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DEMOCRACY, AUTOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: BUSINESS, STATE AND MARKETS

MA Programme in Political Science (1 year and 2 years)

MA Mandatory Elective Course, Fall 2019

4 CEU credits, 8 ECTS

Fall semester 2019

Dr Inna Melnykovska

Assistant Professor Department of Political Science

Central European University Office: Nador 9, Room FT 904 Email: melnykovskai@ceu.edu

Class meetings:

Weeks 1-2 at Budapest campus, Wednesdays, 17:20 - 19:00 in TBC and Thursdays, 11:00 -12:40

in TBC

Weeks 3-12 at Vienna campus, Wednesdays, 15:30 - 17:10 in TBC and Thursdays, 11:00 -12:40

in TBC

Office hours:

Weeks 1-2 at Budapest campus, Wednesdays, 13:00-15:00 and Thursdays, 14:00-16:00 by

appointment via email to: melnykovskai@ceu.edu

Weeks 3-12 at Vienna campus, Wednesdays, 13:00-15:00 and Thursdays, 14:00-16:00 by

appointment via email to: melnykovskai@ceu.edu

Weeks 3-12 at Budapest campus, office hours by appointment via email to:

melnykovskai@ceu.edu

The course is offered within the module “POLITICAL ECONOMY”.

Course Description

The course incorporates a worldwide comparative perspective on relationships between

capitalism and political regimes, either democracy or autocracy, in the context of globalization.

The course aims to analyze the effects of economic development on political processes as well

as the impact of political institutions, political dynamics, political representation and

accountability, clientelism and corruption on business and economy. The course makes

students familiar with the major research schools dealing with the interactions of political and

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economic developments. Moreover, it introduces them to new approaches accounting for

globalization effects in the market-politics dichotomy of national states and encourages

students to discuss practical implications of theories.

Topics and regional focus

In this course, we will seek to size the nexus of political regime and economic development and explore such questions as: What are the effects of economic development and/or economic crisis on political regimes? Is

capitalism compatible with democracy? How can liberal market co-exist with non-competitive

politics? Under which conditions and how does the disproportionate power of business

promote democratization or undermine democracy? Which are the relative strengths and

weaknesses of politics versus markets in bringing about economic growth, good governance

and socioeconomic equality? How does economic globalization and regional (e.g., European)

integration affect the nexus of national politics and local markets?

In order to address these and similar questions, the course will review different theoretical

schools and draw on the experiences of developed (Western capitalist democracies) and

developing countries across world regions (Eurasia, Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia).

Although our readings will include empirical material from different countries and regions, our seminar sessions will be mainly thematic, dealing with one or another issue in the relationships between market and politics. We will also have sessions with the focus on one or another region.

Learning activities and teaching methods

The course will be a combination of lectures and seminars. In the first session of the week the professor will give an intro to the topic of the week, which will be followed by discussion and/or group work based on the compulsory readings. In the second sessions, students will do their presentations and will have a policy-relevant discussion or exercise on contemporary word-based problems. The course will intensively build on the techniques of collaborative and peer-to peer learning. In other words, students will learn not only from the professor but also from and with each other. The professor will overtake the functions of a coach and a moderator by generating discussion topics, raising questions, and developing collaborative exercises. She will make short inputs to the sessions. However, no extensive lecturing should be expected. It means in this course student will learn by doing, not pure listening.

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Pre-conditions and requirements

No prior knowledge is assumed. Knowledge in Comparative Politics and/or Macroeconomics could be beneficial.

Learning outcomes

At the end of the course, you will

• acquire knowledge about some fundamental concepts in political economy and comparative

politics, relevant for market-politics dichotomy;

• become familiar with the major theoretical approaches and debates addressing the

relationship between economic development and political regime;

• understand the interaction mechanisms between economic structures and political systems;

• accumulate the knowledge about the actors, institutions and processes responsible for good

governance and sustainable economic development;

• know specifics of market-politics dichotomy in different world regions;

• learn how to identify empirical puzzles and how to address them with theoretical knowledge

and methodological tools;

• be skilled in ‘translation’ of research findings into practical policy recommendations.

