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Page 1: Descartes and  Method  A search for a method in  Meditations
Page 2: Descartes and  Method  A search for a method in  Meditations

Descartes and Method

Through a careful and rigorous examination of Descartes’s scattered remarks on hismethod and its application in his scientific and mathematical works, Daniel E. Flageand Clarence A. Bonnen develop a systematic account of his method and its role inthe Meditations.

In the first part of Descartes and Method, Flage and Bonnen interpret the Cartesiansearch for essences as a search for both laws and conceptual elucidation. In thesecond half of the book each Meditation is examined in light of the interpretation ofmethod. The interplay between the search for general principles and the clarificationof ideas looms large in the discussions of Meditations Two and Three. The bookexplains how Descartes’s last three Meditations do nothing less than reveal theimplications of God’s non-deceptiveness. We see that in the end Descartes, the greatrationalist, specifies the scope and limits of empiricism.

Unparalleled in any other work, Descartes and Method delineates the role of themethod of analysis in the Meditations. Anyone wishing to gain a new understandingof Descartes’s Meditations should read this book.

Daniel E. Flage is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at James MadisonUniversity. He is the author of Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions, Understanding Logic,and David Hume’s Theory of Mind (Routledge).

Clarence A. Bonnen taught philosophy at Penn State Erie until 1995. He iscurrently a computer programmer in Austin, Texas.

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Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy

1 The Soft Underbelly of ReasonThe passions in the seventeenth centuryEdited by Stephen Gaukroger

2 Descartes and MethodA search for a method in MeditationsDaniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen

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Descartes andMethodA search for a method inMeditations

Daniel E. Flage andClarence A. Bonnen

London and New York

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First published 1999by Routledge

11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2001.

© 1999 Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised inany form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafterinvented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage orretrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication DataDescartes and Method: a search for a method in Meditations/Daniel E. Flage andClarence A. Bonnen

p. 13.8 x 21.6 cmIncludes bibliographical references and index1. Descartes, René. 1596–1650. Meditationes de prima philosophia. I. Bonnen, Clarence A., 1958– II. Flage, Daniel E., 1951–B1854.F57 1999194—dc21 98–45328 CIP

ISBN 0-415-19250-1 (Print Edition)ISBN 0-203-02376-5 Master e-book ISBNISBN 0-203-17475-5 (Glassbook Format)

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To Phillip Cummins

and

in memory of Edmund Pincoffs

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I do think that somewhere in the process of making something – whetheryou’re making a building, or you’re making a part, an actor’s part – that there’ssomething about submitting to the logic of the thing you’re building that’sconsistent between the two. There’s something about understanding how itworks before you set out to use it. There’s something about knowing that onebrick goes on top of another and that there’s a purpose for the foundation – tospread the weight. . . . But basically I think it’s just about a method of work.Not expecting a result, but starting out knowing that it needs this for thebottom.

Harrison Ford, 1996

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Contents

List of figures xAcknowledgements xiAbbreviations xiii

Introduction 1Whither a Cartesian method 1An outline for a search for a method in the Meditations 4Method and metaphor 6

PART I

Descartes’s method 11

1 Analysis: the search for laws 13Analysis 13Material and formal truth 23Intuition and the natural light 27Types of certainty 29The rules in the Discourse 32Analysis and the best explanation 43

2 Analysis: the clarification of ideas 45Are all innate ideas materially true? 45Clarifying ideas and the four rules of the Discourse 56Descartes's idea of light 58

3 Causation 72Caterus on the problem of God’s self-causation 73

Formal and efficient causes 75

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viii Contents

Arnauld on the problem of God's self-causation 77

Cartesian essences and explanations 85

Mind and body 91

The unity of the method 98

Appendix: the rainbow 100

PART II

Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy 109

4 Meditation One: doubts and suppositionsssss 111

New foundations: the task of the Meditations 112

Epistemological doubts 114

The hypothetical doubts 120

Conclusions 128

5 Meditation Two: the beginning of the ascent 129

A new foundation 129

The Cogito outside the Meditations 131

The first Cogito arguments in the Meditations 143

Res Cogitans and the second Cogito 146

The piece of wax 155

Conclusions and cautions 163

6 Meditation Three: reaching the peak, or variations

on the existence and idea of God 166

Clarity, distinctness, and a classification of thoughts 166

The first argument for the existence of God 175

The second argument for the existence of God 187

Odds and ends 191

Clarifying the idea of God 193

Conclusions 202

7 Meditation Four: truth and falsity: reflections

from the summit 203

God and error 204

Clear and distinct ideas are true 210

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Contents ix

8 Meditation Five: the beginning of the descent 214True and immutable natures 215An ontological interlude 221Memory and divine non-deception 230

9 Meditation Six: the world restored 237Material objects as probable, and the real distinction between mind and body 237The argument for the nature and actual existence of the corporeal world 242What “nature” can teach about minds and bodies 244Human error and divine non-deception, revisited 249Conclusions 251

10 Circles 252

Notes 258Bibliography 293Index 300

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Figures

1 Triangle 162 The rainbow 1023 The prism 1054 Movement of particles 106

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Acknowledgements

In working on this study, we have benefited greatly from discussions andcomments from a large number of friends and colleagues. In particular, wewould like to thank Jonathan Bennett, Willis Doney, Donald Cress, PhillipCummins, Ronald Glass, Jeffrey Tlumak, the late William Williams, GordonFisher, Jeffrey Coombs, Madeleine Pepin, Véronique Foti, Michael Gass,Kenneth Winkler, Frederick O’Toole, Russell Wahl, Stephen Wagner, GeorgeStengren, James Petrik, Patrick Murphy, Barbara Tovey, Charles Huenemann,Lisa Hall, Steven Voss, Eric Palmer, Kent Baldner, Joseph Campbell, RoccoGennaro, Eric Sotnak, Susanna Goodin, Matthew Stuart, and Sam Levey fortheir helpful comments and encouragement in working on various parts ofthis work. We would also like to thank Susan Bonnen for helping us eliminatemany of the misspellings, typos and other infelicities in the text.

Research for this book was supported in the summer of 1992 by a SummerResearch Grant from James Madison University (Flage) and a research grantfrom Penn State Erie (Bonnen), which allowed us to collaborate actively forseveral weeks that summer. In 1994, Flage received the Edna T. ShaefferHumanist Award, presented by the College of Letters and Sciences of JamesMadison University, which supported further research for the book. Inaddition, Bonnen participated in Willis Doney’s 1991 NEH Summer Seminar,“The Philosophy of Descartes”, and we both participated in JonathanBennett’s 1995 NEH Summer Seminar, “Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz:Central Themes”. We appreciate each of these organizations for their supportand encouragement.

Some of the early research for Descartes and Method: a Search for Methodin Meditations was presented in articles. We acknowledge the editor ofHistory of Philosophy Quarterly for granting us permission to reprint revised

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xii Acknowledgements

versions of “Descartes’s Cogito” (Flage 1985) and “Descartes and theEpistemology of Innate Ideas” (Flage and Bonnen 1992a). We thank theeditor of Modern Schoolman for permitting us to reprint revised versions of“Descartes’s Factitious Ideas of God” (Flage and Bonnen 1989) and“Descartes’s Three Hypothetical Doubts” (Flage 1993). The editor of TheReview of Metaphysics receives our thanks for allowing us to reprint anexpanded version of “Descartes on Causation” (Flage and Bonnen 1997).

We thank John Cottingham and Cambridge University Press for permissionto quote extensively from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.

Finally, both of us are eternally grateful to wives and families for theirencouragement, patience, and tolerance during the writing of this book.Clarence Bonnen would especially like to thank his parents, James andSarah Bonnen, for all of those times that they expressed to him their sincerebelief that he partakes in one of the most noble of human activities,philosophical contemplation and dialogue.

Daniel E. FlageHarrisonburg, Virginia

Clarence A. BonnenAustin, Texas

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations will be used throughout the book.

AT x: y Oeuvres de Descartes, volume x: page yCSM x: y The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,

volume x: page yCB §x The Conversation with Burman, section xM x Le Monde, ou Traité de la Lumière, page xO x The Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry,

and Meteorology, page xP x: y Principles of Philosophy, part x: section yPOS §x Passions of the Soul, section x

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Introduction

This is a book on René Descartes’s method in his most famous work, Medi-tations on First Philosophy. Although we briefly discuss his celebrated“method of doubt”, our attention centers on the method championed in theDiscourse on Method. Of specific concern is the method of analysis towhich Descartes alludes in the Second and Sixth Replies (AT 7: 155–7, 424–5, 444–7; CSM 2: 110–12, 286–7, 299–301) and which he describes as thefifth way of reaching wisdom – the search for first causes – in the Preface tothe French edition of the Principles (AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181). Once oneunderstands that method, the argumentative structure of the Meditationsshould appear far clearer and much less eclectic than it would be otherwise.

Whither a Cartesian method

Some will greet our task with a healthy dose of skepticism, suggesting eitherthat Descartes had no method (Schuster 1993) or that he abandoned hismethod in the late 1630s or early 1640s (Garber 1992: 46–8). If Descartesabandoned all commitments to method by the late 1630s, one has little reasonto believe that considerations of method are germane to the interpretationof the Meditations of 1641. Others might suggest that even if he had amethod, all knowledge of its nature followed him to his grave. Leibniz put itthis way:

There have been many beautiful discoveries since Descartes, but, asfar as I know, not one of them has come from a true Cartesian. I knowthese people a little, and I defy them to name one such discovery fromtheir ranks. This is evidence that either Descartes did not know the truemethod, or else that he did not leave it to them.

(Letter to Molanus, ca. 1679, in Leibniz 1989: 240–1)

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2 Introduction

If Descartes had a method but did not successfully communicate it to hissuccessors, then he is guilty of the same intellectual sin with which hecharged the ancient geometers, namely, “these writers themselves, with akind of pernicious cunning, later suppressed this mathematics [method] as,notoriously, many inventors are known to have done where their own dis-coveries were concerned” (AT 10: 336, CSM 1: 19; cf. AT 7: 157, CSM 2: 111).Certainly he did not go out of his way to teach his method to others. Hisremark in the Discourse, that “My present aim, then, is not to teach themethod which everyone must follow in order to direct his reason correctly,but only to reveal how I have tried to direct my own” (AT 6: 4, CSM 1: 112;cf. Letter to Mersenne, 27 February 1637: AT 1: 349, CSM 3: 53) suggeststhat the method is to be revealed like the form of a Wittgensteinian world: itcan be shown, but not described. Such an approach bodes ill for the com-mentator on the Cartesian method. Finally, some would find Descartes’s talkof the method of analysis misleading. In the Second Replies, he does notvaunt analysis as a method of discovery or justification; rather, he says it is“the best and truest method of instruction” (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 111, ouremphasis); it is a method of demonstration (AT 7: 155, CSM 2: 110). So somemight conclude that the textual evidence we would bring to bear in ouraccount of the nature of the Cartesian method of discovery and justificationis not germane to the task.

In reply, we stress that our approach will be conservative, perhaps evennaive.1 The sole reason we contend that approaching the Meditationsthrough an examination of the Cartesian method might prove fruitful is thatDescartes says he applied his method to metaphysical topics in theMeditations. In the Dedicatory letter he writes:

I was strongly pressed to undertake this task by several people whoknew that I had developed a method for resolving certain difficulties inthe sciences – not a new method (for nothing is older than the truth),but one which they had seen me use with some success in other areas;and I therefore thought it my duty to make some attempt to apply it tothe matter at hand.

(AT 7: 3, CSM 2: 4)

Further, the suggestion that the “method of analysis” is merely a method ofinstruction or demonstration is misleading. As a method of demonstration,analysis mirrors the method of discovery. Descartes says:

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Introduction 3

Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing in questionwas discovered methodically and as it were a priori, so that if thereader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, hewill make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if hehad discovered it for himself.

(AT 7: 155, CSM 7: 110)

He also alludes to his “method of analysis” at several points in the SixthReplies (AT 7: 424, 444–5, CSM 2: 286, 299–300). Furthermore, to suggestthat he proposed a “method of analysis” places him within a definablehistorical tradition. Descartes himself suggests that his method has much incommon with the method of the ancient geometers (AT 10: 376–7, 7: 4 and156, CSM 1: 18–19, 2: 5 and 111). We also show that his remarks on methodhave strikingly close parallels in the methodological writings of the Italianschool of Padua, which was a leader in the revival of classical studies andthe development of a scientific method for over two centuries before thepublication of Descartes’s Discourse (Randall 1968).

Nor did concerns with the “method of analysis” die with Descartes. InThe Art of Thinking, Arnauld draws the distinction between the method ofanalysis and the method of synthesis along the following lines:

Generally speaking, method may be called the art of arranging well asequence of thoughts either to discover a truth of which we are ignorantor to prove to others a truth we already know. We distinguish two kindsof method: The one for discovery of truth is called analysis or themethod of resolution or the method of invention; the second, used tomake others understand a truth, is called synthesis or the method ofcomposition or the method of instruction.

(Arnauld 1964: 302)

Arnauld’s discussion of the method of analysis concludes with the fourrules of method in Descartes’s Discourse (AT 6: 18–19, CSM 1: 120; Arnauld1964: 308–9). Kant (1950: 11) tells us that his Prolegomena to any FutureMetaphysics follows the method of analysis, and he carefully distinguishesbetween analysis as a method and analyticity as a property of propositions(ibid.: 23n.). Indeed, as we show in Chapter One, there are conceptual affinitiesbetween the method of analysis and what C. S. Peirce called “abduction”(Peirce 1955; see also Hanson 1958: 85–92). But it is one thing to claim that

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4 Introduction

the expression “method of analysis” can reasonably be taken to mark amethod of discovery; it is something else to provide an elucidation of thatmethod.

Descartes provided some account of his method of inquiry in at leastthree works: Rules for the Direction of the Mind (hereafter Regulae), theDiscourse on the Method, and Second Replies. In none of these works doeshe provide a step-by-step account of his preferred procedures of inquiry.Further, since the Regulae were neither completed nor published in hislifetime, it is a matter of debate whether Descartes changed his method,whether there are substantial differences between methods before and afterabout 1629.2

We do not enter that debate; rather, we construct our account of theCartesian method on the basis of the Discourse, the Essays, and other workspublished after 1637. While we do not ignore the Regulae, we use it only,first, to show that further evidence exists that Descartes was cognizant of adistinction or methodological move that his later works seem to support andsecond, in those cases where the Regulae provide a particularly clearstatement of a doctrine that appears in the later works. To put it differently,we use the Regulae to find secondary evidence for our account of themethod, but we draw primary evidence from Descartes’s later works.

An outline for a search for a method inthe Meditations

In the first three chapters we examine the method as such. Even a cursoryexamination of Descartes’s works suggests that he employs an ostensibledistinction between two objectives of methodological inquiry: first, todiscover causes or principles or laws, and second, to discover essences. Inthe first chapter we focus on laws; in the second chapter we focus onessences. In both cases we attempt to show how the Cartesian method ofanalysis works: it is a search for principles that explain why a phenomenon,accepted as given, is as it is. In both chapters we show how Descartes’sabstract remarks on method suggest a procedure, and show how thatprocedure is employed in his nonmetaphysical works. In the third chapterwe examine the Cartesian notion of a cause. We argue that the notion of acause operative in Cartesian explanation is a formal cause. We show thatthis effectively collapses the distinction between a law and an essence and

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Introduction 5

that it makes intelligible both his remarks on the mind–body relation andsome of his remarks on method.

The fourth through the ninth chapters examine the individual Meditations.In Chapter Four we argue, following Frankfurt (1970), that the Descartes ofthe First Meditation focused his attack on the presumed epistemicfundamentality of an empiricist principle. We also show that variousassumptions give life to specifiable doubts. These assumptions becomecrucial at later points in the Meditations, and, in particular, the deceiverarguments raise the most specific doubts.

In Chapter Five we argue that there are four versions of the Cogitoargument and that there is an intimate relationship between Descartes’sproof of his existence and his clarification of the idea of himself. In ChapterSix we show that there are two themes in the Third Meditation. His primaryobjective is to show that God exists, and that his arguments presented toprove that point are, perhaps, the clearest applications of the analytic methodin the Meditations. A secondary objective is to clarify the idea of God, aclarification which remains implicit throughout the discussion.

In Chapter Seven we show that Descartes introduces his theory ofjudgment in the Fourth Meditation to explain the compatibility of anondeceptive God with the fact of human error. In Chapter Eight we arguethat his ontological argument is best construed as a means of confirmingthat his clear and distinct idea of God as a perfect being is true. We alsoargue that his concerns with memory in the closing paragraphs constitutean argument that the notion of a nondeceptive God is broader than theFourth Meditation understanding: it must allow for certainty in mathematicalproofs, even when one merely remembers that one had clearly and distinctlyperceived a conclusion reached earlier in the proof. In Chapter Nine weargue that Descartes again widened the implications of the nondeceptive-God hypothesis to justify the belief in the material world. Throughoutchapters Seven through Nine, we also show that there are claims introducedas working hypotheses in the earlier Meditations that are only later confirmed.

In Chapter Ten we examine the Cartesian Circle. While most Descartesscholars – beginning with his contemporaries (AT 7: 124–5, 214, CSM 2: 89,150) – contend that at some point he assumes what he sets out to prove,there is anything but agreement on where the circularity arises. We showthat, if our account of the method is correct, the Descartes of the Medita-tions avoids Arnauld’s charge (1964) of circularity. But this victory is short-lived. In proposing a way to reconcile his differences with Arnauld regard-

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6 Introduction

ing the second proof of the existence of God in Meditation Three (AT 2: 243,CSM 2:170), he effectively steps into Arnauld’s circle.

Method and metaphor

Before turning to the method of analysis as such, we examine two ofDescartes’s famous metaphors: the house/foundations and the tree ofphilosophy. In the course of discussing these metaphors we elucidate someof the interpretive assumptions with which we approach the Cartesian texts.

Descartes’s most famous metaphor compares his previous system ofbeliefs to a house with weak foundations. Like the owner of such a home, hewill tear it down and build anew (see AT 6: 13, CSM 1: 117). Anyone witheven a modicum of exposure to Descartes knows that it is his doubts thatraze his house to the ground. But what does he do with his demolishedhouse? In the Discourse he suggests that some of the materials will berecycled into his new house:

And, just as in pulling down an old house we usually keep the remnantsfor use in building a new one, so in destroying all those opinions ofmine that I judged ill-founded I made various observations and acquiredmany experiences which I have since used in establishing more certainopinions.

(AT 6: 29, CSM 1: 125)

If one takes the analogy at face value, it suggests that he incorporatescertain elements of the old house into the new one. If one examines PartFour of the Discourse and the Meditations, one notices, at the least,prima facie resemblances between the old house and the new: both containa God; both contain a human being composed of a body and a soul; andboth grant a significant place to the empiricist principle. The old houseand the new also differ in each of those ways: the new house contains acarefully analyzed concept of a God whose existence is proven; theanalysis of body and soul (mind) in the new house differs from that in theold; and although Descartes gives the empiricist principle a significantplace in his new house, it no longer provides the foundation for the house,and it no longer functions as the naive principle found early in theMeditations.

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Introduction 7

Nor should one find it surprising that sensory experience, which is thefundamental object of attack early in the Meditations, is ascribed asignificant place by the end of that work. In the Preface to the Frenchedition of the Principles, Descartes places it fairly high in the levels ofwisdom. Notice the levels of wisdom to which he alludes:

The first level contains only notions which are so clear in themselvesthat they can be acquired without meditation. The second compriseseverything we are acquainted with through sensory experience. Thethird comprises what we learn by conversing with other people. Andone may add a fourth category, namely what is learned by readingbooks – not all books, but those which have been written by peoplewho are capable of instructing us well; for in such cases we hold a kindof conversation with the authors. I think that all the wisdom which isgenerally possessed is acquired in these four ways. . . . Now in all agesthere have been great men who have tried to find a fifth way of reachingwisdom – a way which is incomparably more elevated and more surethan the other four. This consists in the search for the first causes andthe true principles which enable us to deduce the reasons for everythingwe are capable of knowing; and it is above all those who have labouredto this end who have been called philosophers. I am not sure, however,that there has been anyone up till now who has succeeded in thisproject.

(AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181)

As ordinarily understood, knowledge based on sense experience is thesecond highest form of knowledge. Thus, it is not surprising that Descartesshould grant a significant status to the empiricist principle. But he remarksthat there is a fifth way – the Cartesian method – which is superior to theother four in so far as it provides a method for discovering first principles.These first principles provide the ground for all knowledge. Given thesefirst principles, one will be able to explain why each of the principles at thelower levels obtains and what its limits are. It is in this way that he canchampion a modified empiricist principle at the end of the Meditations: thehigher principles specify the limits of the empiricist principle’s applicability.

Returning to the house metaphor, if the foundation is discovered throughthe method, the lower elements on the scale of wisdom are built upon it inthe same way that the studs, joists, and rafters are built upon the foundationof a house.

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8 Introduction

Houses come in many styles, and houses of many styles can be built onany given foundation. So if one pushes the house metaphor further, onemight inquire into the architectural style of the house Descartes builds. Wesuggest that his house be understood on the model of the half-timberedbuildings that were common during the middle ages, what the Germanscalled a Fachwerkhaus. Whatever else might be said about the house ofknowledge built on a Cartesian foundation, the method requires that thevarious elements which are discovered should be systematically integrated,and that one should clearly perceive how the various elements of theepistemic structure support one another. In this regard, there is no bettermodel than the open timbers of a Fachwerkhaus. A visual examination ofthe facade of a half-timbered house allows one to see which timbers providethe structural support for the others. We argue that throughout the earlyMeditations, Descartes introduces assumptions that only later are givensupport. For example, in Meditation Two, he claims that he is “only a thingthat thinks” (AT 7: 27, CSM 2: 18). As he acknowledges in the Preface to theReader, the “only” is unwarranted at the point it is introduced, adding, “Ishall, however, show how it follows from the fact that I am aware of nothingelse belonging to my essence, that nothing else does in fact belong to it”(AT 7: 8, CSM 2: 7). The latter point is proven in the Sixth Meditation (AT 7:78, CSM 2: 54), and we argue that this connection between Meditations Twoand Six is one of many lateral supports (visible timbers) in Descartes’s house.

If the house metaphor suggests that Descartes’s philosophy is systematic,that later elements are logically and conceptually dependent upon earlierelements, this point is driven home even more forcefully by the tree metaphorin the Preface to the French edition of the Principles. There Descarteswrites:

Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics,the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are allthe other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones,namely medicine, mechanics and morals. By “morals” I understand thehighest and most perfect moral system, which presupposes a completeknowledge of the other sciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom.

(AT 9B: 14, CSM 1: 186)

While Descartes suggests that a system of moral principles is the final andmost important fruit of his inquiry, moral knowledge is grounded in a physics

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Introduction 9

– and ultimately a metaphysics – from which it is deduced. Like thefoundation in the house metaphor, the health and strength of the tree isdependent upon the health and strength of its roots. The objective of theMeditations is to build a sturdy house, or to establish that the roots of hisphilosophical tree are strong and healthy.

Regardless of which metaphor one follows, one point is clear: Descartes’sphilosophy is properly systematic. It is hierarchical. The principles ofmetaphysics are at the top of the hierarchy (or, to use the tree metaphor, arethe roots), and everything in his system rests upon those principles. Theprinciples of metaphysics themselves are hierarchically related to one another.In the next three chapters we examine his method as a procedure utilized tofind the most general principles of a discipline. If one takes the tree andhouse metaphors seriously, wherever one might begin in the system, onemust ultimately relate one’s conclusions (deductively) to the principles ofmetaphysics, and the principles of metaphysics must be hierarchicallyarranged. Descartes’s philosophy may be understood on the model of acomplete and unified science, in which the principles of biology are reducedto those of chemistry and the principles of chemistry are reduced to theprinciples of physics.

The question remains, however, how did Descartes believe one shouldproceed in discovering the ultimate principles of the sciences andmetaphysics? To answer that question we must turn to a consideration ofhis method.

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Part I

Descartes’s method

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1 Analysis

The search for laws

At the end of the Second Objections to the Meditations, Mersenne invitesDescartes to “set out the entire argument in geometrical fashion, startingfrom a number of definitions, postulates and axioms” (AT 7: 128, CSM 2: 92).While Descartes complies with Mersenne’s request (AT 7: 160–70, CSM 2:113–20), he initially responds that the arguments of the Meditations are setforth in accordance with a geometrical method, namely, the method ofanalysis.

We begin with a sketch of what we believe Descartes meant by “analysis”.Next we examine the Cartesian texts to show the plausibility of ourreconstruction of Cartesian analysis. In this chapter we focus on analysisas the search for general laws or principles. In the next we examine conceptualanalysis: the search for clear and distinct ideas, or, more properly, the methodby which ideas are clarified.1 While we demonstrate the textual consistencyof our reconstruction of Cartesian analysis, we shall deem it correct only tothe extent that it clarifies the structure of the Meditations, since, as Descartestells us, “it is analysis . . . alone which I employed in my Meditations” (AT7: 156, CSM 2: 111).

Analysis

In the Second Replies, Descartes alludes to analysis as a method ofdemonstration. As a method of demonstration, analysis mirrors the methodof discovery: “Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing inquestion was discovered methodologically and as it were a priori” (AT 7:155, CSM 2: 110). Given this mirroring, one should be able to delineate thesteps operative in the method. Given its universality, the same method shouldbe found in the physical sciences, mathematics, and metaphysics, although

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14 Descartes’s method

one might discover additional constraints appropriate to each of those fields.For example, the “method of doubt” is appropriate in metaphysical inquiries,since the primary notions in metaphysics are:

as evident as, or even more evident than the primary notions which thegeometers study; but they conflict with many preconceived opinionsderived from the senses which we have got into the habit of holdingfrom our earliest years, and so only those who really concentrate andmeditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal things, so far as ispossible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them.

(AT 7: 157, CSM 2: 111)

While the “method of doubt” is a necessary supplement to the method ofanalysis in metaphysical inquiries, it is not identical to the Cartesian method.2

What, then, is the nature of that method?We suggest that the method of analysis is a search for eternal truths

(common notions, axioms), propositions which are recognized as true assoon as they are considered (P 1: 49). Eternal truths vary in degrees ofgenerality. Descartes’s paradigms of eternal truths are: “It is impossible forthe same thing to be and not to be at the same time; What is done cannot beundone; He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks” (P 1: 49: AT 8A:24, CSM 1: 209, Descartes’s emphasis) and “Nothing comes from nothing”(P 1: 75: AT 8A: 38, CSM 1: 221). Eternal truths constitute the essences ofthings (AT 1: 152, CSM 3: 25). Consequently, the generality (simplicity) ofeternal truths varies with the generality of the object(s) under consideration(see AT 1: 149, CSM 3: 24).

Insofar as analysis is the complement of synthesis and the latter is thedeductive method found in works such as Euclid’s Elements and Spinoza’sEthics (see AT 7: 156, 160–70; CSM 2: 110–11, 113–20), the method of analysisis the search for the most basic principles (axioms, eternal truths, commonnotions) in a certain domain. So geometrical analysis yields the most generalprinciples in geometry; physical analysis yields the most general principlesof physics; and metaphysical analysis yields the most general principle ofmetaphysics, namely, the existence of God (AT 1: 149, CSM 3: 24). Furthermore,as we show, the domains in which one seeks eternal truths stand in ahierarchical order: metaphysical truths are higher than mathematical truthswhich are higher than physical truths (see AT 9B: 14, CSM 1: 186). In general,the degree of fundamentality of a truth (or a domain of discourse) is inversely

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proportional to the corporeality of the domain. This is exemplified in theGeometry, where Descartes reduces the truths of geometry to those ofarithmetic.

But while this might tell us what Descartes sought, it does not specify aprocedure for discovering those truths. Is there such a procedure? And ifthere is, can one elucidate it in terms of a commonly understood model? Inwhat follows we suggest that his procedure was to propose a hypothesiswhich, if true, would explain the phenomenon in question. Confirmation ofthe hypothesis is a two-fold process. First, its truth must be recognized bythe natural light (light of reason). Second, either it must be subsumed undera more general hypothesis known by the natural light, or it must unify thedomain from which it is taken. As we argue below, the sense of “truth”operative in these two cases is not the same. We argue that the natural lightrecognizes material truth (cf. Wilson 1978: 107–9; Wolfson 1934 vol. 2: 98–9); coherence is evidence of formal truth. Still, this fails to tell us howDescartes could claim to systematically construct hypotheses. Tounderstand that, let us begin with his Geometry.

In the Geometry Descartes gives us a hint regarding the procedure forsolving any problem. He writes:

Thus, if we wish to solve some problem, we should first of all considerit solved, and give names to all the lines – the unknown ones as well asthe others – which seem necessary in order to construct it. Then, with-out considering any difference between the known and the unknownlines, we should go through the problem in the order which most natu-rally shows the mutual dependency between the lines, until we havefound a means of expressing a single quantity in two ways. This will becalled an equation, for the terms of the one of the two ways [of express-ing the quantity] are equal to those of the other. And we must find asmany such equations as we assume there to be unknown lines. Or else,if we cannot find many of them, and if nonetheless we have omittednothing that is to be desired in the question, this indicates that it is notentirely determined; and in that case, we can take at random lines ofknown length, for all the unknown lines to which no equation corre-sponds.

(AT 6: 372, O 179)

Here the procedure is fairly straightforward. Assume you are given a triangleABC (see Figure 1) and want to find the length of side BE of a similar triangleBDE (AT 6: 370; O 178). If the lines AC and DE are parallel, then:

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Figure 1 Triangle

BE BD— = —BC AB

One cross multiplies:

BE × AB = BC × BD

and, assuming AB = 1 unit, one concludes that:

BE = BC × BD

This is a means of solving an equation for an unknown variable. Insofaras the lines of a geometric construct are treated in terms of numerical values,one reduces geometry to arithmetic, which was one of Descartes’s objectivesin the Geometry (AT 6: 369–70, O 177).3 Insofar as the problem is arithmetic,the method is strictly deductive. But not all the problems which Descartesattempted to solve were arithmetic or reducible to arithmetic problems. Doesthis provide us with any general clues regarding the nature of the method?

We believe it does. Solving arithmetic equations for a given variable isanalogous to finding the missing premise in an enthymematic argument.Given one premise and the conclusion, one can formally and unambiguouslydetermine what premise, if any, will yield a valid categorical syllogism. IfDescartes used a deductive nomological model of explanation, the searchfor an explanatory principle (natural law) may be construed as the search forthe missing premise of a valid enthymematic argument.4 Of course, formalvalidity provides no more than a necessary condition for the acceptabilityof the missing principle. One must also recognize the truth of the principle

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by the natural light. So, did Descartes, like the logical positivists of our owntime (see Hempel 1965), construe explanation in terms of a deductivenomological model?

Yes. Evidence for this can be drawn from his remarks on the methodologyin the Optics and Meteorology. Descartes writes:

Should anyone be shocked at first by some of the statements I make atthe beginning of the Optics and the Meteorology because I call them“suppositions” and do not seem to care about proving them, let himhave the patience to read the whole book attentively, and I trust that hewill be satisfied. For I take my reasonings to be so closely interconnectedthat just as the last are proved by the first, which are their causes, sothe first are proved by the last, which are their effects. It must not besupposed that I am here committing the fallacy that the logicians call‘arguing in a circle’. For as experience makes most of these effects quitecertain, the causes from which I deduce them serve not so much toprove them as to explain them; indeed, quite to the contrary, it is thecauses which are proved by the effects. And I have called them“suppositions” simply to make it known that I think I can deduce themfrom the primary truths I have expounded above; but I have deliberatelyavoided carrying out these deductions in order to prevent certainingenious persons from taking the opportunity to construct, on whatthey believe to be my principles, some extravagant philosophy for whichI shall be blamed.

