Defense – The Other Face of Mars
Saul Bronfeld
Introduction
The ancient Romans worshipped a two-faced deity, Janus,
the God of beginnings and ends. Perhaps Mars, their God of war,
should have also been depicted with two faces, representing offense
and defense.
The relationship between these two forms of warfare has
long been the subject of debate. “We must not shield ourselves to
death,” some have argued. Others have insisted that “the best
defense is a good offense.” In Israel, a common position is that the
country’s defensive doctrine manifests itself in offensive measures.
In practice, security concepts and warfare doctrines define the
relationship between the two and determine the level of resources
to be assigned to each.
This article will argue that military requirements, learning
and experience led the IDF, in two cases, to invest significant
resources in defensive systems. The case studies show that IDF
learning was flexible enough to allocate substantial resources to
defense, which was, in the past as well as today, “the fourth pillar”
of the classical security concept. This was a concept that advocated
offensive action in order to defend. It prioritized offensive
capabilities that would lead to decisive victory, preferably following
a preemptive strike. The concept was derived from the broad and
chronic asymmetry that existed between Israel and its enemies - in
geography and size of the regular army - and from the realization
that it is impossible to achieve a decisive victory through defense
alone. However, when the circumstances necessitated it, even in the
past, tremendous resources were invested in defensive capabilities.
The proper combination of defense and offense has been a
major question for security concepts from time immemorial, but this
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study will refrain from diving into this doctrinal sea. This article will
discuss two events during which the military leadership decided to
adopt new operational concepts that required a heavy investment in
defense. The first event, in the field of airpower, was the acquisition
of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the early 1960s, which competed
for resources with jet fighter procurement. The second event,
relating to ground warfare, was the establishment of a line of
reinforced fortifications on the western bank of the Suez Canal
during the War of Attrition.
Both events occurred against the backdrop of turning points
in Israel’s security reality, which compelled the IDF General Staff to
contend with a new type of war. This article will describe the
political, operational-economic and other considerations which
shaped both events as well as the sharp controversies that
accompanied the decisions to invest in defensive tools. Both events
involved symmetric warfare against regular Arab armies, but they
may provide us with insights and lessons on learning, and on dealing
with change, which is currently required in our warfare doctrines.1
Airpower: Defense Through Surface-to-Air Missiles
In September 1962, President John F. Kennedy announced his
willingness to provide Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. Five
batteries were acquired prior to the 1967 Six Day War, at a cost of
$30 million. This was an unprecedented investment in a defensive
system designed to protect air force bases, the nuclear reactor in
Dimona, and the home front. Below I describe the arguments which
took place prior to the decision to procure these surface-to-air
1 The events described in this study can serve as historical background to studies dealing with
intellectual renewal. See: Eran Ortal, “Is the IDF Capable of an Intellectual Breakthrough?”, Ma’arachot, February 2013. [Hebrew] In order to emphasize the scope of this paper, I will point out that this study only deals with weapons systems that did not have a direct role in offensive action and the achievement of decisive victory. Also, this study does not deal with investments in home front protection, cyber defense, “second strike” capabilities and armored vehicle protection. Finally, investment in protecting combatants’ lives has always played a central role in security concepts, and is therefore outside the scope of the present study.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 11
missiles, which was a deviation from the classic concept that had
guided the Israeli Air Force (IAF) since the 1950s - achieving air
superiority - as well as the conclusion of the incident and the lessons
learned.2
1. The Operational-Economic Considerations
The combat doctrine of the IAF in the 1950s was based on a
combination of fighter aircraft squadrons (and air traffic control
units), three airfields and anti-aircraft artillery battalions - all
designed to protect the country's skies, to control airspace over the
battlefield and to participate in the ground battle. The IAF sought to
increase the size of its fighter jet force and to construct more
airfields. Improving air defense capabilities was its lowest priority.
However, toward the end of the decade, the General Staff began
considering reinforcement of Israel’s air defenses with surface-to-air
missiles. The motivation for this new thinking was the improvement
in the attack capabilities of the Arab air forces (Tupolev-16 bombers
and MIG-19 ground attack jets) and the assessment of the General
Staff’s Staff-Armaments Directorate regarding the severity of the
threat: “The worst-case scenario for the defense establishment is an
attack from the air instigated by the enemy on our airfields and
population centers. There is no way to completely hold back such an
2 This chapter relies to a large extent on Stuart Cohen's study: “Who Needs Ground-Air
Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Acquired,” in Ze'ev Lachish and Meir Amitai (eds). Non-Peaceful Decade: Chapters in the History of the Air Force, 1956 - 1967. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1995. [Hebrew] See also Chapter three of Saul Bronfeld. “From A-4 to F-4: The Beginning of an Aviational Friendship,” Fisher Institute of Strategic Air and Space Research, 2011. [Hebrew], or the summary of the book in the article Saul Bronfeld. “Wise Statesmanship: Levi Eshkol and Arms Procurement in the 60s,” Ma’arachot. No. 437 (Sivan 5771 - June 2011). [Hebrew] The threat to Dimona jumpstarted the IDF’s capabilities and not only in the SAM interception field. Between 1966 and 1967 the “Senator” initiative was established by the Unit 8200 unit in the IDF J2, assisted by Air Force Intelligence, which was designed “to supply an early warning of an Egyptian air force attack on Dimona.” The intelligence that was gathered was very helpful in planning the attacks on the Egyptian airfields in the Six Day War. See Amos Gilboa. “Mr. Intelligence - Ahara'le, General Aaron Yariv, Head of Military Intelligence,” Yediot Ahronot and Hemed books, 2013, pp. 185, 192-193, 214-215. [Hebrew]
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attack with aircraft only... Surface-to-air missiles are a better
defensive means against faster aircraft than interceptors.”3
The General Staff perception was spurred by an important
operational issue - the need to protect the Dimona reactor from low
altitude, hit-and-run incursions from Egyptian airfields in Sinai.
Operational considerations of time and space indicated that it would
be impossible to prevent such an attack only through aerial
interception of the MIGs, and economic considerations prevented
constant defensive air patrols.
The IAF commander, Maj. Gen. Ezer Weizman, objected to the
acquistion of surface-to-air missiles from the US for several reasons.
First, procurement of good air defense capabilities would stengthen
arguments against a preventive air strike. “I feared that when the
senior leadership would need to approve an air offensive,” Weizman
revealed, “the presence in Israel of Hawk missiles would actually
block a fast-affirmative decision [to strike first].”4
Second, he reasoned, surface-to-air missile batteries would use
a large slice of the IAF budget (even though the operational yield
would be higher than if the funds were invested to procure another
Mirage Squadron or build a fourth airfield). “One should not forget
that surface-to-air missiles are static and a missile is a single-use
weapon,” argued IAF headquarters, “while a jet fighter is flexible, it
3 A document from September 10, 1959, quoted by Stuart Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air
Missiles? How the Hawk Missiles Were Acquired,” pp. 255-256. Already during the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, it had become clear that over time it is impossible defend land assets using interceptor patrols. The large contribution of the radar-detection network deployed by the Royal Air Force allowed the British Spitfires and Hurricanes to be launched just in time to intercept the German bombers, preventing the interception squadrons from having to perform grinding patrols. At that time, the United Kingdom's small air force was unable to continuously patrol its skies, but the radar network and the reporting and control system based on it, allowed the RAF to launch fighter planes just in time. The British made early use of a system that the Toyota vehicle manufacturing company brought into industry in the 1950s. See Edward Luttwak. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 235-236.
4 Ezer Weizman. On Eagles' Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., pp. 183-186.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 13
may continue attacking the enemy and is able to handle more than
one target in a single sortie.”5
Third, another important but implicit consideration is
identifiable in the Air Force position over the years. The
organizational culture of the Air Force was not enthusiastic about
weapons systems not operated by pilots. Weizman did not like
surface-to-air missiles, his replacement Maj. Gen. Moti Hod did not
like drones and their successors did not like military satellites or the
Iron Dome system.
