Democracy Global Gov

8/6/2019 Democracy Global Gov

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Democratizing Global Governance*

Draft for the Big Sur CPOGG-Workshop

San Francisco, April 6, 2004

Dr. Philipp Sebastian Mueller

[email protected]

EGAP Monterrey

*I want to thank Andreas Paulus, Ignacio Irazustra, Jrg Friedrich, Markus Lederer, and Katie Tobin who

have had important influences on this paper.


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The Task: Democratizing Global Governance

Global governance is all around us. It is no longer a utopian project of UN-eggheads who

imagine that global issues can be solved by problem-oriented, multi-sectoral networks.

We encounter global governance, or more precisely the legitimizing arguments of the

global governance system of thinking and doing, every day in our lives.1 We are

persuaded that it makes sense to build institutions through combined efforts by the

private and the public sector such as the World Commission on Dams or the Roll Back

Malaria campaign. We accept civil society organizations as service providers and policy

transforming participants in our domestic politics. When local civil society organizations

are linked to global ideas or organizations their clout in local politics often increases. We

take seriously global gatherings that legitimize themselves recursively by being present in

the global media such as the World Economic Forum, the World Social Forum, or the

multi-sectoral UN-summits on any issue from womens rights to information technology.

The system of thinking and doing that we call global governance is here and it is here to

stay.

The idea of using democracy as a basket of principles to evaluate systems of thinking and

doing is even less contested than global governance.2 At this point in history, it does not

have to be defended against other potential baskets of principles, such as transcendent,

authoritarian or communitarian alternatives. Synchronicity calls, both concepts are dear

1A system of thinking and doing is a way of imagining the world in order to analyze it and also to act in it.

2Baskets of principles evaluate systems of thinking and doing, explanations for behavior, or individual

acts. Democracy could also be described as a system of thinking and doing. For the argument made in this

paper, however, I want to analyze the compatibility of global governance as a system of thinking and doing,

with the democracy as a basket of principles, as understood by mainstream liberal democratic theory

prevalent in our time.


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to us at this specific stage in time;3 therefore, the task set out for us is clear: We need to

ask to what degree the system of thinking and practicing global governance is compatible

with the basket of principles of democracy, and if not, how such compatibility could be

achieved.

3Synchronicity is the name given by the Swiss psychologist, C. G. Jung (1875-1961), to the phenomenon

of events which coincide in time and appear meaningfully related but have no discoverable causal

connection. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd

Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.


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I. Global Governance as a System of Thinking and Doing

Why has global governance become such a strong contender as a system of thinking and

doing when we want to explain and imagine world order? What is global governance, and

how do we use the concept? In the following I will address these issues.

The term system of thinking and doing is a not very elegant shortcut for the idea that

we use a certain vocabulary to describe/explain/predict a world and at the same time to

use this vocabulary to legitimize our actions inside the world. 4 To

describe/explain/predict is to take the role of an outside observer, to legitimize actions

inside the world is to make arguments by referring to an intersubjectively accepted body

of truths (communicative rationality) or by referring to transcendental or procedural

modes of authority. The term allows us to reflect on worlds in which we need to deal with

the recursive relationship between thinking and doing and outlines the grammar of

enquiring into these types of worlds:5 it reminds us that our methods of validation that

we use when a distinction between observer and the observed exists are not applicable.

World order is the term we use to describe (inter)social relations. By focusing on the

logic of world order, we can demarcate different world orders spatially and historically.

Different logics at work allow us to describe the (generative) rules that describe/explain

modes of legitimation of actions in different systems of thinking and doing and allow us

to demarcate them from other worlds. World orders can be imagined on the continuum

from spontaneous interactions, such as the market to transcendentally-legitimized

hierarchical systems (Hardt/Negri 2001).

4The word world is understood here as that part of the universe that is interesting for an observer or actor.

