Democracy and economic crisis in Spain:

support, dissatisfaction, and disaffection*

Alberto Sanz,

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

(a.sanz@uam.es),

Rosa M. Navarrete,

Universität Mannheim and

Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES)

(rosa.navarrete@gess.uni-manhnheim.de),

and

José Ramón Montero

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

(joseramon.montero@uam.es)

* We would like to thank Angie Paula Ariza and Amaya Frades for their help in the

data analysis, to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) for its grant for

visiting its extraordinary Banco de Datos, to the Spanish Ministry of Economy and

Competitiveness for its financial support through the research project CSO2013-47071-

R, and to its principal investigator, Mariano Torcal, for his active involvement in the

three-wave panel survey CIUPANEL 2014 which we have used in this paper.

Paper presented for delivery at the at the Workshop on

What Citizens Want from Democracy:

Popular Attitudes to Existing Political Processes and Alternatives

Joint Session of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research

Warsaw (Poland), 29th March-2nd April, 2015

2

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of economic crisis on some relevant political attitudes

towards democracy in Spain, and its consequences in terms of support to established and to

new, emerging parties. We have selected three attitudes: democratic legitimacy or support for

democracy, political and economic discontent or dissatisfaction with the way democracy

works, and political disaffection. Our empirical research strategy included both time-series

and cross-section individual-level analyses over representative samples of Spanish citizens.

Over a period of thirty years, democratic legitimacy and satisfaction with the performance of

democracy, contrary to the mainstream literature in the field, showed to be independent

dimensions --the latter being strongly related to the economic conditions and the former

depending more on political factors. At the individual level, these attitudes proved to have an

impact on the citizens’ disaffection from the political system, as unemployment and opinions

on legitimacy, efficacy, and fairness of capitalism also had. Finally, attending to electoral

consequences, the paper illustrates how, in moments of economic and political crises,

dissatisfaction –but not disaffection-- is directly related to the increasing voting intention

enjoyed by Podemos, a populist left-wing new party, and to the probability of a serious

disruption of the Spanish party system.

3

This paper explores the consequences of the economic crisis in some attitudes towards

democracy in Spain, one of the debtor countries. In Paul Krugman’s (2008) qualified words,

the crisis that began with the bankruptcy of the global financial firm Lehman Brothers in

2008 has been “a long, nasty, and brutish economic slump, … the worst recession in a quarter

of century”. The Great Recession brought in Spain a number of all-time records in increasing

figures for unemployment and public deficit, or in decreasing rates for GDP and capital

formation. Though Spain was not officially bailed-out by the European Stability Program,

both the incumbent socialist government in 2008 and the conservative government which

succeeded it in 2011 introduced a series of drastic austerity measures which included massive

lay-offs, salary cuts for public-sector employees, major tax increases, and extensive cuts in

every social policy, while at the same time negotiated with the EU generous bail-out

provisions for the financial system. The consequences have been devastating. Judged by their

self-proclaimed standards, austerity policies have been a spectacular failure: annual deficits

in the Spanish state budget increased from 4.5 percent of GDP in 2008 to 10.6 percent in

2012; the standing public debt has soared from 36.3 percent of GDP in 2007 to 84.2 percent

in 2012; and unemployment increase from a 8.3 percent in 2003 to a 25.8 percent in 2012.

Austerity policies have not only failed to restore the Spanish economy to health, but they

have also inflicted horrific social costs on already vulnerable sectors of society –in terms of

increasing poverty, producing inequality, and reducing the social-welfare policies and

economic growth of the previous three decades.

The consequences of austerity policies were also political. In a recently systematic

revision of popular reactions to the economic crisis, Nancy Bermeo and Larry M. Bartels

(2014) did show to some extent their surprise for the limited range of these reactions.

Whereas mainstream literature assumes that economic crises are both dramatic and

consequential in terms of citizens’ reactions, Bermeo and Bartels´ findings seem to be more

limited. As they (2014: 3, italics in the original) summarize them, “Voters did punish

incumbents, as predicted; but contrary to expectations, the cumulative potential of the Great

Recession was realized in only a few of the countries we studied… ; in most countries,

popular reactions to the Great Recession were surprisingly muted and moderate”. In

electoral terms, voters punished incumbents regardless their ideology and on the basis of

economic growth much more than unemployment rates (Bartels 2014). And in broader

political terms, austerity policies were contested by distinctive levels of protest mobilization

in the streets (Kriesi 2014).

4

There are, however, other fields of citizen politics that might have received an impact

of the Great Recession and whose consequences are fairly unknown. True, Bermeo and

Bartels (2014: 3) emphasized that none of the cases analyzed in their book “suggests an

ideological sea change or even significant partisan realignments. Nearly all point instead to

impressive continuities with the past”. Yet political attitudes towards democracy were

apparently kept apart from their approach, and, for that matter, from those of many other

contributions that aim to expand the scope of issues potentially affected by the Great

Recession. Besides economic voting and protest mobilization, both political and economic

discontent is to be expected as a natural response to the austerity policies implemented by

governments. And something similar could be said of dissatisfaction with the way democracy

is working or the lack of confidence towards political institutions as the parliament playing a

major role in the economic measures against the recession. But, what if discontent,

dissatisfaction, and distrust reach historically high levels? Do they make any difference for

citizens’ relationships with the political system and more generally with politics? To what

extent could they significantly erode the sources of support for democracy in a given

country? Is there any chance that a profound disaffection with politics could be reinforced

even more by the combination of high levels of dissatisfaction and low doses of democratic

support?

In this paper we will answer these questions through a discussion of democratic

legitimacy, discontent or dissatisfaction with democracy, and political disaffection –three

political orientations that are usually taken as the most relevant attitudes for the relationship

between citizens and their polity or its political institutions. In the next pages we will try to

provide empirical evidence for the relationships between those three political orientations

through two research strategies. The first one consists in a longitudinal analysis of the

dimensions of satisfaction with democracy in Spain and democratic support among citizens.

We have chosen the period 1983-2014. This is justified by the necessity of having a period

long enough to include both wealthy moments and crisis periods, as well as governments

from different political parties with different parliamentary support. The second research

strategy consists in a series of multivariate, cross-section analyses of individual-level survey

data gathered in 2014. This design aims at identifying citizens’ profiles related to democratic

disaffection, lack of legitimacy, and political disaffection in critical moments for both the

5

political system and the economic fabric. Our focus is on the relationship between out three

political orientations, and the extent to which they interrelate with attitudes towards

capitalism, on the one hand, and their joint consequences on party competition and the voting

choice.

We will develop our discussion along five sections. In the following one, we will

conceptualize those political attitudes, establish their relations, and include some contextual

data spanning over more than thirty years. In the second, we will examine the longitudinal

evolution of satisfaction and legitimacy, as well as their statistical association to economic,

political, and contextual factors. In the third, we will perform cross-section analyses of

satisfaction, legitimacy, and disaffection with survey data undertaken in 2014 as a function of

several individual characteristics. In the fourth, we will shortly explore the consequences of

those aforementioned attitudinal factors for the electoral support to different parties in

moments in which both most parties and the party system is experiencing major changes. The

sixth section concludes.

Three dimensions of attitudes toward democracy

Over the course of the 20th century a large number of democratic regimes have come into

existence, but many of them were incapable of surviving over the long term, while others

have functioned poorly. From Max Weber to the present day, many scholars have argued that

the legitimacy accorded to political institutions by citizens is an important dimension of

political systems, particularly in democracies, in which the mass public’s compliance with

government policies is not primarily dependent on coercion. And following David Easton’s

(1965) classical analysis of political life, it has often been argued that the stability of new

democratic systems may depend on the development of widespread mass-level support for

regimes, and that even in established democracies a reservoir of popular support may

facilitate governance and encourage popular compliance with government decisions

irrespective of the policy preferences of individual citizens (see also Gamson 1968).

