DENMARK – SOMALIAPARTNERSHIP POLICY2015-2017
March 2015
CONTENTS
1 DENMARK AND SOMALIA – INTRODUCTION AND FUTURE VISION 3
2 CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SOMALIA 6
3 OVERALL PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIC FOCUS AREAS OF INTERVENTIONS 12
4 RISKS 20
5 RESULTS 21
6 M&E FRAMEWORK 22
7 COMMUNICATION 22
ANNEX 1
KEY DATA SOMALIA 23
ANNEX 2
DENMARK’S ONGOING DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA 25
ANNEX 3
OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MDGS IN SOMALIA (2010) 27
1 DENMARK AND SOMALIA – INTRODUCTION AND FUTURE VISION
The overall vision for Denmark’s engagement in Somalia is to support the people of Somalia to create
a peaceful and stable Somalia through inclusive political processes in order to further economic
and social development. The Somali Compact will present the overarching framework for this vision.
Somalia is one of the world’s most fragile
countries. The country is emerging from
conflict and prolonged fragility with some
regions showing gradual progress towards
a more stable and increasingly democratic
state. Since the establishment of the
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
in September 2012, concerted efforts
have been made to build a foundation for
a stable and democratic state, including
e.g. the adoption of a new provisional
constitution, and the appointment of a
new Parliament by a national constituent
assembly, the election by Parliament of a
Speaker as well as the peaceful selection
of the new President, Hassan Sheikh
Mohamoud. After more than 20 years
of conflict and crisis, the FGS has been
welcomed by the international community.
Somaliland claimed independence
from Somalia in 1991 and has operated
as a de facto nation state – without
formal recognition by the international
community and with some positive gains
in democracy and development.
For the first time, the country has
witnessed a long period of increased
cooperation amongst the leadership
and the two key arms of government,
the executive and the legislative, resulting
in concerted efforts to the endorsement
in September 2013 of a New Deal Compact
for Somalia (Somali Compact), including
the Somaliland Special Arrangements.
This serves as a clear sign of the new
partnership between the FGS, the
people of Somalia and the international
community. Somalia has, with the
assistance of the international community,
accomplished major progress in the past
years; in joint operations with Somali
forces, AMISOM has been successful
in liberating approximately 70% of South
and Central Somalia from Al-Shabaab,
allowing further stabilisation of the
country, the number of piracy attacks has
reduced immensely, the foundation for
a democratic future has been put in place
by the adoption of political and economic
reforms as well as the initiation of legal
frameworks, governance structures and
public financial management processes.
The coming years are crucial for Somalia
to reestablish a social contract with its
citizens, built upon the trust of its people,
in order to shape a stable and peaceful
country. Despite the military operation
by the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) expanding the liberated areas
in Somalia, the security situation is
still fragile and marked by al-Shabaab’s
control over significant parts of Somalia
and ability to carry out serious and
frequent attacks within and outside
the country. This, as well as inter-clan
disputes and conflicts between the
regions continue to have significant
impact on the ability of the international
community to implement development
programmes in Somalia. This policy paper
illustrates how Denmark’s broader
foreign and security policy is carried
out in practice.
The stabilisation, economic, and social
development in Somalia is paramount
to a more stable Horn of Africa which
consequently has an influence on Europe
and Denmark. Radicalisation, spread
of terrorism, and unregulated migration
flows to countries in the region constitute
an almost daily reminder of the lack of
stability, the dire humanitarian situation
and the fledgling security situation in
Somalia. Fighting between radical groups
and authorities in Mombasa, terror attacks
in Kenya’s coastal region and Nairobi,
Uganda’s capital Kampala, as well
as in Mogadishu are seen as direct
consequences of the instable security
situation in Somalia, allowing al-Shabaab
to carry out its attacks from and in
Somalia. Poverty, food insecurity, high
levels of vulnerability to extreme weather
conditions and the lack of security has
displaced millions of Somalis internally
as well as to other countries in the region,
Europe and the United States.
The objective of this policy paper is
to establish a strategic framework for
Denmark’s engagement in Somalia over
the coming three years. Cognizant of
the need for a long term engagement,
a three year time frame has been chosen
for this policy paper as the situation in
3
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SOMALIA
Department of Field SupportCartographic Section
Map No. 3690 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONSDecember 2011
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
SOMALIA
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4
Somalia continues to be dynamic, hard to
predict and requires continued adaptation
and adjustment. Also, the financial
appropriations underpinning the policy
paper as well as the Somali Compact
have a three year time span.
The Danish engagement in the coming
years will be based on the expectation
of continued progress combined with
a realistic sense of what can be achieved
in Somalia in the short term. Somalia
has over the recent years experienced
a number of positive developments
in establishing political institutions as
well as in creating stability in parts of the
country. However, setbacks in key areas
such as security, governance, corruption,
and human rights are to be expected on
Somalia’s path towards further stability
and development. Furthermore, there are
strong indications that the humanitarian
situation is likely to deteriorate due to
a combination of poor rains, continued
armed conflict and limitations to both
humanitarian funding and remittances.
The future of Somalia lies in the hands
of the Somalis. Only if the development
of the country is driven by the Somalis
themselves will Somalia succeed
in attaining sustainable and robust
institutions and systems that can enable
Somalia to cope on its own. The role of
the international community in the coming
years is to support the Somalis in laying
the stepping stones. Even with significant
international support, there is no doubt
that the Federal Government of Somalia
will be faced with a large and difficult task
in the coming years. Not least the
presidential elections, expected to take
place in 2016 are consequential in terms
of political developments in the country.
Thus, despite positive developments,
it is broadly recognized that Somalia will
need significant international support in
the coming years in order for the Somali
authorities to be able to establish security
in the country and to provide basic
services to the population.
The Danish assistance to Somalia in
the past two decades has shown good
results with its broad-based approach
and its close coordination with relevant
stakeholders. Denmark is seen as a
present, visible and reliable partner
through our long term and active
engagement with humanitarian, security,
stabilisation and development assistance
and active engagement with regional
and international partners dealing with
Somalia. Denmark will continue its
engagement based on this foundation
and place a decisive emphasis on Somali ownership enabling a timely transfer
of responsibility to the Somalis – even
if this, in the short term and with respect
to proper fiduciary standards, means
less efficient solutions than those, which
can be implemented with international
assistance today. Denmark will continue
to channel its assistance through the most
appropriate instruments, including
the UN, who continues to play a central
role in Somalia, not least with its presence
in the various regions. The Danish
contributions will be in accordance with
the New Deal principles agreed in Busan
for coordinating and harmonizing donor
assistance in fragile states. Denmark
will continue prioritizing common
programming within the EU and with
like-minded donors.
Engagement in Somalia involves high
political, security and financial risks and
acquires risk willingness. In order to cope
with these risks, Denmark’s engagement
will be conducted with a flexible
programming approach. If the security,
political and/or humanitarian situation
changes radically, our programming
can be adjusted accordingly in order
to meet the conditions on the ground.
Such an approach allows for a rebalancing
between the short-term, quick-impact
humanitarian activities and the long-term
developmental capacity building activities.
Denmark has learned valuable lessons
since reviving the partnership with
Somalia in the 1990s. These lessons
constitute a useful basis for the future
engagement that will be realigned to
the new international framework while
drawing on past experiences. Experience
has, inter alia, shown that when focusing
assistance on fewer and larger well-
established programmes results are
achieved and Denmark simultaneously
obtains a vantage point in the dialogue
with the regional and central admin-
istrations as well as with other donors.
