DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS: WESTERN FATIGUE, RUSSIAN RESURGENCE, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC...

8/20/2019 DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS: WESTERN FATIGUE, RUSSIAN RESURGENCE, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOC…

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INTRODUCTION

In 2015, Former Prime Minister of Poland Don-ald Tusk said “Georgia is denitely a front-run-

ner in the Eastern Partnership. This is not at-tery. It is a fact.”2 He is not the only one withthis opinion: Georgia is often considered oneof the most Western-friendly, non-EU memberpost-Soviet states, a country where both the pub-lic and political elites have a pro-European ori-entation. Even though NATO has failed to offera Membership Action Plan– and the EU has keptGeorgia’s hopes for membership at arm’s length– the Georgian public’s pro-European attitudeshave not changed. More than 60% of Georgians

still support Georgia’s integration into the EU,although this gure has declined recently.3 Over-all, Georgia is considered a champion of demo-cratic, economic and administrative reforms inthe region, despite a number of setbacks. The factis Georgian ruling elites are trying to integrateinto EU structures as much as possible.

Yet, not all is as rosy as it might appear at rst.Although the country’s European identity is anundisputable feature of Georgia’s political dis-

course, shared equally by the political elite andthe public, democratization and liberal-demo-cratic values have not been fully internalizedeither by society or the political class. Politicalelites, and especially those in power are, by de-fault, focused on extending their rule, whichoften jeopardizes their commitment to demo-

cratic values and their relations with the West.Even during the staunchly pro-western andWestern-educated political elite under formerPresident Mikhail Saakashvili, the ruling elite’s

reforms were more autocratic than democratic.In addition, important groups in Georgian soci-ety still believe certain liberal values endangerGeorgia’s national identity. These sentiments arefurther fueled by anti-liberal and pro-Russiandomestic actors in mass media, society, and theclergy, which portray the West as a decadent andhedonistic civilization that contradicts the tradi-tional values of Georgian identity.

Even more alarming is the policy of inde-

nitely postponing NATO and EU membership,which puts pressure on pro-Western politicalparties and contributes to the increased popular-ity of Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union(EEU) In just three years, the number of peoplewho support joining the EEU has tripled from11% to 31%.4 This tendency has added weightto the fear that, while it is unlikely any pro-Rus-sian force will come to power anytime soon, it ishighly possible that their rising popularity willend Georgia’s current ‘pro-West political con-

sensus’ in the upcoming parliamentary elections.5 Russia’s strengthening role has not gone unno-ticed: according to NDI polls from August 2015,Russian inuence has increased by 17%, whilethe inuence of the EU has decreased by 12%(gure1).

Figure 1: Overall, has the EU’s/Russia’s influence on Georgia increased, decreased or stayed

the same since 2012? (%) (NDI-CRRC survey, August 2015)6


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There are also domestic reasons behind the surgein pro-Russian sentiments. Under the Saakash-vili administration, pro-Russian views werecontained by the government’s stigmatization

policy, which often used anti-Russian rhetoricto boost its own popularity – and to intimidateand denounce the opposition, often falsely, as apro-Russian Trojan horse that endangers Geor-gia’s sovereignty.

After the 2012 power change, however, thenew government abandoned the policy of an-ti-Russian rhetoric. Over the past three years, ithas also taken a somewhat ambiguous stance to-ward the West. Moreover, it has often accused the

West of lobbying for the former government andtrying to cover up the crimes supposedly com-mitted by former ofcials.7 Furthermore, a fewmembers of the governing coalition have evenadvocated for Georgia’s accession to the EEU.8 While these statements are just expressions of in-dividual opinions, they decrease the credibilityof the overall pro-Western foreign policy of theGeorgian Dream (GD) government and increasethe social legitimacy of pro-Russian parties andsocietal actors.

After the 2012 power change, Georgia entereda new era with both opportunities and risks.Whereas the real normalization of relations withRussia can stabilize Georgia’s internal reformdynamics, the substantial shift in public opinionand the government’s foreign policy orientationtoward Russia could negatively impact Geor-gia’s democratization processes.