How should popular support for democracy be conceptualized and operationalized in

empirical studies? As M. Stephen Weatherford (1992: 149) has argued, the literature on

democratic support is characterized by a remarkable gap between the relatively high level of

6

theoretical development in normative political science, on the one hand, and the poverty of

the many empirical indicators that have been used in research on this subject, on the other.1 In

general, most published studies in this area of research share two characteristics. First, they

tend to assume that attitudes towards the political system constitute one single attitudinal

domain, including such seemingly distinct orientations as belief in the legitimacy of

democracy and satisfaction with the current performance of governmental institutions. Some

scholars (e.g., Fuchs 1993: 235-237) have contended that, although it is possible to

differentiate at the conceptual level between what Easton referred to diffuse and specific

support for the regime,2 it is not possible to operationalize this distinction and examine it

empirically. This is, they argue, for a variety of reasons; for instance, because Easton's

original conceptualization was too vague and confusing (Kaase 1988), because measurement

problems are "insuperable" (Loewenberg 1971), because the distinction is tautological (Craig

1993), or because citizens are simply not capable of distinguishing between them (Muller and

Jukam 1977).3

Second, many of these studies assume a close (if not deterministic) relationship

between citizens' levels of satisfaction with the performance of political institutions or the

economy, and support for the democratic regime per se. This question of whether citizens'

attitudes towards their governments and political regimes can be meaningfully separated into

such categories as specific and diffuse support, on the one hand, or are largely

undifferentiated, on the other, could be regarded as well within the realm of sterile academic

debate were it not for the fact that several scholars have asserted that regime support and its

1 Indeed, some assert that legitimacy is a value-laden concept whose very nature precludes analysis

using conventional indicators, or whose empirical operationalization is virtually impossible (Schaar

1981; O'Kane 1993).

2 As nicely described by Mishler and Rose (1999: 3), “Specific support... is the temporary and

relatively ephemeral acceptance or approval that individuals extend to a political object as a result of

its satisfaction of their specific demands.... Diffuse support, in contrast, is conceived as a deeper,

more enduring, and more generalized political loyalty resulting from early life political socialization.

As such it is conceived as immune to short-term inducements, rewards or performance evaluations."

Also see some recent empirical reformulations in Kornberg and Clarke (1992: ch.1), Norris (1999),

and Klingemann (1999).

3 In our view, this latter claim is patently incorrect. Citizens who have more or less recently

experienced a transition from a dictatorship are able to both distinguish between authoritarian and

democratic rule, and to separate their evaluations of system performance (satisfaction) from their

support for the current democratic regime (legitimacy); see Morlino and Montero (1995), and Rose,

Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: ch. 5).

7

stability are highly contingent on popular satisfaction with the performance of governments

and, more broadly, democratic institutions (Weatherford 1987: 13; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and

Svensson 1995: 342). And given the findings of numerous studies that the level of

satisfaction with the performance of democracy is strongly associated with the degree of

satisfaction with the current condition of the economy, they assert that the prospects for

democratic stability and the very survival of these regimes may hinge on their capacity to

solve intractable economic problems (Przeworski 1991: 95).

As students of Spanish politics, we are fairly skeptical about the validity of those two

characteristics. Spanish democracy, after all, became consolidated at about the same time that

the economy was passing through a most severe economic crisis. Despite widespread

discontent resulting from the dislocation associated with economic restructuring, and from

unemployment rates that exceeded 20 percent, by the 1980s support for democracy in Spain

rose to levels comparable to other West European democracies and has remained solid ever

since despite continuing Basque terrorism, political scandals, and subsequent economic

difficulties –including those derived from the Great Recession. On the basis of these

suspicions, in the rest of this paper we undertake a systematic analysis of the nature of the

mass public's attitudes towards democratic politics in Spain over a period spanning three

decades. Our starting point is that these attitudes could not be regarded as constituting one

single dimension. Instead, three distinctly different dimensions could be clearly defined

conceptually and measured empirically: these are what we refer to as democratic legitimacy,

or diffuse system support (using Easton's [1965] terminology); performance satisfaction, or

its antonyms “dissatisfaction” or “discontent”; and a third set of attitudinal orientations that

can be regarded as part of a broad syndrome of political disaffection.

Regime legitimacy pertains to citizens' beliefs that democratic politics and

representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable)

framework for government. Such beliefs should focus on the political regime in the

aggregate, and should be expected to be stable over time and immune from the

correspondence between the citizen's partisan preferences and the party of the incumbent

government. Democratic legitimacy is a relative concept; no system should be expected to be

fully legitimate in the eyes of each and every citizen, and the intensity of positive support for

these institutions varies from one person to another. Accordingly, legitimacy may be

considered to be “the belief that, in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political

8

institutions are better than any others that might be established” (Linz 1988: 65; 1978a: 16).

This definition is also relative insofar as it refers to the belief that a democratic political

system is the “least bad” of all forms of government. As famously expressed by Winston

Churchill in his speech at the House of Commons, “Many forms of Government have been

tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is

perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government

except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.4 Otherwise said,

democratic legitimacy is ultimately based on “the belief that for that particular country at that

particular juncture, no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of

collective goals” (Linz 1978b: 18).

In contrast, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, like Easton's concept of

specific support, is based on “peoples’ judgments about the day-to-day actions of political

leaders and the operation of governmental institutions and processes” (Kornberg and Clarke

1992: 20). It should thus be expected to fluctuate over time in accord with the government's

performance and the condition of the society and economy. And since it is focused on

partisan political leaders and the governments they lead, it would not be surprising to find

that, other things being equal, citizens supporting the same party as that of the incumbent

government would be more positive in their assessments than those who voted for the

opposition. Its more commonly used antonyms, political dissatisfaction or, to use still a

similar concept, political or economic discontent result from the government’s inability to

deal effectively with problems regarded by citizens as important (Dahl 1971: 144). And they

can be considered as expressions of displeasure resulting from the belief that the performance

of the government or political is falling short of the citizens’ wishes or expectations (Farah,

Barnes, and Heunks 1979); or as reflecting a frustration derived from comparing what one

has with what one hopes or expects to have (Gamson 1968).5

The third cluster of attitudes that we shall explore in this paper, political disaffection,

is conceptually distinct from both democratic legitimacy and political satisfaction, although it

is often indiscriminately lumped together with them. Following Giuseppe DiPalma (1970:

4 In Hansard, The Official Report, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 444, 11 November 1947.

5 For other enlightening discussions of satisfaction with the performance of democracy and/or

democratic institutions, see Anderson and Guillory (1997); Newton and Norris (2000), and Nadeau, et

al (2000).

9

30), we regard political disaffection as a certain estrangement of members of the polity from

its core political institutions. This syndrome is characterized by a number of specific

symptoms including disinterest in politics, political inefficacy, cynicism and distrust, the

belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens, and a general sense of

detachment from the political system and/or its most relevant institutions. While this

syndrome shares with the dissatisfaction dimension a negative attitude towards politics, it is

different in one important respect: political dissatisfaction may be regarded as the result of a

discrepancy between generally positive expectations regarding the political system, on the

one hand, and a negative evaluation of the way it is currently functioning, on the other; in

contrast, political disaffection is a reflection of a fundamentally distrusting and suspicious

vision of political life. And unlike dissatisfaction (which should be expected to ebb and flow

in accord with current assessments of the performance of incumbents or democratic

institutions), attitudes of disaffection are likely to have been fixed at some stage of the

socialization process, and should subsequently be more resistant to change. In addition,

while dissatisfaction can be charged with a partisan component (with supporters of opposition

parties generally more critical of the performance of the government and dissatisfied with its

policy outputs than those who identify with the incumbent party), disaffection is more far-

reaching and indiscriminate in its objects of negativity (Torcal and Montero 2006).

In earlier empirical studies of Spain (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997; Gunther,

Montero, and Torcal 2007), we found strong evidence that these three dimensions are

empirically distinct. Analyzing survey data in several different ways, we concluded that the

abstract conceptual distinctions described above are clearly reflected in Spanish citizens’

responses to the relevant questionnaire items over three decades. Table 1 and Figure 1

present two indicators that reflect basic perceptions of democratic legitimacy.6 In both cases,

democracy was overwhelmingly endorsed by citizens from the very beginning, and has

remained constant thereafter: between two thirds and more than three quarters of those

interviewed agreed with the statement affirming the superiority of democracy over any other

political system. The high level of support for democracy in 1978 probably reflects a

honeymoon effect, but from 1982 onwards a very high level of democratic legitimacy is fully

6 These items were, for Table 1, the agreement with the statement that “Democracy is the best form

of government for a country like ours”, and, for Figure 1, the choosing by respondents one option

among the followings: “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; Under some

circumstances an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system; [and] For

people like me, one regime is the same as another”.

10

apparent. Figure 1 reveals the same pattern, strengthened now by evidence of the low levels

of support for non-democratic alternatives. The outgoing authoritarian elites played a positive

and constructive role in the transition to a democratic regime, as did prominent political elites

and organizations during the transition period: both did have a major impact on the political

attitudes of their respective sets of followers. The results was that the divide between the new

democracy vs. the old dictatorship did not emerge as a cleavage separating supporters of one

party from another, and a broad interparty consensus in support of democracy emerged.

Indeed, ever since by the 1980s, levels of support for democracy in Spain are

indistinguishable from those of other West European countries (Montero, Gunther, and

Torcal 1997: 129).