5
2 CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SOMALIA
A FRAGILE PAST PREPARING FOR A BETTER FUTURE
Somalia is slowly emerging from two
decades of protracted civil war, but still
carries numerous scars from a state
collapse. External influence, particularly
the Cold War contest over Somalia’s
strategic position on the Horn of Africa
and its internal dynamics, led to the
collapse of the military dictatorship
of Siad Barre in 1991. Clan-based
warfare coupled with interventions from
neighbouring countries, the emergence
of armed militias and the appearance
of the violent and extremist organisation
– al-Shabaab (an al-Qaeda affiliate) have
thrust the country into conflict that has
fragmented the society. These factors
continue to threaten regional and global
peace and have left Somalia with alarming
symptoms which have defined Somalia
as a failed state. This includes the
displacement of one fifth of the civil
population (1,1 million are internally
displaced and nearly 1 million live in
refugee camps in neighbouring countries
Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen), breakdown
of law and order as well as weak or non-
existing public institutions and services.
The long absence of a central government
has meant that public institutions lack
the capacity to deliver services and
lack the accountability or legitimacy
to mediate relations between civilian
groups and between citizens and the
state, making them vulnerable to violence
and corruption. Traditional forms of
authority and local communities, which
in most areas have been clan-based, have
taken over the role of central government
leading to a form of mistrust amongst the
population in the state’s ability to service
delivery. The lack of service-delivery by
the state also has led to the rudimentary
provision of public services, especially
for women, girls and minorities.
DIVERSITY AMONGST THE REGIONS
The fragility of the current situation is
underlined by regional disparities and
hostilities. While Somaliland is relatively
peaceful, the situation in Puntland, Juba
and a large section of South Central
Somalia is less stable and under threat
from inter and intra-clan fighting and
al-Shabaab attacks. The relationship
between the FGS and the regional states
of Puntland and the Interim Administration
for Juba is characterized by different views
on key issues like federalism, integration
of militias, sharing of natural resources,
and by a general lack of trust. The
international community and particularly
the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) has made very
significant and often successful efforts
in mediating regional conflicts while other
partners, notably Turkey, have driven
ongoing negotiations between the Federal
Government of Somalia and Somaliland,
yet with limited progress so far.
An immediate challenge to FGS’s ability
to rule and implement its plans is the FGS’
lack of legitimacy in most parts of the
1 All data sourced from UN Data: https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Somalia
SOMALIA FACTS1
Area 637,660 km2 (Denmark 43,000 km2)
Population 10.2 million
Annual population growth 2.9 %
Population Somali 85 %, others including Bantu and Arabs 15 %
Language Somali (official), Arabic and English
Religion Sunni Muslims
Time 2 hours ahead Danish wintertime
GDP pr. capita 128 USD
Humanitarian situation 3.1 million people in food insecurity
6
country. While the current constitution
of the FGS enables federalism with relative
autonomy to the regions, Somaliland
is formally opposed to becoming subject
to any rule by Mogadishu and continues to
seek formal recognition as an independent
state. Adding to this challenge is the
tendency of regions in Somalia to become
increasingly self-confident in their move
towards autonomy.
The state formation process constitutes
one of the three key milestones defined
in the Somali Compact under its Peace
and State-building Goal 1 (PSG 1)2 and
the FGS’ “Vision 2016 – Framework for
Action”. The three key milestones are:
1. Formation of federal states
2. Adoption of a Federal Constitution
3. Credible elections by 2016.
The state formation process entails a wide
political focus of the FGS. With the
regional federal states
in place, acute issues such as state
security, fiscal federalism and natural
resource management can be addressed.
However, the concept of federalism is
historically controversial and not well
understood amongst the people. For FGS
and its institutions to establish essential
trust and confidence among the people
of Somalia will be central for the FGS
to become successful.
The second key milestone of PSG 1
is the finalisation and ratification of
the Constitution. FGS’ clear aim is for
a revised Constitution to be successfully
ratified by 2015. This will require a high
level of technical assistance and political
deliberations, not least with and within
the various regions.
Credible elections in 2016 constitute the
final key milestone of PSG 1. An electoral
framework needs to be established from
scratch, implying ratification of a vast
amount of related legislation, including on
political parties, and a voter registration.
A functioning and independent election
commission needs to be established and
outreach and civic education on elections
should be prioritized to ensure broad-
based participation at the elections.
Adding to this is the general security
situation. Large parts of Somalia are as
yet dominated by extremist violent groups.
Increasing security before elections
is pivotal for broad-based participation
in the elections.
THE MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES ON THE GROUND AND AT SEA
Despite security gains made over the
last couple of years, inter alia, al-Shabaab
has been forced out of Mogadishu and
the income-generating Kismayo, many
security challenges still remain. Having
been forced to cede control of large parts
of Somalia, al-Shabaab has shifted its
strategy away from traditional warfare
towards asymmetric warfare focusing
on complex and hybrid attacks, involving
suicide bombers and suicide infantry.
Though weakened, i.a. by the killing of its
leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, al-Shabaab
still pose a significant security risk.
Armed conflict between clans or sub-clans
over access to resources and income-
generation, are still prevalent in Somalia,
particularly in South Central Somalia
and in the southern parts of Puntland.
Inter-clan fighting has been exacerbated
by the ongoing state-formation process.
Moreover, Puntland and Somaliland
are engaged in territorial dispute over
Sool and Sanaag regions, resulting
in occasional clashes between the two.
At sea, piracy off the coast of Somalia
has rapidly declined, from 176 incidents
of piracy attacks in 2011 to 15 incidents
in 2013, which is the lowest in five years.
2 The Somali Compact has defined five Peace and State-building Goals of the New Deal, which are the areas of priorities for the FGS and represent agreement amongst the FGS, the people of Somalia and the international community on what is required to move Somalia forward to peace and recovery. The five PSGs are; PSG 1 on inclusive politics, PSG 2 on security, PSG 3 on justice, PSG 4 on economic foundations, PSG 5 on revenue and services.
7
There are a number of reasons for the
decline, most importantly preventive
measures taken by the shipping industry,
including placing armed guards on ships,
a coordinated naval response led by NATO
and the EU, including preventive patrols
as well as vigorous responses in actual
cases of piracy, an overall justice and
security sector response allowing for
the transfer, prosecution, conviction and
detention of pirates, as well as community
responses within Somalia. It is vital to
continue the efforts to counter piracy
at sea as well as on land A key element
in the Somali Compact is to build Somali
capacity to address maritime crime,
including piracy, smuggling of charcoal,
weapons, migrants, drugs and alcohol,
human trafficking, illegal fishing and
armed robbery at sea.
There is evidence of improved capacity
of the FGS security sector to combat
al-Shabaab. The capacity of the FGS
to address the security challenges and
establish sustainable peace and security
remains, however, limited and the FGS
is still dependent on AMISOM to provide
security. Where control of territory has
been established, this has been achieved
by local initiatives (in the North), by armed
groups, or by neighbouring countries and
AMISOM in cooperation with the Somali
National Army (SNA).
In 2014, the SNA and AMISOM embarked
on a large scale joint military campaign
against al-Shabaab with the aim of
liberating the remaining al-Shabaab
controlled areas in Somalia, namely in
South Central. The territorial gains have
led to an increased al-Shabaab presence
in the border areas between Puntland and
Somaliland, indicating that al-Shabaab,
instead of being “rooted out”, is shifting
its presence to the North.
THE POOREST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD WITH IMMENSE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES
Although reliable statistics regarding
Somalia are limited, it is estimated that
about 82% of the Somali population (99%
of the nomadic population) is poor across
multiple dimensions3. Poverty incidences
are relatively more outspoken in rural
areas (91%) than in urban areas (61%)4.
1 million Somalis face acute food
insecurity and an additional 2.1million
people remain highly vulnerable to
external shocks and risk sliding back
into another food security crisis5.