Developing countries like Georgia need an

additional external push to consolidate their de-mocracies and implement good governance-re-lated reforms. A pro-Russian Georgian gov-ernment could be less inclined to implementdemocratic reforms due to weakened Westernpressure, which would leave Russia as the coun-try’s only supporter. Secondly, Russia is not in-terested in having successful democratic statesat its borders. A successful democracy in theneighborhood could raise questions about thedominant position of authoritarian governments

in post-Soviet space and prove that post-Sovi-et societies are capable of building genuine de-mocracies, which is a danger for the Kremlin’sauthoritarian regime. Finally, the EU and the

USA are the only external actors with sufcientexperience in democracy-building in third states,proven by the transitions in the Baltic States andin Central and Eastern Europe.

All the post-Socialist states that have democ-ratized have done so within the context of Eu-ropean integration. Therefore, the processes ofEuropean integration and democratization aretightly intertwined. Georgia can only achieveits democratic consolidation if it maintains itspro-European foreign policy orientation.

Over the past few years, Georgia has facedthree main obstacles to locking in democratic re-

forms: the failure of Western actors to sufcient-ly empower the democratic reform coalitionsin Georgia; the strengthening of anti-reformistforces, which are supported by Russia and feelstronger due to the current fatigue in the pro-cess of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration; andthe overall lack of a democratic political cultureamong the ruling elites (both current and previ-ous), which often conate private with the publicinterests and focus on preserving power, ratherthan building democratic institutions. This paper

will provide detailed analysis of all three points.

The next section discusses Western concernsand expectations for Georgia, and the failure ofGeorgian governments – both current and pre-vious - to fully meet them. The paper will alsofocus on aws in Western strategy and proposerecommendations to x them. In the third part,the increasing inuence of Russia’s soft poweris analyzed and ways to contain it are proposed.The policy brief ends with a list of recommenda-

tions addressed to the Georgian government andcivil society actors, as well as policy makers inthe EU and the West.

WESTERN INTERESTS IN GEORGIA

The EU (and the US) want to establish a dem-ocratically-governed “ring of friends”9 in thepost-Soviet states without violent conicts, dys-functional societies and ourishing organized

crime.10

In other words, the EU believes thatits own security interests can be best served bystrengthening the stability and prosperity of itsneighbors.11


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The European understanding of security andstrategic interests radically contradicts that ofRussia. The main objective of the Russian regimeis to keep post-Soviet countries rmly under its

control and to prevent the emergence of success-ful and democratic states on its borders, as theycould one day serve as an example for the Rus-sian population.12 Therefore, “Russia […] has ac-tively sought to stie any democratic change onits periphery”.13 Edward Lucas summarizes thedifference between Russia and the EU: “Russianinterest is to have the weak and unstable neigh-bors. The Russian concept of security presuppos-es the strong Russian inuence in neighboringcountries. Here lies the fundamental differenceto the geopolitical concept of the EU, which re-quires the existence of strong, independent andresponsible states on its eastern border.”14

Georgia is perceived by the EU as a promisingneighbor on its Eastern frontier.15 It is interestedin strengthening Georgia’s statehood and seeingthat democratic and economic reforms succeed.Yet, whereas Georgia has implemented majorsuccessful economic and administrative reforms,Georgian governments have been less respon-

sive in terms of democratization.

Nevertheless, compared to other countries inthe Eastern Partnership (EaP) region, the Westhas viewed Georgia as a poster child for Westerndemocracy promotion over the past decade.16 Itsigned the Association Agreement with the EUin 2014 and completed negotiations on visa liber-alization in 2015. The West, for its part, played acrucial role in the rst electoral power transitionin 2012. By publicly urging Mikhail Saakashvili

to give up power, it did not leave much roomfor political manipulation, ‘forcing’ the Georgianpresident into the country’s rst electoral powertransition.17

After the power change, the West sought tofurther institutionalize the democratic rules ofthe game and urged the new government to con-structively cooperate with the former ruling par-ty. The new government, however, charged andimprisoned members of the former government,

a policy that was criticized by the West.

