Delievering Human Security

I

Delivering Human Security

through multi-level Governance


through multi-level Governance

II

United Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS)

UNU-CRIS is a research and training unit of the United Nations University based in Bruges, Belgium. It specialises in studying the processes and consequences of regional integration and cooperation. The mission of UNU-CRIS is to contribute towards achieving the universal goals of the United Nations through comparative and interdisciplinary research and training for better understanding of the processes and impact of intra- and inter-regional integration. The aim is to build policy -relevant knowledge about new forms of governance and cooperation, and to contribute to capacity -building on issues of integration and cooperation, particularly in developing countries. The UNU-CRIS peace and security research cluster aims to further expand understanding of the contribution of regional integration processes to peace and security and to support the interactions between the UN and regional organisations.

http://www.cris.unu.edu/

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

in Brussels UNDP focuses on providing the tools and resources necessary for people to build a better life and realise their human rights. UNDP Brussels works to promote greater coordination across the UN system, facilitating the UN’s interaction with institutions of the European Union (EU) and the development of inter-institutional networks. UNDP’s mission in Brussels is to enhance the relationship between UNDP’s global system and EU institutions, ensuring that the policies of both parties contribute to universally -agreed goals and supporting the implementation of joint programmes in the field. UNDP Brussels also directly supports the work of UNDP country offices around the world in their cooperation with the European Commission.

http://www.undp.org/eu

http://www.cris.unu.edu/

http://www.undp.org/eu

III

Project team:

Luk Van Langenhove Antonio Vigilante Emmanuel Fanta Tãnia Felício Monica Ferro Tiziana Scaramagli Rodrigo Tavares The team is grateful for the special contributions by Nicola Harrington and Richard Cox and for the valuable comments and advice received from: Marc de Bernis Fernando Calderon Marcos Farias Ferreira Karen Fogg and colleagues in DG RELEX Douglas Gardner Ana Maria Gomes Andrey Ivanov Christopher Louise Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh Massimo Tommasoli Rastislav Vrbensky

…………………………………………………………............................

March 2009 Disclaimer This paper is produced by the authors in their individual capacities. The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations

Cover photo credits: 160648 UN Photo - Eskinder Debebe 180268 UN Photo - Tim McKulka 191132 UN Photo - Marco Dormino 183044 UN Photo - Martine Perret Ticker 3 1339718060_46b3527144 - Z. Esmeralda via Flickr.com Manifestation anti CPE du 18 mars à Paris - Alain Bachelier via Flickr.com Page IV: Photo European Parliament

IV

Foreword

I would like to welcome this report as an important contribution to the debate on strengthening human security responses

through multi-level governance. i.e. responsibility of governance actors from local to global level. The development of human security as a guiding principle for our external policies has made steady progress since its introduction in the 1994 Human Development Report

1. The

European Parliament has embraced this principle and considers that, along with the

“responsibility to protect”, it entails “both practical consequences and strong political guidelines for the strategic orientation of European security policy...”

2

This endorsement of a policy approach with a human security dimension is important as the European Union develops its own nascent European Security Strategy alongside its longstanding Foreign, Development and Humanitarian Policies. In this respect a focus upon governance at all levels becomes an

essential tool through which we bridge our Security (with an emphasis on freedom from fear) and Development (with an emphasis on freedom from want) priorities. Security pursued through multi-level governance ensures that the institutions and instruments of governance (police, military, judiciary, and executive and legislative branches of government) are reformed to protect and promote human development and not to exploit or repress civilians. Development pursued through multi-level governance promotes

human development by working to eradicate waste, corruption and exploitation in the instruments and institutions of governance, creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accordance with their needs and interests.

1 Human Development Report, UNDP, 1994

2 European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009 on the European Security Strategy and ESDP (2008/2202(INI)),

para 7

V

Multi-level governance, therefore is an important means through which we can achieve more complementary and effective development and security policies. I would like to compliment the authors of this project and their sponsoring institutions, the UN Development Programme and the

United Nations University (UNU-CRIS), for this timely and policy-relevant report. It is an important source of information and provides concrete case studies for those wishing to learn more about human security. More importantly, the report is also an important reference for those seeking to make human security through multi-level governance more operational and effective in ensuring that all civilians around the world have the opportunity to realise their full human potential. I hope that the European Union and the United Nations will continue to put human security at the core of their daily work around the world.

The European Parliament, for its part, will support such action through its regional and international Parliamentary Diplomacy.

Hans-Gert Pöttering

President of the European Parliament

VII

Executive Summary

This paper aims at furthering

the debate on human security. It

considers the incorporation of the

concept into policy frameworks and

suggests concrete tools to operationalise

human security on the ground. The

paper emphasises the role and

responsibilities of governance actors at

all levels - from the local to the global - in

ensuring individuals’ freedom from fear

and freedom from want, the two central

planks of human security.

The paper is divided into four parts:

I. Conceptualising human security

II. Local governance and assessment of

human security

III. Regional governance in the

promotion of human security: the Case

of the European Union

IV. Other regional experiences: the

African Union, the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations and the Pacific

Islands Forum.

Principal conclusions:

The definition of human security

proposed by this paper encompasses

both freedom from fear and freedom

from want. This differs from the more

limited human security definitions,

essentially related to physical violence.

Human security shifts the security focus

from the state to the individual, and

highlights the importance of protection

of individuals from sudden and severe

disruptions in their lives that may derive

from a variety of actual, potential or

perceived threats. Human security is thus

understood to include a variety of issues

such as economic, food, health and

environmental security, as well as

personal, community and political

security.

There are clear links between the

concepts human security, human rights

and human development, all of which

put the well-being of the individual at

their core. However, in recent years,

human security has often been more

closely associated with the concept of

responsibility to protect, thus

emphasising individuals’ freedom from

fear. Yet if the international community is

willing to protect civilians - and indeed

has accepted international

responsibilities in that regard - then it

should also accept that peoples’ needs

and vulnerabilities go far beyond their

freedom from fear. The international

community should be prepared to act in

different and additional spheres of

human security, adopting a

comprehensive approach that takes

account of the differing sources of

vulnerability and human security risks.

The paper goes on to argue that human

security must necessarily be provided by

a wide range of actors operating at all

levels, from local community-based

authorities through to the national,

regional or global governance

institutions. Therefore, the assessment of

human security and analysis of needs

should also be multi-level.

To the extent that all entities vested with

governance powers are responsible for

the development and security of people

they serve, governance should lead to

improvements in the human security

status of people. Indeed, good

governance can be seen as the art of

enhancing human security, with the

latter serving as a measurement by

people of the effectiveness of those who

govern them.

VIII

Human security is highly context-specific.

It is thus inappropriate and indeed

probably impossible to elaborate a single

standard international measure, since

the relevant variables are likely to differ

greatly between places and across time

periods. However, whilst it may not be

possible to make scientific comparisons

between locations of overall levels of

insecurity (except in specific

circumstances where many indicators

happen to coincide) it should

nevertheless be possible to compare

human security trends in single locations

over time.

This paper suggests that many

dimensions of human security are most

effectively dealt with either at a local,

sub-national level (communities,

municipalities, regions), or at a

supranational, regional or continental

level (the European Union being a case

in point).At the local level it is possible to

determine the most important

vulnerabilities to include in a context-

specific formula for the measurement of

human security. This data could provide

a baseline for the formulation of a

human security action plan comprising

policies and concrete actions designed to

improve local human security conditions.

Easily-understood indicators of local

human security have the potential to

empower communities to better

understand and express their

vulnerabilities, to hold political leaders

accountable for responding to these,

and to take appropriate actions

themselves to reduce their levels of

insecurity. In this way, measurement of

the trend and evolution of human

security over the medium-term offers real

potential in assessing the effectiveness of

local governance.

As to the role of supranational regional

organisations, the human security

concept has mainly been used in relation

to external interventions and in

connection with securing freedom from

fear for peoples outside the region. Very

little attention has been paid to how

regional-level governance can be a

provider of human security within the

region itself. Yet many aspects call for the

inclusion of regional processes among

the contributors to human security,

particularly since regional integration

and regional organisations tackle many

issues that have direct consequences on


from want.

The role and influence that the

European Union, as a regional

organisation, has on human security

takes many different forms. Whether it

concerns economic, political integration

or social policies put in place at the

regional level, the process of regional

integration with its emphasis on four

freedoms - free movement of goods,

persons, services and capital - has direct

links to safeguarding the well-being of

citizens and thus ensuring their human

security. By becoming somewhat of a

role model for other regional

organisations, and by establishing

requirements for entry into the European

Union, the Union has also played a

major role in influencing human security

in the candidate countries and in its

neighbouring states.

The European Union is not a sole

successful case of regional integration

which fosters human security, although

it is the most prominent and developed.

Other examples include the African

Union, through its endorsement of the

responsibility to protect within the

African Peace and Security Architecture

and its efforts to promote development

through the New Partnership for African

Development; the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations through its

regional coordination efforts in the face

of pandemics; and the Pacific Islands

Forum efforts to combat environmental

threats. It has thus become increasingly

evident that regional organisations have

IX

a role to play in the many aspects that

constitute human security.

To conclude, since the state is no longer

the alpha and omega of the provision of

human security to its citizens, it becomes

increasingly necessary to look also to

both local and regional governance

actors as human security providers. The

importance of the local level is based

largely on the non-uniformity, or context-

specific nature of actual and perceived

threats to individuals and groups. On the

other hand, the regional level allows for

the tackling of cross-border threats. The

assessment of human security is also

closely linked to good governance, a

core aim of which should be to lower the

threats facing individuals. Real and

perceived threats can usefully be

combined to provide a set of indicators

that allow both the measurement of

change in levels of insecurity over time,

and assessments of the effectiveness of

responses of different actors in

enhancing human security.

Contents

FOREWORD ............................................................................................. IV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................... VII

ACRONYMS .............................................................................................. XII

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

PART I: CONCEPTUALISING HUMAN SECURITY ...................................... 5

Human Security as context-specific ................................................... 8 Human Security as Policy Doctrine ................................................. 11 Human Security, Human Rights, Human Development .......... 12 Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect ..................... 14 Security by Whom?.............................................................................. 17

PART II: LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN SECURITY ........................................................................ 19

Human Security exposes the Vulnerabilities of People ............ 21 Good Governance as the Art of increasing Human Security . 22 Human Security and Democracy .................................................... 23 Can Human Security be measured? ............................................... 25 Human Security in National Human Development Reports ... 28 A Hypothetical Example .................................................................... 30

a) Identification of Human Security Priorities .......................... 30 b) Indicators for Insecurity Factors .............................................. 31 c) Human Security Action Plan .................................................... 31

Applicability of Human Security ...................................................... 36

PART III: THE CASE FOR REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY: THE EU ....................... 39

Regional Integration and Human Security ................................... 41 The EU and Human Security ............................................................ 42 The CFSP and the ESDP ...................................................................... 43 European Integration and Economic Security ............................ 45 European Social Policy and Human Security ............................... 47 Political Integration and the Link with Human Security .......... 50 The Influence of European Integration in the Human Security of Neighbouring Countries ............................... 52 Regional Governance and Human Security ................................ 53

PART IV: OTHER EXPERIENCES OF REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY .......................... 55

African Union: APSA and NEPAD ................................................... 57 Association of Southeast Asian Nations: the Economic Crisis and Pandemics ........................................................................... 60 Pacific Islands Forum and Environmental Security .................... 63 Regional Organisations and Human Security ............................. 64

CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................... 71

XII

Acronyms APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism APSA – African Peace and Security Architecture ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations AU – African Union CAADP – Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme CARDS – Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization CEWS – Continental Early Warning System CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy EES – European Employment Strategy EGF – European Globalisation Fund ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy EU – European Union G8 – Group of Eight G20 – Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors GDP – Gross Domestic Product HIV/AIDS – Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome HPAI – Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza HPI – Human Poverty Index IDPs - Internally displaced persons MDGs – Millennium Development Goals NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations NHDR – National Human Development Report PIF – Pacific Islands Forum SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome UN – United Nations UNDP – United Nations Development Programme UNU-CRIS – United Nations University programme on Comparative Regional Integration Studies WCSDG – World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization

1

Introduction

2

3


through multi-level Governance is the

result of cooperation between staff

working in their personal capacity of two

Belgium-based entities of the United

Nations (UN) system. The United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) in

Brussels is an office that aims to facilitate

interaction between the UN and the

European Union (EU). The United

Nations University programme on

Comparative Regional Integration

Studies (UNU-CRIS) is a research

programme of the UNU aimed at

fostering understanding of the

interactions between the UN and

regional organisations. Both UN entities

share an interest: in contributing to the

mutual reinforcement of global and

regional governance structures. Hence,

the idea emerged to embark upon a joint

intellectual exercise to analyse the

implications of the concept of human

security for interactions between global,

regional and local governance actors, in

order to offer policy reflections and

operational tools to those responsible for

putting human security into practice.

The quest for human security

can be seen as part of a broader

paradigm shift from government to

governance. In the old paradigm, states

were considered to have a monopoly on

the provision of public goods, including

security. States were depicted as the

sovereign building blocks of an

international order. In the new

paradigm, states are no longer seen as

the sole provider of public goods. Other

actors such as non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) or regional

organisations also play a role. At the

same time, the two-level approach to

international relations (level one being

the state and level two,

intergovernmental organisations) is

being replaced by a much more complex

multi-level system of governance that

also involves local, sub-national providers

of public goods as well as regional

governance actors acting at a

supranational but not a global level. If

one adds to that complexity the fact that

meanwhile all kinds of new security

threats have been put on the agenda, it

becomes clear that there is a need for

new thinking about security that is

adapted to this new reality of multilevel

governance and to expanded concepts

of security.

Concepts play a major role in

thinking, debating upon and shaping

the world. The concept of sustainable

development, for instance, was coined

only in 1983 and has since had an

enormous impact at all kinds of policy

levels. Using new concepts is therefore

not neutral. They can be an instrument

of change in their own right. Human

security is such a concept with the

power to change approaches to security

and it already represents new shared

understanding in International Relations.

Yet it is also an ambiguous and elastic

concept that needs further analysis. This

paper aims to contribute to that analysis

through a multi-level, governance-based

approach to human security.

Part I Conceptualising Human Security

6

“Much is said about ecological

scenarios of doom and the nuclear threat but poverty and hunger are worse

than an atomic bomb”

Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann

7

Human security is a novel

concept, but few other ideas were

accepted so quickly and with so much

enthusiasm by policy makers and

academia alike. It is an idea invoked

repeatedly in political debates,

advocated in a multitude of security

policy documents, and proposed by a

range of development and security

actors. But what is human security?

What do we still need to know about it?

In a narrow sense, human

security is about a new central reference

point for security – the individual. This

approach can be traced back to the

1993 Human Development Report,

which triggered debate over the need to

challenge crystallised views of security:

from an exclusive stress on national

security to a focus on the security of the

individual and of people; from security

through armaments to security through

human development; and from territorial

security to food, environmental and

employment security. The old edifice was

shaken. It became evident that the

traditional conception of security –

based upon military defence of territory

– was a necessary but indeed not a

sufficient condition for people’s security

and welfare. The 1994 edition of the

Human Development Report,

championed by Mahbub ul Haq,

elevated the discussion to a level of

doctrine. The intent of human security

was to bridge freedom from fear –

indicating freedom from violence – and

freedom from want – related to poverty

alleviation. It thus included economic

security, food security, health security,

environmental security, personal

security, community security and political

security. As such, human security reflects

the concern that security must focus

upon individuals or people collectively,

wherever the threat comes from and

whatever the nature of this threat.

Therefore, human security is a

transversal concept that affects every

sector that can impact upon peoples’

welfare, and that requires the adoption

of cross-sectoral policies to respond to a

range of human security vulnerabilities

in societies. The focus on the individual

presupposed that security policies should

be moulded by the needs of people and

their perceived or real threats. As

described in the 1994 UNDP report,

“human security is a child who did not

die, a disease that did not spread, a job

that was not cut, an ethnic tension that

did not explode in violence, a dissident

who was not silenced” (HDR, 1994: 22).

The report identified four

essential characteristics of human

security:

• Universality – it is relevant to people

everywhere;

• Interdependence – all components of

human security are mutually reinforcing;

• Prevention – human security is better

ensured by prevention than reaction;

• People-centred – it is concerned with

how people live in a society and how

freely they exercise their many options.

The two notions of freedom from

fear and freedom from want comprise a

multiplicity of both positive and negative

freedoms and rights that have been

linked to human security. In order to be

meaningful, the concept needed to be

narrowed. The central question became

what to include or exclude in human

security as well as the rationale for such

criteria. Divisions emerged around the

scope and mechanisms of human

security, giving birth in particular to a

Canadian and a Japanese version of the

concept. Some indeed advocate a

Delivering Human Security through multi-level Governance

8

“Our human security approach deepens efforts to address

terrorism through initiatives in public safety, conflict prevention,

civilian protection, peace operations and governance”

Bill Graham ,

“Human security is an idea that focuses on protection of people

from threats to human life such as poverty, degradation, terrorism

and conflicts” Makiko Tanaka

narrow definition, arguing that human

security can only be of practical use if it is

centred on freedom from fear, or on

preventing physical violence and

securing the integrity of people

(MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). Others

take a maximalist view and define

human security as both freedom from

fear and freedom from want. In other

words, human security represents the

freedom from all the insecurities that

prevent people from living a life in

dignity, including non-military threats to

the security of individuals, groups and

societies. This contrasts with the more

traditional focus on protecting states

from external threats (Paris, 2001).

Human Security as context-

specific

In line with the UNDP 1994

Human Development Report, this paper

takes the core components of human

security - understood as freedom from

fear and freedom from want - as:

economic, food, health, environmental,

personal, community and political

security.

The weight given by an

individual or group to each of these

elements is likely to be conditioned by a

multiplicity of factors such as ethnicity,

age, gender, time, geography, political

regime, economic situation and culture.

Ethnicity represents both an

important variable in the perception of

vulnerabilities and a major risk factor in

the generation of violence itself. In

approaching the components of human

security, the ethnic perspective gives

primacy to community-level security

because this encompasses the physical

protection of the ethnic group. The

remaining elements of human security

are relevant to the extent that their

accessibility is jeopardised by

discrimination based on ethnicity. People

belonging to different ethnic groups are

unlikely to attribute the same weight to

the components of human security. For

example, the vulnerabilities of a minority

in a country under an authoritarian

regime may well differ from the risks to

which the majority of the population are

exposed. An individual belonging to a

minority group is likely to be concerned

about the protection of his or her

political rights and aspires to his or her

children avoiding the risk of

marginalisation or persecution in the

future. An individual from within the

majority may fear economic or financial

risks and have little or limited concern

about issues of equality or discrimination.

History has shown ethnicity to represent

a major factor of risk of violence in its

own right. Numerous violent conflicts in

the world, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Darfur

being cases in point, were linked to

ethnicity as political, cultural, economic

and social problems among ethnic

groups degenerated into civil war.

