India’s in 1998, are oftenreferred to by many analysts as the“Islamic Bomb”, an association that haschilling echoes in Israel. Itself a “closet”
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
11
corporations under federal investigationon corruption charges.
In March 2009, for instance, three daysbefore the announcement of general elec-tions, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)secretly signed a $ 2.01 billion contractwith Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) fora medium range surface-to-air missile(MRSAM) system, ignoring the ongoinginquiry launched in 2006 against the com-pany by the Central Bureau ofInvestigation (CBI).
This investigation involved allegedbribery charges against a former Indiandefence minister and ex-Naval Chief following the Rs 11.25 billion acquisitionin 2000 of seven IAI Barak-1 area air-defence missile systems for IndianNavy (IN) warships.
Confidential AgreementsOfficial sources said the agreement for 24IAI-designed Barak (lightening) nextgeneration MRSAM systems and some2,000 Rafael missiles with a 70 km range forthe Indian Air Force (IAF) was keptconfidential following fears that itsdisclosure could prove politicallydetrimental to Prime Minister ManmohanSingh’s Congress Party-led administrationin wooing Muslim votes essential for re-election.
And, earlier in 2005, even though theCBI was inquiring into “alleged irregular-ities” at the MoD’s behest in awardingthe $45,524,137 contract to Israel’s SoltamSystems in 2000 to upgrade 180 Soviet130mm M 46 field guns to 155 mm/45 cal-ibre, Defence Minister Mukherjee ruledout cancelling the deal or abandoning theretrofit programme.
Before 1992, Israel is reported to havestealthily assisted India with limited mili-tary aid and weapons during its brief,albeit disastrous war with China in 1962with its Chief of Staff General DavidShaltiel visiting Delhi surreptitiously in1963. Israel provided similar, albeit limit-ed assistance, during subsequent conflictswith Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.
After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’sassassination in October 1984, Indiasought Israel’s help to upgrade its VIPprotection by training and arming thenewly raised Special Protection Groupand National Security Guards. Thesecommandoes would travel to Israel viaCyprus—as no direct air links betweenthe two countries existed—but their pass-ports would have no record of their visitto the Jewish State. Israeli specialists also
devised Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’ssecurity architecture that continuesbroadly up to the present.
Alongside, two Boeing 707 aircraft thatform part of the secretive AviationResearch Centre operated by India’sexternal intelligence agency, theResearch and Analysis Wing (RAW) werefitted with Israeli equipment for commu-nication and electronic surveillance in the1980s. Israel also provided counter-terror-ism assistance to India in the aftermath ofRajiv Gandhi’s assassination by SriLanka’s Tamil Tiger rebels in May 1990 asits security and materiel footprint wasgrowing in the island republic duringthat period.
Strict secrecy was maintained over thiscooperation and contacts owing to politi-cal constraints and the involvement ofsensitive security issues. India’s closelinks with Yasser Arafat and the largerPalestinian cause also foreclosed theoption of making this association public.
The disintegration of the SovietUnion, India’s longstanding ally andprincipal weapons supplier, came as amajor blow to Delhi. Overnight, crucialsupplies of arms and spares for militaryequipment were interminably delayedand India was compelled to consider
10
INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS
Reciprocal visits to Delhiand Tel Aviv by Service,
security and intelligenceofficers, Defence
Research andDevelopment
Organisation techniciansand scientists and
armament companyexecutives are kept strictly
under wraps with neitherside willing to comment on
the burgeoning defencerelationship and related
military commerce.
”
l A possible follow-on purchase of three additional Phalcon AEW&C platforms
l Additional Heron II UAVs
l Procurement by the army of El-Op’s Portable Laser Designating System (PLD)
l Additional 20,000 TAR-21 ARs for the paramilitary—the Cobra commando’s from the Central Reserve Police Force—and the possibility of locally building the weaponsystem in collaboration with the Ordnance Factory Board, the demand for which willeventually run into tens of thousands
l Several hundred full solution thermal imaging fire control systems (TIFCS) to upgrade T-72M1s
ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS UNDER NEGOTIATION OR FOR IMMINENT PURCHASE
The then ExternalAffairs MinisterPranab Mukherjee(right) shakes handswith Israel DeputyPrime Minister andMinister of InteriorMeir Sheetrit duringan official meetingin New Delhi inNovember 2007
AFP
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:17 AM Page 3
diversifying its materiel imports, realisingthe danger of dependence on a single,unreliable source.
The establishment of formal diplomat-ic ties with Israel in 1992 under PrimeMinister P.V. Narasimha Rao enabled bothsides to explore and develop defence andstrategic ties on the basis of mutual secu-rity and commercial interests. But it stilltook another six years and the nationalistBhartiya Janata Party’s ascent to powerfor Israel’s defence machinery to defini-tively establish itself in India, second onlyto the Russians.
India’s deteriorating internal securityenvironment through the 1990s to threat-ening and, at times, alarming levels and
the availability ofmodern weaponsystems and lowintensity warfareknow-how to ter-rorists too spawnedthe requirement forupdated weaponryand sophisticatedsystems. To fulfillthat need too, Indiaviews Israel’s
evolved industrial-military complexfavourably and as one that answeredmany of its defence and security needs.
Israeli expertise in manufacturing andupgrading combat aircraft, anti-tacticalballistic missile systems, electronic war-fare (EW) and communication equipmentand security technology particularlyexcited India whilst military officials alsoindicated an interest in the Israel defenseforces’ successful warfare strategies andconcepts particularly with regard tocountering armed insurgencies.
Besides, the outright sale of weaponsand related force multipliers and retro-fitting varied outdated Soviet-Russian eramilitary equipment, Israel’s defence
involvement in India presently encom-passes limited joint production of con-ventional weapon systems like ballisticmissiles. Both countries perceive theirnon-conventional ambitions in the formof ballistic missiles as an integral part oftheir objective to be regarded as threshold nuclear powers.
Limited technology transfers for EW-related systems to augment network-centricity amongst all three Services,which remains the Indian military’s long-desired but unrealised goal, intelligencesharing on terrorism issues and Israelimilitary training assistance to India’sSpecial Forces (SF) comprise an integralpart of the bilateral strategic and defence relationship.
Israel and India share similar unpubli-cised concerns over threats posed notonly by a nuclear-weapon capable andincreasingly Islamised Pakistan but therapid radicalisation of its society andarmed forces. And, as Pakistan strugglesunder the weight of its regional and trib-al tensions there is the apocalyptic fear ofits strategic weapons cache falling intothe hands of radical Islamic groups, aparanoia shared by many Western coun-tries including Israel’s closest ally, the US.
Revelations in 2004, surrounding thesale of nuclear secrets and centrifuges byPakistan’s atomic scientist A.Q. Khan toIran—and to Libya—to help them withtheir respective weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) programmes, severelyalarmed Israel further underpinning theneed for Tel Aviv and Delhi to cementbilateral military and strategic ties toshare information and construct fail safeoptions to neutralise this threat.
Pakistan’s atomic devices, tested inresponse to rival India’s in 1998, are oftenreferred to by many analysts as the“Islamic Bomb”, an association that haschilling echoes in Israel. Itself a “closet”
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
11
corporations under federal investigationon corruption charges.
In March 2009, for instance, three daysbefore the announcement of general elec-tions, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)secretly signed a $ 2.01 billion contractwith Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) fora medium range surface-to-air missile(MRSAM) system, ignoring the ongoinginquiry launched in 2006 against the com-pany by the Central Bureau ofInvestigation (CBI).
This investigation involved allegedbribery charges against a former Indiandefence minister and ex-Naval Chief following the Rs 11.25 billion acquisitionin 2000 of seven IAI Barak-1 area air-defence missile systems for IndianNavy (IN) warships.
Confidential AgreementsOfficial sources said the agreement for 24IAI-designed Barak (lightening) nextgeneration MRSAM systems and some2,000 Rafael missiles with a 70 km range forthe Indian Air Force (IAF) was keptconfidential following fears that itsdisclosure could prove politicallydetrimental to Prime Minister ManmohanSingh’s Congress Party-led administrationin wooing Muslim votes essential for re-election.
And, earlier in 2005, even though theCBI was inquiring into “alleged irregular-ities” at the MoD’s behest in awardingthe $45,524,137 contract to Israel’s SoltamSystems in 2000 to upgrade 180 Soviet130mm M 46 field guns to 155 mm/45 cal-ibre, Defence Minister Mukherjee ruledout cancelling the deal or abandoning theretrofit programme.
Before 1992, Israel is reported to havestealthily assisted India with limited mili-tary aid and weapons during its brief,albeit disastrous war with China in 1962with its Chief of Staff General DavidShaltiel visiting Delhi surreptitiously in1963. Israel provided similar, albeit limit-ed assistance, during subsequent conflictswith Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.
After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’sassassination in October 1984, Indiasought Israel’s help to upgrade its VIPprotection by training and arming thenewly raised Special Protection Groupand National Security Guards. Thesecommandoes would travel to Israel viaCyprus—as no direct air links betweenthe two countries existed—but their pass-ports would have no record of their visitto the Jewish State. Israeli specialists also
devised Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’ssecurity architecture that continuesbroadly up to the present.
Alongside, two Boeing 707 aircraft thatform part of the secretive AviationResearch Centre operated by India’sexternal intelligence agency, theResearch and Analysis Wing (RAW) werefitted with Israeli equipment for commu-nication and electronic surveillance in the1980s. Israel also provided counter-terror-ism assistance to India in the aftermath ofRajiv Gandhi’s assassination by SriLanka’s Tamil Tiger rebels in May 1990 asits security and materiel footprint wasgrowing in the island republic duringthat period.
Strict secrecy was maintained over thiscooperation and contacts owing to politi-cal constraints and the involvement ofsensitive security issues. India’s closelinks with Yasser Arafat and the largerPalestinian cause also foreclosed theoption of making this association public.
The disintegration of the SovietUnion, India’s longstanding ally andprincipal weapons supplier, came as amajor blow to Delhi. Overnight, crucialsupplies of arms and spares for militaryequipment were interminably delayedand India was compelled to consider
10
INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS
Reciprocal visits to Delhiand Tel Aviv by Service,
security and intelligenceofficers, Defence
Research andDevelopment
Organisation techniciansand scientists and
armament companyexecutives are kept strictly
under wraps with neitherside willing to comment on
the burgeoning defencerelationship and related
military commerce.
”
l A possible follow-on purchase of three additional Phalcon AEW&C platforms
l Additional Heron II UAVs
l Procurement by the army of El-Op’s Portable Laser Designating System (PLD)
l Additional 20,000 TAR-21 ARs for the paramilitary—the Cobra commando’s from the Central Reserve Police Force—and the possibility of locally building the weaponsystem in collaboration with the Ordnance Factory Board, the demand for which willeventually run into tens of thousands
l Several hundred full solution thermal imaging fire control systems (TIFCS) to upgrade T-72M1s
ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS UNDER NEGOTIATION OR FOR IMMINENT PURCHASE
The then ExternalAffairs MinisterPranab Mukherjee(right) shakes handswith Israel DeputyPrime Minister andMinister of InteriorMeir Sheetrit duringan official meetingin New Delhi inNovember 2007
AFP
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:17 AM Page 3
nuclear weapon State, Israel is deeplyconcerned about possible Pakistani atom-ic proliferation to Iran—presently facinginternational inquisition over its report-edly covert strategic weapons pro-gramme—and the wider, anti-ZionistMuslim world.
It is also important to grasp the Israeliestablishments argument that like itself,Delhi is surrounded by hostile neigh-bours and hence a nation under “siege”which needs desperately to strengthenand bolster its security apparatus.Furthermore, Israel markets itself as acountry offering a wide range of battle-tested, new and upgraded materiel, inmany cases of US origin and one that caneffortlessly facilitate transfers that arelargely not subject to international armscontrol regimes. Over years, this reason-ing found an echo in Delhi’s political andstrategic circles.
The 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan dra-matically pushed Israel to centrestage inthe Indian military arena. As the serious-ness of the eventual 11-week-long con-flict unfolded, Israel dug deep into itsmilitary reserves to supply India high-end hardware like the badly-needed 155mm ordnance, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and laser-guided bombs that con-tributed, in part, to vacating the moun-tainous regions siege and eventually ter-minating the fighting.
Soon after, Israel began claiming itsdues in materiel sales and continues to doso, prospering greatly in the process.
Multi-Tiered Defence RelationshipThe emergent defence relationship ismulti-tiered and not dependent entirelyon local agents or facilitators who haveeffectively spread their tentacles into thecountry’s military establishment. “Thereis the broader context that includes poli-tics, diplomacy and common threat per-ceptions like Pakistan and the fear of its ‘Islamic bomb’ falling into the wrong
hands” a three-star Indian military officersaid, declining to be named. Israel, headmitted, has convinced India of its near indispensability as a reliableweapons provider.
India’s political leadership and themilitary, on the other hand, too havecome to realise the efficacy of Israel in thisrole, firm in the belief that materiel sup-plies would continue uninterrupted asTel Aviv neither believes nor adheres toany sanctions regime. Its unstinted sup-port of South Africa during the apartheidera is evidence of this propensity.
Locally, Israeli defence contractors’efforts coordinate with the embassy thatfunctions as the hub for their activities.Israeli defence manufacturers, aided by
12
INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONSofficials of SIBAT, the Foreign DefenceAssistance and Defence Export Organi-sation, approve scores of local agents tosell their wares.
Almost all negotiations with Israelidefence manufacturers, at some pointinvolve SIBAT officials posted at the Delhiembassy who tap effectively into thereservoir of information gatheredthrough de-briefings in Tel Aviv.
For, unlike other country’s vendors,Israeli materiel providers operate in con-cert given their nations inherent paranoiafor security. On returning home fromIndia, all armament company executivesare exhaustively de-briefed by Israelisecurity services creating over years awealth of data on the main players in thesystem, their weaknesses, ‘bribe-ability’in a largely corrupt procurement milieuand, above all their vulnerabilities.
Skilled Manipulation According to armament industry sources,Israeli vendors had skillfully manipulatedthe DRDO, once contracts were inked,aided by co-operative insiders. Theirtactics include, supplying products freelyavailable locally—computer screens, forinstance, for a command and controlsystem for the artillery—at astronomicalprices but withholding crucial componentsin a deal that involves transfer oftechnology in order to extract a higherprice. This latter instance involved thecooling and display unit crucial to some6,000 hand-held thermal imaging systemsthat the State-owned Bharat ElectronicsLimited was building under a transfer oftechnology (ToT) contract.
Also with DRDO connivance, Israelicompanies reportedly “manage” delaysin equipment development forcing theServices to opt for “intermediate imports”from Israel to meet urgent operationalrequirements. In addition, some Requestfor Proposals (RFPs) or tenders for mili-tary equipment sent to overseas suppliersare conveniently fashioned around Israeliproducts. In several instances, the MoDhas been known to contravene estab-lished directives by sourcing equipmentfrom a single Israeli company instead oftwo or more manufacturers in keepingwith successive editions of the DefenceProcurement Procedures.
Other than these established operators,the Israeli pursue a ‘buckshot’ approach insecuring contracts, convinced that one ifnot more of the ‘pellets’would eventuallyhit their target. Hence they work with less-
er-known operators—former military offi-cers, well connected businessmen andretired civil servants—on a case-by-casebasis, offering them varying incentives tofinalise deals.
Large Israeli corporations like IAI, El-Op and even Israem Military Industriesand its breakaway Israel WeaponIndustries, which have negotiated largedeals selling and upgrading equipmentare known to prefer hiring newly retiredmilitary officers to push their wares, con-
vinced that peer pressure will eventuallydeliver results.
Conversely,DRDO and MoD efforts tosell Israel Lakshya, its pilot-less drone, in2003-04, in a token effort to offset the largeamount of military equipment Tel Avivwas supplying Delhi, remained stillborn.Pleading “insufficient funds, Israel sum-marily turned down the Indian drone forwhich price negotiations had opened,opting instead for a US-made system. Tillnow, Israel has bought just one locally
Get fit to commandthe skies, seas and land withElisra's total EW & Intelligence solutions:Latest generation, light-weight, all-in-one self protection systemsfor all aircraft types
• IR-CENTRIC™ - Mission superiority for all airborne and ground platforms• Full helicopter self protection suites against all threats• The only operationally proven IR based MWS protection suites• Total EW and electronic intelligence (SIGINT, ELINT, ESM, COMJAM) for all forces• Advanced command & control (C4I, BMD) solutions for all forces• Data links for UAVs, satellites, net centric operations and search & rescue applications
Members of Elbit Systems
COME SEE US
AND FIND OUT WHAT
IR-CENTRIC™
IS ALL ABOUT!
EWCI BANGALORE
STAND # 18, 19, 20
ELBIT SYSTEMS STAND
ISRAEL PAVILION
SINGAPORE AIRSHOW
2-7 FEBRUARY
MAIN HALL STAND N65
DEFEXPO INDIA
15-18 FEBRUARY
HALL 18 STAND 18.17 G
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
13
The 1999 Kargil war withPakistan dramatically
pushed Israel tocentrestage in the Indian
military arena. As theseriousness of the
eventual 11-week-longconflict unfolded, Israel
dug deep into its militaryreserves to supply Indiahigh-end hardware like
the badly needed 155 mmordnance; unmanned
aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs.
”
The Indian Army’s T-72M1Ajeya Main Battle Tank
was upgraded using partialsolution Thermal Imaging
Stand Alone Systems fromIsrael’s El-Op
AFP
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 5
nuclear weapon State, Israel is deeplyconcerned about possible Pakistani atom-ic proliferation to Iran—presently facinginternational inquisition over its report-edly covert strategic weapons pro-gramme—and the wider, anti-ZionistMuslim world.
It is also important to grasp the Israeliestablishments argument that like itself,Delhi is surrounded by hostile neigh-bours and hence a nation under “siege”which needs desperately to strengthenand bolster its security apparatus.Furthermore, Israel markets itself as acountry offering a wide range of battle-tested, new and upgraded materiel, inmany cases of US origin and one that caneffortlessly facilitate transfers that arelargely not subject to international armscontrol regimes. Over years, this reason-ing found an echo in Delhi’s political andstrategic circles.
The 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan dra-matically pushed Israel to centrestage inthe Indian military arena. As the serious-ness of the eventual 11-week-long con-flict unfolded, Israel dug deep into itsmilitary reserves to supply India high-end hardware like the badly-needed 155mm ordnance, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and laser-guided bombs that con-tributed, in part, to vacating the moun-tainous regions siege and eventually ter-minating the fighting.
Soon after, Israel began claiming itsdues in materiel sales and continues to doso, prospering greatly in the process.
Multi-Tiered Defence RelationshipThe emergent defence relationship ismulti-tiered and not dependent entirelyon local agents or facilitators who haveeffectively spread their tentacles into thecountry’s military establishment. “Thereis the broader context that includes poli-tics, diplomacy and common threat per-ceptions like Pakistan and the fear of its ‘Islamic bomb’ falling into the wrong
hands” a three-star Indian military officersaid, declining to be named. Israel, headmitted, has convinced India of its near indispensability as a reliableweapons provider.
India’s political leadership and themilitary, on the other hand, too havecome to realise the efficacy of Israel in thisrole, firm in the belief that materiel sup-plies would continue uninterrupted asTel Aviv neither believes nor adheres toany sanctions regime. Its unstinted sup-port of South Africa during the apartheidera is evidence of this propensity.
Locally, Israeli defence contractors’efforts coordinate with the embassy thatfunctions as the hub for their activities.Israeli defence manufacturers, aided by
12
INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONSofficials of SIBAT, the Foreign DefenceAssistance and Defence Export Organi-sation, approve scores of local agents tosell their wares.
Almost all negotiations with Israelidefence manufacturers, at some pointinvolve SIBAT officials posted at the Delhiembassy who tap effectively into thereservoir of information gatheredthrough de-briefings in Tel Aviv.
For, unlike other country’s vendors,Israeli materiel providers operate in con-cert given their nations inherent paranoiafor security. On returning home fromIndia, all armament company executivesare exhaustively de-briefed by Israelisecurity services creating over years awealth of data on the main players in thesystem, their weaknesses, ‘bribe-ability’in a largely corrupt procurement milieuand, above all their vulnerabilities.
Skilled Manipulation According to armament industry sources,Israeli vendors had skillfully manipulatedthe DRDO, once contracts were inked,aided by co-operative insiders. Theirtactics include, supplying products freelyavailable locally—computer screens, forinstance, for a command and controlsystem for the artillery—at astronomicalprices but withholding crucial componentsin a deal that involves transfer oftechnology in order to extract a higherprice. This latter instance involved thecooling and display unit crucial to some6,000 hand-held thermal imaging systemsthat the State-owned Bharat ElectronicsLimited was building under a transfer oftechnology (ToT) contract.