The government and parts of Georgian soci-ety largely understood the West’s criticism –and

warnings to avoid the impression of selective jus-tice –as interfering in domestic affairs or cover-ing up crimes committed by members of the pre-vious government. The criticism was, however,

aimed at establishing an example of a democrat-ic power transition without political retaliation.Although the remarks did not entirely deter thedetention of former ofcials, they served to limitthe number of arrests. Critiques by the West alsohelped to secure media pluralism in the country,saving the main opposition TV channel Rustavi2 from governmental interference.

There is still a lot of work to be done: the Geor-gian government needs to improve key political

reforms, which are, rst of all, in Georgia’s bestinterest. Moreover, it should abandon the hostilerhetoric toward the West, which is further fuel-ling the anti-Western mood in Georgian society.The government and parliament should alsowork on a common code of conduct, which willdiscourage some of their members from ques-tioning the universal values of the democraticmodel of governance. Alternatively, the Geor-gian government’s unresponsiveness towardthe West might further decrease the Western

attention toward Georgia, which will harm theprocess of Euro-Atlantic integration and of dem-ocratic reforms in the country.

In addition to the country’s democratic situa-tion, the EU and the US are also concerned withthe deteriorated security situation in Georgia’sseparatist regions and Russia’s increasing inu-ence in Georgia, both of which negatively impactthe democratic processes inside the country. Sofar, the West has not been able to cope with secu-

rity-related problems.

For instance, its engagement in Georgia’s ter-ritorial conicts was no match for Russia’s de-stabilizing measures. In addition, the continuedpolicy of denying Georgia EU and the NATOmembership contributes to the rising frustrationin the population -and Russia’s increasing popu-larity. Thus, whereas the West has been willingto assist Georgia in its democratic development,it has not always invested enough resources to

assist the South Caucasus country, especially interms of hard security and territorial conicts.

Recent Georgian governments also bear a


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there is no need to continue to refer to Georgiaas a “neighbor” rather than a “European state,”and to constantly remind the Georgian politicalelite and the population that membership is not

on the agenda in the long-term perspective.23 ForGeorgia, which has had a very difcult processof identity building since regaining indepen-dence in the early 1990s, a clear commitment bythe EU (and NATO) to accept it as a Europeancountry could be a strong inspirational incentiveto stick to democratic reforms even without theimmediate accession perspective.24

The EU also needs to change its govern-ment-centered approach and focus more on Civil

Society Organizations (SCO) as the main reformagents. Despite the recent inclusion of SCOsin its programs and an increase in nancing ofSCOs, the EaP – the main instrument of the EU -remains largely centered on the state, with stateagencies its only partners in the reform processand policy dialogue. This is a fundamentallyawed strategy, as governments frequently actas main veto players in the reform process sincethey are trying not to lose their grip on power.Instead, the EU should increase its tools to em-

power citizens and SCOs in their push to re-form their own governments. Moreover, the EUshould make its assistance to Georgian govern-ment conditional on the sufcient inclusion ofcitizens’ representatives and NGOs in processesof democratic reforms.

CONTAINING RUSSIAN SOFT POWER

Russia does not directly challenge the pro-cesses of democratization in its neighboring

states.25

Instead, it effectively utilizes its softpower to mobilize post-Soviet societies againstcertain liberal-democratic norms and to portraythe EU as a threat to their national identities. Inrecent years, Russia has internalized the role ofthe main protector of ‘traditional values’ versusthe ‘decadent’ West.

In his 2013 State of the Union address, RussianPresident Vladimir Putin accused Western coun-tries of “reviewing moral norms and erasing

national traditions and distinctions between na-tionalities and cultures”.26 The Russian presidentportrayed himself as a defender of traditional

family values, which are “the foundation of Rus-sia’s greatness and a bulwark against so-calledtolerance – genderless and infertility”.27 Accord-ing to one author, “with the help of the Russian

Orthodox Church, Putin began a battle againstthe liberal (Western) traits that some segments ofRussian society had started to adopt”.28 A primeexample is when Russia criminalized ‘homosex-ual propaganda’, while suppressing LGBT andother minority groups who fail to t the tradi-tional Orthodox image promoted by the Krem-lin propaganda.29 Anti-homosexual propagandamoves easily throughout the post-Soviet states,since post-Soviet societies are not LGBT-friendlyin the rst place.30 Aware of the deep resentmentof parochial segments of post-Soviet societiestoward the homosexuality, Russia reduces thenotion of European values to that of active pro-motion of homosexual propaganda.