All basic service indicators paint a sad
picture of deprivation: life expectancy
is 50 years6, 218,000 children under five
are estimated to be acutely malnourished
of which 20% are severely malnourished
and in acute need of medical treatment
and therapeutic food for survival7. Out of
the three key dimensions used to measure
a country’s development, in Somalia,
education is lowest at 0.118 out of 1,
followed by income at 0.253 out of 1 and
health slightly higher at 0.486 out of 18.
Somalia has a long history of receiving
international humanitarian assistance.
Recurrent droughts and internal conflict
have eroded Somali livelihoods resulting
in one of the most prolonged displacement
and humanitarian crisis in the world.
The drought in 2010-2012 affected
millions of people and led to a massive
internal displacement amongst the
population. Currently, 1.1 million people
are internally displaced9, approximately
one million Somali refugees reside
in neighbouring countries, and roughly
half a million are in Kenya10.
3 UNDP Somalia Human Development Report 2012, Fact Sheet: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Arab%20States/HDR-Somalia-Factsheet-2012-E.pdf
4 UNDP Somalia Human Development Report 20125 OCHA, Humanitarian Snapshot, April 2014, issued on 16 May 2014.6 UNDP Somalia Human Development Report 2012, Fact Sheet: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Arab%20States/
HDR-Somalia-Factsheet-2012-E.pdf7 OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, Somalia, August 2014, issued on 19 September 2014.8 UNDP Somalia Human Development Report 2012, Fact Sheet: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Arab%20States/
HDR-Somalia-Factsheet-2012-E.pdf9 OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, Somalia, September 2014, issued on 17 October.10 UNHCR, Somalia Fact Sheet, April 2014.
8
11 Unicef appeal for Somalia, juli 2014: http://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/Somalia_HAC_MYR_FINALb.pdf
Regionally, South Central is the most
populous area but also the most affected
region given the high levels of fragility.
Despite some improvement since the
devastating famine in 2011-2012, the
levels of food insecurity and nutrition
remains critical, mortality rates are
high and humanitarian access remains
extremely limited. An estimated 3.2
million Somalis lack access to health
care.11 The humanitarian situation is
different in the relatively stable region of
Somaliland where there is no protracted
humanitarian emergency. The situation in
Puntland remains critical, since financial
resources are limited, food security
remains a concern and the vulnerable
population is growing. The positive
political and security changes in
the country since the end of transition
with improved access to regions in South
Central brought about a slight but still
fragile improvement to the humanitarian
situation, resulting in reduction of the
number of people in humanitarian crisis.
However, the AMISOM operations initiated
in March and September 2014 have not
improved the situation. The operations
have led to an increase in food prices,
negative effects on planting activities
and increased levels of displacement.
Access to newly liberated areas remains
a challenge and limits humanitarian
assistance and needed food distribution.
The consequences of conflict and drought
are further exacerbated by high levels
of inflation, extreme environmental
degradation, food and oil price shocks,
and disease outbreaks. The gains in terms
of access and the new political structures
are fragile and highly reversible and a
majority is still without access to social
services. Due to limited capacity of local
administrative structures, instability and
lack of access for humanitarian agencies
there is inadequate capacity to respond to
emergencies in especially South Central.
Nevertheless, the Somali population has
shown a remarkable resilience in coping
with the situation by building clan-level
mechanisms, and in the case of
Somaliland, and to a lesser extent
Puntland, new regional entities. These
efforts show the potential and resilience
of the Somali people and have created
the belief that with an increasingly stable
political and gradually more stable
security situation the Somali people will
be able, through a combination of local
and international efforts, to see significant
improvement in their livelihood. The
potential for an improved economy and
employment rates are high. In particular
the livestock sector has grown, yet
constrained by lack of facilities and
qualified professionals to improve
productivity and quality of the sector.
Similarly the potential within fisheries
as well as in other agricultural production
remains high.
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW AND GENDER
Somalia has experienced substantial
human rights challenges for more than
two decades. The absence of governance
and rule of law institutions in parts of the
country, combined with natural disasters
compounded by conflict, have affected
the respect for human rights and caused
massive human rights violations. Some of
the most widespread and common human
rights abuses in Somalia are extrajudicial
killings also of civilians, discrimination
and violence against minority groups,
including Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs), women and children. Targeted
killings of journalists and a failure to
apprehend the culprits have seriously
affected freedom of expression. After
two decades of conflict and chaos justice
is mostly informal and traditional with
little if any formal justice system left.
As a consequence a culture of impunity
prevails as there are virtually no legal
resources for victims of violence.
Also as regards to human rights the actual
situation on the ground differs within
Somalia, depending on the degree
of stability in the different regions.
Somaliland has the most conducive
environment for human rights compared
with the other regions. The human rights
are legally ensured in the Somaliland
Constitution with the Human Rights
Commission and the Human Rights
and Judiciary Committee in the House
9
of Representatives as the main,
independent oversight bodies.
The FGS is increasingly working on human
rights issues including the drafting of
strategic guidelines that promote a human
rights sensitive approach. The respect
and promotion of human rights is a cross-
cutting issue in the Somali Compact,
which includes the development of an
independent justice sector and legal
frameworks addressing human rights
violations. As set out in PSG 3 of the
Compact, the FGS has, inter alia, set as
a goal to increase the capacity of justice
providers to better address the most
prevalent post-conflict grievances such
as sexual- and gender-based violence
and serious criminal cases. Another aim
is to ensure more Somalis have increased
access to fair and affordable justice.
Corruption in Somalia is rampant.
The latest report from the UN Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea suggests
that 70-80 percent of annual revenue
is unaccounted for In Transparency
International’s 2013 Corruption
Perceptions Index Somalia was ranked
last (together with Afghanistan and North
Korea) of 177 countries surveyed.
Despite the dynamic role women
historically have played in Somali society,
customary clan-based systems continue
to ascribe women with an inferior social
status and generally contribute to
women’s exclusion from political and
public decision making. The situation
for women in Somalia is among the worst
in the world. Inequality based on a
traditional perception of gender roles
is a reality and remains alarmingly high
at 0.776 out of a value of 1 (complete
inequality), with Somalia at the fourth
lowest position globally on the Gender
Inequality Index (GII)12.
Although outlawed under the new federal
constitution, Female Genital Mutilation
(FGM) is still practiced in some form on
nearly all Somali girls (estimated 98%).13
Sexual related gender based violence
and rape are a major concern in Somalia.
Rape cases and rape victims of women
and girls are often stigmatized preventing
many from reporting these crimes. Lack
of access, statistics and monitoring data
makes it difficult for the international
community to establish the full extent
of the problem. Most cases which are
reported are dealt with under clan
or Sharia Law rather in state courts.
The FGS has defined gender as a cross-
cutting issue in the Compact thereby
emphasising that the PSG priorities and
principles in the Compact must endeavour
to contribute to enhancing the role
of women as peace builders, economic
actors, and figures central to the
promotion of community stability and
social cohesion.
CIVIL SOCIETY
Civil society organisations in Somalia have
a relatively short history as the Siad Barre
regime banned all organisations, which
had no direct link to the state. The civil
society organisations created in the wake
of the collapse of the military dictatorship
ranged from informal groupings managing
distribution of natural resources at local
level to urban based organisations formed
by Somali elites, both in and outside
Somalia. Although most organisations
were drawn from traditional powerbases
such as clans, elders, religious leaders
and the business community, new social
actors have managed to emerge, such as
women, professionals, young people and
people with disabilities. These new social
actors play a pivotal role in enhancing
social accountability and can even to some
extent act as counterweight to al-Shabaab
in terms of identity creation.
The lack of functioning governance
structures has made civil society
organisations important players in the
peacebuilding and reconciliation process,
as well as in service delivery. Civil society
organisations were also drivers in
pushing a political transition leading
to the establishment of the FGS in 2012.