In internal discussions, Israel never raised concerns about the
potential for escalation, in contrast to concerns raised by the US
State Department in objecting to the sale of the Hawks to Israel.
American diplomats argued that equipping the IDF with surface-to-
air missiles would lead the Soviets to supply Egypt with long range
surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), which would expose Israel to
significant threats.6 In Israel this consideration was not deemed
relevant, because in the 50s and 60s it was the Soviets who were
introducing advanced air and ground-based weapon systems into
the Middle East, and the prevailing Israeli opinion was that they
were leading the arms race, not reacting.
2. Political Considerations
From the mid-1950s, France was the IDF’s main weapons
supplier. Israel procured tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, various
types of missiles and a nuclear reactor from France. The love affair
between the defense establishments reached new heights in the
early 1960s after France began to supply modern Mirage fighters,
and continued to help in many other ways. The French billed Israel
heavily, but had no political inhibitions and gladly consented to any
purchase request. And the Americans “are inquisitive and
5 A document from September 23rd, 1959, quoted in Stuart Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How the Hawk Missiles Were Acquired,” in Lachish Ze'ev and Amitai, Meir (eds). Non-Peaceful Decade: Chapters in the History of the Air Force, 1956 - 1967. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1995, p. 255. [Hebrew]
6 Ibid, pp. 269-270.
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garrulous,” reflected Ezer Weizman. “The French never questioned
us this way, and we had a feeling that if we asked to buy 300 Mirages
instead of 72, they would have complied after merely clarifying the
terms of payment. And here [in Washington, when presenting the
shopping list for the Air Force in October 1965] there are cross-
examinations and intricate inquiries.”7
At the end of the 1950s, the United States produced the Hawk,
a surface-to-air missile, considered by the IAF “the most
sophisticated of its kind,” as well as other weapon systems that
Israel longed to acquire (primarily tanks and fighter-bomber jets).
But the Americans refused to provide the IDF with weapons of any
kind. To their credit, the Americans were aware of the threats to
Israel, but limited themselves to financial assistance, facilitating the
procurement of weapons systems from France and Britain. Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol called the American policy an “elegant
embargo,” and the policy could be referred to as “the IDF are moving
up a class, but not in the American school.” Accordingly, the debate
on the operational need and effectiveness of surface-to-air missiles
(in cost-benefit terms) was intertwined with what is known in Israeli
historiography as the debate between the “European school” and
the “American school.”8
Weizman, supported by Shimon Peres, then the Deputy Minister
of Defense, preferred to procure another Mirage squadron instead
of the Hawk batteries. This position stemmed from both the
operational-economic considerations described above, and from
the rationale that the acquisition of the additional Mirages would
strengthen Israel's status as an important client of the French
industries, thus intensifying the collaboration between France and
the Israeli defense establishments.
7 Weizman, On Eagles' Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air
Force?” p. 302. His comments described the enormous political difficulty in purchasing weapons in the US, compared to the political ease of purchasing from France (and the economic difficulties in funding the acquisition).
8 Bronfeld, “From A-4 to F-4: The Beginning of an Aviational Friendship,” Fisher Institute of Strategic Air and Space Research, pp. 15-16; Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Aquired,” pp. 264-267.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 15
Their opponents, Generals Haim Laskov, Tzvi Tzur and Yitzhak
Rabin, as well as David Ben Gurion, and later Golda Meir and Levi
Eshkol, believed that with resolute and ongoing political efforts,
Israel could break into the coveted American arsenal. The tactic
chosen by the prime ministers and chiefs of staff at the time
advocated applying pressure to obtain approvals for purchasing
defensive weapon systems to be followed by aircraft and armored
vehicles. The initial stage was successful in 1960, when President
Dwight Eisenhower consented to Ben Gurion's request to provide
the IAF with advanced air control and command (non-firing)
systems, followed by requests to procure the Hawk (a defensive fire
system), and later by requests to purchase aircraft and tanks
(offensive fire systems).
The complexity of the web of arguments of the various parties
is also reflected in the difficulty in separating relevant considerations
(operational, political and economic) from ones driven by
personality/organizational rivalries and interests. It's hard to believe
that the strained relationships between Golda Meir and Shimon
Peres, and between Rabin and Peres, did not influence the debate,
since purchasing more in France, instead of purchasing the Hawk
from the US, would have strengthened Peres position vis-à-vis the
Israeli Foreign Ministry as well as the General Staff.
Yitzhak Rabin described Peres' 1982 objection to the arms
purchases in the US, from the air control systems to the Hawks:
“Of course, Peres argued [in 1960] that there was no need to go
to the Americans, but in the end, Ben Gurion decided and returned
with Eisenhower's approval to purchase the aerial warning systems.
Then Peres, influenced by Weizman, who commanded the air force,
tried to torpedo it. We already had approval to make the purchase,
but nothing was done in order to advance the acquisition, because
Peres claimed that there was an up-to-date radar system in France,
better than that of the Americans, and they appointed a Committee.
In short, they dragged the matter on for a year or a year and a half
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before actually starting, and miraculously we reached the Six Day
War with one fully functioning warning station, and on Mt. Canaan
only an improvised one, because we did not manage, since we had
wasted time. But it [the American system] is, to this day, in fact, the
backbone of all our aerial warning and control systems. Later, in the
second stage, the issue of the Hawk missiles arose, and Tsera [Tzvi
Tzur], the Chief of Staff, and I were in favor, and once again Weizman
and Peres nearly tried to torpedo it. Weitzman argued in principle
that it was not necessary, that it was a waste of money. But Eshkol
and Golda, as soon as Eshkol entered office, they made the radical
shift to the American issue.”9
Similar claims were raised by Yoash Sidon, Chief of the
Armaments and Planning Division at Air Force Headquarters (Air
Group 2) in the early 1960s, who accused Peres and Weizman of fully
identifying with Marcel Dassault, owner of the big French aircraft
manufacturing company, and of consequently introducing
erroneous considerations into the purchase of fighter jets.10
It does not matter here how accurately Rabin's and Sidon's
memories reflect Peres's and Weizman's considerations. Obviously,
personal alliances on the one hand, and sour personal relationships
on the other, lead to mistakes.
9 Avi Shlaim, “Interview with Yitzhak Rabin,” Iyunim Bitkumat Israel (Studies in Israeli and
Modern Jewish society). Vol. 8, Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1998, pp. 688-681. [Hebrew] Rabin “forgot” to mention that after Israel made the decision to request the Hawk, Peres acted energetically to persuade President Kennedy's administration of the vitality of the missiles to Israel's security.
10 Sidon, Joash. Day and Night in Fog. Jerusalem: Ma'ariv Library, 1995 pp. 350-367. [Hebrew] Yaakov Hefetz, who was financial advisor to the Chief of Staff, said in an interview with Sidon: “There were ‘transactions’ between Ezer [Weizman] and Shimon Peres, then between Ezer and Keshet [Moshe, Director of the Ministry of Defense]. You support this and we shall support here... [Weizman and Hod who replaced him] were in direct contact with the Ministry of Defense and all sorts of partnerships in crime... unknown to the IDF Chief of Staff.” Quoted in Yitzhak Greenberg. Accounting and Power: The Defense Budget from War to War. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1997, p. 113. [Hebrew]
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 17
3. Organizational Considerations
In the 1950s, direct responsibility for anti-aircraft systems was
entrusted to the Artillery Corps, and the beginning of the missile era
sharpened the organizational dispute between the two services.