[Table 1 and Figure 1]

In contrast to the underlying continuity seen in these indicators of democratic

legitimacy, evaluations of the performance of the political system and its governing elites have

oscillated considerably over time. There are several different measures of performance, and all

were strikingly parallel to one another in their evolution over time regardless of the wording of

the questionnaire item. Whether the face content of the by now classical survey item focused

on satisfaction with “the way democracy is functioning in Spain”, or on a assessment of the

political or economic situation of the country, all measures of satisfaction were quite positive at

the time the new democracy was coming into existence around 1977 (Figures 2 and 3). They

all fell to a very low level in 1981 (which coincided with the depths of Spain's political and

economic crises, particularly evident in the high unemployment levels) (Figure 4); they all rose

to a peak around 1990 following nearly a decade of stable government and strong economic

growth, and declined again as a series of scandals beset the incumbent Socialist government

and the economy slid into recession in 1992 and 1993; they all then rose as the economy

recovered in the mid 1990s and went down once again after 2008 with the arrival of the Great

Recession. On the other hand, those measures on the performance of the economy almost

perfectly co-varied with the assessment of the political conditions. As would be expected,

dissatisfaction with the economic situation was strongest precisely at the worst moments of the

three recessions. But evaluations of the political conditions followed exactly the same pattern.

This convergence is particularly evident in the consequences of the austerity policies

implemented firstly by a socialist government in 2008 and above all by the conservative

government since 2011. Levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and the

negative assessments of both the economic and political situations did reach extraordinarily,

11

unprecedented high levels. In 2014, and for the first time in the last four decades, around 90

percent of Spaniards showed their discontent towards the economic and the political situation,

and 85 percent reported its dissatisfaction with the working of democracy. The sharp contrast

between the stability over time of attitudes pertaining to democratic legitimacy, on the one

hand, and the considerable fluctuation of satisfaction with the performance of the economy or

the incumbent government, on the other, provided prima facie evidence of the distinctiveness

of these attitudinal dimensions.

[Figures 2, 3, and 4]

Attitudes falling within the disaffection syndrome were also quite stable over this

same time period. In this section we will examine only two indicators of disaffection in

Spain: psychological involvement in politics and confidence in political institutions. Among

the different specific indicators of psychological involvement, the usual indicators are levels

of political interest (defined by the degree to which politics arouse a citizen’s curiosity) (Van

Deth 1990: 281 ff.) and frequency of political discussion (symbolized by the behavioral

expression of interest which crystallizes in informal political participation) (Topf 1995). Both

indicators provide a basic picture of attitudes of affection, perceptions of proximity, and

positive sentiments towards politics. In both cases, the Spanish data suggest the existence of

clear disaffection. As can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, levels of political interest and frequency

of political discussion have been extremely low despite the enormous political and

institutional changes witnessed over the last almost four decades. The final indicator is

confidence in political institutions, and more particularly in the Parliament. It follows similar

patterns (Figure 7): its level is also low, and has been decreasing even more during the Great

Recession. In short, the Spaniards’ levels of disaffection appear high. Their estrangement

from politics (expressed in low involvement and a basic distrust of political institutions) is

reinforced by other relevant attitudinal features, as their scant sense of both internal and

external political efficacy. These symptoms have remained stable over the last decades.

Unlike the indicators of dissatisfaction, measures of disaffection have not fluctuated in

parallel with the gigantic changes affecting social, economic, or political conditions of the

new democracy. Clearly, democratic legitimacy, political discontent, and political

disaffection are conceptually and empirically distinct from each other.

[Figures 5, 6, and 7]

Time series analysis, 1983-2014

12

Research design, data and hypotheses

Longitudinal or time series analysis allows us to determine if the evolution of a specific

dependent variable is associated to the changes shown by a set of independent variables.

Given the continuous quantitative nature of our dependent variables, our time series models

have been formed using ordinary least squares. This method allows also a qualitative

interpretation of the model residuals7. Residuals express the variations in the studied

phenomena that escape from the theory implicit in the models. That is, atypical residuals

peaks point towards the existence of an exceptional event.

Figures 8, 9, and 10 reflect the evolution of our dependent variables along the period

between 1983 and 2014. Data was obtained from the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones

Sociológicas (CIS).8 Following Leonardo Morlino and Marco Tarchi (2006), we have

measured dissatisfaction with the percentage of those “not at all satisfied” with how

democracy works. Figure 8 shows that, starting from a baseline around 8 percent, levels of

dissatisfaction rose up to 16 per cent during the political and economic crises of the early

1990s, and up to 36 per cent in 2013. On the other hand, our second dependent variable has

been operationalized through the measurement of the percentage of those choosing the item

“in some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, can be preferable to a

democratic system” against “democracy is preferable to any other form of government” or

“people like me doesn’t care about one or another regime”. As shown in Figure 9, the

eventual support to an authoritarian regime starts from values close to 12 percent in the

1980s, descends to 5 percent at the end of the 1990s and has grown slightly since then,

regaining the level of 8 percent in 2014. Its total variation range was 11 points. Figure 10

shows the covariation of both series. Results show the autonomy of legitimacy vis-à-vis the

fluctuation of dissatisfaction (with a correlation of .14, and a significance of .44): our first

hypothesis (as stated in Table 2) is greatly falsified.

[Figures 8, 9, and 10]

7 Residuals are computed as the difference between the observed (real) values of the dependent

variable and the predicted (or fitted) values by the model, at every time point.

8 Data on legitimacy for 2014 come from the third way of the CIUPANEL survey, directed by

Mariano Torcal and funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiviness (CSO2013-

47071-R).

13

[Table 2]

Regarding the measurement of our independent and control variables, we have

chosen, in all but one case, objective indicators. By doing so the exogenous nature of the

independent variables is guaranteed. Economic growth and unemployment have been

measured using the GDP increase and the unemployment series provided by Euromonitor; the

size of the public sector has been measured also with the increase of the public spending

provided by Euromonitor. Unfortunately, “objective” data based on expert assessments on

levels of corruption in Spain are available only since 1990, and consequently we had to use

survey data. More specifically, corruption in Spain has been operationalized by the yearly

average of the percentage of respondents who considered “corruption” among the three main

problems in Spain in the CIS quarterly barometer. Control variables are dichotomous, and

take into account the ruling party (which takes the value 1 for the Partido Socialista Obrero

Español [PSOE] and 0 for the conservative Partido Popular [PP]) and the election year

(which takes the value 1 for the years in which general elections were held and 0 in all other

cases).

As mentioned above, Table 2 summarizes our hypotheses. The first predicts that low

levels of satisfaction with democracy are related to a decrease of its legitimacy. The second

(H2.1) considers the existence of a direct relationship between unemployment and GDP

growth and the satisfaction of democracy. The third (H3.1) raises a relationship between the

public spending implemented by the various governments and the levels of satisfaction with

democracy. The fourth (H4.1) is oriented towards contextual factors and proposes an inverse

relationship between levels of corruption and satisfaction with democracy. Similarly,

hypothesis H2.2, H3.2 and H4.2 considered identical relations, but now taking democratic

legitimacy as the dependent variable.

Results

In order to test the aforementioned hypothesis we have estimated several time-series

analyses.

14

On Dissatisfaction. Figure 11 shows the evolution of three series: The actual levels of

dissatisfaction, the predicted (or fitted) values of dissatisfaction from our regression model,

and the residuals (or the differences between the two previous series). As already mentioned,

analysis of these residues can be useful to identify “atypical” oscillations.9 In the case of

dissatisfaction, both the R2 coefficient and the figure of observed and predicted values

confirm the good fit of the data to the model proposed for dissatisfaction.

[Figure 11]

Table 3 shows the regression coefficients for dissatisfaction, in which economic

factors are relevant. Discontent significantly grows whenever unemployment or GDP

decrease. Both findings confirm hypothesis H2.1. In contrast, annual variations in public

spending growth are unrelated to dissatisfaction levels, falsifying hypothesis H3.1 Among

contextual factors, dissatisfaction increases significantly when corruption is perceived as one

of the main problems of Spain, which confirms H4.1. But it was not so with the other control

variables. Neither the color of the party in government nor the celebration of elections in a

given year appear to be associated with variations in the levels of discontent .

[Table 3]

On the preferences for an authoritarian regime. According to models 2, 3, and 5 in

Table 4, higher unemployment increases are associated with increases in the preferences for

an eventual authoritarian regime. This is not the case for GDP growth. This mixed evidence

weakens the relevance of the economic context pointed in H2.2. Attending to the factors

related to public policy, an increase in the public spending is significantly related to an

increase in the support to an authoritarian regime. This –counterintuitive- result contradicts

H3.2. In the same line, the relationships between corruption and legitimacy is also direct but

not robust across different model specifications, and the same is true for the fact of being

governed by PSOE. These mixed results call for a more detailed analysis of legitimacy

within the PP and PSOE voters.