(AT 6: 76–7, CSM 1: 150;see also AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181, P 4: 206)

Notice the role of supposition or hypothesis formation.5 Descartes saysthat in the Optics and Meteorology he introduces various assumptions thatare later proven insofar as they provide adequate causal explanations of thephenomena in question. His remark that there is a mutual proof of causesand effects – the assumption qua cause is proven insofar as it explains thephenomenon in question and the phenomenon is proven insofar as it followsdeductively from the assumption qua cause – shows the role of coherencein his system. To the extent that the supposition explains and deductivelyimplies the claim that a certain effect must occur, one is justified in acceptingthe (formal) truth of the cause qua supposition. Notice that the coherenceDescartes has in mind is theoretical. Even if one recognizes a supposition as

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(materially) true by the natural light, it also must cohere with more generaltruths in a given system. As Descartes notes, “I have called them“suppositions” simply to make it known that I think I can deduce them fromthe primary truths I have expounded above.” Further, it is at least in partobservable phenomena which are explained, since “experience makes mostof these effects quite certain.”

Placing this discussion of suppositions in the context of the levels ofwisdom enumerated in the Preface to the French edition of the Principles(AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181) suggests a deductive (explanatory) relationshipbetween the levels of wisdom exemplified in Descartes’s method. He notesthat the four standard levels of wisdom consist of, first, “notions which areso clear in themselves that they can be acquired without meditation,” second,“everything we are acquainted with through sensory experience,” third,“what we learn by conversing with people,” and fourth, “what is learned byreading books . . . written by people who are capable of instructing us well”(AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181). There is a fifth way which “consists in the search forthe first causes and the true principles which enable us to deduce thereasons for everything we are capable of knowing” (AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181,our emphasis). Descartes’s call for deductive explanations ultimatelysuggests that one will develop a complete and coherent explanation of theworld by following his method.

The double method of coherence to which Descartes alludes in the passageabove was not original to him. At several points he suggests that his methodwas drawn from the Pappus and other ancient geometers (AT 10: 376, CSM1: 18–19; AT 7: 4, CSM 2: 4). Pappus describes the method of analysis asfollows:

Now analysis is the way from what is sought – as if it were admitted –through its concomitants [the usual translation reads: consequences]in order to something admitted in synthesis. For in analysis we supposethat which is sought to be already done, and we inquire from what itresults, and again what is the antecedent of the latter, until we on ourbackward way light upon something already known and being first inorder. And we call such a method analysis, as being a solutionbackwards. In synthesis, on the other hand, we suppose that whichwas reached last in analysis to be already done, and arranging in theirnatural order as consequences the former antecedents and linking themone with another, we arrive at the construction of the thing sought. . . .

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In the theoretical kind we suppose the thing sought as being and astrue, and then we pass through its concomitants [consequences] inorder, as though they were true and existent by hypothesis, to somethingadmitted; then, if that which is admitted be true, the thing sought istrue, too, and the proof will be the reverse of the analysis.

(Hintikka and Remes 1974: 8–9)

The methodological similarity between this passage and the description ofhis method that Descartes proposed in the Geometry is striking. Analysisconsists of two phases. The first or upward phase is a search for principles.Here one assumes what one wants to prove and seeks principles that willdeductively explain it. The second or downward phase – the proof of theanalysis – is a synthetic argument based on the principles discovered.

Another analytic tradition can be traced back through the medievals toAristotle.6 In 1334, Urban the Averroist wrote the following in hiscommentary on Aristotle’s Physics:

[D]emonstrations which proceed from causes . . . though they are alwaysprior and more known quoad naturam, are often posterior and lessknown to us. This occurs in natural science, in which those things priorfor us, such as effects, we investigate their causes, which are posteriorand less known to us. And this is the way of the method of resolution.But after we have investigated the causes, we demonstrate the effectsthrough those causes; and this is the way of the method of composition.Thus physical demonstrations follow after mathematical demonstrationsin certainty, because they are the most certain after those in mathematics.

(Quoted in Randall 1968: 232)

There are several points to notice here. First, Urban draws a distinctionbetween two orders in which things are known. On the one hand, there isthe order of reality, in which general principles (natural laws) are prior to thephenomena they explain; on the other hand, there is the temporal order inwhich things become known to us. Descartes draws a similar distinction. Inboth the Regulae (AT 10: 418, CSM 1: 44) and the Fifth Replies (AT 7: 384,CSM 2: 263–4), he indicates that insofar as one is concerned with epistemicissues, we must distinguish between the order of epistemic priority (whichfollows the metaphysical order, the order of reality) and the order ofconsideration, that is, the order in which one actually considers things.7 As

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Urban notes, in the double process of proof, one considers various issuesbefore one offers explanations of them. Thus, sensible knowledge might beprior in the order of consideration, but knowledge of the causes of thosesensed phenomena are prior in the epistemic order. Just as the Descartes ofDiscourse, Part Six, stressed that one can claim knowledge of sensibleappearance – which is prior in the order of consideration – only whensubsuming it under (explaining it by) a causal principle which is epistemicallyprior to it (prior in reality), Urban stresses that one obtains knowledge onlywhen what is epistemically prior supplies a coherent explanation of what isprior in the order of consideration.

Nor was the “double method” to which Descartes alludes in the Discourseanticipated only by Urban the Averroist.8 Paul of Venice (1429) makes muchthe same point by quoting Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics:

Scientific knowledge of the cause depends on a knowledge of the effect,just as scientific knowledge of the effect depends on knowledge of thecause, since we know the cause through the effect before we know theeffect through the cause. This is the principal rule of all investigation,that a scientific knowledge of natural effects demands a prior knowledgeof their causes and principles. [This is not a circle, however.] In scientificprocedure there are three kinds of knowledge. The first is of the effectwithout any reasoning, called quia, that it is. The second is of thecause through knowledge of the effect; it is likewise called quia. Thethird is of the effect through the cause; it is called propter quid. But theknowledge of why (propter quid) the effect is, is not the knowledgethat (quia) it is an effect. Therefore the knowledge of the effect doesnot depend on itself, but upon something else.

(Quoted in Randall 1968: 233)

Notice that again one finds a distinction between kinds of knowledge. Thefirst kind to which Paul of Venice alludes seems to be sensible knowledge: itis knowledge (or, at least, the presumption) that something is a certain way.Such knowledge is prior in the order of consideration to causal knowledge.The second kind is knowledge of a cause through its effect, which is littlemore than knowledge that a given effect must have a certain cause. One willalso have this second kind of knowledge prior to the search for the causeitself: in the parlance we introduced above, it is prior in the order ofconsideration to knowledge of an effect by way of its cause, even thoughthe cause is prior in the epistemic order. Descartes seems to follow Paul of

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Venice in acknowledging this distinction, since it presupposes the eternaltruth that “Nothing comes from nothing” (AT 8A: 38, CSM 1: 221; P 1: 49),that is, it sets forth the need to inquire into the cause of a phenomenon.9 Ofcourse, it is not until the third and final stage that one can claim scientificknowledge of the phenomenon, for one only then conceives of thephenomenon as the effect of a particular kind of cause.

Both Paul of Venice and Descartes claim that the procedure avoids thecharge of arguing in a circle. How can this be? Is one not simply assumingwhat one sets out to discover and arguing that, since what one has discoveredwill explain the phenomenon in question, one is justified in accepting it astrue?

No. In Descartes’s works we are concerned with two different issues,discovery and confirmation, and confirmation itself consists of two phases.This is how Descartes proceeds. Having isolated a phenomenon, one inquiresinto its cause. The “cause” for which one is looking is a principle or naturallaw that will explain the phenomenon. The phenomenon is prior in the orderof consideration to the question of its cause, and the question, “What is thecause of phenomenon x?” is prior in the order of consideration to anycandidate for an explanatory principle. The question “What is the cause ofx?” identifies the cause only by description. In answering the question,Descartes distinguishes between two phases. In positing a causal principle(statement of natural law), one’s initial question is one of its material truth: isthe posited principle recognized as true by the natural light? An affirmativeanswer initially confirms the law; it shows that the posited law is internallyconsistent: it could be an explanatory principle.

In the second phase, one shows that positing the law explains thephenomenon in question. For example, if one questions why the water onthe stove is boiling, one might make various observations: the water isheated to 212°F.; the atmospheric pressure is 29.92 inches of mercury. Thismight lead one to posit as an explanatory principle that all water at anatmospheric pressure of 29.92 inches of mercury that is heated to 212°Fboils. This principle would be recognized as true by the natural light; that is,it would be recognized as materially true (internally consistent). If, in turn, itwould explain why the water on the stove is boiling, there would be evidenceof the formal truth of the causal principle. One is concerned with two issuesin distinguishing between the two phases of the explanation. The naturallight provides an initial and very limited confirmation of the causal principle:it shows the plausibility of the law by revealing the law as materially true.The deduction of the phenomenon to be explained from the law and the set

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of initial conditions shows that the law in question explains the phenomenon.This is evidence for the formal truth of the law. Further evidence of its formaltruth is derived from subsuming the law in question under more generallaws, the material truth of each being recognized by the natural light.

But one could always construct alternative explanations, each of whichis based on a principle that is recognized by the natural light. How does onechoose among those explanations? Descartes accepted the principle ofparsimony: given a choice between two explanations, he deemed the simplerexplanation – the explanation appealing to fewer fundamentally differentkinds of entities or a smaller number of laws – the most probably true. Thisis not a principle Descartes trumpets from the rooftops. Indeed, as he suggestsin a letter to Regius of January 1642, it is at least politically prudent to leaveexistential questions open; all one need show is that the entities assumedby one’s opponents are not necessary to explain the phenomenon at hand(AT 3: 491–2, CSM 3: 205).10 In the same letter he points to his own strategyin the Meteorology. He counsels Regius:

[W]hy did you need to reject openly substantial forms and real qualities?Do you not remember that on page 164 of my Meteorology, I foundthem unnecessary in setting out my explanations? If you had taken thiscourse, everybody in your audience would have rejected them as soonas they saw they were useless, and in the mean time you would nothave become so unpopular with your colleagues.

(AT 3: 491–2, CSM 3: 205)

In the passage to which he alludes, Descartes explains observable changesin the material world on the hypothesis that observable objects are composedof minute parts, and that macroscopic changes are the result of changes inthe configuration and movement of the particles of which they are composed.He does not deny the existence of the Scholastics’ “‘substantial forms’,their ‘real qualities’, and so on. It simply seems to me that my arguments willbe all the more acceptable insofar as I can make them depend on fewerthings” (AT 6: 239, CSM 2: 187n.2, O 268).

Nor is this the only place Descartes appeals to the principle of parsimony.In the First Discourse of the Optics, and to a lesser extent in the FourthDiscourse, he suggests that there is no reason to posit the intentional formsof the Scholastics insofar as his theory will explain vision without such apostulation. Indeed, he remarks, “By this means, your mind will be deliveredfrom all those little images flitting through the air, called ‘intentional forms’,

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which so exercise the imagination of the philosophers.” (AT 6: 85, CSM 1:153–4; cf. AT 6: 112, CSM 1: 165). Thus, it seems clear that Descartes at leastimplicitly appeals to parsimony as a basis for deciding between two theories.

To summarize, we believe that the Cartesian method is a type of argumentto the best explanation.11 Descartes begins by seeking an explanation for acertain phenomenon. He proposes a hypothesis, a general principle which,if true, would provide the lawful basis for explaining the phenomenon inquestion. This is subject to a two-phase process of confirmation. First, thenatural light must recognize it as materially true. Second, it must provide thebasis for a deductive–nomological explanation of the phenomenon inquestion. This provides evidence that the hypothesis is formally true, andthe degree of evidence is increased if the hypothesis itself can be subsumedunder a higher level law (hypothesis). In addition to this, he implicitly appealsto the principle of parsimony as the basis for choosing between twohypotheses which are equally plausible on the basis of the previous criteria.Simplicity is the ground for deciding which theory is “best”.

In our account of Cartesian analysis as a search for natural laws, weintroduced a distinction between material and formal truth, and we assigneda central role to the light of nature. Before showing the consistency of ouraccount of the method with the four methodological rules Descartes setsforth in the Discourse, we must digress and elucidate the distinction betweenmaterial and formal truth, the role of the natural light (intuition) in his method,and the kinds of certainty found in his philosophy. These are our topics forthe next three sections.

Material and formal truth

In the Third Meditation Descartes introduces the notion of an idea,distinguishes an idea simpliciter from other forms of thought, and draws adistinction between formal falsehood and material falsehood. Formalfalsehood is a property of judgments, rather than of ideas simpliciter (AT 7:37, 43; CSM 2: 26, 30; see also AT 7: 233, CSM 2: 163). Judgment is the properdomain of error, “[a]nd the chief and most common mistake which is to befound here consists in my judging that ideas which are in me resemble, orconform to, things located outside me” (AT 7: 37, CSM 2: 26). Judgments arecomplex mental acts insofar as they require an affirmation or denial by thewill with respect to an idea (see AT 7: 56, CSM 2: 39). While ideas provide thesubject matter for judgments, ideas as such are not formally true or false.

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Descartes contends that if one is to avoid error – formal falsity – “theperception of the intellect should always precede the determination of thewill” (AT 7: 60, CSM 2: 41).

If any sense of truth or falsehood applies to ideas as such, then it ismaterial truth and falsity.12 When he introduces the notion of material falsityin Meditation Three, Descartes indicates that the notion applies strictly toideas having a low degree of clarity and distinctness, ideas that “representnon–things as things” (AT 7: 43, CSM 2: 30; see also AT 7: 233, CSM 1: 163).Ideas of heat or cold, for example, are so obscure and confused, that “theydo not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the absence of heat or viceversa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or neither is” (AT 7: 44,CSM 2: 30). Because ideas present themselves as if they represent things,materially false ideas provide the subject matter for false judgments (AT 7:231, CSM 2: 162).

His more extended discussion of material falsity in the Fourth Repliesrepeats the same theme: material falsity is a function of an idea’s obscurity.Focusing on the idea of cold, he says, “[M]y only reason for calling the idea[of cold] ‘materially false’ is that, owing to the fact that it is obscure andconfused, I am unable to judge whether or not what it represents to me issomething positive which exists outside my sensation” (AT 7: 234, CSM 2:164; cf. AT 7: 233, CSM 2: 163). Material falsity is a function of the obscurityof an idea of sensation, the idea itself being “something positive as itsunderlying subject” (AT 7: 234, CSM 2: 164; see also AT 7: 234–5, CSM 2:164). “The greatest scope for error is provided by the ideas which arise fromthe sensations of appetite,” which explains, for example, why a dropsicalperson may seek to satisfy a craving for water, but does so at serious risk ofinjury (AT 7: 234, CSM 2: 163–4).

A materially false idea is so obscure that one does not know of what it isan idea, that is, one does not know the essence of the thing putativelyrepresented. Since “according to the laws of true logic, we must never askabout the existence of anything unless we first understand its essence” (AT7: 107–8, CSM 2: 78), the fact that an idea is materially false (obscure andconfused), increases the probability of error in any judgment based uponthat idea. If an idea is materially false (obscure and confused), one cannotdetermine its degree of objective reality, and, consequently, one cannotapply Descartes’s maxim that an idea’s degree of objective reality must bethe result of “some cause which contains at least as much formal reality asthere is objective reality in the idea” (AT 7: 41, CSM 2: 28–9). Hence, amaterially false idea can provide no solid ground for judging thenonideational nature of the cause of one’s idea.13

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Given Descartes’s contention that obscure and confused ideas arematerially false, we may extrapolate a notion of material truth. Clear anddistinct ideas are materially true: they provide the basis for formally truejudgments.14 While even Descartes’s most extensive discussion of clearand distinct ideas (P 1: 45) tells one less than one would like regarding theirnature, at least it shows that a clear and distinct idea includes a sufficientnumber of the constituent properties of a thing of a kind to allow one todistinguish it from all other kinds. Given this level of clarity, one can inquireinto the cause of one’s idea. At this point one may move from the realm ofideas to that of formal reality, that is, to the reality of material objects andGod (see AT 7: 37, CSM 2: 26).

But even if clear and distinct ideas are materially true, this does notguarantee that all clear and distinct ideas provide the basis for formally truejudgments, that is, judgments regarding the actual existence of objects. Inthe Fifth Meditation, Descartes indicates that he finds within himself:

countless ideas of things which even though they may not existanywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing; for although in asense they can be thought of at will, they are not my invention but havetheir own true and immutable natures.

(AT 7: 64, CSM 2: 44)

His example is an idea of a triangle, which:

even if perhaps no such figure exists, or has ever existed, anywhereoutside my thought, there is still a determinate nature, or essence, orform of the triangle which is immutable and eternal, and not invented byme or dependent on my mind.

(AT 7: 64, CSM 2: 45)

One’s idea of a triangle is innate (AT 7: 382, CSM 2: 262). One’s idea of atriangle cannot be called nothing, for one can demonstrate that a trianglehas various properties (AT 7: 64–5, CSM 2: 45). To put this differently, anobject possibly exists that corresponds to the idea (AT 7: 71, CSM 2: 50).

But possible correspondence is one thing; actual correspondence issomething else. Descartes raises the possibility that no triangles are actual,even though the idea of a triangle is (materially) true.15 This implies that alleternal truths about triangles have no existential import: no judgments offormal truth (existence) follow immediately from them.

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The conclusions we have reached regarding one’s clear and distinctideas of triangles seem applicable to all eternal truths except the claim thatGod exists. At Principles 1: 13, Descartes places eternal truths or commonnotions in the same class of ideas as those of numbers or triangles.16 Afternoting that one avoids error so long as one makes no affirmations or denialsregarding the ideas one finds within oneself, he writes:

Next, it [the mind] finds certain common notions from which it constructsvarious proofs; and, for as long as it attends to them, it is completelyconvinced of their truth. For example, the mind has within itself ideas ofnumbers and shapes, and it also has such common notions as: If youadd equals to equals the results will be equal; from these it is easy todemonstrate that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles,and so on.

(P 1: 13: AT 8A: 9, CSM 1: 197; see also P 1: 49, CB §52)

Descartes indicates that mathematical truths and other eternal truths, suchas, “He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks,” are free from existentialimport (see P 1: 10, 49). Hence, they cannot be formally true. Consequentlyif, as the texts suggest, the distinction between formal and material truth isexhaustive, eternal truths can be only materially true, and, with the exceptionof the claim of divine existence, entail no formal truths. If we are correct inthis, then among the eternal truths are some that assert the necessary andsufficient conditions for claims of real (formal) existence, but which, apartfrom any factual truths, will not warrant judgments of real (formal) existence.17

Thus, an eternal truth in conjunction with a factual claim, and only inconjunction with a factual claim, can provide the basis for justifying a claimof real existence. If our reconstruction of analysis in the first section of thischapter is correct, eternal truths are the general principles that are discoveredin analysis. But one will generally claim that it is one thing to “discover” aprinciple that will allow one to deduce a factual claim; it is something else toknow that the principle discovered is true. Further, we have already seenthat Descartes holds that the deducibility of a claim from a general principleis a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for asserting the truth of theclaim deduced. But if independently-known, eternal truths serve as thedeductive anchor in the justification of factual claims, then how does oneknow these eternal truths? He answers this question in terms of intuitionand the natural light.

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Intuition and the natural light

Throughout his works, Descartes alludes to principles known by the “naturallight” or the “light of nature” or the “light of reason.” In the Principles ofPhilosophy, he identifies the “light of nature” with the “faculty of knowledgewhich God gave us” (AT 8A: 18, CSM 1: 203; P 1: 30). In the Synopsis of theMeditations, he claims that “speculative truths . . . are known solely bymeans of the natural light” (AT 7: 15, CSM 2: 11). In the Third Meditation henotes:

Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light . . . cannot in any way beopen to doubt. This is because there cannot be another faculty both astrustworthy as the natural light and also capable of showing me thatsuch things are not true.

(AT 7: 38–9, CSM 2: 27)

In Meditation Four he identifies the natural light with the “power ofunderstanding . . . which God gave me” (AT 7: 60, CSM 2: 42). Indeed, theexplanatory subtitle of The Search for Truth by Means of the Natural Lightasserts, “This light alone, without any help from religion or philosophy,determines what opinions a good man should hold on any matter that mayoccupy his thoughts, and penetrates into the secrets of the most reconditesciences” (AT 10: 495, CSM 2: 400, Descartes’s emphasis). The light ofnature is the power or the faculty by which one discerns eternal truths. It iswhat the Descartes of the Regulae (AT 10: 366–70, CSM 1: 13–15) called“intuition,” a term he used almost exclusively in that work.18 In this sectionwe examine the Regulae to show that intuition provides knowledge of eternalmaths, that is, knowledge of material truths; that deductively valid movementsare recognized as such by intuition; and that knowledge of formal truthsrequires a combination of intuition and deduction.19

Descartes’s discussions of intuition and deduction begin in the ThirdRule and continue intermittently through the Twelfth. Claiming that thereare only two sources of “knowledge of things with no fear of being mistaken,”namely intuition and deduction (AT 10: 368, CSM 1: 14), he defines ‘intuition’as follows:

By ‘intuition’ I do not mean the fluctuating testimony of the senses orthe deceptive judgement of the imagination as it botches things

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together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is soeasy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we areunderstanding. Alternatively, and this comes to the same thing, intuitionis the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind whichproceeds solely from the light of reason.

(AT 10: 368, CSM 1: 14)

We have already noticed that Descartes identifies the “natural light” withthe faculty that discerns truth. Intuition, then, initially seems nothing morethan the ability to recognize truth by the light of reason. The passage tellsus a bit more, however, for it requires that the mind be “clear and attentive.”The call for clarity implies that the mind be free of preanalytic biases, e.g.that one reject the assumption that all knowledge is derived from senseperception.20 Further, one must “attend” to what is discovered, e.g. to theextent possible, one should ignore the bombardment of sensuousinformation.21

But intuition is not only the recognition of truth; it is also the recognitionof deductive validity. As Descartes continues:

The self-evidence and certainty of intuition is required not only forapprehending single propositions, but also for any train of reasoningwhatever. Take for example, the inference that 2 plus 2 equals 3 plus 1:not only must we intuitively perceive that 2 plus 2 make 4, and that 3plus 1 make 4, but also that the original proposition follows necessarilyfrom the other two.

(AT 10: 369, CSM 1: 14–15)

In deducing “that 2 plus 2 equals 3 plus 1,” intuition plays two roles. Byintuition one recognizes the serf-evidence of the premises from which thededuction proceeds, and one recognizes the necessary connections amonga very limited number of premises and a conclusion. As Descartes goes onto indicate, deduction, “the inference of something necessarily followingfrom some other propositions which are known with certainty” (AT 10: 369,CSM 1: 15), differs from intuition insofar as it involves a “continuous anduninterrupted movement of thought” (AT 10: 369, CSM 1: 15), while no suchmovement is found in intuition. Deductive arguments often proceed fromseveral premises and require that one draw subconclusions before reachingone’s final conclusion. Such arguments lack the immediate self-evidence ofintuition insofar as they require that one remember the premises and

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subconclusions, that is, “deduction in a sense gets its certainty from memory”(AT 10: 370, CSM 1: 15). Nonetheless, each step of a deductive argumentinvolves an intuitive move, and consequently Descartes claims that:

those propositions which are immediately inferred from first principlescan be said to be known in one respect through intuition, and in anotherrespect through deduction. But the first principles themselves are knownonly through intuition, and the remote conclusions only throughdeduction.

(AT 10: 370, CSM 1: 15).

Notice that Descartes claims that first principles are known throughintuition. As he indicated in the Introduction to the French edition of thePrinciples, such first principles have two characteristics:

First, they must be so clear and so evident that the human mind cannotdoubt their truth when it attentively concentrates on them; and, secondly,the knowledge of other things must depend on them, in the sense thatthe principles must be capable of being known without knowledge ofthese other matters, but not vice versa.

(AT 9B: 2, CSM 1: 179–80;see also AT 10: 401–2, CSM 1: 33–4)

What counts as a “first principle” might vary with the subject matter ofone’s inquiry. But it is clear that these “first principles” are what Descartesalternatively calls “simple propositions” (AT 10: 428–9, CSM 1: 50), “simplenatures which the intellect recognizes by means of a sort of innate light”(AT 10: 419, CSM 1: 44; see also AT 7: 65, CSM 2: 44–5), “common notions”(AT 10: 419–20, CSM 1: 45; see also CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332–3), or“eternal truths” (P 1: 48–50, CB §52: AT 5: 167). These “first principles” arenecessarily true and, when attentively considered, are recognized as suchby the natural light. It is these first principles that provide the basis fordeductions which establish the certainty of less primary claims.

Types of certainty

While Descartes claims that there is but one method for discovering truth,and while he claims that certainty rests on either immediate intuitions of

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eternal truths or deductions from eternal truths that are so known, oneshould not take this to imply that all certainty is monolithic. We have alreadynoticed that he denied existential import to etemal truths. Hence, if all one’sdeductions take only eternal truths as their premises, there is no basis forexistential judgments. We show in Chapter Five that he did not limit intuitivecertainty to knowledge of first truths – he also allowed that one hasimmediate knowledge of one’s own psychological states – but even thisseems to place very severe limits on knowledge. Since Descartes was anoted physicist, as well as a philosopher and mathematician, and sinceexistential judgments in physics cannot reasonably be deemed necessarytruths, what epistemic status does he ascribe to such truths? To put itdifferently, does he distinguish the certainty germane to physics and ordinaryfactual claims from that germane to metaphysics and mathematics?

Yes. Descartes distinguishes between “absolute” or “metaphysicalcertainty,” certainty based solely on necessary truths, and “moral certainty.”In the French edition of the Principles, he writes, “Absolute certainty ariseswhen we believe that it is wholly impossible that something should beotherwise than we judge it to be” (P 4: 206: AT 9B: 324, CSM 1: 290). Moralcertainty is anything that falls short of absolute certainty. To illustrate thenotion of moral certainty, Descartes considers a case of decoding a message.He writes:

Suppose for example that someone wants to read a letter written inLatin but encoded so that the letters of the alphabet do not have theirproper value, and he guesses that the letter B should be read wheneverA appears, and C when B appears, i.e. that each letter should be replacedby the one immediately following it. If, by using this key, he can makeup Latin words from the letters, he will be in no doubt that the truemeaning of the letter is contained in these words. It is true that hisknowledge is based merely on a conjecture, and it is conceivable thatthe writer did not replace the original letters with their immediatesuccessors in the alphabet, but with others, thus encoding quite adifferent message; but this possibility is so unlikely <especially if themessage contains many words> that it does not seem credible.

(P 4: 205: AT 9B: 327–8, CSM 1: 290;see also Regulae, AT 10: 404–5, CSM 1: 35–6)

In proposing a hypothesis that will provide an intelligible rendering of themessage, one has good reason to believe the accuracy of one’s guess at the

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key to the code. Nonetheless, one’s evidence is not conclusive: more thanone key to the code may exist, and if so, one might not possess the key usedby the letter’s author. One can only claim moral certainty for one’s decoding.

A claim possesses only moral certainty if it is either a contingent truth ordeduced from premises some of which are contingent truths. In contrastingcontingent truths with eternal truths, Descartes told Burman, “As forcontingent truths, these relate to existing things. Contingent truths involveexisting things, and vice versa” (CB §52, AT 5: 167). This suggests that allexistential judgments, other than the judgment that God exists (cf. P 1: 14),are contingent truths, and consequently, are only morally certain. But whilethis is generally correct, there are exceptions. For example, Descartes notes:

Again, there are many instances of things which are necessarilyconjoined, even though most people count them as contingent, failingto notice the relation between them: for example the proposition, “I am,therefore God exists”, or “I understand, therefore I have a mind distinctfrom my body”.

(AT 10: 421–2, CSM 1: 46)

The difference here is that certain truths that are taken to be contingentare, Descartes maintains, actually necessary: these truths rest solely ondeductions from self-evident premises. Hence, he claims, the truths arenecessary; their certainty is absolute or metaphysical.

Descartes maintains that the physics of the Principles possesses atleast moral certainty (P 4: 205), though wanting to make a stronger claim forit (P 4: 206). He writes:

Now if people look at all the many properties relating to magnetism, fireand the fabric of the entire world, which I have deduced in this bookfrom just a few principles, then, even if they think that my assumptionof these principles was arbitrary and groundless, they will still perhapsacknowledge that it would hardly have been possible for so many itemsto fit into a coherent pattern if the original principles had been false.

(P 4: 205: AT 8A: 328, CSM 1: 290)

Descartes takes the fact that descriptions of various phenomena arededucible from the assumed principles as evidence of the (formal) truth ofthe principles. This complies with our earlier suggestion that the Cartesian

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method is an attempt to discover the best explanation, and that thededucibility of an explanation from a set of principles is a necessary conditionfor claiming that those principles are formally true. Yet if his deductionsincluded factual assertions known on the basis of experience, rather thanstrictly by the natural light, he may claim no more than a high degree ofmoral certainty for his physics. Similarly, insofar as the Meditations includea combination of principles known by the natural light and factual premises,in many cases he may claim no more than a high degree of moral certaintythat his conclusions are metaphysically certain.22

The rules in the Discourse

To this point we have sketched what we believe Descartes meant by“analysis,” we have argued that he drew a distinction between material andformal truth and that material truth pertains to ideas and eternal truths, andwe have examined his distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty.We turn now to the four methodological rules which he enumerates in theDiscourse and show how they are consistent with the account of analysiswe have developed.

The four rules of the Discourse on Method are notoriously ambiguous,and seem to be compatible with any number of methods of inquiry. If ourpreliminary account of the Cartesian method is correct, however, the rulestake on a distinct and determinate character.

The first rule of the Discourse is:

The first was never to accept anything as true if I did not have evidentknowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusionsand preconceptions, and to include nothing more in my judgmentsthan what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly thatI had no occasion to doubt it.

(AT 6: 18, CSM 1: 120)

This rule might be taken to be operative in the “methodological doubts” ofthe First Meditation, where Descartes shows that he did not have “evidentknowledge” of most of those things he had previously believed. Yet insofaras this is a general rule of the method, one cannot take it to be a call tosystematic doubt, since the doubts that are so pronounced in the Meditationsare wholly absent in the scientific works. The rule does little more thanspecify the need for caution in seeking knowledge and the call for certainty

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in reaching a conclusion. Nonetheless, given the distinctions we haveexamined, a bit more meat can be placed on the bones of this rule.

If one construes “evident knowledge” as knowledge by means of thenatural light (intuition), then it is a call for material truth and metaphysicalcertainty. If so, then it has limited applicability to any of Descartes’s scientificworks, since the conclusions of Cartesian science may reach only a highdegree of moral certainty. Nonetheless, this limitation points to an importantaspect of any Cartesian inquiry. While the ultimate conclusions of Cartesianphysics might have only moral certainty, they must be based on principlesknown by the natural light, that is, they must be based on principles that aremetaphysically certain. Principles known by the natural light are materiallytrue: they show that the entity under consideration is at least possible(something God could create; cf. AT 7: 78, CSM 2: 54) or that the principle iscapable of being formally true in any possible world. In this respect, principlesknown by the natural light are evident; they provide the epistemic basis forany subsequent explanation. Taken in this way, the first rule requires thatone search for eternal truths in any given area of inquiry as the initial basisfor sound judgment.

While the first rule focuses on the material truth and the metaphysicalcertainty relevant to eternal truths, it tells us little about the procedure oneshould follow in solving a problem. The second rule, however, is procedural.Descartes writes:

The second, to divide each of the difficulties I examined into as manyparts as possible and as may be required in order to resolve them better.