Also with DRDO connivance, Israelicompanies reportedly “manage” delaysin equipment development forcing theServices to opt for “intermediate imports”from Israel to meet urgent operationalrequirements. In addition, some Requestfor Proposals (RFPs) or tenders for mili-tary equipment sent to overseas suppliersare conveniently fashioned around Israeliproducts. In several instances, the MoDhas been known to contravene estab-lished directives by sourcing equipmentfrom a single Israeli company instead oftwo or more manufacturers in keepingwith successive editions of the DefenceProcurement Procedures.
Other than these established operators,the Israeli pursue a ‘buckshot’ approach insecuring contracts, convinced that one ifnot more of the ‘pellets’would eventuallyhit their target. Hence they work with less-
er-known operators—former military offi-cers, well connected businessmen andretired civil servants—on a case-by-casebasis, offering them varying incentives tofinalise deals.
Large Israeli corporations like IAI, El-Op and even Israem Military Industriesand its breakaway Israel WeaponIndustries, which have negotiated largedeals selling and upgrading equipmentare known to prefer hiring newly retiredmilitary officers to push their wares, con-
vinced that peer pressure will eventuallydeliver results.
Conversely,DRDO and MoD efforts tosell Israel Lakshya, its pilot-less drone, in2003-04, in a token effort to offset the largeamount of military equipment Tel Avivwas supplying Delhi, remained stillborn.Pleading “insufficient funds, Israel sum-marily turned down the Indian drone forwhich price negotiations had opened,opting instead for a US-made system. Tillnow, Israel has bought just one locally
Get fit to commandthe skies, seas and land withElisra's total EW & Intelligence solutions:Latest generation, light-weight, all-in-one self protection systemsfor all aircraft types
• IR-CENTRIC™ - Mission superiority for all airborne and ground platforms• Full helicopter self protection suites against all threats• The only operationally proven IR based MWS protection suites• Total EW and electronic intelligence (SIGINT, ELINT, ESM, COMJAM) for all forces• Advanced command & control (C4I, BMD) solutions for all forces• Data links for UAVs, satellites, net centric operations and search & rescue applications
Members of Elbit Systems
COME SEE US
AND FIND OUT WHAT
IR-CENTRIC™
IS ALL ABOUT!
EWCI BANGALORE
STAND # 18, 19, 20
ELBIT SYSTEMS STAND
ISRAEL PAVILION
SINGAPORE AIRSHOW
2-7 FEBRUARY
MAIN HALL STAND N65
DEFEXPO INDIA
15-18 FEBRUARY
HALL 18 STAND 18.17 G
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
13
The 1999 Kargil war withPakistan dramatically
pushed Israel tocentrestage in the Indian
military arena. As theseriousness of the
eventual 11-week-longconflict unfolded, Israel
dug deep into its militaryreserves to supply Indiahigh-end hardware like
the badly needed 155 mmordnance; unmanned
aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs.
”
The Indian Army’s T-72M1Ajeya Main Battle Tank
was upgraded using partialsolution Thermal Imaging
Stand Alone Systems fromIsrael’s El-Op
AFP
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 5
DSIFEBRUARY 2010INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS
designed and Hindustan AeronauticsLimited-built Dhruv Advanced LightHelicopter (ALH) to ferry its VIP’s but hasprovided its avionics and several crucialsystems.
Military sources, however, concedethat Israeli access to India’s defence sec-tor is ‘awesome and considerable’ bor-dering on ‘alarming’. It is one whichService officers remain helpless to restrict
or dilute backed as it is by staunch, insti-tutionalised Government support earlier by the BJP-led coalition till 2004 andthereafter by the Congress Party-domi-nated administration.
With Israeli help, the Indian Air Forceis developing a mobile ground-basedimagery receiving and processing termi-nal for use by ground combat forces andthe Navy to target a range of locally
designed nuclear-capable missiles.Agreements are reportedly in place withIsrael to lease capacity on its reconnais-sance Ofeq-5 military satellites until Indiahones its own capabilities.
Further evidence of this continuingbut unacknowledged collaborationemerged in January 2008 after the IndianSpace Research Organisation (ISRO) suc-cessfully placed an IAI-designed TecSAR
l Three IAI Phalcon Ilyushin IL-76TD (Airborne Early Warning and Control) for around $2 billion of which one arrived last year and the remaining two are expected shortly.
l Around 70-odd IAI-built Searcher Mk 1 and Mk 2 and Heron UAVs and 30 Harpyground attack Drones that constitute an integral ingredient of the burgeoning network-centric warfare capability that all three Services seek to execute for the fullspectrum of conflict from insurgencies to nuclear war.
l Two Green Pine radar supplemented by aerostat balloons.
l 30 Rafael Industries-built AGM-142 Raptor Have Nap/Popeye missile, speciallyconfigured for the IAF for around $ 62.7 million.
l Rafael’s SPYDER (Surface-to-air Python and Derby) low level quick reaction missilesystem (LLQRM) for the IAF worth some $ 260 million.
l 3070 5.56 mm Tavor 21 assault rifles (TAR-21) from Israel Weapon Industries (IWI),the break away small arms division of Israel Military Industries (IMI) for $ 20 million forIndia’s Special Forces (SF).
l An unspecified number of Galil 7.62mm sniper rifles in addition to varied night visionand laser range finding and targeting equipment also for the SF.
l Electronics suites for Su-30MKI, MiG-27 and Jaguar combat aircraft and for Mi-35helicopters. Advanced avionics and weaponry for 125 MiG 21 ‘bis’ upgraded groundattack aircraft.
l 11 Barak-1 systems, including around 250 missiles.
l 26 Derby missiles for the Indian Navy’s Sea Harrier fighters presently undergoing a retrofit.
l Upgrade of 180 M46 130 mm field guns to 155mm/39 cal for $ 45,524,137 by Soltam.
l 333 partial solution Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems (TISAS) from El-Op toupgrade the Army’s T-72M1 Ajeya Main Battle Tank for around $ 120,000 each.
l Five Super Dovra II Extra Fast Attack Craft from IAI equipped with modernsurveillance systems acquired from December 1996 onwards; two are beingconstructed under licence at Goa Shipyard Limited while the requirement for another15 is projected for the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard.
l 130 Long Range Observation Systems (LOROS), a multi-sensor imaging system forlong range day and night observation from El-Op.
l 1,200 Hand-Held Thermal Imaging Systems from El-Op.
l Hi-tech sensors for the Line of Control in Kashmir also from El-Op.
l Six El-Op Portable Laser Designating System for the IAF.
l IAI is collaborating with the DRDO to jointly develop a next generation Barak-II ship-borne area air defence missile system extending its strike range from 10 km to 70-80km. The deal signed in February 2006 is valued at around $ 300 million.
l IAI’s Lahav division has provided the glass cockpit package for Dhruv that includes anelectronic warfare suite, day and night observation capability and targeting andflexible armament systems.
MAJOR INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE DEALS SINCE 2000
IAI designed Barak-1 air-defence missile systems
military satellite in polar orbit in a classi-fied operation to which access, at TelAviv’s request, was strictly limited.
TecSAR is expected to appreciably aug-ment Israel’s intelligence-gathering capa-bilities by providing 24-hour high-resolu-tion synthetic-aperture radar imagery inall-weather conditions at an affordablecost. Two additional TecSAR satellitelaunches are expected imminently.
Alongside, the IAF’s plans for a coun-try-wide deployment of integrated aircommand-and-control systems that com-prise airborne early warning and controlplatforms, radar, fighter aircraft andUAVs to replace the obsolete airspacemanagement command and reportingcentres are also being incrementallyresuscitated with Israeli help.
Israel has also provided India with
counter-terrorism assistance to help itdeal with the Kashmiri insurgency. Itmade available over a dozen technicalteams to assist India in augmenting itsborder intelligence gathering capabilitiesin addition to anti-terrorism countermeasures like upgraded border fencing,ground sensors and hand-held thermalimagers for use by the Army and para-military border guards.
Israeli-built hyper band communica-tion systems and devices to jam militantcommunications were also provided toenhance India’s security grid. The IN isalso in the process of acquiring five Israeliaerostat programmable radars to plug vital surveillance gaps in its coastal secu-rity following the November 2008Mumbai terrorist strikes that werelaunched via the sea.
It is also important to graspthe Israeli establishments
argument that like itself,Delhi is surrounded byhostile neighbours and
hence a nation under“siege” which needs
desperately to strengthenand bolster its security
apparatus.
Israeli Chief of General Staff GabiAshkenazi inspects the Guard of Honour
during his three-day visit to India in December 2009
1514 ”
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 7
DSIFEBRUARY 2010INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS
designed and Hindustan AeronauticsLimited-built Dhruv Advanced LightHelicopter (ALH) to ferry its VIP’s but hasprovided its avionics and several crucialsystems.
Military sources, however, concedethat Israeli access to India’s defence sec-tor is ‘awesome and considerable’ bor-dering on ‘alarming’. It is one whichService officers remain helpless to restrict
or dilute backed as it is by staunch, insti-tutionalised Government support earlier by the BJP-led coalition till 2004 andthereafter by the Congress Party-domi-nated administration.
With Israeli help, the Indian Air Forceis developing a mobile ground-basedimagery receiving and processing termi-nal for use by ground combat forces andthe Navy to target a range of locally
designed nuclear-capable missiles.Agreements are reportedly in place withIsrael to lease capacity on its reconnais-sance Ofeq-5 military satellites until Indiahones its own capabilities.
Further evidence of this continuingbut unacknowledged collaborationemerged in January 2008 after the IndianSpace Research Organisation (ISRO) suc-cessfully placed an IAI-designed TecSAR
l Three IAI Phalcon Ilyushin IL-76TD (Airborne Early Warning and Control) for around $2 billion of which one arrived last year and the remaining two are expected shortly.
l Around 70-odd IAI-built Searcher Mk 1 and Mk 2 and Heron UAVs and 30 Harpyground attack Drones that constitute an integral ingredient of the burgeoning network-centric warfare capability that all three Services seek to execute for the fullspectrum of conflict from insurgencies to nuclear war.
l Two Green Pine radar supplemented by aerostat balloons.
l 30 Rafael Industries-built AGM-142 Raptor Have Nap/Popeye missile, speciallyconfigured for the IAF for around $ 62.7 million.
l Rafael’s SPYDER (Surface-to-air Python and Derby) low level quick reaction missilesystem (LLQRM) for the IAF worth some $ 260 million.
l 3070 5.56 mm Tavor 21 assault rifles (TAR-21) from Israel Weapon Industries (IWI),the break away small arms division of Israel Military Industries (IMI) for $ 20 million forIndia’s Special Forces (SF).
l An unspecified number of Galil 7.62mm sniper rifles in addition to varied night visionand laser range finding and targeting equipment also for the SF.
l Electronics suites for Su-30MKI, MiG-27 and Jaguar combat aircraft and for Mi-35helicopters. Advanced avionics and weaponry for 125 MiG 21 ‘bis’ upgraded groundattack aircraft.
l 11 Barak-1 systems, including around 250 missiles.
l 26 Derby missiles for the Indian Navy’s Sea Harrier fighters presently undergoing a retrofit.
l Upgrade of 180 M46 130 mm field guns to 155mm/39 cal for $ 45,524,137 by Soltam.
l 333 partial solution Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems (TISAS) from El-Op toupgrade the Army’s T-72M1 Ajeya Main Battle Tank for around $ 120,000 each.
l Five Super Dovra II Extra Fast Attack Craft from IAI equipped with modernsurveillance systems acquired from December 1996 onwards; two are beingconstructed under licence at Goa Shipyard Limited while the requirement for another15 is projected for the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard.
l 130 Long Range Observation Systems (LOROS), a multi-sensor imaging system forlong range day and night observation from El-Op.
l 1,200 Hand-Held Thermal Imaging Systems from El-Op.
l Hi-tech sensors for the Line of Control in Kashmir also from El-Op.
l Six El-Op Portable Laser Designating System for the IAF.
l IAI is collaborating with the DRDO to jointly develop a next generation Barak-II ship-borne area air defence missile system extending its strike range from 10 km to 70-80km. The deal signed in February 2006 is valued at around $ 300 million.
l IAI’s Lahav division has provided the glass cockpit package for Dhruv that includes anelectronic warfare suite, day and night observation capability and targeting andflexible armament systems.
MAJOR INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE DEALS SINCE 2000
IAI designed Barak-1 air-defence missile systems
military satellite in polar orbit in a classi-fied operation to which access, at TelAviv’s request, was strictly limited.
TecSAR is expected to appreciably aug-ment Israel’s intelligence-gathering capa-bilities by providing 24-hour high-resolu-tion synthetic-aperture radar imagery inall-weather conditions at an affordablecost. Two additional TecSAR satellitelaunches are expected imminently.
Alongside, the IAF’s plans for a coun-try-wide deployment of integrated aircommand-and-control systems that com-prise airborne early warning and controlplatforms, radar, fighter aircraft andUAVs to replace the obsolete airspacemanagement command and reportingcentres are also being incrementallyresuscitated with Israeli help.
Israel has also provided India with
counter-terrorism assistance to help itdeal with the Kashmiri insurgency. Itmade available over a dozen technicalteams to assist India in augmenting itsborder intelligence gathering capabilitiesin addition to anti-terrorism countermeasures like upgraded border fencing,ground sensors and hand-held thermalimagers for use by the Army and para-military border guards.
Israeli-built hyper band communica-tion systems and devices to jam militantcommunications were also provided toenhance India’s security grid. The IN isalso in the process of acquiring five Israeliaerostat programmable radars to plug vital surveillance gaps in its coastal secu-rity following the November 2008Mumbai terrorist strikes that werelaunched via the sea.
It is also important to graspthe Israeli establishments
argument that like itself,Delhi is surrounded byhostile neighbours and
hence a nation under“siege” which needs
desperately to strengthenand bolster its security
apparatus.
Israeli Chief of General Staff GabiAshkenazi inspects the Guard of Honour
during his three-day visit to India in December 2009
1514 ”
Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 7
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
16
TECHNOLOGY
17
The Indian Army is extensivelyengaged in border management onthe Line of Control (LoC) with
Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control(LoAC) with China and needs to prepareitself for a future border conflict that mayescalate to a larger conventional war in theplains with nuclear undertones.Simultaneously, the Army has beendeployed for a long time for internalsecurity duties and counter-insurgency(CI) operations.
In keeping with these twinrequirements, the Army needs tomodernise itself by upgrading itscapabilities for both conventional and sub-conventional conflict. It must enhance itsfirepower-mobility-cyber warfare punchfor a possible war in the plains againstPakistan or in the mountains againstChina. The Army Chief Deepak Kapoor’smodernisation vision is to, “Adapt to high-end technology, improve night-fightingcapability… (and) information technology,
GURMEETKANWAL
LIGHT, LETHAL AND WIRED? NOT YETThe Indian Army ismoving too slowlytowards digitisation
KEY POINTSn Cyber security and the developmentof offensive cyber warfare capabilitieshave not received the attention thatthey deserve.n With the Indian armed forcesbecoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing andvast computer networks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/information warfare.
Indian Army soldiers stand beside amobile satellite terminal vehicle during
exercises held at Madhavpur, Gujarat inFebruary 2009
AFP
Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:30 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
16
TECHNOLOGY
17
The Indian Army is extensivelyengaged in border management onthe Line of Control (LoC) with
Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control(LoAC) with China and needs to prepareitself for a future border conflict that mayescalate to a larger conventional war in theplains with nuclear undertones.Simultaneously, the Army has beendeployed for a long time for internalsecurity duties and counter-insurgency(CI) operations.
In keeping with these twinrequirements, the Army needs tomodernise itself by upgrading itscapabilities for both conventional and sub-conventional conflict. It must enhance itsfirepower-mobility-cyber warfare punchfor a possible war in the plains againstPakistan or in the mountains againstChina. The Army Chief Deepak Kapoor’smodernisation vision is to, “Adapt to high-end technology, improve night-fightingcapability… (and) information technology,
GURMEETKANWAL
LIGHT, LETHAL AND WIRED? NOT YETThe Indian Army ismoving too slowlytowards digitisation
KEY POINTSn Cyber security and the developmentof offensive cyber warfare capabilitieshave not received the attention thatthey deserve.n With the Indian armed forcesbecoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing andvast computer networks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/information warfare.
Indian Army soldiers stand beside amobile satellite terminal vehicle during
exercises held at Madhavpur, Gujarat inFebruary 2009
AFP
Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:30 AM Page 1
18
TECHNOLOGY
information warfare and network centricwarfare.” According to Lt Gen NobleThamburaj, formerly Vice Chief of ArmyStaff, the Army’s modernisation focus inthe ongoing 11th Defence Plan is on,“Precision fire power, air defence, aviation,future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS), infrastructure development,network centricity and achievingbattlefield transparency throughimproved surveillance, night vision andtarget acquisition…”
Net-centric CapabilitiesNet-centric warfare (NCW) integratesmodern weapons, reconnaissance,surveillance, target acquisition andcomm-unications technology by optimallynetworking weapons, sensors anddecision makers to synergise the combatpotential of a force. A “system of systems”approach must be followed so that scarceresources are optimally exploited. The war
in Iraq fought in March-April 2003 wasbased on the concept of NCW. Surveillancesensors; targetting systems and “shooters”were fused together in a seamless “systemof systems” that reduced response timebetween the acquisition of a target and itsdestruction to 15-20 minutes.
According to Lt Gen Prakash Katoch,formerly Director-General InformationServices: “The fulcrum of net-centricity isthe TacC3I System (Tactical Command,Control,Communication and InformationSystem) being developed by the IndianArmy.”Under this mother system, variousother systems such as the CIDSS(Command Information Decision SupportSystem), ACCCS (Artillery CombatCommand and Control System), BSS(Battlefield Surveillance System),ADC&R(Air Defence Control and ReportingSystem), and BMS (BattlefieldManagement System) are beingdeveloped. Lt Gen Katoch is of the view
The Indian Army is not yeta light, lethal and wired 21st
century force that candeter war from breaking
out. The present DefenceBudget is pegged at lessthan 2 percent of India’sGDP. It cannot sustain aone-million strong army,leave aside allowing it to
modernise
”
Indian Army soldiers use a satellite phone and studymaps in Sonamarg, Kashmir,during a search operation
AFP
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:31 AM Page 3
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s • S e n s i n g & S u r v e i l l a n c e • S p a c e • A d v a n c e d E n g i n e e r i n g & I n t e g r a t e d S e r v i c e s
SpearNet offers simultaneous voice, data, video and situational awareness in a low-cost multi-mission, multi-role radio. Light weight and rugged, it provides enhanced mobile capability to soldiers and border security personnel on both land and sea. The ability to transmit data from dismounted soldiers as well as an array of sensors makes SpearNet an integral part of any communications solution. For more visit cs.itt.com/spearnet.
Flexibility at the core of your communications solution.
7088ITT_SpearNet_DefSecIndia_Feb10.indd 1 1/13/10 11:18 AM
20
TECHNOLOGY
that, “While the development of the TacC3ISystem is well under way… frequenthiccups occur due to the tug of war withinthe service, egoistic stonewalling,resistance to change,perceived dangers tocomfort zones and,more significantly, lackof understanding of technology by seniorofficers.” Efforts are also underway in theArmy to finalise a NCW philosophy.
However, an automated command andcontrol and decision support system foruse by the General Staff is still a long wayoff, as are supporting systems like the BSSand ADC&R. The urgent requirement ofreal-time satellite reconnaissance systemshas still not been operationalised despitethe nuclear overhang under which thearmed forces now operate. Even thoughthe cameras on India’s remote sensing andcartographic satellites now have sharplyenhanced resolutions, less than one metre,military-grade photographs of still betterresolution need to be purchased from theopen market. These sources may dry upquickly during war. A tri-Service DefenceCommunication Network (DCN) is in thestages of advanced planning. However,little progress has been made towardsaddressing inter-Service interoperabilitychallenges in the communications field.
While some Stentor long-range Battle
Field Surveillance Radios have been inservice for over a decade,medium-rangeradars are still to be acquired. IsraeliSearcher-I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAVs) have been introduced, but theseare few in number and it will be a long timebefore they will really make a difference by
providing a real-time surveillancecapability so that ground forces can initiateaction even as a fresh input is received.Only a small number of Searcher-II UAVs,with an upper ceiling that makes themsuitable for the mountains, has beenacquired. Indigenously designed UAVsthat are in the design and developmentpipeline include Gagan, Pawan andRustom. Pilot-less target aircraft includeLakshya and Nishant. India does not as yethave a programme to either acquire orindigenously produce unmanned combatair vehicles (UCAVs) of the Predatorvariety being used to kill terrorists in theAf-Pak region by US and NATO forces.