Course requirements and assessment

Regular attendance is required. Students, including those students who audit the course, are expected to be present at all seminars and to come prepared. If you are unable to attend class, you should notify me via e-mail prior to the session. The grading follows the standard scale adopted by the Department of Political Science: A: 100-94; A-: 93-87; B+: 86-80; B: 79-73; B-: 72-66; C+: 65-59; F: 58-0 The final grade will be composed as follows:

Active in-class participation – 15% Two (topical & regional) presentations – 40% Presentation of research design – 10% Final paper – 35%

Active class participation is expected and graded. Students are required to read the assigned material, and participate in the discussions and working groups regularly. Students’ contributions should be informed by the readings, focused on the main analytical points, formulated clearly, refer to other contributions in discussions, and demonstrate critical

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engagement. Note that the quality of your contributions would count more than their quantity. In addition to class participation, students should contribute online by writing op-eds and/or commenting on the op-eds posted on the online discussion platform by other students. It is expected that each students writes one op-ed (max 300 words) in the course. Online discussions will follow the topics of our sessions. The online discussion will be open on Sunday in the week before the sessions and close on Saturday after the sessions. Each student does two team presentations: one with a particular topic in the focus and another one – with a regional focus. The task of the topic-centered presentation is to check the validity of theoretical approaches against the background of the empirical developments in the countries of student’s interest (more details on the content will be provided in the first session). The presentation should be done in teams of 2-4 students (if the number of participants allow, otherwise, it will be individual presentations). The presentation should be no longer than 20 minutes and will be followed by a 20-min Q&A. The presentation should be discussed with the professor at least two weeks before the presentations and the final version of the presentation should be submitted to the professor prior to the session (it will be also uploaded on the Moodle). The preparations for the presentations should include additional literature to the required readings. The region-centered presentation should highlight the specific of market-politics relationship in the selected regions. The presentation should be no longer than 30 minutes and will be followed by a 10-min Q&A. Each student will design a research project dealing with a specific puzzle and question related to the market-politics dichotomy. Against the background of contemporary research students are asked to formulate 2 hypotheses and with reference to methodological rules select the cases, either within a region or across the world or across the time, to test these hypotheses. The research project can be done on one of the (sub-)topics the presentation was done. The research project will be presented as a PowerPoint presentation of 15 minutes maximum (plus 10-15 minutes of the follow-up Q&A). The guidelines for the research design will be introduced in the first session of the first week. The presentations will be scheduled to the end of the semester (after week 9). Students should receive the approval of the instructor on their chosen topic for the research design. This approval is mandatory. The final paper will contain the final version of the research design, applied and tested empirically for the selected cases of hybrid regimes. It should be no more than 4.000 words long (without references, but including possible appendices). Details will be introduced in the first session of the first week. Please note that for all assessments, late submission, and violation of the word or time limit will

result in a lower grade. Late submission will lead to the deduction of the points: 3 points/12

hours. Violations of the word limits will result in the deduction of one grade point from the final

grade of the assignment for every 5% of word limit violation.

Plagiarism is not acceptable and will be punished according to the departmental rules.

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Deadlines:

• Choose the seminar you are going to present – by 23.09.2019

• Choose the region for your regional presentation – by week 8 (7.11.2019)

• Get the approval of the (sub-)topic for the presentation – two weeks prior to the session in which you are going to present

• Submit the presentation in the day before the presentation is done by 1:00pm.

• Get the approval of the topic for the presentation of a research design – by 21.11.2019

• Submit the final paper – by 13.12.2019

All written assignments should be submitted on Moodle and will be checked for plagiarism by

Turnitin.

Late submission will lead to the deduction of the points: 3 points/12 hours. Violations of the

word/time limits will result in the deduction of one grade point from the final grade of the

assignment for every 5% of word/time limit violation.

Reading material

Mandatory readings are listed in the syllabus in the reading order that is suggested by the

professor. All the mandatory course material is available in electronic form through

https://ceulearning.ceu.edu/

The syllabus includes the references of further recommended readings.

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COURSE SCHEDULE

Week 1 [18.-19.09.2019] – Introduction to the course and the topic. Classical theories.

