Department of Social & Decision Sciences Department of Engineering & Public Policy Assessing – and...

Department of Social & Decision SciencesDepartment of Engineering & Public Policy

Assessing – and Communicating – the Risks of Terrorism

Baruch FischhoffCarnegie Mellon University

April 12, 2002


with help from:

Liz Casman, Matt Dombroski, Sara Eggers, Dalia Patino Echeverri, Paul Fischbeck, Roxana Gonzalez, Umit Guvenc, Jennifer Lerner, ClairePalmgren, Deborah Small, Conrad Steenkamp


Overview

• Psychology of risk (publics, experts)

• Risk analysis and communication

• Special challenges of terror

• A worked example: bioterrorism

• Special topics (crises, false alarms, second guessing, priority setting)


Psychology of Risk - Publics(as Actors and Audiences)

• Current beliefs are the basis for future understanding (numeracy, literacy)

• People have limited cognitive capacity

• People use robust, imperfect heuristics

• Some concepts are inherently difficult

• Emotions can both confound and support the understanding of risk


Some Concepts Are Inherently Difficult

• Very low probabilities

• Cumulative risk (from repeated exposure)

• Verbal quantifiers (e.g., “likely” threat)

• Experientially unfamiliar events

• Value uncertainty (what do I really want?)


Emotions Confound and Support Understanding

• Can mobilize, guide, and paralyze• Can both affect and reflect beliefs• Include:

– fear (direct, indirect effects of terrorism)– frustration (with self, authorities)– mourning– solidarity– reflection (about self, society)


Psychology of Risk - Experts

• Face analogous challenges of understanding• Must create public trust - demonstrating

competence and honesty – Realistic assessment of own competence– A clear, consistent public role – Rapid progress on the communication learning

curve– Insight into own intuitive psychology of public


Risk Analysis

• Identify valued outcomes

• Identify contributing processes

• Identify relevant experts

• Elicit experts’ beliefs, uncertainties, controversies, omissions

• Independent peer review


Routine testing water

type

routine testing type

treatment levels

treatment options

index variables for tables

Routine Testing Results

Utility Awareness

Health Department Awareness

Media Coverage

Consumer Awareness for Public Systems

Tap Test

Medical Awareness

Trigger Event

Well Test

Consumer Awareness for Private Wells

Utility Communique

Utility Treatment

Options

Consumption of Well Water

Consumption of Treated Water

Averting Behavior for

Public Systems

Averting Behavior for Private Wells

Special Studies

Joint Task Force

Health EffectsContamination of Drinking Water

Info Sources

Miscellaneous Announcement

-


Units: Averting_behaviorDefinition: if consumer_awareness =0 then 0elseif consumer_awareness =1 then 1 else if info_sources > 0 then 2else 2

Inputs: Consumer_a…Consumer Awareness for Public Systems

Info_sources Info Sources

Outputs: Consumptio…Consumption of Treated WaterDecisionTitle: Averting Behavior for Public SystemsDescription: Do consumers do something to avoid any possible risk of cryptosporidial infection?

Correct averting behavior includes boiling drinking water and switching to safe water sources. Washing dishes, tooth brushing, and rinsing vegetables are not presently considered high risk behaviors for immunocompetent people in developed countries. Showering is not risky. Only filters with an absolute (not nominal) pore size ≤ 1 micron can effectively remove oocysts. (MMWR, 1995) Use of other types of filters do not constitute correct averting behavior.

reference:MMWR 1995. Assessing the public health threat associated with waterborne cryptosporidiosis: report of a workshop. Rep. 44(RR-6):1-19.

0 = no action or inappropriate action (eg charcoal filter)1 = avoid most tap water2 = boil drinking water or use clean bottled water


Waterborne CryptosporidiumSome Analytical Results

• Misplaced priorities

-- pointless “boil water” notices

• Missed priorities– crypto screening technology– routine water substitution for

immunocompromised– broad definition of immunocompromised


Risk Communication

• Identify common knowledge – What goes without saying?

• Identify critical gaps – What’s worth knowing?– Quantitative information (how big is the risk?)– Qualitative information (what determines the risk?)

• Find a story line (creating coherent mental model)• Evaluate success


Special Challenges of Terrorism

• Require broadly shared mental models for coordinated action

• Events threaten validity of experience (and statistics)

• Require theory to augment statistics– Unfamiliar topics (people, places, pathogens)– Unfamiliar interactions (experts without

working relations)


Special Challenges of Terrorism

• Mixed motives of domestic actors– working problem– preserving status– shaping society

• Mixed emotions of audience– want facts– want reassurance– want to blame– want solidarity

Department of Social & Decision SciencesDepartment of Engineering & Public PolicyAnger Prime

Department of Social & Decision SciencesDepartment of Engineering & Public Policy Fear Prime


0.25

0.30

0.35

0.40

0.45

0.50

0.55

Anger Fear

Emotion Condition

Male Female

0.25

0.30

0.35

0.40

0.45

0.50

0.55

Anger Fear

Emotion Condition

Male Female

Emotion & Gender Effects on Terror Risk Judgments

(mid-November 2001; n=973)

Probabilities for OtherProbabilities for Self


What is the Risk of Anthrax?