(AT 6: 18, CSM 1: 120)

There are several elements to this rule, and some of the considerationsraised here will be germane to the third rule as well. We begin with anexamination of the “difficulty.” Then, we look at the reasons why Descartesclaims these difficulties must be divided into parts.

In Rule Thirteen of the Regulae, Descartes indicates that the first step insolving a problem is to delineate the problem clearly. He lists three elementsto this:

First, in every problem there must be something unknown; otherwisethere would be no point in posing the problem. Secondly, this unknownsomething must be delineated in some way, otherwise there would benothing to point us to one line of investigation as opposed to any

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other. Thirdly, this unknown something can be delineated only by wayof something else which is already known.

(AT 10: 430, CSM 1: 52–3)

If one is to solve a problem, one must first know the nature of that problem.If one wanders into one’s kitchen and notices that the refrigerator door isopen and milk and groceries are spilled on the floor, one does not have aproblem. One has a problem or difficulty to be solved only once onedelineates a certain question and decides to make a judgment about thatstate of affairs (AT 10: 432, CSM 1: 53). Under the circumstances, one wouldmost probably attempt to discover why the kitchen is in a state of disarray,that is, one would seek a cause from an effect. Descartes lists five distinctways in which one can delineate a problem: “Now, we are seeking to derivethings from words, or causes from effects, or effects from causes, or a wholefrom parts or parts from other parts, or several of these at once” (AT 10: 433,CSM 1: 53). These modes of delineation help focus one’s thought andinvestigation on an object, although nothing is known of the object otherthan its relation to a certain state of affairs.23

Since Descartes held that “simple natures are all self-evident and nevercontain any falsity” (AT 10: 420, CSM 1: 45), the division of a problem is asearch for the simple nature(s) that will explain why the state of affairs is asit is. All problematic states of affairs are complex, and the division of such astate of affairs into its “parts” provides the basis for answering the questionabout any particular phenomenon, “What is the best way to subsume thephenomenon under first principles?”

If one looks at the scientific works, one quickly discovers how Descartesdivides a problem into its component parts. Consider the Optics. Descartes’sconcern there is with “determin[ing] the shape that these [telescopic] lensesmust have” (AT 6: 92; O 66). To make the discussion intelligible even to the“craftsmen, who usually have little formal education” (AT 6: 82, CSM 1:152), Descartes tries “not to omit anything, or to assume anything thatrequires knowledge of other sciences.” He continues:

This is why I shall begin by explaining light and light-rays; then, havingbriefly described the parts of the eye, I shall give a detailed account ofhow vision comes about; and, after noting all the things which arecapable of making vision more perfect, I shall show how they can beaided by the inventions which I shall describe.

(AT 6: 83, CSM 1: 152)

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The division of the problem in the Optics, and the relationships amongthose divisions, can be understood by briefly considering the topicsDescartes addresses in the several sections of that work. In the “FirstDiscourse: Of Light,” he introduces a particle theory of light on the basis ofthree analogical models: a blind man’s stick, wine in a vat with holes in thebottom, and a ball being thrown into objects of varying consistencies. Thesemodels suggest that light travels in straight lines except when propelledthrough a medium. When propelled toward a medium of one sort or another,the direction of the light ray (the direction of a ball) is reflected, if the mediumhit is firm, in a direction that depends upon the arc of the medium, or isrefracted from its original course in passing through the medium. In the“Second Discourse: Of Refraction,” Descartes expands on the ball modeland discusses the mathematics of refraction.24 In the “Third Discourse: Ofthe Eye,” he gives a detailed description of the parts of the eye. In the“Fourth Discourse: Of the Senses in General,” he expands his anatomicaldiscussion to include the nerves and the brain, explaining how the nervescan transmit images, even though no actual image as such is transmitted.

In the “Fifth Discourse: Of the Images That Form on the Back of the Eye,”Descartes ties together the issues discussed in the first three discourses.By dissecting an eye, noticing the formation of an image on the back of theeye, and noticing how the variations in the shape of the eye tend to changethe sharpness of the image’s focus, Descartes can explain why the optics ofthe eye is as it is on the basis of his considerations of refraction and theparts of the eye. In the “Sixth Discourse: Of Vision,” he explains color visionon the basis of movements in the optic nerve (AT 6: 134, CSM 1: 169),perception of position on the basis of the location in the brain where thenerves originate (AT 6: 134–5, CSM 1: 169), distance in terms both of naturalgeometrical calculations and in terms of the distinctness of an image and itsparts (AT 6: 138–40, CSM 1: 172), the seeing of size and shape (AT 6: 140–1,CSM 1: 172), and an explanation of dreams (AT 6: 141–3, CSM 1: 172–3).25

The plausibility of these explanations rests on the discussion of the role ofthe nerves and the brain in sense experience that he developed in the fourthdiscourse.

The “Seventh Discourse: Of the Means of Perfecting Vision” is anexamination of the use of lenses in correcting vision. Descartes’s case isbased on the theories of light and refraction he developed in the first twodiscourses. The “Eighth Discourse: Of the Shapes That Transparent BodiesMust have in Order to Divert Rays Through Refraction in Every Way That

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is Useful to Sight,” is a mathematical description of the means of determiningwhat shapes a lens must have to reach the desired refractive effect. All ofthis is a preliminary to the explanation of the working of the telescope inDiscourse Nine. Discourse Ten is a practical account of how the appropriatelenses are to be constructed, which constructions would allow one to findgreater empirical evidence for the claims Descartes made throughout theearlier discussions.

One finds much the same kind of arrangement in the Meteorology.Descartes begins with a particulate hypothesis regarding the nature of thephysical world (AT 6: 232–9; O 263–8), that is, he assumes “that water, earth,air, and all other such bodies that surround us are composed of many smallparticles of various shapes and sizes” (AT 6: 233; O 264), and a considerationof the arrangement of the particles of various sizes in the atmosphere (AT 6:239–48; O 269–74).26 He then explains the various atmospheric phenomenaon the basis of his hypotheses and the various conclusions he had reachedin the Optics. His discussions are devoted to winds (Discourse Four), clouds(Discourse Five), snow, rain, and hail (Discourse Six), storms and lightning(Discourse Seven), the rainbow (Discourse Eight), colors in the clouds andcoronas (Discourse Nine), and the appearance of many suns (DiscourseTen). As in the Optics, he introduces hypotheses at the beginning of thework which function in explanations, which explanations allow him toconstruct further explanations.

If the second rule of the Discourse tells us where to begin, the third tellsus how to proceed after the dividing the problem into its “parts”.27 The rulereads:

The third, to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginningwith the simplest and most easily known objects in order to ascendlittle by little, step by step, to knowledge of the most complex, and bysupposing some order even among objects that have no natural orderof precedence.

(AT 6: 18–19, CSM 1: 120)

We have already seen that the “simple and most easily known objects” are“first principles” or eternal truths (see AT 6: 20–1, CSM 1: 121). “Complex”or composite objects are any that are not simple. These include ordinaryobjects and such states of affairs as provide the basis for a problem or“difficulty” of the sort considered in the second rule. Descartes writes ofcomposite natures in Rule Eight of the Regulae:

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As for composite natures, there are some which the intellect experiencesas composite before it decides to determine anything about them: butthere are others which are put together by the intellect itself. All thesepoints will be explained at greater length in Rule Twelve, where it will bedemonstrated that there can be no falsity save in composite natureswhich are put together by the intellect. In view of this, we divide naturesof the latter sort into two further classes, viz. those that are deducedfrom natures which are the most simple and self-evident (which weshall deal with throughout the next book), and those that presupposeothers which experience shows us to be composite in reality.

(AT 10: 399, CSM 1: 32)

Since “the whole of human knowledge consists uniquely in our achieving adistinct perception of how all these simple natures contribute to thecomposition of other things” (AT 10: 427, CSM 1: 49), this passage impliesthat the “ascent” from the simple to the complex is an epistemic ascent thatconsists of the deduction of descriptions of complex states of affairs from“simple natures” or eternal truths. One reduces objects to their simplecomponents by subsuming descriptions of those objects under generallaws. So the order with which Descartes is concerned here is the epistemicorder (the order of reality), not the order of consideration.

This is precisely what Descartes does in his scientific writings. In theGeometry, he explains the conclusions of “ordinary” plane geometry bysubsuming them under the “simpler” (more general) principles of arithmetic.In the Optics and the Meteorology, he assumes various simple (general)principles at the outset and shows that these allow him to explain variousobservable phenomena. In The World, he assumes that God creates a newworld composed of a “perfectly solid body which uniformly fills the entirelength, breadth and depth of this huge space in the midst of which we havebrought our mind to rest” (AT 11: 33, CSM 1: 91) and that this matter operatesin accordance with a specified set of laws (AT 11: 36–48, CSM 1: 92–8). Thisset of general assumptions allows him to explain the formation of the sun,stars, and planets (Chapters Eight and Nine), and to argue that thehypothetical new world, after a sufficient time, would come to be indiscerniblefrom the world we ordinarily perceive (Chapter Fifteen).

One finds the same arrangement in the scientific parts of the Principlesof Philosophy, where he introduces a set of general assumptions (P 3: 44ff.)and proceeds to explain the complex physical world on the basis of them.

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Hence, the scientific writings tend to bear out our suggestion that one ofDescartes’s concerns with “simplicity” was to reduce complex phenomenato their simplest components, that is, the general laws that allow one toexplain them.28

The third rule, however, does not concem only the explanation orjustification of descriptions of complex states of affairs; it also advises us todirect our “thoughts in an orderly manner . . . supposing some order evenamong objects that have no natural order of precedence.” What does thismean? Even as early as Rule Five of the Regulae Descartes emphasizes theextreme importance of this question of order:

The whole method consists entirely in the ordering and arranging ofthe objects on which we must concentrate our mind’s eye if we are todiscover some truth. We shall be following this method exactly if wefirst reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step tosimpler ones, and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest onesof all, try to ascend through the same steps to a knowledge of all therest.

(AT 10: 379, CSM 1: 20, Descartes’s emphasis)

Rule Five contains elements found in both the second and third rules of theDiscourse. As we noted in looking at the second rule, one must attend toelements of a problem with an eye to discovering simple (eternal) truths.Once these are discovered and recognized as (materially) true, one canengage in deductions that yield certainty. The order to which Descarteshere alludes is the same we found in Pappus’ discussion of an analysis andits proof: one first discovers general principles, then one makes deductionsfrom those principles (in Hintikka and Remes 1974: 8–9). This order, Descartesstresses time and again, is at the heart of his method (see AT 10: 451, 6: 21,7: 155; CSM 1: 64, 1: 121, 2: 110).

Questions remain, however, since Descartes calls us to suppose “someorder even among objects that have no natural order of precedence” (AT 6:18–19, CSM 1: 120). If all knowledge is either knowledge of eternal truths orknowledge based on deductions from eternal truths, what does Descartesmean when he suggests that one suppose an order among objects havingno natural order of precedence?

A complete answer to this question will lead us into issues pertinent tothe fourth rule of the Discourse, namely the rule of enumeration, but wemight make some initial distinctions. We have already noticed that Descartes,

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like many of his predecessors, draws a distinction between the order ofconsideration and the order of epistemic priority (order of nature). In thethird rule, he is concerned with an epistemic ordering: an ordering fromthings that are clear and evident (first principles) to things that are less clear.One can clearly and distinctly conceive of characteristics of real objectsthat are inseparable in nature, and it is the fact that these characteristics aremore clearly conceived that entails that they are prior in the order ofknowledge: they will allow one to explain why real objects are as they appearto be.

But Descartes does not merely tell us that an epistemic order exists thatis distinct from the order of nature, he tells us to suppose an order. As wehave already seen, supposition plays a significant role in his account ofanalysis: one supposes a principle to justify a proposition or explain aphenomenon. In other words one takes such a principle as a hypothesis,and a necessary condition for accepting the supposition is that one candeduce from it a statement that one knows (or believes) to be true. If thededuction is possible, this establishes a logical coherence between one’sbeliefs and suppositions. Nor does the order require using the suppositionof principles only with respect to explaining or justifying singular claims.The method requires an ordered progression of increasingly generalsuppositions, each being introduced to explain a “fact,” which was asupposition in a lower level of analysis. As Descartes notes in Regulae RuleFifteen:

Again, we should realize that, with the aid of the unit we have adopted,it is sometimes possible completely to reduce continuous magnitudesto a set and that this can always be done partially at least. The set ofunits can then be arranged in such an order that the difficulty involvedin discerning a measure becomes simply one of scrutinizing the order.The greatest advantage of our ordering lies in this progressive ordering.

(AT 10: 452, CSM 1: 65)

In analysis, one seeks continually more general propositions that will allowone to explain or justify claims of greater particularity, what Descartes callsmore complex claims. While analysis moves upward towards more generalprinciples, the deductive or synthetic phase proves the analysis, showingthat the more complex (less general) claims follow deductively from theprogressively more general principles one discovers during the analyticphase.29

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But given Descartes’s remarks on epistemic priority, this impliessomething else. While the first principles might be best known, that is,epistemically primary, they are discovered by analysis. The analysis is basedon either things that are already known in some other way, perhaps by aprevious analysis–synthesis movement or on the basis of sense experience.Hence, analysis itself requires that one draw a distinction between the orderof epistemic priority and the order of consideration, that is, the order inwhich the analyst actually brings propositions before his or her mind. Hence,a factual statement known on the basis of sense experience which providesthe basis for the analysis – which describes a phenomenon to be explained– might be first in the order of consideration, even though one can claim toknow that the phenomenon is true only after one has discovered a generalprinciple under which it can be subsumed. In analysis, though not insynthesis, the order of consideration is generally the mirror image of theorder of epistemic priority.

So the third rule of the Discourse shows both that supposition plays asignificant role in the method and that the justification of a less general orsingular claim requires a deduction from a more general claim which is knownby the natural light. But this still does not tell us how epistemically basicprinciples are discovered. To understand this, we must turn to the fourthrule of the Discourse.

The final rule reads:

And the last, throughout to make enumerations so complete, and reviewsso comprehensive, that I could be sure of leaving nothing out.

(AT 6: 19, CSM 1: 120)

What does Descartes mean by “enumeration”? To what kinds of “reviews”is he alluding?

To give an “enumeration” is little more than to give a list. It is in thissense that Descartes generally uses “enumeration” in Of the Passions of theSoul, where he merely lists of the principal passions (see AT 11: 372, 379,443, 485; CSM 1: 349, 352, 383, 402; see also AT 10: 395, CSM 1: 29). But sucha minimal sense tells one little. To gain a better understanding of the role ofenumeration, we may turn to the Regulae.

In Rule Seven of the Regulae, Descartes remarks:

In order to make our knowledge complete, every single thing relatingto our undertaking must be surveyed in a continuous and wholly

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uninterrupted sweep of thought, and be included in a sufficient andwell-ordered enumeration.

(AT 10: 387, CSM 1: 25, Descartes’s emphasis)

His subsequent discussion focuses on “truths which . . . are not deducedimmediately from first and self-evident truths” (AT 10: 387, CSM 1: 25). Anenumeration is “an inference drawn from many disconnected facts” (AT 10:407, CSM 1: 37). Enumerations clearly include cases of long deductivearguments, in which one must bring numerous premises and sub-conclusionsbefore one’s mind. In such cases Descartes recommends that one go overthe argument often enough that memory plays little or no role in seeing theevidence of the conclusion (AT 10: 387–8, CSM 1: 25). However, it seemslikely that by “enumeration” Descartes means more than the careful listingof one’s premises.

Descartes provides some insight into the meaning of “enumeration” laterin his discussion of Rule Seven. He writes:

In this context enumeration, or induction, consists in a thoroughinvestigation of all the points relating to the problem at hand, aninvestigation which is so careful and accurate that we may concludewith manifest certainty that we have not inadvertently overlookedanything.

(AT 10: 388–9, CSM 1: 25–6)

Notice that what Descartes says here ties in nicely with the second rule ofthe Discourse, namely that a problem should be divided into its severalparts. If one enumerates or lists all the elements of the problem, one will not“inadvertently overlook anything.” For one’s enumeration to be complete,one must list all the elements of the problem. In the case of a long deductiveargument, one might take this as listing all the premises and sub-conclusionsof the argument. But Descartes’s point seems more general. One must becertain that one has considered all the aspects of the problem or difficultyunder consideration. The issue is “inductive,” in a modern sense of thatterm, Insofar as, apart from the enumeration of the premises and sub-conclusions of a deductive argument, there might always remain somemodicum of doubt that one has enumerated (listed) all aspects of the problem.

Some evidence for this lingering doubt about enumerations may be borneout in Descartes’s discussion of an enumeration sufficient to show that therational soul is not an element of a corporeal substance. In his words:

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42 Descartes’s method

The enumeration should sometimes be complete, and sometimesdistinct, though there are times when it need be neither. That is why Isaid only that the enumeration must be sufficient. For if I wish to determineby enumeration how many kinds of corporeal entity there are or howmany are in some way perceivable by the senses, I shall not assert thatthere are just so many and no more, unless I have previously made sureI have included them all in my enumeration and have distinguished onefrom another. But if I wish to show in the same way that the rational soulis not corporeal, there is no need for the enumeration to be complete; itwill be sufficient if I group all bodies together into several classes so asto demonstrate that the rational soul cannot be assigned to any ofthese.

(AT 10: 390, CSM 1: 26–7)

To base a conclusion on a complete enumeration would require that oneconsider every case of a certain kind of thing. For example, to show that allpresently existing ravens are black, one would need to examine all instancesof ravens. But insofar as classes of things are divisible into kinds, Descartessuggests that if one provides an enumeration of all the kinds of corporealsubstances, it is sufficient to examine the question whether or nor the rationalsoul is corporeal with respect to each kind of corporeal substance. One’sreview of the kinds of corporeal substances must be undertaken with greatcare to assure that no kinds of corporeal substance have been omitted.Since the incompleteness of one’s reviews always looms as a possibility,the certainty of one’s conclusion is relative to the enumeration: one mightshow on the basis of deductions from first principles that the rational soul isnot a corporeal substance of any of the kinds listed, but the possibilityremains that one’s enumeration (list) is incomplete.30

But if an enumeration is fundamentally a list, what kinds of things arelisted, and how are these lists used? Some guidance can be obtained byrecalling that Descartes distinguished among five types of problems tosolve: “seeking to derive [1] things from words, or [2] causes from effects, or[3] effects from causes, or [4] a whole from parts or [5] parts from other parts,or several of these at once” (AT 10: 433, CSM 1: 53). If one keeps this list inmind and looks at some examples, one might develop an understanding ofthe several different activities that are placed under the heading of“enumeration.”

In Regulae, Rules Seven and Eleven, Descartes is concerned with findingthe relationship between two magnitudes, e.g. A and E, for which a number

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of intermediate magnitudes exist, A and B, B and C, and C and D. To find therelationship between A and E, one begins with a listing of the componentparts. Next, one intuits the relations among the various parts of the whole.Finally, one recombines the various parts in coming to know the relationbetween the magnitudes that constitute the whole. Here, and in any case ofseeking a whole from parts, the enumeration with which one begins is anenumeration of parts. In seeking causes from effects – where “cause” isconstrued broadly to include such things as the key to an encoded message– the enumeration is a list of hypotheses, e.g. possible keys to the code (seeAT 404–5, CSM 1: 35–6; cf. P 4: 205). This is an enumeration of possiblecauses. Since only one cause can be responsible for the effect, one dealswith the enumeration by elimination, as Descartes does in the passagequoted above on corporeal substances and the rational soul.

Insofar as one can allude to a methodologically fundamental sense of“enumeration,” we believe this is either first, an enumeration of causalhypotheses with an eye to eliminating those that fail to explain, or second,an enumeration of elements of a thing with an eye to eliminating the inessentialones.31 Descartes suggests this at the end of Rule Thirteen when he writes:

The only thing worth doing, then, in our view is to scrutinize in dueorder all the factors given in the problem at hand, to dismiss thosewhich we plainly see are irrelevant to the issue, to hold onto thosewhich are essential, and to submit the doubtful ones to a more carefulexamination.

(AT 10:438, CSM 1:56)

We shall see that Descartes commonly practiced this sense of enumerationthroughout the Meditations.

Analysis and the best explanation

In Section 1 of this chapter, we suggested that the Cartesian method is to beconstrued in terms of providing an inference to the best explanation.32 Inthis section we summarize the conclusions we have reached by delineatingthe criteria Descartes used to deem an explanation “best.”

Philosophers of science who defend inference to the best explanation asthe ground for theory confirmation differ from proponents of a hypothetical–deductive theory of confirmation primarily in terms of their greater emphasis

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44 Descartes’s method

on the theoretical virtues of simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power.33

It is primarily a set of criteria used to choose between alternative theoreticalaccounts of a given phenomenon. We have seen that Descartes appeals tothe simplicity of his explanations relative to those of the Scholastics as aground for his explanations’ acceptability and, at the least, this providesprima facie evidence that he favored inference to the best explanation. Twofurther points also support our conclusion. First, he included alternativehypotheses among the things enumerated in his attempts to explain a givenphenomenon, and second, he provided grounds for eliminating all but oneof those hypotheses.

There can be little question that Descartes accepted a deductive–nomological model of explanation: it is by deducing a description of aphenomenon from a law of nature that one proves the analysis that led tothe discovery of that law. Hence, the deducibility of a description of aphenomenon to be explained is a necessary condition for an explanation tobe deemed “best,” but it is not a sufficient condition. In addition, the generalprinciple that provides the basis for the explanation must be known by thenatural light, that is, it must have at least an initial plausibility.34 Further, asis suggested by the use of the conclusions reached in the Optics in providingexplanations in the Meteorology, Descartes places considerable emphasison the coherence and systematization of the conclusions he reaches.35

Finally, the systematization and the analytic search for increasingly generalprinciples points to the explanatory power of his approach.36

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2 AnalysisThe clarification of ideas

If Descartes chooses analysis as his method, then analysis applies equallyto all types of inquiry. In the last chapter we discussed how analysisproceeded in the search for natural laws. Since clear and distinct ideasrepresent the essences of things (AT 7: 78, CSM 2: 54), and since “accordingto the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anythinguntil we first understand its essence” (AT 7: 107–8, CSM 2: 78), a clear anddistinct idea is prior in the epistemic order to any judgments one might makeregarding the existence of a thing of a specific kind. Thus the method ofanalysis is germane to finding clear and distinct ideas, or, as we shall show,how ideas are clarified.

Since most commentators identify clear and distinct ideas with innateideas, and many commentators hold that all innate ideas are true (Copleston1960: 93; Jones 1969: 182; Ree 1974: 142–3; Clarke 1982: 53ff.; Flage 1985:165, 174, 176; Van De Pitt 1985b: 363–84; Carriero 1986: 205; Stumpf 1988:241; Edelberg 1990: 493–533 passim; cf. Hausman and Hausman 1997), webegin by delineating our position on innate ideas.1 We show that no textualevidence exists to support what we call “the epistemic thesis,” that is, thethesis that all innate ideas are (materially) true and known to be true as soonas they are considered. Next, we describe the role of analysis in theclarification of ideas. Finally, we turn to the Optics as a case study: we showhow Descartes clarifies the idea of light.

Are all innate ideas materially true?

Any complete examination of Cartesian innate ideas must address two issues.First, there is the metaphysical issue, namely, what is the nature of an innateidea? Is an innate idea a nonoccurrent actual idea or is it merely a disposition

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46 Descartes’s method

to form such an idea under a specifiable set of circumstances? Second, isthe epistemic thesis true?

While we have argued elsewhere that the textual evidence supports adispositional account of the nature of innate ideas, the second question isof primary relevance to questions regarding the Cartesian method.2 In thissection we argue that no unambiguous texts support the epistemic thesis.Moreover, even assuming the truth of the epistemic thesis, its philosophicalpurpose remains a mystery. We conclude this section by arguing thatCartesian innate ideas explain only how concepts are formed.

Before inspecting the textual evidence for the epistemic thesis, we mustdistinguish this from two other issues regarding innate ideas. First, somemaintain that Descartes distinguishes between two senses of ‘innate ideas’,a broader sense pertaining to all nonoccurrent ideas, and a narrower sensethat pertains only to the ideas of God, self, extension, and eternal truths(Clarke 1982: 48–58; see AT 8B: 358–9, CSM 1: 304). If one draws such adistinction, the epistemic thesis pertains solely to the narrower sense of‘innate idea’, and we use the expression “innate ideas” in the narrow sensethroughout this chapter. Second, since Descartes held that eternal truthsreside within the mind (P 1: 49), we shall assume that some innate ideas haveeternal truths as their objects.3 Given these points, we may now peruse theevidence for the epistemic thesis.

Although many commentators accept the epistemic thesis, little attempthas been made to provide a precise formulation for it. Consequently, onemight take the epistemic thesis to assert (a) that the class of innate ideascoextends with the class of clear and distinct ideas, whether such acoextension is necessary or contingent, or (b) that all innate ideas are trueregardless of their clarity or distinctness.4 Given either (a) or (b), one couldinfer that an idea is true from its innateness. Our question is whether sufficientevidence exists to show that either assertion is true. In examining the severaldiscussions of the relationship between an idea’s innateness and its truth,we show that while Descartes consistently claims that all true ideas areinnate, he does not unequivocally claim that all innate ideas are true.

In his early writings, Descartes often claimed that “We have within us thesparks of knowledge, as in a flint” (Olympian Matters: AT 10: 217, CSM 1: 4),or that “The human mind has within it a sort of spark of the divine, in whichthe first seeds of useful ways of thinking are sown” (Regulae: AT 10: 373,CSM 1: 17), or that there are “certain primary seeds of truth naturallyimplanted in human minds” (Regulae: AT 10: 376, CSM 1: 18; see alsoDiscourse: AT 6: 64, CSM 1: 144). Since these “sparks” or “seeds” might be

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understood as innate ideas, does this provide evidence that all innate ideasare true?

No. At most it shows that some innate ideas are true, and given hismetaphorical presentation, any stronger claim is far from obvious. Thepassage from the Olympian Matters (AT 10: 217, CSM 1: 4) contains anambiguity on just this point. The “sparks of knowledge” might be innateideas or simply abilities to obtain knowledge, however one explains thelatter. Furthermore, the first passage from the Regulae suggests that theprinciples of the Cartesian method, not innate ideas of essences or eternaltruths, constitute the “spark of the divine” (AT 10: 373, CSM 1: 17). As thepassage continues, Descartes celebrates his method’s usefulness inproducing arithmetic and geometry as areas of human knowledge. Heremarks, “These two disciplines are simply the spontaneous fruits whichhave sprung from the innate principles of this method” (AT 10: 373, CSM 1:17). If the principles of the method are innate, these principles might be“innate ideas,” but they differ in content from what one ordinarily takesDescartes’s innate ideas to be.

Similarly, even ifone takes the “seeds of truth” in the Regulae (AT 10:376, CSM 1: 18) and the Discourse (AT 6: 64, CSM 1: 143–4) to denotesomething more like conventional Cartesian innate ideas, both passagesindicate that one knows these “seeds of truth” by the “natural light” or the“light of the mind” (AT 10: 376, CSM 1: 18). In the passage from the Discourse,for example, Descartes indicates that he:

tried to discover in general the principles or first causes of everythingthat exists or can exist in the world. To this end I considered nothingbut God alone, who created the world; and I derived these principlesonly from certain seeds of truth which are naturally in our souls.

(AT 6: 64, CSM 1: 143–4)

The allusion to “principles” suggests his concern is with principles knownby the natural light, principles which, in the Meditations, allow him to provethe existence of God (see AT 7: 40-1, CSM 2: 28).5

Hence, the ambiguities in the early writings leave open the question ofwhat is meant by “seeds of truth.” They might be innate ideas as understoodin his later works. They might be the principles of the method. Or they mighteven be the natural light or what the natural light discovers. Given theseambiguities, one cannot claim that the early works clearly support the claimthat all innate ideas are true.

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In the Meditations, the Replies, and the Principles, Descartes explicitlyuses the expression ‘innate ideas,’ and he indicates that ideas are innate ifthey are neither adventitious nor factitious (AT 7: 37–8, CSM 2: 26).6 Inthese later works he indicates that, once one lays aside “the preconceivedopinions acquired from the senses,” one can “make use of the intellectalone, carefully attending to the ideas implanted in it by nature” (P 2: 3). Inexamining the passages from the Meditations and Replies, we again askwhether he claims that all innate ideas are true, or merely that all true ideasare innate.

Two passages in the Fifth Meditation might shed light on the epistemicthesis. In the first, Descartes comments on quantity and extension. Heremarks:

Not only are all these things very well known and transparent to mewhen regarded in this general way, but in addition there are countlessparticular features regarding shape, number, motion and so on, which Iperceive when I give them my attention. And the truth of these mattersis so open and so much in harmony with my nature, that on firstdiscovering them it seems that I am not so much learning somethingnew as remembering what I knew before; or it seems like noting for thefirst time things which were long present within me although I hadnever turned my mental gaze on them.

(AT 7: 63-4, CSM 2: 44)

Although Descartes fails to mention innate ideas in this paragraph, hisconcern centers on innate ideas of extension and the essences of extendedthings. This concern manifests itself in the following paragraph when heclaims, “I find within me countless ideas of things which even though theymay not exist anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing” (AT 7: 64,CSM 2: 44), and he goes on to discuss the nature of triangularity. Oneshould notice two points regarding the passage quoted. First, he limits hisattention to a number of kinds of idea, so the passage can provide no strongevidence that all innate ideas are true. Second, while “the truth of thesematters is . . . open and . . . in harmony with my nature,” the recognition ofthat truth is not simply a function of forming the ideas; it occurs only uponattending to them. This concern with attention suggests that recognizingideas as true requires more than a mere awareness of them (see also AT 7: 73,CSM 2: 51). What more could this be? Presumably, in attending to an idea,

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the natural light yields understanding or the recognition of truth. If so, thenthe fact that an idea is innate appears to bear little or no epistemic importance.

In the second passage Descartes contrasts the idea of God with ideas offigures inscribed in circles. He notes:

I cannot even imagine [that the class of figures that can be inscribed ina circle includes the class of all quadrilaterals], so long as I am willing toadmit only what I clearly and distinctly understand. So there is a greatdifference between this kind of false supposition and the true ideasthat are innate in me, of which the first and most important is the idea ofGod. There are many ways in which I understand that this idea [of God]is not something fictitious which is dependent on my thought, but animage of a true and immutable nature. First of all, there is the fact that,apart from God, there is nothing else of which I am capable of thinkingsuch that existence belongs to its essence. Second, I cannot understandhow there could be two or more Gods of this kind; and after supposingthat one God exists, I plainly see that it is necessary that he has existedfrom eternity and will abide for eternity. And finally, I perceive manyother attributes of God, none of which I can remove or alter.

(AT 7: 86, CSM 2: 47)

This passage is interesting for several reasons. First, it shows that someinnate ideas are true, and it might be taken to show that all true ideas areinnate. Second, and more importantly, it shows that even if one grants thatthe idea of God is innate, as Descartes already did in the Third Meditation(AT 7: 51, CSM 2: 35), nothing interesting follows from that fact. Given thathe provides reasons why the idea of God must be understood as an idea ofa true and immutable nature, rather than a fictitious idea, the passage suggestseither that (a) one cannot know that the idea of God qua innate idea is anidea of an immutable nature, or that (b) no incontrovertible mark of innateideas exists. If it shows (a), the passage is a counter-example to the epistemicthesis. If it shows (b), then even if the epistemic thesis is true, innatenesscannot function as a criterion of truth.