Modern frequency-hopping radio setswith integral encryption devices have beenintroduced in recent years, but networkedcommunications,which form the backboneof an effective C4I2SR system, needsubstantial upgradation. The Plan ARENsystem has been in service for almost threedecades and is based on outdated and bulkytechnologies. Tenders have been floated for aTactical Communication System (TCS) foroffensive operations and a BattlefieldManagement System for communication atthe tactical level in defensive operations. TheBMS will be integrated with the ASCONcommuni-cation system. The ASCON
The Army needs tomodernise itself by
upgrading its capabilitiesfor both conventional and
sub-conventional conflict.It must enhance its
firepower-mobility-cyberwarfare punch for a
possible war in the plainsagainst Pakistan or in themountains against China.
”
An Indian Army radar locatedin the village of Rania, near
Amritsar
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
AFP
Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:31 AM Page 5
www.harris.com
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Warfighters today need to stay in constant communication with their team members and commanders while keeping focused on the mission. The RF-7800S provides full duplex voice, GPS, and high speed data, all in a compact encrypted system.
• Secure voice, data, and position Warfifi hhhhghghttteters today need to stay iniin
provides voice and data links between staticHQ and those in peacetime locations. It stillhas some years of service left as it is ofmodular design and can be upgraded to alimited extent. However, its capability toprovide data links is rather limited as datarequirements have grown by leaps andbounds over the last decade or so. The newoptical fibre network being laid as analternative to the 3G spectrum freed by thearmed forces will go a long way in providingmodern landline communications.
Cyber SecurityCyber security and the development ofoffensive cyber warfare capabilities havenot received the attention that theydeserve. M.K. Narayanan, the formerNational Security Adviser, had told TheTimes,London that China’s cyber warriorshacked into computers in the PrimeMinister’s Office on December 15, 2009. Atleast 30 computers may have beenpenetrated. Last year,Chinese cyber spieswere reported to have broken into and
stolen documents from hundreds ofGovernment and private offices aroundthe world, including those of the Indianembassy in the US.
The People’s Liberation Army usesmore than 10,000 cyber warriors withdegrees in Information Technology tomaintain an e-vigil. On June 23, 2009,Robert Gates,US Secretary of Defence,hadauthorised the creation of a new militarycommand that will develop offensivecyber-weapons and defend command andcontrol networks of the US armed forcesagainst computer attacks. The Chinese calltheir pursuit of information warfare andother hi-tech means to counter theoverwhelmingly superior conventionalmilitary capabilities of the Western Alliance“acupuncture warfare”. Acupuncturewarfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) isdescribed as “paralysing the enemy byattacking the weak link of command,control, communications and informationas if hitting an acupuncture point in kungfu combat.”
22
Even though the camerason India’s remote sensing
and cartographic satellitesnow have sharply
enhanced resolutions, lessthan one metre, military-
grade photographs of stillbetter resolution need to
With the Indian armed forces becomingincreasingly dependent on automateddata processing and vast computernetworks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/ information warfare. Indiashould adopt an inter-ministerial, inter-departmental, inter-Services, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary approach todeal with emerging cyber warfare threats.
Twin-track StrategyA nodal agency must be created tospearhead India’s cyber war efforts under aNational Cyber Security Adviser whoshould report directly to the NSA. A twin-track strategy must be followed:defensive to guard India’s vulnerableassets, such as military command andcontrol networks and civilian infrastructuredependent on the use of cyberspace, aswell as an offensive to disrupt theadversary’s C4I2SR systems and developleverages that can be exploited at theappropriate time.
Despite the large-scale employment ofinfantry battalions on border managementand the extensive commitments of theRashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles in ISand CI operations, infantry modernisationhas been languishing for several decades.The Army’s F-INSAS project focusses onenhancing the lethality and survivability ofsoldiers, but it will take at least five to seven years to be fielded. F-INSAS seeks to transform soldiers into fullynetworked, mobile warriors with a highdegree of situational awareness and theability to operate in all weather conditionsand terrains.
The programme envisages equippinginfantrymen with lightweight integratedhelmets with a head up display, a built-incommunication system and night visiongoggles,a hand-held computer display,GPSand lethal fire power, including laser-guidedweapon systems at appropriate levels.
The F-INSAS programme is akin to theUS Land Warrior programme. A global
tender for 43,000 close-quarter battlecarbines was issued in early-2008. Theacquisition will be followed by the localmanufacture of approximately 1,17,000carbines. Other equipment will follow indue course.
The Indian Army is well equipped todefend the country’s borders. However, itis not yet a light, lethal and wired 21stcentury force that can deter war frombreaking out. If war is thrust on thecountry, the Army must be able to fightand win against the rapidly modernisingPeople’s Liberation Army of China andensure that the major battles are foughtinside enemy territory.
For that, it will need more budgetaryresources and the elimination of red tapein decision making for weapons andequipment acquisition. The presentDefence Budget is pegged at less than 2percent of India’s GDP. It cannot sustain aone-million strong Army, leave asideallowing it to modernise.
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
AFP
Soldiers of the Rashtriya Rifleswalk back to their base camp in
Kargil in 1999
Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:32 AM Page 7
provides voice and data links between staticHQ and those in peacetime locations. It stillhas some years of service left as it is ofmodular design and can be upgraded to alimited extent. However, its capability toprovide data links is rather limited as datarequirements have grown by leaps andbounds over the last decade or so. The newoptical fibre network being laid as analternative to the 3G spectrum freed by thearmed forces will go a long way in providingmodern landline communications.
Cyber SecurityCyber security and the development ofoffensive cyber warfare capabilities havenot received the attention that theydeserve. M.K. Narayanan, the formerNational Security Adviser, had told TheTimes,London that China’s cyber warriorshacked into computers in the PrimeMinister’s Office on December 15, 2009. Atleast 30 computers may have beenpenetrated. Last year,Chinese cyber spieswere reported to have broken into and
stolen documents from hundreds ofGovernment and private offices aroundthe world, including those of the Indianembassy in the US.
The People’s Liberation Army usesmore than 10,000 cyber warriors withdegrees in Information Technology tomaintain an e-vigil. On June 23, 2009,Robert Gates,US Secretary of Defence,hadauthorised the creation of a new militarycommand that will develop offensivecyber-weapons and defend command andcontrol networks of the US armed forcesagainst computer attacks. The Chinese calltheir pursuit of information warfare andother hi-tech means to counter theoverwhelmingly superior conventionalmilitary capabilities of the Western Alliance“acupuncture warfare”. Acupuncturewarfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) isdescribed as “paralysing the enemy byattacking the weak link of command,control, communications and informationas if hitting an acupuncture point in kungfu combat.”
22
Even though the camerason India’s remote sensing
and cartographic satellitesnow have sharply
enhanced resolutions, lessthan one metre, military-
grade photographs of stillbetter resolution need to
With the Indian armed forces becomingincreasingly dependent on automateddata processing and vast computernetworks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/ information warfare. Indiashould adopt an inter-ministerial, inter-departmental, inter-Services, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary approach todeal with emerging cyber warfare threats.
Twin-track StrategyA nodal agency must be created tospearhead India’s cyber war efforts under aNational Cyber Security Adviser whoshould report directly to the NSA. A twin-track strategy must be followed:defensive to guard India’s vulnerableassets, such as military command andcontrol networks and civilian infrastructuredependent on the use of cyberspace, aswell as an offensive to disrupt theadversary’s C4I2SR systems and developleverages that can be exploited at theappropriate time.
Despite the large-scale employment ofinfantry battalions on border managementand the extensive commitments of theRashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles in ISand CI operations, infantry modernisationhas been languishing for several decades.The Army’s F-INSAS project focusses onenhancing the lethality and survivability ofsoldiers, but it will take at least five to seven years to be fielded. F-INSAS seeks to transform soldiers into fullynetworked, mobile warriors with a highdegree of situational awareness and theability to operate in all weather conditionsand terrains.
The programme envisages equippinginfantrymen with lightweight integratedhelmets with a head up display, a built-incommunication system and night visiongoggles,a hand-held computer display,GPSand lethal fire power, including laser-guidedweapon systems at appropriate levels.
The F-INSAS programme is akin to theUS Land Warrior programme. A global
tender for 43,000 close-quarter battlecarbines was issued in early-2008. Theacquisition will be followed by the localmanufacture of approximately 1,17,000carbines. Other equipment will follow indue course.
The Indian Army is well equipped todefend the country’s borders. However, itis not yet a light, lethal and wired 21stcentury force that can deter war frombreaking out. If war is thrust on thecountry, the Army must be able to fightand win against the rapidly modernisingPeople’s Liberation Army of China andensure that the major battles are foughtinside enemy territory.
For that, it will need more budgetaryresources and the elimination of red tapein decision making for weapons andequipment acquisition. The presentDefence Budget is pegged at less than 2percent of India’s GDP. It cannot sustain aone-million strong Army, leave asideallowing it to modernise.
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
AFP
Soldiers of the Rashtriya Rifleswalk back to their base camp in
Kargil in 1999
Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:32 AM Page 7
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
24
MODERNISATION
25
Armed forces must seek cost effective solutions toenhance their combat edge and increase theirtechnological superiority
THE CHALLENGE TO
CHANGE
It is said that in the past 3,000 years,mankind has fought about 14,500 warsand seen only 270 years of peace.
Conflict in some form or the other isinevitable amongst humans and a peaceful,harmonious world seems to be more of anUtopian ideal. Shaping of events by nationsto achieve their objectives is the intention ofa national strategy and it is only sinceIndependence that we, in India, becameconscious of our identity as a nation and theresponsibility of our destiny.
It was the dawn of this awareness thatmarked the beginning of ‘Indian StrategicThought’. The fact that we are the world’slargest democracy and one of the fastestgrowing economies,bears testimony to ourvision and resilience.
However, the subtle changes in globaland regional inter-State dynamics hasplaced India at the cusp of realising it’sdestiny of being a power in the region.Today, Asia is the global engine ofgrowth—booming economies, largepopulations, high productivity, greatpurchasing power and strategic Sea Linesof Communication (SLOC)—criss crossingthe globe. Interestingly, every majorworld power has a presence and highstakes here. Economic growth in theregion has also galvanised Asian militarycapability. The region is also witness toconflicts, instabilities, nuclear proliferationand has become a cradle and playgroundof terrorism.
If chaos is an indicator of progress,Asia today proves it. India’s size,resources, capabilities and growthendow it with power, visibility, influenceand responsi-bility for a greater role inregional affairs. Notwithstanding theturbulence that surrounds India todayand the many uncertainties in our regionand indeed the whole world, these are very exciting times. This is becausefresh and complex challenges providegreat opportunities to set aside oldmindsets and then embark uponvisionary paths—ones that couldpotentially change the destiny of ournation, if carefully chosen.
FALI H. MAJOR
KEY POINTSnWe need to focus attention on buildinga credible and demonstratable militarycapability across the entire spectrum ofconflict because new power centresand unpredictable conflict zones willkeep emerging.nThis capability building exercise is nosimple task and is easier said thandone, since no country in the world canacquire an entire range of militarycapabilities all at once.
Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:41 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
24
MODERNISATION
25
Armed forces must seek cost effective solutions toenhance their combat edge and increase theirtechnological superiority
THE CHALLENGE TO
CHANGE
It is said that in the past 3,000 years,mankind has fought about 14,500 warsand seen only 270 years of peace.
Conflict in some form or the other isinevitable amongst humans and a peaceful,harmonious world seems to be more of anUtopian ideal. Shaping of events by nationsto achieve their objectives is the intention ofa national strategy and it is only sinceIndependence that we, in India, becameconscious of our identity as a nation and theresponsibility of our destiny.
It was the dawn of this awareness thatmarked the beginning of ‘Indian StrategicThought’. The fact that we are the world’slargest democracy and one of the fastestgrowing economies,bears testimony to ourvision and resilience.
However, the subtle changes in globaland regional inter-State dynamics hasplaced India at the cusp of realising it’sdestiny of being a power in the region.Today, Asia is the global engine ofgrowth—booming economies, largepopulations, high productivity, greatpurchasing power and strategic Sea Linesof Communication (SLOC)—criss crossingthe globe. Interestingly, every majorworld power has a presence and highstakes here. Economic growth in theregion has also galvanised Asian militarycapability. The region is also witness toconflicts, instabilities, nuclear proliferationand has become a cradle and playgroundof terrorism.
If chaos is an indicator of progress,Asia today proves it. India’s size,resources, capabilities and growthendow it with power, visibility, influenceand responsi-bility for a greater role inregional affairs. Notwithstanding theturbulence that surrounds India todayand the many uncertainties in our regionand indeed the whole world, these are very exciting times. This is becausefresh and complex challenges providegreat opportunities to set aside oldmindsets and then embark uponvisionary paths—ones that couldpotentially change the destiny of ournation, if carefully chosen.
FALI H. MAJOR
KEY POINTSnWe need to focus attention on buildinga credible and demonstratable militarycapability across the entire spectrum ofconflict because new power centresand unpredictable conflict zones willkeep emerging.nThis capability building exercise is nosimple task and is easier said thandone, since no country in the world canacquire an entire range of militarycapabilities all at once.
Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:41 AM Page 1
26
MODERNISATION
Serious Efforts to ModerniseThe first step in this path is that Indiamust credibly demonstrate its eminencein all facets of national power, especiallyits military might. Any utterance, threat,talk or offer is taken seriously only if youcan deliver.
After many decades, there is a seriouseffort by the present Government tomodernise the Indian armed forces. Wemust, however, put in perspective thenuances, complexities and peculiarities of“defence modernisation”. Withoutexception, armed forces around the world,in some form or the other, are always in theprocess of modernising, upgrading,developing infrastructure and honing theircombat skills to project national power. It isonly the scope, scale, speed, technologylevels and national aspirations that differ.
If we were to look closely anddispassionately at the way the Indianarmed forces are evolving and compare itwith other evolving armed forces and thepath charted by some of the advancedcountries, we can see some essentialsimilarities. Modernisation and thetransformation of armed forces is aninevitable process because of ageingequipment, obsolescence of weaponsystems and platforms, emergintechnologies, the changing securityenvironment and threat perceptions.Since the capability, effectiveness andcredibility of a military power is premisedon technology, which, in turn, is drivenby operational needs—all armed
Tangible force multipliersrelate to numerical
strength and aretechnology driven, while
intangible forcemultipliers, by definition,
are qualitative in natureand reflect the quality of
people, their innate calibre,determination, adaptability
and innovativeness.
”
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
Rohini Radar on displayduring 2010 Republic DayParade in New Delhi
Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:41 AM Page 3
forces, without exception, will evolve onsimilar lines.
But for minor variations, the Indianarmed forces are on a globally recognisedgrowth path today. The luxury of fallingbehind in this business simply does not exist, because it is only military power that empowers, emboldens andprovides credibility to all other indices ofnational power.
It is, however, axiomatic that the armedforces must prepare only for capabilitiesand not ‘intentions’. That intentions havealways remain inscrutable, adds to thedilemma. It is therefore inescapable thatwe focus attention on building a credibleand demonstratable military capabilityacross the entire spectrum of conflict andnot a threat-based or country-centriccapability because new power centres and unpredictable conflict zones will keep emerging. This capability-buildingexercise is no simple task and is easier saidthan done, since no country in the worldcan acquire an entire range of militarycapabilities, all at once. It is just notpossible. But the good news is that afterdecades of waiting for this to happen(capability-based approach) a beginninghas been made, and the modernisationprocess for the Indian armed forces hasactually commenced.
A nuanced modernisation andcapability-building programme, spreadover the next three Plan Periods, is on thecards. If we are successful in establishingfirm foundations in this militarymodernisation process, it will put theIndian armed forces and indeed the
country on a trajectory that will take us afew generations ahead.
Embedded in the defence moderni-sation process are some very crucialtechnological and doctrinal challenges. Thefundamental issue that always crops upwhen modernisation of the armed forces is discussed is ‘Does doctrine drivetechnology, or is it the other way around?’
What it means is that do we conductmilitary operations with what we get orwhat is available, or do we demandtechnology to facilitate the way we fight.Ideally, it should be a doctrine that dictatesthe direction of research and development.A desired concept of operation, or aperceived gap in capability is identified bythe military planners, which requires atechnological solution. This, in turn,becomes the subject of design anddevelopment. A product is then designed,manufactured and inducted.
Tangible Force MultipliersBut that’s not how it usually happens. Forthis to happen, the country needs a veryrobust and indigenous technological baseto develop core competencies in manycomplex technologies. Presently, ourdefence research,design and development(DRD&D) is limited and is just aboutadequate for license manufacture and jointventures. What is manufactured is only bydefence PSU’s, with very little or nocontribution from the private sector.It is quite likely that the defencemodernisation process of our likelyadversaries and indeed armed forcesaround the world also face similar
challenges and dilemmas. So if it is just arace,where does it leave us and what arethe options?
While the quest for technologicaladvantage must continue, the armed forcethat is best able to generate tangible andintangible force multipliers in the interim,will attain the edge. Tangible forcemultipliers relate to numerical strengthand are technology-driven, whileintangible force multipliers, by definition,are qualitative in nature and reflect the quality of people, their innate calibre, determination, adaptability andinnovativeness.
In military parlance, forcemultiplication is a dramatic increase incombat effectiveness, by which therequired effect can be achieved withgreatly reduced numbers. To put it simply,it is an achieving of ‘the same with less’and consequently ‘more with the same’.The armed force which best utilises forcemultiplication to its advantage, bothtangible and intangible, will come outvictorious even against a numerically andtechnologically superior foe. Is that notwhat “asymmetric warfare” is all about?
No nation can be a major powerwithout three attributes—a high level ofautonomous and innovative technologicalcapability; a capacity to meet basic defenceneeds indigenously, and capability toproject power (hard/soft) far beyond its borders.
This comes at a cost, and therefore,keeping costs to the nation in mind, thearmed forces must seek cost effectivesolutions to enhance their combat edge and
Our nation has a large poolof immensely talented
scientists and we need toleverage this resource for
achieving self-reliance.Our armed forces seek to
harness the capabilities ofspace, cyberspace, smart
weapons and other cutting-edge technologies.
”
MODERNISATION
Tejas Light Combat Aircraftdesigned by HindustanAeronautics Limited
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:43 AM Page 5
technological superiority. Notwith-standing the perceived financial downturn,defence technologies are of an enduringnature and will continue to be in the forefront, since they are so deeply embeddedand integral to our national securityrequirements, both in peace and war.
The good news is that the environmentfor growth of the defence industry inIndia is indeed very bright and conducive.The new Government guidelines as laiddown in the Defence and ProcurementPolicy 2009 encourages the participation ofthe private industry in the defence sectorand the time is indeed ripe for the Indian defence industry to take advantageof this opportunity. There is a demand and there is capability in the privatesector—both ingredients are necessary forcatalysing growth.
Rate of ChangeOur nation has a large pool of immenselytalented scientists and we need to leveragethis resource for achieving self-reliance atthe desired pace. Our armed forces seekto harness the capabilities of space,cyberspace, smart weapons and othercutting-edge technologies. These areareas,where opportunity beckons and thearmed forces look forward to the bestminds in the country taking up thechallenge and providing them withbreakthrough defence technologies.
A very unique characteristic thatexemplifies the nature of technologytoday is the rate of change. The shelf-life ofexisting technologies is becoming shorterand newer technologies are emerging at a breath-taking pace. This has a directimplication in the modernisation process.
The development cycle of a productfrom the design to the operationalisationstage has to reduce; otherwise theequipment runs the risk of becomingobsolete in its entirety. This certainly mustnot happen, given the security scenario inthe neighbourhood.
The question that now remains to beanswered is what should be done? Thereis a need to identify core technologies thatneed to be developed and they must beaggressively designed and manufac-tured.If this is not done in time, we run the riskof being saddled with investments outsidethe country that do not add value to ourexisting state and deny us the opportunityto be self-reliant. There is a need tocollectively bring focus into our designand development activities. We must notattempt to do everything.
In the modern competitiveenvironment, such a practice is simply not cost effective and nations the worldover are learning from the benefits ofcollaboration. We must identify zones oftechnology that need to be developed and thereafter concentrate on these nichecapabilities through joint ventures anddiverse partnerships.