[Table 4]

9 Peaks in the residual series indicate specific moments in which levels of dissatisfaction (later, legitimacy) are

not adequately predicted by the factors considered in the model. Usually these peaks in the residuals coincide

with specific moments with exceptional circumstances.

15

On the preferences over an authoritarian regime within the PSOE and PP voters. During

the transition to democracy, levels of democratic support were unevenly distributed among

voters (and also among leaders) for the main political parties. This support was quite high

among left-wing voters for Partido Comunista de España (PCE) and PSOE, and decreased for

Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) centrists and, specially, for the very conservative voters

of Alianza Popular (AP) (Linz et al. 1981; Morlino and Montero 1995; Gunther and Montero

2001). After 1985, party electorates still hold distinctive patterns (Figure 12). Preferences for

an authoritarian regime were low and constant for PSOE voters (with an average of 5, and a

standard deviation of 1.5), and much higher and particularly more volatile for PP supporters

(average, 17, standard deviation, 10).

[Figure 12]

How to explain these differences? Results for PP voters can be found in Models 5 and

6 of Table 4. For them, economic factors seem to play again a role. Unemployment shows a

direct and significant relationship with support to an authoritarian regime, while GDP growth

is not statistically significant; both variables, however, point in the same direction. Public

expenditure shows a remarkable and robust relationship: the higher the public spending, the

greater the conservative voters’ support to an eventual authoritarian regime. Contextual

factors are interesting. Holding of elections and corruption levels show inconsistent or null

relationships. But, when the PSOE is in government, then a strong and significant increase in

support to authoritarian regime occurs, increasing by an average of 8 percentage points.

Figure 13 shows the observed and predicted values of legitimacy of democracy among PP

voters. The model fit is remarkable, capturing correctly 70 per cent of the variation of the

support to authoritarian regimes among the PP voters.

[Figure 13]

It seems that, following Anderson et al. (2005), conservative voters would condition

their support for democracy to their electoral fortunes and to the economic policies at play.

Their attitudes towards democracy seem to reflect a remarkable instrumental component.

They support democracy when AP and later PP, their parties, are in the government and

public spending is low; and they question democracy if spending increases or PP have to stay

in the opposition.

16

Citizens and democracy

In the early 2000s, several cross-section analyses examining the basic perceptions of

democracy in Spain reached the conclusion that satisfaction with democracy, legitimacy, and

disaffection were rather independent among them (Montero, Sanz, and Navarrete

forthcoming). But the political and economic situation has profoundly changed in 2014. As

we already know, political and economic discontent as well as dissatisfaction with the way

democracy works were all-time record for the whole democratic period. Can we expect any

correlative changes in the attitudes towards democracy of Spanish citizens? Paying attention

to some significant changes in the political context –as for instance the entry of two new

parties into the party system and the punishment afflicted to the two major parties--, it is clear

that Spanish democracy is now confronting different challenges.

The slogan “No nos representan” –that can be translated as “They do not represent

us”-- summarizes the feeling of those electors who are switching their preferences to new

political entrepreneurs and their corresponding parties who are taking advantage of the

sustained economic recession and the political discontent. Criticisms against Spanish

democracy have come hand by hand with less disaffection. For instance, the percentage of

those who never or almost never discuss politics has been dramatically reduced. Changes like

this call for an assessment of the determinants of political attitudes towards democracy amid

the Great Recession. To do so, we will test how satisfaction with democracy, democratic

legitimacy and political disaffection interrelate, and how political, social, and economic

factors affect these three attitudinal dimensions. We will use data from the CIUPanel, and

more particularly from its third wave, undertaken in December 2014 and with a sample of

2,563 respondents. By then, Podemos (We Can), a left-wing, populist new party, has made a

surprising entry at the European Elections with eight MEPs and became unexpectedly soon

the very first party in vote intention, leaving behind the conservatives of PP and the socialists

of PSOE.10

Does the emergence of this new party mean a change in the relations between

democratic discontent, legitimacy and disaffection? How does this affect attitudes towards

democracy? Is there any change in the role played by democracy concerning vote choice?

Our expectations are summarized in Table 5. We expect the three dimensions of

attitudes towards democracy to show certain level of autonomy. Concerning the impact of

10

According with the CIS Barometer, survey 3050, January 2015, accessible at

http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=14141.

17

economic factors on these attitudes, we also expect them to have a higher effect on the most

unstable attitudes, i.e., on satisfaction with democracy, compared to the effect on the other

two (H2). We assume that political participation (conventional or unconventional) would

have a distinctive role to each dimension. Those who participate more actively would be

more satisfied with democracy (H3), would prefer democracy over other regimes (H4), and

would be less disaffected towards politics (H5). As the consequences of the economic crisis

are affecting citizens with different social profiles, we expect younger citizens to be more

discontent with democracy (H6), significantly indifferent to the political regime (H7), and

more disaffected than critical (H8). Finally, those who voted for the incumbent government

would feel better represented and would be significantly satisfied with democracy (H9); they

would also think that democracy is the best political system (H10) and would be less

disaffected and less critical towards democracy (H11). By testing these hypotheses we will be

in condition to define citizens’ individual profiles in the context of an economic crisis that

has contributed to a serious disruption of the Spanish party system.

[Table 5 ]

For testing these hypotheses we have estimated three different models for each of our

dependent variables. For satisfactions with democracy, measured for 2014 as a dichotomous

variable in which 0 means dissatisfied and 1 is satisfied with democracy, we ran binomial

logistic regressions. In the case of legitimacy, we ran multinomial regressions since our

dependent variable had three categories: democracy is best (used as reference category),

sometimes an authoritarian regime, indifferent to regimes. The third dependent variable,

disaffection, was computed as a continuous one, so in this case we ran lineal regression

models. Disaffection is measured as the interaction of political interest and confidence

towards political institutions. In its turn, confidence is the resulting variable of a principal

component analysis of the variables measuring confidence in the Spanish Parliament, in

Spanish politicians and in Spanish political parties. The definition of disaffection used here

follows the typology of citizens described in José Ramón Montero, Alberto Sanz, and Rosa

M. Navarrete (forthcoming). According to their typology, citizens can be classified based on

their political interest and confidence in political institutions. The label of cives is defined as

those who combine high levels of both interest and confidence; on the opposite side, the

disaffected are those with low interest and low confidence. The other two combinations refer

18

to critical (high interest and low confidence) and deferent citizens (high confidence and low

interest). In tis section, we will solely focus on critical and disaffected attitudes.

Satisfaction with democracy

Models of satisfaction with democracy can be found in Table 6. The first remarkable result is

that satisfaction seems to be independent from legitimacy, and to some extent related to

disaffection: the more disaffected or the more critical citizens may be, the more chances they

have to be dissatisfied with how democracy works. On the economic side, poor evaluations of

the national economy are related to political discontent. Unconventional participation –but

not turnout- is also related to dissatisfaction with democracy. Regarding other socio-

demographic an attitudinal factors, age and education level are not associated to higher or

lower levels of dissatisfaction as neither is left-right ideology. Finally, a higher degree of

religiosity is associated to greater chances of being satisfied with democratic performance in

Spain.

[Table 6]

Legitimacy

As anticipated by the results in the time-series analyses, support for authoritarian regimes is

independent from satisfaction with democracy and from political disaffection (Table 7). All

other factors constant, the profile of those supporting an authoritarian regime is that of a

person with low social trust, older than those supporting democracy, with low propensity to

participate in demonstrations, with a relative more conservative ideology, higher chances to

vote for PP and maintaining a positive evaluation of the economic situation in Spain. Given

the low variability of legitimacy across Spanish citizens, the model fit for legitimacy is

clearly the lower of the three attitudes considered in this section.

[Table 7]

Disaffection

The results for disaffection can be found in Table 8. The probability of being

a critical or disaffected citizen in Spain is inversely related to both satisfaction with

democracy and democratic legitimacy. And the economy also plays a role: the better the

19

assessment on the economy, the higher the probability of being critical or disaffected. On the

other hand, it is remarkable that being unemployed –and to some extent alienated from the

labor market-- is associated also with higher probability of being disaffected from the

political sphere, but not to hold critical attitudes. Religiosity, a conservative ideology, social

trust, age, and unconventional participation are inversely related to both dimensions, while

conventional participation is inversely related only for that of disaffection.