Differences in age heavily

influence perceptions of vulnerability in

human security, without being linked to

violence as such. A young person is likely

to be primarily concerned about

employment, job security, peer violence,

environment and education, whilst

elderly people will be concerned about

the ability of the state to respond to their

Conceptualising Human Security

9

needs, their access to social services and

the purchasing power of their pensions.

Gender constitutes a complex

variable in perceptions of human

security. In particular, it can be a major

factor in increased risk of violence,

notably in conflict situations. Gender

potentially affects perspectives on all

seven components of human security,

since economic, food, health,

environmental, personal, community and

political securities are fundamental to

women in reducing their vulnerability.

Many women suffer both individual and

societal discrimination in all or some of

these domains. Generally, women have

less control over resources, a factor

which makes them particularly

vulnerable and constantly exposed to

the risk of discrimination. Women are

exposed differently to risks than men. In

terms of physical violence, in conflict

situations in particular, women are often

the target of rape or HIV contagion

through sexual violence: as one

seasoned peacekeeper said recently, it is

now more dangerous to be a woman

than a soldier in modern conflicts. Even

during peace time, women remain much

more vulnerable to physical threats than

men. At a societal level, women are often

affected by disparities in their salaries

compared with men undertaking the

same work. Women may fear

encountering greater difficulty in finding

and maintaining a job, or weak social

protection during their maternity leave.

Finally, in some political regimes, women

are specifically excluded from

participation in political and economic

life of the country because they are not

considered equal to men in society.

Time affects perceptions of

human security vulnerabilities in that it

attributes different levels of importance

to risks depending on historical periods

or on the social or cultural trends that

dominate particular decades or

centuries. What is now perceived as a

threat or a risk may not even have been

considered a potential source of

vulnerability a century or even decades

ago, an instance being climate change

or terrorism, now major international

security concerns. World wars and the

fear of heavy fighting between nations

were fundamental concerns during most

of the 20th

century, whereas now the risk

concerns few countries in the world.

One might expect that elements

currently perceived as major global

security threats, for instance energy

security, may well be of less relative

concern to future generations as other

sources of vulnerability not yet foreseen

become the object of global concern.

Geography affects the analysis of

human security because perceptions of

vulnerability are affected by the location

of individuals, countries or continents.

The geographical perspective puts

primacy on the environmental

dimension of human security, but is also

sensitive to economic, food and personal

security dimensions of vulnerability. In

reality, as a consequence of its

surrounding geography, a population

with less access to resources is likely to

have an underdeveloped economy,

restricted food availability and greater

exposure to natural disasters, all of which

threaten its security. People living in a

desert environment are more exposed to

vulnerabilities in their economic,

personal, physical and environmental

security than individuals living in more

benign environments. At the same time,

islands or states located in areas

threatened by earthquakes or floods

display high levels of vulnerability in

terms of environmental and personal

security. Geography is also a potential

source of risk of violence since it often

implies access to particular resources

with economic or geostrategic

implications and can thus generate

violence amongst groups fighting for

control of the geographical space in

order to appropriate the resources. This


10

can be particularly relevant in the cases

of water or oil, for example.

Political regimes, as with ethnicity

and geography, constitute both a

variable in the perception of human

security vulnerabilities and a risk to the

generation of violence itself. Differences

in the political regime can affect all seven

components of human security, due to

the fact that most of the vulnerabilities

facing individuals and communities, be

they economic, social, environmental or

personal, depend upon the political

system. People living under an

authoritarian regime naturally have

different perceptions of their

vulnerabilities than those living within a

democratic system. In the first case, for

example, even physical security can be

jeopardised, and there is greater scope

for a wide range of freedoms to be

arbitrarily threatened by abuse of power.

However, this shortfall may not be clearly

perceived by the population, as free

access to information is likely to be

curtailed. In democratic countries, people

may fear corruption or misrepresentation

of a legitimate interest, but the legal and

judicial apparatus should ensure a

certain level of protection of the

population’s human security. Political

regimes can also be catalysts for

violence, if interstate conflicts explode as

a result of expansionist policies of the

leadership, as was the case in the

invasion by Iraq of Kuwait in 1990.

The economic situation of a

person or country naturally affects all

elements of human security, since

economic vulnerabilities can have

repercussions on the security of food,

health, environment, communities, the

political system and individuals3. A rich

country will almost inevitably be less

vulnerable to a lack of food, inadequate

3 See, for instance, UNDP (1998) NHDR Chile, which

analyses different security situations according to different political/economic systems, pp. 39-40

health provision, environmental

catastrophes, physical violence or

political instability. A poor country, on

the other hand, is much more concerned

by all these vulnerabilities and, in

addition, to the risk that it can be

weakened by problems deriving from

rich countries upon which it depends for

its economy or for political support. The

same applies to groups and individuals

within the same country since wealth

and individual capacities vary greatly so

giving place to different levels of

resilience and response ability to human

security threats.

The example of the recent

financial crisis is emblematic, in that

while it originated in particular parts of

the developed world, it has triggered

severe economic and human

repercussions in both rich and poor

countries.

As with ethnicity, culture affects

the perception of human security

components, whilst cultural intolerance

represents a potential catalyst of violence

itself. From a cultural perspective, the

most important element in human

security is community security because of

its emphasis on traditions, values and

ethnic links. As with ethnicity, a cultural

approach to the other six human security

characteristics focuses mainly on the risk

of cultural discrimination in access to the

economy, food, health, environment and

political life. People with different

cultures are likely to have divergent

priorities within their human security

perspective. Identity, religion, traditional

values and social systems strongly

influence the identification of risks for

individuals. Especially during the last

decades, religion has become influential

in shaping perceptions of threats and

vulnerabilities. This suggests that culture

represents one of the elements deeply

influenced by time. Some current

international tensions emphasise the

resurgent difficulty in finding common

ground between people belonging to


11

different cultures, whilst religious and

cultural intolerance represent a factor in

creating violence where groups with

different identities may clash violently.

As the above indicates, ethnicity,

age, gender, time, geography, political

regime, economic situation and culture,

all forge an individual’s sense of security

or insecurity. Human security at its core is

built on peoples’ perceptions, which are

themselves embedded in individuals’

cultural background. This means there

can be different perceptions of security

even within the same community and in

circumstances where theoretically

people should share similar feelings of

insecurity. At the same time, common

perceptions of security may develop

across people living in different

continents if they share a core set of

common human security characteristics.

In terms of shared felt vulnerabilities, it is

thus possible to recognise human

security from both a horizontal and a

vertical perspective.

Human Security as Policy

Doctrine

From the time of the 1994

Human Development Report, the

concept and practice of human security

started to permeate the international

political discourse. It took four years until

the then UN Secretary General Kofi

Annan declared that “ensuring human

security is, in the broadest sense, the

cardinal mission of the United Nations”

(UN Secretary General, 1998: 1). In the

same report, he also highlighted the

importance of the development

dimension in dealing with conflict

prevention and sustainable stability. The

position of the Secretary General derives

directly from the work carried out by

UNDP. The reiteration by him of the

centrality of human security, however,

had a multiplying effect and provided

encouragement and legitimacy to the

incorporation of human security in the

policy discourse of UN member states. In

preparation for the 2000 Millennium

Summit, the Secretary General presented

another report entitled We the Peoples:

The Role of the United Nations in the 21st

Century, which proposed solutions to

diminish the negative impact of

globalisation on the weakest human

beings. The importance of this report for

human security resides in its inclusion of

a definition of the concept, which is

described as a value encompassing

human rights, good governance, access

to education and health care as well as

opening access to opportunities and

choices to fulfil every individual’s own

potential. Freedom from want and

freedom from fear come together with

the freedom of future generations to

inherit a healthy natural environment.

Poverty, water, education, HIV/AIDS,

youth employment and building digital

bridges are identified as issues to be

addressed to secure freedom from want.

On the other hand, international law,

peace operations, targeted sanctions,

small arms and nuclear weapons

represent the key issues from the

freedom from fear perspective. These

ideas were retained in the Millennium

Declaration adopted by 189 states at the

2000 UN Millennium Summit.

Responding to the challenges

proposed by the Secretary General Kofi

Annan in his We the Peoples report

about the legitimacy of military

intervention in case of gross human

violations4, during the Millennium

Summit, the Prime Minister of Canada

announced the establishment of the

International Commission on

4 “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an

unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we

respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? Surely no legal principle - not even sovereignty - can ever shield crimes against humanity. Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder, it is an option that cannot be relinquished” (UN Secretary General, 2000: 48).


12

Intervention and State Sovereignty. The

Commission aimed at promoting a

comprehensive debate on the

relationship between intervention and

sovereignty, trying to reach a global

political consensus on the criteria that

could be used to allow external

interventions in a state that is unable or

unwilling to protect its own citizens. In

December 2001, the Commission

finalised its report entitled The

Responsibility to Protect, in which it

studied the relationship between the

rights of sovereign states and the so-

called “right of humanitarian

intervention”. Although the report

focused mainly on state responsibilities

towards its own citizenry, it also

highlighted the concept of human

security, which it defined as “the security

of people – their physical safety, their

economic and social well-being, respect

for their dignity and worth as human

beings, and the protection of their

human rights and fundamental

freedoms” (International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty,

2001: 15). Even though the report

focuses mainly on the concept of

responsibility to protect, inclusion of the

concept nonetheless illustrated the

degree to which human security had

become a central topic in policy-making5.

In 2001, a Commission on

Human Security, chaired by Nobel

Laureate Amartya Sen and the former

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Sadako Ogata, was established to

explore the concept of human security

and to produce policy recommendations.

In 2003, the Commission presented a

report, Human Security Now, which

represented the first important attempt

5 Also the World Bank, in its 2000-2001 World

Development Report, made a very important contribution to the human security debate, identifying three main policies aiming to reduce poverty: facilitating empowerment, enhancing security, and promoting opportunities. It consequently gives high important to the full set of components of human security identified above.

to construct a comprehensive definition

of human security and to elaborate an

official statement on the fundamental

link between human security and

development. It recognised that

achieving human security included not

only protecting people, but also

empowering people to fend for them.

Along similar lines, the 2004 Report of

the High Level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change, prepared under

the chairmanship of former Prime

Minister of Thailand Anand Panyarachun

at the request of the Secretary General,

underlines that human security and

development are indispensable

foundations for a collective security

system and fundamental tools to help

combat poverty, infectious disease and

environmental degradation that

threaten human security. These ideas

were incorporated in the landmark

report of the UN Secretary General In

Larger Freedom: Towards development,

security and human rights for all,

submitted to the General Assembly in

2005.

Human Security, Human Rights,

Human Development

To better understand human

security from a comprehensive

perspective and to have a more general

view of the framework within which

human security is inserted, it is important

to emphasise its linkages with the

concepts of human development and

human rights. The 2003 report Human

Security Now rightly sees human security

and human rights as complementary:

“Human rights and human security are

mutually reinforcing. Human security

helps identify the rights at stake in a

particular situation. And human rights

help answer the question: How should

human security be promoted? The

notion of duties and obligations

complements the recognition of the

ethical and political importance of


13

human security” (Commission on Human

Security, 2003:10).

Both human security and human

rights have the individual at the core of

national and international policies:

human security cannot be assured

without the respect for and the

protection of human rights. Both

concepts have freedom from fear and

freedom from want as fundamental

goals. Additionally, human security has

as its core the indivisible and non-

hierarchical value of human rights,

which allows living a life of dignity.

Moreover, human security and human

rights are deeply interconnected in their

motivations and areas of concern (Alkire,

2003). The objectives of human security

are the most basic and universal human

rights and the two concepts address the

fight against poverty and violence as

priorities in their policy implementation.

Finally, human security and human

rights are both connected to duties and

responsibilities of particular actors. The

enjoyment of human security and

human rights cannot be assured without

people, institutions or structures whose

duty it is to provide individuals with a

range of opportunities enabling their

personal fulfilment. At the same time, this

obligation does not mean that people

themselves have to wait for the provision

of the above-mentioned opportunities by

others. On the contrary, human beings

have to make a proactive effort towards

their realisation. In both human security

and human rights, the responsibility

resides in the provider, but also in the

individual as the principal determinant in

the fulfilment of his/hers own

development.

The inter-linkages between

human security and human

development are also striking. As Alkire

highlights, both human security and

human development are people-centred;

they are multi-dimensional; they have a

strong development perspective in the

long term; and they address deep

poverty (Alkire, 2003). First, the centrality

of people represents the core of both the

concepts, and the individual constitutes

the principal focus in the definition of

human security and human

development-related policies. Second,

they are both multi-dimensional because

they involve different spheres and levels

of society as well as individuals. Their

different components cannot be

considered in isolation, but rather have

to be addressed simultaneously across

their various dimensions. Third, human

security and human development each

have a strong development perspective,

implying a commitment to long-term

action to address vulnerabilities through

policies aimed at fulfilment of human

potential. For UNDP, the right to

personal realisation represents a

fundamental component of both the

concepts. Finally, human development

and human security reflect a strong

commitment to poverty reduction

because there cannot be security or

development in conditions of abject

poverty. On the contrary, poverty

represents a fertile ground for the rise of

all kind of vulnerabilities.

The theoretical differences

between the concepts of human security

and human development lie in the

emphasis on prevention and in their time

horizons (Alkire, 2003). Human security

reflects a strong commitment to

prevention rather than reaction - . Whilst

theoretically speaking, human

development takes a longer-term

perspective than human security, in fact

the latter cannot be addressed without a

clear long-term approach because it

encompasses prevention, crisis

management and post-reconstruction

efforts. Finally, human security permits

the taking into account of perceptions,

which whilst all-important, nevertheless

make attempts at objective measurement

still more elusive and varied. Despite

these differences, human security and


14

human development overlap in many

areas. If human development is the

enlargement of people’s life choices,

human security is the protection of the

availability of such choices and their

continued undisrupted enjoyment.

Nevertheless, their implementation still

requires different institutions and policy-

making.

An analytical study of human

security cannot overlook the importance

of these links and the reciprocal

interactions between the three concepts.

Human security complements state

security, enhances human rights and

strengthens human development

(Commission on Human Security, 2003).

Human Security and the

Responsibility to Protect

As noted above, human security

has traditionally been linked to human

development and human rights.

However, in recent years, it has also

increasingly been associated with the

concept of responsibility to protect and

so closely linked to the freedom from

fear. Its importance resides in the duty of

the international community to

intervene in protecting the civilian

population in a country unable or

unwilling to do so. The Responsibility to

Protect could, in that sense, be seen as a

normative precept able to facilitate the

implementation of a human security

paradigm.

The origins of the responsibility

to protect can be traced back to the

debate over the right of humanitarian

intervention for the protection of civilians

in conflicts and crises held at the UN in

the 1990s mostly in the wake of the

genocide in Rwanda. The 2005 World

Summit put the need to protect

populations from genocide, war crimes,

ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity on the main stage of the policy

debate. On 28 April 2006, the Security

Council unanimously adopted Resolution

1674 on the protection of civilians in

armed conflict. The document contains

the historic first official reference to the

responsibility to protect: it “reaffirms the

provisions of paragraphs 1386 and 139

7

of the World Summit Outcome

Document regarding the responsibility to

protect populations from genocide, war

crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes

against humanity.” Security Council

Resolution 1674 was followed by several

other juridical texts and policy

statements where the responsibility to

protect is regarded as a cardinal principle

in international relations. For instance in

May 2008, the Security Council

reaffirmed “the responsibility of States to

comply with their relevant obligations to

end impunity and to prosecute those

responsible for war crimes, genocide,

crimes against humanity and serious

violations of international humanitarian

law” (SC, 2008:3). The debate around the

responsibility to protect concept keeps

6 “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect

its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.” 7 “The international community, through the United

Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”


15

intensifying. In January 2009, in his

report to the General Assembly, the

Secretary General highlights a three-

pillar strategy for the implementation of

the concept. The first pillar concerns the

protection responsibilities of the state;

the second foresees international

assistance and capacity-building and the

last encompasses a timely and decisive

response by the international

community.

In spite of its universal scope, the

general acceptance of the concept and

indeed the assumption of international

obligations, the responsibility to protect

remains a highly politically sensitive

issue. On what basis can the

international community judge whether

a population is in need of a

humanitarian intervention that requires

the use of military means? Who decides

whether a crisis falls under humanitarian

emergency? Who actually takes the

decision to use military means to

intervene in a country? The SG Report

provides some answers to these

questions and including the role the UN

Security Council should play as the

global institution in this sense under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The

Security Council’s legitimacy, however, is

sometimes perceived as controversial,

mainly due to its composition which is

judged almost universally as obsolete

and the weight and veto power of the

five permanent members in deciding for

or against international interventions.

A fundamental set of questions

remains, however. Why has the

responsibility to protect been confined

only to cases of violent threats to

physical security? In this sense, the

principles related to the responsibility to

protect, being limited to physical

security, take into account just some

components of freedom from fear,

leaving aside, for instance, the whole

spectrum of non-physical violence

security threats. What about the other

constitutive principles of human

security? The concept of responsibility to

protect does not include epidemics or

mass starvation for example, even

though these may cause the death and

destitution of millions of individuals.

If the international community is

willing to protect civilians, then their

fundamental necessities and

vulnerabilities go much further than the

sole freedom from fear. If one takes into

consideration the whole spectrum of

human security, the international

community should in principle be

compelled to engage not only in case of

physical violations but also according to

other fundamental elements that make

up human security. When facing

reluctant states, the international

community has been willing to engage

in humanitarian crises deriving from

natural disasters, as in the case of

Myanmar, more than in situations that

are directly linked to the current

understanding of responsibility to

protect8.

Important criticisms to the

human security concept reside in the fact

that it could be used to legitimise military

8 The debate within the UN is not only

confined to the concept of responsibility to protect. In fact, the General Assembly and the Security Council have already referred to humanitarian crises as justifying international interventions. In a soft written provision the General Assembly (RES/43/131) when

endorsing the need for humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, clearly states that is “up to each State first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations occurring on its territory.” Buy considers that the “abandonment of the victims without humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and an offence to human dignity,” therefore setting the stage for international action. The Security Council in distinct Resolutions (e.g., 688, 794 and 929, for Iraq, Somalia and Ruanda, respectively) explicitly considers that humanitarian emergencies are a threat to international security and peace and resort to the provisions under Chapter VII of the Charter to decide the set up of multinational operations. The assumption of this linkage between humanitarian crises and international security is groundbreaking and is used by the

promoters of a right to intervene as turning point from mere observation (that marked the first 50 years of UN history) to a proactive and restorative action (Ribeiro & Ferro, 2004: 289). But still there is no recognition on the necessity to intervene just for the sake of the humanitarian situation; that recognition only comes when there is a threat to international peace and security.


16

interventions under the guise of the

responsibility to protect. Yet surely the

international community should be

prepared to act in different and

additional spheres of human security,

with the aim of ensuring an adequate

and comprehensive approach to

peoples’ fundamental vulnerabilities.

There are many cases in point.