Though with significant EU support,
the civil society in Somalia still remains
to be substantially involved in policy
formulation processes, especially with
ensuring a bottom up ownership and
12 https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Somalia/20131031_Humanitarian_Needs_Overview_Somalia_2014_FINAL.pdf 13 Unicef MICS for Somalia 2006: http://www.childinfo.org/files/MICS3_Somalia_FinalReport_2006_eng.pdf
10
participation amongst the Somali people.
Civil society is key in order for Somalia
to regain the trust of its people and for
the government to fulfil its role in ensuring
the enjoyment of fundamental rights,
freedoms and equality amongst its
citizens. An element challenging this
is the fact that there is no federal legal
framework for civil society in Somalia.
THE DISPLACED SOMALI POPULATION AND THE DIASPORA
The number of the displaced Somali
population exceeds 2 million people,
including internally displaced people
and refugees residing in neighbouring
countries. With more than 20 percent
of the population being displaced,
the development challenges related to
the sustainable return and reintegration
of the displaced population are many.
These aspects have to be taken into
consideration in future national and local
development plans for Somalia and thus
mainstreamed within the overall strategies
related to economic growth, livelihoods
and service provision. Given its long-term
engagement in Somali displacement
through humanitarian and region
of origin assistance, Denmark has
a particular potential for promoting
this agenda. Denmark is currently
co-chairing The Solutions Alliance,
an international network focusing
on innovative approaches to tackling
the displacement challenges.
The Somali Diaspora in Denmark consists
of 19.000 people (not including asylum
seekers), many of whom take a keen
interest in their country of origin. They
follow political events closely and send
remittances to relatives, an important
source of income in the poor country,
which is also the reason why the diaspora
plays a role in furthering economic and
social development in Somalia. However,
new regulations for money transfer
have recently been put in place, due
to the assumed risk of financing terror
organisations. These regulations are
posing a threat to the remittance system
which functions as a financial lifeline for
the livelihood of a vast number of Somalis.
A number of Danish ministries and
governmental agencies, including the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for
Defence, National Board of Social Services
as well as a number of municipalities are
engaged in dialogue and collaboration
with the diaspora. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has established a particular
programme for the Somali and Afghan
diaspora in Denmark run by Danish
Refugee Council. Also, the Somali
diaspora is actively engaged in the work
of CISU (Civil Society in Development)
that offers advice and support to project
applications from Somali diaspora
organisations in Denmark.
REGIONAL INFLUENCE
Somalia’s long, porous border with
Ethiopia and Kenya has significant
regional implications. Both of these
neighbouring countries host large local
Somali populations and have had their
share of liberation movements and
insurgencies over the past three decades.
External intervention, militarily, politically,
and economically has played a significant
role in shaping Somalia with both
benevolent and malevolent intentions
and results. Both Ethiopia and Kenya’s
interests in Somalia derive from security,
political and economic interests and
are considered substantial in terms
of their ability to shape and influence
the outcome of the situation in Somalia.
As the situation in Somalia seriously
affects its neighbourhood, the region also
contributes to peace and stability efforts
in Somalia. Through the AU, IGAD and
AMISOM Africa and the region are strongly
engaged. The hosting of a large number
of refugees contributes to alleviating
the humanitarian situation in Somalia.
11
3 OVERALL PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIC FOCUS AREAS OF INTERVENTIONS
The purpose of the policy paper is
to establish a strategic framework for
Denmark’s engagement in Somalia
from January 2015 to December 2017.
The vision is to support the people of
Somalia in creating a stable and peaceful
Somalia capable of taking care of its own
security in order to promote economic
and social development.
The political, security and programmatic
risks of engagement are significant.
Progress made one day, can be reversed
the next. Therefore, flexibility and
adaptability are essential.
Denmark’s engagement is nonetheless
ambitious. Danish support will benefit
the population and create results, while
at the same time being realistic. Access to
Somalia is limited, which is why Denmark
remains dependent on other donors, local
and international partners such as the UN.
Bearing this in mind, Denmark will seek
to strike a realistic balance between our
bilateral and multilateral engagement,
cooperating with and channelling funds
through multilateral partners where
these are present and Denmark is not.
There is a need for close cooperation and
coordination, particularly with like-minded
donors and other partners, including civil
society.
In supporting peace, security and
a positive development for the people
of Somalia it is essential that Somalia
itself takes ownership of the development.
Denmark will work to ensure that the
Somali authorities, with international
support, will be able to handle challenges
in an effective and balanced way.
Denmark’s engagement is based on three
strategic principles:
• A comprehensive approach, including
active diplomacy, political dialogue,
development, security and stabilisation
efforts, humanitarian assistance as
well as countering violent extremism
and piracy
• A flexible approach, whereby support
is continuously adapted to the dynamic
local conditions
• A balanced approach, providing
support to the federal and regional
level.
Management and risk assessment
are important elements in the detailed
planning. The situation in southern and
central Somalia remains unstable, despite
political and security gains, whereas the
situation in Somaliland on the other hand
is more stable. Because of limited access
to Mogadishu and other parts of southern
and central Somalia, the focus is on
northern regions, where the states
objectives are more easily met. This
could however be subject to change,
and Denmark’s stabilisation support
is targeted to help address some
of the key stabilisation challenges
in southern and central Somalia.
Denmark’s engagement in Somalia is
based on the Peace and State-building
Goals laid out in the international
agreement on Somalia (Somali New Deal
Compact). Four areas are prioritised:
1. State-building, focusing on broad
participation and engagement,
aligned with PSG 1
2. Security, justice and rule of law,
aligned with PSG2 and PSG 3
3. Poverty reduction and improved
employment opportunities through
the development of value chains and
training, especially in cattle farming
and fishing, aligned with PSG 4
and PSG 5
4. Strengthening of population resilience
through support to improved living
conditions for vulnerable groups,
aligned with the Humanitarian
Principles of the Compact.
The strategic focus areas are chosen
based on the analysis of the biggest
challenges and needs in Somalia, and
on the assessment of where Denmark
will be able to play a catalytic role
in leveraging stakeholders in making
a significant impact towards reaching
the PSG’s in the Compact. Furthermore,
Denmark wishes to build on the
experience and lessons learnt since
Denmark’s partnership with Somalia
in the 1990s and will develop the
priorities under each area according
to these comparative advantages
and past successes.
12
Across the four areas, Denmark will
promote equality, respect for human
rights and support for vulnerable groups,
including women and children. Working
with like-minded partners, Denmark will
assert political influence to ensure that
human rights and especially women’s
rights are protected. Moreover, Denmark
will require development partners to
include specific indicators and targets
in these areas. The Danish engagement
will encompass a strong focus on capacity
building of Somali institutions and
the civil society in order to build a robust
and sustainable Somali society.
Denmark will continue to channel aid
through the most appropriate
organisations in accordance with
the New Deal principles from Busan on
coordination and harmonisation of donor
assistance to fragile states. Denmark will
prioritise program initiatives jointly with
the UN, World Bank, EU and like-minded
donors. Particularly, the UN plays a central
role and is actively present in the majority
of Somali regions.
Denmark has a close collaboration with
the EU, EU member states and other
likeminded partners to Somalia and will,
when opportunities emerge, continue
to explore the scope for developing this
further. Of particular interest is the strong
cooperation and harmonisation of support
to preparations of elections and support
to the livestock sector in Somaliland.
Denmark will also engage actively
in formulation of EU policies relevant
to Somalia.
Due to the complexity of the crisis and
fragility in Somalia, a range of issues have
to be addressed through three different
funding modalities that include:
1. Development support to be managed
by the Embassy in Nairobi through
a bilateral country frame
2. Humanitarian assistance administered
through humanitarian framework
agreements with Danish NGOs
and international organisations
3. Stabilisation efforts from the Peace
and Stabilisation Fund.