Initially, the dispute was over surface-to-surface missiles which were
developed in France for the IDF, and later over locally developed Luz
missiles. When the decision was made to purchase the Hawk
missiles, Weizman demanded responsibility for those batteries. The
Air Force arguments related, initially, to the operational need to
coordinate the employment of the anti-aircraft systems with fighter
jets, an issue which was always important, and which became critical
in the era of surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, the technological
infrastructure required to run and maintain a SAM array was very
advanced, much greater than that at the disposal of the anti-aircraft
cannons. The Artillery Corps objected, of course, with professional
and morale-based arguments, but at the end of a long debate the
IAF carried the day.11
Chief of Staff Tzur’s decision to entrust the Air Force with the
surface-to-air missiles was an important step in transferring
responsibility for the whole air defense array from the Artillery
Corps to the IAF, as part of an operational-organizational concept
that later concentrated under Air Force wings “anything that flies” -
jets, helicopters, drones, anti-aircraft guns, missile defense systems,
surface-to-air missiles and rocket and mortar defense systems (the
anti-aircraft units were transferred in November 1970). At the
General Staff meetings where the organizational implications of the
Hawk’s acquisition were discussed, other options arose. Rabin (then
Deputy Chief of staff), for example, supported the establishment of
a missile command, directly under the Chief of Staff. Other concerns
were that transferring the surface-to-air missiles to the Air Force’s
11 Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Aquired,” pp. 275-
281.
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responsibility would deprive the artillery corps and other entities in
the IDF, and would further augment the importance of the Air Force.
In debates about purchasing expensive weapon systems like the
Hawk, the first question that arises is always from which budget
would the funding be drawn.12 It is not surprising that a service that
desired a certain weapon’s platform would plot to finance the
purchase at someone else’s expense. The best option was a special
allowance from the USA. Otherwise, through increases to the
defense budget, and as a last resort, at the expense of one’s
colleagues on the General Staff. The worst-case scenario for a
service was cutbacks in one’s budget. Commanders throughout the
ages, in the IDF and other armies, would demonstrate great
creativity to avoid encountering a worst-case scenario.13
Weizman understood that the $30 million invested in the Hawks
(although spread over several years) would come at the expense of
purchasing aircraft. He feared that the many requirements of the
ground forces - especially tanks, armored personnel carriers and
modern artillery - would prevent an increase in the Air Force’s share
of the defense budget, and that a serious shortage of foreign
currency for procurement needs would also be a problem.14
4. Epilogue - Purchase of the Hawk Surface-to-Air Missile
The decision to purchase the Hawks despite IAF opposition
stemmed primarily from an immediate operational need, which
could not be fulfilled in any other way. Anti-aircraft guns and fighter
12 In another example, during the discussion of the “Goshen” multi-year plan, in 1968 and 1969, Maj. Gen. Hod opposed financing the procurement of the many helicopters required for vertical flanking “at his expense.” 13 I will limit myself to pointing out the tactic known as “the Cheech Method” named after its
creator Maj. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo (Cheech) Lahat, Mayor of Tel Aviv 1974-1993. General Lahat commanded the Sinai Division during the War of Attrition, but the method was given its nickname when he served as Mayor, developing it greatly while creating large budget deficits. When Lahat was required to cut back on expenses, he would agree immediately, and then announce that the cutbacks would be achieved by closing down services provided to the elderly in distress. “Cheech” had many imitators in the civil and defense sectors, as is evidenced by recent threats to cut back on training for combat forces, following the refusal of the Ministry of Finance to increase the defense budget.
14 Greenberg, “Accounting and Power: The Defense Budget from War to War,” p. 112.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 19
jet patrols and even an additional airfield could not guarantee the
continuous functioning of the Air Force bases and the defense of the
Dimona reactor (nor the home front). Weizman suppressed the
operational problem, whereas Chiefs of Staff Laskov and Tzur (and
Deputy Chief of Staff Rabin) identified the new need and were even
prepared to invest significant resources in a defensive response.
Weizman's resistance to purchasing the Hawks rested on two levels,
related to the IDF’s decisive defeat doctrine. At the strategic level,
there was an apprehension that the defensive capability would
augment the political echelon’s tendency towards containment,
which would likely refuse authorization for a preemptive airstrike.
At the operational level, there was a fear that purchasing the
missiles would come at the expense of purchasing fighter jets
designed to achieve air superiority, according to classical combat
doctrine. Weizmann regarded the purchase of the surface-to-air
missiles - defensive by nature - as an impairment of the ability to
attain a decisive defeat, and he therefore opposed it (gaining the
support of Peres, who wanted to increase procurement from
France). Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir on the other hand, alongside
the chiefs of staff, decided in favor of the Hawks, both on
operational grounds and from a political desire to break into the
American arsenal.
Hindsight suggests that Weizman had neither operational nor
organizational reasons to lament that his position was rejected. His
fear that defensive improvements would prevent the political
echelon from approving a preemptive strike against the Egyptian
airfields in the Six Day War was proven wrong. In June 1967 approval
was indeed granted for Operation Moked, which was a resounding
success. Moreover, the willingness to take risks and leave only a few
Mirages to defend Israel's skies in the morning of Operation Focus
was influenced by the existence of the Hawk batteries. Weizman's
budgetary concern was also proven wrong. In 1965 Eshkol approved
the procurement of an additional 50 Mirages and 48 Skyhawks,
concurrent with the procurement of 250 Centurions and 150 M-48s,
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and after the Six Day War, there was effectively no budgetary limit
on the procurement of jet fighters.
Furthermore, the Air Force succeeded in developing a combat
doctrine for the anti-aircraft missiles, integrating them with the
fighter jets, as was demonstrated during the War of Attrition and the
1973 Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War. Affirming this fact was Brig. Gen.
Benny Peled, the Head of the Air Division during the War of Attrition,
who complained that the Air Force had insufficient Hawk batteries.15
Introducing the Hawks to the IDF’s order of battle in the mid-1960s
was the first step in establishing a modern air defense array - anti-
aircraft systems and later anti-missile and anti-rocket systems -
whose importance grew from the 1990s onwards. Furthermore, the
Hawk array was very technologically advanced, and it helped the Air
Force advance in rocket, air traffic control and radar capabilities.
Finally, the Chief of Staff accepted Weizman's demand to
subordinate the surface-to-air missiles to the Air Force which
intensified Air Force control over “anything that flies.”
Image 1: Postcard of the IDF parade in honor of the purchase of the
Hawk missiles
15 The need for sophisticated air defense measures in the War of Attrition was due to the
proximity of Israeli forces in Western Sinai to the Egyptian airfields, inviting air incursions that the Mirages were unable to intercept.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 21
On the political front, it became apparent that were no reasons
to lament the rejection of Weizman's position against the
procurement of the Hawks. Later came the M-48 and M-60 tanks,
Skyhawk aircraft, Sikorsky CH-53 helicopters, F-4 phantom aircraft
and missiles of various types and from the late 1960s the US became
Israel's main weapons supplier. The many reasons for the gradual
reversal in US policy are complex, but it is clear that the transition
from stingy American consent for the sale of recoilless cannons in
1959 to the supply of the F-4s late in 1968 had to be gradual and
that the sale of the Hawks was an important stop along this long and
winding road. Finally, the embargo imposed by the French president
following the Six Day War proved that Israel's important status vis-
à-vis the French defense industry rested on shifting sands. The
purchase, before the Six Day War, of a few additional Mirage
squadrons from the French would not have changed the scope of
the damage they inflicted.
5. What Can Be Learned?
First, don't put all your eggs in one basket. During the events in
question, Chiefs of Staff Laskov and Tzur decided not to rely on
fighter jets alone for air defense, meaning that air warfare would
have to be conducted using an integrated combat approach in which
both aircraft and sophisticated air defense systems would
participate. Ostensibly, this principle goes without saying in the
development of military doctrine, in investment management and
in other fields. But history teaches us that there is always a strong
temptation to ignore it.16
Second, the event highlights a problem inherent in the IDF
General Staff (and beyond), exacerbated in the context of
technological issues in general and aviation in particular. “In our
twisted organizational structure, the Air Force commander is the
16 The relevancy of this lesson can also be learnt from the fighting in the Sinai during the first
days of the Yom Kippur War. The shortages in artillery, mortars, modern armored infantry carriers and tank transports are a painful example of a deviation from the principle.