[Table 8]

Citizens, democracy, and the economic system

To what extent political legitimacy is linked to beliefs in the legitimacy of the economic

system? There is not much information about the connections between these two fields, and

the literature is remarkably scarce.11

Obviously, the Spanish case after the Great Recession is

particularly interesting since, given its longstanding consequences in terms of unemployment,

inequality, impoverishment, and drastic reductions in welfare policies, the failure of the

political system could be directly connected by citizens to an extremely negative performance

of the economic system. Can we therefore expect an impact of perceptions on the economic

system on attitudes towards democracy?

In this section we analyze whether attitudes towards capitalism are affecting those

towards democracy. Also, we will check whether assessments on the economic system have

an impact on citizens’ political discontent, democratic legitimacy, and disaffection. The

relevance of this analysis lays on their apparent interdependency. We have repeated our

analysis by using the same dependent variables that were discussed in the previous section,

and adding three more independent variables: capitalist legitimacy12

, capitalist efficacy,13

and

11

Juan J. Linz has been one of the few in analyzing with survey data those relationships; see his

chapter, “Legitimacy of Democracy and the Socioeconomic System”, in Mattei Dogan, ed.,

Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,

1988), pp. 65-113. 12

Capitalist legitimacy is a dichotomous variable, in which respondents were asked whether they

agree or not with the statement that “the capitalist economy of free initiative is the best economic

system for our country”.

13

Respondents answered if they agreed with the statement that “the capitalist economy of free

initiative allows citizens of this country to solve their problems”.

20

capitalist fairness.14

We have estimated two models. One model includes those attitudes

towards democracy that are not acting as dependent variable and the three variables related to

the economic system; the second model includes these two groups of independent variables,

the assessment of economy –a variable that has confirmed to have a relevant effect on

democratic discontent and disaffection--, and left-right ideology, which has been statistically

significant in the previous analyses of the three political attitudinal dimensions.

In Table 9, attitudes towards capitalism have a significant impact on satisfaction with

democracy. Legitimacy, efficacy, and fairness of the capitalist system have a positive effect,

what leads us to consider there that citizens seem to perceive political and economic systems

as if they were the two sides of the same coin. Comparing the two models, the main

difference is the decrease on the goodness of fit of the second model. Ideology and

assessment of the economic situation made no contribution to the understanding of

satisfaction with democracy when controlling by attitudes towards the capitalist system.

Because the fairness of the capitalist system has five categories and rising one level on the

perceived fairness of capitalism increases satisfaction with democracy more than half a point,

this is clearly the factor with a higher impact. In short, maintaining all other variables

constant, those who consider capitalism as a very fair system will add more than 2 points on

satisfaction with democracy than those who consider capitalism as very unfair. In what

respects to democratic attitudes, results are comparable to those obtained in the previous

section with the preference for political regimes as non significant, and disaffection with a

negative significant effect.

[Table 9]

Results for democratic legitimacy shown in Table 10 are quite different. They

highlight the autonomy of political discontent vis-à-vis preferences for political regimes. On

the contrary, disaffection is a factor tied to indifference towards political regimes. Here,

assessment of economy and ideology play a relevant role, especially for those who sometimes

would prefer an authoritarian regime over a democratic one: the more to the right, the more

authoritarian or indifferent towards regimes. Also, positive assessments of economy are

related to the eventual preference of an authoritarian regime over a democratic one.

[Table 10]

14

Respondents had to answer whether they considered the economic system to be very unfair, rather

unfair, nor unfair neither fair, rather fair, and very fair.

21

Finally, critical and disaffected citizens are affected by perceptions over the efficacy

and fairness of the economic system (Table 11). As it could be expected, those who answered

that capitalism can solve citizens’ problems tend to be less disaffected or critical, as is the

case of those who believe on the fairness of the economic system. The legitimacy of

capitalism, however, has no effect on disaffection. Adjustment of models improves slightly

when including assessment of economy and ideology. These variables are also significant and

work similarly to the case of legitimacy: the more to the right and the more optimist an

assessment of the economy, the less disaffected or critical. Concerning attitudes towards

democracy, when compared the models of the previous section to these, the impact of

satisfaction with democracy, support to an eventual authoritarian regime, and indifference

towards regimes decrease when attitudes towards capitalism are included in the model. It has

to be highlighted that the coefficients for “sometimes authoritarian” and “indifferent towards

regimes” increase when ideology and assessment of the economy are included in the model;

they change from 0.722 to 0.895 in the case of the critical citizens, and from 0.560 to 0.711

for the disaffected ones. Thus, attitudes towards capitalism may push the effect of legitimacy

on disaffection.

[Table 11]

In our previous longitudinal analysis we observed that attitudes towards democracy

work in a distinctive manner to PSOE and PP voters. In this section we discussed the extent

to which attitudes towards the existing economic system affects democracy. The European

financial crisis has open a major debate about the way the economic system is interfering

with the sovereignty of the countries and how economic powers are winning the battle to the

political ones. This discussion is much more intense in countries that had to confront a bailout

or had to implement austerity, unpopular measures that, in some cases, directly come from

Brussels. This is the case of Spain. In the next section we analyze to what extent attitudes

towards democracy and capitalism play a role on the voting choice.

Democracy, the economic system, and the voting choice

The decrease on the support for the two major parties in Spain was not just an expression of

protest of those more affected by economic constraints, but also a challenge to the existing

political and economic systems. Is voting intention affected by citizens’ assessments over the

democratic and economic systems? Can we point at some profiles of those voting for each of

22

the three most important national parties if attitudes towards democracy and capitalism are

include into the models?

We conducted an exploratory analysis of vote in late 2014 to answer these questions.

We ran linear regressions with the probability to vote for each of four parties selected (PP,

PSOE, Izquierda Unida [IU, a coalition between PCE and some minor left-wing parties], and

Podemos) as dependent variables15

. We did run three models. The first one includes only

attitudes towards democracy; perceptions over the economic system are included in the

second model, and, finally, age and ideology are added in the third model. This way we can

trace the profiles of those who have a major sympathy or a higher propensity to vote to these

parties.

[Table 12]

The results are included in Table 12. The PP is clearly the party with the highest variance

explained by our models; this means that our models are better equipped at predicting the

vote for this party. These models have a worse performance when the dependent variable is

any of the other three parties, perhaps because their potential voters belong all to the left and

therefore have pretty similar attitudes towards the political system and towards capitalism.

Looking more carefully, results for Podemos antagonize with those for PP. Those with a

higher propensity to vote for PP are the most satisfied with democracy, the only ones who

show a significant preference for an eventual authoritarian regime, and a strong support for

capitalism. On the other hand, those who sympathize with Podemos are the most discontented

with democracy and the most critical against capitalism. They are also the youngest and more

leftists. Podemos is the only party in which disaffection has no effect, while on the other three

parties the impact of disaffection is remarkably negative. Instead, this short analysis does not

seem to satisfactorily explain voting for the PSOE. The party is supported by individuals with

a similar profile to that of Podemos sympathizers. Alas, the third model, the one with a better

adjustment, explains only 18 percent of the probability of voting for PSOE, while the

percentage of variance predicted in the case of the PP is higher than 51 percent, and 26

percent in the case of Podemos.

[Table 12]

15

The probability of voting for each party goes from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely).

23

Conclusion

We began this paper by asking the impact of the Great Recession on political attitudes

towards democracy in Spain. In order to answer this question we have firstly discussed the

concepts of support for democracy or democratic legitimacy, political and economic

discontent or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, and political disaffection. Tough

these three attitudes belong to a broader field that houses many political orientations towards

political systems, at the same time are quite different concepts that, once correctly

operationalized, measure different attitudes. Thus, contrary to mainstream literature in the

field, our analysis has shown that they differ both conceptually and empirically. Among

them, dissatisfaction with democracy is the one showing larger variability in recent Spanish

democratic history. In contrast, legitimacy and disaffection were characterized by their great

stability over the past three decades. When we explored through longitudinal, time-series

analyses the impact of political and economic changes on dissatisfaction and preferences for

an authoritarian regime, each one responded in an idiosyncratic way. On one hand,

dissatisfaction proved to be sensitive to the deterioration of the economic situation; on the

other, support for democracy appeared linked to political factors. More specifically, the

eventual support for an authoritarian regime is more prevalent among PP voters than on those

who vote for the PSOE. Additionally, it seems that to some extent conservative voters

condition their support for democracy to the economic policies implemented and also to the

electoral fortune of their party: in the moments when PSOE is in government they increase

their support for authoritarian regimes in an average of 8 percentage points.