• A standard representation of disease risk– chance of exposure– chance of sensitivity – chance of detection – chance of treatment

• Multiplicative structure of risk– everything needs to go wrong– defense in depth


A common structure for bioterrorism risk

pexposure

psensitivity

pdiagnosis

ptreatment

No risk

No risk

Risk

Risk

Risk

Not exposed

ExposedNot

Sensitive

Sensitive

Not Detected

Detected Treated

Not Treated


What determines probability of exposure?

Riskpsensitivity

pdiagnosis

ptreatment

No risk

Risk

Risk

Pexposure

No risk

Not exposed

Exposed

Probability of attack

Terroristresources

Progress of war

Politicalevents

Disruption Our perceivedvulnerability

Vaccines

Detectioncapability

Treatmentcapability

Terrorists’ delivery method

Prob. of interception

Intelligence

Surveillance

Coordination

Prob. ofavoidance

Communication

Training


What determines probability of sensitivity?

No risk

No risk

pdiagnosis

ptreatment

Risk

Risk

Risk

psensitivity

StrainDose

Exposureroute

Vaccinationstatus

Health status of recipient

Not sensitive

sensitive

Exposed

Pexposure


Terroristresources

Progress of war

Politicalevents

Disruption Our perceivedvulnerability

Vaccines

Detectioncapability

Treatmentcapability



Intelligence

Surveillance

Coordination

Prob. ofavoidance

Communication

Training


What determines probability of diagnosis?

Risk

No risk No risk

ptreatment

psensitivity

Strain

Dose

ExposureRoute

Vaccine statusHealth status of recipient

pdiagnosis

Scientificunderstanding

Communicationof sci. und.

Diagnosiscapability

Concurrent conditions

Concurrentevents

Not detected

detected

Pexposure


Terroristresources

Our perceivedvulnerability



Prob. ofavoidance

Risk

Risk


What determines probability of treatment?

No riskNo risk

Risk

pdiagnosis



DetectionCapability

ConcurrentConditions

ConcurrentEvents

Risk

Risk

ptreatment



Treatmentcapability

Populationheterogeneity

treated

Not treated

Pexposure


Terroristresources

Our perceivedvulnerability



Prob. ofavoidance

psensitivity

Strain

Dose

ExposureRoute

Vaccine statusHealth status of recipient


Using the Model

• What is the risk of anthrax now? (after some event or with new information)

• What is the risk of smallpox? (changes in model, parameters)

• What matters everywhere? – probability of attack

– response capability (monitoring, coordination…)

– other valued consequences


Special Topics

• Real-time communication

• False alarms

• Second-guessing leaders, officials

• Second-guessing the public

• Priority setting


Four Priorities from a National Poll(mid-November 2001; n=973)

Provide Americans with honest, accurate information about the situation, even if the information worries people. (anger 0)

Invest in general capabilities, like stronger public health, more than specific solutions, like smallpox vaccination. (anger -)

Deport foreigners in the US who lack visas. (anger +)

Strengthen ties with countries in the Moslem world. (anger -)


Conclusions

Effective risk analysis and communication require:

• Quantitative estimates of risk, including the attendant uncertainties

• Explicit representation of processes shaping risks• Suitably diverse expertise• Integration of analysis and communication

- solve their problem- secure their trust


Sources• Casman, E., Fischhoff, B., Palmgren, C., Small, M., & Wu, F. (2000). Integrated risk

model of a drinking waterborne Cryptosporidiosis outbreak. Risk Analysis, 20, 493-509.

• Fischhoff, B. (1992). Giving advice: Decision theory perspectives on sexual assault. American Psychologist, 47, 577-588.

• Fischhoff, B. (1995). Risk perception and communication unplugged: Twenty years of process. Risk Analysis, 15, 137-145.

• Fischhoff, B. (1998). Communicate unto others... Reliability Engineering and System Safety , 59, 63-72.

• Fischhoff, B. (1999). What do patients want? Help in making effective choices. Effective Clinical Practice, 2(3), 198-200.

• Fischhoff, B. (2000). Scientific management of science? Policy Sciences, 33, 73-87.

• Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A., & Quadrel, M.J. (in press). Risk perception and communication. In R. Detels, J. McEwen, R. Beaglehole & H. Tanaka (Eds.), Oxford textbook of public health London: Oxford University Press


Sources (cont.)

• Henrion, M. & Fischhoff, B. (1986). Assessing uncertainty in physical constants. American Journal of Physics, 54, 791-798.

• Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 81(1), 146-159.

• Morgan, M.G., Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A., & Atman, C. (2001). Risk communication: The mental models approach. New York: Cambridge University Press.

• National Research Council. (1996), Understanding risk. Washington, DC: Author.