There has to be a better and moreeffective way to focus research anddesign activities in the country. Whilstthe prevalent structures andorganisations have just about servedsatisfactorily over the years and havebrought the country to its presenttechnological standard, it is time toevolve with changing requirements.Research, design, development andmanufacturing activities in most othercountries are undertaken by privateindustry in coordination with the userand the Government. This is still not the case with us, and is mostly restricted to defence laboratories andPSUs, who simply do not stick to timeschedules, where manufacturingprocesses are outdated, capacities areinadequate, quality control is suspect and
accountability is rarely enforced.Progressively defence, research, design
and development must move from thepublic to the private sector and into thecapable minds and hands of youngscientists and entrepreneurs. The conceptsof time-bound processes, the ability toscrap a process if it does not meet thedesired objective, the ability to take risksand timely decisions, are some truths, thatwe could do well to absorb.
As military technologies and hardwarechange, new capacities and capabilities aregenerated that sometimes radically alterthe way we do business. And it is hard todo things differently with the oldprocesses, interfaces and organisational
structures that exist in our PSUs and DRDO. Keeping pace and adapting to changes as an organisation, is the challenge.
Another area of concern is the humanresources requirements of our PSUs.Quality people are the most essentialenergisers. This is another of our weakareas. All stake-holders must have a deep, comprehensive, multi-disciplinaryunderstanding. DRD&D needs the bestpeople, world-class education and mostimportantly they need to be retained.Today, retention of organisationalexpertise is a major concern of our PSUs. The Government must takesuitable measures to attract people and
make it worth their while to stay.The requirement to increase
user interface in the designprocess is another crucial area. Itexists to some extent, but it has to take ona more intrusive and effective role.Industry should always be able totranslate user requirements into viabletechnical options. In short, the user mustalways remain the “Captain”.
The last two decades of economicupswing, have resulted in a comparativesurge in the defence industry in ourcountry. This is an encouraging sign butif unregulated, it runs the risk of wastefulexpenditure and duplication of effort.There is therefore a definite need for an
apex agency, to co-ordinateand regulate the activities ofthe many agencies involved indefence production.
There is no doubt that the Indianprivate sector has matured over the yearsand has a significant role to play inassociation with research anddevelopment organisations and PSUs to achieve a competitive edge in defence technology.
Ultimately, all the stake holders—thearmed forces and public and privatesectors need to come together and growin a symbiotic relationship to strengthenthe nation and become self-reliant in oursecurity needs.
Locally designedArjun Main BattleTanks
Progressively defenceresearch, design and
development must movefrom the public to the
private sector; and into thecapable minds and hands
of young scientists andentrepreneurs. The
concepts of time-boundprocesses, the ability to
scrap a process if it doesnot meet the desired
objective, the ability to takerisks and timely decisions,
are some truths that wecould do well to absorb.
”
Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:46 AM Page 7
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
30
MODERNISATION
31
technological superiority. Notwith-standing the perceived financial downturn,defence technologies are of an enduringnature and will continue to be in the forefront, since they are so deeply embeddedand integral to our national securityrequirements, both in peace and war.
The good news is that the environmentfor growth of the defence industry inIndia is indeed very bright and conducive.The new Government guidelines as laiddown in the Defence and ProcurementPolicy 2009 encourages the participation ofthe private industry in the defence sectorand the time is indeed ripe for the Indian defence industry to take advantageof this opportunity. There is a demand and there is capability in the privatesector—both ingredients are necessary forcatalysing growth.
Rate of ChangeOur nation has a large pool of immenselytalented scientists and we need to leveragethis resource for achieving self-reliance atthe desired pace. Our armed forces seekto harness the capabilities of space,cyberspace, smart weapons and othercutting-edge technologies. These areareas,where opportunity beckons and thearmed forces look forward to the bestminds in the country taking up thechallenge and providing them withbreakthrough defence technologies.
A very unique characteristic thatexemplifies the nature of technologytoday is the rate of change. The shelf-life ofexisting technologies is becoming shorterand newer technologies are emerging at a breath-taking pace. This has a directimplication in the modernisation process.
The development cycle of a productfrom the design to the operationalisationstage has to reduce; otherwise theequipment runs the risk of becomingobsolete in its entirety. This certainly mustnot happen, given the security scenario inthe neighbourhood.
The question that now remains to beanswered is what should be done? Thereis a need to identify core technologies thatneed to be developed and they must beaggressively designed and manufac-tured.If this is not done in time, we run the riskof being saddled with investments outsidethe country that do not add value to ourexisting state and deny us the opportunityto be self-reliant. There is a need tocollectively bring focus into our designand development activities. We must notattempt to do everything.
In the modern competitiveenvironment, such a practice is simply not cost effective and nations the worldover are learning from the benefits ofcollaboration. We must identify zones oftechnology that need to be developed and thereafter concentrate on these nichecapabilities through joint ventures anddiverse partnerships.
There has to be a better and moreeffective way to focus research anddesign activities in the country. Whilstthe prevalent structures andorganisations have just about servedsatisfactorily over the years and havebrought the country to its presenttechnological standard, it is time toevolve with changing requirements.Research, design, development andmanufacturing activities in most othercountries are undertaken by privateindustry in coordination with the userand the Government. This is still not the case with us, and is mostly restricted to defence laboratories andPSUs, who simply do not stick to timeschedules, where manufacturingprocesses are outdated, capacities areinadequate, quality control is suspect and
accountability is rarely enforced.Progressively defence, research, design
and development must move from thepublic to the private sector and into thecapable minds and hands of youngscientists and entrepreneurs. The conceptsof time-bound processes, the ability toscrap a process if it does not meet thedesired objective, the ability to take risksand timely decisions, are some truths, thatwe could do well to absorb.
As military technologies and hardwarechange, new capacities and capabilities aregenerated that sometimes radically alterthe way we do business. And it is hard todo things differently with the oldprocesses, interfaces and organisational
structures that exist in our PSUs and DRDO. Keeping pace and adapting to changes as an organisation, is the challenge.
Another area of concern is the humanresources requirements of our PSUs.Quality people are the most essentialenergisers. This is another of our weakareas. All stake-holders must have a deep, comprehensive, multi-disciplinaryunderstanding. DRD&D needs the bestpeople, world-class education and mostimportantly they need to be retained.Today, retention of organisationalexpertise is a major concern of our PSUs. The Government must takesuitable measures to attract people and
make it worth their while to stay.The requirement to increase
user interface in the designprocess is another crucial area. Itexists to some extent, but it has to take ona more intrusive and effective role.Industry should always be able totranslate user requirements into viabletechnical options. In short, the user mustalways remain the “Captain”.
The last two decades of economicupswing, have resulted in a comparativesurge in the defence industry in ourcountry. This is an encouraging sign butif unregulated, it runs the risk of wastefulexpenditure and duplication of effort.There is therefore a definite need for an
apex agency, to co-ordinateand regulate the activities ofthe many agencies involved indefence production.
There is no doubt that the Indianprivate sector has matured over the yearsand has a significant role to play inassociation with research anddevelopment organisations and PSUs to achieve a competitive edge in defence technology.
Ultimately, all the stake holders—thearmed forces and public and privatesectors need to come together and growin a symbiotic relationship to strengthenthe nation and become self-reliant in oursecurity needs.
Locally designedArjun Main BattleTanks
Progressively defenceresearch, design and
development must movefrom the public to the
private sector; and into thecapable minds and hands
of young scientists andentrepreneurs. The
concepts of time-boundprocesses, the ability to
scrap a process if it doesnot meet the desired
objective, the ability to takerisks and timely decisions,
are some truths that wecould do well to absorb.
”
Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:46 AM Page 7
A new look for legendary weapons
At Defexpo India 2010, to be heldfrom 15 to 18 February in Delhi,India, Rosoboronexport will present
the latest Russian developments in thefield of land, naval and air materiel as wellas advanced air defense weapons.Particularly, S-400 Triumph SAM system,Mangust, Svetlyak and Mirazh patrolboats, and the upgraded BMP-3M infantryfighting vehicle will be on display. Theexposition also includes both new andknown, well-proven small arms, anti-tankmissile systems and multi-purposegrenade launchers.
Among them are the Pecheneg, Kord,RPK-201 machine guns and also the AN-94Abakan assault rifle unrivalled in terms of thenumber of embodied design solutions.Russia's Metis-M1 and Kornet-E anti-tankmissile and upgraded Shmel-M rocket-assisted flamethrower offering longer rangeand higher lethality invariably remain in thelimelight.
Kalashnikov assault rifles and RPG-7Vgrenade launcher are still among the topRussian exhibits. They have rightly earnedthe respect of several generations of soldiersand officers from many countries in the worldand become a symbol for reliability, simplicityand efficiency of Russian weapons. Theywon a high reputation in armed conflicts thattook place in a variety of geographic andclimatic conditions, whether high mountains,hot deserts or humid tropics.
AK-100 SERIES – IN THE BESTTRADITIONSThe AK-47 became the most renowned andmass-built assault rifle of the 20th century.Hundreds of stories of its amazingruggedness, simplicity and unsurpassedreliability can be heard. Even in the mostcritical situation the soldier feels certain thatthat the AK will not fail.
Today’s successors to the legendaryweapon are the “hundredth” (AK-100) seriesassault rifles which are manufactured inIzhevsk. Of this new family, the export lineincludes the AK-101 and AK-103 versionsand AK-102 AK-104 and AK-105 compactmodels. Moreover, a unique design of theassault rifle allows various modifications tobe developed on its basis to meet thecustomer requirements.
In the new Kalashnikov assault rifles, theRussian arms manufacturers have managedto reduce muzzle flash and recoil energyupon firing. The rifles gained increasedstability and better grouping in automatic fire.The "hundredth" series differs in higheroperational reliability and longer life throughthe use of modern high-strength materials.
The essential advantage of the newKalashnikov rifle family on the world market,aside from the recognized technical merits, isthe capability to use rounds of variouscalibers. They can fire both 5.56 mm NATOstandard rounds (AK-101 AK-102) and 7.62mm Soviet rounds mod. 1943 (AK-103, AK-104) as well as 5.45 mm rounds (AK-105).
At the same time the repairability of allAK-100 series assault rifles is high due tocommonality of subassemblies. Independentadjustment of subassemblies and parts isalmost entirely excluded during rifleproduction.
The new assault rifles have a standardbase for mounting optical and night sightsand provision is made for installing the GP-34anti-personnel rifle grenade projectors.
RPG-7V – PORTABLE CLOSE-INARTILLERYThe RPG-7 grenade launcher was adoptedby the Soviet Army in 1961 and is still inservice with 50 countries around the world,including the Russian Army, too. Like theKalashnikov rifles, it was successfully usedin almost all present-day conflicts. Suchlongevity was achieved through simple andoriginal design, system modernization of thegrenade launcher and primarily through thedevelopment of new rounds with regard tocombat experience.
Thus, a shaped-charge jet of the PG-7VRanti-tank rocket grenade with a tandem
warhead cuts through 600 mm armor like aknife through butter, even if it is protected by amodern add-on ERA. The TBG-7V roundwith a thermobaric (FAE) warheadcomparable in lethality to a 120 mm artilleryshell or mortar bomb is effective againstenemy manpower located in fortifications. Todefeat infantry in the open or and in sheltersand buildings, the OG-7V round with afragmentation grenade is used. It can alsodestroy soft-skinned vehicles. This round isparticularly effective for engaging enemy fireemplacements during operations inresidential and industrial areas.
In recent years, Russia has been activelyopposing the unlicensed production ofSoviet- and Russian-design weapons.
"Only license weapons meet thehighest technical requirements and haveknown longevity. By now, we have alreadyreached an understanding on this issuewith a number of countries, - s aidRosoboronexport’s Deputy Director GeneralViktor Komardin. - Of course, even the mostreliable weapon models become outdatedwith time. And only the developers - in thiscase this is Russia - can offer modernweapon systems based on the best traditionsand huge experience."
In the coming decades the KalashnikovAK-100 series assault rifles and theupgraded RPG-7V grenade launchers withnew grenades are to become a reliable andtimely replacement for the legendary time-tested weapons.
India’s maritime challenges andopportunities are best illustrated if the map of the Subcontinent—
traditionally projected with a north-southorientation—is reversed. Peninsular Indiais the only sizeable landmass thatstraddles one of the world’s threenavigable oceans in a manner thatprovides enormous opportunities andcomplex challenges to national security.The paradox is that the politics, and hence history of modern India, is decided in Delhi that is determinedly sea-blind and consequently unable toharness opportunity or cope withchallenges appropriately.
The macro-security concerns rangefrom easy access to the peninsulathrough the seas to trade-energydependence and the inexorable compul-sions of the Weapons of MassDestruction-driven strategic arena. Thevulnerability was agonisingly exposedon November 26, 2008, when Mumbaiwas attacked by a group of ruthless ter-rorists who used the sea routes to enterthe city. Interrogation of the lone perpe-trator, currently in Indian custody,
indicates clear linkages with Pakistanand the country’s support to terrorism.
Currently, India is reviewing the trag-ic fall-out of what is now referred to as26/11; while the death and destructionhas been considerable there is also a wel-come element of determination to learnfrom the enormity of the tragedy. But, asin most national security experiences,India learns reluctantly.
A silver lining to 26/11 lies in theIndian State’s renewed focus on its long-neglected maritime domain. It has longbeen averred that Independent Indiahas been indifferent to its long coastlineand distant island territories and thatafter the 1962 war with China the security fixation with the land bordershas been pronounced. The sovereigntyof the anxious post-colonial State is inextricably linked with a heightenedsensitivity about territoriality and itspurported loss.
Almost 46 years after the ignominy ofthe war with China, the trauma of 26/11has compelled the Indian State to movewith urgency to redress the many gapsin its maritime security. It merits repeti-tion that while the Mumbai tragedy hasexposed the vulnerability of the Indiancoastline, the spectrum of challenges inthe maritime domain range from nucleardeterrence to monitoring suspiciousboats and related illegal activities acrossa 7,600 km-long coastline and in the far-flung islands in the Bay of Bengal andthe Arabian Sea.
The Indian Navy (IN) and the IndianCoast Guard (ICG), formed on February 1,1977, are the primary agencies responsiblefor maritime and coastal security with theState marine police assuming the responsi-bility of the waters contiguous to the shore.It is instructive that, historically, India has
Despite attacks by terrorist from the sea, the focus on maritime security remains inadequate
POLICINGTHE SEA
C. UDAY BHASKAR
KEY POINTSn A silver lining to the 26/11 attacks is India’s renewed focus on its long-neglected maritime domain.n The country’s nine coastal Stateshave woefully inadequate marinepolice capacity. n With the surge in acquisitions andincrease in personnel, it is envisagedthat by 2012, the Indian Coastal Guardwill be a 100-ship/100-aircraft force,putting it among the world’s top fourcoast guards.
An Indian Coast Guard helicopter and shiptake part in an exercise off the coast ofPorbandar in the Arabian Sea
AFP
MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:54 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
34
MARITIME SECURITY
35
India’s maritime challenges andopportunities are best illustrated if the map of the Subcontinent—
traditionally projected with a north-southorientation—is reversed. Peninsular Indiais the only sizeable landmass thatstraddles one of the world’s threenavigable oceans in a manner thatprovides enormous opportunities andcomplex challenges to national security.The paradox is that the politics, and hence history of modern India, is decided in Delhi that is determinedly sea-blind and consequently unable toharness opportunity or cope withchallenges appropriately.
The macro-security concerns rangefrom easy access to the peninsulathrough the seas to trade-energydependence and the inexorable compul-sions of the Weapons of MassDestruction-driven strategic arena. Thevulnerability was agonisingly exposedon November 26, 2008, when Mumbaiwas attacked by a group of ruthless ter-rorists who used the sea routes to enterthe city. Interrogation of the lone perpe-trator, currently in Indian custody,
indicates clear linkages with Pakistanand the country’s support to terrorism.
Currently, India is reviewing the trag-ic fall-out of what is now referred to as26/11; while the death and destructionhas been considerable there is also a wel-come element of determination to learnfrom the enormity of the tragedy. But, asin most national security experiences,India learns reluctantly.
A silver lining to 26/11 lies in theIndian State’s renewed focus on its long-neglected maritime domain. It has longbeen averred that Independent Indiahas been indifferent to its long coastlineand distant island territories and thatafter the 1962 war with China the security fixation with the land bordershas been pronounced. The sovereigntyof the anxious post-colonial State is inextricably linked with a heightenedsensitivity about territoriality and itspurported loss.
Almost 46 years after the ignominy ofthe war with China, the trauma of 26/11has compelled the Indian State to movewith urgency to redress the many gapsin its maritime security. It merits repeti-tion that while the Mumbai tragedy hasexposed the vulnerability of the Indiancoastline, the spectrum of challenges inthe maritime domain range from nucleardeterrence to monitoring suspiciousboats and related illegal activities acrossa 7,600 km-long coastline and in the far-flung islands in the Bay of Bengal andthe Arabian Sea.
The Indian Navy (IN) and the IndianCoast Guard (ICG), formed on February 1,1977, are the primary agencies responsiblefor maritime and coastal security with theState marine police assuming the responsi-bility of the waters contiguous to the shore.It is instructive that, historically, India has
Despite attacks by terrorist from the sea, the focus on maritime security remains inadequate
POLICINGTHE SEA
C. UDAY BHASKAR
KEY POINTSn A silver lining to the 26/11 attacks is India’s renewed focus on its long-neglected maritime domain.n The country’s nine coastal Stateshave woefully inadequate marinepolice capacity. n With the surge in acquisitions andincrease in personnel, it is envisagedthat by 2012, the Indian Coastal Guardwill be a 100-ship/100-aircraft force,putting it among the world’s top fourcoast guards.
An Indian Coast Guard helicopter and shiptake part in an exercise off the coast ofPorbandar in the Arabian Sea
AFP
MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:54 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
37
been indifferent to the challenges andopportunities posed by its maritimeexpanse and historians aver that this traitled to the later colonisation of theSubcontinent. The Navy was and is theproverbial Cinderella service with the low-est personnel strength and the smallestbudgetary allocation of the total DefenceBudget. The manpower ratio of the Army,Air Force and Navy stands at 22:2:1—inoverall terms, the 50,000 plus navalstrength is dwarfed by the million plusIndian Army. Predictably, the fiscal alloca-tions follow the same pattern, with theNavy receiving the smallest share of thedefence cake.
Low BudgetThe budget figures of the last two yearsare instructive. In FY 2008-09, the totalIndian defence expenditure (DE) wasbudgeted at Rs 105,600 crore ($ 22.95 bil-lion at current exchange rates) and thenaval portion was Rs 18,797 crore ($4.1billion); this works out to a share of 17.8percent—an improvement from the sin-gle digit figures of earlier decades.However, in FY 2009-10 the total DE hasgone up to Rs 141,703 crore ($30.8 bil-lion), the total naval allocation has beenpegged at Rs 19,656 crore ($4.27 bil-lion)—only 13.8 percent of the totalIndian defence outlay.
In other words, there has been a dropin the naval budget as a percentage ofthe overall Defence Budget. The increasein FY 2008-2009 was in part due to thefocus on the Indian Coast Guard afterthe Mumbai tragedy. To augment theexisting force-levels, the CabinetCommittee on Security (CCS) sanc-tioned 40 ships, 20 boats and 42 aircraftfor the ICG in February 2009. Shortlythereafter, the Government also accord-ed Acceptance of Necessity for 7 offshorepatrol vessels, 20 fast patrol vessels and12 Dornier aircraft. The induction ofthese platforms in the near future willsignificantly enhance the ICG’s opera-tional capability. It is pertinent that asmany as five ships, including oneadvanced offshore vessel, were commis-sioned in the ICG during 2009.
On the infrastructure front, the CCSsanctioned 9 stations and the regionalheadquarters (North-West), along withrequisite manpower, to cover the vul-nerable gaps along the coast. The newregional headquarters in Gujarat andICG stations at Gandhinagar, Vadinar,Karwar, Veraval and Hut Bay were com-
missioned or activated in record timeduring the year.
To man these new platforms and sta-tions, the Government has sanctioned asmany as 3,229 additional personnel,whenfully implemented these inductions willdramatically alter the profile of the ICG.Not since the 1962 war, when the IndianArmy was given a dramatic fillip, has theCentre acted with such alacrity to aug-ment the capacity of an individual armedforce. The scale of the increase may begauged from the fact that currently theICG has 43 ships, about 25 craft/boats ofdifferent types and 45 aircraft, which aremanned by about 7,500 personnel. Withthe surge in acquisitions and increase inpersonnel, it is envisaged that by 2012,the ICG will be a 100-ship/100-aircraftforce, putting it among the world’s topfour coast guards.