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only source of knowledge to the Chief of Staff, and through him to
the Government, in everything relating to military aviation,” Sidon
described the situation in the years when he headed Air Branch 2,
under Weizman as Air Force commander. “He is service commander
and staff officer at once... A definite conflict of interests that is
worsening as the level of specialization in the service is deepening,
making things more difficult for the uninitiated to understand.”17
The technological leaps in various types of weapon systems since the
1960s exacerbated the need for General Staff planning entities,
headed by commanders with technological and operational
knowledge, and able to cope with the demands of the services.
The need for such professional entities was prominent in other
events related to the Air Force, characterized by a bias against
systems not operated by a human pilot. The resistance of the Air
Force to drone development in the 1970s, to the development of
military satellites in the 1980s and to the development of the Iron
Dome in 2000s is no secret. Less widely known is the unsophisticated
use of drones during the Yom Kippur war and the resistance to the
development of surface-to-surface missiles for use by the ground
forces.
The need to develop General Staff capabilities to handle
complex technological issues exists not only in relation to the Air
Force. It also especially concerns cyber warfare, command and
control systems, intelligence, unmanned systems and robotics and
many other issues that have developed over the last generation.
One hopes that today, with senior Air Force officers filling key
positions in the General Staff directorates, matters had improved in
comparison to the 1960s. However, the American experience
teaches us that even following the Goldwater-Nichols Act revolution
in 1986, which, inter alia, improved integration between
headquarters and the commands, it is not easy to uproot narrow
thought patterns and allegiance to one’s own corps.
17 Sidon, “Day and Night in Fog,” p. 352.
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Land Warfare: Defense Through Fortified Outposts ("Strongholds")
On September 8, 1968, Egypt launched a war of a type
entirely new to the IDF - a war of attrition. The Egyptians shelled the
Israeli line along the Suez Canal, leaving dozens of soldiers killed and
wounded. At the same time, under the cover of darkness and
shelling, Egyptian commando units successfully crossed the canal,
planted mines, set ambushes and even attacked IDF positions,
causing additional casualties. The novelty in the War of Attrition was
the deadly combination, the likes of which the IDF had never
encountered before - fierce artillery fire and commando raids
conducted by a state army - determined and properly equipped. The
scope was infinitely larger than that of the incidents which took
place on the Jordanian and Syrian borders prior to the Six Day War,
and in the Jordan and Beit Shean Valleys after the war.
For political and military considerations, Israel decided to
keep a military presence along the Suez Canal’s eastern bank, and
not to retreat eastward. This meant that IDF forces would remain
within range of Egyptian artillery. For the same reasons, Israel
decided against pushing Egyptian artillery back by seizing the
western bank of the canal. Furthermore, retaliatory actions carried
out by the IDF, initially the destruction of Egyptian cities along the
canal and deep raids inside Egypt later, did not deter Nasser nor put
an end to the fire (though they did cause him much embarrassment).
As time went by, it became clear that this was a costly type of
warfare, which would last for a long time - several months, perhaps
even years - and that it was impossible to end it in one stroke.
The shelling and commando raids were an important
element in the strategy to drive the IDF from the Sinai Peninsula.
They were part of the Soviet-Arab effort to force Israel's retreat by
constantly igniting the theater, designed to secure US support for a
retreat, as had happened after the 1956 Sinai War. In addition, the
losses caused by the attrition, in blood and money, were meant to
soften Israel's opposition to retreating. The attrition was also seen
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in Egypt as a stage that would prepare their armed forces for an all-
out war and the reoccupation of the Sinai, if international pressures
failed, as well as serving the Egyptian government on the domestic
front. It came as a response to a craving for revenge by the army and
the people, wishing to erase the shame of defeat from the Six Day
War.
Until September 1968, the IDF was deployed in western Sinai in
a thin green line, with few troops and minimal fortifications. As soon
as the shelling began, the General Staff took emergency measures,
including sending reinforcements, distancing some of them beyond
the range of the Egyptian artillery, new combat procedures and
fortifying the outposts with additional layers of earth. On October
26, the Egyptians launched another round of shelling, again causing
dozens of casualties. After the second bombardment, the General
Staff understood that the steps already taken were insufficient and
the IDF must prepare for a new type of war. This study limits itself
to the learning processes and the formation of the IDF's response
during the first, formative, phase of the War of Attrition until July
1969, when the Air Force joined the campaign.
The changes in the political and military circumstances after the
Six Day War forced the General Staff to revise its security concept
and to adapt to the new reality. The transition from an offensive
mindset, at the heart of the military discourse for many decades, to
trench warfare in the autumn of 1968, was not easy and was
accompanied by pointed debates, not always presented accurately
in the historiography of the period.18
1. Political Considerations
In the period immediately following the Six Day War, political
considerations played an important role in decisions around plans to
defend the Sinai Peninsula, and the necessary investments. On
policy issues, there were no real differences of opinion between the
government and the General Staff, which perceived a great deal of
18 Here we shall mainly use sources from the period, and refrain from using insights generated after the Yom Kippur War.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 25
military logic in the political directives. The first directive was to not
retreat from the canal unless a political agreement was achieved.
This was accepted by the General Staff, which felt comfortable in
deploying behind a water barrier, 180 meters wide.
Similarly, there was hardly any protest against the second
directive, to maintain the status quo on the canal while not pushing
the fire back by seizing territory to the west of the canal. This
directive came from the fear of intervention by Soviet forces should
the IDF endanger the Nasser regime, and the fear that igniting the
canal would cool relations with the US, which was deterred from
confronting the Soviets because of the Vietnam quagmire. The
American consideration had another aspect, a fear that the US
would not supply the F-4s and Skyhawks, leading to a decision to
refrain from employing the Air Force to suppress Egyptian fire until
July 1969. The Israeli government and the General Staff also agreed
on the necessity to avoid endangering the acquisition of more
fighter jets.
In addition, the government and the IDF had to consider the
effect on national morale a new war would have. After the elation
brought about by the victory in the Six Day War, the Israeli public
descended into a sort of depression, not having expected another
war and so many casualties on the eastern and canal fronts. The
public was frustrated that they couldn’t enjoy quiet for even forty
days, and the persistence of the War of Attrition and the
accumulation of casualties on both fronts created a painful
atmosphere. The need to do everything possible to minimize
casualties increased. On both fronts, the IDF patrolled with armored
vehicles only, converted tanks to evacuate casualties, placed
physicians in the strongholds, and acquired bulletproof vests.
2. The Operational-Economic Considerations
The operational significance of the policy directives was that the
IDF was stuck on the banks of the Suez, exposed to the Egyptians. It
was not allowed to (nor did it necessarily want to) cross the canal,
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nor withdraw to the east. Moreover, the IDF artillery order of battle
was smaller, by an order of magnitude, than that of the Egyptians,
and was unable to silence the shelling.19 The General Staff
understood that this difficult situation was expected to persist.
Therefore, the IDF prepared for an extended stay on the Suez, while
readying itself for two types of threats - an all-out war started by
Egyptian initiative aiming to reconquer the Sinai, and a limited war,
a “war of attrition” in Nasser’s parlance, in the form of heavy shelling
and commando raids on the eastern bank, which could develop into
a land grab.20
This section will describe the considerations of the IDF in
defending the canal line in the first six months of the War of
Attrition, from early September 1968 (when the first shell fell) to
early March 1969 (when the war entered its intensive, continuous
phase).21 There is a special interest in the learning processes and
dilemmas of this period, and in the gradual disengagement of the
General Staff from the memories of the Six Day War and classical
security concepts.