The sphere within which one's interests are bound up or one's activities find scope; (one's) sphere of action

or thought; the realm within which one moves or lives. OED 10.5Grammar, understood here in the late Wittgensteinian sense, is constituted by all the linguistic rules thatdetermine the sense of an expression. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of

Wittgenstein, rev. edn. (Oxford, 1986), 17992.


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We are in times of transformative change, where new conceptions of world order are

emerging that may or may not supersede older conceptions of world order. So the

question Why has global governance become such a strong contender as a system of

thinking and doing when we want to explain and imagine world order? Has become

salient. It can be better understood if placed in a historical framework.

Today

Tomorrow?Yesterday

Modern State Systembased on territorial

sovereignty

Globalization Empire? GlobalGovernance? self-

regulating Markets?

If one is interested in thinking the modern state system in terms of its logic, then one can

make a surprisingly simple argument (that has been repeated often, e.g. Osiander 1994,

Walker 1995, Kratochwil 1989, Friedrich 2002, Wendt 1999, etc.). The figure of

sovereignty with its binary distinctions of the domestic/international and state/society has

a generative function that has structured world order (Bartelson 2001).

Domestic International

State (civil)Society

Locus of Authority Legitimacy

Hierarchy(Security providedby the state,

Specialization)

Anarchy(Self-help System,no specialization)


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Global governance then is the world order that goes beyond these institutions. It includes

however not only the dissolution of the boundaries, but a positive construction of a

system of thinking and doing out of different original distinctions. 6

Why Global Governance?

There are three historical forces that are confronting us with the need to reconceptualize

world order: The emergence of global issues, the contestation of the legitimacy of

political entities, and changes in how we think and do things in the world are forces that

are leading to a re-evaluation of how to imagine world order.

The first historical force consists of events in our material world, such as global

warming, the integration of the global financial and trade flows, and cultural

globalization that have led to the emergence of the idea of global issues as legitimate

arguments in policy debates on domestic, international, and global levels (Kaul 1999).

The idea of global issues is being circumscribed by a number terms such as globalization,

global commons, global public goods, and global public bads.

The second historical force is the crisis of modernity that comes to bear on our

understanding of the nation-state both internally (blurring of the boundary between

private and public spheres) and externally (blurring of the boundary between the inside

and the outside).

Domestic International

State(civil)

Society

6It is not clear if Jens Bartelson would agree. His main argument in the Critique of the State is that we do

not have the vocabulary to think beyond the nation state, because or the critical stance we are taking in

order to develop this vocabulary. He argues that any critical mo


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And the third is a shift in our understanding of instrumental rationality, i.e. how we get

things done in the world, from institutional to functional solutions of problems. By shift

of our understanding of instrumental rationality, I mean that a shift can be observed from

the idea of dealing with problems through ex ante legitimated institutions, where

legitimation of any problem solution is achieved by referring to mechanisms of

procedural justice (Rawls 1971) to an understanding where problems legitimize the

institutions that are built around them. The following picture visualizes this development:

Problem solving in the Modern Nation StateSystem

Institution

(state)

Problem Solution

Problem

Input legitimated


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Global Governance: Multi-sectoral

Policy Networks

Problem

Solution

States

(International)Business

(International)Civil Society

Problem

Output -legitimated

These three discrete forces together are presenting us with the problem of governing the

post-nation-state world. One world order framework that seems to be able to address

these three forces is global governance. Therefore, as a political idea, global governance

has the chance to supersede other understandings of world order, such as the modern

nation state system, world government, or ad hoc coalitions of the willing. In academiathe concept is emerging as an important framework to imagine the global realm, and for

policy makers global governance is a political project and an emerging background

condition.

What is Global Governance?