In Georgia, however, during the Saakashviligovernment, the country’s pro-Western foreignpolicy orientation was undisputed and the gov-ernment was more eager to challenge Russianideological narratives, for instance, by openingthe Russian-language TV PIK and by limiting

the broadcasting of Russian TV channels. As aresult, there was little need for SCOs to step in tocounter Russian soft power.

The situation drastically changed, however,after the 2012 power change. Although the Geor-gian Dream (GD) government has preserved thecountry’s overall pro-Western foreign policy, ithas, at the same time, radically changed its ap-proach toward Russia. As a result, the govern-ment’s mild policy has encouraged important

parts of Georgian society – mostly Soviet-eraintelligentsia and some media outlets – to open-ly campaign against the ‘decadent’ and ‘gay’Western values and embrace close ties to Russia,which occupies part of the country but shares thesame values and same religion (gure 2).

To cope with the increased popularity of an-ti-liberal and anti-democratic values, the currentgovernment should engage in a battle againstRussia-supported propaganda, which is promot-

ed by local pro-Russian proxies. It should, forinstance, limit the broadcasting licenses for Rus-sian TV channels and launch a media campaignto support the process of European integration


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by explaining to citizens that approximation tothe EU does not endanger Georgia’s traditionalvalues.

But if the current Georgian government is not

interested in containing Russian propaganda, itbecomes the responsibility of the liberally-mind-ed SCOs and the EU to handle the myths dissem-inated by the Kremlin-controlled media and itslocal anti-liberal partners. Georgian civil actors,who possess great regional expertise, can serveas local partners to the EU. A good example is theUkrainian stopfake.org, a website made by thestudents of Ukrainian Kyiv Mohyla Academy,which exposes Kremlin’s lies by “fact-checking”the fabricated Russian media news. In addition

to launching fact-checking media projects, theSCOs should conduct an active media campaignto explain the merits of the democratic form ofgovernance, as well as the advantages of Euro-pean integration and communicate the true im-age of the EU, to the broader public. They shouldespecially focus on the sensitive issues that areactively utilized by Russia and local anti-liberalactors. For instance, it has to be sufciently ex-plained that the approximation to - or even be-coming a member of - the EU will not automat-ically result in the legalization of the same-sexmarriage. This is the only way to oppose the Rus-sian propaganda directed against the West. Al-ternatively, the unchecked gospels of anti-liberaland pro-Russian forces might attract more andmore citizens and further undermine pro-West-ern attitudes among Georgians.

In 2015, the EU launched its own ‘disinforma-tion review’.32 Yet, the public visibility of theseproducts remains a major problem. The EU pub-

lishes the review only on its web portals, which

are not accessed or read by the broader public,both in the EU and in the Eastern Partnershipcountries (EaP). The review does not have aFacebook page – the main social media which is

actively used in Georgia for public political dis-cussion.

The EU has also tried to persuade the Geor-gian population about the advantages of Euro-pean integration and attempted dismantle fearsrelated to the Association Agreements and theDeep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, butagain its explanatory material has never gonefurther than the webpage of the EU delegationto Georgia.33

In order to be more effective, the EU shouldbroaden its communication strategy. A campaignon the country’s main TV outlets to counter, asstraightforwardly as possible, the anti-EU pro-paganda would be a good start. “Myth busting”will only work when it is successfully delivered.

Compared to the EU, US state agencies aremore active in countering anti-Western propa-ganda. For instance, USAID recently nancedthe report on ‘anti-Western propaganda’ pub-lished by the Media Development Fund.34 Nev-ertheless, as long as such kind of reports do notreach the broader population, inter alia by activecampaigning through mass media, their impactwill be limited.