While Descartes provides several discussions of innate ideas in theReplies, few are relevant to the epistemic thesis. In several of his discussions,he argues that the only way to explain the possibility of having an idea ofGod is that God caused that innate idea within us (see AT 7: 105–6, 133;CSM 2: 77, 96). In another discussion he explains how it is possible to forman idea of a geometrical figure on the basis of innate ideas (AT 7: 381–2,

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50 Descartes’s method

CSM 2: 262).7 The sole remark that might imply the epistemic thesis is theclaim that “My principal aim has always been to draw attention to certainvery simple truths which are innate in our minds, so that as they are pointedout to others, they will consider that they have always known them” (AT 7:464, CSM 2: 312). Here again, the most this remark reveals is that all trueideas are innate; it does not show that all innate ideas are true.

Thus, Descartes’s major philosophical works provide little evidence thathe accepted the thesis that all innate ideas are true; at most they show heaccepted the thesis that all true ideas are innate.

But the proponent of the epistemic thesis might contend that inDescartes’s correspondence there is evidence for that thesis. In the letter toMersenne of 16 June 1641, for example, he draws the distinction betweenadventitious, factitious, and innate ideas, commenting of the last that “othersare innate, such as the idea of God, mind, body, triangle, and in general allthose which represent true immutable and eternal essences” (AT 3: 383,CSM 3: 183). In the letter to Hyperaspistes of August 1641, he remarks:

Nonetheless, it [the mind] has in itself the ideas of God, itself, and allsuch truths as are called self-evident, in the same way as adult humanshave when they are not attending to them; it does not acquire theseideas later on, as it grows older. I have no doubt that if it were taken outof the prison of the body it would find them within itself.8

(AT 3: 423–4, CSM 3: 190; see also AT 5: 146, 149–50;CB §1 and §9: AT 5:146 and 149–50,

CSM 3: 332–3 and 336–7)

Notice that in both letters Descartes claims that one has innate ideas ofimmutable natures, but neither letter implies that the class of innate ideascoextends with the class of ideas of immutable natures or that all innateideas are materially true.

Thus, the textual evidence we have considered to this point does notprove that Descartes embraced the epistemic thesis: it might prove that hebelieved that all true ideas are innate, but it does not prove that he believedthat all innate ideas are true. In turning to one final piece of textual evidencewe find not only insufficient evidence for the truth of the epistemic thesis,but evidence for the falsity of or confusion in the epistemic thesis itself.

In the letter to Mersenne of 16 October 1639, Descartes comments on theaccount of innate ideas Herbert of Cherbury developed in De Veritate. He

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notes that Lord Herbert devoted considerable space to the nature of truth,and takes common consent as the mark of the true and innate. Descartesthen contrasts his own position with that of Herbert. He writes:

The author takes universal consent as the criterion of his truths; whereasI have no criterion for mine except the light of nature. The two criteriaagree in part: for since all men have the same natural light, it seems thatthey should have the same notions; but there is also a great differencebetween them, because hardly anyone makes good use of that light ofnature, so that many people – perhaps all those we know – may consentto the same error. Also there are many things which can be known bythe light of nature, but which no one has yet reflected on.

(AT 2: 597–8, CSM 3: 139)

Notice the contrast between Herbert and Descartes. Herbert held that alltrue ideas are innate and that one can recognize their truth on the ground ofcommon consent. While Herbert of Cherbury might have held that all innateidea are true, Descartes seems to divorce the question of innateness fromthe question of truth: neither the fact that an idea is innate nor the fact thateveryone accepts the idea as true provides evidence for its truth. Descartesclaims that one can know the truth of an idea only by means of the naturallight.9

Descartes goes on to indicate that Herbert conflates two senses of‘instinct’:

He recommends especially that one should follow natural instinct, fromwhich he derives his common notions. For my part, I distinguish twokinds of instinct. One is in us qua men, and is purely intellectual: it isthe light of nature or eye of the mind, to which alone I think one shouldtrust. The other belongs to us qua animals, and is a certain impulse ofnature toward the preservation of our body, towards the enjoyment ofbodily pleasures and so on. This should not always be followed.

(AT 2: 599, CSM 3: 140)

In the Third Meditation Descartes distinguishes between the two kinds ofnatural instincts that Lord Herbert conflated. Alluding to the passivity ofperception and one’s inclination to believe that the world is as one sensiblyperceives it, Descartes comments:

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52 Descartes’s method

When I say ‘Nature taught me to think this’, all I mean is that aspontaneous impulse leads me to believe it, not that its truth has beenrevealed to me by the natural light. There is a big difference here.Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light – for example that fromthe fact that I am doubting it follows that I exist, and so on – cannot inany way be open to doubt. This is because there cannot be anotherfaculty both as trustworthy as the natural light and also capable ofshowing me that such things are not true. But as for my natural impulses,I have often judged in the past that they were pushing me in the wrongdirection when it was a question of choosing the good, and I do not seewhy I should place greater confidence in them in other matters.

(AT 7: 38–9, CSM 2: 26–7)

Consistent throughout Descartes’s works is the theme that perceptionsknown by the natural light are true and that such perceptions are clear anddistinct (cf. AT 7: 15, 192, CSM 2: 11, 135; AT 10: 368, CSM 1: 14; P 1: 11, 18,20, 28, 44, 3: 1). Neither Descartes’s distinction between two kinds of instinctnor his remarks on the natural light, however, provide support for the epistemicthesis. Indeed, the considerations of the natural light tend to suggest thatquestions of one’s knowledge of the material truth or falsehood of an ideaare independent of considerations of the innateness or noninnateness of anidea, for one would assume that Descartes offers his method to help placethe mind in the appropriate state for the natural light to illuminate the truth.10

Thus, after considering the textual evidence, we find no reason toconclude that Descartes embraced the epistemic thesis.

One should not find it terribly surprising that the textual evidence fails tosupport the epistemic thesis, for if it did Descartes’s epistemology would beriddled with redundancy. On the side of objects of thought, it isunquestionable that he held that clear and distinct ideas are (materially) true(see AT 6: 33, 38, 7: 35; 9B: 9; CSM 1: 127, 130, 183, 2: 24; P 1: 30, 43). On theside of the mind, the natural light is the faculty of discerning truth (see P 1:30). Had he also accepted the epistemic thesis, claims of innateness wouldhave fulfilled no epistemic purpose that the criterion of clarity and distinctnessand the natural light did not already fulfill. Further, it would have broughtadditional epistemic problems in its wake. Were one to claim that all innateideas are true, and were that contention to carry any epistemic weight, thenthere would have to be grounds for knowing that some particular idea isinnate, rather than adventitious or factitious. But what could those grounds

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be? In the Third Meditation, Descartes’s sole reason for claiming the idea ofGod is innate is that innateness alone will explain how one can have anoccurrent idea of God (AT 7: 51, CSM 2: 35), and this hardly constitutes asufficient reason for claiming that the idea itself is true. Further, even if theproofs of God’s existence rest upon the clarity and distinctness of the ideaof God, the presupposition of that idea’s innateness would contributenothing of epistemic significance to those proofs. Similarly, with regard tothe eternal truths “which have no existence outside our thought” (P 1: 48:AT 8A: 22, CSM 1: 208), Descartes finds it epistemically sufficient to claimthat one immediately recognizes them as true by the natural light: theirinnateness need play no epistemic role in such a judgment.

The proponent of the epistemic thesis might contend that if any innateideas are materially false, then God would be a deceiver. How would such anargument go? Error, properly so called, does not occur at the level of ideas;rather, it occurs at the level of judgment, within the domain of formal, notmaterial, truth and falsity.11 A charge of divine deception would seemwarranted only if an idea is clear and distinct but (materially) false, butDescartes identifies materially false ideas solely with obscure or confusedideas (AT 7: 232–5, CSM 2: 162–4). Further, the distinction between clearand distinct, and obscure and confused ideas is exclusive and exhaustive.Were one to contend that Cartesian innate ideas are ideas that one cannotbut believe to be (materially) true, one begs the question, for only clear anddistinct ideas are indubitable (see AT 7: 69, CSM 2: 48). Any weaker versionof the thesis claiming deception on the basis of a mere tendency to believeis inconsistent with the entire Cartesian project. Hence, one lacksphilosophical grounds for interpreting Descartes as an adherent of epistemicthesis.12

To this point we have argued that no textual or philosophical argumentsufficiently warrants the conclusion that Descartes embraced the epistemicthesis. But if innate ideas play no epistemic role in his philosophy, why werethey introduced? We suggest that they play nothing more than anexplanatory role. As we have noted, he claims that the idea of God is innatebecause one, we have such an idea, and two, the fact that we have such anidea cannot be accounted for through either experience or a recombinationof adventitious ideas. If the idea of God is a paradigmatic innate idea, onewill recognize that the same explanatory value of the doctrine of innate ideasholds vis-à-vis the entire class of innate ideas.

The class of innate ideas contains at least ideas of essences and ideas ofgeneral principles (eternal truths). Each of these is an idea one has on various

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occasions. If Descartes assigned an ontological status to either generalproperties or general facts, then there would be grounds for claiming thatone perceives general properties, for example, in perceiving particularproperties. But one has reason to doubt that such general properties(universals) and general facts have any status in his ontology. In discussing“How universals arise,” he writes:

These universals arise solely from the fact that we make use of one andthe same idea for thinking of all individual items which resemble eachother: we apply one and the same term to all the things which arerepresented by the idea in question, and this is the universal term.When we see two stones, for example, and direct our attention not totheir nature but merely to the fact that there are two of them, we form theidea of the number which we call “two”; and when we later see twobirds or two trees, and consider not their nature but merely the fact thatthere are two of them, we go back to the same idea as before. This, then,is the universal idea; and we always designate the number in questionby the same universal term “two”. In the same way, when we see afigure made up of three lines, we form an idea of it which we call the ideaof a triangle; and we later make use of it as a universal idea, so as torepresent to our mind all the other figures made up of three lines.

(P 1: 59: AT 8a: 27–8, CSM 1: 212–13)

This paragraph is reminiscent of Locke’s account of abstraction (1975: 409–20), although the operative mechanism differs in Descartes’s account. Insteadof abstracting from experience, Descartes’s innate ideas provide the basisfor the formation of more general ideas. Descartes makes precisely thispoint in his reply to Gassendi: it is the fact that one has an innate idea of atriangle that allows one to recognize a crude, particular figure drawn onpaper as a triangle (AT 7: 381–2, CSM 2: 262). While all existents might beparticulars, the doctrine of innate ideas at least allows one to explain howone can have ideas of general properties (essences).

The mechanism just described extends to the formation of generalprinciples as well. There are indubitably occasions on which one considersgeneral propositions such as “It is impossible for the same thing to be andnot be” or “Whatever thinks, exists” (see P 1: 49). How can one do this? Ifone has innate ideas of eternal truths, this provides the needed explanation.

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But even though Descartes claims that the unprejudiced mind cannot butassent to eternal truths when considered, this does not entail that therecognition of their truth is a function of their innateness. Presumably hiscelebrated causal maxim that “there must be at least as much <reality> in theefficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause” (AT 7: 40, CSM 2: 28)is an eternal truth. Since that maxim is “manifest by the natural light” (AT 7:40, CSM 2: 28), one may reasonably assume that the same can be saidregarding all eternal truths. If so, then the grounds for deeming a propositiontrue are distinct from questions of its innateness.

If Descartes divorces epistemic considerations from questions ofinnateness, then the sole function of Cartesian innate ideas is to explainhow we can form general ideas. If this is so, then such innate ideas will allowone to explain all one’s general beliefs, both true and false. For example, onthe basis of an innate idea one can explain the possibility of forming the ideacorresponding to the general proposition, “The material world is exactly asit appears to the senses,” a proposition whose falsity the light of reasonrecognizes. Further, if one divorces questions of the truth of an idea fromquestions of innateness, that is, if questions of truth are relegated solely tothe domains of the clarity and distinctness of ideas and the natural light,then his remark in the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet that there is asense in which even adventitious ideas are innate (AT 8B: 359, CSM 1: 304;see also AT 3: 417–18, CSM 3: 187) fits well with his better-known discussionsof innate ideas. Innate ideas allow one to explain how motions in the senseorgans can result in ideas of figures which fail to resemble the source ofthose motions, in the same way that they allow one to explain the formationof ideas of essences and general propositions. In both cases, the processthat allows one to explain concept formation is independent of questions oftruth and falsehood.

Thus, the evidence suggests that Cartesian innate ideas only explainhow it is possible to form occurrent ideas. We have seen that the textualevidence does not support the epistemic thesis that all innate ideas are true.If it did support that thesis, then Descartes would be saddled with theadditional epistemic problem of providing incontrovertible grounds fordistinguishing innate ideas from adventitious and factitious ideas. Nor doesthe rejection of the epistemic thesis raise the specter of a divine deceiver.Finally, if the doctrine of innate ideas plays only an explanatory role inDescartes’s philosophy, it throws light on his remark that, in a sense, allideas are innate (AT 8B: 358–9, CSM 2: 304).

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Clarifying ideas and the four rules of the Discourse

So far we have argued for three claims: one, that the doctrine of innate ideasonly explains how it is possible to form general ideas; two, that neithertextual nor philosophical grounds exist for claiming that all innate ideas arematerially true; and three, that the material truth of an idea – whether innateor otherwise – is recognized by the natural light. This third point wouldplace ideas on the same plane as general principles insofar as the naturallight recognizes both as true. Given these three claims, we may now considerthe four roles of the method enumerated in the Discourse and show how themethod operates to clarify ideas.

Through the natural light one recognizes the material truth of an idea: theclass of materially true ideas corresponds to the class of clear and distinctideas. If one makes no judgments except on the basis of clear and distinct(materially true) ideas, one complies with the first rule, namely, “never toaccept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth” (AT6: 18, CSM 1: 120). But as we observed in the last chapter, this is a cautionaryrule: it does not tell us how to discover or create ideas that are clear anddistinct.

The second rule, “to divide each of the difficulties I examined into asmany parts as possible and as may be required to resolve them better” (AT6: 18, CSM 1: 120), points to the relationship between the ideas one has andthe problem(s) one confronts. Ideas tell us what something is. The ideas weconsider go hand in hand with the problems we face. Assume we areconcerned with the nature of a human being, a task Descartes undertakes inMeditations Two and Six. We might raise a number of questions, for example,is a human being a simple or a composite? If it is a simple, what simple kindof thing is it? If it is a composite, of what simple kinds of things is a humancomposed? One attempts to form the relevant ideas. One enumerates thepossibilities (rule four) to see whether the natural light deems the proposedidea materially true. One analyzes each of the ideas – in the ordinary senseof taking them apart – to see whether the component ideas are clear anddistinct (materially true). One continues until such a point as the resultantideas are recognized as materially true by the natural light. Throughout theprocess, one’s inquiry is guided by questions such as, “What is this?”

The third rule concerns order: “to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner,by beginning with the simplest and most easily known [most general] objectsin order to ascend little by little, step by step, to knowledge of the mostcomplex” (AT 6: 18, CSM 1: 120). Once one completes the analysis, that is,

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once one has reduced one’s idea of an entity to its fundamental components,each of which is conceived clearly and distinctly, one looks for connectionsamong those ideas. As we show below, these are deductive relationshipsmuch like those we examined in Chapter One. Throughout this procedurethe natural light guides one’s intellect.

This call to order is not only constructive. Just as we noticed a distinctionbetween the order of epistemic priority and the order of consideration whenexamining natural laws, the same is found here. In the process of clarifyingan idea, one often begins with the ordinary (complex) notion and hones ituntil all the elements that remain are clearly conceived. For example, whenDescartes begins his inquiry into his own nature in Meditation Two, heasks, “What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man?” (AT6: 26, CSM 2: 17). His former ideas are first in the order of consideration.These ideas are analyzed (considered in terms of their elements, followingthe second rule), and with the guidance of the natural light, all but theirsimplest (most general, most clearly conceived) elements are rejected.

The fourth rule, “to make enumerations so complete, and reviews socomprehensive, that I could be sure of leaving nothing out” (AT 6: 19, CSM1: 120), plays two important roles in the clarification of ideas. First, as in thecase of principles, the rule often requires an enumeration (listing) ofhypotheses: alternative ideas of a thing of a specific kind. In his discussionof his idea of a human, for example, Descartes begins with the Aristoteliannotion of a human – a rational animal – rejects it, and turns to the alternativehypothesis that a human is a combination of body and soul (AT 6: 25–6,CSM 2: 17). Second, the rule calls for an enumeration of the elements thatconstitute the idea under consideration. As we show in Chapters Five andSix, this kind of enumeration is important, since it often provides the basisfor an argument by elimination (a complex disjunctive syllogism) in which,by the guidance of the natural light, inessential elements are eliminated. Atother points, such an enumeration provides the occasion on which the mindforms a more general idea of the essence of a thing of the kind in question.

This process is related to the doctrine of innate ideas. If an innate idea isa disposition to form an occurrent idea with a specific cognitive contentunder a specifiable set of conditions, then the analysis of an idea which isfirst in the order of consideration triggers a disposition to form an idea thatis earlier in the order of epistemic priority (is simpler), or the natural lightwhittles away the nonessential elements of the initial idea, leaving only thesimplest (most general) elements of the initial idea.13 These two processes

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might be called conceptual amplification and conceptual limitation(elimination). Descartes uses both processes in the Meditations.

It is one thing to show that a certain procedure is found in the Meditations;it something else to show that a certain procedure is an element of theCartesian method of analysis. If we have correctly interpreted the Cartesianmethod of analysis relative to ideas, then it should also appear in Descartes’sscientific writings. To illustrate, we examine his analysis of light in the Optics.

Descartes’s idea of light

Descartes devotes the first and second discourses of the Optics to honinghis concept of light. At the outset he delineates his procedure with respectto the development of his scientific conception of light:

Now since my only reason for speaking of light here is to explain howits rays enter into the eye, and how they may be deflected by thevarious bodies they encounter, I need not attempt to say what is its truenature. It will, I think, suffice if I use two or three comparisons in orderto facilitate that conception of light which seems most suitable forexplaining all those of its properties that we know through experienceand then for deducing all the others that we cannot observe so easily.In this I am imitating the astronomers, whose assumptions are almostall false or uncertain, but who nevertheless draw many very true andcertain consequences from them because they are related to variousobservations they have made.

(AT 6: 83, CSM 1: 152–3)

By likening his methodical approach to that of the astronomers, Descarteselucidates the idea of light. When astronomers reason about the sun or astar, they can consider two different ideas of the sun or a star. One is theimmediate sensory experience that one has when looking at the sun or a star,while the second is the idea one has after reasoning about that sensoryexperience.14 Thus, the “assumptions” spoken of here are the initial sensoryexperiences that we all have of astronomical phenomena. Descartes saysthat these ideas or sensory experiences are false. The true idea is the onewhich is the result of reasoning about the false idea.15 Like the astronomers,he starts from those initial sensory experiences of light and develops theidea of light through a process of reasoning.

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Descartes begins his analysis by considering three comparisons ormodels. These models do two things: first, they help elicit or draw ourattention to common experiences concerning light, and second, they helpus refine these common experiences into a geometrical notion. Part of hismethod requires an arrangement of his experiences of light through asufficient enumeration.16 The investigator’s problem or problems and thedegree of certainty required determine the nature of any particular sufficientenumeration. In this case Descartes wishes to explain how light enters theeye and, ultimately, how to grind lenses properly.17 With these purposes inmind, he enumerates the relevant experiences of light by examining his threemodels and achieves a more general account of the principles or propertiesof light through the use of mathematical and geometrical description.

How does Descartes draw attention to the relevant experiences of lightthat must be examined? There are three rough, but common kinds ofexperience that people have of light: first, light moves in a straight line;second, it emanates from one luminous body and lands on one or morebodies; and third, it is deflected (reflected or refracted) or completely absorbedby bodies.18 Each of Descartes’s models is clearly intended to draw attentionto certain common experiences of light. But this is just the first step. The realwork consists of taking these ideas of commonly observed behaviors oflight and using the models to amplify (draw out) other properties and refinethem into an adequate geometrical account of light.19 Descartes believesthat the final, geometrical idea will still be related to these initial ideas, sincethe geometrical idea of light is merely a refinement of the initial ideas. Let ussee how he moves from a commonsensical to a geometrical idea of light byexamining each of the three models.

The walking-stick model

Descartes starts with the model of the blind man’s walking-stick. This exampleevokes the idea that light moves in a straight line; however, this is not whatDescartes emphasizes.20 Notice how he establishes the analogy betweenthe walking-stick and our sensations of light:

In order to draw a comparison from this [the blind man’s walking-stick],I would have you consider the light in bodies we call ‘luminous’ to benothing other than a certain movement, or very rapid and lively action,

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which passes to our eyes through the medium of the air and othertransparent bodies, just as the movement, or resistance of the bodiesencountered by a blind man passes to his hand by means of his stick.

(AT 6: 84, CSM 1: 153)

Here Descartes points to the similarities between light and a blind person’suse of a walking-stick. Notice that the walking-stick does not represent lightitself; it represents the medium through which light passes, that is, air andtransparent bodies. He chooses this model to underscore his suppositionthat light is a mode of matter. It is the movement of matter between a luminousbody and the illuminated bodies (such as a human eye). Employing themodel in this way implicitly prohibits the Scholastics’ standard explanationof light in terms of intensional forms (intelligible species).21 Through a carefulexamination of the walking-stick model, Descartes also attempts to breakthe Scholastic urge to appeal to intensional forms by eliminating the theassumption of a resemblance between the light itself and our sensory ideasof light. No object need pass between a luminous body and an illuminatedbody.

Instead of using the first model to draw the conclusion that light movesin a straight line, Descartes emphasizes first, the instantaneous nature oflight, and second, light’s ability to traverse vast distances.22 He writes:

In the first place this [comparison] will prevent you from finding itstrange that this light can extend its rays instantaneously from the sunto us. For you know that the action by which we move one end of astick must pass instantaneously to the other end, and that the action ofthe light would have to pass from the heavens to the earth in the sameway, even though the distance in this case is much greater than thatbetween the ends of a stick.

(AT 6: 84–5, CSM 1: 153)

With the walking-stick model Descartes not only extends but refines theidea of light. Initially, the model represents light moving over relativelyshort distances, distances which can be taken in at one glance. He easilyconvinces us that the movement of light over relatively short distances isinstantaneous. In that case the walking-stick analogy is hardly stretched.However, when thinking about light from the heavens, the question whetherthe model still holds will naturally arise: maybe over short distances light

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only appears to move instantaneously because light moves very fast, andover longer distances light’s real non-instantaneous nature would showitself. Through the use of the model he implicitly removes the non-instantaneous hypothesis.23 His response that it is instantaneous even inthe case of vast distances represents an amplification of the concept oflight. Thus, distance is irrelevant to the movement of any particular ray oflight.24

The walking-stick model loses its explanatory purchase when one focuseson the medium rather than the movement through that medium. A walking-stick is not similar to air or transparent bodies. Hence, the model is limited.Being aware of this limitation (AT 6: 86, CSM 1: 154), Descartes introducesa model to help explain the medium that propogates the motion that is light.

The wine-vat model

Though the walking-stick model suggests that light is a straight-linephenomenon, the wine-vat model actually reveals this essential feature oflight. The three parts of the wine-vat passage help Descartes to clarifyfurther the idea of light. The first part provides the link between the experienceof light and the wine-vat model. The second establishes light as a straight-line phenomenon. The third elaborates on the propagation of light and howmuch light can be emitted from one source. We examine each part in turn.

First, Descartes establishes the relevant similarities between a wine vatand light. In constructing the analogy, he makes several assumptions whichelucidate the nature of light. He writes:

Consider a wine vat at harvest time, full to the brim with half-pressedgrapes, in the bottom of which we have made one or two holes throughwhich the unfermented wine can flow. Now we observe that, since thereis no vacuum in nature . . . and yet there are many pores in all the bodieswe perceive around us . . . it is necessary that these pores be filled withsome very subtle and very fluid matter, which extends withoutinterruption from the heavenly bodies to us. Now if you compare thissubtle matter with the wine in the vat, and compare the less fluid orcoarser part of the air and the other transparent bodies with the bunchesof grapes which are mixed in with the wine, you will understand thefollowing.

(AT 6: 86–7, CSM 1: 154)

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Descartes points to two similarities between the wine vat and light: one,the medium (transparent bodies or air) through which light is conveyed islike the liquid in the wine vat, and two, given that there is no vacuum, thetransparent bodies or air are like the grapes (whether crushed or not) in thevat. He tells us that light consists of the movement or action of the fine or“subtle” matter (movement or action of the liquid in the vat) found in thepores of bodies in the air or the bodies that constitute air.25 Thus, light inany form must be a mode of the substance through which it passes, since itis the motion or action of the fine or “subtle” substance found in the poresof bodies.

In the second part, Descartes establishes light as a straight-linephenomenon. Commenting on the model, he writes:

The parts of wine at one place tend to go down in a straight line throughone hole at the very instant it is opened, and at the same time throughthe other hole, without these actions being impeded by each other orby the resistance of the bunches of grapes in the vat. This happenseven though the bunches support each other and so do not tend in theleast to go down through the holes, as does the wine, and at the sametime they can even be moved in many other ways by the buncheswhich press upon them.

(AT 6: 87, CSM 1: 154)

Then he examines his perceptions of light and sees how the model helps toilluminate his experience:

In the same way, all the parts of the subtle matter in contact with theside of the sun facing us tend in a straight line towards our eyes at thevery instant they are opened, without these parts impeding each other,and even without their being impeded by the coarser parts of thetransparent bodies which lie between them. This happens whether thesebodies move in other ways – like the air which is almost always agitatedby some wind – or are motionless – like, say glass or crystal.

(AT 6: 87, CSM 1: 154–5)

One should recognize two points. First, the wine-vat models light as a straight,linear phenomenon. Second, the half-crushed grapes make explicit theassumption that the air between a light source and its destination is a

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continuous mass and that light is the movement of the mass between thetwo. Though Descartes recognizes that air is non-empty and that transparentbodies stand between the light source and its destination, he recognizesthat the subtle matter is impeded neither by these bodies nor by other subtlematter: air and the transparent bodies in air yield to the movement of themore subtle matter in the air.

In the third part of the passage, Descartes develops the wine-vat analogyby suggesting that at any particular point on the surface of the vat, the fluidhas a tendency to move towards both holes in the bottom. While this issuggested in the second part of the discussion of the wine-vat model, it isonly in the third part that he fully develops this property of light. He drawshis reader’s attention to this feature of the wine vat in the following way:

And note here that it is necessary to distinguish between the movementand the action or the tendency to move. For we may very easily conceivethat the parts of wine at one place should tend towards one hole and atthe same time towards the other, even though they cannot actuallymove towards both holes at the same time, and that they should tendexactly in a straight line towards one and towards the other, even thoughthey cannot move exactly in a straight line because of the grapes whichare between them.

(AT 6: 88, CSM 1: 155)

Then he draws the analogy to light:

In the same way, considering that the light of a luminous body must beregarded as being not so much its movement as its action, you mustthink of the rays of light as nothing other than the lines along whichthis action tends.

(AT 6: 88, CSM 1: 155)

In moving from the model to the phenomenon of light, Descartes emphasizesthe manner in which light is conveyed from its source to other surfaces. Hispoint is that any wine at a point on the surface of the vat will tend to movein a straight line toward both holes at the bottom of the vat.26 The same willhold of a light source. He distinguishes between the movement of the wineand its tendency to move because its tendency to move is much more akinto his experiences of light. Wine at a particular point on the vat will actually

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move toward one or the other holes in the bottom of the vat, but not both.But this is not how light works. If one looks at a candle on a table in thecenter of a room one notes that the candle actually emits light in all directions.Thus, the analogy between the wine vat and light must be understood interms of the tendency to move rather than the actual movement. 27

From the development of the analogy in the third part of this passage,Descartes discovers that a number of other properties of light follow.

Thus there is an infinity of such rays which come from all points of aluminous body towards all the points of the bodies it illuminates, justas you can imagine an infinity of straight lines along which the ‘actions’coming from all the points on the surface of the wine tend towards onehole, and an infinity of others along which the “actions” coming fromthe same points tend also towards the other hole, without either impedingthe other.

(AT 6: 88, CSM 1: 155)

Descartes extrapolates from the idea of the movement of wine along a straightline from one point on the surface of the wine vat towards a hole at thebottom to the movement of the wine along straight lines from an infinity(indefinitely large number) of points on the surface of the vat to a hole at thebottom; moreover, such an infinity of rays exists for every hole in the bottomof the vat.28 The same holds for a candle in a room. The number of rays thatwill fall on a point on an object in the room from the candle will be indefinite,given an indefinite number of points on the surface of the candle’s flame. Totake his analogy one step further we could also say that the number of raysfrom a given point on the candle’s flame extending to an object in the roomis also indefinite, so long as he willingly grants an indefinite number ofgeometrical points on the surface of an actual object.

We should notice how the wine-vat model moves from a commonexperience of the wine vat to a more purely geometrical discussion towardsthat passage’s end. Thus, he conceives of the indefinite number of lightrays in terms of multiplying the divisions of the points on the surface of thewine vat to arrive at indefinitely many movements from the top of the winevat to one of the holes (AT 5: 154, CSM 3: 339; CB §21: AT 5: 154, CSM 3:339).29 Even so, the conclusion that there are indefinitely many movementsfrom the surface of the wine vat to a hole goes beyond the observable to astrictly geometric consideration. Descartes begins with sensory experienceand amplifies it considerably.

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Through the wine-vat model, Descartes also has analyzed the nature oflight by breaking it down into first, its source, second, its destination, andthird, how it travels between the two. He has also broken down thephenomenon of a luminous body illuminating the whole of a surface at theend of the wine-vat passage. Thus he not only amplifies the concept oflight, he also analyzes the concept by using the wine vat as a model.

The tennis-ball example

Finally, Descartes discusses two other features of light: reflection andrefraction. In these cases he employs the motion of a tennis ball as it strikesa number of different surfaces. He begins by noting that light will passthrough a uniform transparent body in a straight line but that the behaviordiffers with respect to other sorts of bodies. Then he introduces the tennis-ball model.

But when they meet certain other bodies, they are liable to be deflectedby them, or weakened, in the same way that the movement of a ball orstone thrown into the air is deflected by the bodies it encounters. For itis very easy to believe that the action or tendency to move (which, Ihave said, should be taken for light) must in this respect obey the samelaws as motion itself. In order that I may give a complete account of thisthird comparison, consider that a ball passing through the air mayencounter bodies that are soft or hard or fluid.

(AT 6: 88–9, CSM 1: 155)

Descartes uses the tennis-ball analogy to model three different ways lightbehaves: light gets absorbed by objects, reflected by objects, and refractedby objects. These three behaviors result from coming into contact with soft,hard and fluid bodies, respectively. He has little to say about balls hittingsoft bodies, except that the ball ceases to move after hitting such a body.Later, when explaining the color of different surfaces, he suggests that blackbodies are the result of breaking up all of the light rays.30 He does not dwellon this at any length. This should not surprise us given that he wantedprimarily to understand the nature of vision in the Optics with an eye toproducing better lenses.

The phenomena of the reflection and refraction of light take center stageat the end of the First Discourse and through the Second Discourse. His

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account of the nature of light must explain these two kinds of behavior. Hegives a very general account of both phenomena at the end of the FirstDiscourse. One finds a more careful analysis of both in the Second Discourseand, by the end of the Second Discourse, we have the concept of lightwhich Descartes will confirm in his discussions of vision and lenses(Discourses Six through Ten).

Using the tennis-ball model, Descartes describes the phenomenon oflight reflection through observations of tennis balls bouncing off of hardsurfaces. He notes that a ball can bounce off a number of differently shapedhard surfaces.