No single definition of global governance exists that is accepted by all or even by the

majority of scholars or policy makers. The reason for this is not the incompetence or

incoherence of scholars and policy makers, but lies in the type of concept that is

involved. Already the act of defining global governance involves political moves and

therefore unanimity cannot and should not be achieved. In contemporary global


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governance literature, three strategies to categorize global governance emerge. The first

is the denial that something like global governance exists at all; the second is to offer a

positive definition that assumes that a new form of managing global affairs has developed

that can be characterized through specific actors, instruments or practices. The third is

juxtaposing global governance to a more familiar term.

Mainstream international relations theory continues to have difficulties with global

governance because of its foundational conceptualization of the international system as

an anarchic realm (Jahn 2000). Thus, for many, global governance is nothing new per se,

but merely a continuation of the interdependence literature of the 1970s or of the

discussion about regimes in the 1980s. Given the strongly state-centric focus of

international relations theory (especially regime theory), this position makes sense

(Hasenclever et al. 1997; for an exception see Haufler 1993). Even those who have

started to take other actors more seriously do not conceptualize them as independent

agents, but still define their roles in relation to the nation-state or to the

intergovernmental system of the UN (for example Messner and Nuscheler 1996). It is

therefore no surprise that James Rosenau an early and vivid contributor to the debate

has rather pessimistically concluded that the discussion on global governance has not

really abandoned the notion of an anarchic international system and has not yet

contributed to a global political order (Rosenau 2000, 189). Following the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001, the strategy of denial has again gained influence. It should

not be discounted, because such a perspective can be crowned by success, as long as

these scholars and policy makers are able to persuade the rest of the world (on the policy

level) that only a security-centered perspective resonates with the brute facts of

international life.

In total contrast to the strategy of denial is the attempt to catch all new practices that have

developed within the global realm in one positive definition. The most prominent

example of such an exercise is the definition of the Commission on Global Governance,

which states that global governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and


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institutions, public and private, manage the ir common affairs. It is a continuing process

through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative

action may be taken (1995, 2f). This all-inclusive perspective gave respectability to

global governance studies as an academic field and a policy area; however, because of its

over-inclusiveness it cannot suggest research avenues, operationalizable hypotheses, or

policy recommendations.

A scholarly, more ambitious project is James Rosenaus attempt to focus on spheres of

authority which are able to set norms on various levels. For Rosenau, global governance

compromises all the structures and processes necessary to maintaining a modicum of

public order and movement toward the realization of collective goals at every level of

community around the world (1997, 367). However, even though such a broad

understanding of the term allows accounting for the evolution of new instances and forms

of governing, the price to pay is that the definition itself becomes so open that it is bound

for theoretical over-stretch.

Another way to define global governance in this manner is to use the term only in relation

to the empirical fact that actors other than governments have become important agents on

the international scene. Because of this, a large portion of the debate over global

governance is dedicated to conceptualizing which actors are influential in international

life and how they exert their influence and legitimize it in relation to their principals.

Sub-state groups or regions, supra-national organizations as well as intergovernmental

groups, transnational corporations (TNCs) and their associations, individual non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) of all aspects and civil society as a whole have all

been identified as relevant actors (see especially Messner and Nuscheler 1997). To grasp

the interdependence of these various agents, network analysis (Pierre and Peters 2000),

multilateralism (Ruggie 1993), multi-level analysis (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch

1996), questions of subsidarity (Reinicke 1998), informal control mechanisms (Mrle

1998), and discussions about steering (Scharpf 1999) are often used and even

combined. While these actor-centered approaches have convincingly shown that new


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actors have indeed become relevant agents in global affairs, they nevertheless could not

capture the logic of what defines global governance as a practice.

Because many scholars dismiss defining global governance in positive terms as fruitless,

some researchers have taken to juxtaposing it to a known term. Examples are

considering global governance as not government at all, or the idea of global governance

as a political answer to economic globalization.

One early notion of defining global governance as a linkage comes from Rosenau and

Czempiel, who speak of Governance Without Government (Rosenau and Czempiel

1992). Similarly Lawrence Finkelstein states that global governance is governing,

without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers (Finkelstein

1995, 369).