The technology augmentation byway of enhancing coastal surveillance isalso sizeable. Phase 1 of the critical sur-veillance network includes an upgradeof 46 coastal stations/lighthouses thatwill receive new radars, cameras,Automatic Identification Systems andrelated sensors.
On the eve of Coast Guard Day,Director-General of the Indian CoastGuard, Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, onwhose watch these steps have been
36
MARITIME SECURITY
The Navy was and is theproverbial Cinderella
service with the lowestpersonnel strength and the
smallest budgetaryallocation of the totalDefence Budget. The
manpower ratio of theArmy, Air Force and Navy
stands at 22:2:1—in overallterms, the 50,000 plus navalstrength is dwarfed by themillion plus Indian Army.
”Gujarat State Governor
Dr. Kamla Beniwal at theinauguration ceremony of the
regional headquarters of the IndianCoast Guard in Gandhinagar
AFP
MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:54 AM Page 3
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
37
been indifferent to the challenges andopportunities posed by its maritimeexpanse and historians aver that this traitled to the later colonisation of theSubcontinent. The Navy was and is theproverbial Cinderella service with the low-est personnel strength and the smallestbudgetary allocation of the total DefenceBudget. The manpower ratio of the Army,Air Force and Navy stands at 22:2:1—inoverall terms, the 50,000 plus navalstrength is dwarfed by the million plusIndian Army. Predictably, the fiscal alloca-tions follow the same pattern, with theNavy receiving the smallest share of thedefence cake.
Low BudgetThe budget figures of the last two yearsare instructive. In FY 2008-09, the totalIndian defence expenditure (DE) wasbudgeted at Rs 105,600 crore ($ 22.95 bil-lion at current exchange rates) and thenaval portion was Rs 18,797 crore ($4.1billion); this works out to a share of 17.8percent—an improvement from the sin-gle digit figures of earlier decades.However, in FY 2009-10 the total DE hasgone up to Rs 141,703 crore ($30.8 bil-lion), the total naval allocation has beenpegged at Rs 19,656 crore ($4.27 bil-lion)—only 13.8 percent of the totalIndian defence outlay.
In other words, there has been a dropin the naval budget as a percentage ofthe overall Defence Budget. The increasein FY 2008-2009 was in part due to thefocus on the Indian Coast Guard afterthe Mumbai tragedy. To augment theexisting force-levels, the CabinetCommittee on Security (CCS) sanc-tioned 40 ships, 20 boats and 42 aircraftfor the ICG in February 2009. Shortlythereafter, the Government also accord-ed Acceptance of Necessity for 7 offshorepatrol vessels, 20 fast patrol vessels and12 Dornier aircraft. The induction ofthese platforms in the near future willsignificantly enhance the ICG’s opera-tional capability. It is pertinent that asmany as five ships, including oneadvanced offshore vessel, were commis-sioned in the ICG during 2009.
On the infrastructure front, the CCSsanctioned 9 stations and the regionalheadquarters (North-West), along withrequisite manpower, to cover the vul-nerable gaps along the coast. The newregional headquarters in Gujarat andICG stations at Gandhinagar, Vadinar,Karwar, Veraval and Hut Bay were com-
missioned or activated in record timeduring the year.
To man these new platforms and sta-tions, the Government has sanctioned asmany as 3,229 additional personnel,whenfully implemented these inductions willdramatically alter the profile of the ICG.Not since the 1962 war, when the IndianArmy was given a dramatic fillip, has theCentre acted with such alacrity to aug-ment the capacity of an individual armedforce. The scale of the increase may begauged from the fact that currently theICG has 43 ships, about 25 craft/boats ofdifferent types and 45 aircraft, which aremanned by about 7,500 personnel. Withthe surge in acquisitions and increase inpersonnel, it is envisaged that by 2012,the ICG will be a 100-ship/100-aircraftforce, putting it among the world’s topfour coast guards.
The technology augmentation byway of enhancing coastal surveillance isalso sizeable. Phase 1 of the critical sur-veillance network includes an upgradeof 46 coastal stations/lighthouses thatwill receive new radars, cameras,Automatic Identification Systems andrelated sensors.
On the eve of Coast Guard Day,Director-General of the Indian CoastGuard, Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, onwhose watch these steps have been
36
MARITIME SECURITY
The Navy was and is theproverbial Cinderella
service with the lowestpersonnel strength and the
smallest budgetaryallocation of the totalDefence Budget. The
manpower ratio of theArmy, Air Force and Navy
stands at 22:2:1—in overallterms, the 50,000 plus navalstrength is dwarfed by themillion plus Indian Army.
”Gujarat State Governor
Dr. Kamla Beniwal at theinauguration ceremony of the
regional headquarters of the IndianCoast Guard in Gandhinagar
AFP
MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:54 AM Page 3
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
38
MARITIME SECURITY
39
taken, asserted: “AfterPhase II with 56 addi-tional stations, there willnot be a single placealong the coast notunder radar coverage.”This entire coastal net-work will be linked tothe national grid to provide real timemaritime domain awareness and inte-grate this information and intelligencewith the Navy’s operational commands.
Sustained Capacity BuildingOn the face of it, this proposed enhance-ment of the ICG is very impressive butthese remain plans that are yet to befully implemented and address only onepart of the maritime spectrum. The abid-ing challenge to India’s holistic maritimesecurity can be conceptually predicatedon a tripod of sustained capacity build-ing—inventory and human—across themany agencies responsible for the mar-itime domain; regular coordinationamong the principal actors involved inthe maritime arena; and the quality ofthe Indian politico-military leadership
across the board (meaningCentre and State) that willhave to respond effectivelyto any security challengesthat may arise.
While the ICG hasreceived a special focus inthe aftermath of the
Mumbai attack, it will be misleading toinfer that this one initiative will redressthe many gaps in India’s maritime securi-ty. The lower end of the security spec-trum encompasses the possibility thatLIC (low intensity conflict) will acquire amaritime dimension and Mumbai is areminder, if it were needed. But as anyobjective study of the pattern of terroristattacks reveals, it is very unlikely thatanother 26/11 will be attempted by use ofmaritime ingress. And in the event ofsuch an exigency, the primary responsi-bility on the shore and the proximatewaters lies with the State police and theirmarine component.
Regrettably, this is one of the weakestlinks in the overall maritime securitychain. India’s nine coastal States have onecommon feature: woefully inadequate
marine police capacity. Speedboats andpatrol craft are limited and their mainte-nance pathetic. The personnel who manthese vessels are poorly trained and havelittle motivation. However, the overallcommand and control of the local police—whether marine, car-borne or in policeposts—lies with the individual States andthey are loath to cede any power andspace to the Centre. The entire local policerecruitment process is rife with malprac-tices and the political masters treat thesepersonnel very shabbily.
It is often averred that India’s LICchallenges, including the left wingMaoist movement, have their origins inthe sub-optimal policing of the States.Much of the smuggling and relatedcrime, including syndicates linked to theGulf, have their origins in the sea and inthe maritime domain—Mumbai’sunderworld with its close proximity tothe local police and their politicalpatrons is a case in point. Hence, ifIndia’s coastal security is to beimproved, the first rung at the local,State and major port level—be it marinepolice or revenue officials—will need to
have an ethos and professionalism thatis very different from what prevailsamong the local police. Given the closenexus between some sections of theIndian politico-bureaucratic-policeestablishment and the criminal/terroristconstituency, this will be the single-mostdifficult challenge to the management ofcoastal security.
The second element of improved mar-itime security lies in the coordination andsharing of resources between the IndianNavy and the ICG. While post-Mumbai,the ICG has been designated as the soleauthority responsible for coastal securitywithin territorial waters and for the over-all coordination between Central andState agencies in all matters relating tocoastal security, the actual implementa-tion of this mandate will be tricky and isyet to be tested. The ICG is the youngerservice in relation to the Indian Navy andits assets are more modest. The civil-mili-tary interface as translated into CentralGovernment ministries is fraught withmultiple sensitivities and needs an empa-thy factor that has eluded the Indianhigher-defence systemic.
Maritime security for a nation likeIndia cannot be predicated on the mereaccretion of platforms and personnel. Byits very nature, the trans-border andinherently flexible nature of the mar-itime medium calls for a texture of lead-ership that is dynamic, confident andinnovative in its ability to respond to sit-uations as they arise.
It is instructive that in December2004, when a tsunami unexpectedly rav-aged the southern Indian Ocean, India’smaritime response was exemplary andlittle noticed. Indian ships and assetswere the first to arrive in South East Asiaand Sri Lanka even while providing suc-cour nearer home. This was enabled bythe close coordination between thenaval apex and the highest levels of thenational security apparatus.
However, this element failed inMumbai 2008. Thus the abiding challengefor managing India’s complex and wide-spectrum maritime security challengeswill be to hone these institutional skillsand underlying ethos before the next exi-gency arises so that the collective responseis appropriate and effective.
An Indian Coast Guard Chetakhelicopter flies over Sikka Portin the Gulf of Kutch during an exercise; (right) Indiansoldiers take cover nearMumbai’s coastline during the 26/11 attacks
It is instructive that inDecember 2004, when a
tsunami unexpectedlyravaged the southernIndian Ocean, India’s
maritime response wasexemplary and little
noticed. Indian ships andassets were the first to
arrive in South East Asiaand Sri Lanka even
while providing succournearer home.
”A
FP
AFP
MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:55 AM Page 5
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
38
MARITIME SECURITY
39
taken, asserted: “AfterPhase II with 56 addi-tional stations, there willnot be a single placealong the coast notunder radar coverage.”This entire coastal net-work will be linked tothe national grid to provide real timemaritime domain awareness and inte-grate this information and intelligencewith the Navy’s operational commands.
Sustained Capacity BuildingOn the face of it, this proposed enhance-ment of the ICG is very impressive butthese remain plans that are yet to befully implemented and address only onepart of the maritime spectrum. The abid-ing challenge to India’s holistic maritimesecurity can be conceptually predicatedon a tripod of sustained capacity build-ing—inventory and human—across themany agencies responsible for the mar-itime domain; regular coordinationamong the principal actors involved inthe maritime arena; and the quality ofthe Indian politico-military leadership
across the board (meaningCentre and State) that willhave to respond effectivelyto any security challengesthat may arise.
While the ICG hasreceived a special focus inthe aftermath of the
Mumbai attack, it will be misleading toinfer that this one initiative will redressthe many gaps in India’s maritime securi-ty. The lower end of the security spec-trum encompasses the possibility thatLIC (low intensity conflict) will acquire amaritime dimension and Mumbai is areminder, if it were needed. But as anyobjective study of the pattern of terroristattacks reveals, it is very unlikely thatanother 26/11 will be attempted by use ofmaritime ingress. And in the event ofsuch an exigency, the primary responsi-bility on the shore and the proximatewaters lies with the State police and theirmarine component.
Regrettably, this is one of the weakestlinks in the overall maritime securitychain. India’s nine coastal States have onecommon feature: woefully inadequate
marine police capacity. Speedboats andpatrol craft are limited and their mainte-nance pathetic. The personnel who manthese vessels are poorly trained and havelittle motivation. However, the overallcommand and control of the local police—whether marine, car-borne or in policeposts—lies with the individual States andthey are loath to cede any power andspace to the Centre. The entire local policerecruitment process is rife with malprac-tices and the political masters treat thesepersonnel very shabbily.
It is often averred that India’s LICchallenges, including the left wingMaoist movement, have their origins inthe sub-optimal policing of the States.Much of the smuggling and relatedcrime, including syndicates linked to theGulf, have their origins in the sea and inthe maritime domain—Mumbai’sunderworld with its close proximity tothe local police and their politicalpatrons is a case in point. Hence, ifIndia’s coastal security is to beimproved, the first rung at the local,State and major port level—be it marinepolice or revenue officials—will need to
have an ethos and professionalism thatis very different from what prevailsamong the local police. Given the closenexus between some sections of theIndian politico-bureaucratic-policeestablishment and the criminal/terroristconstituency, this will be the single-mostdifficult challenge to the management ofcoastal security.
The second element of improved mar-itime security lies in the coordination andsharing of resources between the IndianNavy and the ICG. While post-Mumbai,the ICG has been designated as the soleauthority responsible for coastal securitywithin territorial waters and for the over-all coordination between Central andState agencies in all matters relating tocoastal security, the actual implementa-tion of this mandate will be tricky and isyet to be tested. The ICG is the youngerservice in relation to the Indian Navy andits assets are more modest. The civil-mili-tary interface as translated into CentralGovernment ministries is fraught withmultiple sensitivities and needs an empa-thy factor that has eluded the Indianhigher-defence systemic.
Maritime security for a nation likeIndia cannot be predicated on the mereaccretion of platforms and personnel. Byits very nature, the trans-border andinherently flexible nature of the mar-itime medium calls for a texture of lead-ership that is dynamic, confident andinnovative in its ability to respond to sit-uations as they arise.
It is instructive that in December2004, when a tsunami unexpectedly rav-aged the southern Indian Ocean, India’smaritime response was exemplary andlittle noticed. Indian ships and assetswere the first to arrive in South East Asiaand Sri Lanka even while providing suc-cour nearer home. This was enabled bythe close coordination between thenaval apex and the highest levels of thenational security apparatus.
However, this element failed inMumbai 2008. Thus the abiding challengefor managing India’s complex and wide-spectrum maritime security challengeswill be to hone these institutional skillsand underlying ethos before the next exi-gency arises so that the collective responseis appropriate and effective.
An Indian Coast Guard Chetakhelicopter flies over Sikka Portin the Gulf of Kutch during an exercise; (right) Indiansoldiers take cover nearMumbai’s coastline during the 26/11 attacks
It is instructive that inDecember 2004, when a
tsunami unexpectedlyravaged the southernIndian Ocean, India’s
maritime response wasexemplary and little
noticed. Indian ships andassets were the first to
arrive in South East Asiaand Sri Lanka even
while providing succournearer home.
”
AFP
AFP
MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:55 AM Page 5
In the service of the nation as a Defence PSU
Garden Reach Shipbuilders & EngineersLtd. (GRSE), a premier ShipbuildingYard, under the administrative control of
the Ministry of Defence, has come a longwaysince 1960 when it was taken over by the Govt ofIndia. Having rendered yeoman service towardsdefence preparedness of the nation, theshipyard is poised for greater achievement inforeseeable future.GRSE, then known as Garden ReachWorkshops Ltd., started out as a small shiprepair yard in 1884. It was taken over by theGovernment of India in 1960 which placed thecompany on a path of growth, diversificationand modernization. GRSE now has sevenunits in and around Kolkata and one unit atRanchi. GRSE is one of the leadingshipbuilding yards, manufacturing a widerange of high tech ships from modern warshipsto hovercrafts. GRSE is presently engaged in construction ofmodern Anti Submarine Warfare Corvettes(ASWC) and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts(WJFAC) for the Indian Navy. It also has FastInterceptor Boats under construction for the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). TheseBoats will be used by the State PoliceAuthorities for coastal patrolling and security.GRSE has received order for eight InshorePatrol Vessels (IPVs) for the Indian CoastGuard in Mar 2009. In order to construct warships of larger size,GRSE has embarked upon a ModernisationProgramme in it’s Main Unit at an approximate
cost of over US$ 113.49 million. TheModernisation is scheduled to be completedby mid 2011. Post Modernistion, GRSE willhave one large Dry Dock and one largeInclined Berth, both 180 Mtr long, supported bymodern integrated Paint Cell, Modular Hall,allied Workshops and a 250 T Goliath Crane.Availability of such Modern Infrastructurefacilities will enable the shipyard to undertakeconstruction of large size ships with modernconstruction concept in shorter time frame.In addition, facilities at Raja Bagan Dockyard,acquired in July 2006, are also beingmodernized / augmented / renovated toundertake construction of smaller vessels inlarge numbers.In addition to construction of warships andpatrol vessels, GRSE also manufacturesBailey Brides, various Deck Machinery andassembly of Marine Diesel Engines. GRSE has been manufacturing and supplyingvarious types of Bailey Bridges to Army, BorderRoad Organisation and civil authorities.Recently, GRSE has developed and patentedmodern Double Lane Bridge which willincrease market share considerably. A number of Deck Machinery such asCapstan, Windlass, Winches, Boat Davits,Helo Traversing Systems (HTS) andCollapsible Helicopter Hangar aremanufactured and supplied by GRSE tovarious shipbuilding yards. GRSE havedeveloped a new HTS which can be used bydifferent types of helicopters thus giving a
viable flexibility to the Navy in operation ofhelicopters from warships. Efforts are in hand toobtain technology from abroad for railless HTS,which will further enhance the capability of theNavy in helo-operation. GRSE’s Diesel Engine Plant (DEP) at Ranchi,assembles various marine diesel engines andgenerators for Navy and Coast Guard underlicence from MTU Germany. DEP also has thefacilities for repair and major overhaul of theseengines. Future plans in this area includesupply of spare parts and service / overhaulingof MTU engines supplied to the Navy andCoast Guard under long term Rate Contract.GRSE has also been engaged in manufactureof Pumps for the Naval Ships and Submarines.A number of different types of Pumps havebeen developed and designed by GRSE andhave been accepted by the Navy afterextensive trials on board naval vessels.Recently Navy has placed order for supply of about 120 Pumps on GRSEwhich are now under manufacture at GRSEPump division. Ships which are now under construction atGRSE includes Anti Submarine WarfareCorvettes and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts forthe Navy and Fast Interceptor Boats for theMinistry of Home Affairs. All these achievements have been possiblewith efforts of highly skilled and dedicatedworkmen of GRSE who are determined to take GRSE to much greater height in the near future.
GRSE – 50 GOLDEN YEARS
Water Jet Fast Attack Craft
DSI Marketing Promotion
Landing Ship Tank (Large)
GARDEN.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 4:35 PM Page 1
In the service of the nation as a Defence PSU
Garden Reach Shipbuilders & EngineersLtd. (GRSE), a premier ShipbuildingYard, under the administrative control of
the Ministry of Defence, has come a longwaysince 1960 when it was taken over by the Govt ofIndia. Having rendered yeoman service towardsdefence preparedness of the nation, theshipyard is poised for greater achievement inforeseeable future.GRSE, then known as Garden ReachWorkshops Ltd., started out as a small shiprepair yard in 1884. It was taken over by theGovernment of India in 1960 which placed thecompany on a path of growth, diversificationand modernization. GRSE now has sevenunits in and around Kolkata and one unit atRanchi. GRSE is one of the leadingshipbuilding yards, manufacturing a widerange of high tech ships from modern warshipsto hovercrafts. GRSE is presently engaged in construction ofmodern Anti Submarine Warfare Corvettes(ASWC) and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts(WJFAC) for the Indian Navy. It also has FastInterceptor Boats under construction for the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). TheseBoats will be used by the State PoliceAuthorities for coastal patrolling and security.GRSE has received order for eight InshorePatrol Vessels (IPVs) for the Indian CoastGuard in Mar 2009. In order to construct warships of larger size,GRSE has embarked upon a ModernisationProgramme in it’s Main Unit at an approximate
cost of over US$ 113.49 million. TheModernisation is scheduled to be completedby mid 2011. Post Modernistion, GRSE willhave one large Dry Dock and one largeInclined Berth, both 180 Mtr long, supported bymodern integrated Paint Cell, Modular Hall,allied Workshops and a 250 T Goliath Crane.Availability of such Modern Infrastructurefacilities will enable the shipyard to undertakeconstruction of large size ships with modernconstruction concept in shorter time frame.In addition, facilities at Raja Bagan Dockyard,acquired in July 2006, are also beingmodernized / augmented / renovated toundertake construction of smaller vessels inlarge numbers.In addition to construction of warships andpatrol vessels, GRSE also manufacturesBailey Brides, various Deck Machinery andassembly of Marine Diesel Engines. GRSE has been manufacturing and supplyingvarious types of Bailey Bridges to Army, BorderRoad Organisation and civil authorities.Recently, GRSE has developed and patentedmodern Double Lane Bridge which willincrease market share considerably. A number of Deck Machinery such asCapstan, Windlass, Winches, Boat Davits,Helo Traversing Systems (HTS) andCollapsible Helicopter Hangar aremanufactured and supplied by GRSE tovarious shipbuilding yards. GRSE havedeveloped a new HTS which can be used bydifferent types of helicopters thus giving a
viable flexibility to the Navy in operation ofhelicopters from warships. Efforts are in hand toobtain technology from abroad for railless HTS,which will further enhance the capability of theNavy in helo-operation. GRSE’s Diesel Engine Plant (DEP) at Ranchi,assembles various marine diesel engines andgenerators for Navy and Coast Guard underlicence from MTU Germany. DEP also has thefacilities for repair and major overhaul of theseengines. Future plans in this area includesupply of spare parts and service / overhaulingof MTU engines supplied to the Navy andCoast Guard under long term Rate Contract.GRSE has also been engaged in manufactureof Pumps for the Naval Ships and Submarines.A number of different types of Pumps havebeen developed and designed by GRSE andhave been accepted by the Navy afterextensive trials on board naval vessels.Recently Navy has placed order for supply of about 120 Pumps on GRSEwhich are now under manufacture at GRSEPump division. Ships which are now under construction atGRSE includes Anti Submarine WarfareCorvettes and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts forthe Navy and Fast Interceptor Boats for theMinistry of Home Affairs. All these achievements have been possiblewith efforts of highly skilled and dedicatedworkmen of GRSE who are determined to take GRSE to much greater height in the near future.