[I]f they [bodies] are hard, they send the ball in another direction withoutstopping it, and they do so in many different ways. For their surfacemay be quite even and smooth, or rough and uneven; if even, either flator curved; if uneven, its unevenness may consist merely in its beingcomposed of many variously curved parts, each quite smooth in itself,or also in its having many different angles or points, or some partsharder than others, or parts which are moving (their movements beingvaried in a thousand imaginable ways).

(AT 6: 89, CSM 1: 155)

This is a list of the differently textured surfaces that affect the behavior of atennis ball when it strikes them. Descartes takes for granted that light reflectsin all of the same ways given the same sorts of surface only on a muchsmaller scale.

In returning to the phenomenon of reflection at the beginning of theSecond Discourse, Descartes turns his interest from the general movementof light to a careful analysis of its nature. There he intends to determine therelationship of the angle of incidence to the angle of reflection. By findingthat the angle of incidence in a ball thrown at the ground is equal to theangle of its reflection, he discovers a way of measuring what he calls thequantity of reflection. What interests us here is his use and his idealizationof the model. The idealization starts when he discusses how the actualmovement of the ball compares to the movement of light as it has so far beenconstructed.

To avoid getting into difficulties, let us assume that the ground isperfectly flat and hard, and that the ball always travels at a constantspeed, both in its downward passage and in rebounding, leaving aside

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entirely the question of the power which continues to move it when it isno longer in contact with the racquet, and without considering anyeffect of its weight, size or shape. For there is no point in going intosuch details here, since none of these factors is involved in the actionof light to which the present inquiry must be related. It is only necessaryto note the power, whatever it may be, which causes the ball to continuemoving is different from that which determines it to move in one directionrather than another.

(AT 6: 93–4, CSM 1: 156–7)

Given the task of uncovering the relationship between the angle ofincidence and the angle of reflection, Descartes believes that certainidealizations of the model are in order. By assuming that the ball travels at aconstant speed throughout the motion under consideration and that itsweight, size and shape are irrelevant, he preserves the assumption that lightmoves instantaneously and in straight lines. If he were to let the effects ofthe ball’s weight, size or shape influence his thinking on light, he wouldhave to abandon light as moving instantaneously and in straight lines. Notethat he also comments that the ball’s movement through space is irrelevant.This also should not surprise us given his contention that light is themovement of the subtle matter found in the pores of bodies. One shouldthink of the tennis ball as light insofar as its line of flight represents thebodies through which the movement of the subtle matter takes place. Weend up with a model that is more idealized than either the walking-stick orwine-vat model.

As for refraction, Descartes briefly introduces it in the First Discourseand returns to it in the Second Discourse. In the last sentence of the FirstDiscourse, he only introduces a ball striking fluid as a model of the refractionof light:

Finally, consider that the rays are also deflected, in the same way as theball just described, when they fall obliquely on the surface of atransparent body and penetrate this body more or less easily than thebody from which they come.

(AT 6: 92–3, CSM 1: 156)

One should take note of two things about this model. First, Descartes requiresan oblique angle of incidence: one has a case of reflection if the angle ofincidence is too acute or a case that is neither refraction nor reflection if the

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angle of incidence is a right angle. Second, one may wonder how thepenetration can occur with more ease given the model of throwing the ballinto a body of water. But here he proposes a wider application of his model.Though this might appear difficult to do, imagine throwing or somehowlaunching the ball from the bottom of the deep end of a pool and having theball leave the pool.

Descartes develops this model of refraction midway through the SecondDiscourse (AT 6: 97, CSM 1: 58). There he switches the medium throughwhich the ball passes to a thin sheet of linen to capture more clearly thephenomenon we call surface tension. One of the best ways of introducingthis notion is to imagine the surface of the water as something different fromthe rest of the water. Moreover, it is easier to describe the resistance of thesurface of water in terms of its two components – vertical force and horizontalforce – using the image of a sheet. Descartes describes this feature of themodel as follows:

[I]n order to know what path it [the ball] must follow, let us consideragain that its motion is entirely different from its determination to movein one direction rather than another – from which it follows that thequantity of these two factors must be examined separately. And let usalso consider that, of the two parts of which we can imagine thisdetermination to be composed, only the one which was making the balltend in a downward direction can be changed in any way through itscolliding with the sheet, while the one which was making the ball tendto the right must always remain the same as it was, because the sheetoffers no opposition at all to the determination in this direction.

(AT 6: 97, CSM 1: 158–9)

Given this construction, the sheet offers resistance only to vertical movement.This explains why the ball cannot continue in a straight line after it ripsthrough the sheet. And since its vertical moment is slower than it once was,the ball moves off at an angle more acute than the angle of incidence (usingthe sheet as the base line for both angles).

The same should happen if one replaces the sheet with water. Assumingthat the water’s surface and the sheet have the same effect on the ball, theangle of refraction should be exactly the same. As Descartes notes:

[I]t is certain that the surface of the water must deflect it [the ball]towards that point in the same way as the sheet, seeing that it reduces

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the force of the ball by the same amount, and that it is opposed to theball in the same [vertical] direction. Then, as for the rest of the body ofwater which fills all the space [through which the ball will pass], althoughit resists the ball more or less than did the air which we supposed therebefore, we should not say for this reason that it must deflect it more orless. For the water may open up to make way for the ball just as easilyin one direction as in another, at least if we always assume, as we do,that the ball’s course is not changed by its heaviness or lightness, orby its size or shape or any other extraneous cause.

(AT 6: 98–9, CSM 1: 159–60)

The last part of this quotation reiterates the idealization that was made in thecase of reflection. To model more precisely the effect of light passing intowater, we must treat the medium on either side of the water’s surface ashaving the same effect with respect to the ball’s direction.

The remainder of the Second Discourse focuses on measuring the quantityof any particular refraction, which is necessary for the later Discourses. Atthis point in the Second Discourse, Descartes has laid bare the essentials ofthe refraction of light through the extension of the tennis-ball model. In aparagraph toward the end of the Second Discourse, he reveals one significantdifference between the movement of balls traveling through air and themovement of light through air:

When you make these observations [of particular refractions], however,you will perhaps be amazed to find that light-rays are more sharplyinclined in air than in water, at the surfaces where their refraction occurs,and still more in water than in glass; while just the opposite occurs inthe case of a ball, which is inclined more sharply in water than in air, andwhich cannot pass through glass at all.

(AT 6: 102, CSM 1: 162)

Descartes’s point is that large objects like balls move through air with moreease than subtle matter can. He explains this phenomenon through his earlierhypotheses about the nature of light:

You will no longer find this strange, however, if you recall the naturethat I ascribed to light, when I said it is nothing but a certain movementor an action received in a very subtle matter which fills the pores of

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other bodies. And you should consider too that just as a ball losesmore of its motion in striking a soft body than a hard one and rolls lesseasily on a carpet than on a completely bare table, so the action of thissubtle matter can be impeded much more by the parts of the air (which,being as it were soft and badly joined, do not offer it much resistance)than by those of water, which offer more resistance; and still more bythose of water than by those of glass, or of crystal. Thus, insofar as theminute parts of a transparent body are harder and firmer, the more easilythey allow the light to pass; for the light does not have to drive any ofthem out of their places, as a ball must expel the parts of water in orderto find a passage through them.

(AT 6: 103, CSM 1: 162–3)

Given his three assumptions – that light consists in the movement ofsubtle matter, that subtle matter is much smaller than the bodies that makeup air, and that the bodies in air are much softer than those of water or glass– the movement of light finds much more resistance in air than in water orglass. If one remembers that the motion of subtle matter is broken up by softbodies, then Descartes’s reasoning should be clear. A large body like a ballmust force other bodies out of its path when it is moving. Thus, it becomesclear why the softer bodies of air are not as great an impediment as theharder bodies found in water and glass. The result of this difference betweenthe tennis-ball model and light affects the size of the angles of refraction.The important point is that the change in media has a significant affect onthe refraction of light.

The tennis-ball model tums out to be quite a rich vehicle for explainingthe exact nature of light’s reflection and refraction. In various ways, we haveseen how Descartes extends and amplifies the concept of light as it isunderstood in the walking-stick and wine-vat examples. One should notethat by the end of the Second Discourse he has an idealized model as heattaches assumption after assumption of how his reader should understandthe movement of a tennis ball through either a sheet or water. Through thisidealization he arrives at a conception of light that is precise enough totackle the problems of improving vision with telescopes.

Descartes’s conception of light

There are a number of lessons that we should draw from Descartes’s

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conceptual clarification of light. First, he locates the rough nature andproperties of light that must be understood. This rough account representsan analysis or breakdown of the different common experiences of light. Heattends to light’s instantaneous nature, its linear movement, and that itreflects and refracts. Second, he refines his understanding of each of thesefeatures through an analogy or model. He knows that he must provide anaccount of the basic nature of light. This is achieved through the use of thewalking stick to elucidate the instantaneous nature of light, and the wine inthe wine vat to elucidate the propagation of light and its nature as a straight-line phenomenon. The major properties of refraction and reflection of lightare refined in a lengthy discussion about throwing or hitting a tennis ballagainst or through different bodies. Finally, as with any conceptualclarification, he need not give a full-blown account. In the case of light in theOptics, the conceptual clarification is driven by the need to understandvision and to improve telescopes. These purposes explain why his discussionof the absorption of light is so brief: an examination of absorption is notneeded to explain vision or improve telescopes.

One should keep in mind one point about the place of conceptualclarification in Descartes’s system. The clarification process itself does notvalidate the final concept of light; the process does not show that theclarified idea of light is the concept operative in the correct account ofvision. At most, clarification shows that the idea of light is materially true,that it is not the basis for false judgments regarding vision. Descartes himselfexplains that the process of constructing the idea of light in the Optics doesnot confirm its accuracy. That confirmation – the formal truth of thejudgments based upon the idea – comes when the idea is successfullyemployed in the explanation of vision and the improvement of telescopes.And this is precisely what our account of the method implies.

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3 Causation

Since our account of the Cartesian method places causal explanation at thecenter of Descartes’s concerns, it is imperative that we clarify what he meantby a causal explanation. To do so, we turn to that place in the Third Meditationwhere he suggests that God, and only God, is self-caused (AT 7: 49–50,CSM 2: 34). This claim results in objections, first from Caterus and then fromArnauld, that an efficient cause must be distinct from its effect, and thereforethe notion of self-causation is unintelligible (AT 7: 95, CSM 2: 68; AT 7: 207–13, CSM 2: 146–50). In the course of his reply to Arnauld, Descartesdistinguishes between a formal cause and an efficient cause, contends thatGod’s essence is properly the formal cause of God’s existence, and attemptsto find a cause midway between a formal cause and an efficient cause.

In this chapter we examine Descartes’s discussion of the distinctionbetween formal and efficient causes in the reply to Arnauld. We show thatDescartes’s account of the formal/efficient causation distinction is consistentwith prominent accounts of that distinction from Aristotle to Suarez: anexplanation by formal cause is an explanation based on the essence of athing, while an explanation by efficient cause is an explanation based onagency. We then ask whether Descartes’s concern with formal causation islimited to God’s self-causation. To answer that question we inquire into theontological and epistemic status of Descartes’s natural laws, and determinethat Cartesian natural laws are ontologically and epistemicallyindistinguishable from eternal truths: they constitute the form or essence ofthe world. If so, then apart from God’s action in creating and sustaining theworld and acts of the human will, all Cartesian causes are formal. Such aposition makes intelligible Descartes’s remarks on the union of mind andbody. Further, it unifies the two elements of the Cartesian method that we

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discussed in Chapters One and Two: all explanation is formal explanation,that is, explanation based on the essences of things.1

Caterus on the problem of God’s self-causation

In the Third Meditation, Descartes considers the possibility that he, a thinkingthing with an idea of God qua supremely perfect being, is caused bysomething distinct from himself. Either he is caused by God, or he is causedby some being less perfect than God. If the latter is true, he can raise thesame question regarding the cause of that being. As he writes:

In respect of this cause one may again inquire whether it derives itsexistence from itself or from another cause. If from itself, then it is clearfrom what has been said that it is itself God, since if it has the power ofexisting through its own might, then undoubtedly it also has the powerof actually possessing all the perfections of which it has an idea – thatis, all the perfections which I conceive to be in God. If, on the otherhand, it derives its existence from another cause, then the same questionmay be repeated concerning this further cause, namely whether it derivesits existence from itself or from another cause, until eventually theultimate cause is reached, and this will be God.

(AT 7: 49–50, CSM 2: 34)

The argument is a variation on the cosmological argument, and, as Descartestells Caterus in his reply, he takes this self-causing God to effectively alleviateany possibility of an infinite causal regress (AT 7: 108–9, CSM 2: 78).

Descartes’s commentators found the argument puzzling. Caterus askedwhat Descartes meant by ‘from itself.’ Caterus distinguished between apositive and a negative sense of that expression. In the positive sense, itmeans “from itself as from a cause,” and in this sense a cause from itself“bestows its own existence on itself; so if by an act of premeditated choiceit were to give itself what it desired, it would undoubtedly give itself allthings, and so would be God” (AT 7: 95, CSM 2: 68). But Caterus consideredthe negative sense of ‘from itself,’ not from another, as what is more commonlyunderstood by that phrase. In this negative sense, ‘from itself’ implies thatquestions of efficient causality cannot be raised regarding God. So, Caterusnaturally concludes, “it does not derive existence from itself as a cause, nordid it exist prior to itself so that it could choose in advance what it should

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subsequently be” (AT 7: 95, CSM 2: 68–9). Caterus further relates thisnegative sense of ‘from itself’ to the essence or form of a thing by focusingon the question of limitation. Claiming Descartes had not proved that theessence of God is infinite, Caterus gives an example to show that the internal(formal, essential) principles of things place limitations on things. He writes,“That which is hot, for example, . . . will be hot as opposed to cold in virtueof its internal constitutive principles, and this will be true even if you imaginethat its being what it is does not depend on anything else” (AT 7: 95, CSM2: 69). If there are essential properties, these properties place limitations onthings regardless of whether those things are caused by another. Thus,unless Descartes shows that God has no essential limitations, the negativesense of ‘from itself’ fails to prevent the potential regress.

In his reply, Descartes modifies the standard meaning of “efficient cause”as it applies to a divine cause, an attempt that continues in his replies toArnauld. Among the standard conceptual constraints on the notion ofefficient causality were the claims that one, whatever will count as an efficientcause must be prior in nature to its effect, and two, the cause and the effectmust be distinct entities (it is an extrinsic cause).2 Descartes rejects both ofthese in the case of God’s self-causation. He cites three reasons for rejectingthese standard constraints: first, “it would make the question trivial, sinceeveryone knows that something cannot be prior to, and distinct from, itself”(AT 7: 108, CSM 2: 78); second, the cause qua cause exists only at the timeit is effective; and third, the assumption of self-causation is the only meansof heading off an infinite causal regress (AT 7: 108–9, CSM 2: 78).

Descartes continues by attempting to explain how God can be self-preserving, that is, the positive sense in which God’s existence is from itself.He argues for this extended positive sense of ‘efficient causation,’ by tryingto expand the domain to which the notion of an efficient cause can apply. Hesuggests that if he preserved his own being, he would have no problemreferring to himself as his own efficient cause. On the basis of such anappeal to authority, he turns to the case of God. He warns us against applyingthe notion of efficient causation to God’s causal powers when he tells us,“[A]ll that is implied [by divine self-preservation] is that the essence of Godis such that he must always exist.”

In the next paragraph, Descartes claims that God’s self-preserving causalityis analogous to, but presumably not the same as, efficient causality. ThereDescartes writes:

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There are some who attend only to the literal and strict meaning of thephrase ‘efficient cause’ and thus think it is impossible for anything to be thecause of itself. They do not see that there is any place for another kind ofcause analogous to an efficient cause.

(AT 7: 109, CSM 2: 79)

He then turns to a discussion of the omnipotence he finds when he examineshis idea of God. If we attend to this, “we will have recognized that this poweris so exceedingly great that it is plainly the cause of his continuing existence,and nothing but this can be the cause” (AT 7: 110, CSM 2: 79–80). It is the“immense and incomprehensible power” of God (AT 7: 110, CSM 2: 79),Descartes says, that constitutes the positive sense in which one can claimthat God’s existence is “from himself” as an efficient cause or as somethinganalogous to an efficient cause.

This is not Descartes at his best. Although here he explicitly claims thatthere is a positive sense in which God is the efficient cause of himself – or,at least, something closely analogous to the efficient cause of himself – inthe Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, he writes:

I must advise the author of these pamphlets that I have never writtenthat God should be called “the efficient cause of himself not just in anegative but also in a positive sense”, as he is rash enough to allege onpage eight of the second booklet.

(AT 8B: 368, CSM 2: 310)

Why the about face? In the First Replies, Descartes has blurred thedistinction between an efficient and a formal cause.3 In claiming, “all that isimplied is that the essence of God is such that he must always exist” (AT 7:109, CSM 2: 79), he is appealing to a formal cause, not an efficient cause.4

This point did not go unnoticed by Arnauld, whose criticisms focus primarilyon the position advanced in the replies to Caterus. But before we turn toArnauld’s objections, we digress briefly and examine the traditionaldistinction between an efficient and a formal cause.

Formal and efficient causes

The Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes was presupposed by Descartesand his critics. These causes provide four ways of answering the question

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“Why?” That Descartes rejected the doctrine of final causality, that is, anatural end or purpose, is widely acknowledged (see AT 7: 55, 5:158 CSM 2:38–9, 3: 341; P I: 28). He also had little interest in material causality, that is,questions concerning the stuff of which something is made (see AT 7: 242,366; CSM 2: 169, 252). His official interest is in efficient causality, that is, thecause of existence or change, although in the Fourth Replies he raisesquestions regarding formal causality, that is, explanation based on theessence of a thing. To place the Descartes–Arnauld exchange into context,we look briefly at historical discussions of efficient causality and formalcausality.

Aristotle defined an efficient cause as:

That from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e.g.the advisor is a cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child,and in general a maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing.

(Metaphysics, 5.2 1013a29–33: Aristotle 1941: 752;see also Posterior Analytics 2.11 93a36–94b8: Aristotle 1941: 171;

and Physics 2.3 194b29–32: Aristotle 1941: 241)

In the Aristotelian metaphysics of agent and patient, the efficient cause isthe agent to the material cause’s patient. This is the standard nomenclaturethroughout the medieval period and into Descartes’s time (see Aquinas1970: 198–9; Peter of Spain, Topics, in Kretzmann and Stump 1988: 236;William of Sherwood 1966: 86–7; Suarez 1994; Arnauld 1964: 243). Descarteswas well within the tradition in suggesting that an efficient cause is that“without which finite things cannot exist” (AT 7: 236, CSM 2: 165), as he wasin claiming that at least God and human wills are efficient causes (see POS§34–6; see Suarez 1994, 18.2.40: 88; 19.2.12–23: 290–300; see also Garber1993b), and that there is only a distinction of reason between creation andconservation.5

Aristotle defines a formal cause as follows: “The form or pattern, i.e., thedefinition of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts includedin the definition” (Metaphysics, 5.2 1013a27–9: Aristotle 1941: 752). In thepassage Descartes cites from the Posterior Analytics, Book Two, ChapterEleven (AT 7: 242, CSM 2: 169), Aristotle says this:

Why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? – or from what assumption

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does it follow that it is a right angle? Thus, let A be right angle, B the halfof two right angles, C the angle in a semicircle. Then B is the cause invirtue of which A, right angle, is attributable to C, the angle of asemicircle, since B = A and the other, viz. C, = B, for C is half the tworight angles. Therefore it is the assumption of B, the half of two rightangles, from which it follows that A is attributable to C, i.e. that theangle in a semicircle is a right angle. Moreover, B is identical with (b) thedefining form of A, since it is what A’s definition signifies. Moreover,the formal cause has already been shown to be the middle.

(Posterior Analytics, 2.11 94a27–35: Aristotle 1941: 171;cf. Posterior Analytics 2.8 93a3–14, Aristotle 1941: 167;

see also Aquinas 1970: 198)

A formal cause is explanatory. Unlike an efficient cause, which explainswhy or how something comes to be, a formal cause explains why somethingis what it is. As Suarez put it, “the form is properly a cause not of thegeneration but of the thing generated” (Suarez 1994, 1.17.1: 5). As Aristotle’sexample shows, appeals to a formal cause explain why something is thecase. Such explanations are deductive: the essential definition (as majorpremise) plus a statement of conditions (minor premise) entail a descriptionof the phenomenon to be explained. In a geometric case, the formal causeexplains the phenomenon by reducing it to (deducing it from) Euclid’sfundamental elements; in the case of a natural phenomenon, it is to give adeductive-nomological explanation where one takes the natural law to be“essential.”6 Insofar as it is based on the essence of a thing, it is an intrinsiccause, while an efficient cause is extrinsic (Suarez 1994: 17, Introduction: 3).Again, prior to Descartes a formal cause was commonly understood as anexplanation from the essence of a thing (Peter of Spain, Topics, in Kretzmannand Stump 1988: 237; Arnauld 1964: 244; cf. William of Sherwood 1966: 86–8), and Descartes also understood it in that way (AT 7: 236, CSM 2: 165).

Given this distinction, we may now turn to Arnauld’s objections andDescartes’s replies.

Arnauld on the problem of God’s self-causation

Arnauld was not satisfied with Descartes’s reply to Caterus and proceededto push the objection further. After summarizing the reply to Caterus, Arnauldraises questions regarding the formal criteria for being an efficient cause,notably, the contention that an efficient cause must be a distinct thing from

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its effect. Quoting Descartes’s contention that the natural light reveals thatan efficient cause qua cause exists only at the time that it produces its effect(AT 7: 209, CSM 2: 147; quoted from AT 7: 108, CSM 2: 78), Arnauld raises aseries of objections focusing on the distinction between an efficient causeand its effect. First, the natural light seems to require that the cause isdistinct from the effect, or, at least, Descartes provided no reasons to believeotherwise (AT 7: 209, CSM 2: 147). Second, the causal relation is irreflexive:nothing can receive existence from itself (AT 2: 209–10; CSM 2: 147–8).Third, the causal relation is dyadic: “there is a mutual relation betweencause and effect. But a relation must involve two terms” (AT 7: 210, CSM 2:147).

Next Arnauld launches an attack on Descartes’s claim that God, in particular,is the efficient cause of himself in a positive sense. First, the conservationthesis cannot be applied to God, for it requires that the existence of a thingbe divisible into temporally distinct units, and temporal predicates areinapplicable to God (AT 7: 211, CSM 2: 148). Second, since God is eternal, “itis pointless to ask why this being should continue to exist” (AT 7: 211, CSM2: 148); indeed, the question why God should continue to exist is absurd(AT 7: 211, CSM 2: 148–9). Third, if God derived existence from himself, hewould have to be conceived as existing before he existed (AT 7: 211–12,CSM 2: 149). Fourth, the notion of preservation presupposes original creation,and “the very terms ‘continuation’ and ‘preservation’ imply some potentiality,whereas an infinite being is pure actuality, without potentiality” (AT 7: 212,CSM 2: 149).

The most telling objection however rests on the distinction betweenefficient and final causes. After remarking that, “We look for the efficientcause of something only in respect of its existence, not in respect of itsessence” (AT 7: 212, CSM 7: 149), Arnauld explains that mathematicians donot look for the existence of the objects of their studies (AT 7: 212, CSM 2:149).7 Then he proceeds to show that Descartes had blurred the distinctionbetween formal and efficient cause. In Arnauld’s words:

But it belongs to the essence of an infinite being that it exists, or, if youwill, that it continues in existence, no less than it belongs to the essenceof a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right angles. Now ifanyone asks why a triangle has its three angles equal to two rightangles, we should not answer in terms of an efficient cause, but shouldsimply say that this is the eternal and immutable nature of a triangle.

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And similarly, if anyone asks why God exists, or continues in existence,we should not try to find either in God or outside him any efficientcause, or quasi-efficient cause (I am arguing about the reality, not thename); instead, we should confine our answer to saying that the reasonlies in the nature of a supremely perfect being.

The author [Descartes] says that the light of nature establishesthat if anything exists we may always ask why it exists – that is, we mayinquire into its efficient cause, or if it does not have one, we may demandwhy it does not have one. To this I answer that if someone asks whyGod exists, we should not answer in terms of an efficient cause, butshould explain that he exists simply because he is God, or an infinitebeing. And if someone asks for an efficient cause of God, we shouldreply that he does not need an efficient cause. And if the questionergoes on to ask why he does not need an efficient cause, we shouldanswer that this is because he is an infinite being, whose existence ishis essence. For the only things that require an efficient cause arethose in which actual existence may be distinguished from essence.

(AT 2: 212–13, CSM 2: 149–50)

Arnauld’s point is this. If existence is essential to God, then God’s essenceis a formal cause of his existence, that is, the essence of God explains why itis impossible to push the causal regress in a version of the cosmologicalargument to the point of asking, “And what is the cause of God?” Thatquestion is unintelligible. So in appealing to efficient causation vis-à-visGod, Descartes had misstated the proof. Rather than repeatedly askingwhether or not the cause of one’s being is self-caused and pushing theinquiry until such a point as one finds a self-caused being, he should haveasked whether the cause of one’s being is itself caused or is God. The chainwould have ended at the point that God was identified as an efficient causeof one of the causes of one’s being, since the essence of God entailsexistence: a formal cause would have ended the chain of efficient causes. Ifone accepts the distinction between formal causes and efficient causes, webelieve that Arnauld’s criticism is exactly right.8

In his reply, Descartes attempts to defend a broadened notion of efficientcausality, one that would justify deeming God self-caused in a positivesense. He stresses that “in saying that God ‘in a sense’ stands in the samerelation as an efficient cause, I made it clear that I did not suppose he wasthe same as an efficient cause” (AT 7: 235, CSM 2: 164–5), and that his

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guiding principle was that “‘if anything exists we may always inquire into itsefficient cause’ . . . ‘or, if it does not have one, we may demand why it doesnot need one’. These words make it quite clear that I did believe in theexistence of something that does not need an efficient cause. And whatcould that be, but God?” (AT 7: 235–6, CSM 2: 165). In claiming that God was“his own cause” Descartes says he did not “mean an efficient cause; itsimply means that the inexhaustible power of God is the cause or reason forhis not needing a cause” (AT 7: 236, CSM 2: 165). It is because God’spositive essence qua “inexhaustible power or immensity of the divine essenceis as positive as can be, I said that the reason or cause why God needs nocause is a positive reason or cause” (AT 7: 236, CSM 2: 165).

Descartes next introduces the distinction between a formal and an efficientcause. He writes:

Similarly, in every passage where I made a comparison between theformal cause (or reason derived from God’s essence, in virtue of whichhe needs no cause in order to exist or to be preserved) and the efficientcause (without which finite things cannot exist), I always took care tomake it explicitly clear that the two kinds of cause are different. And Inever said that God preserves himself by some positive force, in theway in which created things are preserved by him; I simply said that theimmensity of his power or essence, in virtue of which he does not needa preserver, is a positive thing.

(AT 7: 236–7, CSM 2: 165)

The paragraph is interesting in a number of ways. First, as we have seen,Descartes’s distinction between a formal and an efficient cause is well withinthe Aristotelian tradition. Second, we have been unable to find any placeother than the Fourth Replies where he takes “care to make it explicitly clearthat the two kinds of cause are different.” Finally, even here he is concerned,not with the claim that God’s existence follows immediately from his essence,but with the contention that the essential power of God somehow accountsfor God’s existence and that God does not preserve himself in the same waythat he preserves other things. Thus, he grants Arnauld that God is notproperly the efficient cause of himself, but insofar as the power of God is apositive element of God’s essence, God is not the cause of himself in apurely negative sense.

As he continues, Descartes attempts to detail the extended sense inwhich he is wont to use the expression “efficient cause” with respect to

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God’s self-causation. Suggesting that virtually everyone grants thatconsidering efficient causes is “the primary and principal way, if not theonly way, that we have of proving the existence of God” (AT 7: 238, CSM 2:166), Descartes suggests that it is correct to inquire into the efficient causesof God himself, “even though we have not given an explicit account of whatit means to say that something derives its existence ‘from itself’” (AT 7: 238,CSM 2: 166). As he continues, however, he suggests that properly speaking,this blurs the distinction between a formal and an efficient cause of God. Inhis words:

Those who follow the sole guidance of the natural light will in thiscontext spontaneously form a concept of cause that is common to bothan efficient and a formal cause: that is to say, what derives its existence‘from another’ will be taken to derive its existence from that thing as anefficient cause, while what derives its existence ‘from itself’ will betaken to derive its existence from itself as a formal cause – that is,because it has the kind of essence which entails that it does not requirean efficient cause. Accordingly, I did not explain this point in myMeditations, but left it out, assuming it was self-evident.

(AT 7: 238–9, CSM 2: 166–7)

Here Descartes suggests a notion of cause that is common to both anefficient and a formal cause, although his discussion suggests that thiscommon element is little more than a blurring of the distinction: properlyspeaking, deriving existence “from itself” – from its own essence – is aninstance of a formal causality. Indeed, while arguing for an extended notionof ‘efficient cause,’ he later grants that he can reconcile his differences withArnauld by deeming God the formal cause of his own existence. He writes:

But to reconcile our two positions, the answer to the question why Godexists should be given not in terms of an efficient cause in the strictsense, but simply in terms of the essence or formal cause of the thing.And precisely because in the case of God there is no distinction betweenexistence and essence, the formal cause will be strongly analogous toan efficient cause, and hence can be called something close to anefficient cause.

(AT 7: 243, CSM 2: 170)

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The question is, then, what is this analogy between God’s self-causationand an efficient cause? How can Descartes extend the notion of an efficientcause to include God’s self-causation? Contending that the causal argumentmust fail unless efficient causality extends to God’s own existence (AT 7:239, CSM 2: 167), Descartes defends the extended meaning of ‘efficientcause’ by means of several geometrical analogies. In his words:

To give a proper reply to this, I think it is necessary to show that, inbetween ‘efficient cause’ in the strict sense and ’no cause at all’, thereis a third possibility, namely ‘the positive essence of a thing’, to whichthe concept of an efficient cause can be extended. In the same way ingeometry the concept of the arc of an indefinitely large circle iscustomarily extended to the concept of a straight line; or the concept ofa rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number of sides is extended tothat of a circle. I thought I explained this in the best way available to mewhen I said that in this context the meaning of ‘efficient cause’ must notbe restricted to causes which are prior in time to their effects or differentfrom them. For, first, this would make the question trivial, since everyoneknows that something cannot be prior to, or distinct from, itself; andsecondly, the restriction ‘prior in time’ can be deleted from the conceptwhile leaving the notion of an efficient cause intact.

(AT 7: 239–40, CSM 2: 167;see also AT 7: 245, CSM 2: 170–1)

What is this analogy supposed to show? Consider the case of a regularrectilinear polygon with an indefinite number of sides. One can construesuch a polygon as a circle. Why? Descartes seems to believe that each sideof a rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number of sides would have a sidewith the length of one point. Hence, the distinction between a polygon anda circle would collapse. Similarly, he seems to claim that when one is concernedwith a being whose essence is infinite power, the distinction between aformal and an efficient cause collapses.9 Why? An efficient cause is anagent; it is a cause of the generation of a thing or state of affairs. A formalcause is the essence of a thing. If the essence of a thing is infinite power,then there can be no limits on its causal efficacy. Its essence as a formalcause entails existence in the sense that there could be no efficient causethat would prevent its existence. We believe that it is in this peculiar waythat Descartes attempts to collapse the formal/efficient cause distinction inthe case of God. Just as the distinction between a regular rectilinear polygon

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and a circle collapses when the number of sides of the polygon becomesindefinitely large, so the distinction between efficient and formal causalitycollapses when pushed to infinity.10 Such seems to be the point of theanalogy. 11

We are not convinced that this analogy is intelligible. At best it showsthat God’s self-causality is sui generis, and given Descartes’s remarks onthe limitations of the human understanding vis-à-vis the divine, this mightnot speak against it (see, for example, AT 7: 220, CSM 2: 155). Our interest,however, remains with the introduction of the notion of a formal cause. Aswe argue in the last three sections of this chapter, construing much ofCartesian explanation in terms of formal causality is consistent with boththe textual evidence regarding the status of natural laws and the integrationof his grand explanatory scheme. But he seems hesitant to discuss hisprogram in terms of formal causation – the only place he explicitly alludes toformal causes is in the replies to Arnauld. In the remainder of this section,we give reasons why Descartes might have been hesitant to construe hisexplanatory program in terms of formal causes.