The second juxtaposition is to argue that global governance is the political answer to an

economically-determined process of globalization (for example Messner 2001, 3f). This

argument defines global governance in opposition to the post-war compromise of

embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1983) in which the increase of international trade flows

was accompanied by protective measures to ensure social stability. Global governance is

being offered as an alternative to the neoliberal Zeitgeist: In such a situation the concept

of global governance presents itself. It is related to the demand to resolve the problems of

a neoliberal globalization. The concept is presented as a progressive alternative to

neoliberalism (Brand et al. 2000, 13 own translation). The argument is that embedded

liberalism has been abandoned and that global governance is the only viable alternative.

As sympathetic as this usage might be, by juxtaposing political global governance andeconomic globalization, the political aspects of both are lost. Globalization is not the

naturally determined fate of humanity, but instead has often been advanced by states.

This can be seen even in the critical case of international financial markets (Helleiner

1994). Thus, important developments are missed when one overestimates the economic


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forces of globalization and simply takes global governance as being the ex post reaction

to the naturalistic force of the market. This perspective depoliticizes both processes.

In summary, one can say that no single accepted definition of global governance exists

today. The lack of such a definition should, however, not disqualify global governance as

an academic or political project; in fact it should not even be seen as a problem. There are

some things we can say about how we use the concept.


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What can we say about Global Governance?

Even if no authoritative definition of global governance exists, there are some things we

can say about how the concept is used in the discourse. Global governance combines the

move to dissolve the barriers between inside and outside, the domestic and the

international, by considering the world as a totality, thereby enabling it to conceptualize

global problems with the move from thinking about problem-solving in terms of ex ante

legitimated institutions to building institutions around problems. It is therefore able to

address global problems. In the following matrix I relate our understanding of

instrumental rationality to the principles of organizing international/world systems. We

can then distinguish between different worlds that have different capabilities to deal with

our third force, namely the emergence of global issues.

World Order frameworks and their ability to deal with Global Issues:

How we do things

Input legitimated Output legitimated

Ordering

principles

System Based on

Territorial

Sovereignty

Modern StateSystem

(cannot do GlobalIssuess)

Coalitions of theWilling

(cannot do GlobalIssues)

System Based on

Awareness of

Global Totality

World Government

(could do GlobalIssues)

Global Governance

(can do Global

Issues)

In short, global governance offers an alternative perspective from which to imagine world

order and is becoming a serious contender for explaining how we see the world and it is

guiding us in acting in the world.


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The ability to think and act on global issues, however, comes at a cost. The legitimacy of

issue-specific institutions can only come from the success or effectiveness of the

problem-solving mechanism. There is therefore a democracy gap: Effectiveness does not

address the question of who are the stakeholders that have the right to decide if a

problem-solving mechanism was both effective and efficient. And if all conceptions of

democracy maintain that democracy is about collective self-determination by free and

equal citizens (Held 1995), global governance as a system of thinking and doing is

clearly inconsistent with this requirement: Who are citizens? How can they be equal?

What are the spatial and temporal boundaries of the self-determining collectivity?

Now it could be argued that global governance as a system of thinking and doing is more

compatible with democratic principles on the global level than the modern nation state

system, because it at least allows parapolitical contestation. However, this argument

makes a category mistake. The modern nation state system demarcated political spaces

inside the nation state and paid for that by depoliticizing the international. Global

governance as a system of thinking and doing dissolves this demarcation and therefore

has to answer the questioning of the basket of democratic principles on the global, i.e. the

formerly domestic and international levels.

The inability to address these questions means that global governance is not able to deal

with democracy. Global governance offers a functionalistic vocabulary that can offer

solutions to problems conceived as coordination or technical problems but is blind to

fully developed (democratic) politics.

This means we are exposed to an empirical aporia, where a fashionable system of

thinking and doing clashes with a just as fashionable basket of principles. So what can we

do? As unattached observers we should be curious and ask how this is possible and how

this will play out, as engaged observers and policy makers we should find some type of

patchwork solution that lets us reconcile global governance with democratic principles.