The volume of the latter allocation is yet
to be determined and its detailed content
to be informed by, among others, an
evaluation of the Peace and Stabilisation
Fund.
Up until present, almost 2/3 of the funds
under the Somalia country programme
have been allocated to Somaliland.
New Deal funding modalities for Somalia
are in the pipeline and will provide a
potential platform for Danish assistance.
Denmark will be ready to look into these
new funding mechanisms and, in line with
accountability and application of proper
fiduciary standards, consider a step-by-
step approach increasingly using country
system funds and funding mechanisms.
This will apply both to Somalia as well
as Somaliland.
The strategic principles and strategic
choices outlined in this policy paper are
underscored by a commitment to strong
joint donor coordination as enshrined in
the New Deal for Somalia and the Compact
and Somaliland Special Arrangement
in which Denmark has engaged significant
resources and shown full commitment.
Denmark will together with the
international group of donors support
the Somalis in their commitment as set
out in the Compact and Somaliland
Special Agreement in delivering progress
in areas such as state-building, security,
conducting elections.
13
STRATEGIC FOCUS AREA 1 STATE-BUILDING BASED ON INCLUSIVE POLITICS
Within this strategic focus area, the FGS
has set as a priority in the coming years
to advance inclusive political dialogue,
to clarify and settle relations between
the federal government and existing and
emerging administrations and initiate
processes of social reconciliation to
restore trust among communities.
Traditional forms of authority are to be
harmonized with state-level governance
systems in order to ensure accountability
and deepen bottom-up inclusivity,
especially among women, youth, and
marginalized communities. Legitimate
systems and an efficient public sector
capable of implementing the rule of
law and delivering basic services to
the Somali people will in turn help built
the population’s trust in the government.
The overall objective of Denmark’s support
to the state-building process based
on inclusive politics is to strengthen
the development of democratic legitimate
structures and institutions based on
the population’s trust and ownership,
transparency and accountability.
Denmark will work closely with a broad
range of stakeholders that are capable
of and willing to drive the needed changes
and reforms, first and foremost the FGS
and government of Somaliland, but also
relevant multilateral partners such as UN
agencies, international NGOs and civil
society. The Danish engagement will,
mainly through active diplomacy in
bilateral and relevant multilateral fora
e.g. in the New Deal institutional
arrangements, support the FGS’ overall
efforts in implementing the Compact
and the FGS’ “Vision 2016 – Framework
for Action”14 in continuation of the first
Ministerial High Level Partnership Forum,
hosted by Denmark in Copenhagen on
19-20 November 2014. Together with
other international partners, Denmark will
support the FGS’ PSG 1 efforts in adopting
a Federal Constitution built on inclusive
political consultations and negotiations
by channelling development assistance
through new multi donor funding
mechanisms. Denmark’s contribution
to the UN Multi Party Trust Fund (MPTF) will
support a number of priority interventions
to ensure that Somalia stays on the path
to long-term peace- and state-building,
in line with the Somali Compact. Such
funding will allow for the necessary
technical assistance, regional outreach
and legislation before the final adoption
of the Federal Constitution as well as
to subsequent legislative work.
A critical milestone in state-building and
good governance in Somalia involves
preparation for the national popular
elections in 2016. The FGS has defined
a roadmap for the preparatory process
leading up to the elections. Denmark will,
in addition, put emphasis on the demand
side approach to good governance
through supporting measures which
enhance state accountability, freedom
of expression of the people, and anti-
corruption. Cross-cutting issues which
will be given both political and financial
priority are women’s inclusion and
participation in society, the promotion
and protection of human rights and
the deepening of the role of civil society
in the development of the state. In this
regard, the successful reintegration
and inclusion of a potential large number
of returnees will also be prioritized.
The government of Somaliland has
identified the building of a politically
stable and democratic Somaliland
adhering to the principles of good
governance as a strategic objective
for the coming years. A reformation of
the electoral system, in order to address
the need for a voter registry and current
gaps of representation of women and
marginalized communities is in the
pipeline. The upcoming Somaliland
Parliamentary and Presidential elections
in 2015 will serve as a critical milestone
in this regard. Denmark will continue to
support wider democratisation processes
in Somaliland with focus on strengthening
bottom-up democracy. Denmark will
provide support to well-established
partners capable of engaging local
NGOs and working with key stakeholders
14 The Vision 2016 – Framework of Action is a document prepared by the FGS to serve as a roadmap for achieving three key milestones as set out in the Compact; 1) state formation and federalism, 2) review of Provisional Constitution, and 3) democratisation and election preparations.
14
with emphasis on peaceful, democratic
development and the sustained capacity
building of electoral institutions.
As a cross-cutting theme, Denmark will
contribute towards ensuring that human
rights and especially the rights of women
and children are accommodated.
IN 2015-2017 DENMARK WILL:
– Support and put constructive pressure on the FGS’ willingness
to deliver state-building and the necessary legal reform which
includes democratic national and local governance.
– Through active involvement in the High Level Partnership Forum,
and following up on the first Ministerial High Level Partnership
Forum in Copenhagen in November 2014, support the FGS
in implementing the Compact and the Vision 2016.
– Support political dialogue that should include appropriate
representation from women, youth and marginalized groups.
– Continue to support the ongoing democratisation processes in
Somaliland with focus on strengthening bottom-up democracy
leading to transparent and credible elections.
– Continue to provide support to well-established partners capable
of engaging local NGOs and working with key stakeholders in
society in order to enhance democratic reforms and strengthen
electoral processes in Somaliland.
15
STRATEGIC FOCUS AREA 2 SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW
The security in Somalia remains closely
linked to the political processes of the
establishment of a functioning federal
system, implementing a new constitution
and holding fair elections in 2016.
The FGS has identified the strengthening
of the capacity and accountability of
security and justice institutions as the two
main priorities. As for the security sector
(PSG 2), this includes increased ability
to recover, stabilize and provide basic
services in liberated areas; integration
of security forces into federal structures;
ensuring treatment, rehabilitation and
reintegration of disengaged combatants;
and the development of a maritime
security strategy. Building the capacity
and accountability of the security sector,
including the security forces and
the police, is an important step towards
enabling the FGS to provide security
and safety for the Somali population,
independent of support from AMISOM.
It is equally important that disengaged
combatants are provided with a
sustainable non-violent alternative to
the militant groups including al-Shabaab,
thereby decreasing the likelihood
of relapse and contributing to the
undermining of the militant groups.
As for the justice sector (PSG 3), this
includes ensuring that the legal framework
is coherent with the Constitution and
international standards by way of
establishing a Legal Policy and Drafting
Unit within the Ministry of Justice,
that will undertake a review of the existing
legal framework; that justice institutions
address key grievances and injustices,
by way of increasing the capacity of justice
providers by, inter alia, establishing
regional courts, case management
systems, and training; and that more
Somalis have access to fair and affordable
justice.
The overall objective of Denmark’s support
to the state-building process within this
strategic focus area is to continue building
the capacity of the security and justice
institutions, including the countering
of piracy, in order to promote sustainable
peace security, safety and justice for
the Somali people as well as regional
stabilisation.
Merging the two areas security and justice
(PSG 2 and 3) under one strategic focus
area, emphasizes Denmark’s integrated
approach to stabilisation, whereby
security and development interventions
work in tandem. Within the framework
of the Compact, Denmark will continue
working bilaterally and with international
partners, incl. the UN, EU and likeminded
countries, to build the capacity of state
security and justice institutions. Realizing
that the Somali security institutions in the
foreseeable future will remain too weak to
provide security and safety to the Somalia
people on their own, Denmark will also,
in cooperation with partners such as
AMISOM, continue to support the efforts
of African countries to stabilize Somalia
and the broader East African region.
