Democracy and Management of Knowledge: From Ancient Athens to
Modern Institutions Josiah Ober Stanford University
[email protected]
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The Argument: Fact: Classical Athens outperforms its city-state
rivals. Correlation: Growth of democracy at Athens leads growth of
state capacity, suggesting that democracy promotes high
performance. Puzzle: Why and how? Democratic participation is
costly. Answer: Democratic management of useful knowledge produces
benefits that exceed the costs. Mechanism: Benefits of democratic
knowledge arise from ongoing innovation and social learning
(routinization).
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Whats at stake? For classical history: Explains origins and
persistence of Athenian exceptionalism. For political science:
Identifies knowledge as a source of democratic advantage. For
normative political theory: Demonstrates compatibility of rational
choice with social/political cooperation. Eliminates trade-off:
efficiency v. value of citizen participation.
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Received wisdom II: Participatory democracies are dominated by
hierarchies in competitive environments. Iron Law of Oligarchy:
command and control hierarchy will invariably drive out democracy
Robert Michels, Political Parties. 1911 because participatory
democracy has excessively high transaction costs. Oliver
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies. 1975, & Economic
Institutions of Capitalism, 1985.
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Yet in the real world, democracies often out- compete
authoritarian rivals. Economically: Acemoglou and Robinson,
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 2006 Militarily:
Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War 2002 Why? Morale, mobilization,
leadership commitment but also knowledge management.
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Democracy and knowledge in recent political philosophy, social
science, business literatures. E. Anderson, Epistemic democracy
2006, building on John Dewey. J. Surowiecki, Wisdom of crowds 2004,
building on Condorcet et al. Brown and Duguid, Social life of
information 2000, and many studies of so-called learning
organizations.
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Useful knowledge is dispersed and diverse 1.Knowledge is
dispersed among many individuals: F.A. Hayek, Use of Knowledge in
Society 1945. 2.Knowledge takes diverse forms (social, technical,
latent, tacit): M. Polanyi 1966 3.Knowledge is held by diverse
categories of people: S. Page, The Difference 2007 Epistemic
democracys organizational challenges: aggregating dispersed
knowledge and managing diversity.
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Democratic institutions for aggregating dispersed knowledge and
managing diversity Deliberation. Face-to-face talk, sharing
viewpoints, may lead to common ground. J. Fishkin 1991 Prediction
markets. Aggregated independent guesses can beat other approaches
to predicting the future course of events. C. Sunstein 2007
Assessing the value of institutions requires long-term case studies
featuring real-world consequences.
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Table 4 Daily wheat wages of unskilled workers, 2000 BCE 1300
CE (W. Scheidel 2008) Date Location Wheat wage (in liters). Core
range = 3.5-6.5 20th/16th c. BCE Southern Mesopotamia 5.3-6.3
15th/14th c. BCE Nuzi 5.3 7th/6th c. BCE Southern Mesopotamia4.8
late 5th c. BCE Athens 8.7 320s BCEAthens 13-15.6 321 BCE Babylon
(1.3*) 3rd/early 2nd c. BCE Delos 3.2-11.1 (4.6-8.6?) 260s/250s BCE
Egypt 3.4-4.2 210-180s BCE Egypt 3.2-6.2 160s-120s BCE Egypt
1.6-1.9 120s-90s BCE Egypt 1.3-5.8 (2.6-3.1?) 93 BCE Babylon
(2-2.4*) 1st c. BCE/1st c. CE China (1.4-3.9??) 1st c. BCE/CE Rome
(>5.9?? 7.7-13.4 760s CE Mesopotamia 3.6-5.3 late 8th/early 9th
c. Egypt(3.2-10?) 8th/9th c. CE China (0.8-11.7??) 10th/12th c.
CEChina (0.8-3??) c.1000 CE Constantinople (5.6??) c.1000-1050 CE
Egypt(>?)4.3-5.3 11th c. CE Mesopotamia 6.1 11th/13th c. CECairo
7.5-13.5 12th c. CE Egypt 6.4-10.6 12th/13th c. CE Constantinople
(4.2-9.3?) 13th c. CE Mesopotamia 9
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Majority rule is not the key differentiator. Other Greek
democracies are generally less successful than Athens. Tyrannies
are indeed unproductive relative to republican
(oligarchic/democratic) regimes. But there is no strong correlation
between majority rule and a given polis flourishing.
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Historical origins of democracy, 508 B.C. Sparta (dominant
state in Greece) fails to dominate Athens due to mass uprising by
ordinary Athenians. Cleisthenes, elite leader whose reform
proposals inspired the uprising, must implement new order very
quickly. Tyranny, narrow oligarchy were discredited. Result is
invention of democratic institutions.
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New participatory democratic institutions Council of 500:
Deliberation among a quasi- representative sample of the
population. Information-sharing among people with diverse
backgrounds and knowledge. Ostracism: Non-deliberative pre-emptive
prediction market. Independent individual judgments are aggregated
to identify and eliminate future risks.