GRSE – 50 GOLDEN YEARS
Water Jet Fast Attack Craft
DSI Marketing Promotion
Landing Ship Tank (Large)
GARDEN.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 4:35 PM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
42
SECURITY
43
National Security Advisers have generally tended to treat anticipating andpreparing for future security threats as something of secondary importance
The National Security Adviser (NSA)is a relatively recent innovation inthe Indian system, introduced only
in 1998 after the Atal Bihari VajpayeeGovernment named Brajesh Mishra to thejob. Twelve years on, however, the NSA’srole and office remain very much a work inprogress,with each incumbent managingto mould the work profile to suit his ownprofessional background, administrativepreferences and bureaucratic strengths.
If we set aside the relatively brieftenure of J.N. Dixit, who died in harnessin January 2005 without having had thechance of leaving his imprint, the tenures
of Mishra and M.K. Narayanan,who heldthe post for five years till his removal inJanuary 2010, present a contrasting pic-ture of what the NSA’s job is all about.Despite combining the job of the NSAwith that of the Principal Secretary to thePrime Minister, Mishra was careful aboutnot allowing his remit to expand towardsinternal security or day-to-day manage-ment of intelligence. As a former diplo-mat, he realised the most important rolean NSA could play was in giving a newthrust and definition to India’s relationswith the big powers. Though the problemof managing existing diplomatic issueswas best handled by the foreign ministry,he believed the NSA and the PrimeMinster’s Office (PMO) were best suitedto innovating new approaches and effect-ing paradigmatic shifts in the way Indiadealt with the wider world.
Expanded Role of NSAAs a former director of the IntelligenceBureau,Narayanan was happy to enlargethe scope of his mandate as NSA toinclude overseeing intelligence gather-ing. The results were, at best mixed, andperhaps even poor, if we take theNovember 2008 terrorist attack onMumbai as an example of intelligencefailure. As Vikram Sood, a former head ofthe Research and Analysis Wing hasargued perceptively, the NSA is the ulti-mate consumer of intelligence, not itsproducer and Narayanan often ended upconfusing the two roles. “If the NSA inad-
vertently becomes the man responsiblefor the product, then he ends up being itssalesman, however shoddy the product”,wrote Sood in a recent article.
But where Narayanan performed rela-tively well was on the external front. AsNSA, his biggest achievement was in man-aging the inter-agency process that fed intothe Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. In January 2005,Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, then theFrench President’s Diplomatic Adviser,arrived in New Delhi with a non-paperspelling out a broad proposal on behalf ofthe U.S., France and Britain for the resump-tion of nuclear commerce with India. TheJuly 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement grew out ofthat visit, with both Narayanan and theMinistry of External Affairs playing keyroles in framing the nature of the bargain.
Negotiations with the U.S. over theseparation of civil and military nuclearfacilities, the nature of safeguards and fuelassurances, reprocessing and other issueswere difficult and often saw the Ministerof External Affairs, the Indian Embassy inWashington and the Department ofAtomic Energy at logger-heads with eachother. As head of the ‘apex group’ over-seeing the negotiations, the NSA had toreconcile these positions. Later, he had todirectly step in at the highest levels to getthe U.S. to stick to its commitments.
Going by the areas where both Mishraand Narayanan succeeded, it would betempting to conclude that the role of theNSA is essentially that of a foreign policyczar, a diplomatic adviser to the Prime
KEY POINTSn The NSA was conceived as the prime mover of a multi-tiered, planningstructure with the National SecurityCouncil headed by the Prime Ministerat the apex.n Given their other short-term duties,responsibilities and the absence of aproper support structure, successiveNSAs have failed to deliver on thelong-term planning front.
SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN
PERSPECTIVE PLANNING
NEEDED:
AFP
Policemen take positionsoutside Hotel Taj Mahal
during the 26/11 Mumbaiterrorists attack in 2008
NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:03 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
42
SECURITY
43
National Security Advisers have generally tended to treat anticipating andpreparing for future security threats as something of secondary importance
The National Security Adviser (NSA)is a relatively recent innovation inthe Indian system, introduced only
in 1998 after the Atal Bihari VajpayeeGovernment named Brajesh Mishra to thejob. Twelve years on, however, the NSA’srole and office remain very much a work inprogress,with each incumbent managingto mould the work profile to suit his ownprofessional background, administrativepreferences and bureaucratic strengths.
If we set aside the relatively brieftenure of J.N. Dixit, who died in harnessin January 2005 without having had thechance of leaving his imprint, the tenures
of Mishra and M.K. Narayanan,who heldthe post for five years till his removal inJanuary 2010, present a contrasting pic-ture of what the NSA’s job is all about.Despite combining the job of the NSAwith that of the Principal Secretary to thePrime Minister, Mishra was careful aboutnot allowing his remit to expand towardsinternal security or day-to-day manage-ment of intelligence. As a former diplo-mat, he realised the most important rolean NSA could play was in giving a newthrust and definition to India’s relationswith the big powers. Though the problemof managing existing diplomatic issueswas best handled by the foreign ministry,he believed the NSA and the PrimeMinster’s Office (PMO) were best suitedto innovating new approaches and effect-ing paradigmatic shifts in the way Indiadealt with the wider world.
Expanded Role of NSAAs a former director of the IntelligenceBureau,Narayanan was happy to enlargethe scope of his mandate as NSA toinclude overseeing intelligence gather-ing. The results were, at best mixed, andperhaps even poor, if we take theNovember 2008 terrorist attack onMumbai as an example of intelligencefailure. As Vikram Sood, a former head ofthe Research and Analysis Wing hasargued perceptively, the NSA is the ulti-mate consumer of intelligence, not itsproducer and Narayanan often ended upconfusing the two roles. “If the NSA inad-
vertently becomes the man responsiblefor the product, then he ends up being itssalesman, however shoddy the product”,wrote Sood in a recent article.
But where Narayanan performed rela-tively well was on the external front. AsNSA, his biggest achievement was in man-aging the inter-agency process that fed intothe Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. In January 2005,Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, then theFrench President’s Diplomatic Adviser,arrived in New Delhi with a non-paperspelling out a broad proposal on behalf ofthe U.S., France and Britain for the resump-tion of nuclear commerce with India. TheJuly 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement grew out ofthat visit, with both Narayanan and theMinistry of External Affairs playing keyroles in framing the nature of the bargain.
Negotiations with the U.S. over theseparation of civil and military nuclearfacilities, the nature of safeguards and fuelassurances, reprocessing and other issueswere difficult and often saw the Ministerof External Affairs, the Indian Embassy inWashington and the Department ofAtomic Energy at logger-heads with eachother. As head of the ‘apex group’ over-seeing the negotiations, the NSA had toreconcile these positions. Later, he had todirectly step in at the highest levels to getthe U.S. to stick to its commitments.
Going by the areas where both Mishraand Narayanan succeeded, it would betempting to conclude that the role of theNSA is essentially that of a foreign policyczar, a diplomatic adviser to the Prime
KEY POINTSn The NSA was conceived as the prime mover of a multi-tiered, planningstructure with the National SecurityCouncil headed by the Prime Ministerat the apex.n Given their other short-term duties,responsibilities and the absence of aproper support structure, successiveNSAs have failed to deliver on thelong-term planning front.
SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN
PERSPECTIVE PLANNING
NEEDED:
AFP
Policemen take positionsoutside Hotel Taj Mahal
during the 26/11 Mumbaiterrorists attack in 2008
NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:03 AM Page 1
this third task to his Principal Secretary,the NCA has been handled by the NSAever since the United Progressive AllianceGovernment came to power in 2004.
Notwithstanding the NSA’s utility onthe diplomatic and nuclear fronts, thefact remains that successive incumbentshave failed to deliver on the long-termplanning front. Given their other short-term duties and responsibilities and theabsence of a proper support structureand requisite talent, NSAs have generallytended to treat the task of anticipatingand preparing for future threats as some-thing that is of secondary importance.
The NSCS was created by folding theJIC into it as its core and then pulling inadditional staff. But opinions are mixedabout the extent to which it has been ableto function as the executive “office of theNSA” in its interaction with differentbranches of the Government. And the factthat the JIC has been revived as a separatepart of the NSCS suggests intelligenceassessment and tasking is still very much awork in progress.
Correct in PrincipleNarayanan was aware of the fact that theNSCS was doing neither the task of intel-ligence collation and assessment norlong-term strategic policy and planningwell and thought that explicitly splittingthe mandate of the Secretariat wouldhelp improve the functioning of both theNSCS and the revived JIC. His idea wascorrect in principle but flawed in execu-tion since bifurcation was not accompa-nied by a commensurate increase in thetotal staff strength for the two bodies. TheNSA tried to increase the numbers buttough security requirements, exacerbatedby the Rabindar Singh scandal in RAWand the cyber-security scandal in theNSCS, meant staff strength in bothorganisations remained in short supply.
The Indian Foreign Service, whichmight otherwise have been an idealreservoir for the NSCS, is itself short-staffed and has been able to send onlyone officer, China expert Sujan Chinoy,on deputation to the Secretariat in addi-tion to the current Deputy NationalSecurity Adviser (DNSA) Alok Prasad. Asfor Indian academia, another potentialcatchment area, the NSC has done littleto encourage foreign language and areastudies despite being in existence formore than a decade.
At a more practical level, the lack of con-tinuous connectivity between the NSA and
the NSCS hampers the effectiveness ofboth. With the Secretariat officially taskedto serve the NSCS,which rarely meets, theNSA is left to perform his diplomatic andnuclear functions with just one joint secre-tary and two director-level officers in thePMO. The NSCS has a staff but has neverreally functioned as the “Office of theNSA”. Under Mishra, Dixit andNarayanan, the National SecurityAdviser’s work has gradually expanded inline with the complexity of India’s interac-
tion with the rest of the world.Even if the work of counter-terrorism
intelligence is handled by the Ministry ofHome Affairs and the proposed NationalCounter-Terrorism Centre, there is muchmore to intelligence than that. There issome thought being given to appointing astandalone ‘intelligence czar’ to deal withfusion and tasking. Even if that happens,the three core functions of diplomacy,nuclear command and control and long-term security planning and assessment
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
45
Minister. However, such a conclusionwould be unfortunate since the NationalSecurity Adviser was actually intended tofill another vacuum in the Indian system.
Three Broad HatsBroadly speaking, the NSA was con-ceived as the prime mover of a multi-tiered long-term, planning structure withthe National Security Council (NSC)headed by the Prime Minister at the apex.An NSC Secretariat (NSCS) was createdto service the Council, which subsumedthe Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)and its staff within it. Finally, a NationalSecurity Advisory Board (NSAB) of out-side experts was set up to generate inde-pendent inputs to the NSC.
As matters stand, the NSA today for-mally wears three broad hats. First, ascoordinator of complex foreign policy ini-tiatives and interlocutor with the big pow-ers on strategic matters, he is diplomaticadviser to the Prime Minister. Second, ashead of the NSCS, he is a long-term plan-ner, anticipating new threats and chal-lenges to national security. Third, as chairof the Executive Council of the NuclearCommand Authority (NCA), he is theoverseer of India’s nuclear weapons pro-gramme and doctrine. Though the notifi-cation allows the Prime Minister to assign
44
SECURITY
Negotiations with the U.S.over the separation of
civil and military nuclearfacilities, reprocessing and
other issues were difficultand often saw the MEA, the
Indian Embassy inWashington and the
Department of AtomicEnergy at logger-heads
with each other. As head ofthe ‘apex group’ overseeing
the negotiations, the NSAhad to reconcile these
positions.
”Shiv Shankar Menon at theExternal Affairs Ministry inNew Delhi. He has beenappointed as the new NationalSecurity Adviser
AFP
AFP
French Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne welcomes former National SecurityAdviser M.K. Narayanan at the Elysee Palace,Paris, in September 2005
NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:05 AM Page 3
this third task to his Principal Secretary,the NCA has been handled by the NSAever since the United Progressive AllianceGovernment came to power in 2004.
Notwithstanding the NSA’s utility onthe diplomatic and nuclear fronts, thefact remains that successive incumbentshave failed to deliver on the long-termplanning front. Given their other short-term duties and responsibilities and theabsence of a proper support structureand requisite talent, NSAs have generallytended to treat the task of anticipatingand preparing for future threats as some-thing that is of secondary importance.
The NSCS was created by folding theJIC into it as its core and then pulling inadditional staff. But opinions are mixedabout the extent to which it has been ableto function as the executive “office of theNSA” in its interaction with differentbranches of the Government. And the factthat the JIC has been revived as a separatepart of the NSCS suggests intelligenceassessment and tasking is still very much awork in progress.
Correct in PrincipleNarayanan was aware of the fact that theNSCS was doing neither the task of intel-ligence collation and assessment norlong-term strategic policy and planningwell and thought that explicitly splittingthe mandate of the Secretariat wouldhelp improve the functioning of both theNSCS and the revived JIC. His idea wascorrect in principle but flawed in execu-tion since bifurcation was not accompa-nied by a commensurate increase in thetotal staff strength for the two bodies. TheNSA tried to increase the numbers buttough security requirements, exacerbatedby the Rabindar Singh scandal in RAWand the cyber-security scandal in theNSCS, meant staff strength in bothorganisations remained in short supply.
The Indian Foreign Service, whichmight otherwise have been an idealreservoir for the NSCS, is itself short-staffed and has been able to send onlyone officer, China expert Sujan Chinoy,on deputation to the Secretariat in addi-tion to the current Deputy NationalSecurity Adviser (DNSA) Alok Prasad. Asfor Indian academia, another potentialcatchment area, the NSC has done littleto encourage foreign language and areastudies despite being in existence formore than a decade.
At a more practical level, the lack of con-tinuous connectivity between the NSA and
the NSCS hampers the effectiveness ofboth. With the Secretariat officially taskedto serve the NSCS,which rarely meets, theNSA is left to perform his diplomatic andnuclear functions with just one joint secre-tary and two director-level officers in thePMO. The NSCS has a staff but has neverreally functioned as the “Office of theNSA”. Under Mishra, Dixit andNarayanan, the National SecurityAdviser’s work has gradually expanded inline with the complexity of India’s interac-
tion with the rest of the world.Even if the work of counter-terrorism
intelligence is handled by the Ministry ofHome Affairs and the proposed NationalCounter-Terrorism Centre, there is muchmore to intelligence than that. There issome thought being given to appointing astandalone ‘intelligence czar’ to deal withfusion and tasking. Even if that happens,the three core functions of diplomacy,nuclear command and control and long-term security planning and assessment
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
45
Minister. However, such a conclusionwould be unfortunate since the NationalSecurity Adviser was actually intended tofill another vacuum in the Indian system.
Three Broad HatsBroadly speaking, the NSA was con-ceived as the prime mover of a multi-tiered long-term, planning structure withthe National Security Council (NSC)headed by the Prime Minister at the apex.An NSC Secretariat (NSCS) was createdto service the Council, which subsumedthe Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)and its staff within it. Finally, a NationalSecurity Advisory Board (NSAB) of out-side experts was set up to generate inde-pendent inputs to the NSC.
As matters stand, the NSA today for-mally wears three broad hats. First, ascoordinator of complex foreign policy ini-tiatives and interlocutor with the big pow-ers on strategic matters, he is diplomaticadviser to the Prime Minister. Second, ashead of the NSCS, he is a long-term plan-ner, anticipating new threats and chal-lenges to national security. Third, as chairof the Executive Council of the NuclearCommand Authority (NCA), he is theoverseer of India’s nuclear weapons pro-gramme and doctrine. Though the notifi-cation allows the Prime Minister to assign
44
SECURITY
Negotiations with the U.S.over the separation of
civil and military nuclearfacilities, reprocessing and
other issues were difficultand often saw the MEA, the
Indian Embassy inWashington and the
Department of AtomicEnergy at logger-heads
with each other. As head ofthe ‘apex group’ overseeing
the negotiations, the NSAhad to reconcile these
positions.
”Shiv Shankar Menon at theExternal Affairs Ministry inNew Delhi. He has beenappointed as the new NationalSecurity Adviser
AFP
AFP
French Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne welcomes former National SecurityAdviser M.K. Narayanan at the Elysee Palace,Paris, in September 2005
NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:05 AM Page 3
will need a tighter relationship betweenthe NSA and the NSCS, with the DNSAbeing tasked to a much greater extent onkey diplomatic and security issues.
The only caveat, of course, is that theproblem of long-term assessment will notbe resolved through bureaucratic adjust-ment. The fact is that the NationalSecurity Council, whose membership isthe same as that of the CabinetCommittee on Security (CCS), rarelymeets as the NSC. By definition, the CCSdeliberates on current policy and not onmatters of long-term planning and solong as it does not insist on meeting asthe NSC, other elements of the NSCmatrix will also tend to treat the long-term as irrelevant, requiring, at best, adhoc management rather than systemicadjustment and overhaul.
Long-term planning is preciselywhere urgent action is needed as thecountry’s global clout increases. India’sproblems here are systemic and chronic:it is simply not prepared in terms of tal-ent and systems for medium and long-term planning. Indian universities do notproduce talent in the quantity and quali-ty required and there is no part of thebureaucratic system which encouragesthe nurturing of talent. Given this defi-
ciency, the NSA tends to be burdenedwith everyday demands and little time isdevoted to effecting systemic structuralimprovements in how decisions get takenwhen multiple Government agencies areinvolved. If India wants to be in a posi-tion to exercise power internationally, itrequires both diplomatic instruments andinternal structures.
The Copenhagen Climate ChangeSummit is a good example of how thelack of a proper internal system of policyarticulation can lead to an unsatisfactorydiplomatic outcome. Narayanan showedgreat skill in pulling together differentparts of the system during the Indo-U.S.
nuclear negotiations. But the effort wasad hoc, leaving no permanent structuralimprint or institutional memory.
An effective NSA can solve the prob-lem of spatial management of bureau-cratic decision-making through his ownefforts but the long-term dimension is aharder nut to crack. Ensuring the NSCS is restructured to serve both as the ‘Office of the NSA’ and as the catalyst for talent generation from within and outside the system is the onlyway the National Security Adviser will be able to address the lacuna of perspec-tive planning that plagues India’s strate-gic culture.
46
DSIFEBRUARY 2010SECURITY
Brajesh Mishra, India’s firstNational Security Adviser was also
Principal Secretary to former PrimeMinister Atal Behari Vajpayee
At a more practical level,the lack of continuous
connectivity between theNSA and the NSCS
hampers the effectivenessof both. With the
Secretariat officiallytasked to serve the NSCS,
which rarely meets, theNSA is left to perform his
diplomatic and nuclearfunctions with just onejoint secretary and twodirector-level officers
in the PMO.
”A
FP
NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/02/10 5:41 PM Page 5
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� High quality strategic affairs magazine withSouth Asian perspective covering region'slinkages with China, Indian Ocean region,near Middle East & South Central Asia.
� Reaches to decision makers in Armed &Para-Military Forces, policy makers in Govt.,strategic analysts, security agencies, domestic& international defence manufacturers who arelooking at India as a potential market.
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The verdict has arrived: MahindaRajapaksa has been re-elected as thesixth Executive President of Sri
Lanka. The victory is a thank you from theSri Lankan people to the President forwinning the war against the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). His rival andco-author of the victory, former Army ChiefSarath Fonseka, however, finds himself onthe losing side. Although Fonseka will beremembered as a hero, those who voted forRajapaksa say he paid the price for teamingup with “traitors”, a reference to the UnitedNational Party (UNP), the main oppositionwhich ridiculed Rajapaksa’s war effort.
Another factor that went againstFonseka was the fear that the former ArmyChief could bring in a military dictatorship
— the State media had projected him as theIdi Amin of Sri Lanka and Adolf Hitler.