Realizing the rapid decline in piracy,
Denmark will together with key partners,
gradually re-focus its support from
combating piracy in a narrow sense
to building the capacity of the Somali
institutions to address maritime crime
in a broad sense, including piracy,
smuggling of charcoal, weapons,
migrants, drugs and alcohol, human
trafficking, illegal fishing and armed
robbery at sea. Denmark will adopt
a broad based, multifaceted and
international approach to maritime crime.
This will include capacity building of
security and justice institutions, naval
presence, as well as social and economic
development.
IN 2015-2017 DENMARK WILL:
– Continue building the capacity and accountability of state security
and justice institutions making them capable of providing basic
safety, security and justice to the people of Somalia.
– Continue supporting the efforts of African countries to stabilize
Somalia and the broader East African region.
– Continue supporting stabilisation efforts in Somalia within
the established international framework.
– Continue supporting the broad-based, multifaceted, and
international approach to maritime crime, including piracy.16
STRATEGIC FOCUS AREA 3 POVERTY REDUCTION AND INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH
As emphasized in the Compact, Somalia’s
economy plays a critical role in the
state- and peacebuilding processes.
An improved economy contributes to
creating sustainable peace and stability
and to establishing a fundamental trust
of the Somali people in the government.
In order to accommodate a better
economy, the FGS will according to PSG 4,
focus on enhancing the productivity of
high priority sectors and related value
chains, such as livestock and fisheries.
Correspondingly in focus is the
establishment of critical infrastructure
such as market access, trade and
transport. The FGS has recognized that
the Somali youth comprises an important
driver of change. The vast majority of
Somalia’s youth has very limited economic
possibilities, while at the same time
it constitutes a large resource. Education
and job creation are essential in order
to prevent the youth turning to militias
and criminal gangs, including al-Shabaab.
The FGS will expand opportunities for
youth employment through job creation
and skills development. The sharing
of public resources, fiscal federalism,
constitutes the FGS’ strategic objective
of PSG 5. A better service delivery
for all, including the most vulnerable
communities, is also crucial in
establishing trust amongst the people in
authorities and government. A regulatory
environment that promotes decentralized
delivery and prioritizes key investments
can extend and increase access to
services. In turn, economic growth
and sustainable service delivery lead
to resilience amongst the population
and that of society in general. The FGS
will in the coming years, inter alia, focus
on establishing service and delivery
standards, build partnerships with
non-state and/or private actors and
increasingly cover the costs of basic
service delivery.
Somaliland has committed itself
to create an enabling economic and
financial environment with the aim
of maximising economic growth in its
Special Arrangement of the Compact.
Strengthening investment in the
productive sectors, particularly
agriculture, livestock, and fisheries
constitute a priority. Generation of
employment through the delivery of large
scale infrastructure and the development
of vocational and technical training
are also priorities. The Somaliland
government has committed itself to ensure
the provision of more equitable and
quality services in an accountable and
transparent manner. For the government
to meet this aspiration, a gradual
shift from post conflict to development
orientated political settlement is required
so that national revenue results in an
increase in the distribution of basic
services to the population.
The overall objective is to reduce poverty
through selected value chains and
investments in the productive sector
by creating employment and through
increased service delivery
In order to support Somalia’s efforts
to reduce poverty and create inclusive
economic growth and improve living
conditions, Denmark will continue
to provide substantial development
assistance to Somalia in the coming years.
Denmark will through the World Bank
Multi Partner Trust Fund (WB MPF)
provide financial support to private
sector development. In the field of growth
and employment, Denmark will support
the development of a regulatory
framework and the creation of business
opportunities in productive sectors such
as agriculture, livestock, and fisheries.
Also financial support will be targeted
to small and medium size enterprises
and infrastructure rehabilitation through
the WB MPF. Denmark will promote the
involvement of the diaspora, returnees,
women and the Somalia youth in
the development of the private sector.
Denmark will also continue to prioritize
education. In light of previous experience
and results, Denmark will continue to
provide support to education programmes
as well as vocational training. Capacity
building of regional and district
17
administrations and service delivery
planning framework will remain areas
of focus for the Danish engagement.
The Somaliland Development Fund
(SDF) initiated by Denmark and DFID
and established in 2012 has become
the Somaliland Government’s preferred
vehicle for receiving and channelling
development funds. The primary focus of
the SDF has initially been on governance;
establishing systems and procedures
within government to design, review and
prioritize needed public sector projects
in several line ministries. With the SDF
procedures and systems in place, the SDF
will in the coming years shift its focus to
inclusive economic growth. Denmark will
in the coming years continue to financial
and technical support to the SDF.
IN 2015-2017 DENMARK WILL:
– Contribute to the capacity building of regional public
administration.
– Contribute to the continued development of the social
and private sector, including involvement of the diaspora.
– Contribute to a more qualified work force within the productive
sectors of agriculture, fishing and livestock, supporting vocational
training and creating employment, particularly for the youth
and women.
– Contribute to the establishment of critical infrastructure.
18
STRATEGIC FOCUS AREA 4 BETTER LIVELIHOODS
Somalia is home to one of the
world’s most protracted and complex
humanitarian situations. Two decades
of conflict and war has created several
waves of forced migration from Somalia
and the country is together with
Afghanistan and Syria amongst the top
three countries in the world creating
refugee populations. The majority of the
967.000 refugees live in the neighbouring
countries including Kenya, Ethiopia and
Yemen. Furthermore, there are around
1.1 million displaced people in Somalia.
These groups are vulnerable and as
mentioned earlier in the policy paper, they
are also drivers of poverty and destitution
in an already fragile context, which is why
these population groups have to be taken
into consideration in relation to all aspects
of the development of a future Somalia.
It is important to see the potential
reintegration of these groups mainly
as a development challenge rather than
a humanitarian endeavour. Denmark will
address these issues through improving
livelihoods and enhancing resilience
of the population as well as through
improved coordination of development
and humanitarian support. The FGS
emphasises within the Compact their
commitment to the humanitarian
principles of humanity, neutrality,
impartiality and operational independence
endorsed in General Assembly resolutions
46/182 and 58/114.
The overall objective of Denmark’s support
to livelihood is to reduce the vulnerability
and increase the resilience of the Somali
people.
Denmark will support Somalia’s efforts
in improving livelihoods with a particular
focus on groups that are vulnerable
to external shocks, including adverse
climatic conditions and local conflict.
In line with the conception that many
of the current humanitarian issues
in reality constitute longer term
developmental challenges, the Danish
engagement will seek to bridge the
humanitarian activities with long-term
development assistance through placing
resilience and the durable solutions
for reintegration of returning refugees
and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
as a cross-cutting objective for the policy
as a whole. The refugees and IDPs of
Somalia also constitute an important
resource. Apart from a pronounced need
for improved possibilities in Somalia’s
many IDP camps, returned refugees
with an education and vocational
experience will be able to contribute
to the development and reconstruction
of Somalia. Denmark will contribute
to sustainable solutions for returned
refugees and IDPs and work to increase
the FGS and Somaliland government’s
focus on the vast and special needs
among these people, but also on applying
their resources.
Denmark will likewise continue to
contribute to the prevention and
alleviation of acute humanitarian crises.
Depending on the nature and scope
of the crisis the choice of partners
in these efforts will typically include
existing Danish humanitarian partner
organisations, among them UN
organisations.
IN 2015-2017 DENMARK WILL:
– Work towards returned refugees and internally displaced
being taken into consideration in the broader effort for growth
and employment.
– Contribute to the sustainable reintegration of internally
displaced persons and returnees.