In addition to the information campaign, theEU and the Georgian government have to workclosely with the Georgian Orthodox Church(GOC) to limit Russian inuence on the coun-try’s most popular institution. The GOC’s infor-mal structure is quite complicated and consists of

Figure 2: Types of messages concerning [Western] values and human rights

(amount of messages between 17 February 2014 – 18 February 2015)31


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several factions. Most of them are more inclinedtoward Russia, but there are also strong, pro-Eu-ropean groups.35 The Georgian governmentsshould empower the pro-European factions in-

side the Church through increased cooperationand public support. The EU should try to makethe Church a cooperative partner in democraticreforms. It should offer church clerics increasedpossibilities to study and conduct research inEuropean universities, as well as intensify con-tacts with European churches. Persuading theGeorgian church about the merits of Europeanintegration and democratic development is tre-mendously important.

If this is not done, the alternative is a power-ful Georgian Orthodox Church that will remainunder the dangerous inuence of Russia. Thatrelationship will become a powerful tool of softpower for the Kremlin, which will try to instru-mentalize its close connection to the GeorgianChurch to harm the process of Georgia’s Eu-ro-Atlantic integration.

Russian soft power in Georgia has also beenstrengthened through the intensied trade and

business relations between Russia and Georgiathat began in 2012, when Moscow opened thecountry’s market to Georgian products. Geor-gian exports to Russia almost doubled between2012 and 2014, amounting to $274 million USD in2014. Russian investments reached ve percentof the country’s total FDI in 2014.36 Althoughthe gures are still not high, stronger trade-re-lations with Russia makes important groups ofGeorgian exporters, such as wine-makers andmineral waters companies, increasingly depen-

dent on the Russian market, and thus vulner-able to potential political pressure by Russia.Whereas the intensication of trade with Russiais not a negative development as such, the ac-companying risks should be taken into accountand adequately addressed by the government.Moreover, the government should develop alter-native scenarios in case Russia begins to utilizeincreased trade and mobility contacts for polit-ical reasons. If it does not take these steps, thegovernment runs the risk of repeating the pre-2006 situation, when the Georgian economy wasvulnerable to Russian pressure. It is obvious thatRussia, which is famous for instrumentalizing

economic ties for political reasons, will at somepoint try to use Georgia’s increased dependenceon Russian market as a “stick” against the Geor-gian government.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDA-TIONS: MANAGING GEORGIA’S EUROPE-AN INTEGRATION

In small countries like Georgia, the process ofdemocratization is closely linked to foreign policyorientation and regional integration processes.37 The experience in the post-Socialist world clear-ly shows that the process of democratization insmall countries is best served by facilitating their

approximation to Euro-Atlantic structures.38

Forinstance, the Baltic States achieved a high degreeof democratization and good governance withinthe process of their Euro-Atlantic integration. Inthis regard, the processes of democratization andof European integration are inextricably linked.That means attempts by certain anti-liberal forc-es, both of local and foreign origin, to discreditGeorgia’s European integration process and Eu-ropean values also undermine Georgia’s chancesfor democratic development.

In light of this, there are three main challengeswhich should be urgently addressed by domes-tic actors to avoid autocratic backsliding – andto lock in Georgia’s existing democratic reforms.First, the Georgian government and SCOs shouldensure that the wider population knows about –and understands – the advantages of Europeanintegration and EU reforms. Second, the govern-ment and the SCOs should seek to contain Rus-sian soft power by launching an active campaign

to dismantle the Russian discourse that aims todiscredit Western liberal-democratic values. Fi-nally, the EU should also improve its democra-cy-promotion agenda by being more consistentin its relations with the Georgian government; byproviding new incentives to strengthen pro-re-formist parties; by closely cooperating with theGeorgian Church; and by supporting the activecampaign to improve its own image among theGeorgian population.


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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The Georgian government should:

● Limit the inuence of Russian soft power,which is primarily aimed at discrediting West-ern-style liberal democracy, by, for instance, lim-iting the broadcasting licenses for Russian TVchannels.

● Avoid ambiguous statements regardingthe role of the EU and the democratic form ofgovernance by some members of governmentand the ruling coalition’s members of parliament

by elaborating a common stance on foreign-poli-cy orientation and liberal democratic values.