When one indicates the formal cause of something, one offers anexplanation based on essential properties. Though the mention of formalcauses revolted him, Descartes did not find talk of essences unseemly.Indeed, he held that “according to the laws of true logic, we must never askabout the existence of anything until we first understand its essence” (AT 7:107–8, CSM 2: 78). Further, he clearly held that mathematical explanations(geometric proofs) are explanations based on formal (essential) causes. Why,then, did he seemingly spurn explanations based on formal causes? Wesuspect that his reservations stemmed from the connotations thataccompanied the word “form.”

Famously, Descartes rejected the Aristotelian doctrine of forms. Hisevidence against the doctrine came, in part, from showing that a particularphenomenon could be explained without reference to forms. In the Optics,he indicates that his explanation of color does not require the Scholasticdoctrine of intentional forms (AT 6: 85, CSM 1: 155–6; see also AT 6: 112,CSM 1: 165). In the Meteorology, he stresses that his account of the natureof terrestrial bodies does not:

deny any further items which they imagine in bodies over and abovewhat I have described, such as ‘substantial forms’, their ‘real qualities’,and so on. It simply seems to me that my arguments must be all the more

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acceptable in so far as I can make them depend on fewer things.(AT 6: 239, CSM 2: 173n2)

As he tells Regius in January 1642, one need not overtly deny the existenceof substantial forms, since by adequately explaining the phenomenon inquestion without positing such forms, one effectively shows that the doctrineof forms is useless and may fruitfully be rejected (AT 3: 491–2, CSM 3: 205).Given his rejection of the doctrine of forms, we believe Descartes held itwould be verbally misleading to suggest his explanations are based onformal causes.

Furthermore, while Descartes’s account of formal causes alludes toessences, and Cartesian essences are treated as something other thanAristotelian forms, it was not uncommon to conflate “formal cause” or “formalexplanation” with “caused by (or explained on the grounds of) an Aristotelianform.”12 Notice how the sixteenth century philosopher Peter Ramus definedformal causality:

The formall cause is that by the which the thing hathe his name andbeyng. And therfore euery thing is distingued from another by its forme.

The forme also is engendred togeather, with the thing it self: as, areasonable soule is the forme of man, for by it Man is man, and isdistingued from other thinges. The Geometricall figures haue their forme,some beyng triangles, and some quadrangles. So hathe naturall thinges:as the heauen, the earthe, trees, fyshe and suche others. So that euerything is to be expounded as the nature of it is, if we maye attayne to theknowledge theof, as in artificiall thinges is more easie to be founde.13

(Ramus 1969: 15)

Notice that obtaining an Aristotelian form somehow explains why somethingis what it is. Our suspicion is that even though Descartes understood formalcauses in terms of deductions from Cartesian essences, he recognized thatthe very expression “formal cause” invites theoretical confusion – it containsunwanted Aristotelian connotations, probably including the sanctioning offinal causes – and he therefore avoided the terminology. In the next twosections, we hope to show that, while he avoided the terminology, many ofhis explanations are best construed as explanations from formal causes(essences).

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Cartesian essences and explanations

So far we have examined Descartes’s discussions of the self-causality ofGod. In the replies to both Caterus and Arnauld, he argues that God possessesa form of self-causality midway between formal and efficient causality. Weare not convinced that he was successful; nonetheless, since Descarteshimself acknowledged that taking God as only a formal, and not an efficient,cause of himself alleviates his differences with Arnauld (AT 7: 243, CSM 2:170), we explore the possibility that either the formal/efficient causalitydistinction was blurred in other contexts or he came to acknowledge that alarge part of his explanatory structure rests on formal causes. In this sectionwe argue that Cartesian natural laws can be construed as essences. In thenext section we argue that such a construal of natural laws helps clarify hisaccount of mind-body interaction.

Outside the replies to Arnauld, Descartes does not explicitly concernhimself with formal causality. Throughout his writings, however, he providesexplanations on the basis of natural laws and appeals to various eternaltruths known by the natural light.14 Several questions should be askedregarding natural laws and eternal truths: What is their ontological andepistemic status? Insofar as God is the efficient cause of essences, eternaltruths, and natural laws, are these ontologically on a par?15 What are theepistemic relations among them? If essences, eternal truths, natural laws areontologically on a par – if the laws of physics, along with the laws ofgeometry, constitute the essence of the material world – it is reasonable toconstrue Cartesian explanations as explanations based on formal causes.

In this section we begin with a short argument to show that a deductive-nomological explanation is more reasonably construed as an explanationfrom formal causes than from efficient causes, that, as Suarez puts it, “theform [natural law] is properly not a cause of the generation but of the thingthat is generated” (Suarez 1994, 17.1.2: 5). Then we show that the textualevidence in Descartes’s works tends to support the contention that naturallaws constitute the essence of the physical world, that they are eternaltruths, and therefore that a Cartesian deductive-nomological explanationmeets the criteria for being an explanation based on formal, not efficient,causes.

Consider the form of a deductive-nomological explanation: given anatural law and a set of antecedent conditions, one deduces a description

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of a phenomenon to be explained. For example, if we wanted to explainwhy the water on the stove is boiling, we might propose the followingexplanation:

All water heated to 212°F boils (law).The water on the stove is water heated to 212°F (antecedent condition).Therefore, the water on the stove boils (phenomenon to be explained).

What does this explain? It explains why the water on the stove is boilingwater rather than gaseous water or frozen water. It explains why the thinggenerated has the characteristic it has. It does not explain how there came tobe boiling water on the stove. That would require a different kind of story:

John went into the kitchen. He filled a pan with water. He placed the panon the stove and turned on the gas. The heat from the burning gas wastransferred to the molecules of water, causing them to move rapidly. Ata certain point the movement of the molecules became so rapid that itmanifested itself in the macroscopic property we call “boiling water.”

Here John is an agent of change; he is the transient efficient cause of theboiling of the water. Yet, the deductive-nomological explanation has thecharacteristics of an explanation based on formal causes. To follow ourreasoning here consider the similarities between the characteristics of anatural law and metaphysical essence.

Natural laws state the necessary and sufficient conditions for theoccurrence of a state of affairs.16 A complete description of the essence of athing of a specific kind would allow one to deduce the various states of thatthing under various conditions. Both natural laws and essential descriptionsare sempiternal: they hold at all times. Both natural laws and essentialdescriptions are partial descriptions of the structure of the world. In a well-developed system, both natural laws and essential descriptions can, anddo, stand in deductive hierarchical relations to one another. Due to thesesimilarities, one might reasonably conclude that the distinction between anatural law and an essential description is merely verbal and that deductive-nomological explanations are explanations from formal causes.17

Here someone will certainly object that, even granting these similarities,there are absolutely fundamental differences between natural laws and

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essential descriptions. Natural laws are contingent truths; essentialdescriptions are necessary truths. One can imagine denying a natural law,but one cannot imagine denying an essential description since, indeed,such a denial is self-contradictory. Hence, even if formal similarities existbetween deductive-nomological explanations and explanations based onformal causes, their fundamental difference rests on the status of naturallaws with regard to essential descriptions. While explanations based uponessential descriptions are explanations from formal causes, deductive-nomological explanations cannot be, since natural laws are contingent.

This objection merely assumes that all natural laws are nonessential.There are three considerations that tend to show that Descartes considerednatural laws as a species of eternal truths. First, he held that God createdeternal truths along with all other things. Second, he held that God soconstructed the natural realm that the natural laws follow deductively fromGod’s nature and the other eternal truths. Thus, Descartes would denyHume’s claim that it is clearly conceivable, and therefore possible, that “thecourse of nature may change” (Hume 1975: 35, 37–8).18 Finally, Descartesemploys the same terminology in the description of a person’s psychologicaldisposition to accept a natural law as he does in the description of a person’spsychological disposition to accept an eternal truth. Let us turn to the firstof these three considerations.

When Descartes claimed that God is the efficient cause of all things, heclearly meant to include all eternal truths. Note what he writes to Mersenne:

As for the eternal truths, I say once more that they are true or possibleonly because God knows them as true or possible. They are not knownas true by God in any way that would imply that they are trueindependently of him. If men really understood the sense of their wordsthey could never say without blasphemy that the truth of anything isprior to the knowledge God has of it. In God willing and knowing are asingle thing in such a way that by the very fact of willing something heknows it and it is only for this reason that such a thing is true. So wemust not say that if God did not exist nevertheless these truths wouldbe true; for the existence of God is the first and most eternal of allpossible truths and the one from which alone all others proceed.

(AT 1: 149–50, CSM 3: 24)

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You ask me by what kind of causality God established the eternal truths.I reply: by the same kind of causality as he created all things, that is tosay, as their total and efficient cause. For it is certain that he is theauthor of the essence of created things no less than of their existence;and this essence is nothing other than the eternal truths.

(AT 1: 151–2, CSM 3: 25;see also AT 1: 145, 152–3, 2: 138, CSM 3: 23, 25–6, 103)

Descartes never relinquished the claim that God is the total and efficientcause of all things, including eternal truths (cf. AT 7: 432, CSM 2: 291).Insofar as God is the cause of all things, including the essences of things, itseems prima facie plausible to suggest that the natural laws are eternaltruths since they constitute the essence of the material world. But one mightobject that insofar as Descartes is concerned with the essence of the materialworld, he is concerned – as he makes clear in Meditation Five – with theprinciples of geometry. Even if one grants that the principles of geometryare eternal truths, this does not entail that the laws of motion are.

In reply, several points should be noticed. First, Descartes occasionallysuggests that “my entire physics is nothing but geometry” (AT 2: 268, CSM3: 119; cf. AT 1: 476, 3: 39, CSM 3: 77, 145). While one might suggest that thisis something of an overstatement, we shall see that Descartes considered itonly a slight exaggeration. Second, in section five of the Discourse onMethod, his summary of The World, he writes:

Further, I showed what the laws of nature were, and without basing myarguments on any principle other than the infinite perfections of God, Itried to demonstrate all those laws about which we could have anydoubt, and to show that they are such that, even if God created manyworlds, there could not be any in which they failed to be observed.

(AT 6: 43, CSM 1: 132)

The suggestion that the principles of motion are true in all possible worldssuggests that they are eternal truths. Finally, the fact that Descartes deemedhis physics mechanical, and held that, except in those cases in which thematerial realm is impinged upon by a mind qua efficient cause, all events canbe explained on the basis of a small collection of laws, indicates that he heldthat they are universally true.19 Since God is the cause of all things, includingeternal truths, one would need a reason why the laws of physics are

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intrinsically different from other eternal truths. As we shall see, the laws ofphysics are different from other eternal truths, but not in a way that makesthem less eternal or necessary.

How do the laws of physics differ from other eternal truths? They are lessbasic, since one derives the laws of physics from the truths of metaphysicsand the more basic eternal truths. This brings us to our second consideration,namely that Descartes understood his philosophy as constituting adeductively related whole. Again, this is a recurrent theme in the letters: “Imust tell you that the little book on metaphysics which I sent you [theMeditations] contains all the principles of my physics” (AT 3: 233, CSM 3:157); “I may tell you, between ourselves, that these six Meditations containall the foundations of my physics” (AT 3: 298, CSM 3: 173; see also CB §48:AT 5: 165; CSM 3: 346–7). In his writings, he makes the same point. In TheWorld, he justitles his first two laws of motion as follows: “So it is that thesetwo rules follow manifestly from the mere fact that God is immutable andthat, acting always in the same way, he always produced the same effect”(AT 11: 43, CSM 1: 96). A bit later we find this:

But I shall be content with telling you that apart from the three laws Ihave expounded, I do not wish to suppose any others but those whichfollow inevitably from the eternal truths on which mathematicians haveusually based their most certain and most evident demonstrations –the truths, I say, according to which God himself has taught us that hehas arranged all things in number, weight and measure. The knowledgeof these truths is so natural to our souls that we cannot but judge theminfallible when we conceive them distinctly, nor doubt that if God hadcreated many worlds, they would be as true in each of them as in thisone. Thus those who are able to examine sufficiently the consequencesof these truths and of our rules will be able to recognize effects by theircauses. To express myself in scholastic terms, they will be able to havea priori demonstrations of everything that can be produced in this newworld.

(AT 11: 47, CSM 1: 97)

Similarly, his call in the Meditations for new foundations for the sciences(AT 7: 17, CSM 2: 12) can be seen as such a clarion call. Again, in his letterto Mersenne of 11 March 1640, he is concerned with the reduction of thelaws of physics to the more basic laws of mathematics. He writes, “I wouldthink I knew nothing in physics if I could say only how things could be,

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without demonstrating that they could not be otherwise. This is perfectlypossible once one has reduced physics to the laws of mathematics” (AT 3:39, CSM 3: 145; cf. AT 1: 140–1, CSM 3: 22). And the penultimate section ofthe Principles shows that Descartes attributed absolute certainty to hisphysics insofar as the less fundamental elements were deduced from themore fundamental. In his words:

This [absolute] certainty is based on a metaphysical foundation, namelythat God is supremely good and in no way a deceiver. . . Mathematicaldemonstrations have this kind of certainty, as does the knowledge thatmaterial things exist; and the same goes for all evident reasoning aboutmaterial things. And perhaps even these results of mine will be allowedinto the class of absolute certainties, if people consider how they havebeen deduced in an unbroken chain from the first and simplest principlesof human knowledge. . . . Once this is accepted, then it seems that all theother phenomena, or at least the general features of the universe andthe earth which I have described, can hardly be intelligibly explainedexcept in the way I have suggested.

(P 4: 206: AT 8A: 328–9, CSM 1: 290–1)

If the laws of physics are “deduced in an unbroken chain from the first andsimplest principles of human knowledge,” and if those principles are eternaltruths, then the laws of physics must also be eternal truths. Because thelaws of physics represent more complex and derivative truths, they mightnot be as immediately obvious as their more basic counterparts.20

Our third and final consideration also supports the view that Cartesiannatural laws are essential truths. Descartes uses the same terminology todescribe one’s psychological dispositions to accept natural laws, on theone hand, and eternal truths, on the other. He claims that eternal truths areself-evident:

But when we recognize that it is impossible for anything to come fromnothing, the proposition Nothing comes from nothing is regarded notas a really existing thing, but as an eternal truth which resides withinour mind. . . . It would not be easy to draw up a list of all of them; butnone the less we cannot fail to know them when the occasion for thinkingabout them arises, provided that we are not blinded by preconceivednotions.

(P I: 49: AT 8A: 23–4, CSM 1: 209)

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Does Descartes ascribe such certainty to the laws of physics? Yes. In theDiscourse, one finds this:

What is more, I have noticed certain laws which God has so establishedin nature, and of which he has implanted such notions in our minds,that after adequate reflection we cannot doubt that they are exactlyobserved in everything which exists or occurs in the world.

(AT 6: 41, CSM 1: 131)

In his letter to More of 5 February 1649, he writes:

Moreover, I do not agree with what you very generously concede,namely that the rest of my opinions could stand even if what I havewritten about the extension of matter were refuted. For it is one of themost important, and I believe the most certain, foundations of myphysics; and I confess that no reasons satisfy me even in physicsunless they involve that necessity which you call logical or analytic,provided you except things which can be known by experience alone,such as that there is only one sun and only one moon around the earthand so on.

(AT 5: 275, CSM 3: 364–5)

These passages tend to show that one knows the laws of physics with thesame certainty as eternal truths, and, therefore, one should categorize themas eternal truths. Even if Descartes had not alluded to the psychologicalforce with which the laws of physics strike the mind, his contention thatmore basic eternal truths deductively entail these laws shows that the lawsof Cartesian physics – and all other natural laws – must be deemed eternaltruths. As eternal truths, they provide a partial specification of the essenceof the world. For that reason, explanations based on appeals to natural lawsare explanations based on formal causes.

Mind and body

Two objections will naturally arise. First, some might object that our concernwith formal causality ignores questions regarding efficient causality.Descartes regarded God and human minds as efficient causes of states ofaffairs. If we do not delineate the relationship between formal and efficient

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causality, the critic will claim that our case lacks credibility. Second, only inhis reply to Arnauld does he ever explicitly allude to formal causes, andthere he seems inclined to avoid them. Unless one can show that construingcausal issues as questions of formal causation elucidates an otherwiseopaque issue, one has little reason to believe he embraced formal causalityas thoroughly as we claim.

To answer the first objection, we must look briefly at some of Descartes’sremarks on efficient causality. These concern questions of the will, the aspectin which human beings most resemble God (AT 7: 57, CSM 2: 40). He writesthat even though one does not speak univocally in comparing the divinewill and the human will, “the only idea I can find in my mind to represent theway in which God or an angel can move matter is the one which shows methe way in which I am conscious I can move my own body by my thought”(AT 5: 347, CSM 3: 375). What is the will?

[T]he will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (thatis, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply inthe fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmationor denial or for pursuit for avoidance, our inclinations are such that wedo not feel we are determined by any external force.

(AT 7: 57, CSM 2: 40; see also POS §41)

This definition is somewhat curious. The will is an ability: the power to do orrefrain from various activities. What does this mean?

Presumably, one can find out what these powers or abilities are only bypractice. Can one effect a movement of one’s arm by an act of will? Yes. Onewills it to move and it moves, although, starting with a movement of thepineal gland (POS §41), numerous intermediate effects occur between theact of volition and the resulting movement of the arm. An act of will is anagent’s action; as such, an act of will has no further explanation. But what isthis? In characterizing will as an ability or a power, what does this mean ?Descartes offers no characterization of the notions of power or ability. It isbasic; it is ineffable. To put any conceptual meat on the bones of power, onemust analyze the power or the ability to do something. That analysis comesin the form of a law: if act of will Am occurs, then a mental state Sm occurs, ora physical state Sb occurs. Or, to say that God is omnipotent, is to say thatfor any x, if God wills that x, then x. The human will has limits: we discoverthese limits by experience. But the fact that acts of will escape furtherexplanation does not entail a lack of lawful correlation between certain acts

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of the will and certain states of the pineal gland. As Descartes told PrincessElizabeth in his letter of 6 October 1645:

I must say at once that all the reasons that prove that God exists and isthe first and immutable cause of all effects that do not depend on humanfree will prove similarly, I think, that he is also the cause of all the effectsthat do so depend.

(AT 4: 314, CSM 3: 272)

God established laws correlating acts of the will with states of the pinealgland. In this way the notion of power obtains cognitive content. Oneexplains and understands the efficacy of the will only in terms of naturallaws. So considerations of efficient causality do not militate against thecontention that Cartesian explanation should be construed in terms of formalcausality; rather, they tend to support it.

The lawful connection between states of the will and states of the pinealgland also implies that formal causality helps us understand Descartes’saccount of the connection between mind and body: mind and body arelawfully connected. This answers the second objection. If Descartes holdsthat the world is governed by natural laws and these laws are eternal truths,then lawful explanations of body to body relations are based on formalcauses. Insofar as God is the efficient cause of all natural laws, God couldestablish a series of lawful (essential) relations between bodily states andmental states. Descartes’s discussion of phantom pains in the SixthMeditation makes little sense unless one assumes that there is some kind oflawful connection such that if the pineal gland is in a certain state Sb, themind is in a state Sm (see AT 7: 83–8, CSM 2: 58–61). Similarly, such a lawfulrelationship is suggested in the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet when,after alluding to his Optics, he proposes that innate ideas are dispositionsto form occurrent ideas with a particular content, that:

The ideas of pain, colours, sounds and the like must be all the moreinnate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to becapable of representing them to itself, for there is no similarity betweenthese ideas and the corporeal motions.21

(AT 8B: 359, CSM 1: 304)

If we look at his letter to Elizabeth, 21 May 1643, we see that his remarks

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support our contention that the connections between mind and body arelawful connections construed as eternal truths.

In responding to Elizabeth’s question of “how the soul of man (since it isbut a thinking substance) can determine the spirits of the body to producevoluntary actions” (in Blom 1978: 106), Descartes indicates that he had saidlittle about how the body and soul act upon one another, his primary aimhaving been to demonstrate their distinctness (AT 3: 665, CSM 3: 218). Toexplain how we understand both the distinctness and the union of mind andbody, he alluded to primitive notions. He writes:

First I consider that there are in us certain primitive notions which areas it were the patterns on the basis of which we form all our conceptions.There are very few such notions. First, there are the most general –those of being, number, duration, etc. – which apply to everything wecan conceive. Then, as regards body in particular, we have only thenotion of extension, which entails the notions of shape and motion;and as regards the soul on its own, we have only the notion of thought,which includes the perceptions of the intellect and the inclinations ofthe will. Lastly, as regards the soul and the body together, we have onlythe notion of their union, on which depends our notion of the soul’spower to move the body, and the body’s power to act on the soul andcause its sensations and passions.

(AT 3: 665, CSM 3: 218; cf. 3: 690–1, CSM 3: 226)

Descartes claims we have four sorts of primitive notions in our mind. Thereare the most general notions, notions that apply to anything at all. Moreinterestingly, there are the primitive notions: one, of extension, “which entailsshape and movement,” two, of thought, and three, of the union of body andmind, on which depends all knowledge of the powers minds have regardingbody and bodies have regarding mind. What are these primitive notions?They are the eternal truths, the common notions of Principles 1: 48–50, or,more properly, they are the most basic eternal truths, those from which allother etemal truths (natural laws) can be deduced. As eternal truths, theseprimitive notions express the essence of mind, body, and the mind-bodyunion. Indeed, all of knowledge follows from them. As Descartes continues:

I observe next that all human knowledge consists solely in clearlydistinguishing these notions and attaching each of them only to thethings to which it pertains. For if we try to solve a problem by means of

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a notion that does not pertain to it, we cannot help going wrong. Similarlywe go wrong if we try to explain one of these notions by another, forsince they are primitive notions, each of them can be understood onlythrough itself.

(AT 7: 665–6, CSM 3: 218, our emphasis)

It is to our own soul that we must look for these simple notions. Itpossesses them all by nature, but it does not always sufficientlydistinguish them from each other, or assign them to the object to whichthey ought to be assigned.

(AT 7: 666–7, CSM 3: 219)

Notice that Descartes says exactly what he should say if all Cartesianexplanation stems from formal causes (essences). The primitive notionsconstitute the essences of mind, body, and the mind-body union. They aredistinct essences: each is known through itself. As eternal truths they residein the soul and “have no existence outside our thought” (P I: 48: AT 8A: 22,CSM 1: 208). Error occurs when these essential truths are applied to thewrong domain.

Notice further that this account makes intelligible Descartes’s analogybetween the mind-body connection and heaviness construed as a realquality. He writes:

So I think that we have hitherto confused the notion of the soul’spower to act on the body with the power one body has to act onanother. We have attributed both powers not to the soul, for we did notyet know it, but to the various qualities of bodies such as heaviness,heat, etc. We imagined these qualities to be real, that is to say to havean existence distinct from that of bodies, and so to be substances,although we called them qualities. In order to conceive them wesometimes used notions we have for the purpose of knowing bodies,and sometimes used notions we have for the purpose of knowing thesoul, depending on whether we were attributing to them somethingmaterial or something immaterial. For instance, when we suppose thatheaviness is a real quality, of which all we know is that it has the powerto move the body that possesses it towards the centre of the earth, wehave no difficulty in conceiving how it moves this body or how it isjoined to it. We never think that this motion is produced by a realcontact between two surfaces, since we find, from our own inner

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experience, that we possess a notion that is ready-made for forming theconception in heaviness, which – as I hope to show in my Physics – isnot anything really distinct from body. For I believe that it was given usfor the purpose of conceiving the manner in which the soul moves thebody.

(AT 3: 667–8, CSM 3: 218–19;cf. AT 3: 693–4, 7: 441–2; CSM 3: 227–8, 2: 297–8)

In alluding to real qualities or substantial forms, Descartes attempts toelucidate the relationship between body and soul on the basis of a theoreticalconcept he rejects.22 How can this be helpful? Natural laws qua eternaltruths fulfill some of the same functions in his philosophy as Aristotelianforms in the Scholastic philosophy: they specify the essential connectionsamong things. Just as a Scholastic form is the essence of a thing of a kind,natural laws (primitive notions, eternal truths) provide the essentialconnection between mind and body. So Descartes’s allusions to primitivenotions supports our account of the mind-body relationship, and ouraccount tends to be confirmed insofar as it makes intelligible the analogy toheaviness construed as a real quality.

Certainly someone will raise an objection. The union between mind andbody is either a substantial union or it is not.23 If the human mind and bodyjoin to form a single substance, then one must raise all the questions that aregermane to the doctrine of substance, e.g. what is its principal attribute?Descartes does not tell us what the principal attribute of the mind-bodyunion is, which provides prima facie evidence that he did not hold that thereis a substantial union between body and soul. On the other hand, if asubstantial unity does not exist between body and soul, the suggestionthat an essential relation exists between them is far too strong. Indeed, ifessential connections do obtain between mind and body, he would have noclear way to establish the soul’s immortality (AT 7: 14, CSM 2: 10), sincewhen one claims an essential connection one takes what are putatively twothings as fundamentally one. Thus, the critic would claim, either Descartesmade an elementary error or our interpretation is wrong. Given that the latterseems far more probable than the former, the critic would reject ourinterpretation.

This objection is misguided, for it assumes that there are essential truthsonly with respect to substances. Descartes rejects such a view. His doctrineof true and immutable natures entails that there are essential and eternaltruths with respect to nonsubstantial entities, such as triangles (AT 7: 64;

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CSM 2: 44–5). Essential truths are truths about kinds of things. So, onemight reasonably interpret his remarks on primitive notions (AT 3: 665, CSM3: 218) as claiming that there are essential truths pertaining to this mindinsofar as it is an entity of the mental kind, to this body insofar as it is anentity of the bodily kind, and to this mind–body complex insofar as it is anentity of the mind–body kind. One might cringe at this mind–bodyhyphenate, but it is perfectly justified. Descartes tells us that the notion ofthe mind-body union is primitive (see quotation above). If so, then themind-body union constitutes a basic kind. Moreover, he explicitly tellsArnauld in the Fourth Replies that “although mind is part of the essence ofman, being united to a human body is not strictly speaking part of theessence of mind” (AT 7: 219, CSM 2: 155, our emphasis).

Whether the mind–body complex constitutes a substantial union is adistinct question from whether it has essential properties insofar as it is anentity of the mind–body-complex kind. Since Descartes himself seems notto have been of one mind on the first question, we will not pursue it (seeVoss 1994). Whether a mind, insofar as it is an entity of the mental kind,could exist apart from the body to which it is united is a distinct questionfrom whether a mind, insofar as it is an entity of the element-of-a-mind-body-complex kind, could exist apart from the kind of complex of which it isan element. Descartes answers the first question in the affirmative (see AT 7:444–5, CSM 2: 299). We find his negative response to the second questionin the Fourth Replies:

Thus a hand is an incomplete substance when it is referred to the wholebody of which it is a part; but it is a complete substance when it isconsidered on its own. And in just the same way the mind and the bodyare incomplete substances when they are referred to a human beingwhich together they make up. But if they are considered on their own,they are complete.

(AT 7: 222, CSM 2: 157)

Though Descartes avoids such bothersome hyphenates as our “element-of-a-mind-body-complex,” a mind and body do conjoin to form an instanceof the mind–body kind. They are properly parts of that whole. Given hiscommitment to the mind–body kind, relative to that kind neither mind norbody can be conceived independently of one another. One can conceive ofa mind separate from a body, but only when one conceives of a mind as athing of the mental kind.24

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We conclude, therefore, that Descartes’s answer to the problem of theconnection between mind and body is that they are joined by natural laws,that these laws are eternal truths, and that questions of Cartesian causalrelations are questions of formal causality.

The unity of the method

In Chapters One and Two, we examined the Cartesian method with respectto natural laws and with respect to ideas. If our argument in this chapter issound, it reveals an essential unity in the Cartesian method. The fundamentalobject sought through methodological inquiry is the essence of a thing,whether that is an object – in which case one seeks a clear and distinct idea– or a natural law (a partial specification of the essence of the natural world)or some more general eternal truth (a partial specification of the essence ofany possible world). In each case, the natural light provides one with theinsight that one has found an essence. Except in the case of God, to showthat something exists requires an existential premise. Following the deductive-nomological model of explanation, the justification of the form “x exists”would require an eternal truth of the form, “Anything that is ø exists” and anexistential claim of the form “x is ø.”25 Insofar as eternal truths are essentialclaims, this procedure complies with Descartes’s maxim that “according tothe laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anythinguntil we first understand its essence” (AT 7: 107–8, CSM 2: 78).

In our earlier chapters, we distinguished between an enumeration ofhypotheses in searching for natural laws and an enumeration of propertiesin seeking the essence of a thing. Since eternal truths are essences, theseare two sides of the same coin. When seeking a natural law, one enumerateshypotheses: these are objects of consideration because they partially specifythe essence of the world (or any possible world). Similarly, in consideringthe essence of an object, the enumeration of properties is the object ofconsideration since they help one specify a thing of a certain kind. In eithercase, the natural light guides one in the elimination of hypotheses orproperties from the list.26

Finally, construing Cartesian causes as formal causes increases theplausibility of Descartes’s commitment to the double method of coherenceto which he alludes in Part Six of the Discourse on Method.27 Recall thatDescartes warns his readers not to be shocked that:

[I call some of the statements] at the beginning of the Optics and

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Meteorology “suppositions” and do not seem to care about provingthem. . . For I take my reasoning to be so closely interconnected thatjust as the last are proved by the first, which are their causes, so thefirst are proved by the last, which are their effects”

(AT 6: 76, CSM 1: 150)

Insofar as the suppositions or hypotheses on which his system is built areeternal truths – and recognized as such by the light of nature – this mutualproof complies with a concern with formal causes. The natural lightrecognizes his initial hypotheses as true: their material truth is recognized.As long as they explain the phenomena in question, evidence for theirformal truth exists: it is evidence that the principle in question applies to thereal world. Further, if a description of the phenomenon to be explained canbe deduced from the hypothesis and a statement of fact, this constituteswhat Pappus called the proof of the analysis (in Hintikka and Remes 1974:9). If we correctly claim that Descartes concerned himself with formal causes– explanations based on essences – the various elements of his remarks onthe method of analysis cohere nicely.

But to this point we have only shown that one can construct a coherentaccount of Cartesian analysis. Since Descartes claimed that analysis “is thebest and truest method of instruction, and it was this method alone which Iemployed in my Meditations” (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 111), the adequacy of ouraccount can be shown only if it manifests itself in the Meditations, that is,if it increases the coherence of that work. To this task we now turn.

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AppendixThe rainbow

In his letter to Vatier of 22 February 1638, Descartes writes:

I have, however, given a brief sample of it [my method] in my account ofthe rainbow, and if you take the trouble to reread it, I hope that it willsatisfy you more than it did the first time; the matter is, after all, quitedifficult in itself.