Poll analysts had predicted that theelection would be a tight race; some hadeven talked of a loss for Rajapaksa. They feltthat since the Sinhalese were divided, theminority votes would be the decider. Butwhen the results came in, it was clear thatthe majority Sinhalese had decided theoutcome of the election, not the minorityTamils. Some 90 percent of Rajapaksa’s totalvotes came from the Sinhalese,while a largepercentage of the minority Tamils andMuslims voted for Fonseka.
Deep DivideSinhalese nationalists felt that the Tamilnationalists, smarting from the defeat ofthe LTTE,would support Fonseka to teachRajapaksa a lesson, so they voted forRajapaksa. The unbearable cost of living,corruption charges, the lack of mediafreedom and the poor human rights recordof the Rajapaksa administration did notdissuade them from voting for theincumbent President. For the rural masses,it was Rajapaksa’s leadership and resolvethat won the war and, therefore,he was tobe rewarded. The verdict made it clear thatthere is a deep divide between theaspirations of the urban people and therural masses.
The result establishes that Rajapaksahas alienated the Tamils in post-warnationalistic Sri Lanka and underscores thefact that Sri Lanka is a divided nation. ThePresident may have won the war but hehas not united the people. Addressing thenation soon after the victory over theLTTE, Rajapaksa had declared, “There
KEY POINTSn The result of the Sri Lanka electionestablishes that President Rajapaksahas alienated the Tamils in post-war,nationalistic Sri Lanka. n India may call on the RajapaksaGovernment to take measures to holdelections to the Northern ProvincialCouncil and offer meaningful andeffective devolution of power to theprovincial administration.
AMEEN IZZADEEN
Supporters of Sri Lanka’s People’sAlliance celebrate President
Mahinda Rajapakse’s re-election inColombo in January 2010
President Mahinda Rajapaksa may have won the war, and the recent elections, but he has notsucceeded in uniting the people
Sri Lanka-final-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:19 AM Page 1
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
48
NEIGHBOURS
49
AFP
BETRAYALSPROMISES AND
The verdict has arrived: MahindaRajapaksa has been re-elected as thesixth Executive President of Sri
Lanka. The victory is a thank you from theSri Lankan people to the President forwinning the war against the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). His rival andco-author of the victory, former Army ChiefSarath Fonseka, however, finds himself onthe losing side. Although Fonseka will beremembered as a hero, those who voted forRajapaksa say he paid the price for teamingup with “traitors”, a reference to the UnitedNational Party (UNP), the main oppositionwhich ridiculed Rajapaksa’s war effort.
Another factor that went againstFonseka was the fear that the former ArmyChief could bring in a military dictatorship
— the State media had projected him as theIdi Amin of Sri Lanka and Adolf Hitler.
Poll analysts had predicted that theelection would be a tight race; some hadeven talked of a loss for Rajapaksa. They feltthat since the Sinhalese were divided, theminority votes would be the decider. Butwhen the results came in, it was clear thatthe majority Sinhalese had decided theoutcome of the election, not the minorityTamils. Some 90 percent of Rajapaksa’s totalvotes came from the Sinhalese,while a largepercentage of the minority Tamils andMuslims voted for Fonseka.
Deep DivideSinhalese nationalists felt that the Tamilnationalists, smarting from the defeat ofthe LTTE,would support Fonseka to teachRajapaksa a lesson, so they voted forRajapaksa. The unbearable cost of living,corruption charges, the lack of mediafreedom and the poor human rights recordof the Rajapaksa administration did notdissuade them from voting for theincumbent President. For the rural masses,it was Rajapaksa’s leadership and resolvethat won the war and, therefore,he was tobe rewarded. The verdict made it clear thatthere is a deep divide between theaspirations of the urban people and therural masses.
The result establishes that Rajapaksahas alienated the Tamils in post-warnationalistic Sri Lanka and underscores thefact that Sri Lanka is a divided nation. ThePresident may have won the war but hehas not united the people. Addressing thenation soon after the victory over theLTTE, Rajapaksa had declared, “There
KEY POINTSn The result of the Sri Lanka electionestablishes that President Rajapaksahas alienated the Tamils in post-war,nationalistic Sri Lanka. n India may call on the RajapaksaGovernment to take measures to holdelections to the Northern ProvincialCouncil and offer meaningful andeffective devolution of power to theprovincial administration.
AMEEN IZZADEEN
Supporters of Sri Lanka’s People’sAlliance celebrate President
Mahinda Rajapakse’s re-election inColombo in January 2010
President Mahinda Rajapaksa may have won the war, and the recent elections, but he has notsucceeded in uniting the people
Sri Lanka-final-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:19 AM Page 1
Opposition, the President confided injournalists close to him that he would winby a small margin. However, he put on abrave face in his last rally before theelection, and declared that he would bePresident on January 27. Rajapaksa wascertainly not prepared to face defeat or thehumiliation of being thrown out of officeafter just four years of his first six-yearterm. He did win, but the question remainswhether the election was free and fair. A
highly agitated Election Commissioneradmitted in his statement after declaringRajapaksa winner that he was not allowedto do his job independently.
It was in October last year, when thesouth of the country was celebrating thewar victory, that Rajapaksa decided to seeka fresh mandate from the people. After all,he was being hailed as a maha rajanani orgreat king. But he also knew that he waslosing the economic war. Two more years
in office, he felt, would make himunpopular. So, he decided to go for apresidential election. When asked, ‘Whynow?’, his answer was that he wanted toget the endorsement of the Tamil people,whom he claimed he had liberated from theclutches of the LTTE tyranny and terror.The LTTE had called for a boycott of the lastelection in 2005, as a result Rajapaksa hadwon by a narrow margin.
Backed by the Main OppositionBut in the January 26 elections, the Tamilsin the north and east voted for GeneralFonseka. On January 28, Rajapaksa saidthat although he did not get the votes ofthe majority of the people in the north andthe east, he was happy that theyparticipated in the democratic process.For most of them, the choice was betweenthe one who ordered the killing and onewho carried out the order to kill. They feltthe former was a bigger enemy anddecided to back Fonseka. Besides, they alsofelt that they stood to gain if the Generalwon because he was being backed by themain opposition UNP,which advocates apolitical solution based on greaterdevolution of power to the Tamil regions.The main Tamil party, the Tamil NationalAlliance, also endorsed the General—anendorsement that cost him the votes of theSinhalese who oppose power devolutionto the Tamils.
That it was the Sinhalese voters whodecided the outcome of the election castsdoubts over Rajapaksa’s willingness to
won’t be any minorities in this countryafter today. I want everybody to feel likeone”. But his campaign had anultranationalist flavour that eventuallyproduced a result that shows a nationpolarised on ethnic lines.
After being defeated, the Oppositioncried foul, alleging that the poll had beenrigged at the counting stage. Andindependent analysts shook their heads indisbelief at Rajapaksa’s huge margin of
victory. A tense situation prevailed inColombo as the results were beingannounced. Troops surrounded a cityhotel where Fonseka was staying with hissecurity contingent. As an Armycommander, he had laid siege to many aLTTE stronghold, but hours after theelection, ironically, he found himselfunder siege, surrounded by the verysoldiers and officers who months ago hadobeyed his orders.
On January 27, the day after theelections and hours before he left the hotelfor his residence, Fonseka told journaliststhat he would not concede defeat andvowed to fight back. “The Governmentwon the election by fraudulent means,resorting to dirty tricks and violating everyelection law. We will fight back,”he said.
Days before the election, Rajpaksa hadbeen a worried man. While opinion pollsand surveys spoke of a victory for the
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
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51
A Sri Lankan in Colombo moves past a wallpainting depicting the recent war betweenthe Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE (right)Sri Lanka’s defeated presidential candidateGeneral Sarath Fonseka
Addressing the nationsoon after the victory overthe LTTE, Rajapaksa had
declared, “There won’t beany minorities in this
country after today. I wanteverybody to feel like one”.
But his campaign had anultranationalist flavour that
eventually produced aresult that shows a nationpolarised on ethnic lines.
”AFP
AFP
Sri Lanka-final-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:19 AM Page 3
Opposition, the President confided injournalists close to him that he would winby a small margin. However, he put on abrave face in his last rally before theelection, and declared that he would bePresident on January 27. Rajapaksa wascertainly not prepared to face defeat or thehumiliation of being thrown out of officeafter just four years of his first six-yearterm. He did win, but the question remainswhether the election was free and fair. A
highly agitated Election Commissioneradmitted in his statement after declaringRajapaksa winner that he was not allowedto do his job independently.
It was in October last year, when thesouth of the country was celebrating thewar victory, that Rajapaksa decided to seeka fresh mandate from the people. After all,he was being hailed as a maha rajanani orgreat king. But he also knew that he waslosing the economic war. Two more years
in office, he felt, would make himunpopular. So, he decided to go for apresidential election. When asked, ‘Whynow?’, his answer was that he wanted toget the endorsement of the Tamil people,whom he claimed he had liberated from theclutches of the LTTE tyranny and terror.The LTTE had called for a boycott of the lastelection in 2005, as a result Rajapaksa hadwon by a narrow margin.
Backed by the Main OppositionBut in the January 26 elections, the Tamilsin the north and east voted for GeneralFonseka. On January 28, Rajapaksa saidthat although he did not get the votes ofthe majority of the people in the north andthe east, he was happy that theyparticipated in the democratic process.For most of them, the choice was betweenthe one who ordered the killing and onewho carried out the order to kill. They feltthe former was a bigger enemy anddecided to back Fonseka. Besides, they alsofelt that they stood to gain if the Generalwon because he was being backed by themain opposition UNP,which advocates apolitical solution based on greaterdevolution of power to the Tamil regions.The main Tamil party, the Tamil NationalAlliance, also endorsed the General—anendorsement that cost him the votes of theSinhalese who oppose power devolutionto the Tamils.
That it was the Sinhalese voters whodecided the outcome of the election castsdoubts over Rajapaksa’s willingness to
won’t be any minorities in this countryafter today. I want everybody to feel likeone”. But his campaign had anultranationalist flavour that eventuallyproduced a result that shows a nationpolarised on ethnic lines.
After being defeated, the Oppositioncried foul, alleging that the poll had beenrigged at the counting stage. Andindependent analysts shook their heads indisbelief at Rajapaksa’s huge margin of
victory. A tense situation prevailed inColombo as the results were beingannounced. Troops surrounded a cityhotel where Fonseka was staying with hissecurity contingent. As an Armycommander, he had laid siege to many aLTTE stronghold, but hours after theelection, ironically, he found himselfunder siege, surrounded by the verysoldiers and officers who months ago hadobeyed his orders.
On January 27, the day after theelections and hours before he left the hotelfor his residence, Fonseka told journaliststhat he would not concede defeat andvowed to fight back. “The Governmentwon the election by fraudulent means,resorting to dirty tricks and violating everyelection law. We will fight back,”he said.
Days before the election, Rajpaksa hadbeen a worried man. While opinion pollsand surveys spoke of a victory for the
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
50
NEIGHBOURS
51
A Sri Lankan in Colombo moves past a wallpainting depicting the recent war betweenthe Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE (right)Sri Lanka’s defeated presidential candidateGeneral Sarath Fonseka
Addressing the nationsoon after the victory overthe LTTE, Rajapaksa had
declared, “There won’t beany minorities in this
country after today. I wanteverybody to feel like one”.
But his campaign had anultranationalist flavour that
eventually produced aresult that shows a nationpolarised on ethnic lines.
”AFP
AFP
Sri Lanka-final-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:19 AM Page 3
fulfil his promise to the Tamil people andIndia. Rajapaksa in interviews to theIndian media during the campaign hadvowed to go beyond the 13th Amendment,which followed the Indo-Sri LankanAccord of July 1987 and promises todevolve authority to the provinces. The presence of the ultranationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in hiscoalition is another hindrance to fulfillingthis promise.
In the Indo-Sri Lankan pact of 1987,
India had advocated the merger of theTamil-dominated Northern and EasternProvinces and a political solution based ondevolution of power. Howeverultranationalist parties, which includedRajapaksa’s coalition partner JHU, got aSupreme Court ruling to demerge the twoprovinces, to the utter dismay of India. As acompromise, India may not at presentinsist on a re-merger of the two provinces,but it may call on the RajapaksaGovernment to take measures to hold
election to the Northern Provincial Council and offer meaningful and effective devolution of power to theprovincial administration.
India’s Domestic PoliticsSince Rajapaksa owes his re-electionlargely to the Sinhalese, most of whomoppose greater devolution of power toTamil regions, it remains to be seen if he will succumb to Indian pressure.Moreover, Rajapaksa’s party will have towhip up nationalistic fervour again for theParliamentary election to be held withinmonths. So,probably, the Tamils and Indiawill have to wait till the Parliamentaryelections are over until they can prod theRajapaksa Government for a solution tothe Tamil problem.
The Tamil issue in Sri Lanka isintricately linked to India’s domesticpolitics. It is also a major foreign andsecurity policy concern for India.Although, it has undergone a paradigmshift in the post-war period. The Tamils’struggle for a political solution that willaddress their long-standing grievances infields such as language, education, landand jobs has taken a backseat in the face of their immediate problems such as the rehabilitation of half a milliondisplaced people;developin war-damagedinfrastructure and ensuring the security ofthe people.
Misinterpreting the Tamil psyche,Rajapaksa told a news conference duringthe final days of his campaign that onlynon-Governmental organisations werekeen on a political solution, the Tamilpeople were not in need of it. But, in thecoming days, Rajapaksa is likely to come
The Tamil issue in SriLanka is intricately linked
to India’s domesticpolitics. It is also a major
foreign and security policyconcern for India.
Although, it has undergonea paradigm shift in the
post-war period.
”
Sri Lankan soldier stands next tothe wreckage of a light aircraftbelonging to LTTE in Katunayaka,near Colombo, in February 2009
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AFP
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under Indian pressure to announce hispolitical solution. With the Sri Lankan-Tamil issue still a powerful political topicin Tamil Nadu, the Congress-led CentralGovernment in India will feel compelledto please the Dravida MunnetraKazhagam (DMK), its coalition partnerfrom the southern State. Besides, IndianHome Minister P. Chidambaram, himselfa Tamilian, has been an advocate of whathe calls a “credible devolution of power”to the Tamils of Sri Lanka.
Realistic SolutionIndia continues to maintain close contactswith Sri Lankan Tamil leaders, who arenow free from LTTE pressure to agree to arealistic solution. Rajapaksa cannot affordto play a wait-and-see game with India,because Sri Lankan leaders from both sidesof the divide know that Sri Lanka is more orless doomed if it antagonises India.Rajapaksa needs India’s help to overcomethe challenges he faces post-election. Chiefamong them is the economic war. He facesthe daunting task of steering the countryon the path to development after 30 yearsof civil war.
Already, the European Union haswithdrawn a tariff concession facilityextended to Sri Lankan exports. As a result,thousands of garment factory workerscould lose their jobs in the coming months.The Government also depends on foreignloans, some of which have been obtained at
commercial rates, to shore upits foreign reserves andstrengthen the Sri Lankanrupee. Large-scale economicassistance from Europeancountries has becomeconditional on measures toimprove human rights,media freedom and a political solution tothe minority Tamils. However, in post-warSri Lanka there is space for investment. TheGovernment’s investor-friendly policiesand long-term political stability created byRajapaksa’s re-election could attractinvestors. Also, relations with the West,which were strained during the last stages ofthe war against the LTTE, could improve.
Just a few weeks ago, the US has said it ishopeful that relations,which were straineddue to Washington’s criticism of Sri Lanka’shuman rights record and the conduct of thewar,would improve. Indeed,Washingtoncannot afford to allow Sri Lanka to driftaway from its sphere of influence.
A recent report by the US Senate ForeignRelations Committee urged the BarackObama administration not to neglect SriLanka’s strategic importance. India andChina, like the US,were anxious about theJanuary 26th election and the perception inSri Lanka was that President Rajapaksa wasIndia’s favourite candidate. India claimed ithad no favourites, though it apparentlybelieved in the dictum that a known devilwas better than an unknown one.
In the current scenario,given China’s growingpresence in Sri Lanka, Indiacannot afford to antagonisethe Rajapaksa Government.China is building a deep-sea harbour in Rajapaksa’shometown of Hambantota in
southern Sri Lanka. Some analysts sayHambantota is part of the ‘necklace ofpearl’ naval presence China is buildingsurrounding India. China has also got thelion’s share of the post-war developmentprojects in Sri Lanka’s northern areas.
However, Sri Lankan policymakers are aware of the Indira doctrine that shapes India’s security policy in theneighbourhood. After Sri Lanka learnt abitter lesson by being not-so-friendly toIndia in the 1980s, no Sri Lankan head ofState has irked India.
Over the years,Sri Lanka-India relationshave improved immensely. Sri Lanka isIndia’s biggest trading partner in the SouthAsian region. The trade between the twocountries has reached $ 3 billion a year and isgrowing. With more and more Indian andSri Lankan investors going to each other’smarkets, the two countries also want tomove beyond the Free Trade Agreementand sign a Comprehensive Economic Pact.Sri Lanka can ill afford to lose India’ssupport. Besides, it needs India for oneimportant issue: to overcome the crisis that isbound to erupt over war crime charges.
Tamil Nadu’s Deputy Chief Minister M.K.Stalin with Home Minister P. Chidambaram duringthe Chief Ministers’Conference in New Delhiin August 2009
54
NEIGHBOURSWith the Sri Lankan Tamil
issue still a powerfulpolitical topic in Tamil
Nadu, the Congress-ledCentral Government willfeel compelled to please
DMK, its coalition partner.Besides, Home Minister
P. Chidambaram has beenan advocate of what he
calls a “credibledevolution of power” to
Tamils of Sri Lanka.
” AFP
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Today, Basanti Mondal, 20, is acelebrity in her village Kirnahar, inthe Birbhum district of West Bengal.
She is the chief guest at all village functionsand families come to her for suggestions ondecisions like which school their childrenbe should be sent to or which jobs theyouth should try for or even on how tofind grooms for their daughters. There’ssomething special that makes her soimportant. Basanti carries a gun, wears auniform and is in the India’s armed force.
A year ago, Basanti was a rebel. Inresponse to an adverstisement in theEmployment Gazette asking for womenrecruits for the Border Security Force(BSF), she had left the village almost as anoutcast, defying parental and socialobjections. The villagers were horrified atthe very thought of a girl joining theforce, doing a man’s work and also wear-ing an uniform of a security force.“The common reaction was that I will
not be unable to do it physically. After all,a woman is weaker and more frail than aman. She is not expected to bear the hardtraining of a soldier,” says Basanti. Butshe did it. “After completing 36-week ofrigorous training, I am finally a constablewith the BSF. My hard work and perse-
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By joining the BSF, women are not only breaking barriers but deterringwomen indulging in cross-border criminal and extremist activities
ARMS AND THE W OMANKEY POINTSn When the BSF was sanctioned 700posts for women constables, itreceived 8,500 applications indicatinga growing interest among women tojoin the force. n Although the minimum qualificationrequired to join the force is Class XII, ofthe 178 women constables recruited,14 are post-graduates and 22 aregraduates.
Women celebrate their graduationas the first female cadets of the
Border Security Force at theJahankhelan Training Centre
in Hoshairpur, Punjab, in July 2009
AFP
AJITHA MENON
Women in defence story-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:37 AM Page 1
Today, Basanti Mondal, 20, is acelebrity in her village Kirnahar, inthe Birbhum district of West Bengal.
She is the chief guest at all village functionsand families come to her for suggestions ondecisions like which school their childrenbe should be sent to or which jobs theyouth should try for or even on how tofind grooms for their daughters. There’ssomething special that makes her soimportant. Basanti carries a gun, wears auniform and is in the India’s armed force.
A year ago, Basanti was a rebel. Inresponse to an adverstisement in theEmployment Gazette asking for womenrecruits for the Border Security Force(BSF), she had left the village almost as anoutcast, defying parental and socialobjections. The villagers were horrified atthe very thought of a girl joining theforce, doing a man’s work and also wear-ing an uniform of a security force.“The common reaction was that I will
not be unable to do it physically. After all,a woman is weaker and more frail than aman. She is not expected to bear the hardtraining of a soldier,” says Basanti. Butshe did it. “After completing 36-week ofrigorous training, I am finally a constablewith the BSF. My hard work and perse-
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BORDER SECURITY FORCE
57
By joining the BSF, women are not only breaking barriers but deterringwomen indulging in cross-border criminal and extremist activities
ARMS AND THE W OMANKEY POINTSn When the BSF was sanctioned 700posts for women constables, itreceived 8,500 applications indicatinga growing interest among women tojoin the force. n Although the minimum qualificationrequired to join the force is Class XII, ofthe 178 women constables recruited,14 are post-graduates and 22 aregraduates.