In addition to the emergency measures taken from September
1968, the General Staff quickly prepared along several lines of effort
for the new type of warfare. A cross-service planning team headed
by Brig. Gen. Avraham Adan, Deputy Commander of the Armored
Corps, prepared a comprehensive new program to defend the Sinai
- the “Stronghold” Plan - which was implemented immediately, even
before its final approval, in December 1968. The prompt
construction of fortifications was spurred by an intelligence report
that Egypt was about to launch a full-scale war in the spring of 1969,
19 According to Haim Bar-Lev, the ratio between their barrels and ours was 1:20 or 1:30, and no one proposed to change that by acquiring more artillery pieces. 20 The IDF also prepared for intermediate scenarios, such as a seizure of Sharm-al-Sheikh or Northen Sinai, but due to space limitations, we will not discuss them here. 21 From November 1968 to early March 1969, the fire was temporarily halted since Egypt was
forced to organize its rear defense, following a successful raid by the Israeli Paratroopers Brigade’s Reconnaissance Unit on the relay stations and bridges in the area of Nag-Hammadi (Operation “Shock”). In this article, as in the literature of the period and its historiography, the limited war which took place on the banks of the Suez Canal is referred to as the “War of Attrition,” and also occasionally as routine security activity.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 27
and by the contribution ascribed to the strongholds in successfully
parrying an expected crossing.22 In early March 1969, construction
of the first phase of the Bar Lev Line was completed. An array of 32
well-protected outposts stood ready, some intended for actual
combat, others for early warning and observation. The outposts,
nicknamed strongholds, boasted effective protection against
artillery, were surrounded by fences and mines, and came with
access roads and firing positions for tanks protecting the line. The
strongholds were constructed to provide reasonable amenities to
the soldiers manning them, not an easy achievement in the Sinai
desert. This represented an investment of approximately 52 million
Israeli Lira on the canal line, not an overwhelming sum, comparable
to the cost of three F-4s or a hundred upgraded Patton tanks, but
more than the IDF had ever spent on fortifications.23 The cost of the
strongholds themselves only amounted to approximately 12 million
IL, and the remaining sums were invested in paving roads and other
infrastructure required for a defensive line.
The Southern Command’s Stronghold Program was an
operational plan for the defense of the Sinai during an all-out war as
well as in routine operations, integrated within the General Staff’s
“Sela” (Rock) plan, and included deployment and warfare methods,
assignment of troops and construction of operational infrastructure.
22 See the General Staff meeting, 21/11/1968, IDF archives 10/10/2013. 23 The retrospective pricing of the stronghold line at the beginning of the War of Attrition is
not simple. On the one hand, the figures cited do not include the full economic cost (not even the budgetary) of the many military personnel and heavy construction equipment involved in the construction project. On the other hand, the stronghold line’s budget contains sums, which would have been spent anyway by the IDF, even if an alternative defensive method were chosen. It is important to note that the heaviest expenditures on the Bar Lev Line were invested after the ceasefire in August 1970, when 150 million IL were spent in strengthening the line, bringing about the “infamous enrichment of the contractors.” These figures are rough estimates - 250 million IL according to Haim Laskov testifying at the Agranat Commission meeting of January 10, 1974, or 300 million as stated by Abraham Zohar in his book - of the costs of constructing the line. In any case, these figures are smaller by an order of magnitude than the refuted figures presented by David Arbel and Uri Neeman, approximately the equivalent of 100 fighter jets and 1,000 tanks, i.e. above 2,000 million IL. See Arbel and Neeman, “Unforgivable Delusion,” Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2005. p. 150. [Hebrew]; Ami Shamir, “History of the Army Engineering Corps,” Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1978, pp. 79-91. [Hebrew]
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It was prepared under two constraints - preventing any Egyptian
achievements, political or military, both in a limited and in an all-out
war, and avoiding casualties and costs as much as possible
(manpower, engine hours, fuel, spare parts, etc.).
There was a close link between the two constraints. After the Six
Day War, the IDF was required to deal with a limited but intense
conflict, while preparing for all-out war. Therefore, the need to
conserve power in the canal zone became a major guideline.
Moreover, the IDF was burdened with many more demanding tasks
- combat on the eastern front, controlling and managing the
territories occupied during the Six Day War, fighting terrorism within
the Green Line and overseas, increasing and improving the order of
battle, developing new capabilities (helicopter-borne attacks in
depth, water crossings, intelligence gathering, defense against non-
conventional threats), organizational changes, establishing an
operational infrastructure for road construction, and the
establishment of defense industries. The General Staff realized that
intensive attrition could last far longer than in the past, and
demanded that ongoing routine defense not curtail training, nor
wear down the order of battle designated for an all-out war.
In his memoirs, Adan described the constraint guiding the
Stronghold plan as the desire to invest in “operational employment
the minimum number of troops,” in order to “train the maximum
troops uninterruptedly, wearing down fewer tanks and artillery
pieces [and half-tracks, of which there was a critical shortage] while
conserving the troops.” The chosen solution consisted of static
strongholds and deterrence - and not a mobile and reinforced
warning screen - with the addition of ambushes.24
Adan phrased his argument in military terms, but with his
degree in economics, he could have done so in economic ones as
well. Establishment of the line was performed using a type of
“production actor” of which, relatively, there was no shortage:
24 Avraham Adan. On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War. Jerusalem: Presidio Press, 1980, pp. 54-68.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 29
construction and civil engineering entities and a non-professional
workforce (new recruits and reservists). In addition, necessary
special warning systems could be purchased abroad or developed in
the country. This one-time investment in fortifications was designed
to conserve the resources employed in routine security patrols, and
primarily to conserve the two “production actors” of which acute
shortages were felt after the Six Day War, combat forces and
armored vehicles. Combat forces - the strongholds and warning
measures - made it possible to hold the line with less regular and
reserve personnel. And for the armored vehicles (engine hours,
spare parts and tracks), the strongholds helped reduce the scope of
patrols and operational movements required.
The lack of routine security resources was largely “real,” and not
merely financial. That is, because of the multiplicity of tasks imposed
on the IDF after the Six Day War, there was a severe lack of combat
forces, rather than budgetary resources. This is despite Israel
extending mandatory service to 36 months, and recruiting reservists
for 30 to 60 days a year. But many of those days were sucked into
routine security activities, thus curtailing training and exercises of
both regular and reserve units, constantly impacting the readiness
of armored vehicles and the equipment in the emergency supply
depots (while the Six Day War generated extensive operational
experience, as time passed the need to return to an investment in
training increased).
In the minutes of the General Staff meetings in the autumn of
1968, we find broad agreement that attrition warfare required
proper fortification of the existing outposts and an increase in their
number. Even Maj. Gen. Israel Tal and Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon said
that for the purpose of the routine security patrols, “it [the
Stronghold plan] is very good,” and that “a very thorough job had
been done.”25
25 General Staff meeting, December 19, 1968, quoted in Amnon Reshef, We Will Never Cease!
The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War. Dvir Publishers, 2013, pp. 33-34 [Hebrew].
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In the learning processes, the Generals were dealing not only
with defense, but also with developing offensive responses to
incidents initiated by the Egyptians. In keeping with its classical
security concept, the IDF carried out retaliatory acts designed to
dissuade Nasser - shelling and destroying high value targets in the
cities near the Suez, raids and ambushes across the canal, deep raids
into the heart of Egypt and more. But the General Staff had no
illusion that these would stop the shelling, nor did it consider
increasing the artillery order of battle, nor an attempt to stop the
shelling by firing at the Egyptian batteries.
A dispute between the generals broke out concerning the
multiplicity of missions inherent in the investment in the Bar Lev
Line, missions that were designed for two substantially different
types of warfare - the ongoing limited war, which might last a long
time, and a future all-out war, in which the IDF would have to
contain the enemy using only the regular troops deployed in the
Sinai, before attacking and achieving a decisive victory with reserve
divisions.
The first round of the opposing stance taken by Tal and Sharon
dealt with these two types of combat and was heard during the
discussions immediately after the first round of shelling in
September 1968. Sharon proposed to evacuate the outposts on the
Suez and to construct a new line at a distance of 30 km to the east,
beyond the range of the Egyptian artillery. He proposed to perform
routine security activities using tanks, a minority on the bank of the
canal, and mostly in the rear at a distance of 10-20 km to the east.