The present financial crisis and the

related economic downturn is leading to

a profound crisis affecting the everyday

lives, livelihoods and survival of millions

of individuals and has deeply affected

the safety and value of people’s savings

in many countries. This has increased

their economic vulnerabilities and hence

their vulnerabilities in many other

aspects of human security. This requires

action on the part of the international

community to prevent the more serious

consequences on individuals. Indeed, the

international actions needed to stabilize

financial markets and the measures

required to alleviate the consequent

economic hardship for developing

countries could be presented at least as a

compelling contribution to human

security, if not as part of the responsibility

to protect, the duty bearer being the

international community at large,

especially the G20, the donor countries,

the International Financial Institutions

(IFIs) and the UN.

Another security element that

should be assured by the international

system is environmental security. Natural

disasters are usually out of states’ control.

Floods, earthquakes or drought can

hardly be tackled by national

governments. Inhabiting a secure

environment represents a core value for

human beings. The international

community has already intervened in

several environment-related crises or

natural hazards. Without its help, it is

difficult to imagine how states such as

Pakistan during the 2005 earthquake

could have dealt with the crisis. The

alleviation and prevention of climate

change-related disasters can therefore

also be considered as vital and relevant

to a wider framework of the

responsibility to protect.

Food security represents another

important factor that could demand

international intervention within a

particular state. If a large segment of the

population does not have physical or

economic access to basic food because

its state cannot or is not willing to

provide it, the international community

should have the responsibility to act in

protection of these peoples. The right to

food represents a core value in the

affirmation of security: aside from the risk

of outright starvation, a hungry person is

more exposed to violations to his or her

integrity.

Today, religious and ethnic

identity represent values easily

threatened both by other communities

and by national authorities in certain

countries. Community security is more

and more a central right to be defended.

Despite numerous genocides, identity-

related violations still constitute one of

the most common threats to human

security. States are often unable to

prevent violence between communities

and major community security violations

could come once again from states’

actions. In these cases, the international

community should engage to ensure the

protection of civilians from threats to

their own identity, cultural or physical

survival.

If a wider understanding of the

responsibility to protect envisaged in this

paper is considered reasonable, then

one can derive from that that the

international community should not only

have a mandate but also the

responsibility to protect all human beings

through facilitation or the provision of

essential global public goods such as a

reliable international economic and


17

financial order, sustainable development

frameworks, international peace, climate

stability, sufficient food availability to all,

human rights enhancement and

protection systems and more.

In today’s international politics,

humanitarian assistance is perceived as

an act of good will or generosity from

the international community or

individual states. Instead, it should be

promoted as a fundamental tool

somehow linked to the responsibility to

protect principle and it should be

provided as a real commitment in the

fight against all severe human security

violations.

The current international debate

is understandably focused on the

responsibility to protect people from

massive, violent threats to their lives9.

However, this should not exclude a

debate on the enlargement of the

concept to other severe and massive

threats connected to freedom from

want. Indeed the on-going work on the

protection of persons in the event of

disasters in the International Law

Commission suggests the existence of a

right to humanitarian assistance and

may lead to a legal framework at least for

international disaster response activities.

This possibility is recognised in

the resolution on humanitarian

assistance adopted by the Institute of

International Law in 2003, which states

that “if a refusal to accept a bona fide

offer of humanitarian assistance or to

allow access to the victims, leads to a

threat to international peace and

security, the security Council may take

the necessary measures under the

Chapter VII of the United Nations

Charter”.

9 “The responsibility to protect applies, until Member

States decide otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. (UN Secretary General, 2009: 8)

Security by Whom?

Human security is centred on the

idea that the object of security is the

people (security to whom?). The

providers of security (by whom?), or the

agents responsible for diffusing and

containing the threats are studied less in

the human security literature. This paper

argues that human security should be

facilitated or provided by a wide range of

actors from the local to the global levels.

As seen above, a comprehensive

interpretation of the responsibility to

protect could be a powerful instrument

to underline state’s responsibilities and

rectify the incapacity of the state to

provide human security. However, the

responsibility to protect individuals, or

the ability to intervene to address correct

wrongdoings, presupposes the idea that

human security can indeed be facilitated

or provided at different levels and by a

multiplicity of actors:

• Local Level. Human security is

deeply rooted in the idea of grassroots

empowerment. Citizens are often

embedded in formal and informal local

networks that may help to prevent

threats10

. Municipalities and other

administrative structures of local power

are also particularly well-equipped in this

regard given their proximity to the

citizens and the local problems facing

them. Some threats to human welfare

are highly localised and have a very

short range (e.g. water quality) which

makes them highly suitable for local

interventions.

• National Level. The natural

social contract presupposes that the

state is responsible for the protection of

its citizens. Indeed, sovereignty has been

equated to responsibility, i.e. the state

sovereignty consists in fulfilling

10

This is defined as “sociabilidade” in UNDP (1998) NHDR Chile, p. 106. The Report also discusses the importance of social capital for human security at p. 37


18

fundamental protection obligations and

respecting core human rights towards its

citizens (UN Secretary General, 2009).

And that protection cannot be limited to

physical violence. The state remains the

most prominent political actor and the

bedrock of social organisation and social

protection, and is more powerful and

better-resourced than local institutions.

• Regional Level. Regional and

other intergovernmental organisations,

for example the European Union (EU),

the African Union (AU) and the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), are gradually becoming

prominent actors in international

relations. A large number of such

organisations have strengthened their

mandate in peace and security and

adopted regional development plans.

• Global Level. The United

Nations and other relevant global

institutions are well positioned and

mandated to tackle global threats. What

they may lack in local specificity and local

impact, they compensate with their

capacity to provide international

legitimacy to particular actions.

All these levels operate in an

interdependent and inclusive way. The

range of human security threats is

heterogeneous and undefined.

Therefore no single method or actor is

able to counter all threats. Indeed,

individuals need to be protected by a

wide range of different actors who

might intervene according to the

specificity of each threat.

The complexity of the

relationship of human security to its

context is addressed more concretely in

Part II. Indeed, the universal conception

but local application of human security

represents a fundamental element in the

study of human vulnerabilities, security

providers and cross-border threats.

19

Part II Local Governance and

Assessment of Human Security


“People protected can exercise choices, and people empowered can

make better choices and actively prevent or mitigate the impact of

threats and insecurities”

Sadako Ogata

21

“Because human security is a public

good, it entails the state responsibility, as w ell as a

corresponding duty of engagement by the people. With the ultimate aim s of ensuring survival, livelihoods and dignity, the obligations of those in

power – the state and the international community – consist of

protecting, providing and empowering”

UNDP, Afghanistan HDR

This section focuses on the link

between local governance and the

provision of human security. It takes as a

starting assumption that enhanced

human security is a central outcome of

good governance, and seeks to

demonstrate first, that it is possible to

monitor human security at the local level;

second, the political and programmatic

utility of this approach; and, third, the

fact that mapping the evolution of a

chosen set of human security indicators

at the local level can provide an

indication of the quality of local

governance by local authorities.

Security carries with it the

notion of living without concerns, of

being carefree. As such, it encompasses

predictability and control over one’s

destiny, and it implies the removal of

obstacles that prevent people from

realising their aspirations towards a

better life for themselves, their families

and for communities.

Human security thus has a double

agenda of protection and

empowerment. Protection refers to the

norms, processes, and institutions

required to shield people from critical

and pervasive threats.

Empowerment emphasizes

people as actors and participants in

removing “unfreedoms” and defining

and implementing their vital choices.

(Ogata, 2004:10) In all fundamental

social contracts, good governance is

expected to respond to these challenges.

The state has been created to provide

people with the necessary public goods

to ensure their well-being. Because

sometimes the state is either too big or

too small to deliver these goods to

people effectively, other layers of

governance have also been created.

Human Security exposes the

Vulnerabilities of People

Worldwide, people experience

“unfreedoms,” namely obstacles and

insecurities that prevent them from

realising their aspirations to live a life of

dignity in larger freedom: free from want

and free from fear, and ensuring the

freedom of future generations to inherit

a healthy natural environment. This

legitimate aspiration implies that a set of

governance institutions, starting from

the state and moving across the whole

spectrum - from municipalities up to

international organisations and

including the regional and sub-national

layers of the governance processes -

works towards the creation and

maintenance of an environment

conducive to the fulfilment of such

aspiration. This shift away from an

exclusively state-based conception of

collective security to a people- and

community-centred definition enables

security to be understood as the sum of

individual and community concerns,


22

“Afghanistan has no policies for any of the things that help w ith

human security and human development. It has no education policy, it has no health policy, it has no economic policy, it has no environmental policy, it has no

security policy. It just takes everything by the day and many of the days are bad. I w ish I could

have been more optimistic”

Hamdullah from Jalalabad

with a possible positive-sum game in

which all actors can realize greater

security (Jolly and Ray, 2006:12).

As noted earlier, human

security is rarely just about the protection

from violence, and security is always

more than just freedom from fear. In

crises and other extreme scenarios,

conflicts and social upheaval may focus

peoples’ security concerns on violence.

More often, however, the primary threats

to the lives of millions of people living in

developing countries are related to the

“supply side” of societal systems, and

involve socioeconomic risks: security of

employment and income, the access of

individuals to health care and education

systems, or the promotion and

guarantee of their basic human rights.

Where large segments of the population

spend most of their income on food,

where people face the menace of

recurrent devastating floods, (as in

Bangladesh), or droughts, (as in

Ethiopia), security there means above all

else development.

This enlarged perception of

what impacts on people’s security and

related dignity means that “[in] today’s

world, the well-being of the individual

requires a far more complex set of

considerations than was considered

necessary within the state-based

definition of security. The very reason

that for an Afghan citizen the definition

of security is drastically different than

that of a Latvian citizen compels an

immediate reformulation of the very

definition of security” (Jolly and Ray,

2006: 9).

That being said, there is no

fundamental difference between the

aspiration to human security of an

Afghan, of a Latvian or of an inhabitant

of flooded Bangladesh or of drought-

ridden Ethiopia: they all want to realize

their potential. As Amartya Sen clearly

states: “[p]eople need security so as to

enjoy the greatest possible degree of

freedom and dignity in their lives” (Sen,

2000).

Good Governance as the Art of

increasing Human Security

Governance constitutes the

system of values, policies and institutions

by which a society manages its

economic, political and social affairs

through interactions within the state and

between the state, civil society and the

private sector. Governance is the way a

society organizes itself to make and

implement decisions through mutual

understanding, agreement and action. It

comprises the mechanisms and

processes for citizens and groups to

articulate their interests, mediate their

differences and exercise their legal rights

and obligations. It is the rules, institutions

and practices that set limits and provide

incentives for individuals, organisations

and firms. In its social, political and

economic dimensions, governance

operates at every level of human

enterprise, be it the household, village,

municipality, nation, region or globe.

(UNDP, 2000)

Local Governance and Assessment of Human Security

23

In principle, governments, and

indeed all entities vested with

governance powers, seek to secure

development and security for the people

they serve. Serving people means to

empower them to face the challenges of

life. Good governance is central to

human development. It requires

fostering fair, accountable institutions to

protect human rights and basic freedoms

(UNDP, 2002, a: 2). Effective governance

must by definition lead to improvements

in the human development and human

security status of people, enlarging

choices available to individuals to live the

long, healthy life they value and

effectively reducing risks and threats

associated with human security.

With this understanding of

good governance, it is evident that the

performance of governance institutions

(judiciary, political parties, public

administration, municipalities and

governments) and their attributes

(representativeness, legitimacy, fairness,

transparency, accountability, equity)

often help to determine the nature and

scope of human security in a given

society. These institutions may

themselves constitute major factors

influencing positively or negatively

human security levels. Indeed, some

human security surveys have found that

the major threats and factors of

insecurity identified by the population

include their own government and

politicians, their lack of influence on

decisions or the absence of legitimate

and impartial representation. In some

surveys, respondents have identified

international organisations as the best

security providers for them, expressing

higher levels of confidence in them than

in their own national institutions.

Box 1. Human Security and Democracy

Human security’s challenges of the 21

st century require the promotion of a

broader definition of democracy that includes human rights concerns, capacity for social

and economic development, accountability, the building of consensus in settings of high

diversity, improving electoral processes and promoting public involvement. Sources of

insecurity lie in exclusion and lack of access to power and resources. The concept of

human security emphasizes the protection of people from grave threats to their lives,

safety from harm and violent conflict, and empowerment against such social threats as

disease or crime. Democracy enables the protection of peoples through institutional

safeguards, equality before the law, and the advancement of human rights. Democratic

practice links the empowerment of people to critical developmental outcomes such as

education, health care, and opportunities for livelihood.

Human Security and Democracy

This section sought to convey

the vital continuum between

governance, its effects, and the provision

of human security, leading to the

conclusion that protection and

empowerment should be embodied in

the functioning of any well-governed

state (Ogata, 2006: 11). The counter

argument can be made for states

displaying weak governance: where the

state does not deliver the political goods

for which it was created (e.g. security,

rule of law, accountable and transparent

public institutions, a functioning judicial

system that guarantees people due

process), and the regional and local

governance structures are not

empowered to do so. In such an absence


24

“Building a safer world also means

looking at the real sources of insecurity from which millions of

people suffer. Promoting security is not just about fighting a war against

terrorism . It is about looking at threats more broadly and

understanding them in the context not of state but people’s security.”

Irene Khan

of good governance, people are bound

to feel insecure.

Today, the state level alone

seems inadequate to deal with human

insecurity, since many of the related

issues are either dependent on local

conditions at sub-national level, or are

derived from global challenges (such as

climate change, transnational terrorism,

proliferation of nuclear weapons,

pandemics, financial crises, energy and

food price rises, unfair and unpredictable

global trade practices). Crisis prevention,

mitigation and recovery require actions

beyond the reach of a single state. In the

latter case, such insecurities should

indeed be dealt with at a global

governance level, although global

organisations, with their current

institutional settings (mainly in terms of

composition and decision making

power), seem hardly able to tackle them

effectively (Secretary General’s High-

Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and

Change, 2004: 4).

The dramatic events that the

world witnessed in 2008, such as the

food and energy exploding costs, the

severe financial crisis and economic

downturn, the increasing effects of

climate change, stress the need for a

human security framework and

governance system at the global level. It

has become clear that more and more

factors of human insecurity are “external”

- and frequently confused and

unforeseen - variables, which escape

control of even the most powerful states.

From there the ongoing call for better

international economic and financial

order rules and early warning systems

and the revamped call for reform of

international and political governance

institutions. The international community

should endow itself with much more

effective mechanisms of prevention and

protection against global security

challenges which affect hundreds of

million people all over the planet, with

different degrees and modalities, and

that end up, in any case, reflected in the

“classical” individual human security

dimensions.

The efforts to build more

inclusive, accountable global

governance systems face two main

challenges. The first is increasing

pluralism: expanding the space for non-

state actors to participate in global

decision making; the second is increasing

participation and accountability in

multilateral institutions to give

developing countries a larger role

(UNDP, 2002, a: 7). Pending the much-

needed reform of the overall global

governance mechanisms, especially of

the United Nations Organization and

System, other possible “supranational”

governance mechanisms such as the G8,

the G20 and the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) also seem able to provide

only partial, (and sometimes contentious)

responses since their legitimacy,

adequacy and universality are often

questioned. In this specific subject, the

Least Developed Countries (LDCs) claim

that they are the ones whose peoples’

daily lives are most threatened by

current crises (with an emphasis on the

financial global crisis and climate change

effects) and therefore have the highest

risks impeding on their human security,

while they are not adequately

represented in the existing mechanisms


25

of global governance. This was a claim

that was echoed recently at the Doha

International Conference for Financing

for Development.

Many human security

dimensions are however better dealt

with at a local level (municipalities,

regions, communities), or at regional

(continental) level (EU) where it is

possible to tackle similar issues of

insecurity felt in countries sharing similar

geography, economic development,

demographic features, shared cultural

backgrounds and practices, networks,

etc.

Compared with the restrictions

noted above for operating at the global

and national levels, the local level offers

greater scope to identify the main

priority dimensions of human security.

The focus on the local

dimensions and structures of

governance represents a fundamental

tool to assess, manage and provide

human security. It allows for a closer

perception of vulnerabilities, threats and

aspirations, which is likely to facilitate the

measurement and management of

human security indicators.

As will be demonstrated

below, it is not only desirable but also

quite possible to create a local human

security framework that can support the

efforts of local decision-makers and their

societies to understand the local human

security challenges better. Such a local

framework, with indicators, would

permit the crafting of tailored policies,

enable their implementation and impact

to be monitored, and ultimately allow all

stakeholders to evaluate the

effectiveness of the interventions

themselves, and ultimately the

governance system that delivered them.

Can Human Security be

measured?

From the discussion in Part I of

this paper, human security can be seen

to be highly context-specific and

dynamic. Moreover, the assessment of an

individual’s human security is influenced

by subjective perceptions of vulnerability

as much as by real threats. Perceptions

and threats are all a product of space,

time and other factors.

Drawing from this, measures of

human security need to include not only

quantitative indicators (such as those

included in the UNDP human

development index), but also qualitative

indicators. This combination is

fundamentally important. A good

indicator of human security, that adds

real value to the existing research in this

field, needs to include not only the

amount of existing or perceived threats,

but also the nature of existing

vulnerabilities and how these are felt by

individuals and groups. That said, the

difficulties in measuring these elements

are enormous, not only because of

availability of data on such aspects, but

also because of the risk of their

politicisation. Who decides which cases

should be taken into consideration and

on which criteria? Who elaborates the

ratio for surveys on the ground and

prepares survey content? Who

determines the hierarchy among

different threats and on what basis?

These are just a few of the problems in

the identification and interpretation of

peoples’ vulnerabilities that need to be

carefully taken into consideration to the

extent possible.

These concerns with

measurement have been far from absent

in the debate on implementation of the

human security concept. Decision-

making, policy design and programmatic

implementation all require monitoring


26

“The goal in Afghanistan is not simply to create a development or democracy agenda, but to use these

tools to prevent conflict, on one hand, and to provide the ultimate goal of

human security as a public good, on the other”

National Human Development

Report Afghanistan

against some benchmark, to verify the

impact of a given policy, and to ascertain

the need to reformulate courses of

action. Monitoring is served by the use of

indicators, indices and other analytical

tools that make measurements possible

and feasible over time.

When analyzing human

security, the two aspects - real and

perceived threats – should be combined

and eventually produce a set of

indicators allowing, first, to measure

changes of insecurity over time and,

second, to undertake comparisons

between different places. The complexity

of this task is self-evident. In some cases,

socioeconomic risks can be measured

through quantitative indicators. The

same can be true for many

environmental risks. However,

measuring other insecurities, such as

personal security risks, requires the use of

subjective or proxy indicators. Moreover,

the perception of insecurity needs to be

captured since this is as important as real

insecurity – feeling secure is of capital

importance. The degree of resilience,

which is not the same even amongst

people belonging to the same

community, also needs to be measured.