Our first session will be organizational and substantive. You will be introduced to the topics and questions of the course. The main requirements, deliveries and assessment will be highlighted. Although there are no mandatory readings for the first session, be ready to present in 2-3 minutes your research interests that brought you to the course.

In the 2nd session of the week, we will review the classical theories and key concepts that reflect the debates on the relationship between economic development and establishing of stable liberal democracies. We will learn about the role these theories devote to economic development and modernization as the pre-requisites of democracy as well as the effectiveness of democratic institutions in bringing economic prosperity and equality.

Mandatory readings:

Gabriel Almond. 1991. Capitalism and Democracy. PS: Political Science and Politics Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 464-477.

Diamond, L. (1992). "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered." American Behavioral Scientist 35(4-5): 450-499.

Further readings:

Alt, James and Alex Crystal, Political Economics, chs. 1-5, 8, conclusion.

Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993.

Caporaso, James and Levine, Theories of Political Economy, chs 1-6.

Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William T. Barndt, and Carola Moreno. 2005. “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective,” World Politics, 57(3): 323-364. doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0002

Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy. Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe, New York i Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 3 (July 1, 1993): 71–86.

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Jones, Benjamin and Benjamin Olken. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(3): 835-64.

Lipset, Seymour Martin & Jason M. Lakin, The Democratic Century, Norman (Okl.): University of Oklahoma Press, 2004.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics, in: Robert Dahl et al. (ed.), The Democracy Sourcebook, Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press, 2003, pp. 56-64.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2013. "Why Do we Still Read Barrington More? Some Reflections on the Survival of an Intellectual Icon" Comparative Democratization Newsletter, APSA 11 (1).

Week 2 [25.-26.09.2019] – Modern theoretical approaches and current debates

In week 2, we will deal with more recent theoretical approaches and debates concerning the nexus between economic and political institutions. Moreover, we will critically review the literature that discuss the multi-dimensional development in the frameworks of inclusive vs. exclusive institutions as well as open vs. closed societies.

Mandatory readings:

Ziblatt, Daniel. “How Did Europe Democratize?” World Politics 58, no. 2 (2006): 311–38. doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0028.

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty (1st ed.). New York: Crown. Read pages 7-9, Chapter 2 (all), and pages 70-79.

North, D., Wallis, J., & Weingast, B. (2009). Violence and social orders : A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. Selected pages.

Further readings:

Acemoglu Daron and and James A. Robinson. The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 15-46 (The Argument).

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins Of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91(5): 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Why Not A Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, And Politics,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 620-652.

Boix, Charles. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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Collier, Ruth Berins. Paths toward Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Goodin, R., & Iversen, T. (2011-07-07). Capitalism and Democracy. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. : Oxford University Press. Retrieved 16 Sep. 2019, from https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-040.

Mares, Isabela. 2015. From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 2014. “Is Capitalism Compatible with Democracy?” Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 8 (2): 109–28.

Przeworski, Adam et al., Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Tilly, Charles Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Week 3 [02.-03.10.2019] – Building market and democracy: Historical and recent experiences of transformations by design In week 3, we review experiences of transition countries: how economic structures determine political transformation and how institutional choices affect trajectories and outcomes of economic politics. Our main focus will be on post-communist transition, which was complicated by simultaneous transformations in political, economic and nation-state building dimensions.

Mandatory readings:

Wittman, D., Weingast, B., Grzymala‐Busse, A., & Jones Luong, P. (2008). Democratization: Post‐Communist Implications. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. : Oxford University Press. Retrieved 16 Sep. 2019, from https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548477-e-036.

Claus Offe (1991). “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transformation in East Central Europe”, Social Research, 58(4), 865–92.

Frye, Timothy. 2010. Building States and Markets After Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 21-47.

Further readings:

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Bohle, Dorothee, and Béla Greskovits. Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2012.

Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ekiert, G. and Hanson, S. 2003. Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Stephen E. Hanson. Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Gallagher, Mary E.. 2002. “‘Reform and Openness’: Why China’s Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy,” World Politics 54(3): 338-372.

Greskovits, Béla. The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared. Central European University Press, 1998.