On the second part of our paper we have paid attention to cross-section survey data

gathered in late 2014, in a moment combining huge levels of dissatisfaction and disaffection

with the first signs of a serious party system change after the entry of new parties at the

occasion of the elections to the European Parliament held in May 2014. Current political

situation cannot be understood without looking carefully to what led citizens to distrust the

two major parties. We have examined a number of variables affecting those attitudes toward

democracy what affects attitudes towards democracy; to the usual set of economic, social,

and political factors, we have also included variables related with the economic system. We

found there are interesting –and not very often explored-- relationships between assessments

of capitalism and attitudinal dimensions of democracy. Finally, those relations are also

relevant for explaining some features of party competition and voting choice. While potential

24

voters for PP and Podemos exhibit antagonistic profiles, PSOE and Podemos seem to

compete for a very similar electorate in terms of ideology, but much less so in terms of

attitudes towards both the economic and political systems.

References

Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. “Political Institutions and

Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian

Systems”. American Political Science Review 91: 66-81.

Bartels, Larry. 2014. “Ideology and Retrospection in Electoral Responses to the Great

Recession”, in L. Bartels and Nancy Bermeo, eds., Mass Politics in Tough Times. Opinions,

Votes, and Protest in the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bermeo, Nancy, and Larry M. Bartels. 2014. “Mass Politics in Tough Times” in L. Bartels

and N. Bermeo, eds., Mass Politics in Tough Times. Opinions, Votes, and Protest in the

Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Craig, Stephen C. 1993. The Malevolent Leaders: Popular Discontent in America. Boulder,

CO: Westview Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1970. Apathy and Participation. Mass Politics in Western Societies.

New York: Free Press.

Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.

Farah, Barbara G., Samuel H. Barnes and Felix Heunks. 1979. “Political Dissatisfaction”, en

Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al., Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western

Democracies. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Fuchs, Dieter. 1993. “Trends of Political Support in the Federal Republic of Germany”, in D.

Berg-Scholosser and R. Rytlewski, eds., Political Culture in Germany. New York: St.

Martin’s Press.

Fuchs, Dieter, Giovanna Guidorossi, and Palle Svensson. 1995. “Support for the Democratic

System”, in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., Citizens and the State. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

25

Gamson, William A. 1968. Power and Discontent. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press.

Gunther, Richard, and José Ramón Montero. 2001. “Die Multidimensionalität der

Einstellungen zur Demoktratie: Das Beispiel Spanien”, in Marcus Gräser, Christian Lammert

and Söhnke Schreyer, eds., Staat, Nation, Demokratie. Traditionen und Perspektiven

moderner Gesellschaften. Fetschrift für Hans-Jürgen Puhle. Gotinga: Vandenhoeck &

Ruprecht.

Gunther, Richard, José Ramón Montero, and Mariano Torcal. 2007. “Democracy and

Intermediation: Some Attitudinal and Behavioral Dimensions”, in R. Gunther, J. R. Montero,

and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaase, Max. 1988. “Political Alienation and Protest” in Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing

Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy. Boulder and London: Westview Press.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global

Analysis”, in Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic

Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kornberg, Allan, and Harold D. Clarke. 1992. Citizens and Community: Political Support in

a Representative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2014. “The Political Consequences of the Economic Crises in Europe:

Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest”, in Nancy Bermeo and Larry M. Bartels, eds.,

Mass Politics in Tough Times. Opinions, Votes, and Protest in the Great Recession. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Krugman, Paul. 2008. “Let’s Get Fiscal”. The New York Times¸ October 16, 2008.

Linz, Juan J. 1978a. “Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration”, in Juan J. Linz and Alfred

Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press.

- 1978b. “Legitimidad y eficacia en la evolución de los regímenes políticos”, in Problemas

del subdesarrollo. Granada: Caja General de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Granada.

- 1988. “Legitimacy of Democracy and the Socioeconomic System”, in Mattei Dogan, ed.,

Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy. Boulder and London: Westview

Press.

26

Linz, Juan J., Manuel Gómez-Reino, Francisco Andrés Orizo and Darío Vila. 1981. Informe

sociológico sobre el cambio político en España, 1975-1981. Madrid: Fundación FOESSA.

Loewenberg, Gerhard. 1971. “The Influence of Parliamentary Behavior on Regime Stability”.

Comparative Politics 3: 170-95.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1999. “Learning Democracy: The Dynamics of Popular

Support for Post-Communist Regimes”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the

American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 1999.

Montero, José Ramón, Richard Gunther, and Mariano Torcal. 1997. “Democracy in Spain:

Legitimacy, Discontent and Disaffection”. Studies in Comparative International

Development 32,:124-160.

- 1998. “Actitudes hacia la democracia en España: legitimidad, descontento y desafección”.

Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 83: 9-49.

Morlino, Leonardo, and José Ramón Montero. 1995. “Legitimacy and Democracy in

Southern Europe”, in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle,

eds., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative

Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Morlino, Leonardo, and Marco Tachi (2006). “The Dissatisfied Society: The Roots of

Political Change in Italy”. European Journal of Political Research 30(1): 236-259.

Muller, Edward. W., and Thomas O. Jukam. 1977. “On the Meaning of Political Support”.

American Political Science Review 71: 1561-1595.

Nadeau, Richard, André Blais, Neil Nevitt, and Elisabeth Gidingil. 2000. “Elections and

Satisfaction with Democracy”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American

Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Newton, Kenneth, and Pippa Norris. 2000. “Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture

or Performance?”, in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Disaffected Democracies:

What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O’Kane, Rosemary M.T. 1993. “Against Legitimacy”. Political Studies 93: 471-487

27

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in

Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and its

Alternatives: Understanding Post-communist Societies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University

Press.

Schaar, John, ed. 1981. Legitimacy in the Modern State. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction

Books.

Topf, Richard. 1995. “Beyond Electoral Participation”, in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and

Dieter Fuchs, eds., Citizens and State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Torcal, Mariano, and José Ramón Montero. 2006. “Political Disaffection in Comparative

Perspective”, in M. Torcal and J. R. Montero, eds., Political Disaffection in Contemporary

Democracies. Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London: Routledge.

Van Deth, Jan W. 1990. “Interest in Politics”, in Karlheinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart, eds.,

Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion. Londres: Macmillan.

Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1987. “How does Government performance influence political

support?”. Political Behavior. 9:5-28.

- 1992. “Measuring Political Legitimacy”. American Political Science Review 86: 149-166.

28

Figure 1. Evolution of democratic legitimacy in Spain, 1979-2013 (in percentages)

Sources: Banco de Datos del Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) and Data for those surveys with asterisks.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

19

79

*

19

80

19

85

19

86

19

87

19

88

19

89

19

90

19

91

19

92

19

93

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

12

20

13

Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government

In some circumstances a non-democratic form of government is preferable

For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non democratic regime

29

Figure 2. Dissatisfaction with democracy and negative assessments of the economic situation, 1983-2014 (in percentages)

Source: Banco de Datos, CIS.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

19

83

19

84

19

85

19

86

19

87

19

88

19

89

19

90

19

91

19

92

19

93

19

94

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

Somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with democracy

Assessment of the economic situation as bad or very bad

30

Figure 3. Dissatisfaction with democracy and negative assessments of the political situation, 1983-2014 (in percentages)

Source: Banco de Datos, CIS.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

19

83

19

84

19

85

19

86

19

87

19

88

19

89

19

90

19

91

19

92

19

93

19

94

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

Somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with democracy

Assessment of the political situation as bad or very bad

31

Figure 4. GDP growth (in percentage points) and unemployment (in percentages) in Spain,

1983-2014

Sources: Eurostat and Euromonitor.

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

GDP growth Unemployment

32

Figure 5. Interest in politics (many and a lot), 1983-1911 (in percentages)

Source: Banco de Datos, CIS.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40 M

ay-8

3

Mar

-85

Feb

-86

May

-86

Dec

-86

Jan

-89

May

-89

May

-90

Jun

-91

Ap

r-9

3

Feb

-94

Mar

-02

Oct

-04

Jan

-06

Jan

-08

Oct

-11

33

Figure 6. Political discussion in Spain, 2006-2014 (in percentages)

Source: Banco de Datos, CIS.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2006 (Jun) 2007 (Jul) 2009 (May) 2010 (Jul) 2013 (Feb) 2014 (Feb)

Everyday 3-4 days per week

1-2 days per week less than 1-2 days per week

Never

34

Figure 7. Confidence in the Parliament (0-10), 1994-2014

Source: Banco de Datos, CIS.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1994 (nov)

1995 (dic)

1996 (Nov)

1996 (Dec)

1998 (Dec)

2003 (Feb)

2010 (Nov)

2011 (Feb)

2013 (Apr)

2014 (Apr)

(0-3) (7-10) Don't Know/No opinion

35

Figure 8. Dissatisfaction (“not at all satisfied”) with the way democracy works, 1983-2014 (in percentages)

Source: Banco de Datos, CIS.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Not at all satiesfied on how democracy works (%)

Mean: 10,2S.D.: 7,7

Min: 4 Max: 36,5 Range: 32,5

36

Figure 9. Support to an eventual authoritarian regime, 1983-2014 (in percentages)

Sources: Banco de Datos, CIS, and CIUPANEL for 2014.