However, the number of

factors that have a direct impact on

human security is very large and the

influence of each one of them is also felt

differently across time and space. Threats

(real and perceived) are either linked to

external factors, those that are difficult to

control locally (for instance: human-

made or natural disasters, regional

conflicts, world commodity and energy

prices, financial crisis, pandemics,

economic cycles, political developments

in neighbouring countries) or are very

much localised (soil erosion or

salinisation, common criminality, access

and affordability of basic services,

employment opportunities, health and

education infrastructure availability and

quality, desertification, water availability

etc.).

Whilst various dimensions of

human security are increasingly

connected globally, nevertheless their

impact and how they are felt need to be

looked at in the local context. Comparing

human security between countries may

not allow meaningful results. Even those

who take a strong stand for developing

a “system of monitoring levels of human

security based on measurable indicators”

warn that “the elaboration of a human

security index is undesirable for political

and practical reasons” (UNDP Bratislava,

2003: 4). An attempt to build a standard

international index could introduce

unnecessary confrontation between

different national governments in a

particular sub-region and shift the

attention from the substance to the

question of relative rankings or more

political aspects. Even the call even for

national measurement of human security

is still controversial.

Over and above the potential

controversy inherent in creating such an

index, the task is in any case

methodologically arduous. Only a

detailed analysis of the human security

situation, through a matrix of a plethora

of indicators, prevailing in different

places and over time, could give the

possibility to make comparisons. Even so,

such comparisons would remain

unscientifically-based and largely

intuitive. What may be possible is to

compare separate elements of human

security, taken individually. For instance,


27

it may be possible to ascertain whether

physical insecurity is higher in a place

than in another through a set of

quantitative indicators (provided they

are available) such as crime rates, the

incidence of violent deaths, or numbers

of cases reported to the police; or to

compare economic insecurity between

places using indicators such as the

incidence of extreme poverty, utilising

the UNDP human poverty index, income

distribution, unemployment rates, and

others.

For these reasons, exploration

of the preparation of a standard and

internationally-comparable index of

human security seems a wasted effort.

Even assuming that suitable measures

and indicators could be identified for the

main dimensions of human security and

for each factor capable of influencing

them, nevertheless the variability in the

severity or relevance of the different

factors in time and space would make

the index hardly fit as a comparative tool.

It is perhaps equally difficult to

arrive at a single composite index of

human security even at the local level.

That notwithstanding, at the local level it

may be possible to identify a set of

indicators corresponding to prioritised

insecurity factors. These indicators,

monitored over time, can as a minimum

provide a measure of the evolution of

human security in situ. Indeed,

measuring human security focusing at

the local level is not only feasible, but can

also be an important source of insight

from which to discern trends and take

action.

Identification of a baseline

measurement of the individual priority

components should provide a first

diagnosis, from which policies,

instruments and initiatives could be

identified aimed at removing the

obstacles to peoples’ exercise of their

freedoms. Ex-post monitoring of the

implementation of policies and actions

should permit assessment of whether

and the extent to which they are

enhancing people’s capacities to make

choices. The challenge here is to find

measures that are closely and irrefutably

related to, and behave in a similar way to

the targeted element.

Of course, this approach

requires instruments that can provide,

firstly the available statistical data on

local issues (such as crime, employment,

access and use of basic services,

morbidity and mortality indicators,

household expenditures) and, secondly,

a subjective vision of insecurity factors by

citizens, which could be delivered

through a human security survey

interpreted by expert analysis. The expert

analysis should seek to purge

perceptions from possible distortions

induced by media, local leaders, political

propaganda, commercials, etc.

And because governance is the capacity

resident in a system of government to

adopt decisions and public policies in a

legitimate, effective and efficient way,

good governance can be defined as the

art of enhancing human security, with

the latter serving as a measurement by

people of the effectiveness of those who

govern. Easily-understood indicators of

local human security could serve to

empower communities to better

understand and express their

vulnerabilities, to hold political leaders

accountable for responding to these,

and to take appropriate actions

themselves to reduce their levels of

insecurity. In this way, measurement of

the trend and evolution of human

security over the medium-term offers real

potential as a tool to assess the

effectiveness of local governance.


28

Human Security in National

Human Development Reports

The mechanisms through

which human security can be explored

include an array of instruments, ranging

from public opinion polls, surveys,

enquiries and interviews. Many existing

local, national and regional experiences

can be examined as starting points. A

number of UNDP National Human

Development Reports (NHDRs) focused

on human security, albeit with different

approaches to the concept, and have

produced statistics, surveys and detailed

analyses. Reports on Afghanistan (2004),

Chile (1998), Former Yugoslav Republic

Of Macedonia (2001) and Latvia (2003)

and undertook specific statistical surveys

to obtain original data on how people

perceive threats to their security and

about their own experiences of

insecurities in their lives or communities

(Jolly and Ray; 2006: 17).

Box 2. National Human Developments Reports

Afghanistan

The Afghanistan NHDR 2004, Security with a Human Face, Challenges and

Responsibilities, is built around the concept of human security. It conducts a threat-based

analysis of people’s wants and fears, a study of the causes and consequences of these

insecurities, and an evaluation of Afghanistan’s state-building process from a human

security perspective. The report emphasizes that “human security is a public good that

belongs to all and cannot be exclusive, it entails a responsibility for the state to provide

guarantees that people will not fall below an acceptable threshold, but also a

corresponding duty among people to remain engaged.” (UNDP, 2004:10). In the analysis

of Jolly and Ray, the National Human Development Report of Afghanistan is “a brilliant

example of human security’s multidimensional analysis, with particular reference to post-

conflict reconstruction.” (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 15). Features of this report are elaborated

upon below in relation to local governance and post-conflict peace-building.

Chile

Among the attempts to arrive at a composite national index of human security,

the case of Chile, in the NHDR 1998, where 2 indexes are proposed, is an interesting one.

The first indicator constitutes an objective index, based on six dimensions and 12 variables,

and derived from statistical indicators. This index reflects the availability to individuals of

security “mechanisms”, those capabilities or instruments able to build empowerment and

resilience to face threats. This index assumes that the availability of security mechanisms is

directly correlated to the objective security of the individual, but does not take into

account the degree of the risk or the severity of insecurity, nor assign weights to the

different elements, according to different circumstances. The second subjective index

reveals the perceptions of individuals with respect to the effectiveness of the security

protection mechanisms or, in other words, their perceived vulnerability. Results were

analyzed according to several variables. The authors acknowledge that the methodology

is not suitable for international use and that it provides a static, “frozen” image of the

reality. They also stress the need to accompany measurement with sophisticated expert

interpretation of human security factors.

This report interestingly analyses also the relationship between phases of societal changes

and human security perceptions and stresses the individual agency towards human

security and the relevance of social capital for human security.


29

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

In the report on the FYROM, Social Exclusion and Human Insecurity in the FYR

Macedonia, a public opinion poll asked the respondents which category of threat made

them feel more insecure. The data indicated that “almost every citizen of the FYROM feels

some kind of insecurity derived from the societal context or circumstance. The insecurity in

the transitional period (over the last decade) is much higher in comparison to the previous

period. The absolute strongest origin of insecurity is due to unemployment. The next type

of insecurity derives from low and/or irregular remuneration, followed by inadequate

social assistance. In general, causes related to subsistence (or obtaining the means to make

a decent standard of living) dominate (about 80% of the total number of responses) in

Macedonia” (UNDP, FYR Macedonia, 2001: 11).

Latvia

In Latvia, in preparing the NHDR 2003, Human Security and Human

Development, a survey was undertaken to identify the complex and multidimensional

vulnerabilities of the population. Respondents were asked about their perception of more

than thirty specific threats: they were asked whether or not they felt concerned about

each and were asked to rate their degree of concern (from not afraid at all to very afraid).

This approach permits a ranking of the different threats, and deeper analysis of

perceptions and relative degrees of concern felt by respondents (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 17).

Since, in this case, economic/income uncertainty and access to health care were defined

as the two most pressing threats to security, the policy conclusions on human security

contained in the report pointed to a multi-stakeholder employment strategy consisting of

both formal sector employment initiatives and a comprehensive government-led social

security network (UNDP, 2003: 120-121). This report usefully draws attention to the

different levels of human security: the individual, family, community, national and finally

the international level. It highlights how improved security in any one individual sphere

can translate into a greater sense of security and an ability to act at other levels.

Conversely, insecurity at any one level can have negative ramifications on people’s sense

of security at other levels (UNDP, 2003: 18). The Latvian report is conceptually innovative,

introducing the concept of securitability. Securitability is explained as the interconnection

of two dimensions of security: an objective state of security and a subjective sense of

security. The first is the actual state of being free from threats and the latter is the inner

state of feeling secure. Securitability is thus the cumulative effect of a set of subjective and

objective factors about the capacity to be and to feel secure (UNDP, 2003: 19). It is what

this paper refers to as real and perceived threats.

The value of such surveys carried out for

both the Afghan and FRY Macedonia

reports is twofold: to understand the

dimensions of human insecurity and to

guide actions to diminish them. These

surveys also help to rate relative threats

in ways that can be useful in assessing

alternative public actions and tradeoffs in

the use of resources (Jolly and Ray, 2006:

18).

Experiences of measurement,

including through instruments like these

carried out at a national level and

disaggregated at a local level, can

provide some indicators of human

security levels. In turn, the policies and

action plans to address the identified

human security priorities may provide

indicators to measure governance

effectiveness. However, the


30

“When people’s livelihoods are

deeply compromised – when people are uncertain where the next meal

will come from , when their life sav ings suddenly plummet in value, when their crops fail and they have

no sav ings – human security contracts”

Commission on Human Security

measurement, even at the local level,

should more usefully consist of a set of

locally-determined indicators, rather than

any single composite index of human

security. What the experimental National

Human Development Reports show is

that analytically11

, it is normally possible

to identify four or five local human

security priorities, each with a form of

baseline data. If this approach is retained,

it may be also possible to apply such an

approach to specific groups of people,

e.g. by minorities, ethnicity, age, gender

and economic groups. This would allow

formulation of policies that in a targeted

way, addressed a clearly identified

priority dimension of human security for

each of the relevant groups.

The same survey instruments,

accompanied by statistical data, if

applied periodically, should allow for the

identification and monitoring of

variations and trends in local human

security in the medium and long-term.

Once changes deriving from a force

majeure (external insecurity elements

which are not in control by local actors)

are discounted, the periodic

measurements would allow an

assessment of whether at the local level,

good governance has been exercised

and the capacity - through policy, direct

actions, programs, empowerment,

capacity building, leadership and

participation - to improve the human

security situation of large segments of

the population has been demonstrated.

A Hypothetical Example

Taking into consideration all

the conceptual and methodological

limitations noted above, the case for

11

For a list of National Human Development Reports adopting a human security approach, see: Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray (2006), “The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports”, UNDP, NHDR Occasional Paper 5. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/Human_Security_GN.pdf.

specific-context analysis on human

security as the best way to translate this

approach into practice has been made.

An imaginary test case, albeit one with

several resemblances to familiar realities,

is elaborated below to test the

hypothetical viability of the proposed

local human security framework,

The methodological approach

has four phases. It starts by taking an

imaginary region where it is possible to

identify a set of human security priority

dimensions through a survey of the local

population and analysis of the results.

Once the determinants of human

security at the local level have been

selected, for each one a small number of

suitable indicators need to be identified.

This set of indicators represents the

baseline situation of human security in

the selected locality. On the basis of the

survey, local authorities should then

devise a human security action plan,

identifying the measures to be taken to

improve the status of human security.

After a period of implementation of such

measures, the survey should be repeated

and the indicators updated to assess

whether the intended improvement has

been realised.

a) Identification of Human Security

Priorities

The seven dimensions of

human security identified by UNDP in

1994 can be used as the starting point,

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/Human_Security_GN.pdf



31

namely: economic, food, health,

environmental, personal, community and

political security (UNDP, 1994: 24). Each

dimension in turn contains a number of

specific insecurities that can be identified

by applying one of the surveying

techniques to assess vulnerabilities of the

targeted group, assumed to be a

representative sample of the local

community or a geographic district. It is

also assumed that the revealed insecurity

priorities, namely the ones assigned the

highest degree of importance in the

survey and/or that demonstrate the

greatest severity when combining

factual findings and perceptions, were:

1) Decreasing quantity of available water

per capita (due to increased population

and increasing agricultural water

demand);

2) Civil strife in a country bordering with

the district in question, which impedes

safe transportation of products to a port

for forwarding to final market;

3) Recurrent agricultural pests which

make food availability and affordability

uncertain;

4) Rising personal insecurity due to

violence and crimes of juvenile gangs;

5) Job scarcity and high unemployment,

especially affecting young people,

women and an ethnic minority.

b) Indicators for Insecurity Factors

For the identified priorities,

several indicators could be used to

develop a baseline insecurity situation.

Without being exhaustive, some

indicators that could be used to assess

the above-mentioned severity include:

for insecurity priority 1), the cubic meters

available pro capita for daily

consumption and the patterns of water

usage; for insecurity priority 2), the

number of road blockades per week and

of violent episodes occurring in the

nearby country; for insecurity priority 3),

the number of recurring disease types

and the harvest losses; for insecurity

priority 4), the number of criminal

episodes communicated to the police

and those revealed by victimisation

surveys; for insecurity priority 5), the level

of long-term and youth unemployment

rate, disaggregated by sex and ethnic

groups, and the average time for

securing a first employment or to find a

new job.

c) Human Security Action Plan

The human security baseline

information, obtained through surveys,

expert analysis and indicators, should

help local governance institutions in the

design of specific policies and

implementation instruments that address

the identified human security priorities

and build resilience and empowerment

mechanisms. This exercise can also

provide the governance structures with

the analytical capacity to develop early

warning mechanisms and craft tailored

responses. It goes without saying

perhaps that generally it will be

considerably less costly and more

humane to meet these threats upstream

rather than downstream, early rather

than late (UNDP, 1994: 3).

It is then possible to envisage

the type of response by the local security

providers, namely local authorities,

including the municipalities and the

district authorities.

Faced with such a scenario, a

human security local action plan could

include: for priority 1), the decreasing

quantity of available water could result

in a request for technical assistance to

increase water recycling and water

efficiency and the exploration of new

groundwater possibilities.

For priority 2), civil strife in a

country bordering with the district in

question which impedes the safe

transportation of products to a port for

forwarding to final market, the rapid

impact measures that have to be

undertaken are likely to fall outside the

purview of the local authorities and even

from their capacity to influence. In fact,


32

this is one of the cases when the

national authorities themselves have little

political space to manoeuvre. What the

local authorities could do is to request

the national government to revamp

efforts and negotiations with the

neighbouring country, for instance

possibly including the nomination of

local negotiators to facilitate a peaceful

solution of the current crisis. The local

level could also ask national authorities

to provide escorts for convoys or to

improve infrastructure for alternative

routes to markets. With this proactive

approach, the local authorities are

helping to shape the response of

another security provider, even if

national authorities may be ineffective in

dealing with this specific insecurity

component. As a minimum, local

constituencies may also perceive that

there is an active commitment to act

from the authorities which may reduce

the perception of vulnerability.

For priority 3), recurrent pests

that are undermining food security, the

local institutions can make available to

local farmers organic pesticides through

subsidised purchases or conditional

loans (with reimbursement conditional

upon crop performance) and make

available specialised technical assistance

and extension services for pest control

and improved agricultural practices.

For priority 4), to deal with

rising personal insecurity due to crimes

from juvenile gangs, the authorities, after

analysing possible root causes of the

phenomenon, can organize a system of

community safety control, introduce a

small arms control and reduction project.

It can introduce parental counselling,

introduce upgrading skills training of

local enforcement authorities and

eventually improve its internal

organisation and possibly increase the

effective numbers, enhance the creation

of facilities and social infra-structures

offered to young people, and promote

the creation of part-time job

opportunities for youngsters.

Finally for priority 5), job

scarcity and insecurity, local authorities

can envisage several active labour

market policies, including vocational

training for unskilled workers,

improvement of productive

infrastructure, and review investment

promotion measures and micro-credit

schemes. Such measures should be

tailored by gender and particularly target

the ethnic minority most affected, to

protect and empower those identified as

the most insecure.

As summarised in the table

below,12

it is possible to relate each one

of the identified priority factors of human

insecurity to a human security

dimension. It is a clear, common-sense,

experimental framework that can have a

high positive impact on policy design

and implementation.

12

For an abstract application of a similar matrix to a real case study, see the Summary of the Dimensions of Human Security in Afghanistan, UNDP (2004), NHDR Afghanistan, pp. 243-244.


33

Table 1. Human Security Priorities and Dimensions

Priority factor

of Human

Insecurity

HS Dimension Indicators Response Provider

Decreasing

water

availability

Health

security

Environmental

security

Water per capita

(cubic meters)

T/A for policy

and action to

increase

efficiency of

water usage and

recycling

Municipality

Disrupted

route to

markets

through

bordering

country

Economic

security

Personal

security

Number of road

blocks and

violent incidents

Request state to

undertake

mediation in

nearby country,

explore

alternative

routes, organize

escorts

State upon

request of

local

governor

Agricultural

pests

Economic

security

Food security

Recurrence and

type of pests.

Harvest losses

Subsidised

organic

pesticides,

extension

services

District

authorities

Violence and

crimes by

juvenile gangs

Personal

security

Incidence

revealed by

victimisation

surveys

Small arm control

Youth vocational

training and

employment

programmes

Strengthen law

enforcement

Municipality,

local labour

offices,

governorate

law

enforcement

authorities

Unemployment

especially

among youth

and minority

Economic

security

Disaggregated

unemployment

rate and labour

indicators

Active labour

market policies,

incl. vocational

training and

microcredit

Municipality,

labour

offices, local

NGOs

As it can be seen from the very

simple example provided above, most

threats can be dealt with at the local

level and even those which fall outside

the sphere of influence of the unit could

be indirectly supported locally by

creative and proactive engagement and

by involving the national authorities. If

the policies are well-designed and

implemented, they should lead to an

improvement in the indicators over time,

confirmed by periodic human security

surveys, which should show the

percentage of people identifying the

threats in question and the perceived

severity of these, actually decrease.

By monitoring the levels of

insecurity in such a way in the medium

and long-term, and by regularly cross-

checking these with the factual

measures of impact of the actions taken,

the local authorities can obtain feedback

on the quality and effectiveness of their

governance capacities.

In the above-mentioned

example, a human security social

contract is implicitly being forged


34

between citizens and local authorities. In

that case, good governance would

correspond to the ability to increase

human security of people concerned

and weak governance would

correspond to the inability to meet the

human security demands of those

people. Discounting possible cases of

force majeure which may interfere with

the evolution of the human security

indicators, the lion’s share of the work

should be done by local governance

structures.

The applicability of this

approach to measurement of human

security at local level depends largely on

the quality and impartiality of the

surveys, including the correct and

precise composition of the representative

sample and on the availability of

statistical data. It is also clear that

another district of the same country may

reveal a completely different composition

of factors of vulnerability, depending on

geography, demographic composition

and other factors mentioned earlier. It

may well prove impossible to make

scientific comparisons in the overall level

of insecurity between districts, unless the

priorities and indicators happen to be

the same. However, it should be possible

to compare human security trends at the

local level, over time.