Sharon would have used the infantry to only defend the
bottlenecks behind the line, at the Mitla and Gidi passes. Bar-Lev
reported Sharon's proposal to Moshe Dayan, saying that he and the
rest of the General Staff opposed it (he said Sharon was “in splendid
isolation”). Dayan accepted Bar-Lev's opinion, noting that infantry
According to Emmanuel Sakal: “The literature dealing with the debate at the General Staff on the defense system augmented the differences of opinions and underrated the agreements.” Emmanuel Sakal, Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War. University Press of Kentucky, 2014, pp. 20-31.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 31
posts on the canal were important for routine security activity,
adding that their evacuation would have “a negative demonstrative
effect.” However, he did not rule out the possibility that in an all-out
war it would be preferable to evacuate the outposts and conduct a
destructive battle using the armored divisions.26
The second stage in the dispute took place in November 1968,
after a deadly bombardment in October, when the General Staff
ordered Adan and the planning team to maintain a continuous
presence on the canal and to properly fortify the posts. At the same
time the controversy focused on the contribution of the strongholds
to preventing a crossing in an all-out war, but it also had
repercussions on defensive investment for routine security. At this
stage, Tal and Sharon praised the strongholds for their expected
contribution to routine security, but they added that they would
contribute nothing in the holding action phase of an all-out war.
They presented dangerous scenarios in which even the well-
defended strongholds would not withstand the destructive fire likely
to precede a crossing. Furthermore, they indicated that the
firepower provided by the strongholds towards the canal area would
be too weak to stop a crossing.
Bar-Lev rejected their opinion (and was joined by Adan and
Yeshayahu Gavish, head of the Southern Command) and explained
that the scenarios presented by Tal and Sharon about the
destruction of the strongholds in the initial shelling were
exaggerated. He added that stopping the crossing would be done by
tanks deployed on three lines, and fighter jets, assisted by fire from
the clusters of strongholds constructed on the six entry axes into the
Sinai. In other words, according to Bar-Lev’s concept, although the
strongholds would contribute to stopping the Egyptian crossing,
most of the work would be done by the tanks and aircraft.
26 See Reshef, We Will Never Cease! The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, Dvir Publishers,
2013. [Hebrew]
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Although there was already no disagreement regarding the
benefits of well-fortified strongholds during the War of Attrition, Tal
and Sharon's opinion was that it was unnecessary to invest a lot of
money in their fortification. They claimed that for the purposes of
routine security, strongholds made up of two bunkers should suffice
(not four, as suggested by the planning team), or bunkers placed as
“rear positions” (behind, not in the front of a rampart). They also
believed that observation towers were not necessary, nor were
heavy investment in mines and fencing. Their position was that even
“thin” strongholds would meet the needs of routine security and
that large and expensive strongholds would not contribute to
preventing a crossing; that would be done by tanks placed on the
first line and those in the reserve. Tal's and Sharon's position was
supported by the Brigadier Generals, Rafael Eitan, Chief
Paratroopers Officer, Asher Levy, Head of the Southern Command
and Isaac Hofi, Deputy Chief of Operations.27
Bar-Lev rejected these objections due to a combination of
economic and operational considerations. He calculated that
constructing thin strongholds, as proposed by the objectors, would
only save a small percentage of the budget, because most of the
expenses were not directly related to the number of bunkers in a
stronghold, but to the logistics infrastructure of the strongholds,
roads to be paved, and the communications and observation
systems. Furthermore, it was important to maintain the possibility
of preparations for war, and to deploy larger infantry forces in the
posts along the line, because in his opinion the strongholds located
on the access roads into the heart of the Sinai would play an
important role - both in deterring the Egyptians and in blocking the
crossing should deterrence fail (he did not believe that the
strongholds should serve as an assembly area from which to cross
into Egypt). The intelligence assessments at the time were that, in
an all-out war, the Egyptians would seek to occupy the Sinai, at least
27 The meager and cheap strongholds, “pillboxes,” proposed by Sharon, were also rejected
because their shielding was based on pouring concrete which was impossible to construct in such a short time while under fire.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 33
the area between the canal and the line between the Mitla and Gidi
passes. Thus, the combat outposts along the roads leading into Sinai
were designed to play an important role in its defense.
Bar-Lev's approach was practical. He believed that the
strongholds would provide a good response during the War of
Attrition and could also offer a greater range of courses of action for
Israeli troops in an all-out war. In his opinion, the strongholds would
effectively resolve the acute problem of routine security operations
and in case of an all-out war, which was not expected soon, would
likely assist the tanks and aircraft in intercepting the enemy.
Moreover, until an all-out war broke out, it would be possible to
address the vulnerabilities of the strongholds by special measures of
various kinds, and to increase their fire power.28
Bar-Lev's intellectual flexibility was especially apparent in the
middle of the War of Attrition, about six months after the
establishment of the strongholds. The Southern Command
requested to add strongholds at a distance of 1,000 meters from the
canal, to deepen the line. Bar-Lev rejected the request. He said that
depth would not serve routine security operations, nor would
additional strongholds contribute to the holding action phase in an
all-out war, depth would be provided by tanks, not by more
strongholds. One could justify the construction of more strongholds
only for observation purposes or in areas inaccessible by tanks. In
his opinion, the establishment of additional strongholds, especially
under fire, was unjustified, given the limited benefits anticipated
from them.29
There were important conclusions about the order of battle that
arose in the discussion about the defense of Sinai by the regular
forces. The new and distant frontiers of the period following the Six
Day War, and the accumulation of Egyptian divisions along the
28 The “Strongholds” file, General staff preliminary debate, November 4, 7, 1968, IDF archives
file 315-717/1977. 29 Summary of the debate of General Staff, September 19, 1969, IDF archives file 34-829/1971.
34 | THE DADO CENTER JOURNAL | VOL. 4
Canal, required an increase in the regular forces deployed opposite
the Egyptians. The regular armored force prior to the Six Day War
was primarily the 7th Brigade, to which were gradually added, after
the war, the 14th and 401st brigades, deployed in western Sinai. At
the outbreak of the War of Attrition, the 7th Brigade was deployed
on the Golan Heights, and the immediate reinforcement of western
Sinai with regular troops was supposed to be supplied by battalions
from the Armor School (later the 460th Brigade) which could deploy
within 12-14 hours. During the Stronghold Plan discussions, General
Tal argued that for the holding action phase, all regular tanks would
be required, about 300 in all, while the reserve tank formations
should be employed only to carry out a counteroffensive against
forces that penetrated the defensive lineups of the 14th and 401st
Brigades. Only thus would it be possible to prevent any significant
achievements by the Egyptians before the arrival of the reserve
brigades. Thus, was born, in late 1968 and early 1969, the magic
number of 300 tanks that accompanied IDF planning and war games
until the Yom Kippur War.30
3. Epilogue - The Establishment of the Bar Lev Line
At the beginning of the War of Attrition the IDF was a rapid
learning organization - finding a response to the challenges posed by
the Egyptians, while setting correct priorities, at a time when a large
gap had opened between its many considerable tasks and the
resources at its disposal. The General Staff judged correctly that an
all-out war against Egypt was not expected in the near future, and
therefore allocated considerable resources to routine security on
both fronts, while making an effort to continue training and prepare
the forces for all-out war, while minimizing wear and tear on
armaments and weapons systems. The Bar Lev stronghold line
30 See “Stronghold” file, operational debate in the Situation Room, December 19, 1968, IDF
Archive, file 560/381-73. Tal's position was only gradually accepted, because it meant shifting the 7th Armored Brigade from the North to Central Israel, and the establishment of a regular tank formation in the North, which later became the 188th division. In addition, it was necessary to add to the Armor School’s battalions a support and logistics layer which would enable them in wartime to completely operate as a brigade, and to establish a brigade emergency storage unit in Bir-el-Thamada (Sinai).
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 35
enabled the army to maintain a presence on the Suez while investing
relatively few resources. Also, the timing of the deployment on the
canal was consistent with the principle of economy of force - the line
was reinforced and fortified only after it became clear, in the fall of
1968, that the Egyptians could and wished to engage in a land grab
on the eastern bank, and that the green line deployed on the canal
was too thin.