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Mean: 8,1S.D.: 2,6

Min.: 4

Max. : 15

Range: 11

37

Figure 10. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works and support to an eventual authoritarian regime, 1983-2014 (in percentages)

Source: CIS, and CIUPANEL for legitimacy in 2014.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Not at all satisfied with how democracy works (%)Support for an eventual authoritarian regime (%)

Correlation : 0,14 P. Value : 0,44

38

Figure 11. Evolution of dissatisfaction with democracy in Spain, 1983-2014

-12

-8

-4

0

4

8

0

10

20

30

40

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Residual

Not at all satisfied with democracy (%)

Model 2 Predicted values

R2: 0,85

39

Figure 12. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works and support to an eventual authoritarian regime, 1983-2014 (in percentages)

Sources: Banco de Datos, CIS, and CIUPANEL for 2014.

0

10

20

30

40

50

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Support for an eventual authoritarian regime (% within PP voters)Support for an eventual authoritarian regime (% within PSOE voters)

40

Figure 13. Support for an eventual authoritarian regimes in Spain among PP voters, 1983-2014

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

0

10

20

30

40

50

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Residual

Support to an eventual authoritarian regime (%)

Model 5 predicted values

R2: 0,71

41

-

Year % N

1978 77 5.898

1980 69 3.132

1981 81 1.703

1982 74 5.463

1983 73 5.481

1988 87 4.548

1993 79 1.448

1994 82 2.491

Includes answer to the question on whether "Democracy is the best form of

government for a country like ours"

Sources: For 1978-1993, DATA, and Bano de Datois, CIS, for 1994.

42

Table 2. Time series analysis: variables, operationalization, and hypotheses

Dependent variables

Independent variables and control variables

Satisfaction Legitimacy

Economic context H 2.1 H 2.2

Unemployment rate

Gross Domestic Product

(growth)

Political factors H 3.1 H3.2

Public expenditure

(growth)

Contextual factors

Corruption perception H 4.1 H 4.2 (% considering corruption among

most important problems in Spain)

Party in government

- - (0 PP, 1 PSOE)

Election year

- - (0 No, 1 Yes)

43

Table 3. Time series analysis: dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in

Spain, 1983-2013a

Variables Model 1 Model 2

Constant 2.937 10.391 ***

(2.539) (1.584)

Economic factors

Unemployment rate (t+1) .404 **

(0.148)

GDP growth -1.100 ***

(0.280)

Political factors

Public expenditure growth -.232 .0164

(0.159) (0.140)

Contextual factors

Corruption .36 *** .555 ***

(0.112) (0.065)

PSOE in government -.590 -1.497

(1.685) (1.468)

Election year

-1.425 -1.092

(1.502) (1.345)

.724 .853

Number of observations 31 32

a Entries are least-squares regression coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; *** p< 0.01.

Sources: CIS, Eurostat and Euromonitor.

^2

44

Table 4. Time series analysis: preferences for an eventual authoritarian regime in Spain, -

Entire sample PSOE voters PP voters

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Constant .181 4.351 1.350 3.287 -11.690 1.290

(1.209) (1.014) (.841) (.600) (-4.273) (3.493)

Economic factors

Unemployment rate .288 *** .120 ** .967 ***

(.068) -.047 -.242

GDP growth -.021 -.088 .346

(.179) (.106) (.618)

Political factors

Public expenditure growth .243 *** .260 *** .065 -.832 .841 *** .840 **

(.066) (.089) (.046) (.053) (.235) (0.309)

Contextual factors

Corruption .023 .117 *** .016 .053) * .063 .391 **

(.039) (.041) (.027) (.025) -.138 (0.144)

PSOE in government 1.447 ** 1.706 ** .629 .638 6.667 ** 8.065 **

(.707) (.940) (.492) (.556) (2.500) (3.237)

Election year -.428 -.216 -.072 -.005 1.278 2.046

(.666) (.861) (.463) (.509) -2.355 2.965

.691 .481 .404 .477 .707 .532

Number of observations 32 32 32 32 32 32

a Entries are least-squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis). * p< 0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p< 0.01

Sources: CIS, Eurostat, Euromonitor, and CIUPANEL.

^2

45

Table 5. Analysis for 2014 operationalization and hypotheses

Dependent variables

Independent variables

and control variables Satisfaction Legitimacy Disaffection

Attitudes toward

democracy H1

Satisfaction with

democracy

Legitimacy

Disaffection

Economic context H2

Unemployed

Assessment of

economic situation

Political participation H3 H4 H5

Vote

Volunteer labor

Political contact

Participation in boycotts

Participation in

demonstrations

Sociodemographic

Age H6 H7 H8

University

Religiosity

Ideological and

political

Party identity

Right-left ideology

Social trust

Voted for PP H9 H10 H11

46

Table 6. Satisfaction with democracy in Spain, 2014a

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Sometimes authoritarian 0.003

-0.238

(0.201)

(0.261)

Indifferent towards regimes -1.046***

-0.880**

(0.349)

(0.440)

Disaffection -0.246***

-0.217***

(0.039)

(0.053)

Critical -0.222***

-0.210***

(0.033)

(0.044)

Assessment of economy

0.350*** 0.180***

(0.059) (0.066)

Unemployed

-0.236 -0.121

(0.180) (0.194)

Age

-0.001 -0.008

(0.005) (0.005)

University

-0.054 -0.028

(0.142) (0.154)

Religion

0.236*** 0.224***

(0.046) (0.051)

Turnout

0.384** 0.243

(0.171) (0.185)

Voluntary work

-1.048*** -1.041***

(0.264) (0.284)

Contact with politicians

0.692*** 0.654***

(0.168) (0.188)

Boycott

-0.465*** -0.228

(0.145) (0.157)

Demonstrations

-0.264 -0.442**

(0.164) (0.177)

Ideology

0.118*** 0.061

(0.036) (0.040)

Social trust

0.048* -0.030

(0.029) (0.032)

Voted for PP

0.185 0.066

(0.194) (0.216)

Constant -1.854*** -3.594*** -2.447***

(0.072) (0.347) (0.384)

Observations 2.562 1.833 1.833

Nagelkerke Ps. R2 0.192 0.143 0.258 a Entries are logistic regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.

47

Table 7. Legitimacy of democracy in Spain 2014a

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Variables

Authoritari

an

Indifferen

t

Authoritari

an

Indifferen

t

Authoritari

an

Indifferen

t

Sat. democracy 0.094 -0.861***

-0.240 -0.904**

(0.195) (0.331)

(0.258) (0.431)

Disaffection 0.032 0.265***

0.081 0.217***

(0.046) (0.048)

(0.063) (0.073)

Critical -0.000 -0.056

0.062 -0.047

(0.042) (0.049)

(0.056) (0.069)

Economic eval.

0.158** -0.152 0.244*** -0.039

(0.079) (0.102) (0.082) (0.105)

Unemployed

0.133 0.101 0.092 -0.015

(0.216) (0.254) (0.217) (0.260)

Age

-0.015** -0.003 -0.014** -0.001

(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)

University

-0.135 -0.403 -0.157 -0.369

(0.191) (0.247) (0.193) (0.250)

Religion

0.021 0.141* 0.056 0.186**

(0.066) (0.078) (0.067) (0.078)

Turnout

-0.342 -1.071*** -0.286 -0.935***

(0.230) (0.260) (0.232) (0.264)

Voluntary work

-0.053 0.070 -0.099 0.027

(0.316) (0.365) (0.318) (0.369)

Contact politicians

0.186 -0.483 0.234 -0.440

(0.232) (0.335) (0.235) (0.339)

Boycott

0.081 -0.483** -0.034 -0.525**

(0.186) (0.240) (0.191) (0.245)

Demonstrations

-0.585** -0.189 -0.550** -0.129

(0.239) (0.260) (0.240) (0.262)

Ideology

0.123*** -0.014 0.149*** 0.021

(0.046) (0.056) (0.047) (0.057)

Social trust

-0.139*** -0.118*** -0.112*** -0.090**

(0.038) (0.044) (0.038) (0.045)

Voted for PP

0.662** 0.643* 0.727*** 0.719*

(0.271) (0.365) (0.270) (0.367)

Constant -2.261*** -2.500*** -1.905*** -1.210** -2.441*** -1.969***

(0.080) (0.095) (0.425) (0.483) (0.453) (0.528)

Observations 2.562 2.562 1.833 1.833 1.833 1.833

Nagelkerke Ps. R2 0.0254 0.0254 0.0787 0.0787 0.0992 0.0992

a Entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. * p<0.1

Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.