Box 3. Local Governance in Post-Conflict Situations

Local Governance: building Human Security in post-conflict settings

Conflicts have a long and lasting impact on peoples’ human security. They

hamper the physical personal security of individuals, and because they destroy livelihoods,

infrastructures and governmental institutions their effects last throughout into the post-

conflict settings. Hence, economic, political, food, health, community and environmental

securities are disrupted and the feeling of insecurity is widespread and enduring.

Post-conflict peace-building should, therefore, be seen by all major rebuilding

stakeholders (international community, national governments, civil society organisations

and NGOs) as an opportunity to implement a human security action plan.

UNDP’s work on Governance in Post-Conflict Situations seeks to highlight the

inter-linked nature of development, human rights and security, acknowledging that they

are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and to identify opportunities at the

grassroots level as the entry strategy for building resilient states with good governance.

Local governance is the obvious tool with which to do this.

The National Human Development Report of Afghanistan of 2004 addresses

peace-building with that view point. Entitled Security with a Human Face, Challenges and

Responsibilities, the report uses human development and human security as analytical

frameworks and advocates a human security perspective for Afghanistan’s state-building

process. The end-result of this process should be building a state for good governance

(UNDP, 2004: 160).

In the same line, Serge Yapo, in a paper entitled Improving Human Security in

Post-Conflict Cote d’Ivoire: A Local Governance Approach, advocates for the recognition of

local governance as a key entry point for improving human security in a post-conflict

situation (Yapo, 2007:3).

The rationale behind this assumption is based on lessons learned on the

ground. Often, in post-conflict reconstruction, the challenges are addressed at the national


35

level and, out of necessity to restore state legitimacy, the majority of reconstruction

strategies are state- centric. Putting local governments at the centre in post-conflict

situations has several advantages: authorities at the local level are close to the citizen; local

governance provides an opportunity to develop a locally-owned peace building strategy

through the participation of the public in security sector reform and in the provision of

basic social services; local governance can give voice to the most vulnerable, empower

individuals and build strong communities. Moreover, if local reconstruction programmes

are planned in cooperation with the local authorities and well implemented, their

cumulative effects can contribute to national peace and stability and form the basis for

sustainable development at the national level (Yapo, 2007: 5).

The 2003 report Human Security Now, Protecting and Empowering People,

dedicates a chapter to the challenges of recovering from violent conflict. Recognising that

helping countries recover lays the foundations for development to take off as well as for

human security (Commission on Human Security; 2003: 57), the report acknowledges that

“post-conflict recovery requires an integrated human security framework, developed in full

partnership with the national and local authorities to ensure ownership and commitment

to the objectives.” (Commission on Human Security; 2003: 61).

By emphasising the role of local governments in fostering post-conflict

development, decentralised governance in post-conflict settings appears to represent a

major opportunity to re-establish governments’ services and mobilize communities,

empowering individuals, reinforcing citizenry, and giving people national ownership over

the process of building good governance.

Tentative approaches to

human insecurity identification and

action have to be devised, application of

which will necessarily be dependent on

the governance structure of each

country. In a highly centralised

environment, the responsibility for

human security will rely almost

exclusively on the government and on

the international and regional

organisations to which the country

chooses to belong. In such

environments, there is probably little

room for local enquiry and for the

promotion of locally-based assessments

and action plans. In authoritarian

regimes, where everything is decided

and applied by the state structures, there

is likely to be limited scope to research

and model locally-based human security

local and empowerment approaches. In

autocratic regimes all threats, external

and internal threats, are perceived as

against the very existence of the state.

Therefore, individuals are treated only as

part of the group and their security in

not differentiated from the state security.

The security agenda has not been

“humanised” and the process, even if it

makes it onto the political agenda,

would be meaningless.

The more democratic and

decentralised a country is, normally the

greater the level of power vested in each

layer of governance. Decentralised

governance, carefully planned,

effectively implemented and

appropriately managed, can lead to

significant improvement in the welfare of

people at the local level, the cumulative

effect of which can lead to enhanced

“Local governance is a key entry

point for improving human security in a post-conflict situation”

Serge Armand Yapo


36

“If people can be of any help in

enhancing human security they need to be taken into confidence with

respect to the relevant policies. They should be provided w ith information about the current policies and asked

about their advice w ith respect to improving them ”

Gul Ahmad Yama from Ghanzi

human development. (UNDP, 2004:

156). Local institutions and civil society

organisations all have a part to play in

deciding and implementing the policies

that empower people and lead them to

a higher degree of human development,

in identifying and reducing threats or in

offsetting the impact of the threats that

were not diminished (either because

they fell out of its purview or because

they were addressed too late with too

little means). Strengthening civil society

organisations, therefore, is vital do the

implementation of human security

(Ogata, 2004: 11). In this scenario,

human security is a cross-cutting

approach whose responsibility resides in

governments, local authorities and civil

society organisations, depending on the

type and severity of the vulnerability.

While some “unfreedoms” can

only be removed by a normative and

legislative exercise that has to be

assumed by national powers (the

protection agenda), the local institutions

normally have the potential to address

vulnerabilities faster and with more

tailored solutions (filling in the

empowerment gap). If a human security

problem is localised in a certain

community, because it is exposed to a

particular threat or because it constitutes

a clearly-identified group, then the case

for local action is evident.

A particularly interesting case,

in this sense, is that of climate change.

Despite the global dimension of the

roots and consequences of climate

change, certain populations are affected

by a determined set of events. Not

everyone is affected by droughts, and

certainly not everybody is affected by

hurricanes – at least directly. A global

action is needed to slow down and

reverse climate change effects. However,

adaptation to climate change has a

crucial local dimension. For instance,

dealing with rising sea level, frequent

intense atmospheric events, or soil

erosion, may provide the case for specific

local actions to increase resilience,

preparedness and devise economic

diversification activities, infrastructure

improvements.

When adopting a human

security approach, the focus shifts from

the state to people, from the exclusive-

national-layer to local, sub national

institutions; this shift also brings other

actors into play. “Because human

security is a public good that belongs to

all and cannot be exclusive, it entails a

responsibility for the state to provide

guarantees that people will not fall

below an acceptable threshold, but also

a corresponding duty among people to

remain engaged. It is in its response to its

citizens that the state finds its meaning

and moral legitimacy.” (UNDP, 2004: 10)

“Those in position to receive – people

and communities – must assume,

demand and defend their rights” (UNDP,

2004: xxv). Civil society organisations are,

hence, part of the equation.

Applicability of Human Security

Human security can be useful

at a national level to devise the “security

deficits” (including unbalanced

developed across territories or

populations). Because of that, it

represents a valid analytical framework

which enables the identification of

desirable policy directions and the

selection of those human security factors


37

“Good governance at the local,

national and international levels is perhaps the single most important factor in promoting development

and advancing the cause of peace”

Kofi Annan

whose evolution could usefully be

followed by early warning systems.

However, it is essentially the application

of a human security framework at local

level that allows the mapping of specific

priority gaps and the prescription of

more targeted actions. Since it leads to

the evaluation of results, human security

can reflect the efficacy and quality of

local governance.

Therefore, the opportunity for

practical applicability of the human

security concept, as an essential element

of policy and accountability, seems to

reside primarily at sub-national level,

where there is an important governance

role to be played, and where the real

power of the human security tool can be

felt. It is there that, with appropriate

tools, one may define the content and

meaning of human security, identify

priority threats and potential measures at

policy level to improve it, and monitor

performance and results over the

medium- and long-term.

Part III

The Case for Regional Governance

in the Promotion of Human Security:

The European Union

“The philosophy underlying the EU’s approach to security, as outlined in the Security Strategy, is that security can

best be attained through development, and development through security.

Neither is possible without an adequate level of the other.

That’s why we focus on the holistic concept of human security”.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner

41

As it has been shown in Part I

and II, the concept of human security

has led to a redefinition as to the subject

of security policy. The premium is no

longer placed on the security of the state

but rather, there has been a shift

towards the individual. This shift also

calls for a revision as to who the security

provider(s) should be and at which level

actions ought to be taken. The

complexity of the threats, but also of the

ways to prevent them, point to the

importance of governance in

safeguarding and promoting human

security in all its forms. However, this

governance should not be considered as

restricted to one level only. Quite to the

contrary: it is important to recognise that

in regard to the human security

conundrum, governance must be

acknowledged in its multi-level

dimensions. From the local to the global,

there are various entities exercising

governance and thus have a role to play

in human security. Regional

organisations represent one of these

levels and as they evolve and expand it

becomes increasingly necessary to take

them in consideration as actors that can

affect human security.

Concerning the role of regional

organisations, the human security

concept has been mainly used in regard

to external interventions while very little

attention has been dedicated to how

regional levels of governance can be a

provider of human security within the

region itself. Nevertheless, there are

many aspects that call for the inclusion of

regional processes as part of the human

security contributors, especially since, in

many ways, regional integration and

regional organisations tackle issues that

have direct consequences on the

components of human security.

Regional Integration and

Human Security

One of the main reasons for

taking into account the regional

dimension is the very fact that several

issues affecting human security are cross-

border issues. The problems affecting

human security are not restrained by

political borders but to the contrary tend

to affect more than one state.

In fact each of the seven

components of human security can be

considered to have a cross-border reach

for which a solely national response can

be insufficient. The globalisation

phenomenon has demonstrated that

economies in various parts of the world

are now closely intertwined. The recent

financial crisis has been the latest

reminder that economic security can no

longer be thought solely at the national

level but now needs a multilateral

approach. Similarly, food security is often

a challenge that affects more than one

state. Lately the food crisis in the Horn of

Africa has shown that food security is

not just restricted to individual countries

(Ethiopia, Kenya or Somalia for instance)

but affects many states at the same time.

Moreover, it is caused not only by local

but also international factors ranging

from world commodity and energy

prices, exchange rates, agricultural

outputs, land use changes, small farmers’

productivity, etc. Health security can also

be a concern that goes beyond national

frameworks. One just has to think about

potential pandemic risks such as the

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

(SARS), the Avian Flu or HIV/AIDS.

Environmental security also needs a


42

broader perspective than the national

one. It would be ineffectual for example

to try to tackle environmental problems

in the Mediterranean Sea without trying

to include as many coastal countries as

possible. Regarding personal security,

community and political security it is

possible to make reference to the case of

Darfur and the spill-over of the conflict to

Chad and the Central African Republic.

Given the cross-border

characteristics of these problems

affecting human security, it becomes

insufficient to look at the state as the sole

provider of security. As it has already

been mentioned in Part II, since similar

problems affect a set of countries or

because a national issue poses a threat

to neighbouring states, it is necessary to

envisage solutions and remedies at a

larger framework than the national one.

As recognised by Boin and Rhinard, “if

threats to safety and security unfold

along boundary-crossing trajectories,

response capacities of individual states

will have to become linked if not

integrated” (2008: 1). States throughout

the world are aware that on many

different issues they would gain more

and become more effective by pulling

together and combining their efforts.

Regional integration has emerged as one

of the key developments in international

relations at the beginning of the twenty-

first century. States are increasing their

cooperation and collaboration with their

neighbouring countries in order to

better respond to the pressures and

opportunities presented by globalisation

(Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhove,

2005).

This tendency to set up

regional frameworks has reached such a

scale that it is now possible to say that a

new level of governance has been

created that oscillates between the

national and international ones. This

regional level is not as broad and as

diluted as can be the case with global

governance mechanisms while still

offering the opportunity to surpass that

narrow national level. Moreover, this

new regional level of governance should

not be considered as undermining

neither the global level nor the national

one (Thakur and Van Langenhove,

2008: 24). It rather offers an intermediate

level that allows neighbouring states to

collaborate on a given set of issues.

However, it is necessary to be

wary of the idea that the creation of a

new level of governance is followed

automatically by an improvement in the

amount of good governance. Rather,

regional governance, just as it is the case

for global governance, national

governance or local governance needs

to be benchmarked so that its

effectiveness can be evaluated. It is

important that regional governance is

assessed in regard to its actual capacity

to provide the citizens of the member

states with a higher level of human

security. So far, most studies on good

governance and regional governance

focus only on the legitimacy and

democracy promotion and little on

human development, stability and

human security – the actual results that

good governance is expected to achieve.

Taking into account the degree of

human security that is provided by the

regional organisation also allows one to

go beyond the immediate aim of the

integration process and evaluate as well

some other more far-reaching

consequences of the integration process.

The EU and Human Security

Ever since the adoption of the

1994 Human Development Report and

the appearance of the concept of human

security, major actors of the international

scene have shown their interest in

promoting human security worldwide.

Among these actors the European Union

embraced the concept of human security

and included it in many of its policy

The Case for Regional Governance in the Promotion of Human Security: The EU

43

documents. However, in most cases the

adoption of this concept served the EU

policies outside its own borders and not

within them. Whether it is out of

conflicts, humanitarian, human rights or

development concerns, the EU has

persistently referred to the concept of

human security as an instrument of its

external relations and its effort to

promote security as a global actor.

This EU human security vision

can be problematic as it often seems to

equate human security and the

responsibility to protect even though

they are two very different concepts. As

human security has been coined to

involve many features such as economic

security, food security, health security,

environmental security, personal

security, community security and political

security, limiting its applicability to the

sole field of external relations and

political instability situations can only be

counter-productive. At a closer look, it is

not only state security that the EU is

promoting but also elements of human

security within its own borders.

In this chapter, rather than

taking the usual perspective of the EU as

a security provider in other parts of the

world, the aim here is to look as well on

the EU’s role within its own borders. This

paper wishes to illustrate how various

policies adopted at the regional level

have contributed to an increased

security level for people within the

regional area. After all, the Treaty of

Rome signed in 1957 clearly stipulated

that the aims of the European

integration process were “to promote

throughout the Community a

harmonious development of economic

activities, a continuous and balanced

expansion, an increase in stability, an

accelerated raising of the standard of

living” (Art. 2). Using the European

integration process allows us to look at

how one of the most successful regional

integration schemes has helped in the

provision of human security to the

citizens living within its borders.

Boin and Rhinard state that

“today’s crisis management capacities

are the result of a broader process of

policy integration in Europe” (2008: 11)

and later on that “the EU has gradually

but steadfastly assumed a role in the

provision of transboundary crisis

management capacity. Across the three

Pillars, and within its institutions, a

substantial collection of venues,

mechanisms, policies, and funding can

be found that directly enhance the

capacity to deal with future threats”

(2008: 18). In this paper, four particular

ranges of issues will be the focus of our

attention. Firstly, the EU itself has

become increasingly active in the field of

peace and security including through its

Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP). Secondly, the issue of economic

security needs to be looked at. This is

quite an evident choice as one of the

leading topics of European integration

has been economic integration. Thirdly,

sets of policies that are of relevance for

the evaluation of the European

governance effect on human security

concern social policies. Fourthly, the

consequences of political integration

cannot be left out either, also because it

concerns not only the current member

states but also has an influence on the

future members and other membership

candidates.

The CFSP and the ESDP

The EU has also empowered

itself so as to become a global actor in

the field of peace and security. In 1992

the member states decided with the

Maastricht Treaty to introduce some

responsibilities in the field of security at

the European level by opening the way

for a future common defence and

foreign policy. Eventually, the Treaty of

Amsterdam in 1999 clarified the role of


44

“We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and

inequality, promoting good governance and human

rights, assisting development, and addressing

the root causes of conflict and insecurity”

European Security Strategy (2008)

the EU by introducing a new title

specifically related to defence policy and

peace and security. It also marked the

incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks

that give the EU the opportunity to

undertake military missions such as:

humanitarian and rescue tasks;

peacekeeping tasks; as well as tasks of

combat forces in crisis management.

Following this empowerment, the EU

has been working hard to become

operational for these new tasks. It was

under the aegis of this European Security

and Defence Policy (ESDP) that the EU

has been able to deploy troops in

different parts of the world13

.

The ESDP itself is in fact part of

the larger ranging Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP) which constitutes

the second pillar of the three pillars of

the EU. According to the Article J.1 of

the Treaty on European Union:

“The objectives of the common

foreign and security policy shall be:

- to safeguard the common values,

fundamental interests and

independence of the Union;

- to strengthen the security of the

Union and its Member States in all

ways;

- to preserve peace and strengthen

international security, in accordance

with the principles of the United

Nations Charter as well as the

principles of the Helsinki Final Act and

the objectives of the Paris Charter;

- to promote international

cooperation;

- to develop and consolidate

democracy and the rule of law, and

respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms.”

The CFSP itself is driven by the

European Security Strategy, a policy

13

These overseas deployment include most notably the 2004 EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 2006 Operation Artemis in Eastern DR Congo and since 2007 the EUFOR in Chad and Central African Republic.

document that not only identifies the

threat the EU is facing but also sets out

the strategic objectives for the EU.

Additionally, the EU has also decided to

establish the position of a High

Representative to be the figure of the

common European position on the

international scene. The document was

assessed during the December 2008

European Council, when a new version

of the Strategy, the Report on the

Implementation of the European Security

Strategy - Providing Security in a

Changing World, was adopted. In this

document, the EU takes into account a

variety of new challenges and threats it

aims to address and it makes explicit

reference to human security in its

policies.

The European Union has been

advocating a human security approach

to international affairs. At the request of

EU High Representative Secretary

General Javier Solana, a study group was

convened to examine the possibilities to

integrate human security in the foreign

policy of the EU. The group’s report, A

Human Security Doctrine for Europe

(September 2004) boldly proposed, for

instance, the formation of a 15,000-

strong human security response force

(HSRF), with at least one third being

civilian (police, human rights monitors,

development and humanitarian

specialists, administrators, etc.), and a


45

human security volunteer service to

assist the HSRF. Although these

proposals have never been adopted, the

European Union has repeatedly

expressed the need to reconcile security

with development in all aspects of its

foreign policies.

Nevertheless, the same study

group presented a new report in 2007

entitled A European Way of Security, in

which it articulates a proposal for a

European military and security doctrine

based on the principles of human

security. The report calls for the primacy

of human rights and the protection of

civilians, legitimate political authority, a

bottom-up approach, effective

multilateralism, an integrated regional

approach and a clear and transparent

strategic direction. Both the large

spectrum of foreign policy tools at the

disposal of the EU (including

development policies) and the fact that it

has strived to become a global military

security actor open up the way for EU’s

engagement in the protection of human

security. In fact, the EU, as a relative new-

comer to the challenges of military crisis-

management, has been keen to appear

as a new military actor, whose

interventions and actions intend to

ensure human security. Its interventions,

rather than aiming at physically

eliminating a given enemy, are more

focused on the provision of human

security. All of the EU’s military

operations so far have set themselves

goals that go beyond a traditional

military rationale. They include, among

others, providing security for elections to

take place in the DRC in 2006, to stabilize

post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and

help it foster economic development as

well as providing security to Internally

Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees in

Chad and Central African Republic.