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Public action problem. Building bridges from one strong-tie
network (residents of Prasiai) to another (residents of a distant
village) is costly. Without good reasons, individuals will not
engage in this costly behavior. If cooperation and coordination
remain local, state capacity remains limited.
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Institutional design solution. Creating conditions in which
individuals have reasons to bridge between local networks. Thereby
increasing the flow of information across the whole society - the
extended network. And collecting useful knowledge from diverse
sources in a Council, where it becomes the subject of deliberations
among diverse individuals who share information in seeking the best
solution.
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Cleisthenes reforms and Athenian political geography 10 new
artificial Tribes (I - X) Each tribe drawn from existing villages
(dots) across 3 regions Coastal (blue) Inland (red) Urban
(yellow)
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Citizen population of Athens divided into 10 tribes (phulai)
Example of Tribe III Pandionis Breakdown by regional Thirds
(trittyes) And by villages (demes)
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The Council of Five Hundred. Council sets agenda for citizen
Assembly and carries out day-to-day administration. 500 councilors
(bouleutai) annually selected by lot for one-year term. = 10
tribe-teams of 50 men, chosen by villages/neighborhoods
(demes).
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Councilors for each 50-man tribe- team are chosen by villages
(demes). Each deme of the tribe sends one or more Councilors each
year, based on its population. Each tribe includes demes from the
inland, coastal, and urban regions, so each tribe team is
regionally diverse.
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Pandionis tribal team of 50. Stage 1. Strong ties (solid lines)
link fellow demesmen. Few bridging ties (dashed lines) between deme
contingents. Prasiai = deme numer 8.
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Structural holes separate deme contingents. Organizational
problem (holes limit knowledge flow). But individual opportunity
for gaining social capital.
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Problem: Each member of the Council sits only for one year, has
little chance of reappointment, so low rewards from time &
effort costs of bridge-building. Premise 1: The least advantaged
(SES) Councilor has the greatest incentive to seek new sources of
social capital. He innovates by bridging. Premise 2: Success of
early-adapting bridge-builder stimulates imitation. Poseidippos of
Prasiai and his motivation for bridging:
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Stage 2. A social entrepreneur sees the opportunity. He bridges
across the structural holes, thereby gaining information &
social capital.
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Stage 3. As others imitate, the extended network of Pandionis
contingent grows dense with bridging ties. Diverse knowledge is
collected and exchanged.
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IIIIII 506471436401366331 IVVVI BC Premises Densely-bridged
networks facilitate communication, preserve valuable information.
Bridges are robust, over time (generations) and across space (demes
and tribes). Result. Each generation of Councilmen has deeper
social knowledge, better technical knowledge of government
institutions, stronger incentives to share knowledge. Council
service promotes social learning over time. Six generations of
Councilors.
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Council service promotes polis performance Networks connect
diverse regional and social groups Social knowledge is more freely
exchanged More diverse technical knowledge is aggregated Experts in
government process multiply Incentives for novel solutions push
innovation Knowledge is cross-appropriated between domains
Governance processes become more transparent Social capital among
mass of citizens grows So Athens knows (more of) what Athenians
know
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Ostracism as a preemptive prediction market Problem: How to
identify and address serious risks to polis without crushing
entrepreneurial initiative? Stage I assesses likelihood of high
risk. Citizens in Assembly annually decide, by vote. Do we
ostracize someone this year? Vote answers 1st question about how
the present state of affairs could play out in the future. Is there
in the polis an individual whose continued presence would put the
state enough at risk to justify his expulsion without trial?
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Answer is usually No (15 known ostracisms in 180 years). When
majority of Assemblymen vote Yes to ostracism Stage II: 1.Each
citizen goes to the public square (agora) with a sherd (ostrakon)
inscribed with a name. 2.Citizens cast their ostraka/votes (no
formal deliberation). 3.Ostraka are sorted and counted. 4.Name of
man with the most votes is announced.
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Stage II of ostracism weighs alternative futures Vote
aggregates many independent opinions about prominent individuals to
answer 2nd question. Whose continued presence would be most likely
to put Athens seriously at risk? Vote by ostraka identifies and
pre-empts the alternative future regarded as worst/most likely in
the absence of concerted public action.
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Stage III of ostracism is predetermined by rules. Rules
prescribe the answer to 3rd question, What to do with the man whose
continued presence is considered to put our future most at risk? He
is immediately exiled for 10 years. But his family may remain in
Athens and he retains possession of his property. Clear rules and
limited downside risk to prominent individuals raise the incentive
to accept the rules of the game. No mass exit of elites from
Athenian public life.
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Athenian Law on Tyranny, 337 B.C. The law is a product of
aggregated knowledge about how to deal with potential tyrants By
building common knowledge the law aligns actions of citizens in the
face of a tyrannical threat Erecting the stele codifies knowledge:
makes a public record of the new rule.