(AT 1: 559, CSM 3: 85)

This is one of the few places in which Descartes unequivocally claims toprovide a sample of his method; hence, we briefly examine that work, andfind that his procedural moves comply with our account of the method.1

Descartes’s discussion of the rainbow in Discourse Eight of theMeteorology differs in certain ways from the method we have discussedand which we will discuss in detail with respect to the Meditations. At firstblush, one might think that he conducts no searches for general principles,no exercises in conceptual elucidation, and fails to appeal to the naturallight. Since we contend that these characteristics are hallmarks of theCartesian method, does their absence expose a fundamental flaw in ouraccount of the method?

Not at all. First, being a fairly complex phenomenon, the rainbow is farfrom fundamental. His discussion presupposes the conclusions reached inthe previous seven discourses of the Meteorology and the Optics. Weshould not be surprised that he discovers no new laws. Second, the discourseon the rainbow is explanatory. As such, it exemplifies the fundamentality ofcoherence to the Cartesian method. Third, it is only at first blush that onefinds no exercises in conceptual elucidation. As we show, Descartes isconcerned with the essential elements necessary for the occurrence of arainbow. While his interests are straightforwardly causal, the search for

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essential elements may be construed as an exercise in ideational clarification.Finally, as one would expect when examining a topic that is several levelsremoved from the metaphysical foundations of the Cartesian system, it isonly reasonable to contend that he tacitly justifies his conclusions by meansof the natural light; to explicitly introduce the natural light at this level ofdiscourse would be inappropriate.

Descartes describes the phenomenon to be explained in the first paragraphof Discourse Eight. He begins by observing the occasions on which oneperceives a rainbow. He writes:

First, I considered that this arc can appear not only in the sky, but alsoin the air near us, whenever there are many drops of water in the airilluminated by the sun, as experience shows us in certain fountains;thus it was easy for me to judge that it came merely from the way thatthe rays of light act against those drops, and from there tend towardour eyes. Then, knowing that these drops are round, as has been provenabove, and seeing that their being larger or smaller does not change theappearance of the arc, I then took it into my head to make a very largeone, the better to examine it.

(AT 6:325, O 332)

Descartes sets the initial elements of the problem as follows. Experienceindicates that it is only on occasions in which droplets of water are in the airthat one perceives a rainbow. This occurs not only in cases when a rainbowappears at a distance after a rainstorm, but also when rays of sunlight passthrough droplets of water close at hand. Thus, the phenomenon to explainis how the interaction of water droplets and light result in an observablerainbow. Given his conclusion earlier in the Meteorology that all drops ofwater are round – “those of fresh water are round like strings, and those ofsalt like cylinders or rods; for all bodies that move in different ways over along period of time usually become rounded” (AT 6: 203, O 285; cf. AT 6:280–1, O 298–9, where water droplets are said to be perfectly round) –Descartes proposes to examine the phenomenon by using a large roundflask filled with water to simulate a water droplet. Let us call this round flaskof water a “super-droplet.”

Descartes observes the effects of sunlight passing through the super-droplet. (See Figure 2.) There are two rainbows. In the primary rainbow, thecolor red is perceived at point D. In the secondary rainbow, a fainter red is

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perceived at point K. In the case of D, the angle formed by point D, theobserver E and the point M at the base of the rainbow is about 42°. Theangle KEM is approximately 52°. So long as the angle DEM remains atapproximately 42°, the brilliant red remains. If the angle becomes bigger, thecolor disappears; if it becomes smaller, it divides into other colors. Thefainter rainbow is inverted. If the angle KEM is made slightly larger than 52°,weaker colors (yellow, blue) appear; if it is much larger or somewhat smallerthan 52°, the colors disappear. This is the phenomenon to be explained.

Descartes now turns to explanation. He writes:

After this, examining in more detail what caused the part D of the ballBCD to appear red, I found that it was the rays of the sun which,coming from A toward B, were curved as they entered the water at pointB, and went toward C, whence they were reflected toward D; and there,being curved again as they left the water, they tended toward E. For as

Figure 2 The rainbow

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soon as I put an opaque or dark body in some place on the lines AB, BC,CD, or DE, this red color would disappear. And even if I covered thewhole ball except for the two points B and D, and put dark bodieseverywhere else, provided nothing hindered the action of the raysABCDE, the red color nevertheless appeared. Then I was also searchingfor the cause of the red which appeared at K; and I discovered that itwas the rays which came from F toward G, where they curved toward H,and in H reflected toward I, and in I reflected again toward K, and thenfinally they curved at point K and tended toward E. Therefore theprimary rainbow is caused by the rays which reach the eye after tworefractions and one reflection, and the secondary by other rays whichreach it only after two refractions and two reflections; which is whatprevents the second from appearing as clearly as the first.

(AT 6: 328–9, O 334)

To understand how this passage agrees with our account of the Cartesianmethod, one should take the initial observation – that wherever rainbowsappear water droplets and sunlight must also appear – as placing certainlimits on the explanans: any explanation of the rainbow must appeal only toproperties of water and light. The discussions of reflection and refraction inthe Optics (see AT 6: 93–105, CSM 1: 156–64) provide the guiding thread:namely, water bends rays of light. Given this, Descartes may formulate ahypothesis regarding the roles of reflection and refraction in explaining thephysical side of color perception: in the case of the primary rainbow, oneperceives red as a result of two refractions and one reflection, and in thecase of the secondary rainbows, one perceives red as a result of tworefractions and two reflections. The hypothesis, in turn, guides thesubsequent experimental tests and observations: by blocking the lightfollowing any of the lines represented on the diagram, the phenomenon(red) ceases to occur. These observations confirm the supposition that tosee red requires light. They also show that to perceive redness requires tworefractions.

If Descartes’s method complies with the model we have suggested, heshould seek the minimum number of characteristics of light interacting witha medium to explain the phenomenon (the rainbow) sufficiently. If one wereto enumerate the characteristics he has considered to this point, these wouldinclude: one, curved water droplets, two, light traveling in straight lines,three, two refractions of light, four, one or two reflections of the light, andfive, refractions resulting in angles of very specific degrees. Are all of these

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characteristics necessary for the phenomenon? No. His discussion of theprism reduces the number of characteristics necessary for explaining thephenomenon.

A prism is a triangle of crystal which causes a rainbow phenomenon. Ashe describes the case, he assumes a prism with an angle of 30° to 40°, suchthat the sun’s rays that enter the prism are perpendicular to its angled surfaceand bend to form a rainbow. (See Figure 3.) The phenomenon is the same asit was in the case of the rainbow, but there are significant differences in thecircumstances that result in the rainbow-like phenomenon. Descartes liststhese:

From this I learned, first, that the surfaces of the drops of water neednot be curved in order to produce these colors, for those of this crystalare completely flat; nor does the angle under which they appear need tobe of any particular size, for it can be changed there without theirchanging. And although we can cause the rays going toward F tocurve sometimes more and sometimes less than those going toward H,they nevertheless always paint red, and those going toward H alwayspaint blue; neither is reflection necessary, for there is none of it here;nor finally do we need a plurality of refractions, for there is only one ofthem here. But I judged that there must be at least one refraction, andeven one such that its effect was not destroyed by another, forexperiment shows that if the surfaces MN and NP were parallel, therays, being straightened as much in the one as they were curved in theother, would not produce these colors.

(AT 6: 330–1, O 335)

Notice that Descartes eliminates a certain number of characteristics. Therainbow phenomenon occurs when light passes through a prism. But theprism has only straight edges, so the curvature of a water droplet is notnecessary for the formation of a rainbow. The size of the angle appears to beirrelevant to the phenomenon. In the case of the prism, there is only onerefraction and no reflection of the light, so it appears that only one refractionis necessary for the phenomenon.2 So he leaves us with the refraction oflight as the sole necessary condition for explaining the rainbow phenomenon.

Before going on, we should notice what Descartes has done here andhow it complies with our general account of the Cartesian method. Notice,first, that a rainbow as a phenomenon that occurs after a thunderstorm is

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sensibly indistinguishable either from a rainbow that occurs when lightpasses through water in a fountain or from the result of light passing througha prism. Second, insofar as the visual effect is the same, prima facie reasonsarise for assuming a common cause. In examining the prism, Descartes hasclarified the idea of the cause of a rainbow; it is in many ways analogous tothe clarification of the idea of the self in Meditation Two (see AT 7: 25–8,CSM 2:17–19).3 The meteorological rainbow is phenomenally identical withthe rainbow caused by light passing through a prism. In showing thedifferences between the two cases, he enables himself to hone the notion ofthe cause of a rainbow to its single fundamental element, namely, therefraction of light.

But if the refraction of light alone is essential to the rainbow phenomenon,it remains an open question why such refraction results in the apparentchange from white light to colored light. In turning to this problem, Descartesagain allows the conclusions reached in the Optics to guide his hypotheses.Light is construed as the movement of fine particles. The movement ofthese particles is, in principle, no different from the movement of otherbodies. So to explain refraction is nothing more than to explain changes inthe motion of the moving particles constituting light. Descartes explainsthis (see Figure 4) by means of the interaction of a particle V (whose spin isrepresented by the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4) with four other particles, Q,R, S,

Figure 3 The prism

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and T. If Q and R are moving more rapidly toward some point X than V, andS and T are moving more slowly toward X than V, then Q increases the spinof V without hindrance from R, since R is already moving faster. The resultis that V has a stronger tendency to rotate than to move in a straight line,which causes the color red. If the opposite situation obtains – if Q and R aremoving more slowly than V, which is moving more slowly than T and S –then the rotation of V is decreased and it veers in such a way that it is visibleas the colors green to blue.4

Notice what has happened. Descartes focuses on the rainbowphenomenon. He makes certain observations of a meteorological rainbow.He clarifies the concept of the cause of a rainbow by considering rainbowscaused by a prism. This ideational analysis clarifies the idea of the cause ofa rainbow by reducing it to a fundamental common element, namely therefraction of light. He then explains refraction in terms of his optical theory.All that remains for him to do is explain why, in the case of the meteorologicalrainbow, the primary and secondary rainbows are perceived only at about42° and 52°. This he explains in terms of shadows, the blockage of light (seeAT 6: 336–7, O 339).

We need not go into the details of that explanation. Nor need we go intohis explanations of inverted rainbows (AT 6: 341–2, O 343–4) and tertiaryrainbows (AT 6: 342–3, O 344). Suffice it to say his pattern throughout

Figure 4 Movement of particles

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Discourse Eight follows the model we set forth in the first three chapters.He analyzes the phenomenon (he looks for clear and distinct ideas). Heseeks natural laws which will allow him to explain it. In this case, unlikethose we have considered or shall consider below, the laws are found inthe more general work he has already completed, namely, the Optics.Having found the laws and a “clear and distinct idea” of the cause of therainbow, he can explain the meteorological phenomenon on the basis ofhis laws. This is precisely what one would expect given our account of theCartesian method.

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Part II

Descartes’sMeditations on FirstPhilosophy

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4 Meditation One

Doubts and suppositions

Now that we have provided a general account of the Cartesian method, weturn to the Meditations. Since Descartes claimed that “analysis . . . is thebest and truest method of instruction, and it was the method alone which Iemployed in my Meditations” (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 111), our account of themethod should prove insightful with regard to the argumentative structureof the Meditations. Further, we take seriously his remark that “there aremany truths which – although it is vital to be aware of them – this methodoften scarcely mentions, since they are transparently clear to anyone whogives them his attention” (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 110), which implies that manyappeals to the common principles and eternal truths are not explicitlymentioned (see P 1: 49; CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332).

In this chapter we examine the First Meditation. We show that the doubtsare not all of a kind. The early doubts are based on epistemic assumptions;the later doubts are purely hypothetical. While one might argue that thedoubts function only as hypotheses to be refuted, we argue that the deceiver-God argument, the defective-faculties argument, and the malicious-demonhypothesis fulfill more complex heuristic roles.

Our discussion has three parts. We begin by examining the meditation’sopening paragraphs and argue that the “method of doubt” serves primarilyto clear the mind of its pre-philosophical biases. Next we examine what wecall the “epistemic doubts,” that is, the doubts prior to the deceiver-Godargument. Finally, we examine the purely hypothetical (hyperbolical) doubtsand argue that the heuristic functions of the deceiver-God argument, thedefective-faculties argument, and the evil-demon hypothesis are distinctfrom one another.

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New foundations: the task of the Meditations

Descartes begins the Meditations with his famous foundations metaphor.Having been:

struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true inmy childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edificethat I had subsequently based on them . . . [I realized that it wasnecessary] to demolish everything completely and start again rightfrom the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in thesciences that was stable and likely to last.

(AT 7: 17, CSM 2: 12)

Descartes seeks to establish new epistemic foundations for his sciences.What does this entail? He tells us later that “Whatever I have up till nowaccepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through thesenses” (AT 7: 18, CSM 2: 12). This suggests that he will focus his attack onthe empiricism manifest in the Scholastic maxim, “Nihil est in intellectuquod prius non fuerit in sensu.” If our account of the method is correct,Descartes replaces this empiricist principle with the principle that one shouldaccept as “most true” only such principles that one knows through thenatural light of reason (eternal truths).1

The foundations metaphor seems to have two further implications. First,consistent with the shift away from an empiricist epistemology, first principlesare known by reason, not by abstraction from experience (see AT 7: 117, 120,220, 221, 228, 9A: 211, 215, 216; CSM 2: 83, 85, 155, 156, 160, 274, 276, 277).This epistemological shift marks a significant departure from the Aristoteliantradition, which held that even the truths of mathematics and metaphysicsare abstracted from experience (Metaphysics 11.3, 1061a29–1061b12: Aristotle1941: 855). Second, although the Meditations is an epistemological work,metaphysics is its subject-matter. Descartes attempts to place his scientificworks on secure metaphysical as well as epistemological foundations.2 Giventhe reductionist tendencies in his scientific works, we can reasonablyunderstand the search for metaphysical foundations for the sciences as thesearch for the highest explanatory principle.3 If one finds such a principle, itprovides the basis for justifying the claim that the material world exists andexplains what can be known of it.

Descartes urges one “to demolish everything completely and start againright from the foundations” (AT 7: 17, CSM 2: 12; see also AT 6: 13–14, 10:

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511–14, CSM 1: 117, 2: 407–9, and P 1: 1–2), but when one looks at that taskin comparison with the conclusions of Meditation Six, one notices that theworld envisaged there appears much like the world dismantled in MeditationOne. Descartes seems to have replaced his old opinions “with the sameones once I had squared them with the standards of reason” (AT 6: 13–14,CSM 1: 117).4 While the attack on the foundations razes Descartes’s houseof opinions to the ground, his practice comes closer to lifting a house fromits foundation and moving it to a new and firmer one. Such a move inevitablyrequires some patching in the edifice moved: for example colors, sounds,heat and cold lose the status of “real qualities” and become what laterphilosophers call “secondary qualities,” but much of the house remainsintact. Nor should one find this terribly surprising. While the rhetoric of theMeditations plays down the role of sense experience, Descartes grants atleast a moderate degree of certainty to sense experience. In the Preface tothe French edition of the Principles, he lists sense experience as a level ofhuman wisdom second only to “notions which are so clear in themselvesthat they can be acquired without mediation” (AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181).Although he goes on to claim that there is a still more perfect way, which“consists in the search for the first causes and the true principles whichenable us to deduce the reasons for everything we are capable of knowing”(AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181), much of what is known by this highest way leavesintact what is known by the lower ones. This result should startle no one,since the fifth and highest level of wisdom, more properly understood, definesthe limits of what is known by sense experience.

Descartes gives voice to another theme that recurs throughout theMeditations, namely, that the discovery of false beliefs is the motive forsystematic doubt. If knowledge is based on the wrong foundations, errorcan easily follow. But this alone does not explain why he believed thatsystematic doubt constitutes a necessary propaedeutic to discovering newfoundations.

Doubt is needed to free the mind from “preconceived opinions”(præjudiciis) formed by sense experience (see AT 7: 445, CSM 2: 299; AT 1:353, CSM 3: 55; P 1: 1 and 71). In the Dedicatory Letter to the Sorbonne heindicates that a primary reason why few people will understand hisMeditations is that “they require a mind which is completely free frompreconceived opinions and which can easily detach itself from involvementwith the senses” (AT 7: 4, CSM 2: 5). In the Preface to the Reader he warns,“I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able andwilling to meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from thesenses and from all preconceived opinions” (AT 7: 9, CSM 2: 8). In the

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Synopsis he writes that the greatest benefit of the doubts “lies in freeing usfrom all our preconceived opinions, and providing the easiest route bywhich the mind may be led away from the senses” (AT 7: 12, CSM 2: 9). And,finally, in the Conversation with Burman he sounds this theme once again:“[T]he author is considering at this point the man who is only just beginningto philosophize and who is paying attention only to what he knows he isaware of” (CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332). In a prephilosophical state, onenaturally assumes that the empiricist principle is true. The data of senseexperience are, for all of us in a naive state, first in the order of consideration.Insofar as Descartes attempts to replace the empiricist principle with analternative foundational epistemic principle, he drives a wedge betweenwhat is first in the order of consideration and what is first in the order ofepistemic priority.

Calling preconceived opinions into doubt allows us to attend more closelyto the natural light (AT 7: 107, CSM 2: 77; see also AT 7: 135, CSM 2: 97; seealso CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332–3). A systematic doubt paves the way forrecognizing the primary notions or eternal truths – particularly metaphysicalfirst principles (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 111) – which “we cannot fail to know . . .when the occasion for thinking about them arises, provided that we are notblinded by preconceived opinions” (P 1: 49: AT 8A: 24, CSM 1: 209; see alsoP 1: 50, 67). The philosopher at the beginning of the Meditations isunderstood as one in a state of philosophical naiveté, one having all thenatural biases toward the reliability of sense perception. By weaning oneselffrom sense experience, one becomes aware of those axioms that are “in usfrom birth” (CB §1: AT 5: 145, CSM 3: 332), and one is in a position torecognize their truth by the natural light.

While Descartes’s objective was to doubt all his previous opinions, heinsists on a reasoned doubt. He explains that “it will be enough if I find ineach of them at least some reason for doubt” (AT 7: 18, CSM 2: 12). For eachclaim that he engulfs in doubt, he provides a reason for doing so. As weshall see, the doubts are of various kinds. Some doubts are based onexperience; others are purely hypothetical. By raising these doubts,Descartes destroys the foundations for his current house of beliefs and thehouse “collapses of its own accord” (ibid.).

Epistemological doubts

In his scientific writings, Descartes typically begins with a set of suppositions(hypotheses) that his subsequent discussions tend to confirm insofar as

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they explain known phenomena. The doubts raised in the First Meditationcan be treated as suppositions, but they differ in two ways from thesuppositions in his other works. First, while he offers the suppositions inthe scientific works for adoption, the doubts in the First Meditation functionprimarily as suppositions to be refuted.5 Second, while the suppositions inthe scientific writings are conceptually simple, those introduced by thedoubts are conceptually complex. By looking at the prudential doubt at thebeginning of Meditation One, we discover that Descartes makes twosuppositions, namely that all knowledge is derived from the senses and thatjudgments based upon sense perception are sometimes inconsistent.Granting the second supposition sets the stage for a reductio ad absurdumof the first.

Descartes begins by noting:

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquiredeither from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time Ihave found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trustcompletely those who have deceived us even once.

(AT 7: 18, CSM 2: 12)

Cases in which the senses have deceived include “towers which had lookedround from a distance appeared square from close up; and enormous statuesstanding on their pediments did not seem large when observed from theground” (AT 7: 76, CSM 2: 53; cf. AT 7: 385, CSM 2: 264). Assuming thatneither the tower nor the statue mutates when its sensible appearanceschange, we have made inconsistent judgments based on past experience.So Descartes suggests it is epistemically prudent to withhold judgmentuntil one is in the most favorable position to judge.

Is Descartes’s concern limited to epistemic prudence? We think not. Ifeverything is known “from the senses or through the senses,” and if, asBerman reports, this is the distinction between what is known by sight andwhat is known by hearing, that is, instruction (CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332),then the principle of noncontradiction must be known through the senses.6

One cannot know it “from the senses”: the most the senses could show isthat, as a matter of fact, objects do not have inconsistent properties, notthat it is impossible for them to have inconsistent properties.7 Hence, itcould only be known “through the senses,” that is, by instruction. This setsthe stage for a regress to Proto-Gorgias, the first person who taught the

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principle of noncontradiction. At that point one faces the following dilemma:either Proto-Gorgias knew the principle was true or she did not. If she didnot know it, then even now no grounds for doubt exist in cases ofinconsistent judgment. But we supposed that grounds for doubt do exist.Therefore, she must have known the principle of noncontradiction. If shedid know it, either she knew it “from or through the senses” or in some otherway. We have already acknowledged that it cannot have been known fromthe senses, and by hypothesis she cannot know it through the senses,since the first person who taught the principle of noncontradiction cannothave been taught the principle by another. Hence, Proto-Gorgias must knowit in some other way, that is, the supposition that all knowledge is derived“from the senses or through the senses” must be false. Thus, by acceptingDescartes’s supposition that doubt is possible, one implicitly accepts anonempirical basis for knowledge.

This does not imply that one has no knowledge on the basis of senseexperience; it merely implies that at least there is some non-sensuous basisfor knowledge. Descartes must modify his initial supposition that allknowledge is derived from experience to the claim that only some – though,perhaps, most – knowledge is derived from experience, while allowing atleast that there is a nonsensuous basis for the principle of noncontradiction.The call for prudence is the mark of such a modification.

Having duly noted the need for prudence in making judgments fromsense experience, Descartes implicitly changes his assumed epistemicprinciple from what might be called the Principle of Acquaintance (PA) towhat might be called the Enhanced Principle of Acquaintance (EPA). PAstates that whatever one is sensibly acquainted is identical with the realworld. EPA states that whatever one is sensibly acquainted with providesthe basis for one’s knowledge of the real world, and the real world is identicalwith an internally consistent reconstruction of sensible experience. In otherwords, the object of sensible awareness o1 at t1 may be taken as identicalwith an object in the world so long as there is not another object of sensibleawareness o2 at tn whose existence is inconsistent with o1.

While PA commits one to the claim that the round-appearing, five-inch-tall tower one now sees in the distance is actually round and five inches tall,EPA requires that one suspend judgment on the shape and size of the toweruntil one has more experience. Hence, if one is now at the base of the whatone sees as the same tower that once had appeared as round and five-inches-tall, but now appears to be square and thirty feet tall, and if experienceteaches that towers that appear as short and round from a distance often

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appear tall and square from a closer view, EPA requires that one judge thetower itself as tall and square (see AT 7: 76, 82; CSM 2: 53, 57). EPA providesa judgmental stability to the presumptive world that is not provided by PA.8EPA is a recognition of the normal standards of inductive certainty.

Descartes’s supposition of EPA is evident in the fourth paragraph of theFirst Meditation. There he acknowledges that since the senses occasionallydeceive one, PA must be rejected, that is, one must not judge that the worldis as it appears in those cases in which experiential judgments prove to beinconsistent. Nonetheless, there are cases in which it is virtually impossibleto doubt beliefs derived from the senses, e.g., “that I am here, sitting by thefire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in myhands” (AT 7: 19; CSM 2:13). Why is this virtually impossible to doubt?How does it differ from the case of the distant tower? In the case of thedistant tower, he has inconsistent experiences; in the case of sitting by thefire in his dressing gown he presumably has no such inconsistent experiences.Descartes implicitly appeals to not only his present experience, but to pastexperience as well; he appeals to EPA: given his past experience, he has noreason to doubt his senses in the present case. Indeed, his experiencesuggests that the sole analogue for claiming that he is presently deceived isfound in the insane person, who has numerous false – indeed, outrageous– beliefs. Since no experiential grounds exist for claiming that his belief thathe is seated near the fire in his dressing-gown is false, EPA seems to justifyhis belief. The considerations in this paragraph provide no basis for callingEPA into doubt.

Descartes’s confidence is short-lived. Though he does not explicitly callEPA into doubt, his famous dream argument suggests that no clear groundexists for applying the criterion. In Descartes’s words:

A brilliant piece of reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps atnight, and regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as madmendo when awake – indeed sometimes even more improbable ones. Howoften, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events – thatI am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire – when in fact I amlying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wideawake when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is notasleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I knowwhat I am doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness tosomeone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasionswhen I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I

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think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never anysure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished frombeing asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this veryfeeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.

(AT 7: 19, CSM 2: 13)

If experience is the touchstone of knowledge, one must take into account allkinds of experience. If there were a form of experience distinct from sensibleacquaintance, but not clearly distinguishable from it, then one would notknow when EPA could be applied. The dream argument raises precisely thisproblem. A dream is a natural form of madness. Phenomenally, dream statesare indistinguishable from waking perceptual states.9 Since, by hypothesis,dream states provide one with no knowledge of the real world, any judgmentsregarding the world made on the basis of a dream state will as much lead oneinto error as if one were insane. Descartes alludes to past experiences inwhich he confused dream states with waking perceptual states to provideevidence that such a confusion is possible. But if such a confusion is possibleinsofar as it occasionally occurs, unless there is a criterion by which onecould distinguish dream states from waking perceptual states (the domainto which EPA applies) EPA can provide no clue to the nature of the realworld. Thus, the dream argument raises the specter of losing epistemiccontact with the real world. The dream argument fails to force an explicitrejection of EPA; instead, it forces one to arrive at a meta-criterion that willallow one to delineate those states to which EPA applies from otherexperiential states.10

Since Descartes claims an inability to distinguish dream states from wakingstates, does this imply that experience can play no role in the search forknowledge? No. As the painter paragraph (AT 7: 20, CSM 2: 14) makes clear,the specter of dreams simply requires that one’s epistemic suppositions bechanged once again. They must be both broadened and narrowed. Sinceone finds no criterion on which to distinguish waking experience from dreamexperience, one must broaden “sensible acquaintance” to the generic“experience.” Since some forms of experience yield false judgments, onemust narrow the objects of experience to include those and only thoseobjects that are common to all experience. The analogy between a dreamand a painting does this. While neither a painting nor a dream represents anoccurrent state of affairs, the elements of both are found in occurrentperceptual states. Whether one perceives a portrait or a person, one will

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notice various kinds of body parts: “eyes, head, hands and the body as awhole” (AT 7: 19, CSM 2: 13).

Not all objects represented in dreams or in paintings actually exist.Consider mythical beasts, for example. Yet even mythical beasts arecomposed of parts of the same kinds one sensibly perceives. Though oneoften takes the fact that objects in some dreams and paintings bear littleresemblance to real objects as a ground for questioning the existence ofheads or hands, at least one should deem as real the most general sorts ofthing, “corporeal nature in general, and its extension” (AT 7: 20, CSM 2: 14).

By limiting the things one can claim to exist in spite of the dream argumentto the class of geometrical objects (corporeal nature in general), the painterparagraph is a study in abstraction from sense experience. In moving fromthe contention that bodily parts are real through the contention that colorsare real to the contention that corporeal nature in general is real, Descartesremains consistent with the assumption that one derives all knowledge fromexperience. Those in the Aristotelian-Scholastic heritage even assume thatthe truths of geometry are ultimately abstracted from what is given inexperience. Aristotle himself suggests just this in his Metaphysics, wherehe writes:

As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginninghis investigations he strips off all the sensible qualities, e.g. weight andlightness, harness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and theother sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative andcontinuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in threedimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitative and continuous,and does not consider them in any other respect, and examines therelative positions of some and the attributes of others, and the ratios ofothers; but yet we posit one and the same science of all these things –geometry) – the same is true with regard to being.

(Metaphysics, 11.3, 1061a29–1061b5: Aristotle 1941: 855)

The theme that knowledge arises through abstraction from senseexperience persisted in various forms throughout the Middle Ages (seeCopleston 1972: 82, 92, 119, 122, 130, 211, 241). Hence, as Harry Frankfurt(1970: 64–7) also argues, some version of the empiricist principle ofknowledge, limited now to only the most simple and general aspects ofexperience (mathematical principles), is still supposed when Descartes

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concludes that only the basic truths of mathematics remain indubitable (AT7: 20, CSM 2: 14). If experience is the touchstone of knowledge, and if theprinciples of mathematics apply to all objects of experience insofar as theyare the most abstract truths derived from experience, then the principles ofmathematics are indubitable. To carry the process of doubt any furtherrequires that reasons be given for calling the domain of experience – and theexistence of the corporal realm which presumably underlies it – into doubt.This is the task of the hypothetical doubts.11

The hypothetical doubts

Up to this point Descartes has whittled away at the empiricist principle ofknowledge. Beginning with the very broad and naive principle that allknowledge is derived from sense experience (PA), Descartes first shows thatthe fact that one reaches inconsistent conclusions from experience showsthat one must make experiential judgments with some care. Implicit in his callfor prudence in experiential judgment is a refutation of PA: if one knows thatinconsistent judgments cannot both be true, this must be derived from asource other than sense experience. Then an enhanced principle ofacquaintance (EPA) replaced PA and this new principle requires that onelimit one’s experiential judgments to consistent judgments based on furtherexperience and suspend judgment when the veracity of appearance is anopen question. The dream argument allows EPA to stand, while it alsoproduces the necessity for a meta-criterion that allows one to determinewhen one is in a state of sensible awareness as opposed to a dream state.Given the inapplicability of EPA as the fundamental epistemic principle, weargued that the painter paragraph broadens the epistemic criterion fromsensible appearance to experience in general while narrowing it to experienceof that which is common to both dream-states and waking states. The painterparagraph reflects the common Aristotelian-Scholastic position thatknowledge of universals is obtained by an abstraction from experience.Thus, only the most abstracted aspects of experience, such as mathematicaland geometrical principles, would remain immune from systematic doubt.

To this point only variations on an empiricist principle provide thesuppositional basis for the doubts, and thus empirical considerations fuelthe skeptical engine that propels the continued limitation of the supposition.The remaining doubts raised in the First Meditation are of a different kind.While the previous doubts made no metaphysical assumptions – at most

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they posed limits for one’s metaphysical assumptions – the remaining doubtsmake metaphysical assumptions and are purely hypothetical, raising thequestion of the consequences that would occur if one’s assumptions werecorrect. To distinguish them from their epistemological predecessors, werefer to the deceiver-God argument, the defective faculties argument, andthe malicious demon as “the hypothetical doubts.”

Many commentators treat the three hypothetical doubts as a single“deceiver argument.”12 While we grant that Descartes could treat them asmerely three variations on a common theme, this would make the hypotheticaldoubts differ qua suppositions from the suppositions in the scientificwritings as well as those in the earlier part of the Meditation. If thehypothetical doubts qua suppositions follow the pattern in the scientificwritings, one can read nothing more or less into the supposition than hespecifies. Given this approach, we argue that he uses each hypothesis as aheuristic device for raising a separate set of doubts. In the remainder of thischapter we examine these doubts and, by appealing to the specific places atwhich he replies to the issues raised in each argument, provide some groundsfor contending that a distinct heuristic accompanies each of them.

To facilitate the ability to follow our argument from here to the end of thethis chapter, we have marked the three suppositions under the deceptive-God hypothesis, or the first hypothetical doubt, with the markers “DG1”,“DG2” and “DG3”, and the three suppositions under the malicious-demonhypothesis, or the third hypothetical doubts, with “MD1”, “MD2” and“MD3”.

Descartes expresses the first of his three hypothetical doubts in thefollowing words:

And yet firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion thatthere is an omnipotent God who made me the kind of creature that I am.[DG1] How do I know that he has not brought it about that there is noearth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while atthe same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just asthey do now? [DG2] What is more, since I sometimes believe thatothers go astray in cases where they think they have the most perfectknowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and threeor count the sides of a square, or in some even simpler matter, if that isimaginable? [DG3] But perhaps God would not have allowed me to bedeceived in this way, since he is said to be supremely good. But if itwere inconsistent with his goodness to have created me such that I am

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deceived all the time, it would seem equally foreign to his goodness toallow me to be deceived even occasionally; yet this last assertion cannotbe made.