European Integration and

Economic Security

Europe has come a long way

since the signing in 1957 of the Treaty of

Rome establishing the European

Economic Community. The European

integration process has also greatly

facilitated the recovery of the economies

after the Second World War up to a

point where nowadays the EU with its

27 member states represents a third of

the world GDP (Eurostat, 2006:11). In

the 50 years since then, the integration

process has evolved in such a way that

Europe now has a single market, 16 of its

members share a common currency, and

has adopted a large set of common

policies regarding trade, regional

development, internal competition,

agriculture and many others.

The EU’s macroeconomic

policies are developed to handle these

issues at the regional level. The EU can

either act by formulating guidelines

within which member states have the

liberty to adopt tailor-made national

reform programs or it can have a more

direct implication in various aspects of

the economy. In fact, the EU as a

regional organisation has several ways

through which it can impact upon the

economic prospects of its member states

and the well-being of their citizens. Since

EU policies are set up with the aim of

improving the well being of European

citizens it thus becomes a provider and

promoter of human security for its own

citizens.

Ever since the beginning of

the European integration process,

economic integration has played a major

role. The creation of the single market

and of the customs union have been

two of the main achievements of the

European integration process. Both have

largely favoured trade and exchanges

between the member states and have

also eliminated the risks of a tariff war by


46

pushing the member states to

collaborate rather than compete.

Moreover, the EU has also repeatedly

thrived to create conditions to attract

investments including by instituting free

movement of capital within its borders.

The EU as the regional body that has

taken to its farthest point the free

movement of people, goods, services

and capital has enabled Europeans to

experience such economic development

that the economic security of European

citizens has become somehow

cemented. This has enabled the EU to

experience continuous growth since the

entry into force of the Single European

Act in 1987 and increase per capita GDP.

But there are also other ways

through which the EU as a regional

organisation tries to ensure and improve

the economic security of its inhabitants.

In fact, one of the overriding principles of

the EU is to coordinate the economies of

its member states so as to enable them

to foster growth. One of the methods

used for this purpose is the

establishment of guidelines and or

strategies agreed upon by all the

member states. One such case is the

Lisbon Strategy which states that it aims

at transforming Europe into “the most

dynamic and competitive knowledge-

based economy in the world capable of

sustainable economic growth with more

and better jobs and greater social

cohesion and respect for the

environment by 2010”. It is in this case

quite evident that a link exists between

the European policies and the provision

and promotion of human security, not

only with an impact on economic

security but also concerning

environmental and social or community

security. Since 2000, the EU economic

and social model has been redesigned

by the Lisbon Agenda to include high

economic growth, and a high level of

social and economic cohesion. “This is

Europe’s response to globalisation in

order to make business and labour more

competitive and better able to take

advantage of the opportunities arising

from globalisation” (UNU-CRIS, WP 2008:

14).

However, this does not mean

in any way that the Lisbon Strategy has

been met with full success. There have

been various aspects where there are

serious shortcomings. In 2004, the

European Council invited the

Commission to establish a High Level

Group headed by Mr. Wim Kok to carry

out an independent review and monitor

the progress and pitfalls of the Lisbon

Strategy. This High Level Group

recognised in its report that “halfway to

2010 the overall picture is very mixed

and much needs to be done in order to

prevent Lisbon from becoming a

synonym for missed objectives and failed

promises” (High Level Group, 2004:9).

The EU has also been able to

introduce on certain occasions more

forceful economic guidelines that ought

to be respected by the member states.

This has been the case for the fiscal

policy through the adoption in 1997 of

the Stability and Growth Pact

anticipating the introduction of the Euro.

Thus the Stability and Growth Pact

ensures that all member states maintain

their annual budget deficit under 3% of

the GDP and additionally that the

national debt remains lower than 60% of

the GDP. Similarly, the Convergence

Criteria have been set out for member

sates willing to join the European

Monetary Union with provision

regarding the maintaining under control

of inflation rates and the stability of

interest rates and exchange rates. The

aim is to ensure more rigorous

budgetary discipline through EU level

surveillance and coordination of

budgetary policies within the Euro area

and the EU.

The introduction of the Euro in

2002 has also benefited European

citizens in many different ways. Despite

the fact that prices across the EU are not


47

converging at the expected pace, the

European common currency has

enabled European citizens to be better

protected against negative global

economic and financial phenomena. The

Euro offers a much stronger currency

with a much less volatile exchange rate

on international markets and a better

protection against speculative actions. As

former European Central Bank Executive

Board member Otmar Issing recently put

it: “It is not difficult to imagine what

would have happened during the recent

financial-market crisis if the euro-area

countries still had all their national

currencies: immense speculation against

some currencies, heavy interventions by

central banks and finally a collapse of the

parity system.” (EPC, 2008) It is also

possible to cite a less expected

phenomenon which is the

strengthening of the Euro exchange rate

against the dollar that has for example

allowed European citizens not to bare

the full brunt of the high oil prices in the

first half of 2008.

Another element regarding

the role of the regional level in ensuring

the protection of human security

concerns the capacity and willingness of

states to work together to tackle a

specific problem. “Even in areas in which

no formal EU competences exist, states

sometimes display a “coordination reflex”

(Boin and Rhinard, 2008: 15). The latest

example to date is the coordinated

response EU heads of states and

governments have been able to give in

front of the looming financial crisis.

Although initially uncoordinated due to

a panic based, knee-jerk reaction, the

heads of states and governments of the

EU convened in order to streamline their

actions and act cohesively. This has

enabled the threat of a financial

meltdown to recede. And, of more direct

concerns to the citizens, it has also

allowed measures to be taken in order to

guarantee the repayment of private

savings and prevent banks from running

bankrupt.

The EU can also play a much

more direct role in improving the

economic security of its citizens through

a variety of redistribution instruments.

Looking at the EU budget is sufficient to

see that redistribution of resources

accounts for a very large share. Two of

the most important budget lines for the

EU are the Structural funds and the

Cohesion funds. Both are regional

integration instruments that have been

established in order to improve the

economic prospects and the well-being

of European citizens by reaching out to

the local level. These instruments were

developed and conceived so as to

ensure growth, economic development,

stability, rising employment and other

elements of citizens’ welfare that help

diminish vulnerabilities and therefore

promote human security. For example,

the Cohesion fund, available for the

member states whose Gross National

Income is below 90% of the EU average,

allows for European investment in the

field of trans-European networks and the

environment. Similarly, the European

Regional Development Fund (ERDF)

serves three objectives: improving

regional competitiveness and

employment, fostering territorial

cooperation and improving the

convergence of all European regions.

Taken together these two funds account

for no less than €348 billion over the

2007-2013 period.

European Social Policy and

Human Security

Social policies can cover many

different aspects of everyday life. At one

level it is about policies and practices that

support the means of social participation

(domains of health and social care,

income maintenance, employment or

livelihoods, housing and education) – all


48

critical aspects of the concept of human

security. At another level, social policy

may be understood as those

mechanisms, policies and procedures put

in place by governments (collaborating

with other actors) with a regulating

purpose for the general welfare of the

citizen and to create safeguards against

economic and social exclusion. They can

be characterised as being constituted by

three strands: redistribution (involving

investments, transfers or cross-

subsidisation from some socio-economic

groups to others), regulation (to frame

the activities of businesses and other

private actors so that they take more

account of social aims and impacts and

keep goods/services more affordable),

and rights (to ensure efficient legislative

processes and institutional mechanisms

to enable citizens to make claims about

social entitlement from their

governments) (Deacon, Ortiz and

Zelenev, 2007).

In front of the challenges

posed by globalisation especially

concerning the preservation of existing

social rights and policies that provide for

the social needs of populations, authors

like Yeates and Deacon (2006) have

claimed that regional integration can

have an important added value. Effective

regional groupings of countries can

develop cross-border regional

redistribution, regulation, and rights

articulation mechanisms that will protect

social rights. Therefore Yeates and

Deacon make the case for a regional-

based strategy to achieve a more socially

just globalisation (2006). Such an

approach affords protection from global

market forces that might erode national

social entitlement and allows such

grouped countries to have a louder

voice in global negotiations on economic

and social issues. According to the two

authors, this would be done through:

- regional social redistribution

mechanisms: regionally financed funds

to target particularly depressed localities

or to tackle significant health or food

shortage issues or to stimulate cross-

border cooperation;

- regional social, health and labour

regulations: food production and

handling standards, agreement on the

equal treatment of workers;

- regional mechanisms giving citizens a

voice to challenge their governments in

terms of social rights;

- regional intergovernmental

cooperation in social policy on health,

migration, education, food, livelihood

and social security;

- regional regulation of the de-facto

private regional social policies of health,

education, utilities and social protection

companies.

In 2002 the International

Labour Organisation (ILO) established

the World Commission on the Social

Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG) as

an independent body to reflect upon the

challenges globalisation has brought to

peoples’ lives, their families, and the

societies in which they live. The

Commission aimed at exploring the

existing and future opportunities to

combine the necessity of economic

development with social policies and a

sustainable environment. Its 2004 final

report, A Fair Globalization: Creating

Opportunities for All, claims that regional

integration can contribute to a more

equitable pattern of globalisation if

regional integration has a strong social

dimension (WCSDG, 2004:73).

According to the WCSDG, this could be

achieved by empowering people and

countries to better manage the global

economic forces, by capacity-building so

as to take advantage of global

opportunities and by improving the

conditions under which people connect

to the global economy (WCSDG,

2004:71).

The EU has also become

aware of the social challenges created by

globalisation. The Luxembourg


49

European Council in 1997 paved the

way for the European Employment

Strategy (EES), also known as the

“Luxembourg processes”. The EES aims

at achieving better European

convergence of national employment

strategies, while respecting national

diversity. The goal is to promote high

employment rates, but not at any price

(preserving quality of jobs, avoiding tax

competition between countries) (UNU-

CRIS, WP 2008:14).

Furthermore, the Commission

in its 2005 report European values in the

globalized world stressed that the gains

made so far through the European

integration process were under threat if

Europe could not rise to the challenge of

responding to the negative

consequences of globalisation especially

regarding job loss. As a part of the

solution, the Barroso Commission

proposed the establishment of a

Globalization Fund which was endorsed

with a few alterations at the December

2005 European Council. The European

Globalization adjustment Fund (EGF)

represents an innovative instrument “to

provide additional support for workers

made redundant as a result of major

structural changes in world trade

patterns” (European Council Conclusions

of December 2005). The novelty of EGF

is the direct support offered to workers

who have been made redundant, and

not the companies or institutions,

through active labour market tools such

as counselling, job search and mobility

allowance, and micro-credits (UNU-CRIS,

WP2008: 21). This new instrument,

which saw the first full payments being

made in December 2007, is an important

landmark in protecting the economic

and social security of European citizens.

The adoption of the EGF as an

instrument of European integration

proves that there has been a long-term

shift in the EU’s social concerns. While it

started from a vision of the European

project working on a restricted number

of issues between six quite similar

member states, it evolved into a broader

vision encompassing broad social

categories of people in a vast area of

great social and economic disparities.

The contrast between the short list of

specific articles contained in the Treaty of

Rome and the long list of social

provisions provided for in the Treaty of

Lisbon (incorporating the Charter of

Fundamental Rights) is palpable.

A clarification is needed in

regard to what is exactly meant by

“European Social Policy”. Confusion is

easy since for many years in the

European integration process the title

“Social Policy” meant working conditions,

equal pay for women and men, and

youth exchanges while important social

aspects such as health, education and

welfare policies remained conspicuous

by their absence, the wording of the

Treaty of Rome giving the European

Community no powers in these fields.

However, along the years

there has been a fundamental expansion

of the social agenda in European

integration. A small but significant set of

powers have been transferred to the

supranational level particularly with

regard to the physical working

environment of employees and equal

treatment at work. Still, major elements

of social policy at national level have only

a limited involvement with the European

policy making structures, and direct

provision of services by the EU remains

almost non-existent. Where there has

been European involvement, the social

transfers that member states are

supposed to provide after EU-level

agreement are mostly non-

benchmarked, suggesting that

differential implementation continues. So

in no sense has the EU grown into a

supranational welfare state. Yet,

paradoxically, the focus of the EU policy

is now definitely more directly oriented

towards the general welfare of its

citizens than it was even a decade ago.


50

The EU has developed a more

sophisticated multi-faceted role in social

policy, that goes beyond the supra-

national regulation of working

conditions towards taking responsibility

for setting up frameworks for adequate

living conditions, and guiding member

states through inter-governmental

coordination procedures. It is fair to say

that the social protection and freedom

from discrimination required ensuring a

better quality of life for EU citizens and

residents is now a fundamental concern

of the EU, even when it does not always

deliver clear improvements. Member

states have been able to combine the

autonomy they still enjoy over social

policy with the advantages brought by

burden-sharing, policy-learning and

gradual convergence of policy

outcomes, particularly in cases where the

harmonisation systems is problematic.

The EU itself has proven to be a dynamic

forum for advancing a sui generis form

of social integration and has transformed

itself into an actor that has a role in the

protection of the various components of

human security.

Political Integration and the Link

with Human Security

While using the concept of

economic integration when talking

about the EU may not raise many

eyebrows, such is not the case when

political integration is mentioned. It is

therefore necessary to make clear that

political integration as part of a regional

process does not always amount to the

creation of a federal state. Political

integration speaks about the multiple

beliefs and dynamics that pull together

the countries taking part in a same

regional integration process. In fact, the

ability of various independent states to

take action together in agreement can

be considered to reflect successful cases

of political integration. According to

Haas “political integration is the process

whereby political actors in several

distinct national settings are persuaded

to shift their loyalties, expectations and

political activities to a new centre, whose

institutions possess or demand

jurisdiction over pre-existing national

states” (1958: 16).

But if on the one hand political

integration refers to the building or

strengthening of formal political

institutions and regulative structures, on

the other hand it refers more specifically

to the sharing of common concerns and

the creation of a set of common norms.

In the case of more advanced schemes

of regional integration it is even possible

to witness the formation of political

communities and common political

identities (Kelstrup 1998).

The history of the European

integration process shows a tendency in

favour of political integration. Whether it

is considered the establishment of

regional level institutions or the creation

of a community of values, the 50 years

since the Treaties of Rome clearly show

that the EU has experienced a high

degree of political integration. This

phenomenon is also of particular interest

to study the role of the EU in regard to

human security. Firstly, as a process

establishing solid regional institutions

that can play a role in the protection of

various aspects of human security; and,

secondly, as a community of values that

has at its core a set of norms protecting

European citizens from abuses and

allowing them to enjoy larger freedoms.

Regarding the institutional

aspect of political integration, the

examples abound when one looks at the

EU especially because the European

integration is the most institutionalised of

all regional integration processes. The

history of European construction is also

the history of the creation and

reinforcement of supranational

institutions. The EU Commission and the

European Parliament have both


51

witnessed an increase in terms of

quantity (each of the enlargements

adding to their size) but also in terms of

quality (with more power being

delegated to the two institutions). Both

the Commission and the Parliament, as

supranational institutions have also

come to complement the role of member

states in protecting and promoting

human security. In fact, these European

institutions can also play a safeguarding

role by protecting European citizens

from abuses from the member states

themselves. It is even possible to wonder

whether infringement procedures

enacted by the Commission do not

amount to such a safeguarding role.

Through the broad range of

resolutions that are adopted at the

European Parliament, this institution is

deeply involved in the promotion of

essential elements linked to human

security. A concrete example concerns

the various safety standards that are

discussed and adopted at the European

level. These European safety standards

are more than helpful in what concerns

the protection of health, environmental

sustainability, food safety and many

other aspects that are directly linked to

human security.

Another, and a not EU limited,

European institution worth mentioning

given its role in safeguarding European

citizens is the European Court of Human

Rights. The Court is responsible for

ensuring the respect for the Convention

for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms which include

among others the right to life, to liberty

and security, the freedom of expression,

prohibition of discrimination, etc. As all

47 member states of the Council of

Europe are contracting parties to the

Convention, they all fall under its

jurisdiction. Moreover, the Protocol 11 to

the Convention also enables European

citizens to challenge member states

when their actions go against the

Convention thus enabling European

citizens not to be subjugated to the

abuses of their own states and to seek

reparation at a higher regional level.

What the European Court of Human

Rights also proves is that Europe, by

allocating such powers to a regional

court, shares a common understanding

of the rights citizens can enjoy.

To show how shared values

and norms can effectively protect human

security (and not just political security) it

is worth mentioning some of the core

values of the EU. Democracy and the

respect for democratic governance is a

very good example. Through a slow and

gradual process, democratic legitimacy

became one of the important features of

the European integration process. While

in the early days very little official

documents mentioned “democracy” as a

requirement for joining the European

integration process, it has now become

an essential part of the EU membership

conditions. EU’s embrace of democracy

as one of its core values is visible through

its inscription in the Preamble of the

Lisbon Treaty.

Moreover, in the 1980s and

1990s European institutions themselves

were increasingly criticised for their lack

of a democratic character. Moreover, it

was considered that European

institutions themselves ought to work in

accordance to the principles of good

governance. Well aware of this problem,

the Commission explicitly pushed

forward the idea of improving the

governance of the EU in order to

address its democratic deficit. The 2001

Commission’s White Paper on

Governance clearly states that improving

governance is an answer to the

difficulties met in transposing democratic

characteristics at the supranational level

(European Commission, 2001a:8).


52

The Influence of European

Integration in the Human

Security of Neighbouring

Countries

In 1993, the European Council

meeting in Copenhagen established

criteria that new member states needed

to comply with. These criteria, which

became known as the Copenhagen

Criteria, included strict rules regarding

candidate countries legislation to allow

them to join the EU. The Presidency

Conclusions explicitly stated:

“Membership requires that the candidate

country has achieved stability of

institutions guaranteeing democracy, the

rule of law, human rights and respect for

and, protection of minorities, […].

Membership presupposes the

candidate’s ability to take on the

obligations of membership including

adherence to the aims of political,

economic and monetary union.”

(European Council, 1993) By establishing

these requirements the EU has in fact

played a major role in influencing

human security in the candidate

countries and in its neighbouring states.

These Copenhagen Criteria

are divided into three parts. The political

criteria include various provisions

regarding, among others, the stability of

institutions guaranteeing democracy, the

rule of law, human rights and respect for

and protection of minorities. Economic

criteria ensure the existence of a

functioning market economy and the

capacity to cope with competitive

pressure and market forces within the

Union. And finally the acceptance of the

Community acquis ensures that

candidate countries have the ability to

take on the obligations of membership,

including adherence to the aims of

political, economic and monetary union.

Therefore, by setting out pre-conditions

to accession to the EU, the European

integration process has been able to

ensure various aspects of human security

were respected even outside its own

borders.

In fact, the prospect of

accession to the EU has played a very

important role in what concerns the

political stability of Eastern and Central

Europe after the end of the Cold War. It

provided these countries with a clearly

laid out and credible economic and

political project which they could aim for.

The EU became somewhat of a pole of

attraction that, with its influence, policed

the political dynamics in the countries

aiming for EU membership. In the 13

years between 1991 and 2004, the

shared willingness to be part of the

European integration process acted as a

preponderant stabilising factor, even

though Former Yugoslavia had to

endure major conflicts.