Women celebrate their graduationas the first female cadets of the
Border Security Force at theJahankhelan Training Centre
in Hoshairpur, Punjab, in July 2009
AFP
AJITHA MENON
Women in defence story-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:37 AM Page 1
verance is paying rich dividends. The vil-lagers revere me now. Not in their wildestdreams had they thought a girl from theirvillage would make it to the force.”
It was in 2008 that the BSF was sanc-tioned 700 posts for women constables.About 8,500 applications were received,indicating the growing interest amongwomen to join the forces. As the firstbatch of the armed women contingent,178 women recruits passed out with fly-ing colours from BSF’s training camp, inHoshiarpur, Punjab in July 2009. Ofthese, 108 were from Punjab, 46 fromWest Bengal and 24 from Assam.
Same Training as Men“Anu Tamang from North Bengal led thepassing out parade for both men andwomen. It was a proud moment forwomen recruits to see the flag beingborne gracefully in her hands,” recalls TiaRoy, 20, from Beliatore village inBankura. She says that women recruitsare fully trained in the use of weapons,“Even the Indian Army does not have anarmed women’s force yet. We had thesame physical training as for the men andI am proud to say that we could undergothe strict regimen confidently.”
Currently, BSF women constables fromWest Bengal are posted in Petrapole inNorth 24 Parganas District, Gede in NadiaDistrict, Lalgola in Murshidabad Districtand Hily in South Dinajpur District ofWest Bengal. All these areas have interna-tional borders with Bangladesh.
The BSF’s 36 Battalion,whichhas 50.52 kilometres of the Indo-Bangladesh border within itsArea of Responsibility (AoR), hasto contend with problems likecross-border smuggling ofdrugs, arms and ammunition and cattle,along with illegal immigration and traf-ficking in women. “There was dire needof women BSF personnel as otherwise itwas impossible to frisk or detain womenwithout facing allegations of humanrights violation,” points out ShrabantiKarmakar, 21, who along with five otherwomen constables, has been deployedwith the 36 Battalion at the HaridaspurBorder Outpost.
India has a 4,023-km border withBangladesh through West Bengal, Assam,Tripura, Meghalaya and Mizoram. With 2, 216 km, Bengal has the longest stretchto guard. The border is extremely porouswith large tracts being completely river-ine. “Until now, most of the smugglingoperations and trafficking were beingconducted by women, as it was known
that BSF would be unable to takeaction without impunity. Butnow, with women constables inBengal and Assam, criminal andanti-national activities can betackled better,” adds Shrabanti,
who also hails from Bankura. The armed women guards are in
themselves a huge deterrent for womenindulging in cross-border criminal andextremist activities. The BSF had long feltthe need for women personnel and nowthat an armed women’s force has beenraised and deployed, it is hoped that thedeployment of women for cross-borderillegal activities will be curtailed signifi-cantly, believes C.V. Murlidhar, InspectorGeneral, BSF, South-Bengal Frontier.
Improved Economic StatusConstable Putul Murmu, 22, with the 36Battalion, says it was the Maoist problemin West Midnapore that prompted her tojoin the force. “I hated to feel like a victimall the time. It’s true that the area has seenno development over several decades but
58
BORDER SECURITY FORCE
As the first batch of thearmed women contingent,
178 women recruitspassed out with flying
colours from BSF’straining camp, in
Hoshiarpur, Punjab, in July 2009. Of these,
108 were from Punjab, 46 from West Bengal and
24 from Assam.
”Women recruitsin the BorderSecurity Forceundergo armstraining
AJIT
HA
ME
NO
N\W
FS
DSIFEBRUARY 2010
Women in defence story-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:37 AM Page 3
being anti-national cannot be thesolution. Serving the nation is theright thing to do and joining theforce has also improved my eco-nomic status considerably with astarting salary of Rs 11,000,” she adds.
All the women constables are fullytrained for 12-hour shifts of guard andpatrol duty along the borders. They are alsotrained in the handling and use of the 5.56mm INSAS rifles, 9 mm Carbine MachineGuns and 5.56 Light Machine Guns.
For women living along the border,whocross the gates daily to tend to their fields orgraze cattle on their property on one side orthe other of the zero line, the presence ofwomen constables is a Godsend. “Not onlyhas it become easier to be frisked and thor-oughly checked, it’s also easier to answerquestions put by women personnel,” saysAyesha Mollah, 41, a resident of Jayantipur
village under the HaridaspurBorder Outpost.“Trafficking of women across
the border is a big problem.Most of these young girls and
women are too scared to protest whentouts pass them off as relatives at thecheck posts. They also fear detention bymen constables and remain quiet. Now,it is hoped that the trafficked girls willfeel more emboldened to voice theirpredicament to someone of the samesex,” adds Mollah.
Uncomfortable with Male GuardsSharbano Kazi, 58, also from Jayantipurvillage, observes that even local womenlike her always felt uncomfortable withmale guards. “It was as though we werealways under suspicion. Since they couldnot frisk us, the doubt always remained. I
used to feel like a thief every day whilecrossing through the gates. Now I canboldly pass through knowing they cannotsuspect me any more.”
Despite the obvious advantages, onereason why the armed forces are reluc-tant to recruit women is the possibility ofthem quitting after marriage or gettingpregnant. But Purnima Kundu, 23, fromthe Ayodhya village of Bankura, dismiss-es this apprehension. “There is no ques-tion of my quitting ever. If that is a pre-condition to marriage, it will be prefer-able to remain unmarried,” she says. Theother women constables have a morepractical stand on this. “We will try tofind boys within the BSF itself as theywould be more understanding about ourprofessional compulsions. The force alsohas a policy of posting couples together.That will bring down such problems sig-nificantly,” adds Purnima.
Although the minimum qualificationrequired to join the force is Class XII,of the 178 women constables in the first batch of women aged between 18-22 years, 14 are post-graduates and 22, graduates. There are also 25sports women and 11 National CadetCorps volunteers.
Obviously, these women have made aclear career choice. They are here to stayon the country’s international borders.The BSF plans to recruit 35,000 womenguards in the paramilitary forces over thenext four years. Many of these womendon bangles but they have certainly bro-ken a stereotype. The country will be insafe, strong hands.
—Women’s Features Service
A women BorderSecurity Forceconstable onborder vigil
The BSF had long felt theneed for women personnel
and now that an armedwomen’s force has beenraised and deployed, it is
hoped that the deploymentof women for cross-border
illegal activities will becurtailed significantly.
”A
JIT
HA
ME
NO
N\W
FS
Women in defence story-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:37 AM Page 5
DefenceServices
GovernmentSecurity Event
&
The
DefenceServices
GovernmentSecurity Event
&
The
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THE Indian Air Force (IAF) is in a crisis overtraining its fighter pilots some six months afterhaving grounded its entire fleet of Stage-1 traineraircraft following a series of accidents.
To cope with this serious problem, that adds toits collective woes, the IAF has dispatched anurgent Request For Proposal (RFP) to 7 overseasmanufactures for the outright purchase of 75 basicturbo-prop trainers to replace its 200-strong fleetof locally-constructed Hindustan Piston Trainer(HPT)-32 initial trainers.
The RFP sent to Brazil’s Embraer, EADS PZLWarszawa-Okecie in Poland, Germany’s GrobAircraft Company, Italy’s Finmeccanica, KoreaAerospace Industries, Switzerland’s Pilatus andUSA’s Raytheon requires all bids to be submittedby March 17.
The tender requires the first 12 of 75 trainers tobe handed over to the IAF within 25 months of thecontract being inked and all deliveries completedwithin four years.
IAF sources said these 75 trainers were part of alarger requirement for around 180 aircraft, but thedecision on whether the remaining 105 units wouldbe imported—in complete or kit form—or builtlocally in partnership with Hindustan AeronauticsLimited (HAL) was awaited.
Industry sources said that some of the rival
contenders had offered to lease out their aircraft toinstruct IAF pilots till the final selection was madebut had received no response from air headquarters.Some European manufacturers have even offered tosupply all 75 aircraft within 36 months of theagreement being signed, an offer that would, nodoubt be considered by the distressed air force.
The IAF retired around 200 HPT-32s with twoside-by-side seats after 10 crashed between 1999and 2009, the last decisive accident taking place onJuly 31, 2009 in which two instructors from the AirForce Academy (AFA) at Hyderabad were killed.
Earlier, in May 2008, a female IAF cadet had diedafter an aircraft crashed after fuel leaked into itsengine confirming the Comptroller and AuditorGeneral’s (CAG) assessment that the trainingaircraft was “technologically outdated and besetby flight safety hazards”.
The CAG had declared in its 2008 audit, “In spiteof the loss of 11 pilots and 15 aircraft, it (HPT-32)continues to be used today. Further, HPT-32 doesnot aid in the smooth transition of trainees to thenext stage of training.”
IAF sources indicated that problems in ‘mating’the HPT-32’s Avco Lycoming AEIO-540-D4B5engine with the air frame had led to problems thatresulted in their grounding.
Since the late 1980s, 140-150 IAF cadets had
Safety Measures NeededThe locally-constructed Hindustan Piston Trainer-32 aircrafts need replacement
annually received instruction on the HPT-32sbefore moving onto to the locally constructedHindustan Jet Trainer-16 Surya Kiran MKIintermediate flight and weapons trainingaircraft followed by the newly imported BAESystems Hawk 132 Advanced Jet Trainers.
But with the HPT-32s grounded for nearlysix months, a batch of IAF cadets had beentrained directly on Surya Kiran MKIs placingundue pressure on the aircraft. Long termplans to use the imported trainers till HALcan design and construct the single-engineHindustan Turbo Trainer—40 (HTT-40) it hadproposed by 2015 too has run intotechnological problems, adding to thebeleaguered IAF’s anguish.
New C-17 for IAFTHE IAF is planning on acquiring 10 BoeingC-17 Globemaster-III advanced airlift aircraftfrom the US via the Foreign Military SalesProgramme (FMS) for over $2.4 billion.
If confirmed, the C-17 sale will be India’sbiggest ever deal with the US surpassing lastJanuary’s $2.1 billion procurement of eightBoeing P-8I long-range, maritimereconnaissance aircraft (MRA). Alsoovertaking the earlier $962 million acquisitionof six Lockheed Martin-built C-130 J-30 SuperHercules military transport aircraft speciallyconfigured for Special Forces operations.
At present, the IAF operates barely adozen Russian-origin Ilyushin IL-76 Gajrajtransporters capable of carrying cargoes ofaround 45 tonnes and some 104 medium-liftRussian-built Antonov-32 twin-engineturboprop planes that are undergoing a $400 million upgrade in Ukraine. But theIAF’s entirely Soviet and Russian transportfleet has for years been plagued by ashortage of spares and unsatisfactory aftersales service and it has desperately beenseeking a substitute.
Consequently, at the IAF’s behest theMoD issued the letter of request in earlyJanuary 2010 for the 10 C-17s to be obtainedvia the FMS route following clearance by theDefence Acquisitions Council headed byDefence Minister A. K. Antony.
Last year, Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik haddeclared that the C-17s powered by four Pratt& Whitney F-117-PW-100 turbofan engineswere preferred not only for their ability to ferryup to 70 tonnes to a distance of 2,400 nauticalmile but also for their overall operationalefficiency and capability to use short, evenmake-shift runways at high altitudes.
The high-wing, T-tailed C-17 can carrylarge equipment including tanks, suppliesand troops directly to small airfields in harsh terrain in day or night. It is operated bya two-man crew and one loadmaster, canseat two observers and also double as an
aerial ambulance. Around 212 C-17s were in service around
the world, the majority of them with the USAir Force but were also operated byAustralia, Britain, Canada, Qatar and NATO.
Since 2002 India has, under the FMS trackacquired 12 Thales-Raytheon SystemsAN/TPQ-37 (V) 3 Firefinder artillery for $142.4 million and the USS Trenton(re-named INS Jalshawa), a 16,900 tonnesrefurbished Austin-class landing platformdock and six embarked second hand UH-3HSea King helicopters for $ 92.5 million in2006. The six C-130J Super Hercules aircraftand eight P8I MRA were also acquired viathe FMS programme.
India also bought three wide-bodiedBoeing Business Jets (BBJs) for over $212million for the IAF’s VVIP squadron two yearsago to transport officials like the President,the Prime Minister and other dignitaries.
Last July, India and the US confirmed thelong pending End-Use Monitoring Agreement(EUMA) in New Delhi mandatory underAmerican law to facilitate the sale ofsophisticated American materiel to Delhi.
However, the concomitant, but equallycrucial, Communications and InformationSecurity Memorandum of Agreement andBasic Exchange Co-operation Agreementare under bilateral negotiation. Discussionson it were held during US Defence Secretary
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Robert Gates’ two-day visit to Delhi thatended on January 20. Under US law bothpacts need to be signed to ensurecompliance with the export of sensitivetechnology control requirements.
Small Arms for NepalINDIA has finally decided to end itsfour-year long self-imposed embargo onsupplying small arms to Nepal and plans toprovide it a range of assault rifles, machineguns, pistols and revolvers in addition tobomb-detection and disposal equipment.
But this supply that includes 7.62mmmedium machine guns, locally designed 5.56mm assault rifles and ammunition too issomewhat mealy mouthed as Ministry ofDefence officials said such requests fromKathmandu will be dealt with on a‘case-to-case’ basis. Other than small arms,Nepalese Army requirements includearmoured and other multi-purpose militaryvehicles, 81 mm mortars and ordnance for 105mm light field guns, provided earlier by India.
India’s cautious approach is despite itscontinued agitation over Nepali plans tosource its military hardware from Pakistanand China in an area that Delhi considers tobe part of its strategic ambit. But it is, sadly,in keeping with its continued diffidence in
such matters. Senior Indian officials,including the former National SecurityAdviser M. K. Narayanan, had complainedwhen the Sri Lankan Army began sourcingmateriel from Islamabad and Beijing to fightthe Tamil Tigers. But like in Nepal’s case,India doggedly declined to supply it anyweaponry, securing a badly-neededstrategic foothold in its neighbourhood.
To counter Delhi’s influence overKathmandu, both China and Pakistan haveupgraded diplomatic, political and strategiclinks with Nepal in recent years with Islamabadoffering it a line of credit to facilitate armstransfers. China’s foreign minister visitedNepal recently while Pakistan’s ambassadorto Kathmandu declared some weeks ago thatIslamabad would be willing to provide itmilitary aid if requested.
New Delhi’s decision to lift the armsembargo follows the eight-day trip to India inDecember 2009 by the Nepalese Army ChiefGeneral Chhatraman Singh and the reciprocalvisit to Kathmandu by his Indian counterpart,General Deepak Kapoor a month later.
India is also considering increasing the number of Nepalese Army officers and personnel it trains at several of itsmilitary institutions particularly the counter insurgency jungle warfare school atVirangte in Mizoram.
Night Blind TanksThe Army Chief General Deepak Kapoorrecently admitted that around 80 percent of his force’s Main Battle Tanks(MBT) were 'night blind'.
“One of the major areas of my concerns isto remove the night blindness of the tanks sothat we are able to effectively fight at nightas we are able to do in the day," GeneralKapoor said in his press conference aheadof Army Day in mid-January.
Grudgingly, he admitted that thearmoured columns of nuclear rivals Pakistanand China’s were 80 percent and 100 percentrespectively capable of night fighting."There are projects already in the pipelinefor ensuring the kind of night visioncapability that some of our adversaries have. It takes at least three to four years andsome of the projects are likely to fructify in the next year or so” declared the ArmyChief defensively.
General Kapoor’s confession—commonto all his numerous predecessors—fuelledthe incredulous spectacle of a medievalbattlefield in which feuding armies retired atdusk to regroup in order to resume fightingthe following morning.
The only problem with that set ofgentlemanly Queensbury rules of warfare isthat they do not apply in a nuclearisedenvironment in the 21st century. Thissituation becomes even more laughable inlight of the Army’s newly formulated andmuch touted “cold start” strategy of goingon the offensive in a limited war scenario toachieve suitable military gains against anuclear backdrop.
India’s armour fleet comprises some2,000 T-72 Ajeya MBTs, made locally underlicence by the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF)at Avadi and the Bhishma T-90s series ofwhich 310 were imported in 2001-124 in acompleted form and the remaining 186assembled by HVF. Two years ago, the Armyagreed on contract for 347 additional T-90s incompleted and kit form following technical
DSI FEBRUARY, 2010
Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor with his Nepalese counterpart GeneralChhatraman Singh in New Delhi in December 2009
problems with locally building 1,000 of themat Avadi.
The Mechanised Forces Directorate isalso in the process of inducting some 124locally designed Arjun MBTs but remainsunclear about placing additional orders forthe Defence and Research Organisation(DRDO)-designed combat vehicle, becauseof its reportedly inadequate performanceand technological shortcomings.
Additional orders of another 124 Arjun’sand 250 Arjun Mk II remained underconsideration.
Of this large fleet, only around a fifth havenight fighting capability as repeated trialslasting several years for equipment toprovide them that capability have beeninconclusive. To make matters worse, therewas a backlog of some 1,500 T-72s in need ofoverhauling, a number that could rise toaround 2,000 over the next five years. Thoughthe HVF has an installed capacity of annuallyoverhauling 200 tanks it falls woefully shortas do Army Base Workshops tasked withretrofitting another 100 MBTs.
In comparison, the Pakistan Army’sarmoured fleet of around 1,800 MBTsincluding 320 Ukrainian T-80UDs, some 200 AlKhalid/ MBT 2000 developed in collaborationwith China alongside T-69s, T-59s and T-85 IIs,are largely equipped with night fightingcapability. Ironically, India’s decision toimport T-90s MBT’s followed Pakistan’simport of T-80UDs in the early 1990s.
The armoured assets of the China’sPeople’s Liberation Army, on the other hand,too are equally well equipped to operate in thedark, leaving India the only major Army in theregion that continues to doggedly believe inthe non-existent Queensbury rules of tankwarfare of fighting only in daylight hours.
Gunning for ArmsTHE Indian Army is soon to acquire 145ultra-light M777 BAE-Systems-designed 155mm Field Howitzers via the US ForeignMilitary Sales (FMS) Programme for $647million as part of its much-postponedattempt to standardise its artillery inventory.
The imminent purchase of M777s, withlaser inertial artillery pointing systems, willequip two mountain divisions currently underraising for deployment along the unresolvedfrontier with China in India’s Northeast. It willbe New Delhi’s first artillery purchase afterthe controversial acquisition of 410 FH 77B155mm/39 cal guns in 1987.
The FH 77B Howitzer import has beenswathed in corruption charges for over 23years that remain under prosecution.
The M777 with a 25-30 km range becamethe obvious choice after SingaporeTechnology Kinetics, makers of the rival albeitfavoured Pegasus Lightweight Howitzer,were blacklisted last June for allegedcorruption involving India’s Ordnance FactoryBoard that is presently under inquiry by theCentral Bureau of Investigation.
Consequently, on January 22, 2010, the USDefence Security Cooperation Agency(DSCA) notified Congress of its intent to sellIndia the M777s following a request from itsMinistry of Defence (MoD).
Once acquired, the M777 will be thefirst offensive weapon system the US
supplies its new found strategic ally India,having sold it materiel worth over $3.29 billionsince 2001. This includes 12 Thales/RaytheonSystems AN/TPQ-37(V) firefinder artillerylocating radar, a troop ship, maritimereconnaissance and a military transporteraircraft respectively.
No formal trials of the M777 are expectedto take place in India, as the Army accepts it to be a proven weapon system, deployedby the US and British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But an Indian Army artillery evaluationteam is likely to travel to the US sometime
over the next few weeks to witness a live fire demonstration prior to inking the deal.
“This proposed sale (of M777 Howitzers)will contribute to the foreign policy andnational security of the US by strengtheningthe US-India strategic relationship. It willalso improve the security of an importantpartner, which continues to be an importantforce for political stability, peace andeconomic progress in South Asia,” theDSCA notification declared.
Military sources in Delhi said therequirement for M777s were expected toincrease to around 400-500 guns which, in alllikelihood, will be built locally under therecently concluded joint venture betweenBAE Systems and Mahindra DefenceSystems, one of India’s larger defence firms.
The BAE-Mahindra JV is the only suchentity formed so far under India’s revisedDefence Procurement Procedures thatpermits foreign direct investment of up to 26percent in the military-industrial sector. BAESystems' startup share in the JV wasreportedly $5.83 million with Mahindramaking up the balance and providing theChief Executive Officer for the JV to bebased in Delhi.
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