● Launch an active media campaign to ex-plain to citizens that the process of Europeanintegration and Georgia’s traditional values gohand in hand, and that the reforms demanded bythe West are, in the rst place, in the interest ofthe Georgian population.

● Analyze the risks of increasing trade andmobility with Russia and develop alternativescenarios in case Russia starts to use increasedtrade and mobility contacts for political reasons.

● The existence of occupied territories andsecurity problems severely limits both state ca-pacities and public mobilization for democraticreforms. The Georgian government should putmore pressure on the West to prioritize Georgia’sterritorial conicts and its security concerns intheir agenda. The Georgian government shouldemphasize the importance of improved security

for accomplishing democratic reforms.

The civil society actors should:

● Oppose Russian soft power by disman-tling Russian myths, for instance by launch-ing fact-checking media projects, such as theUkrainian stopfake.org.

● Conduct an active media campaign tar-

geted at the wider public to explain the merits ofthe democratic form of governance, as well as theadvantages of European integration, and com-municate the true image of the EU. They should

focus especially on the sensitive issues that areactively utilized by Russia and local anti-liberalactors. For instance, it has to be sufciently ex-plained that the approximation to, or even mem-

bership in, the EU will not automatically resultin the legalization of the same-sex marriage.

● SCOs should actively monitor Russia’sincreasing inuence in Georgian media. For in-stance, the dramatic changes in the editorial pol-icy of the popular Maestro TV channel after itwas acquired by Russia-based businessman.

The EU should:

● Improve its public image by broadeningits communicating strategy and directly target-ing citizens in Georgia through an active massmedia campaign (such as launching short infor-mational clips) to explain existing policies andto counteract the anti-EU discourse that is en-couraged by pro-Russian politicians, parts of the‘intelligentsia’ and several media outlets, and issupported by Russia.

● Be more consistent in applying democra-tizing pressure on the Georgian government toprevent autocratic backsliding and avoid beingidentied with ofcials’ misdeeds.

● Develop post-association conditionalitymechanisms to prevent the Georgian govern-ment from developing a sense of self-satisfactionfrom successfully accomplishing the AssociationAgreement and visa liberalization. The EU hasto send a clear signal that Georgia’s institutional

approximation to the European Union is not ir-reversible and that any progress achieved in re-lations can be rolled back at any time should thegovernment not comply with democratic norms.

● Offer new incentives, such as more eco-nomic benets or new and more advanced waysof integration, to stabilize democratization re-forms and stipulate the government’s continuingadherence to democratic norms.

● Increase funding for SCOs and make

them the main local partners in policy dialoguewith the government, both in terms of policyadoption and policy implementation, as well asthe reform monitoring process.


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REFERENCES:

1 Statement or the Record Worldwide Treat Assessment o the US Intelligence Community Senate ArmedServices Committee, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pd, retrieved Feb-ruary 16, 2016

2 EU Neighbourhood Ino Centre. 2015. Donald usk says Georgia a ront-runner in the Eastern Partnership.Available rom . Accessed 16 February 2016.

3 Gilbreath, Dustin. 2015. No, Putin is not winning Georgia away rom Europe. Here are the acts. Availablerom . Accessed 20 January 2016.

4 Cecire, Michael. 2016. Yes, Putin may be starting to win Georgia away rom the West. Here’s why that matters.Available rom . Accessed 26 January 2016.

5 Ibid.

6 Graph taken rom: Social science in the Caucasus. 2016. Te Georgian public’s perceptions o the EU’s andRus-

sia’s influence on the country. Available rom . Accessed 3 February 2016.

7 Civil Georgia. 2016. Georgia in U.S. Intelligence Annual Report. Available rom . Accessed 16 February 2016.

8 ass. 2015. Georgia to move towards EU, not Eurasian union — prime minister. Available rom . Accessed 26 January 2016.

9 Prodi, Romano. 2002. A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability. Available rom . Accessed 2 January 2016.

10 European Council. 2003. ESS: European Security Strategy. Available rom .

11 Council o the European Union. 2009. European Security Strategy.: A secure Europe in a better world. Brus-sels: EUR-OP.