As an engaged observer I therefore aim to offer an uneasy solution on what type of


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patching is necessary in order to enable global governance to comply with the democratic

requirements. It must be clear that any patch will only be a patch: it will not be elegant,

but it also does not have to be because it is synchronicity and not the World Spirit that

has brought global governance and democracy together. And any patch will always

remind us of the arbitrariness of our solution and the underlying incompatibility of the

two concepts.


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II. The Politics of Global Governance

At this point in time, it seems paradoxical to be talking about a world order conception

that cannot internally talk about politics. Especially, if we assume that the ability of

talking politics is the precondition for any democratization of global governance. In order

to better understand this statement, we need to explain what we expect from a world

order conception that can talk about politics.

Politics is that vocabulary that deals with questions that are described as questions of

choice for collectivities. It can be circumscribed by the terms community and authority

that can be ostensibly related to the questions Who is member? and who gets to

decide?

Community: Who is member?

Authority:Who gets to make

policy decisions?

So saying the politics of world order allows us to ask about who gets, what when, and

how and how expectations are structured in a world. Then a framework to think politics is

to distinguish between different aspects of politics. It must be able to address (a) who is a

member, what questions we may talk about, and what are the ground rules, (b) how

conflicts between competing interpretations of collectivity are actually solved inside the

accepted system of rules, and (c) instances of partial compliance, the sometimes unfair

haggling cases that fall outside the accepted system of rules. This can be described in the

following framework:


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What we want to talk about when we talk about politics:

Metapolitics

How can we delineate political space?

What is considered political?

Politics

How can we adjudicate between conflicting

interests when we accept certain rules?

Parapolitics

How can we legitimize specific acts, on a

case-by-case basis?

In the empirical practice of global governance, we mainly encounter instances of

parapolitical arguments and some efforts at meta-politicking. It is clear that this does not

satisfy our political needs. Therefore, the task is cut out for us: we need to figure out,

how we can integrate politics into global governance.

A-PoliticalPolitical

Global GovernanceIdea of World GovernmentSystem Based on

Awareness ofGlobalTotality

Coalitions of the WillingModern State SystemSystem Based on

Territorial

Sovereignty

Multi-sectorial networksfunctionally builtaround Problems

(output-legitimated)

Problems dealt with bypolitically legitimized

Institutions

(input-legitimated)

ORGANIZING

PRINCIPLE//

APPROACH TOPROBLEMS

A-PoliticalPolitical

Global GovernanceIdea of World GovernmentSystem Based on

Awareness ofGlobalTotality

Coalitions of the WillingModern State SystemSystem Based on

Territorial

Sovereignty

Multi-sectorial networksfunctionally builtaround Problems

(output-legitimated)

Problems dealt with bypolitically legitimized

Institutions

(input-legitimated)

ORGANIZING

PRINCIPLE//

APPROACH TOPROBLEMS

In order to get global governance to be compliant with more than parapolitics and that

is a necessary precondition if we want it to be compatible with our democratic basket of

principles, we need to address the two main variables that distinguish global governance

from other forms of order: its deconstruction of spatial boundaries and its de-legitimation

of ex ante created institutions. And this needs to be done from two sides: we need to


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critically evaluate the necessity of spatial boundaries and ex ante created institutions for

democratic theorizing and on the other hand we need to critically reflect upon the all-

inclusiveness paradigm and the ex post functional legitimation of global governance. And

because a patch will always be a patch, we should not want to change democratic theory

or global governance. We do not want to let the patch change the nature of either concept,

but rather simply bridge the gap (to mix metaphors).


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III. Democratic Patching: Politicizing Global Governance and Tweaking

Democratic Theory

In order to make global governance as a system of thinking and doing compatible with

the democratic basket of principles, we will have to work on both sides. The questions

that need to be addressed are: How can we politicize global governance? and how can we

tweak democratic principles so that they can deal with the imperfect politicization of

global governance?