– Continue to contribute to the prevention and alleviation
of humanitarian crisis.
19
4 RISKS
Engagement in Somalia involves high
political, security and financial risks.
The government capacity is modest and
the political situation unstable. Corruption
is widespread in all layers of society
and the security situation is volatile.
Implementation of the Somali Compact
will require dialogue, building of trust,
patience, time and risk willingness.
The risk profile is high and in the
worst case scenario risks can increase
dramatically with negative impact
on activities. A flexible programming
approach is key and interventions need
to be constantly monitored and analysed
to ensure that the ’Do No Harm’ principle
is followed. The Danida Risk Management
Tool constitutes the basis of the risk
assessment that will be further developed
during the formulation phase.
CONTEXTUAL RISK
Somalia is a fragile state with political
instability, high insecurity and conflict.
The Federal Government has only limited
legitimacy throughout Somalia and it
continues to be a challenge to conclude
the federal and cross-country peace
process. The humanitarian crisis in
Somalia remains one of the largest and
most complex in the world. Currently,
there is a high risk that the country might
slip into an even greater humanitarian
crisis, with negative effects on nutrition
and food security for the most vulnerable
populations. Environmental impact from
rains, floods or drought will affect the
programme. To mitigate and potentially
lower risk, Denmark will support AMISOM
through the stabilisation efforts and
continue political dialogue and capacity
building across regions. Enhanced
transparency, accountability and resilience
at national and local level will improve civil
society’s trust and public participation
in future political processes and
development. The risks associated with
overlooking the aspects of sustainable
reintegration of refugees and IDPs are
typically the significant risks of secondary
displacement and unforeseen growth
in urban poverty. These risks can be
mitigated through the mainstreaming
of a durable solutions strategy throughout
the programmes. Finally, a continuous and
timely effort to alleviate the humanitarian
crisis is an important aspect of hindering
an escalation of the humanitarian
situation.
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC RISK
Somalia is one of the most corrupt
countries in the world and there are major
fiduciary and financial risks. Institutional
capacity in government and civil society
organisations is weak. Access to the South
Central part of Somalia remains limited
and continues to be a challenge for
monitoring of activities on the ground
due to armed conflicts and lack of security.
The newly established UN and World
Bank Multi Donor Trust Funds will bring
relatively large funding into a resource
constrained environment, and may
exacerbate federal-regional-clan tensions
around power. The majority of the Danish
support will be channelled through
multilateral partners, which contribute
to mitigate fiduciary risks, improve
monitoring and oversight, as they have
more resources than bilateral donors and
presence on the ground. Partners known
to be effective management agents will
be applied where the fiduciary risk is
high. The Danish engagement will put
emphasises on dialogue, inclusion,
transparency and ownership to limit
the sustainability risk.
20
5 RESULTS
Denmark’s engagement with Somalia
will focus on ensuring long-term impact.
Denmark’s engagement will contribute to:
1. Further political dialogue and
reconciliation between the Federal
Government of Somalia and existing
and emerging administrations,
incl. Somaliland and Puntland
2. Increase stability and peace in
Somalia and in the Horn of Africa
3. Reduce poverty and improve access
to social services and employment
opportunities
4. Improve living conditions of vulnerable
groups.
Most of the priorities and efforts
mentioned in this country policy paper
will be implemented though the Somalia
Country Programme 2015-2017.
A number of activities in the area of
stability and security will be funded
under the Danish Governments Stability
Frame, and humanitarian interventions
will be funded under humanitarian
framework agreements. As part of
the implementation of this policy paper,
Denmark will consider entering into
a government-to-government agreement
with the FGS. Such an agreement would
confirm Denmark’s engagement as set
out in this policy paper and, in turn,
place emphasis on the reforms and
commitments to be fulfilled by the FGS.
21
6 M&E FRAMEWORK
Within each of the focus areas, specific
output based indicators will be chosen
to manage and monitor progress,
performance and results. To the largest
extent possible, these output based
indicators will be derived from the
Somali Compact within the selected
areas. Denmark will continuously monitor
progress against these indicators and
assess whether the support is achieving
the intended results. Denmark will identify
potential risks within each area and
the needed risk management strategies
to continuously monitor and manage
these risks. Denmark will also use
supplementary data sources, for example
World Bank website/forums; programme/
project specific reports. Denmark will
align its monitoring with the review
processes defined in the Somali Compact.
In preparing the programmes the Theory
of Change principles will be applied.
7 COMMUNICATION
Regular updates on the implementation
of the Somalia Policy Paper will be
provided on the Danish Embassy website
under a permanent section on the front
page entitled: “Denmark’s engagement
in Somalia”. Updates will also be shared
on Facebook and Twitter.
22
KEY ECONOMIC DATA UNIT SOURCE
Area (2013) Km2 637,657 WSP
Population (2012) Million 10.2 WB
GDP (2011) Million USD 1.071 WSP
Annual economic growth (2011) % in GDP 2.6 WSP
GNI per capita (2011) USD 107 WSP
Growth in GNI per capita USD n/a
Ease of doing business Rank
Somalia n/a
Somaliland (2012) 174 DB
ECONOMIC SECTORS
Agriculture (2012) % of GDP 59.3 CIA
Industry (2012) % of GDP 7.2 CIA
Services (2012) % of GDP 33.5 CIA
Government expense % of GDP n/a
Tax revenue % of GDP n/a
Development assistance per capita (2011) USD 111 WB
Net official development assistance (2011) Million USD 1,096 WB
Debt service % of export n/a
KEY SOCIAL DATA UNIT SOURCE
Population growth (2012) % average annual 2.9 WB
Life expectancy at birth (m/w) (2013) Years 50.1/53.4 WSP
Infant mortality rate (2012) Deaths per 1000 births 91 WB
Population with sustainable access to an improved water source (2011)
% 30 WB
ANNEX 1 KEY DATA SOMALIA
23
KEY SOCIAL DATA UNIT SOURCE
Access to health facilities % n/a
Number of doctors Per 1,000 inhabitants n/a
People btw. 15-49 years living with HIV (2012) % 0.5 UNAIDS
Adult literacy rate (2008) % of people aged 15 and above 24 MDG
Primary school gross enrolment ratio (m/w) (2008) % 26/15.4 MDG
Primary-secondary education % gross enrolment n/a
Girls in primary education (2012) % of total primary school enrolment 36 UNDP
Military expenditure % of GDP n/a
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
Richest 10% of population % of national income n/a
Poorest 10% of population % of national income n/a
KEY ENVIRONMENTAL DATA UNIT SOURCE
Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area % n/a
CO2 emissions (2009) Metric tons per capita 0.1 WSP
KEY HUMAN RIGHTS DATA UNIT SOURCE
Ratification with main international human rights instruments Number n/a OHCHR
Compliance with main international human rights instruments Number n/a OHCHR
Sources: CIA CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html) DB Doing Business in Hargeisa Report 2012 MDG Millennium Development Goals Progress Report Somalia 2010 UNAIDSUNDP Somalia Human Development Report 2012 WB World Bank Data Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all) WSP World Statistics Pocketbook, 2013 Edition
24
ANNEX 2 DENMARK’S ONGOING DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA
OVERVIEW OF DENMARK’S ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA
The government has stepped up its efforts
in regard to Somalia with a total budgetary
framework of approx. DKK 650 million,
measured in disbursements, in the period
of 2012-2014 – which amounts to an
average of more than DKK 200 million
per year. The assistance covers activities
of security nature, inter alia, assistance to
AMISOM and military coastal monitoring,
as well as activities of a civilian nature,
such as the creation of a justice system,
the international cooperation in regard
to safeguarding the legal framework
for the combatting of piracy, promotion
of growth and employment in Somalia,
and promoting good governance
within the framework of development
aid. In addition to this, Denmark
has contributed with an average of
approximately DKK 100 million a year
to humanitarian activities in and around
Somalia in the period 2012-2014.