Kornai, Janos. 2006. \The Great Transformation of Central Eastern Europe." Economics of Transition. 14:207-244.

Roberts, Andrew L. 2009. The Quality of Democracy in Eastern Europe: Public Preferences and Policy Reforms. New York: Cambridge University Press.

de Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books. Chapters 1-3, pp. 1-67.

Week 4 [09.-10.10.2019] – Globalization and politics-market dichotomy

In week 4, we will deal with the new globalization framework political and economic institutions are functioning within and with the effects of globalization on political regimes and economic systems and their nexus.

Mandatory readings:

Rodrik, D. (2011). The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, W. W. Norton. Introduction and chapter 9.

Unger, Roberto Mangabeira "The Search for Alternatives to Neoliberalism in the Developing Countries" from Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative, pp. 52-71, 79-132.

Further readings:

“The Atlas of Economic Complexity,” Center for International Development, Harvard University. http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/

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Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” International Organization. Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn): 787-824.

Reich, Robert. 2007. “How Capitalism is Killing Democracy.” Foreign Policy. (Sept/Oct): 38-42.

Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel and Robert Scott, "Contracting for Innovation: Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration," Columbia Law review, 109(3), April 2009, pp. 433-472.

Yochai Benkler, Peer production, the commons, and the future of the firm,” Strategic Organization, 2016, 1-11, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1476127016652606.

Week 5 [16.-17.10.2019] – Economic and political crises

In week 5, the financial economic crisis of 2008 was followed by the crisis of representative democracy and the rise to power of populist forces. What is the relation (if any) between these two crises? How the interaction of political and economic institutions resulted in different popular and policy reactions to these crisis?

Mandatory readings:

Streeck, Wolfgang. 2011. The Crises of Democratic Capitalism. New Left Review, II, no. 71(October): 5-29.

Hernandez, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi 2015. The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe. European Journal of Political Research. 55, 2: 203-224.

Further readings:

Bohle, Dorothee. 2014. “Responsible Government and Capitalism’s Cycles.” West European Politics 37 (2): 288–308.

Dani Rodrik (2014) The Future of European Democracy https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Commentary/Future-of-Democracy-in-Europe.pdf

De Grauwe, Paul 2016. The legacy of the Eurozone crisis and how to overcome it, Journal of Empirical Finance 39: 147-155.

Fritz W. Scharpf (2011): “Monetary Union: Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy.” LSE Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series, LEQS Paper 36/2011.

Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (chapters 1-2, pp. 17-68).

Hall, Peter 2012. The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis, German Politics 21, 4: 355-371.

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Jürgen Habermas, (2014) “Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the European Union into a Transnational Democracy is Necessary and How it is Possible?” ARENA Working Paper 13/2014 December 2014.

Pepinsky, Thomas (2009). Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes. Cambridge University Press.

Schwartz, Herman. “Housing, Global Finance and American Hegemony: Building Conservative Politics One Brick at a Time.” In The Politics of Housing Booms and Busts, edited by Herman M. Schwartz and Leonard Seabrooke, 28–52. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Wade, Robert. “The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis of 1997-?: Causes and Consequences.” World Development 26, no. 8 (August 1998): 1535–53. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00070-9.

Walter, Stefanie. “Financial Crises and Politics Macroeconomic Adjustments”. Cambridge University Press”, Chapter 1.

More literature references can be find here: https://www.eui.eu/Documents/Research/Library/ResearchGuides/Economics/PDFs/GlobalCrisisBibliographyWebed.pdf

Week 6 [23.-24.10.2019] – Political economy of competitive autocracies

In week 6, we will deal with economic foundations of modern authoritarian regimes, how authoritarian rulers use patronage and welfare policies to maintain the loyalty of elites and legitimacy of their rule in population. Also, we will address why some authoritarian regimes outperform others in economic development and how we can explain the extraordinary economic performance of some authoritarian regimes, such as China.

Mandatory readings:

Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review 87(3): 567-576.

Fuller, C. R.(2017). The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/4202. Selected chapters.

Further readings:

Acemoglu, Daron, Thierry Verdier, and James A. Robinson. 2004. "Kleptocracy and Divide‐and‐Rule: A Model Of Personal Rule." Journal of the European Economic Association. 2(2‐3):162-192.