12 Umland, Andreas. 2009. Understanding the Orange Revolution: Ukraine’s Democratization in the RussianMirror. Available rom .Accessed 22 March 2013.

13 Walker, Christopher. 2011. Te Authoritarian Dead End: Te Arab Spring’s Implications or the Former SovietUnion. Available rom . Accessed 12 March 2014.

14 Lucas, Edward. 2013. Putin’s Latest Hunting rip. Available rom .

15 EU Neighbourhood Ino Centre. 2015. Donald usk says Georgia a ront-runner in the Eastern Partnership.Available rom . Accessed 16 February 2016.16 Ibid.

17 Sherwood-Randall, Liz. 2012a. President Obama Meets with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili: TeWhite House. Available rom ; Sherwood-Randall, Liz. 2012b. President Obama Meets with GeorgianPresident Mikheil Saakashvili: Te White House. Available rom .

18 Börzel, anja and Bidzina Lebanidze. 2015. European Neighbourhood Policy at the Cross-Roads: Evaluatingthe Past to Shape the Future. MAXCAP Input Paper (13).

19 Börzel, anja, Yasemin Pamuk, and Andreas Stahn. 2009. Democracy and Stability? EU and US Engagementin the Southern Caucasus. In Promoting democracy and the rule o law: American and European strategies, edited

by Amichai A. Magen, Tomas Risse-Kappen and Michael McFaul, 150–184. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.20 Börzel, anja and Bidzina Lebanidze. 2015. European Neighbourhood Policy at the Cross-Roads: Evaluating

the Past to Shape the Future. MAXCAP Input Paper (13).

21 Civil Georgia. 2015. In Quotes: Int’l Reactions to Rustavi 2 V Case. Available rom


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article.php?id=28756>. Accessed 26 January 2016.

22 Babayan, Nelli, anja Börzel, Antoaneta Dimitrova, Julia Langbein, and Bidzina Lebanidze. 2015. 10 Years othe ENP - Te Way Forward with the EaP. Available rom . Accessed 24 January 2016.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Way, Lucan A. 2015. Te limits o autocracy promotion: Te case o Russia in the ‘near abroad’. EuropeanJournal o Political Research:n/a-n/a.

26 Vasilyeva, Nataliya. 2013. Putin deends Russian conservative values. Available rom . Accessed 28 March 2014.

27 Ibid.

28 Barbashin, Anton and Hannah Toburn. 2014. Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy BehindPutin’s Invasion o Crimea. Available rom . Accessed 7 June 2014.

29 Ibid.


31 Graph taken rom: Social science in the Caucasus. 2016. Te Georgian public’s perceptions o the EU’s an-dRussia’s influence on the country. Available rom . Accessed 3 February 2016.

32 Rettman, Andrew. 2015. EU diplomats launch Russia ‘myth-busting’ weekly. Available rom . Accessed 24 January 2016.


34 Kintsurashvili, amar. 2015. Anti-Western propaganda. Available rom . Accessed 24 January2016.

35 Kapanadze, Sergi. 2015 // op. 2015. Russia’s So Power in Georgia – A Carnivorous Plant in Action. In Tedifferent aces o “sof power”: Te Baltic States and Eastern neighbourhood between Russia and the EU, edited byoms Rostoks, Andris Spruds and Andris Sprūds, 162–184. Riga: Latvian Institute o International Affairs.

36 Ibid.

37 Ambrosio, Tomas. 2014. Beyond the transition paradigm: A research agenda or authoritarian consolidation.Demokratizatsiya 22 (3):471–495.

37

Ibid.

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Georgian Institute o Politics

el: +995 599 99 02 12Email: [email protected]

www.gip.ge

THE GEORGIAN INSTITUTE OF POLITICS (GIP)is a Tbilisi-based non-prot, non-partisan, research and analysis orga-

nization. GIP works to strengthen the organizational backbone of dem-ocratic institutions and promote good governance and development

through policy research and advocacy in Georgia.

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DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS: WESTERN FATIGUE, RUSSIAN RESURGENCE, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC...

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