The development of the War of Attrition, following the renewal
of the Egyptian bombardments in March 1969 until the ceasefire in
August 1970, is another fascinating example of learning
competition. The long duration of the war brought about an
intellectual and operational dynamic on both sides of the canal,
which is deserving of a broader and separate review. It is sufficient
to mention here the following stages of the war: in July 1969, the
IDF began to employ the Air Force as air artillery, after it became
clear that holding the line had become very difficult despite the
significant reinforcement of the strongholds. In the second half of
1969, the IAF systematically destroyed the Egyptian air defense
array, and gradually crushed the Egyptian artillery near the Canal,
while simultaneously conducting successful raids in Egypt.
In January 1970, Israel intensified the fighting and began
strategic bombing of the Egyptian hinterland. These were small scale
raids, but their political significance was great, because the US
opposed them and the Egyptians presented them as grounds to
deploy the Soviet Air Defense Division (advanced ground-to-air
missile units and MIG squadrons) on the Egyptian side. Following the
Soviet entry, the IDF stopped the attacks deep in Egypt, but the
rollout eastward of the Soviet-Egyptian air defense system
continued until the ceasefire. During the final stage, Israeli F-4s were
shot down by the air defense and MIGS, and Soviet pilots were shot
down by the IAF.
On August 8, 1970, both sides responded positively to the
ceasefire initiative from the American Secretary of State, William
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Rogers. The night the ceasefire went into effect, the Egyptians
violated it by deploying surface-to-air missile batteries in the Canal
area. Israel decided to ignore the violation, and the US government
compensated the IDF with modern ground and air weapons.
In the War of Attrition, the IDF won the race of determination
and learning in the operational domain. “The Egyptians didn't
achieve any goal in the War of Attrition,” argued Bar-Lev as he
painted a picture of an Israeli victory. “They received neither land,
nor the political support which would have brought them the
desired result. They were forced to accept a ceasefire after
seventeen months of warfare [March 1969 to August 1970] while
Israel had achieved all its goals. It succeeded in preventing the
Egyptian goals and in ending the war with the minimum casualties.
The Egyptians wanted to push the IDF out of the Suez, but it
remained under our control.”31
However, political assessments of the situation were
problematic. Israel was mistaken in its assessment of Soviet-
Egyptian determination to act in the aftermath of the crushing of
Egypt’s air defenses and the subsequent air raids deep into Egypt.32
The government and the General Staff did not believe that the Soviet
Union would send combat troops (as opposed to advisors) to Egypt,
which would not hesitate to clash with the Israel Air Force and
neutralize its capabilities. This mistaken assessment stemmed from
there being no precedent of the Soviets employing forces outside of
the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Israel discovered that what the
31 Haim Bar-Lev, “The War and Its Goals in Light of the IDF’s Wars,” Ma’arachot. No. 266,
November 1978 [Hebrew]. These are the remarks that Bar-Lev made to students at the Staff and Command College, 1978. Gen. Tal saw things differently, arguing that in the War of Attrition the ground forces failed to cope with the Egyptian army, and thus the Air Force was called upon to come to their aid. He claimed that the result of this “original sin” was the establishment of a heavy Air Defense Command by the Egyptians, which wore down the IAF at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War. Israel Tal. National Security: The Israeli Experience. Praeger Security International, 2000, pp. 173-180.
32 Dima Adamsky. Operation Caucasus - The Soviet Involvement and the Israeli Surprise in the War of Attrition. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot Press and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006, pp. 34-47 [Hebrew]. The research shows that the Soviet decision to intervene had already been taken by the end of 1969, before the bombing raids deep in Egypt which began in January 1970.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 37
Soviet Union was unwilling to do in Korea and North Vietnam against
American attacks, it was ready to do in Egypt in response to Israeli
raids. This mistaken political assessment did not bring Israel to the
brink of the abyss, for, as pointed out by Bar-Lev, the IDF succeded
in wearing down the Egyptians, and in August 1970 a ceasefire
agreement was signed when both sides were well exhausted and
after the Soviet Union and the United States applied pressure on its
own ally to agree to a ceasefire.
However, it appears that during the ceasefire period until the
outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the learning competition favored
the Egyptian side, which derived the strategic, operational and
tactical lessons from the War of Attrition and was properly prepared
for the 1973 War, in comparison to the IDF, which increased and
improved its order of battle, but did not do its homework properly.
Maj. Gen. Amnon Reshef described the IDF planning deadlock.
“The only obvious conclusion is that the operational orders
'Dovecote' and 'Rock' were not defensive plans in the deep and
broad meaning of an operational plan,” he lamented. “These were
vague orders, shallow and lacking in real content. They lacked the
basic elements that constitute an integral part of a defensive plan.
The enemy's modus operandi was known and clear, and against this
background, the plans did not include a thorough professional
analysis of the combat zone, and consequently no 'critical areas,'
'key terrain,' 'kill zones,' etc., were defined. They had no depth, to
allow management of the defense. They did not have any definition
of what the 'end state' is. There was no counterattack plan, and
worst of all - they were not practical!”33
Some believe that Reshef's judgment, which represented the
opinion of many, was overly harsh, and that the main reasons for
the failures in the Sinai at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War are
different (the intelligence failure and surprise, the Air Force
problem, structure of the order of battle, the functioning of senior
33 Reshef, We Will Never Cease! - The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, p. 56.
38 | THE DADO CENTER JOURNAL | VOL. 4
commanders, the scope of the deployed forces). Between the end
of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War three whole years
passed, a period long enough to properly re-examine the Sinai
defensive plans for an all-out war, and to detach oneself from
concepts intended for a limited war. In particular, it was important
to reexamine the detailed plan for the holding action phase by
regular units, which was not done properly, as noted by the Agranat
Commission and by many thereafter.
4. What can we learn?
The first lesson is positive: The General Staff determined the
correct priorities during a very tense period, and quickly formulated
and implemented the Stronghold Plan. Following the Six Day War, a
new kind of situation was created, requiring the IDF to engage in
attrition warfare on two fronts, while preparing for all-out war of a
new kind (new from temporal and spatial considerations, and
political restrictions).
Based on this description, Chief of Staff Bar-Lev's priorities were
correct. His first priority was routine security at the Suez, and under
his leadership a fortified line was established, within a surprisingly
short time, providing reasonable protection to the troops and
deterring the Egyptians from attempting to take over outposts on
the eastern bank of the canal. The new deployment included, in
addition to the strongholds and the infrastructure, the
establishment and deployment of regular forces in western Sinai, at
a level appropriate to the new situation.
At the same time, he made sure to improve preparations for an
all-out war: To pursue training and exercises, to increase the order
of battle, to develop and improve weapons systems, to develop new
combat tactics (for water crossings, covering fire and deep
incursions, and even protection from non-conventional weapons).
All of these issues cannot be produced with a stroke of a pen. Bar-
Lev saw the stronghold line as a dual-purpose system, necessary for
attrition and useful in an all-out war. He did not accept Sharon and
Tal's views that the strongholds would not contribute to holding the
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 39
enemy, arguing that a proper deployment, integrating mobile
armored forces, fighter jets and infantry in the strongholds, would
definitely thwart an Egyptian attempt to cross the canal.