It was because the EU selected

some specific criteria that needed to be

respected and was itself a model that

could be followed, that the

neighbouring states adopted various

policies that ensured the respect for

human rights and promoted human

development.

The role that the EU as catalyst

can play in the provision and

safeguarding of human security in the

neighbouring countries is very well laid

out in the Ukrainian National

Development Report 2008 which

highlights the linkage between what

they call “European Choice” and a

tentative human security agenda. “The

modern European architecture is a

multidimensional structure whose many

intergovernmental organisations […] deal

with pressing political, security,

economic and humanitarian challenges

on a regional and global scale, including

eradicating poverty, combating health

and environmental degradation,

protecting human rights and freedoms,

strengthening democratic institutions

and the rule of law and fighting


53

terrorism and organized crime.” (UNDP,

2008: 11).

The EU has also been playing

a pro-active role in its neighbouring

countries. Aware that the very security

and stability of Europe depended on the

security and stability of the Eastern and

South-Eastern part of the continent, the

EU developed a series of programs

meant to help develop Eastern and

South-Eastern European states. As such,

the Phare program was established by

the EU to assist the applicant countries of

Central and Eastern Europe in their

preparations for joining the European

Union. The Phare program has three

overriding objectives: strengthening

public administrations and institutions to

function effectively inside the European

Union; promoting convergence with the

European Union’s extensive legislation

(the acquis communautaire) and reduce

the need for transition periods; and

promoting Economic and Social

Cohesion. Moreover, in 2000 the EU

decided to create another financial

instrument program known as the

Community Assistance for

Reconstruction, Development and

Stabilization (CARDS) meant specifically

for the Western Balkan region14

. This

program puts an emphasis on

reconciliation, reconstruction,

democratic stabilisation, and the return

of refugees as well as sustainable

economic and social development with

the eventual aim of preparing these

countries to one day join the EU. More

recently, the EU has launched an

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

(IPA) to support the same objectives, but

for countries aspiring to join the Union in

the period 2007-2013. This framework

encompasses the previous pre-accession,

stabilisation and association assistance to

14

Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania are eligible for CARDS

candidate and potential candidate

countries.

The influence that the EU

exercises is not limited to the potential

member states either. In fact, the EU has

also developed series of instrument that

focus on its neighbouring countries,

even though it is not expected that they

would join the European integration

process. The European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP) has in fact been established

in this regard as well. It is, for example,

under the framework of the ENP that the

Euro-Mediterranean partnership, also

known as the Barcelona process, has

been placed since 2007. Through its

ENP, the EU has therefore been able to

get across its own borders and influence

the level of human security in its

neighbouring states as well.

Regional Governance and

Human Security

Both the number of existing

regional organisations and the

deepening of existing regional

integration processes call for a

reconsideration of the role of regions in

the world of today. In many ways it

appears that regional integration has

favoured the emergence of a new level

of governance that is an intermediate

between the national and the global.

The setting up of new institutions

accompanied with the delegation of

certain powers to the supranational level

has created new dynamics where states

try to increasingly collaborate to better

respond to the various challenges they

may have to face. As such, the regional

level, as a level where governance is

exercised, needs to be studied to see in

which ways it can serve to promote and

protect the human security of its citizens.

The EU, because it is the most

far-reaching regional integration process

with the most firmly institutionalised

supranational structures, is an interesting


54

case study to see how it can ensure and

safeguard the various components of

human security. Moreover, this role and

influence that the EU as a region has on

human security can happen in many

different ways. Whether it concerns the

economic integration, political

integration or the social policies that are

put in place at the regional level, it is

possible to see in each case that the

process of regional integration can be

instrumental in ensuring the respect for

the four freedoms and safeguarding the

well-being of citizens.


55

Part IV

Other Experiences of Regional Governance in the Promotion of

Human Security

“A regional organization can

fundamentally shift the dynamics of the

region toward peace and security. It can

build bridges of understanding; it can

transform relations from enmity to

amity; and it can bring stability and

prosperity where conflict and discord

previously reigned”.

Hassan Wirajuda

57

The European Union, as one

of the most institutionalised and far-

reaching processes of regional

integration, offers a good case study to

verify how issues affecting human

security can be managed at the regional

level. However, it is not enough to look

solely at the EU experiment to make the

point of regional governance in the

handling of human security threats and

lack of human freedoms. Looking at

other regional integration processes, one

sees that the EU, notwithstanding its sui

generis nature, is far from constituting a

unique case. Other regional integration

processes have perhaps developed

alternative ways to protect their citizens.

All parts of the world are not affected by

the same threats and some threats are

more accentuated in some regions

rather than in another. It is therefore

useful to see how various regional

organisations have understood the

threats they are facing and how they

respond to it. Such an exercise is

necessary since, as was shown in Part II,

threats to human security do not impose

themselves uniformly and there is no

unique scheme that is universally valid

and applicable to manage and curtail a

given threat.

It is almost impossible to assess

here all the existing schemes and

mechanisms that have been developed

by regional organisations throughout

the world. The number of existing

regional organisations and the number

and complexity of the human security

threats they have to face would make

this a fastidious task. An effort in that

direction has been undertaken by UNU-

CRIS which during the course of 2007

and 2008 researched one specific aspect,

namely the role and mandate of regional

and other intergovernmental

organisations in the maintenance of

peace and security. This Capacity Survey

that covers no less than 21 regional and

intergovernmental organisations shows

that analyzing in a similar way all the

issues pertaining to human security is a

Herculean task.

Rather than trying to have an

exhaustive list of regions and the

schemes and mechanisms that they have

developed to respond to threats

affecting them, this part of the work

gives an overview of some specific

instruments that have been developed

by some particular regional integration

process. Firstly the African Union (AU)

will be looked at, with more attention

being devoted to the African Peace and

Security Architecture (APSA) and the

New Economic Partnership for Africa’s

Development (NEPAD) and their role in

protecting and improving human

security. It will then turn to the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) to see how this regional

organisation has been able to respond to

such threats as the Asian economic crisis

and SARS pandemic. Eventually, it will

turn to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) as

it has embraced the concept of human

security in its own internal agenda

because of worries concerning

environmental security.

African Union: APSA and

NEPAD

When the African Union was

established in replacement of the

Organization of African Unity (OAU), it

marked a major turn in the importance

of protecting human security on the

continent. One of the most persistent


58

“CONSCIOUS of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa

constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the

continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a

prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration

agenda”

Preamble Constitutive Act of the

African Union (2002)

criticisms that had been expressed

towards the OAU had focused

specifically on the inability of the

regional organisation to intervene in

cases where human security was under

threat. In particular, the fact that the

OAU failed to prevent and to stop the

genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was a

demonstration that its strict adherence

to the concept of state sovereignty was

detrimental for the very security of

African citizens. The inclusion in the

Constitutive Act of the African Union of a

clause clearly allowing the regional

organisation to intervene in case of

“namely war crimes, genocide, and

crimes against humanity” (Protocol,

Article 4-j; Constitutive Act, article 4-h)

marks a u-turn as it ensures the

recognition of the responsibility to

protect.

The AU has also taken

additional steps so as to ensure that it

can effectively play a role in protecting

human security in the continent. An

important stage in that regard has been

the adoption in 2002, of the Protocol

Relating to the Establishment of the

Peace and Security Council of the AU.

This Protocol laid out the plans that the

AU needed to implement so as to

become an effective actor. As part of the

provisions included in the Protocol were:

the establishment of a Panel of the Wise

in charge of mediation, conflict

prevention and peacemaking efforts; a

Continental Early Warning System

(CEWS) to monitor political dynamics

and prevent crisis; an African Standby

Force (ASF) which establishes brigades

that the AU may deploy as peacekeeping

forces; and a Peace Fund to provide

financial support.

This Protocol therefore

establishes the backbone of the African

Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The APSA rather than focusing solely on

the AU, enlarges the responsibility of

establishing the African Standby Force to

the Regional Economic Communities

(RECs) as they are the stepping stones of

the continental integration. Therefore,

each of the five sub-regions of the AU

(namely, East, South, Central, West and

North) are to implement a scheme so as

to have Regional Brigades that can be

deployed in case a crisis erupts. Similarly,

the setting up of the CEWS will largely

depend on regional early warning

mechanisms. But it is also noteworthy to

mention that the APSA also opens the

door for other actors to collaborate with

the African Union in its effort to provide

peace and security in the continent. This

means for example that African citizens

may contribute to this effort firstly

through the involvement of the Pan-

African Parliament (established in 2004)

but also with the contribution that civil

society organisations may provide.

The setting up of APSA is a

promising step forward that has been

taken by African states. Nevertheless, the

implementation of the various

components of APSA has been met with

many difficulties both institutionally and

financially. So far, none of the APSA

instruments have been implemented in a

way that it can be described as fully and

efficiently functioning. There is in fact still

a long way to go before it will be

possible to give a positive assessment of

the working of APSA.

Other Experiences of regional Governance in the Promotion of Human Security

59

The New Economic

Partnership for Africa’s Development

(NEPAD) was adopted in 2001 to

become the official economic

development program for Africa. It is

interesting to briefly go back to the

genesis of the NEPAD to understand

what the program has been designed to

stand for. This new economic program

was in fact the realisation of various

different economic plans that had been

drafted by African head of states and

governments. The existence of different

proposals clearly shows that there was a

genuine interest in adopting a new plan

guiding the development of the African

continent. Moreover, whether it was the

Millennium Partnership for the African

Recovery Programme heralded by the

South African President Thabo Mbeki

along with Olesegun Obasanjo and

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, or the Omega Plan

for African development presented by

President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, it

was abundantly clear that this new

development strategy was to focus on

good governance to ensure effective

development.

Eventually, the NEPAD which

was adopted in 2002 is a multi-faceted

program that touches not only on

economic development but also on such

issues as good governance, women

empowerment, the eradication of

poverty and human development with a

focus on health, education, science and

technology and skills development.

Therefore, NEPAD already touches on

many aspects that are of direct concerns

to human security and its components.

Makinda and Okumu note that “NEPAD

was established to promote good

governance in return for aid, investment,

and debt relief. This initiative appears to

have been influenced by the desire for a

rethinking of the African state’s

responsibility towards its citizens. It is a

poverty-reduction initiative that reflects

the belief that African states can make

progress in development only if internal

governance is on solid foundations, and

external trade and investment climates

are transformed” (2008:69).

One of the major instruments

used by NEPAD is the African Peer

Review Mechanism (APRM) that has

been established with the aim of

monitoring the level of governance in

the participating states. The APRM thus

aims at enquiring if there is effectively a

conducive environment for economic

development. For that purpose it looks

at, among other things, the level of

corruption in the state under-review and

ensures that the state has ratified

international anti-corruption codes. But

the APRM goes even further by

scrutinising the respect for human rights,

democracy and the rule of law as well.

The APRM reports are then made public

in order to highlight the various

successes and pitfalls, and thus allow for

suggestion for improvement to be

expressed. As an integral component of

NEPAD, and because it focuses more

specifically in resolving “unfreedoms”

linked to bad governance, lack of

democracy and the lack of respect for

human rights, the APRM can be seen as

an essential regional instrument that

participates in the complex architecture

of human security protection and

provision. But in order to do so, the

APRM needs to be followed up with

effective willingness to resolve the

problems identified in the APRM reports.

The self-assessment effort undertaken by

the participating countries should also

not shy away from controversial issues or

serious political problems. Failing to do

so would pose the risk that the NEPAD

commitment to good governance

expressed through its APRM remains an

empty shell. (Jordaan, 2006)

More generally, NEPAD

through its various instruments needs to

be accounted for as a crucial mechanism

working against human security threats.

The overarching aims of NEPAD: to


60

eradicate poverty; to place African

countries (individually and collectively)

on a path of sustainable growth and

development; to halt the marginalisation

of Africa; and to empower women, can

in fact be closely linked to the provision

and improvement of economic security.

NEPAD is also active in regard to the

other components of human security.

For example, the attention devoted to

the promotion of agricultural

development through the

Comprehensive Africa Agriculture

Development Programme (CAADP) can

be directly linked to an effort to provide

food security to African citizens. The

2008 review of the CAADP undertaken

by the African Union recognised that “In

general, CAADP has made significant

progress over the last one and a half

years under the leadership of the Africa

Union Commission (AUC) and the

NEPAD Secretariat to establish itself as a

credible and actionable collective

framework to boost agricultural growth,

reduce poverty, and achieve food and

nutrition security among African

countries.” (African Union, 2008: 4)

All in all, and despite some

shortcomings, it is possible to say that

the AU as a regional organisation has

the ability to play an important part in

the human security equation. Whether it

is through the APSA that directly relates

to freedom from physical violence or the

NEPAD whose various instruments touch

on many aspects of human security, the

AU has been making important steps to

improve the security of African citizens

and reduce the threats they have to face.

This does not mean in any way that the

AU has the same resources and capacity

as other regional organisations such as

say the EU. In fact, despite the

engagement of the AU with various

human security related threats, this

regional organisation has found it quite

difficult to operationalise its endeavours.

Association of Southeast Asian

Nations: the Economic Crisis and

Pandemics

The Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN) was first

established in 1967 with the aims of

accelerating economic growth, social

progress and cultural development in

the region and promoting regional

peace and stability through abiding

respect for justice and the rule of law in

the relationship among countries in the

region and adherence to the principles

of the UN Charter. The regional

organisation soon adopted a framework

to prevent conflicts arising between its

member states. The 1971 Zone of Peace,

Freedom and Neutrality Declaration

(ZOPFAN) commits all ASEAN members

to “exert efforts to secure the recognition

of and respect for Southeast Asia as a

Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality,

free from any manner of interference by

outside powers”, and to “make

concerted efforts to broaden the areas of

cooperation”. However, on the various

instances where ASEAN member states

have had to convene together and

attempted to resolve a given situation,

this has also led to the appearance of the

ASEAN Way which reflects the strict

adherence to the concepts of state

sovereignty and non-interference in

national affairs. The ASEAN Way was in

fact also visible in the institutional set-up

of the south-eastern Asia regional

organisation that gave pre-eminence to

states, was driven by a strictly inter-

governmentalist approach, and very

weak regional institutions. This strict

adherence to the ideals of state

sovereignty and the overarching interest

in state security rather than the security

of individuals has in the end hampered

the ASEAN in taking a stake in the

security of its citizens (Cheeppensook,

2007:6-7)


61

“We see v ibrant and open ASEAN societies consistent w ith their respective

national identities, where all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of gender,

race, religion, language, or social and cultural background.

We envision a socially cohesive and

caring ASEAN where hunger, malnutrition, deprivation and poverty are no longer basic problem s, where strong families as the basic units of

society tend to their members particularly the children, youth, women and elderly; and where the civil society is empowered

and gives special attention to the disadvantaged, disabled and

marginalized and where social justice and the rule of law reign.”

ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997)

Since its inception, ASEAN has

also furthered its regional integration as

it had to deal with various other

important socio-political and economic

issues affecting the region. To that effect

an important aspect has been the way

that ASEAN has responded to the

economic crisis in the 1990s. The 1997

Asian economic crisis deeply affected the

region and created a high level of

economic insecurity in the various

ASEAN member states. The lack of

adequate instruments to protect ASEAN

citizens against the threats created by

the crisis revealed the fragility of the

previously experienced economic boom.

But it also drew the attention of the

member states towards the very human

security of their citizens. “[The] enormous

human sufferings from the crisis put the

rationale of achieving state security

through economic growth in serious

doubt. In post-crisis era, the state’s role of

being the sole provider of security to its

citizens was damaged since it was no

longer capable of delivering continuous

economic growth and sustaining living

standards” (Cheeppensook, 2007:11).

Eventually, in December 1997

the heads of state and governments of

ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020

which laid out the joint plan to help stir

the region out of the crisis. This

document is remarkable as it makes

some clear links with some of the

components of human security. It for

example sets out that the various

member states “envision a socially

cohesive and caring ASEAN where

hunger, malnutrition, deprivation and

poverty are no longer basic problems,

where strong families as the basic units

of society tend to their members

particularly the children, youth, women

and elderly; and where the civil society is

empowered and gives special attention

to the disadvantaged, disabled and

marginalized and where social justice

and the rule of law reign.” (ASEAN,

1997)

The adoption of the ASEAN

Vision 2020 represents an important step

for this regional organisation. With the

adoption of the economic recovery plan,

the ASEAN and its member states have

clearly turned the page of state security

and paid more attention to the security

of their citizens. This shift toward human

security is a clear and major change for

the regional organisation as it will

encourage it to work with the member

states to protect their citizens from

threats and “unfreedoms”. The provisions

made in the ASEAN Vision 2020 have

also been reinforced by the adoption in

2007 of a new ASEAN Charter. This

ASEAN Charter clearly sets out that the

regional organisation shall, among other

things, “ensure that the peoples and

Member States of ASEAN live in peace

with the world at large in a just,


62

democratic and harmonious

environment” (Par. 4).

This shift toward human

security would become instrumental in

the way ASEAN would respond to non-

traditional security threats. As such, the

outbreak of such pandemics as SARS and

the Avian Flu would both demonstrate

that the ASEAN interest in human

security was timely and much needed in

order to curtail the health threat the

pandemics posed not only to the region

but also to the entire world. In late 2002,

the epidemic of SARS broke out in some

southern China province. This pandemic

soon propagated to the neighbouring

areas and by 2003 had transformed itself

in a clearly regional threat affecting the

health of many citizens throughout Asia.

But SARS did not only represent a health

threat, it also had a very important and

negative impact on the economies of the

region. “The extent of the economic

impact of SARS was reflected in the

sudden disruption of economic activity in

several Asian economies. Although the

crisis lasted for about five months, the

economic loss was estimated to be

US$50 billion for the region and about

US$150 billion worldwide” (Caballero-

Anthony, 2008:200).

Asian countries were quick to

realize that to tackle with this threat and

the economic loss it curtailed, a

coordinated response was more than

needed. It is also interesting to note that

ASEAN countries also accepted to

collaborate in this instance with non-

member neighbouring states. Along

with Japan, Korea and China they

grouped as the ASEAN+3 in order to join

their efforts and work together to

combat the threat. Additionally, in April

2003 was also conveyed the Special

ASEAN Summit on SARS to outline the

needed mechanism against SARS and its

various socio-economic consequences

(Caballero-Anthony, 2008:202).

The experienced gained by

responding to the SARS pandemic would

become particularly useful only a few

months later when yet another

pandemic broke out in the region. The

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

(HPAI), caused by the H5N1 virus

represented once again a major threat to

the region. As recognised by the ASEAN

Secretariat:

“[The Avian Flu] had detrimental impacts

on socio-economic development of

several ASEAN Member Countries. The

disease resulted in tremendous losses to

ASEAN poultry industry and posed a

threat to public health. It has also

created a panic in various other regions

all over the world over a potential

human influenza pandemic which

would be caused by mutation of the

H5N1 virus into new strains that could

be transferred between humans and

threaten lives of millions of people”

(ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).