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Arriola, Leonard R. 2009. “Patronage and Political Stability in Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 42(10): 1339-1362.

Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36(2): 139-157.

Blanchard, Olivier and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. “Federalism with and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia,” IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 48(4), pages 8.

Darden, Keith A. 2009. Economic Liberalism and Its Rivals. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3-15, 261-305.

Desai, Raj M., Anders Olofsgård, and Tarik M. Yousef. 2009. “The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains,” Economics & Politics 21(1): 93-125.

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2008. “Capital Mobility and Coalitional Politics: Authoritarian Regimes and Economic Adjustment in Southeast Asia,” World Politics 60(2): 438-474.

Shih, Victor. 2008. “Nauseating” Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China,” Journal of Politics 70(4): 1177-1192.

Week 7 [30.-31.10.2019] – Inequality, welfare state, populism and economic nationalism

In week 7, we will address the performance of different political regimes in terms of in-/equality and welfare. Also, we will deal with the consequences of bad performance – the rise of populism and return to economic nationalism.

Mandatory readings:

Teo, T. (n.d.). Inequality under Authoritarian Rule. Government and Opposition, 1-25. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.19

Bluhm, K. and M. Varga (2019). "Conservative Developmental Statism in East Central Europe and Russia." New Political Economy: 1-18.

Further readings:

Ansell, Ben W. and David J. Samuels. Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dalton, R. (2004) Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: the Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford University Press, pp. 21-52.

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Dani Rodrik, “Populism and the Economics of Globalization,” Journal of International Business Policy, vol. 1, 2018.

Hayek, Friedrich August von. “Competition as a Discovery Procedure.” Translated by Marcellus S. Snow. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5, no. 3 [1968] (2002): 9�23.

Iversen, Torben and David Soskice 2015. Democratic limits to redistribution. Inclusionary versus exclusionary coalitions in the knowledge economy, World Politics 67, 2: 185-225.

Johnson, J. and A. Barnes (2015). "Financial nationalism and its international enablers: The Hungarian experience." Review of International Political Economy 22(3): 535-569.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Polanyi, Karl (2001 [1944]). The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press, chapters 6 and 11, pp. 71-80, 136-141.

Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm, Ruth Crowley, and Fred Thompson. Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Cornell University Press Ithaca, NY, 1991.

Schelkle, Waltraud (ed.), “In the Spotlight of Crisis: How Social Policies Create, Correct, and Compensate Financial Markets.” Special issue of Politics and Society, 40 (1), 2012.

Week 8 [6.-7.11.2019] – Business powers & political regimes

In week 8, we will grasp the influences of business elites on political and economic institutions by theorizing and analyzing business powers, preferences, strategies and networks political actors. We will seek to identify the determinants of their contingent political behavior.

Mandatory readings:

Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011) Oligarchy, Cambridge University Press, Ch1, pp. 1-39.

Marsh, David Sadiya Akram, and Holly Birkett, “The Structural Power of Business: Taking Structure, Agency and Ideas Seriously,” Business and Politics, 17.3 (2015): 577-601.

Further readings:

Culpepper, P. D. (2015). "Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era." Business and Politics 17(3): 391-409.

Culpepper, Pepper D. 2011. Quiet Politics and Business Power. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Fish, M. Steven. 2005. Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 7.

Hellman, Joel S. 1998. Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions." World Politics. 50: 203-234.

Kesarchuk, Olga (2015)The Power and Powerlessness of the Post-Soviet Business in a Comparative Perspective; Paper presented at the 21st Annual ASN World Convention, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

Lindblom, Charles E. “The Market as Prison,” The Journal of Politics, 44. 2 (1982).

Lindblom, Charles Edward. Politics and Markets: the World's Political Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1977.

Oliver E. Williamson. “The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 171-195.

Yakovlev, Andrei. "The Evolution of Business: State Interaction in Russia: From State Capture to Business Capture?" Europe-Asia Studies 58.7 (2006): 1033-56.

Week 9 [13.-14.11.2019] – Corruption and bad governance

In week 9, we will deal with political and economic sources of corruption, bad governance and failure of modernization.