As I have shown above, the vocabulary of global governance cannot talk about politics

internally. So the strategy is clear: if we want to talk politics but cannot, because the

internal logic of the concept allows only meta- and parapolitical questions, we need to

integrate perspectives from the outside into the discourse; this is the same as saying, we

need to take a critical perspective on the concept. If this is they only strategy imaginable

that does not give up the concept of global governance, we need to ask which forms of

critique are possible? A distinction between three different modes of critique are

imaginable that are distinguishable by the level of engagement with the discourse that is

to be criticized.7

In the first mode, the author assumes the role of an external observer who claims to be as

distant from the object of inquiry as possible. Through the methodology of alienation it is

then possible to foreground the inability of the global governance discourse to talk

politics. The second way of criticizing is the strategic engagement within a debate. The

critic is still trying to distance herself from the project she is facing; however, contrary to

the first one she now takes part in the criticized discourse attempting to hijack existing

structures and injecting a new vocabulary and a new direction within it. The method is

thus one of colonization or the one of the Trojan horse. The third mode of being critical is

the attempt to improve theory and practice within the field being criticized. The

7The notion of the modes of critical engagement with the global governance discourse was introduced into

the debate by Thomas Skouteris at the Harvard Law School CPOGG-workshop in October 2003.


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presupposition of such a strategy is that existing theories and practices are already of

much value and only need some refinement to work even better. In pursuing such a

project, one will choose such methods as are already used within the mainstream.

Different critical modes have different (meta-)political consequences, but all are

necessary sometimes. We do not need to accept any one specific mode of critical

engagement. However, the strategy of integrating critical perspectives into the pre-

existing discourse on global governance will always only be a patch to functionally deal

with a fundamental problem: the inability of global governance to think and do politics.

But as a patch that is evaluated not for its elegance, but its function it looks great.

Up to now I have said surprisingly little about liberal democratic theory: the basket of

democratic principles. By black-boxing the internal debates on democracy, I am able to

concentrate on the task, namely patching global governance. Perhaps I can get away with

that. From the one substantive statement I made that all theories of democracy agree that

democracy is about collective self-determination by free and equal citizens (Held 1995),

enough can be derived to make a few suggestions in the direction of liberal democratic

theory. Most liberal democratic theories share two base assumptions (a) a conception of

space as bounded territory, and (b) a reliance on ex ante defined stakeholders in

processes, i.e. citizens. These two base assumptions need to be tweaked--not given up or

supplanted--in order to be able to evaluate the compliance of specific acts of global

governance with the democratic basket of principles. And with any tweaking there can be

no one once-and-for-all strategy, so here are several:

Lose the fear of loosing territory, start thinking in terms of functional space. Read

some Luhmann. Relax! The world is still out there. Deliberately imagine

deliberation that is not territorially bounded. Think of Habermas in your Windows

Messenger.

Be pragmatic about participation. Only the modernist idea of territorial

sovereignty has led us to believe that the question of identity or being inside to

some outside is the first question that we, the people ask. Think of working in


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another country, a different university, think of consultants working on different

projects in similar companies, or similar projects in different companies. It can be

done!

Conclusion

Global Governance as a system of thinking and doing and democratic theory as a basket

of principles to evaluate systems of thinking and doing are both here to stay. Global

governance in itself is not compatible with democratic principles. However, because of

the synchronicity of the two concepts, a patch to make the two compatible becomes

necessary. This type of patch will never be perfect and always will be a local,

temporalized solution and will stand in tension to the inherent logics of the concepts.

However, it is feasible and can be achieved through two moves. By politicizing global

governance by integrating an external, i.e. critical perspective, into the discourse on

global governance and by restraining democratic theories from being over-demanding, by

offering different metaphors to think space and ex ante legitimation, it can be done.


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