Therefore, the member states

of ASEAN decided to jointly establish a

HPAI Task Force that would be

responsible for formulating and helping

in the implementation of definite

measures and areas of cooperation to

control HPAI in the animal health sector.

Moreover, the combat against the Avian

Flu was also spearheaded alongside with

the neighbouring countries as part of

the ASEAN+3 framework.

It is quite clear that, in the late

1990s, ASEAN made an important shift

towards being more focused on human

security. This new interest in the security

of citizens rather than the security of the

member states has allowed the regional

organisation to design various

instruments and mechanisms that have

ensured and promoted human security.

Whether it concerned economic security

in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian

economic crisis or health threats

following the two pandemics of SARS

and the Avian Flu, the role of the


63

“The Forum noted that the most immediate risks to security in the

region hinge on regional and domestic developments, including natural disasters, trans-national crime including drug trafficking, and

economic, social and environmental policies”

Aitutaki Declaration (1997)

regional organisation in finding a

solution to the threats affecting the

region has been more than instrumental.

It is also interesting to see that the very

existence of ASEAN as a coordinating

mechanism for its member state has

facilitated cooperation with non-member

states of the region through the

ASEAN+3 framework.

Pacific Islands Forum and

Environmental Security

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

started as an international arrangement

in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum. It

was only in 2000 that it transformed

itself in a full-fledged regional

organisation following the Agreement

establishing its Secretariat. In fact, the

Agreement marked more than a simple

name change; it also represented the

willingness of the various states in the

Pacific regions to empower more the

regional level so as to improve

collaboration and cooperation among

themselves. Again in 2005 another step

was taken in the effort to strengthen the

PIF by adopting the Agreement

establishing the Forum and thus creating

a formal regional organisation.

According to the Article II of the 2005

Agreement “The purpose of the Forum is

to strengthen regional cooperation and

integration, including through the

pooling of regional resources of

governance and the alignment of

policies, in order to further Forum

members' shared goals of economic

growth, sustainable development, good

governance, and security”.

The institutional strengthening

of this regional organisation has in fact

followed the realisation by its member

states that the previous arrangement

was ineffectual in what concerned

important threats posed to the region.

The Pacific region has been among the

first regions to recognize and endorse

the concept of human security. In 1997 it

adopted the Aitutaki Declaration on

Regional Security Cooperation. This

document represented a major step

towards a more inclusive definition of

security and an increased concern

regarding non-traditional security

threats. This commitment to human

security has been further strengthened

in the various decisions that have been

adopted afterward by the PIF.

The Aitutaki Declaration states

that: “The Forum recognised the region's

vulnerability to natural disasters,

environmental damage and unlawful

challenges to national integrity and

independence and reaffirmed its

commitment to take a comprehensive,

integrated and collaborative approach to

maintaining and strengthening current

mechanisms for cooperation among

members in dealing with threats to the

security, broadly defined, of states in the

region and of the region as a whole”

(PIF, 1997). The attention being devoted

to environmental security is not innocent

since the Pacific region is particularly

vulnerable to the catastrophe induced

by climate change and environmental

degradation.

In order to better tackle this

environmental threat, the Secretariat was

empowered so that it could coordinate

the efforts being undertaken in that


64

regard. The PIF Secretariat not only

provides assistance in term of policy

assistance but it has also favoured a

more pro-active approach by providing

more direct technical assistance. For

example, the Pacific Plan, which consists

in a regular review of the

implementation of the adopted policies

and programs, ensures that the various

National Sustainable Development

Strategies (NSDS) implemented in the

member states take due consideration

for environmental security and receive

sufficient support in that regard.

Eventually, in 2008 the PIF adopted the

Niue Declaration on Climate Change

which clearly laid out that the PIF and its

member state clearly envisioned climate

change and environmental threats as

being integral parts of their security.

Regional Organisations and

Human Security

The examples given on the

African Union, ASEAN and the PIF show

that there are undoubtedly many ways

in which regional organisations can

contribute to the ongoing efforts to

protect and promote human security.

Each of these regional organisations has

already adopted some instruments and

mechanisms to better respond to human

security threats they have had to face. It

is worth noting that in all of the above

given examples the regional level of

governance has shown a genuine

interest in protecting human security

and is no longer restricted to the

protection of state security.

Moreover, it is also evident

that the role that regional organisations

can have in regard to human security is

not limited to the sole provision of

physical security. Whether it concerns

the AU’s effort to promote development

through NEPAD, ASEAN coordination

efforts in the face of pandemics or PIF

interest in combating environmental

threats, it has become clear that regional

organisations have a role to play in the

many aspects that form human security.

There are in fact many other examples

that could be elaborated to show that

such is the case. The increasing interest

towards the security of individuals has

allowed the regional level to better

coordinate efforts promoting human

security through a variety of issues. The

mechanisms and instruments that have

been established at the regional level

have also become an integral part of the

human security equation.

Another important aspect that

transpires from these examples is that

regional organisations do not only serve

their member states but can actually

create a momentum that allows

neighbouring states and their citizens to

board ship and also benefit from the

regional efforts in the protection and

promotion of human security. It is

interesting to take into account such

phenomenon as it shows that regional

integration processes have become

essential factors in furthering

collaboration and cooperation among

states. This facilitation rendered possible

by regional governance can become

crucial to thwart threats and

“unfreedoms”.

If it has been recognised, as

said in Part I, that the responsibility to

protect is not restricted to the

responsibility to protect from physical

threats, it is then important to also accept

that regional levels of governance can

be human security providers. This

regional level becomes particularly

important when it is indispensable to

tackle with cross-border threats that

need to be addressed above the national

level.

Conclusion

67

Human security encompasses


from want. It implies a paradigm shift in

the old concept of security, changing its

referent, from the state to people, and

covering formerly neglected security

areas: securing people not only

physically bur also protecting them from

sudden and severe disruptions in their

lives that may derive from a plethora of

real and perceived threats.

Human security, as discussed

in Part I, is a universal concept with local

application and relevance. There is no

inherent contradiction in this approach.

Rather, there is a clear recognition that

human security can only be achieved by

giving it concrete meaning for an

individual or a community, considering

that the weight of its composite

elements is likely to vary greatly

depending on several factors. Among

them ethnicity, age, gender, time,

geography, political regime, economic

situation and culture play a significant

role.

Human security does not

mean the same for a poor elderly Roma

woman in Bosnia, for a farmer woman in

Haiti, for a wealthy young man from the

Colombian élite, or for a European

citizen today. They may all face severe

human insecurities, but they face

different threats. The changing nature of

insecurity and vulnerability over time and

space makes, therefore, a strong case for

context-specific approaches.

The current status of human

rights doctrine, the priority given to a

human development agenda and the

ongoing debate on the responsibility to

protect, help to frame the novel concept

of human security, highlighting its

interlinked nature. Implicit in a human

security agenda is the respect and

enjoyment of basic and universal human

rights. Both concepts are sensitive, in

their implementation, to the fight against

poverty and the prevention of violence.

Human security is also intrinsically linked

to human development, since it

represents the protection of the safe and

uninterrupted enjoyment of the

enlarged opportunities and choices that

human development procures. And

finally, the concept of human security is

linked to that of the responsibility to

protect, because, as it was argued in Part

I, the responsibility to protect concept

could eventually be enlarged to all

severe cases of human insecurity.

The limited interpretation and

application of the responsibility to

protect concept to genocide, war crimes,

ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity, pertaining to the freedom

from fear sphere, is well justified by the

need to confirm acceptance, secure

consolidation and early implementation

of this basic principle. However, the

present prevailing understanding of the

responsibility to protect does not allow

the international community to apply the

same sense of compelling obligation to

prevent and remedy extreme sufferings

such as mass starvation, epidemics or

other massive life threats falling under

the category of freedom from want. The

ongoing debate and the discussion that

will follow the recently released report of

the Secretary General of the UN on

Implementing the Responsibility to

Protect should also link those major

insecurities to an explicit responsibility of

the States and the International

Community.

Since the factors of insecurity

may be of a local, national, regional or


68

even international origin, any analysis of

human security must necessarily be

conducted through multilevel lens.

Indeed, providers and facilitators of

human security can range from the very

local authorities at the village level to the

regional or global institutions. It is clear

that global public goods are of central

relevance to human security and,

because of their very nature, they need

to be secured by global actors and often

by regional providers. This means that

the state is no longer the alpha and

omega of the provision of human

security to its citizens, albeit it remains a

critical one.

As explained in Part II, because

of the context specificity characterising

human security, it is not possible to

elaborate a single international standard

measure. The relevant variables change

greatly over place and overtime not

allowing systematic and wide coverage.

International comparisons of human

security situations through quantitative

measures do not seem meaningful in the

light of this analysis. However, it may be

possible to attempt measurement and

international comparison of some

individual factors of human security

taken individually and separately, for

instance the extent of physical insecurity

due to criminal activities.

At the local level

(municipalities, districts, etc.), it may be

possible to identify the priority factors of

real or perceived insecurity, in order to

measure human security through a set of

indicators. In this way, as demonstrated

in Part II, human security may represent

a highly appropriate outcome against

which to assess governance, especially at

local level. Following this rationale, the

medium-term trends and evolutions of

human security indicators at the local

level could provide an indication of the

effectiveness of local governance.

Human security should be a

primary conceptual framework, guiding

the elaboration of public policy and

international actions, again including the

interpretation of the responsibility to

protect. It is, however, at the local level

that human security can represent a real

framework for action since there it

becomes specific and measurable.

Locally, it is possible to determine the

most important vulnerabilities to include

in a context-specific formula for

measuring human security. Such a

baseline could lead to the formulation of

a human security action-plan composed

of policies and concrete actions and

aimed at improving local human security.

The outcome of such a plan should, in

turn, help communities assess the

effectiveness and quality of their local

governance structures.

The rise of regional

frameworks and institutions has created

a new level or layer of governance that

oscillates between the national and

international governance competencies.

This is clearly evident in the case of the

EU which is analysed in Part III. At such

regional levels of governance, the

concept of human security has been

widely used, but mainly in its limited

interpretation, namely as freedom from

fear and physical threat. In the EU,

human security has been applied mainly

to its external relations and foreign

policy. The EU has already proved to be

an interesting case of providing

increased human security outside its

borders, for instance in the impact of the

accession perspectives on neighbouring

countries. However, the internal

application of the human security

framework is highly relevant as well.

Human security of European citizens has

indeed been greatly enhanced by

economic and social integration policies

of the European Union, by the political

integration process, by the application of

the four freedoms (i.e. the free

movement of goods, persons, services

and capital) and by the monetary system

and adoption of a single currency in

some of the member states.

Conclusion

69

As illustrated in Part IV, the EU

represents the most advanced, but not

sole case of successful regional

integration which fosters human

security. Other regional organisations

such as the African Union (AU),

Association of South East Asian Nations

(ASEAN) and the Pacific Islands Forum

(PIF) for example, have shown that they

can potentially contribute in several

ways to the promotion of human

security in their regions. Several

organisations have already adopted

instruments to respond to some human

security threats, and not only limited to

physical security. The examples drawn

from the AU, the ASEAN and the PIF also

illustrate the wide spectrum of threats

that can be tackled by regional

organisations. Far from restricting

themselves to military operation such as

the establishment of a peacekeeping

force, these regional organisations have

demonstrated their willingness to

address, at the regional level, issues such

as economic development, health and

food security, environmental security

and many others. In addition, they create

momentum for their member states to

focus more on their own role as

providers of human security for their

citizens, while cross-border threats to

human security can usefully be dealt

with at the level of regional

organisations. Regional organisations

may have a major role in securing

increased human security for the citizens

of their member states when threats

have to be dealt with above the national

level.

The debate is not near its end.

Reconceptualising security, changing its

referent and advocating for new

instruments that can foster it, but that

can also help to correct the major

disruptions in the daily life of people

requires a shift in paradigm. The

abundance of human security

references, their inclusion into the

agendas of governments, international

and regional institutions is a clear sign

that this is in fact an idea with the power

to reorganize development thinking and

orient the policy response to the ever

changing nature of local and global

insecurities.

71

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Further Readings

Part I Chandler, David (2008), “Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark”, in Security Dialogue,

Vol. 39, No. 4, August 2008, pp. 427-438 Human Security Study Group (2007) A European Way of Security (The Madrid Report),

Madrid: 8th

November 2007. Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid%20Report%20Final%20for%20distribution.pdf

King, Gary and Christopher J. L. Murray (2001), “Rethinking Human Security”, in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 4, pp. 585-610. Available at: http://gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdf.

Large, Judith and Timothy D. Sisk (Eds) (2006, 2007) Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21

st Century, Volumes 1 and 2. Available at:

http://www.idea.int/conflict/dchs/publication.cfm MacLean, Sandra, David R. Black and Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.) (2006) A Decade of Human

Security, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate Newman, Edward (2001) “Human Security and Constructivism”, in International Studies

Perspectives, Vol. 2, pp. 239-251 Newman, Edward and Oliver P. Richmond (Eds.) (2001), The United Nations and Human

Security, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (2004) A Human Security Doctrine for

Europe (The Barcelona Report), Barcelona: 15th

September 2004. Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou (2007), “Human Security in International Organizations: Blessing or Scourge?”, Human Security Journal, Volume 4, Summer 2007

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Anuradha M. Chenoy (2007), Human Security: Concepts and Implications, London and New York: Routledge

Thomas, Caroline (2000) Global Governance, Development and Human Security, London: Pluto Press

Von Tigerstrom, Barbara (2007) “Human Security and International Law”, in Studies in International Law, Vol. 14, Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing

Part II Cahill, Kevin M. (2006) (Ed.), Human security for all, a Tribute to Sergio Vieira de Mello,

New York: Fordham University Press Muggah, Robert and Keith Krause, “A true measure for success? The Discourse and

Practice of Human Security in Haiti,” in the Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2006. Available at:

http://www.journalofdiplomacy.org Owen, Taylor (2004), “Challenges and opportunities for defining and measuring human

security,” in Human Rights, Human Security and Disarmament, Disarmament Forum, three 2004. Available at:

http://www.prio.no Owen, Taylor (2004), “Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium

Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 373. Available at:

http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-774147971/2004to001.pdf UNDP (2005), Venciendo el temor: (In)seguridad Ciudadan y desarollo humano en Costa

Rica, Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, San Jose: PNUD

http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid%20Report%20Final%20for%20distribution.pdf

http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid%20Report%20Final%20for%20distribution.pdf

http://gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdf

http://www.idea.int/conflict/dchs/publication.cfm

http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf

http://www.journalofdiplomacy.org/

http://www.prio.no/

http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-774147971/2004to001.pdf

UNDP (2005), Agenda para el Fortaleciemiento de La gobernabilidad Local en America Latina, Proyecto Regional Feria de Conociemiento de Gobernabilidad Local en America Latina. Available at:

http://www.comminit.com/en/node/41110/36 UNDP, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Centre for the Study of Democracy (1998), Human Security

in Bulgaria 1997, People In Transition, Sofia UNDP (1999), Human Security in South-East Europe, Special Report Commissioned by

UNDP, Skopje, FYROM Part III Biscop, Sven (2005), The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power,

Aldershot: Ashgate Burgess, J. Peter et al. (2007), Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and

Educational Frameworks in Western Europe. Available at: http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/UNESCO_Burgess.pdf

Council of the European Union (2008), Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels: 11

th December

2008 Glasius, Marlies and Mary Kaldor (Eds.) (2006), A Human Security Doctrine for Europe,

London and New York: Routledge Harris, Paul G. (Ed.) (2007), Europe and Global Climate Change: Politics, Foreign Policy,

and Regional Cooperation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Howorth, Joylon (2007), Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke:

Palgrave Kirchner, Emil, and James Sperling (2007), EU Security Governance, Manchester:

Manchester University Press Meyer, Christophe O. (2007), The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing

Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Monar, Jorg (2004), “The EU as an International Actor in the Domain of Justice and Home

Affairs”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9 (3) Smith, Michael E. (2004), Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization of

Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Odette Tomescu-Hatto (Eds) (2007), Promoting Human

Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Eastern Europe. Available at:

http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/UNESCO_Tadjbakhsh_Tomescu-Hatto.pdf Waever, Ole (1998), “Insecurity, security and Asecurity in the Western European Non-War

Community”, in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Ed.), Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Webber, Mark, Stuart Croft, Joylon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Elke Krahmann (2004), “The governance of European security” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 30 (1)

Part IV Abass, Ademola (2004) Regional Organizations and the Development of Collective

Security: Beyond Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Oxford: Hart Publishing Graham, Kennedy and Tãnia Felício (2006), Regional Security and Global Governance, A

Study of Interaction between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council; With a Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism, Brussels: VUB University Press

Lake, David, and Patrick Morgan (Eds.) (1997), Regional Orders, Building Security in a New World, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press

Pugh, Michael and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (Eds.) (2003) The United Nations and Regional Security, Europe and Beyond, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner

The African Union Cilliers, Jackie (2003) Peace and Security through Good Governance: A guide to the

NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism, ISS Paper 70, April 2003. Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/70/Paper70.html

http://www.comminit.com/en/node/41110/36

http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/UNESCO_Burgess.pdf

http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/UNESCO_Tadjbakhsh_Tomescu-Hatto.pdf

http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/70/Paper70.html

Francis, David J. (2006), Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate

Kent, Vanessa and Mark Malan (2003), “The African Standby Force, Progress and Prospects” in African Security Review, Vol. 12 (3). Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No3/EKent.pdf.

Laakso, Liisa (2005), “Beyond the notion of security community: What role for the African regional organizations in peace and security?” in The Round Table, Vol. 94 (381)

Murithi, Timothy (2005), The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development, Aldershot: Ashgate

Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni (2004), “The Role of the AU and NEPAD in Africa’s New Security Regime”, in Shannon Field (Ed.), Peace in Africa. Towards a Collaborative Security Regime, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Acharya, Amitav (1992), “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: a

Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN” in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29 (1)

Acharya, Amitav and Evelyn Goh (Eds.) (2007), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, Cambridge MA: MIT Press

Caballero-Anthony, Mely (2005), “SARS in Asia: Crisis, Vulnerabilities, and Regional Responses”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 45 (3)

Caballero-Anthony, Mely (2005), Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Asean Way, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Garofano, John (2002), “Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?” in Asian Survey, Vol. 42 (3)

The Pacific Islands Forum Chand, Satish (Ed.) (2005), Pacific Islands Regional Integration and Governance, Canberra:

Australian National University Press and Asia Pacific Press Fry, Greg (1991), “The Politics of South Pacific Regional Cooperation”, in Ramesh Thakur,

(Ed.), The South Pacific: Problems, Issues, and Prospects, New York: St. Martin's Press Graham, Kennedy (Ed.) (2008), Models of Regional Governance for the Pacific. Sovereignty

and the future architecture of regionalism, Christchurch: Canterbury University Press Peebles, Dave (2005), Pacific Regional Order, Canberra: Australian National University

Press and Asia Pacific Press

http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No3/EKent.pdf

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