Mandatory readings:

Gel'man, V. (2016). "The vicious circle of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism in Russia." Post-Soviet Affairs 32(5): 455-473.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption, Cambridge University Press. Selected chapter.

Further readings:

Alon, I., Li, S., and Wu, J. (2016). “Corruption, Regime Type, and Economic Growth”. Public Finance and Management, 16(4), pp. 332-361.

Bach, D. C. (2011). "Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism: comparative trajectories and readings." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 49(3): 275-294.

Barnes, A. (2003). "Comparative theft: Context and choice in the Hungarian, Czech, and Russian transformations, 1989-2000." East European Politics and Societies 17(3): 533-565+575.

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Beeson, M. (2009). "DEVELOPMENTAL STATES IN EAST ASIA: A COMPARISON OF THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE EXPERIENCES." Asian Perspective 33(2): 5-39.

Chibber, V. (2014). “The Developmental State in Retrospect and Prospect: Lessons from India and South Korea”. In M. Williams (ed.) The End of the Developmental State?. Routledge, pp. 30-54.

Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2010. Winner-Take-All Politics. New York, London: Simon & Schuster.

Hopkin, J. (2002). States, Markets and Corruption: A Review of Some Recent Literature. Review of International Political Economy, 9(3), 574-590.

Hutchcroft, Paul D. ‘The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impacts of Rents, Corruption and Clientelism on Third World Development’, Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1997), pp. 639–58 at p. 643.

Johnston, Michael ‘The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1986), pp. 459–77.

Kong, T. Y. (2004). "Corruption and the effect of regime type: the case of Taiwan." New Political Economy 9(3): 341-364.

Lin, J. Y. and C. Monga (2012). "Solving the Mystery of African Governance." New Political Economy 17(5): 659-666.

Nye, Joseph S. ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost–Benefit Analysis’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1967), pp. 417–27.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

White, Gordon ‘Corruption and Market Reform in China’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1996), pp. 40–7.

Woo-Cumings, M., Ed. (1999). The Developmental State. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.

Week 10 [20.-21.11.2019] – Regional integration

In week 10, we will consider the effects of regional integration on the politics-market dichotomy.

Mandatory readings:

Bohle, D. (2018). "European Integration, Capitalist Diversity and Crises Trajectories on Europe’s Eastern Periphery." New Political Economy 23(2): 239-253.

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Libman, Alexander, and Anastassia V. Obydenkova. "Understanding Authoritarian Regionalism." Journal of Democracy, no. 4 (2018): 151-65.

Further readings:

Bruszt, Laszlo and Visnja Vukov, 2017. “Making states for the single market: European integration and the reshaping of economic states in the Southern and Eastern peripheries of Europe” West European Politics Vol 40 N.4 pp. 663-68

Höpner, Martin and Armin Schäfer. „Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi in a Hayekian Setting.” International Organization 66, No. 3 (2012), 429-55.

Gibb, Richard and Karen Treasure, “SACU at Centenary: Theory and Practice of Democratising Regionalism,” South African Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2011): 1–21.

Kneuer, M., et al. (2019). "Playing the regional card: why and how authoritarian gravity centres exploit regional organisations." Third World Quarterly 40(3): 451-470.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” International Organization 56 (Summer 2002): 477–51

Week 11 [27.-28.11.2019] – Regional Insights into Market-Politics Nexus: Commonalities and Differences

In week 11, we will encounter for conceptual and empirical varieties of political regimes and capitalism. We will review why and how the complementarities between political and economic institutions evolve. In addition, students will be asked to do presentations on regional specifics of market-politics dichotomy.

Mandatory readings:

Hall, P., & Gingerich, D. (2009). Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 39(3), 449-482. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27742754

Schmitter, Philippe C. and Todor, Arpad (2012) Varieties of Capitalism and Types of Democracy. In Ido MASANOBU (ed.), Varieties of Capitalism, Types of Democracy and Globalization, Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2012, Routledge Advances in International Political Economy, 17-52

Further readings will be suggested by the regional students’ groups.

Week 12 [4.-5.12.2019] – Presentations of Students’ Projects

In week 12, students will present and discuss their research designs of the final papers.

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