• OECD. (2002). Guidance document on risk communication for chemical risk management. Draft, 6 March.

• Performance and Innovation Unit. (2002). Risk and uncertainty. London: Parliament.

• Slovic, P. (Ed.). (2001). The perception of risk. London: Earthscan.

• Mostly available from: [email protected]


Appendices

Psychology of the PublicPsychology of the ExpertsRisk Communication ProcessSpecial TopicsCryptosporidium risk assessmentAdditional survey results


Psychology of Risk - Publics(as Actors and Audiences)

• Current beliefs are the basis for future understanding

• People have limited cognitive capacity

• People use robust, imperfect heuristics

• Some concepts are inherently difficult

• Emotions can both confound and support the understanding of risk


Current Beliefs Are the Basisfor Future Understanding

• General literacy– Language, science, civics, cultures, statistics…

• Specific literacy– Radon, electromagnetic fields, climate change, driving,

breast cancer, mammography, breast implants, HIV/AIDS, other STDs, childhood immunizations, anthrax vaccine, nuclear energy sources in space, Lyme disease, agricultural biotechnology, dietary supplements, sexual assault…


People Have Limited Cognitive Capacity

• Illiteracy ≠ Stupidity• Channel limits (72 chunks)• Chunking capacity increases with coherent

mental model• Learning depends on feedback (prompt,

unambiguous)• Metacognition matters (need appropriate

feelings of confidence, self-efficacy)


People Use Robust, Imperfect Heuristics

• Plausible, practical rules of thumb• Simplify problems/provide approximate

answers - but can produce biases• Example: Availability

Familiarity indicates frequency+: uses our natural tracking ability-: insensitive to omissions (non-events,

reporting biases)


Some Concepts Are Inherently Difficult

• Very low probabilities

• Cumulative risk (from repeated exposure)

• Verbal quantifiers (e.g., “likely” threat)

• Experientially unfamiliar events

• Value uncertainty (what do I really want?)


Emotions Confound and Support Understanding

• Can mobilize, guide, and paralyze• Can both affect and reflect beliefs• Include:

– fear (direct, indirect effects of terrorism)– frustration (with self, authorities)– mourning– solidarity– reflection (about self, society)


Psychology of Risk - Experts

• Face analogous challenges of understanding• Must create public trust - demonstrating

competence and honesty – Realistic assessment of own competence– A clear, consistent public role – Rapid progress on the communication learning

curve– Insight into own intuitive psychology of public


Realistic Assessment of Competence

• Domain of expertise

• Pedigree of knowledge– Theoretical base– Uncertainty– Controversy

• Coordination with other domains


A Clear, Consistent Public Role

• Informing: just the facts

• Cheer-leading: just the spin

• Persuading: some facts plus spin

• Shared decision making


Rapid Progress on the Communication Learning Curve

• All we have to do is:– Get it right

– Report what we’re doing

– Explain what we’re doing

– Show comparable (and seemingly acceptable) risks

– Consider the acceptability of risks (in light of benefits)

– Treat the public nice

– Make the public partners


Insight into Own Intuitive Psychology of the Public

• Limited (and often biased) opportunities to observe the public

• Interpretative biases (e.g., fundamental attribution error)

• Possible ego involvement– professional arrogance– defending expert status– defensiveness


Risk Communication Process

• Identify common knowledge – What goes without saying?– open-ended interviews, allowing expression of beliefs,

values, and formulations– surveys, for frequency estimation

• Identify critical gaps – What’s worth knowing?– quantitative information (how big is the risk?)– qualitative information (what produces and controls the

risk?)


Risk Communication (cont.)

• Find a story line (coherent representation)– anticipate constructive process of learning and

memory– facilitate integration of facts (and uncertainties)

• Evaluate success– elicit feedback– await feedback


Special Topics (I)Real-time Communication

• Risk analysis protocol– integrated assessment– coordinating task force

• Risk communication protocol– pre-tested message structure– topical modules (e.g., exposure, detection)– common format (e.g., risk levels, uncertainties)


Special Topics (II)False Alarms

• Avoid disruption

• Avoid perception of cover-up

• Maintain consistent alarm standards

• Explain process


Special Topics (III)Second-Guessing Leaders

• Judge the quality of their choice, not its outcome

• Avoid hindsight bias– what did they know?– what could they reasonably have known?– how clear was the signal?

• Consider their entire decision– could they have acted on their knowledge? – was leadership possible?


Special Topics (IV)Second-Guessing the Public

• What problem are they solving (options, values, beliefs)?

• How good is our evidence?– sample size, representativeness– interpretability of actions

• Distinguish ignorance and stupidity.– how defensible are their misunderstandings?– how good was our communication?

• Were the conditions for trust maintained?


Special Topics (V)Priority Setting

• Present full range of outcomes• Offer numbers, not verbal quantifiers• Avoid potential certainty effects --preferring

“sure” solutions to narrow problems to probable solutions to broad problems

• Link public opinion and public policy

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