48

Table 8. Political disaffection in Spain, 2014a

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Variables Critical Disaffected Critical Disaffected Critical Disaffected

Satisfaction with democracy -2.885*** -2.456***

-2.276*** -1.795***

(0.130) (0.119)

(0.156) (0.131)

Sometimes Authoritarian 0.138 0.168

0.605*** 0.546***

(0.175) (0.161)

(0.208) (0.175)

Indifferent towards regimes 0.727*** 1.142***

0.447* 0.796***

(0.190) (0.175)

(0.249) (0.209)

Assessment of economy

-0.543*** -0.428*** -0.432*** -0.337***

(0.056) (0.047) (0.053) (0.045)

Unemployed

0.258* 0.360*** 0.190 0.304**

(0.149) (0.125) (0.141) (0.118)

Age

-0.015*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.013***

(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)

University

0.004 0.012 -0.012 0.007

(0.129) (0.108) (0.121) (0.102)

Religion

-0.174*** -0.135*** -0.091** -0.073*

(0.047) (0.039) (0.045) (0.037)

Turnout

-0.364** -0.491*** -0.229* -0.359***

(0.144) (0.121) (0.137) (0.115)

Voluntary work

0.283 0.056 0.066 -0.116

(0.182) (0.153) (0.172) (0.145)

Contact with politicians

-0.369** -0.101 -0.165 0.067

(0.157) (0.131) (0.148) (0.125)

Boycott

0.662*** 0.384*** 0.551*** 0.306***

(0.125) (0.105) (0.119) (0.100)

Demonstrations

-0.287** -0.282** -0.320** -0.303***

(0.140) (0.117) (0.132) (0.111)

Ideology

-0.137*** -0.144*** -0.111*** -0.124***

(0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026)

Social trust

-0.202*** -0.150*** -0.182*** -0.131***

(0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)

Voted for PP

-0.351* -0.147 -0.256 -0.086

(0.195) (0.164) (0.185) (0.155)

Constant 0.318*** 0.480*** 3.643*** 3.366*** 3.326*** 3.044***

(0.060) (0.055) (0.293) (0.245) (0.279) (0.235)

Observations 2.562 2.562 1.833 1.833 1.833 1.833

R2 0.171 0.163 0.199 0.191 0.291 0.280

a Entries are OLS regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.

49

Table 9. Satisfaction with democracy in Spain, 2014

a

Variables Model 4 Model 5

Sometimes authoritarian −0.363 −0.441

(0.297) (0.301)

Indifferent towards regimes −0.748 −0.753

(0.478) (0.474)

Critical −0.150*** −0.151***

(0.044) (0.045)

Disaffection −0.267*** −0.255***

(0.058) (0.058)

Assessment of economy 0.051

(0.073)

Ideology 0.050

(0.036)

Capitalist legitimacy 0.566*** 0.519***

(0.196) (0.198)

Capitalist efficacy 0.719*** 0.657***

(0.200) (0.204)

Capitalist fairness 0.511*** 0.461***

(0.097) (0.104)

Constant −2.866*** −3.093***

(0.150) (0.209)

Observations 1.652 1.652

Log Likelihood −566.785 −565.318

Akaike Inf. Crit. 1.149.570 1.150.637 a Entries are logistic regression coefficients.

(Standard errors in parentheses).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.

50

Table 10. Legitimacy of democracy in Spain, 2014a

Model 4 Model 5

Variables Authoritarian Indifferent Authoritarian Indifferent

Satisfaction with democracy −0.215 −0.639 −0.319 −0.716

(0.282) (0.467) (0.287) (0.470)

Critical 0.074 −0.085 0.095 −0.076

(0.059) (0.071) (0.060) (0.072)

Disaffection 0.073 0.265*** 0.094 0.268***

(0.071) (0.082) (0.071) (0.082)

Assesment of economy 0.254*** 0.015

(0.089) (0.113)

Ideology 0.234*** 0.190***

(0.043) (0.052)

Capitalist legitimacy 0.237 0.064 −0.049 −0.113

(0.252) (0.313) (0.257) (0.319)

Capitalist efficacy 0.702*** −0.497 0.439 −0.689*

(0.263) (0.412) (0.270) (0.418)

Capitalist fairness 0.170 0.046 −0.028 −0.039

(0.122) (0.159) (0.135) (0.168)

Constant −2.856*** −2.862*** −4.107*** −3.501***

(0.165) (0.187) (0.285) (0.314)

Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,531.177 1,531.177 1,486.421 1,486.421

a Entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients.

(Standard errors in parentheses).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.

51

Table 11. Political disaffection in Spain, 2014a

Model 4 Model 5

Variables Critical Disaffected Critical Disaffected

Satisfaction with democracy −2.231*** −1.754*** −2.120*** −1.663***

(0.175) (0.142) (0.174) (0.142)

Sometimes authoritarian 0.722*** 0.560*** 0.895*** 0.711***

(0.230) (0.187) (0.230) (0.187)

Indifferent towards regimes 0.464* 0.764*** 0.533* 0.834***

(0.280) (0.228) (0.278) (0.226)

Assesment of economy

−0.316*** −0.224***

(0.059) (0.048)

Ideology

−0.069** −0.074***

(0.029) (0.023)

Capitalist legitimacy 0.164 0.028 0.320* 0.160

(0.169) (0.138) (0.170) (0.138)

Capitalist efficacy −0.713*** −0.424*** −0.580*** −0.305**

(0.190) (0.155) (0.190) (0.155)

Capitalist fairness −0.867*** −0.659*** −0.688*** −0.518***

(0.083) (0.067) (0.087) (0.071)

Constant 1.046*** 0.986*** 1.716*** 1.528***

(0.095) (0.078) (0.145) (0.118)

Observations 1,652 1,652 1,652 1,652

R2 0.250 0.234 0.234 0.250

a Entries are OLS regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.

52

Table 12. Probability of voting for different parties (PTV) in Spain, 2014a

Variables

Model 1 Model 2

PP PSOE IU Podemos

PP PSOE IU Podemos

Satisfaction 1.873*** -0.121 -1.625*** -2.106*** 0.834*** 0.441** -0.662*** -0.873***

democracy (0.181) (0.206) (0.224) (0.270) (0.153) (0.206) (0.208) (0.252)

Sometimes 1.834*** -0.793*** -0.845*** -0.729** 0.774*** -0.129 0.166 0.399

authoritarian (0.235) (0.268) (0.291) (0.351) (0.194) (0.260) (0.263) (0.318)

Indifferent (regimes) 0.197 -0.665** -0.650* -0.391 -0.197 -0.361 -0.215 0.008

(0.289) (0.329) (0.357) (0.431) (0.235) (0.315) (0.319) (0.385)

Disaffection -0.202*** -0.158** -0.133** 0.020 -0.110*** -0.205*** -0.228*** -0.105*

(0.047) (0.054) (0.058) (0.070) (0.038) (0.051) (0.052) (0.063)

Critical -0.197*** -0.195*** -0.050 0.114** -0.120*** -0.231*** -0.121*** 0.010

(0.038) (0.043) (0.047) (0.057) (0.031) (0.042) (0.042) (0.051)

Capitalist legitimacy 0.124 -0.045 -0.406** -0.439*

(0.143) (0.191) (0.194) (0.234)

Capitalist efficacy 1.107*** -0.381* -0.343 -0.836***

(0.161) (0.216) (0.219) (0.264)

Capitalist fairness 0.270*** -0.102 -0.379*** -0.641***

(0.072) (0.097) (0.098) (0.119)

Age 0.003 0.011** -0.002 -0.021***

(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)

Ideology 0.529*** -0.362*** -0.538*** -0.548***

(0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039)

Constant 1.137*** 2.556*** 2.978*** 4.517*** -1.348*** 3.458*** 5.465*** 8.266***

(0.075) (0.086) (0.093) (0.112) (0.197) (0.264) (0.268) (0.324)

Observations 1,652 1,652 1,652 1,652

1,652 1,652 1,652 1,652

R2 0.258 0.091 0.041 0.068 0.517 0.180 0.247 0.264

a Entries are OLS regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses).

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.