IDF plans and exercises indeed focused on crossing the canal
into Egypt and subduing its army west of it. But Bar-Lev and Adan
are entitled to the benefit of the doubt, assuming that the neglect
of defensive plans at the time expressed primarily an assumption
that an all-out war was not expected in the near future (it is hard to
argue that neither general understood the benefits of a mobile
defense). According to this hypothesis, the critical defensive needs
during the War of Attrition focused the General Staff's attention on
the establishment of the Bar Lev Line and its employment in deep
raids (and from July 1969 employment of the air force), while
delaying the preparation of detailed plans for the employment of
the line during an all-out war. This hypothesis facilitates a
rationalization for why detailed plans for an all-out war were not
prepared until August 1970, although it cannot explain why these
were not prepared in the three years until the outbreak of the Yom
Kippur War.34
This criticism is intensified due to the fact that the IDF was well
prepared materially for an all-out war. The order of battle had grown
tremendously, the troops were properly trained and weapons were
34 See the description of the war games “Strike” in January 1971 and “Battering Ram,” July -
August 1972 and the “Dovecote” and “Rock” plans, in Reshef, We Will Never Cease! - The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, pp. 62, 74; Sakal: Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War, pp. 54-78. Meir Finkel researched in depth the harmful impact of combat patterns learnt during routine security operations on capabilities for an all-out war, and concluded that as far as combat training and increasing and improving the order of battle “routine security activities [after the Six Day War] did not influence the preparations for [all-out] war.” However, he too (like the Agranat Commission and many others) indicates a doctrinal regression as a factor affecting the functioning of the IDF in the Yom Kippur War. See Meir Finkel, “The Tension Between Success in Routine Security Operations and the Risk of Assuming them to be War Capabilities” in Meir Finkel, Challenges and Tensions in Force Generation. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2013, pp. 79-98 [Hebrew]. Note that in the three years prior to the Yom Kippur War, Israel enjoyed “quiet” (relatively), on both the Eastern and Western fronts, and routine security operations did not dominate the General Staff’s focus.
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substantially improved, mainly due to the US “compensation” to
Israel following the forward deployment of Egyptian air defenses.
The only thing missing was a doctrinal effort to reexamine the
defensive plans and adapt them to the new Egyptian warfare
doctrine, especially in anti-tank and air defense - an effort that
wouldn’t have cost money and was not limited by political,
economic or other constraints.
The second lesson relates to the need to periodically challenge
conventions and to discover whether there is still a need for
investments previously made in systems and doctrines. The painful
issue of the fighting on and around the strongholds at the beginning
of the Yom Kippur War is testimony to that. Many see this issue as
one of the major failures of the war, and there is a systematic
intellectual bias that could lead to similar failures in the future.35
Experience in many fields suggests that the human psyche has
difficulty moving on from sunk costs, because in doing so there is a
certain admission of past mistakes and despair that the investment
will never justify itself. In the military world, an argument is
occasionally heard that “it is unthinkable to withdraw from an area
whose occupation cost so much blood” (for example, the Gallipoli
Peninsula in World War I). Similarly, investors are often hesitant to
sell a stock which was purchased for a lot of money, even though the
company is in deep trouble.36
The strongholds functioned well during the War of Attrition, and
immediately after the ceasefire large sums were invested in
preparing them to withstand renewed shelling. The attrition did not
resume, but prior to 1973, fears of an all-out war increased. How
should the operational plans have been updated after August 1970,
and especially after the clouds of war gathered over the Sinai?
35 Sakal dedicated a substantial part of his study to “the contribution” of the strongholds to
the erosion of most of the 252nd Division in the first days of the war: Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War, pp. 169-175.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 41
In a 2013 article, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Dr. Meir Finkel describes the
contrasting defensive plans of Sharon and Gonen and highlighted
the unfortunate timing, with the Egyptians catching the IDF
dithering between the different plans in 1973. Finkel also proposed
lessons to be learned from such situations. In his opinion, an
alternative plan to “Dovecote” should have been formulated and
exercised, because the friction with an alternative plan would have
created insights about points of failure inherent in the existing
operational concept.37
Therefore, it is possible that serious friction with alternative
plans of various kinds would have emphasized the gap between the
existing plans and the air force's ability to participate in repelling the
Egyptian crossing, as well as emphasizing other failures which were
exposed during the Yom Kippur War.
This approach would have also generated friction with the
holding action plans that presumed there would be no combat
strongholds, only those used for observation and warning. This
would have been in effect a conceptual write-off of the investment
in the strongholds, and a drafting of an alternative defense plan.
The third lesson concerns the human tendency to rest on ones’
laurels after a substantial achievement, which can be dangerous in
the multi-round wars waged by Israel (and the Jewish population in
Mandatory Palestine before that) against Arab forces for more than
a hundred years.
The classic security concept holds that in the absence of a
political settlement a round of war is to be expected periodically.
The period leading up to the Yom Kippur War proved that one should
not rest between rounds, even if we believe that we were victorious
in an important round. The IDF won the War of Attrition due to rapid
and effective learning, but was not sufficiently prepared for the next
37 “The outbreak of war during a conceptual disagreement,” wrote Finkel in “Challenges and Tensions in Force Generation,” p. 178.
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round (with the exception of the Navy), while the Egyptians did
wonders in their preparations for the Ramadan War.
The incident is underscores two important truths. First, one has
to assume that the enemy will learn, therefore the IDF must too.
Second, victory in a specific round does not guarantee a victory in
the next one. This was true when the IDF fought the Arab armies,
and is no less true in the warfare against the Hamas and Hezbollah.
This might seem obvious, not to mention trivial, but perhaps
because of this, there is a tendency to forget the lesson.
The fourth lesson is also not new - never underestimate the
enemy. Throughout the War of Attrition and in the period after, IDF
senior officers regularly dismissed Arab armies in meetings,
debriefings, lectures and reports to the Government. There is not
enough space here to describe all of these, but it is enough to say
that there was overwhelming consensus regarding the inferiority of
the Arab armies. Even Bar-Lev and Gen. Aharon Yariv, Head of
Military Intelligence, who were generally cool-headed, joined in.
Plans to defend Sinai, approved after the Six Day War, during the
War of Attrition and afterwards, were all based on the presumed
pitiful state of the Egyptian army and the superiority of the IDF, both
during the holding action phase and in counterattacking. Therefore,
a significant portion of the criticism of the IDF concerns the result of
this contempt for the enemy from which many planning failures
issued.
Although IDF learning patterns following the Six Day War and
during the first stage of the War of Attrition were prompt and
effective, subsequent events raise questions about the political-
military strategy that escalated the fighting from July 1969 to August
1970, and much more about what happened in the three years
between the ceasefire and the Yom Kippur War. These important
questions are unresolved to this day.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 43
Conclusion
Two events of different types were described above. But
they have much in common as both deal with the IDF responses to
a substantial change of circumstances, requiring a greater
investment in defensive measures, in addition to the reinforcement
of offensive capabilities. The lack of a satisfying offensive response
to the increasing threat of the Arab air forces in the early 1960s, and
the political directives and military thinking that bound the IDF to
the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition, required creative learning
and a search for solutions which deviated from the classical
offensive security concept.
Decisions in both events were affected by a complex web of
political, operational-economic, organizational and personal
considerations, and in hindsight we may say that these were good
decisions.
In purchasing surface-to-air missiles, military
professionalism carried the day. Determined chiefs of staff, backed
up by staff work, overwhelmed the parochial interests of the IAF
chief, while contributing to the effort to convert the United States
into an important weapons supplier. The chiefs of staff were aided
by the prime minister and foreign minister, who saw political
advantages in purchasing a modern weapons system from the
United States.
The establishment of the Bar Lev Line is harder to evaluate,
largely because of the link between the War of Attrition and the Yom
Kippur War. The historiography of both wars - from the 1974
Agranat Commission report, to Amnon Reshef's 2013 book -
analyzed the establishment of the Bar Lev Line in hindsight, in the
wake of the Yom Kippur War, and a large part of it was written by
those who managed the war or commanded troops, or were
otherwise linked to it. This work is not intended to deal with the
important question of the strongholds’ contribution to the crisis of
the early days of the Yom Kippur War, or whether it was possible to
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more effectively plan the defense of the Sinai against an Egyptian
offensive. It is sufficient here to conclude that the Bar Lev Line was
an effective solution in the War of Attrition, and that from the war’s
end to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, there was more than
enough time to properly plan the defense of the Sinai in an all-out
war, based on a realistic estimate of the strengths and weaknesses
of the strongholds, and of the enemy’s plans and capabilities.
BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 45
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Archival Documents from the Ministry of Defense and IDF:
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