The humanitarian effort continues to
contribute to the assisting of internally
displaced persons and refugees in
the region – especially Kenya, as well
as to strengthen the Somali population’s
resilience towards drought and conflict.
The overall purpose is to contribute
towards a stable Somalia, which is
capable of handling its own security
and initiating economically and socially
sustainable development. The foundations
of this are the safeguarding of the rights
of the individual, enhanced security,
and improved conditions of life. Denmark
provides assistance to creation of a federal
government in Mogadishu, as well as
to individual regions – such as Puntland
and Somaliland. Seeing as Somaliland,
and to some extent Puntland, have been
relatively stable, a large part of the Danish
assistance has been implemented in these
areas rather than in Mogadishu and the
southern parts of Somalia, as these have
been characterized by war and conflict.
Due to the positive, albeit fragile, political
development, new opportunities for
cooperating with the federal government
are emerging. Denmark has, actively
and swiftly, made use of these new
opportunities. This has resulted in
Denmark entering into an agreement
with Somalia. The agreement, which lives
up to OECD’s good practice principles,
provides direct assistance to the federal
government’s work. On top of that,
Denmark, through UNICEF, is assisting
efforts in the field of education –
something which will play a determining
role in the future as Somalia has lacked
an educational system the past 20 years.
ASIDE FROM ACTIVE DIPLOMACY, DANISH SUPPORT TO SOMALIA RESTS ON FOUR PILLARS:
1. Security
The new federal government is first and
foremost concerned with security. Owing
to the efforts of the African Union’s
military mission, AMISOM, together with
Ethiopia and the Somali government’s
own forces, Al-Shabaab has been forced
to retreat. It is vital that the momentum
is kept up in order to consolidate the new
federal government and expand its area
of operations. Somalia must carry on
the task of creating its own armed forces
and safeguarding law and order through
the creation of police and justice sectors.
On the nautical front, it is uplifting
to see that piracy is on the decline,
owed to the combined efforts of
the international maritime operations,
as well as the implementation of the
shipping companies’ Best Management
Practices and Somali initiatives land-side
– especially in Puntland, where the
population to a great extent is realizing
that piracy does not serve the interests
of Somalia. However, the network of the
pirates remains intact and it is therefore
paramount that the efforts to combat
piracy persist.
Denmark assists security related
efforts both on land and at sea through
a naval contribution to the NATO naval
operation Ocean Shield, financial support
to AMISOM, and assistance to the
UN initiatives concerning the creation
of prisons, police, and a justice sector.
2. Good Governance
Somalia has not had a functioning
government for the past two decades.
As a result of this, Somalia lacks the
framework for rules and regulations
usually found in a functioning society.
25
The absence of a central government
has had the effect that private companies,
regional administrations, and traditional
arrangements, such as clans and councils
of elders, have taken on tasks usually
managed by the state. A great deal
of effort is required to create formal
structures such as a central administration
with a fiscally responsible administration
and a functional justice system.
This constitutes a key priority area
for Denmark. Denmark has, among
other things, supported the creation
of democratic and good governance
structures in Somaliland. A large part
of the assistance to Somaliland has
been through the so-called Somaliland
Development Fund. Moreover, Denmark
provides assistance to gender equality
and elections, inter alia, in Somaliland
and Puntland. Also, Denmark has provided
DKK 18 million in direct support to
capacity-creation of the new federal
government in Mogadishu. On top of that,
Denmark has provided a grant of DKK
12 million as a contribution towards the
safeguarding of stability in the newly
liberated areas.
3. Growth and Employment Growth and job creation are necessary in
order to improve the situation in Somalia
and provide the youth of Somalia with
improved future prospects. Somalia’s
natural resources are very scarce and
it has, throughout its history, sustained
itself on livestock and agriculture. In the
absence of a government, a predatory
economic system has emerged. As a result
of this, the country’s resources have been
exploited in an unsustainable manner,
inter alia by the production of charcoal.
Denmark has successfully supported
veterinarian institutes, which are capable
of training qualified veterinarians with
a view to ensuring that goats, sheep,
and camels are free of disease and
exportable to the Arab Peninsula.
Such initiatives are the first steps
towards creating value-chains capable
of maintaining a sustainable production
in Somalia.
4. Improvement of Living Conditions and Strengthening of Resilience
A large part of Somalia’s population
remains dependent on emergency relief.
The overall food security situation is
deteriorating and malnutrition rates,
already among the highest in the world,
have increased. For the time being,
there is no famine in Somalia, but people
remain vulnerable to drought and conflict.
It is imperative that the resilience of these
people is strengthened and that they
engage in productive activities, thereby
allowing them to be citizens of a
functioning society – not recipients
of emergency relief. Denmark is working
towards combining the developmental
assistance with humanitarian efforts
in order to administer the scarce natural
resources in a sustainable manner.
26
MDG INDICATOR
BASELINE(1990 WHEN POSSIBLE)
CURRENT LEVEL
MDG OBJECTIVES
2015
PROBABILITY FOR REACHING THE OBJECTIVE
GOAL 1: ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER
Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (%)
43.2 (2002) No data (2006) 21.5 Unlikely
Prevalence of underweight in children under five years(%)
26 (2002) 36 (2006) 13 Unlikely
GOAL 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION
Primary school gross enrolment ratio (%) 9,6 (girls 6.6, boys 12.7)
(1990)
20.7 (girls 15.4, boys 23.7)
(2008)
100
Unlikely
Adult literacy rate (%)
24 (Female 14, Male 36)
(1990)
24
100
Unlikely
GOAL 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education
Only 30 % of the pupils in primary
education are females (2005/6)
1.0
Unlikely
GOAL 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY
Under 5-mortality rate/1000 live births
275 (1990)
144 (2007)
92 Potentially
GOAL 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH
Maternal mortality rate/100.000 live births 1,600 (1990)
1,044 (2006)
400 Potentially
Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (%)
25 (2000)
30 (2006)
51 Potentially
ANNEX 3 OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MDGS IN SOMALIA (2010)
27
MDG INDICATOR
BASELINE(1990 WHEN POSSIBLE)
CURRENT LEVEL
MDG OBJECTIVES
2015
PROBABILITY FOR REACHING THE OBJECTIVE
GOAL 6: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES
HIV prevalence rate among population ages 15-49 years (%)
Somaliland 1.4Puntland 0.9
South Central 0.5(2005)
Somaliland.0.9Puntland 0.9
South Central 0.6(2007)
0 Potentially
GOAL 7: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
Proportion of people with sustainable access to safe drinking water (%)
21 (2000)
29.3 (2006)
38.5 Potentially
GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT
Improved access to the benefits of new technologies. No clear data for objectives. Growth in the number of cellphone users from app. 1 per 100 population (2000) to 7 per 100 population (2007)
Source: Somalia Millennium Development Progress Report 2010. Published by Transitional Federal Government, Mogadishu. The report is the outcome of a UNDP Somalia organised workshop in Uganda 2010. The conclusion stresses that there is insufficient data to plot progress of Somalia’s MDGs, but the country is predicted to be seriously off track in meeting them. Progress in reaching MDG’s is normally measured with 1990 as baseline but 1990 data for Somalia are often lacking.
28
DENMARK – SOMALIAPARTNERSHIP POLICY2015-2017March 2015
Publisher:Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DenmarkAsiatisk Plads 21448 Copenhagen KDenmark
Phone +45 33 92 00 00Fax +45 32 54 05 33E-mail [email protected] www.um.dk
Design: BGRAPHIC Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark/
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ISBN 978-87-90656-31-7 (PDF version)