The second hypothetical doubt is expressed in the following way:

Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence ofso powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain.Let us not argue with them, but grant them that everything said aboutGod is a fiction. According to their supposition, then, I have arrived atmy present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events, orby some other means; yet since deception and error seem to beimperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, the morelikely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time. I have noanswer to these arguments, but am finally compelled to admit that thereis not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properlybe raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but isbased on powerful and well thought-out reasons. So in future I mustwithhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I wouldfrom obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty.

(AT 7: 21–2, CSM 2: 14–15)

Two paragraphs later, the third hypothetical doubt is expressed:

I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good and thesource of truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost powerand cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me.[MD1] I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes,sounds, and all external things are merely delusions of dreams which hehas devised to ensnare my judgement. [MD2] I shall consider myself asnot having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but falselybelieving that I have all these things. [MD3] I shall stubbornly andfirmly persist in this meditation; and, even if it is not my power to knowany truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, that is, resolutelyguard against assenting to any falsehoods, so that the deceiver, howeverpowerful and cunning he may be, will be unable to impose on me in theslightest degree.

(AT 7: 22–3, CSM 2: 15)

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If one notices what Descartes says explicitly, one realizes that one shouldseparate the specific and explicit doubts raised by each of these possibilities.The first hypothetical doubt calls the existence of a material world intoquestion (DG1), it calls one’s mathematical beliefs into question (DG2), andit raises the possibility that the fact that one occasionally errs is sufficient toshow that God is a deceiver (DG3). The second hypothetical doubt doesnot explicitly ask one either to raise questions regarding the existence ofmaterial objects or to question mathematical truths. It simply asks what theconsequences would be if the cause of one’s existence were somethingother than a perfect God: the less perfect the cause of one’s existence, themore probable it is that one is deceived. Finally, the third hypothetical doubt– the malicious demon – raises the possibility that all appearances aredelusions (MD1) and that one does not have a bodily nature (MD2), addingthe reminder that one must guard against assenting to falsehoods (MD3).Hence, with the possible exceptions of DG1 and MD1, the specific andexplicit doubts one entertains in the three hypotheses are distinct. Beforeturning to Descartes’s uses of these doubts, let us ask whether there aredifferences between DG1 and MD1.

If one examines DG1 and MD1, one observes both similarities anddifferences. In DG1 Descartes explicitly raises the possibility that a deceiver-God could cause one falsely to believe in the existence of external objects.While MD1 does not explicitly raise the question of existence, it does suggestthat external things and their properties might be “delusions of dreamswhich he has devised to ensnare my judgment” (AT 7: 23, CSM 2: 15). Is thedifference significant? We believe so. Since Descartes indicates in the painterparagraph that one’s inability to distinguish dream states from bona fideperceptual states fails to entail a complete lack of knowledge (AT 7: 19–20,CSM 13–14), we suggest a similar point here, namely, even if one were in aperpetual dream state, one cannot conclude that one would have nowarranted judgments regarding material objects, although any suchjudgments would be nonexistential judgments. To see the plausibility ofthis point, let us see how Descartes uses the malicious-demon hypothesis.

The malicious demon

The third hypothetical doubt supposes a malicious demon as the root causeof deception. In the Meditations, the demon explicitly appears on themeditative stage for a fairly short period of time: it makes its entrance at the

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end of Meditation One, and is never mentioned after Meditation Two. InMeditation Two, Descartes responds to MD1–MD3 in the reverse of theorder in which they are introduced.

Recall MD3: “even if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall atleast do what is in my power, that is, resolutely guard against assenting toany falsehood” (AT 7: 23, CSM 2: 15). The Second Meditation begins withvirtually the same vow:

Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if Ihad found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until Irecognize some thing certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least recognizefor certain that there is no certainty.

(AT 7: 24, CSM 2: 16)

Being nothing more than a resolution, MD3 needs no reply.MD2 raises doubts about one’s bodily existence: “I shall consider myself

as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but falsely believingthat I have all these things” (AT 7: 23, CSM 2: 15). The same issue comes upin the first Cogito passage (AT 7: 24–5, CSM 2: 16–17) and again in thediscussion leading to res cogitans:

But I have just said that I have no sense and no body. This is thesticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with abody and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I haveconvinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky,no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it not follow that I too do not exist?

(AT 7: 24–5, CSM 16)

MD2 raises these doubts. The demon is a heuristic device. One of its usesis to strip away the presumption that one’s existence is purely bodily ordependent upon the existence of bodies. By clearing away those preanalyticprejudices, the demon hypothesis paves the way for Descartes’s recognitionthat thinking is a sufficient condition for knowing his own existence, acondition that is immune from the doubts raised by the possibility of an evildeceiver (AT 7: 25, CSM 2: 17).13 Similarly, in clarifying the concept of himself,Descartes appeals to these same demonic doubts regarding the presumptionthat he is a bodily thing (AT 7: 26–7, CSM 2: 18).

With res cogitans, the malicious demon disappears from the stage of theMeditations. The demon functioned as a epistemic purgative and as a foil

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against which to test the conclusions reached to that point in the Meditation(see AT 7: 172, CSM 2: 121). But even if the persona of the demon is gone,MD1 remains. Where does Descartes examine that doubt? We have noticedthat there are prima facie differences between MD1 and DG1. We hope toshow that one can reasonably take the piece-of-wax argument as a reply tothe doubt.

Recall MD1: “I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes,sounds, and all external things are merely delusions of dreams which he hasdevised to ensnare my judgement” (AT 7: 23, CSM 2: 15). Notice that colors,shapes, and sounds are among the specific things Descartes suggests mightbe delusions of dreams. Notice also that he is concerned with judgments.He addresses these topics in the piece-of-wax argument. When the wax isremoved from the honey-comb, “its colour, shape, and size are plain to see. . . if you rap it with your knuckle it makes a sound” (AT 7: 30, CSM 2: 20).Yet, as Descartes approaches the fire, these specific qualities change. Thewax becomes clear, its shape changes, it expands in size, and it no longermakes sounds when rapped with one’s knuckle. Still one judges that the waxremains the same throughout the changes. Judgment is a function of theintellect, not the perceptive faculty. Insofar as the intellect helps producejudgments, it makes little difference whether the ideas that are the objects ofjudgment are ideas of existent things or mere delusions. The clarified idea ofthe wax – the idea that results from one’s judgment – is the idea of the natureof wax whether or not wax exists. Hence, with respect to essential – asopposed to existential – judgments, it makes no difference whether externalthings are “delusions of dreams.” MD1 provides the catalyst fordistinguishing between essential and existential judgments.14

The deceptive-faculties argument

Descartes’s second doubt supposes that a being less powerful than Godcauses one’s being.15 He believes that the less powerful the cause of one’sbeing, the greater the probability that one is deceived. Why would Descartesbelieve this? What are the “powerful and well thought-out reasons” thatunderlie this doubt? The doubt rests on Descartes’s causal maxim, “theremust be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in theeffect of that cause” (AT 7: 40, CSM 2: 28). Since it is a corollary of thisprinciple that “what is more perfect . . . cannot arise from what is less perfect”(AT 7: 40–1, CSM 2: 28), the supposition that the cause of one’s being is less

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than perfect entails that one is less than perfect, and as the perfection ofone’s cause decreases, the probability of deception increases.

If our construal of the second doubt is correct, the arguments for theexistence of God in the Third Meditation are an extended reply to it, for thecausal maxim and its corollary with respect to objective reality take centerstage in that Meditation (see AT 7: 42, CSM 2: 29). Descartes turns thedoubt on its head, since, in conjunction with the claim that one has an ideaof God, he uses the operative principle to show that the cause of one’sbeing must be God. As we show in Chapter Six, there is also a shift in thatMeditation from the idea of God as a being with numerous properties to theidea of a supremely perfect being, and “since it is manifest by the naturallight that all fraud and deception depend on some defect,” Descartesconcludes that God cannot be a deceiver (AT 7: 52, CSM 2: 35). Given thatconclusion, the issue shifts to whether any remaining grounds exist fordeclaring God is a deceiver, the issues raised in the first hypothetical doubt.16

Is God a deceiver?

If one accepts our account to this point, the malicious-demon hypothesisfunctions primarily as a means of drawing the reader away from theassumptions, first, that the domain of reality is identical with the corporealrealm and second, that all judgments are or presuppose existential judgments.The deceptive faculties argument raises questions concerning the cause ofone’s existence and was introduced as a hypothesis to be refuted. Given histripartite rationale for doubting, namely, the doubts that either first, drawone away from the presumption that the world is corporal and known solelyby experience, second, provide Descartes with something to which to replyin subsequent meditations, or third, provide a foil against which to testsubsequent conclusions (AT 7: 172, CSM 2: 121), one would expect that atleast some of the doubts raised by the deceiver-God argument are foilsagainst which to test his conclusions. We shall see that this is so.

At the end of the Third Meditation, Descartes concludes that God is nota deceiver (AT 7: 52, CSM 2: 35). Nonetheless, the implications of thepossibility of divine deception dominate the last three meditations. Recallthat DG3 raises the question whether God would be a deceiver if it everhappened that one were deceived. This issue is addressed in MeditationFour. Descartes claims that one has a faculty of judgment that is implantedby God and that a nondeceiving God would not allow one “to go wrong

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while using it correctly” (AT 7: 54, CSM 2: 38). Immediately after this, heraises the issue expressed in DG3: “There would be no further doubt onthis issue were it not that what I have just said [that God is not a deceiver]appears to imply that I am incapable of ever going wrong” (AT 7: 54, CSM2: 38). The remainder of the meditation is devoted to developing a theoryof judgment which explains how one can err while exonerating God fromcharges of deception. Hence, DG3 is a foil against which Descartes teststhe contention that God is not a deceiver.

DG2 raises the possibility that one might err even in cases in which onebelieves one has the most perfect knowledge. Meditation Five focuses onDescartes’s paradigm of perfect knowledge, mathematics. He argues firstthat knowledge of simple natures is evident (AT 7: 64–5, CSM 2: 44–5),and later that insofar as clear and distinct ideas depend upon God theymust be true (AT 7: 70, CSM 2: 48), and that one’s knowledge of theexistence of God guarantees that one will not be deceived in one’s memoriesof clear and distinct ideas, thereby guaranteeing the certainty ofmathematical demonstrations (AT 7: 69–70, CSM 2:48).17 Thus, DG2 isalso a foil against which Descartes tests his conclusions.

Finally, DG1 calls the existence of material objects into question. InMeditation Six Descartes replies to that doubt. He argues that the materialworld must exist insofar as it is subject to mathematical description fromthe following observations and previously established conclusions: one,one has a natural disposition to believe in the existence of the materialworld; two, God is not a deceiver; three, God would be a deceiver if onehad a disposition to believe in a material world but there were no facultythat allowed one to correct one’s belief.18

In the Conversation with Burman Descartes indicates that in the FirstMeditation he was considering a person who was just beginning tophilosophize. He assumed that “the common principles or axioms . . . arepresent in us from birth with such clarity . . . we neglect them and thinkabout them only in a confused manner, but never in the abstract, or apartfrom material things and particular instances” (CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3:332–3). If our account of the hypothetical doubts is correct, one implicitlyaccepts at least one of those common principles (Descartes’s causal maxim)in supposing the doubts, and the process of meditation makes many ofthose principles and their consequences explicit.

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Conclusions

The task of the First Meditation is to rid the mind of its preconceivedopinions. Descartes undertakes this task by introducing two sets of doubts.The one kind is characterized by a challenge to one’s epistemic suppositionthat the world is as one perceives it. Each successive doubt posesexperientially based counter-examples to one of the supposed empiricalepistemic principles, which requires, in each case, that a more limited versionof the supposition replace the original. The second set of doubts ishypothetical in nature. The doubts raise numerous issues to which he repliesin subsequent Meditations. He claimed that in the First Meditation “we aredealing primarily with the question of whether anything has real existence”(CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332). By the end of the Meditation, the existenceof all things has been called into doubt. He has cleared the reader’s mind ofits preconceived opinions, and it is now in a state in which the natural lightcan shine forth. We shall examine the first fruits of this natural illuminationin the next chapter.

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5 Meditation Two

The beginning of the ascent

Having completed the systematic undermining of his earlier beliefs, Descartesbegins to rebuild his epistemic world. In his reconstruction he follows themethod we outlined in the first three chapters. Under that method the Secondand Third Meditations are fundamentally a search for principles. To followDescartes’s house metaphor, in these meditations he pours the foundationand constructs most of the framing; in the final three meditations, he addsthe siding and lays out the interior. The completion of the interior decor andexternal trim is work left for his physics and ethics.

In this chapter we show how the method operates in the SecondMeditation. Descartes takes the fact that he doubts as a factual premise andproceeds to search for a principle which justifies the claim that he exists. Inthe Second Meditation, one finds a characteristic interplay between a searchfor principles and conceptual elucidation. His examinations of his own natureand the piece of wax stand as exemplars of clarifying an idea. Theseexaminations provide important preliminaries to his introduction of thecriterion of clear and distinct perception in Meditation Three.

A new foundation

Descartes is nothing if not dramatic when he begins the Second Meditationwith a reiteration of the conclusions of Meditation One. The openingparagraph of the Meditation stresses the seriousness of his doubts. Heincludes a virtual restatement of the third explicit doubt under the malicious-demon hypothesis, namely, the resolution to “guard against assenting toany falsehoods, so that the deceiver, however powerful and cunning hemay be, will be unable to impose on me in the slightest degree” (AT 7: 23,CSM 2: 15) in stating “Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will

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set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly false.” The more interestingelement of the paragraph, however, is found in his desire to find anArchimedean point:

Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in orderto shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage tofind just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable.

(AT 7: 23, CSM 2: 16)

What is the nature of this point? What will Descartes gain if he discovers it?One might reasonably suggest that “the point” is the Cogito: this is the

starting-point of his philosophy (see P 1: 10). But what status should beascribed to that discovery? Is this the foundation on which he intends torebuild his sciences (cf. AT 7: 17, CSM 2: 12)? Or is its status more like thatof a basement wall that is built upon a foundation that has already beenpoured? We believe it is the latter, the first brick laid upon a new foundation,a foundation which, at least for purposes of dramatic effect, Descartes doesnot yet recognize as secure. To understand our point here, let us returnbriefly to the First Meditation.

Recall that Descartes’s objective there was to demolish what he hadformerly considered the foundation of his sciences, namely an empiricistcriterion of knowledge: “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most trueI have acquired either from or through the senses” (AT 7: 18, CSM 2: 12). Ifthe Archimedean point qua Cogito were construed as the foundation of hisnew philosophy, it would be a radically different kind of foundation fromthat which he destroyed: he would be replacing a criteriological foundationwith a factual foundation. But a factual claim will not work as an epistemicfoundation: the epistemic objective is to distinguish what can be known astrue (known as facts) from what cannot. For this reason we consider it primafacie implausible to construe the search for an Archimedean point as asearch for foundations.

Furthermore, the criticisms of the empiricist criterion in Meditation Onealready point to an alternative criteriological foundation. Recall Descartes’sseemingly modest claim that “from time to time I have found that the sensesdeceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceivedus even once” (AT 7: 18, CSM 2: 12). We argued that to raise foundationaldoubts Descartes must implicitly weigh the probability of one criterion onthe basis of another. Claims of deception require that one previously know

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that the conjunction of two inconsistent claims cannot be true. Thisknowledge cannot be obtained from sense experience alone: sense experiencecan report no more than what appear to be the facts at a given time. Theprinciple of noncontradiction must be known in some other way, namely, bythe natural light: its truth must be perceived clearly and distinctly.

As we shall see, Descartes repeatedly appeals to what is known by thenatural light at crucial junctures in his arguments. We believe that the naturallight (perceiving clearly and distinctly) constitutes his new epistemicfoundation: it is necessary for judging the applicability of other criteria,such as the epistemic criterion, and it provides the source for knowledge ofexceedingly general principles (eternal truths).1

Even if the new epistemic foundation is criteriological, that is, perceivingclearly and distinctly, this still fails to help us locate the Archimedean point.We are inclined to identify the Cartesian self as that point. The doubts hadcalled the existence of all objects into question. Through the Cogito, theCartesian self becomes the first existent object introduced into Descartes’sworld.2 This entity, the first one placed on the foundation, like an Archimedeanpoint, provides the fulcrum to move additional building materials into place.

Descartes continues by reminding himself of the doubts he hadentertained. First, he raises the doubts consistent with holding that allknowledge requires sense experience. This is emphasized in his remarksthat “everything I see is spurious” and “I have no senses” (AT 7: 24, CSM2: 16). Second, he seems concerned with existential claims. He clarifies thisconcem with regard to memory: the assumption is that “none of the thingsthat it reports ever happened” (AT 7: 24, CSM 2: 16). One might reasonablysuggest the same regarding body, shape, extension, movement, and place,since Descartes said he would consider them chimeras, that is, idle fanciesand illusions. Finally, if existential claims are his only concern, he wouldleave open the entire realm of eternal truths as things knowable. Indeed, theabsence of any allusion to the unknowability of mathematical truths suggeststhat the Cartesian meditator is concerned solely with existential claims andthat a nonempirical means might remain for knowing truths.

The Cogito outside the Meditations

On our account of the Cartesian method, Descartes searches for eternaltruths as explanatory principles. In the case of the Cogito, this would implythat he infers his own existence in the form of an argument, or alternatively

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a principle which, together with the fact that he thinks, explains his existence.While to construe “I think, therefore I am” as an enthymematic syllogismseems consistent with the remark in Principles Part 1, section 10, it appearsinconsistent with one of Descartes’s famous remarks in the Second Replies.So before turning to the Cogito passages in the Meditations, we provide away to understand the Cogito passages outside the Meditations asconsistent with our interpretation and, given our account of the method,with one another.

In the Second Replies, Descartes seemingly denies that his knowledge ofhis own existence rests upon a syllogistic argument. He writes:

And when we become aware that we are thinking things, this is a primarynotion which is not derived by means of any syllogism. When someonesays ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist,’ he does not deduceexistence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it assomething self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clearfrom the fact that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, hewould have to have had previous knowledge of the major premiss‘Everything that thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it fromexperiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should thinkwithout existing. It is in the nature of our mind to construct generalpropositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones.

(AT 7: 140–1, CSM 2: 100)

Here Descartes seemingly denies that one’s knowledge of one’s ownexistence is based on a syllogism. If one’s knowledge of one’s own existencewere so based, then the major premise, “everything that thinks exists,”would be logically and epistemically prior to the existential claim. But insofaras we “construct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge ofparticular ones,” he seems to reject both the logical and epistemic priority ofthe general proposition. Here he appears to embrace the claim that oneknows one’s own existence by an immediate intuition. Since thisinterpretation of the passage is widespread, let us call it the “standardinterpretation” (see Copleston 1960: 101–2; Frankfurt 1970: 97; Williams1978: 89; Wilson 1978: 56; Curley 1978: 87–93).

In the Principles, on the other hand, Descartes seems to reverse theorder of epistemic priority, for there he writes:

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And when I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist isthe first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes inan orderly way, I did not in saying that deny that one must first knowwhat thought, existence, and certainty are, and that it is impossible thatthat which thinks should not exist, and so forth. But because these arevery general notions, and ones which on their own provide us with noknowledge of anything that exists, I did not think they needed to belisted.

(P 1: 10: AT 8A: 8, CSM 1: 196)

Even though the Cogito is the “first and most certain of all [propositions] tooccur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way,” this does not implythat “sum” can be known apart from the general principle “everything thatthinks exists.” This passage seems to suggest that the general principle isepistemically prior to “sum,” which seems to be exactly what Descartesdenied in the Second Replies.

In his conversation with Descartes, Burman raised the question of theconsistency of the two passages. Descartes’s reply is recorded as follows:

Before this inference, “I think therefore I am,” the major “whateverthinks is” can be known, for it is in reality prior to my inference, and myinference depends upon it. This is why the author says in the Principlesthat the major premise comes first, namely because implicitly it is alwayspresupposed and prior. But it does not follow that I am always expresslyand explicitly aware of its priority or that I know it before my inference.This is because I am attending only to what I experience inside myself– for example, “I think therefore I am”: I do not pay attention in the sameway to the general notion “whatever thinks is.” As I have explainedbefore, we do not separate out these general propositions from theparticular instances; rather, it is in particular instances that we think ofthem. This is the sense in which the words from page 155 cited here[from the Second Replies] should be taken.

(CB §4: AT 5: 147, CSM 3: 333)

In his reply to Burman, Descartes draws a distinction between the logical orepistemic order of propositions and the order of consideration, that is, theorder in which propositions are actually entertained.3 Consistent with hisposition in the Principles, Descartes claimed that there is an inference from

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I think to I exist and that the general proposition, Whatever thinks exists, isepistemically prior to “sum.” But the fact that the justification of “sum” isdependent upon one’s prior knowledge of the general proposition does notentail that one is explicitly aware of the general proposition beforeentertaining the inferential claim, “I think, therefore I am”: nothing guaranteesthat the order of consideration is the same as the order of epistemic priority.Indeed, he suggests that one entertains general propositions only whenone is considering particular propositions, that is, “it is in particularinstances that we think of them” (CB §4, Cottingham’s emphasis: AT 5: 147,CSM 3: 333, Cottingham removes the emphasis). This indicates that at leastone particular proposition is prior in order of consideration to generalpropositions: there may be more. Since the proposition Whatever thinksexists is an eternal truth, we recognize it as true as soon as we entertain it (P1: 49); however, we entertain and recognize such eternal truths as true onlywithin the context of examining their particular instances. As Descartescommented earlier in the Conversation:

since they [common principles and axioms, that is, eternal truths] arepresent in us from birth with such clarity, and since we experience theminside ourselves, we neglect them and think about them only in aconfused manner, but never in the abstract, or apart from material thingsand particular instances. Indeed, if people were to think about them inthe abstract, no one would have any doubt about them; . . . for theycannot be denied by anyone who carefully focuses his attention onthem.

(CB §1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332–3)

This indicates that even though certain general propositions are epistemicallyprimary, particular propositions supersede them in the order of consideration.

If the position Descartes advanced in the Conversation reconciles thepassage in the Second Replies with that in the Principles, this reconciliationis reached through the distinction between the order of consideration andthe order of epistemic primacy. Further, if this distinction allows for aconsistent reading of those two passages, then the interpretation that hasbeen advanced for one of the passages must be incorrect: that is, bothpassages cannot be concerned primarily with the order of epistemic primacy.

Examining the passage from the Principles, one finds that Descartesimplicitly acknowledges a distinction between the order of considerationand the order of epistemic primacy. He claimed that “the proposition I am

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thinking, therefore I exist is the first and most certain of all to occur toanyone who philosophizes in an orderly way” (P 1: 10: AT 8A: 8, CSM 1:196): that is, a person who follows Descartes’s method in philosophicalinquiry will positively entertain it as the first proposition. But the Cogito’spriority in the order of consideration is not to be confused with epistemicpriority. As Descartes writes, “I did not in saying that deny that one mustfirst know . . . that it is impossible that that which thinks should not exist” (P1: 10: AT 8A: 8, CSM 1: 196). Although the general proposition is epistemicallyprior to “sum,” the Cogito is prior in consideration. Thus, consistent withthe Conversation, this passage from the Principles suggests that it is onthe occasion that one entertains the Cogito that one recognizes the truth ofthe general proposition.

If, however, one accepts Descartes’s contention that the positionadvanced in the Conversation effects a reconciliation between the Principlesand the Second Replies, then one must reject the standard interpretation ofthe passage from the Second Replies: one must reject the assumption thatDescartes is there concerned solely, or even primarily, with the issue ofepistemic primacy. Through a sentence-by-sentence examination of thecritical passage from the Second Replies, we shall show that his interestthere is in the priority of consideration.

The first sentence of the passage reads, “And when we become awarethat we are thinking things, this is a primary notion which is not derived bymeans of any syllogism” (AT 7: 140, CSM 2: 100). Here Descartes does notclaim that coming to know that we are thinking things is a primitive act ofknowledge or a primary notion (prima quaedam notio). Instead, he claimsthat when we become aware or take notice (cum auteum adventimus) thatwe are thinking things, that this “taking notice” is a primary notion. Thelanguage of “taking notice” or “becoming aware” need not imply the truthof that which is noticed. In science, for example, one formulates a hypothesisabout which, prior to empirical and theoretical investigation, one temporarilysuspends judgment. Yet, one is aware of the hypothesis prior to itsconfirmation. To understand “awareness” as mere consideration is consistentwith the Conversation. Similarly, the position advanced in the Conversationrequires that one place no epistemic weight on this primary notion, that is,that the notion of oneself as a thinking thing is primary only in the order ofconsideration, not in the order of epistemic primacy. If this account is correct,then the first sentence in the Replies is consistent with the Conversation.

Further, were one to claim that becoming “aware that we are thinking

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things” is an act of knowledge, it is a claim with no existenrial import.Consistent with his maxim that “we must never ask about the existence ofanything until we first understand its essence” (AT 7: 107–8, CSM 2: 78),Descartes is concerned with his nature, not his existence.4 Insofar as he isconcerned with his nature, this awareness of his nature does not entail thathe considers the maxim that “Everything that thinks exists,” although itmight be the occasion on which he considers that proposition. Thus, evenif one claims the first sentence has epistemic weight, it leaves open thequestion whether his knowledge of his own existence rests upon the generalprinciple.

The second sentence reads, “When someone says ‘I am thinking,therefore I am, or I exist,’ he does not deduce existence from thought bymeans of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simpleintuition of the mind” (AT 7: 140, CSM 2: 100). As Anthony Kenny (1968:84)acknowledges, this passage is ambiguous as to what is known self-evidently, that is, whether it is sum or the Cogito, and consequently wemust consider both possible interpretations. But since the same ambiguityis found in the third sentence, we may reasonably examine the second andthird sentences together. The third sentence reads:

This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by means of asyllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the majorpremiss ‘Everything that thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it fromexperiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should thinkwithout existing.

(AT 4: 140, CSM 2: 100)

We may ask whether one must claim that one’s knowledge of one’s ownexistence is intuitive (known by the natural light) if the ‘it’ in both of thesesentences refers to ‘existence’ rather than the Cogito; that is, whether theintent of “recognizes it [one’s own existence] as something self-evident bya simple intuition of the mind” is that one intuitively knows of one’s ownexistence. One need not conclude that such knowledge is intuitive, but toreject such a conclusion one must recognize that the translation shroudsthe ambiguity of the Latin. The word translated as ‘as’ is ‘tanquem,’ whichcan mean either ‘as’ or ‘as if.’ On the one hand, if it is interpreted as the ‘as’of identity, all the apparent inconsistencies between the Second Repliesand the Principles are justified. On the other hand, if one interprets ‘tanquem’as ‘as if,’ that is, if one understands it as indicating some degree of similarity

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short of identity, one might have a means of rendering the two passagesconsistent. Understood in this second way, this ‘as if’ suggests that one’sown existence is not known by intuition, but that one’s knowledge of one’sown existence is in some way similar to intuitive knowledge. How mightthey be similar?

As we will see, in the Meditations Descartes comes to discover his ownexistence on the basis of methodological doubt: given that he recognizesthat he is a thinking thing, he cannot doubt that he exists (AT 7: 24–5, 27;CSM 2: 16–17, 18). If the fact that he cannot doubt his own existencesufficiently demonstrates that his existence is clearly and distinctly perceived(known by the natural light), then this fact would show that “sum” isintuitively known, and one would have no reason to claim merely that one’sknowledge of one’s own existence is as if it were intuitive knowledge.Descartes, however, lacks the conceptual room to lay claim to clear anddistinct knowledge of his own existence. First, he generally limits clear anddistinct ideas and knowledge by the natural light to ideas of the essences ofthings and necessary truths, and he takes existence to be an essential propertyof God alone (AT 7: 35, 64–5, 8: 21–2, 6: 31–4; CSM 2: 24, 44–5, 1:126–7 andP 1: 45; see also Gewirth 1967). Second, as we have seen, Descartes’s firstrule of method in the Discourse (AT 6: 18, CSM 1: 120) suggests thatindubitability is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for judging aproposition true. Similarly, in Section 43 of Principles, Part 1, he writes,

And even if there were no way of proving [that we never go wrongwhen we assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive], theminds of all of us have been so molded by nature that whenever weperceive something clearly, we spontaneously give our assent to it andare quite unable to doubt its truth.

(AT 8A: 21, CSM 1: 207)

In both passages Descartes suggests that if an idea is clearly and distinctlyperceived, one cannot doubt it. He never suggests that if one cannot doubtan idea, then it is clearly and distinctly perceived. If indubitability is only anecessary, but not a sufficient condition for properly judging the truth of aproposition, then the fact that a proposition is indubitable is compatiblewith the material falsity of that proposition’s constituent ideas.5 Nonetheless,even if one does not clearly and distinctly perceive “sum,” one mightrecognize it “as if it were [our emphasis] something self-evident” in thesense that it is immune from systematic doubt and is accompanied by a

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psychological attitude that is similar to the psychological attitudeaccompanying an idea that is clearly and distinctly perceived. Thus, even ifthe general proposition were epistemically prior to, and therefore necessaryfor the justification of, “sum,” Descartes correctly entertains “sum” prior tothe general proposition according to the order of consideration.

If, according to the other interpretation, the ‘it’ in the second and thirdsentences refers to the Cogito itself, the same understanding of “recognizedas if” applies. If the general proposition were known, the Cogito wouldfollow from it. In the order of consideration, however, a singular propositionsuch as the Cogito is prior to its corresponding general proposition. Onlyon the occasion of considering the singular proposition does one entertainand recognize the truth of the general proposition.

Given this second interpretation, the sense of the final sentence in theparagraph is clear. The sentence reads, “It is in the nature of our mind toconstruct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particularones” (AT 7: 140-1, CSM 2: 100). Particular propositions are prior in theorder of consideration to general propositions.6 This reading of the sentenceis consistent with Descartes’s expressed claims in the Conversation (CB §4:AT 5: 147, CSM 3: 333) and his contention that the proposition “Everythingthat thinks exists” is an eternal truth (P 1: 49). Even though the eternal truthis epistemically prior to both the Cogito and “sum,” this does not entail thatone actually thinks of the general proposition before one thinks of theparticular.

Our reading of the passage from the Replies also supplies an importantexplanation to another peculiarity regarding Descartes’s reply to theobjection. While his reply focuses on the Cogito, the objection focuses onDescartes’s claim that he knew he was a thinking thing. The objection reads:

Thirdly, you are not yet certain of the existence of God, and you saythat you are not certain of anything, and cannot know anything clearlyand distinctly until you have achieved clear and certain knowledge ofthe existence of God. It follows from this that you do not yet clearly anddistinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, on your ownadmission, that knowledge depends on the clear knowledge of anexisting God; and this you have not yet proved in the passage whereyou draw the conclusion that you clearly know what you are.

(AT 7: 124–5, CSM 2: 89)

The question here concerns, not whether there is a syllogism involved in

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concluding that one exists, but one’s knowledge of one’s essential nature.As we have seen, the bulk of Descartes’s reply concerns the Cogito, not thequestion of one’s essential nature. These issues are, of course, closelyrelated. An attribute is an essential attribute of a kind of object if and only ifhaving that attribute is a sufficient condition for the existence of that kind ofobject. Insofar as thought is an essential attribute of the self (mind),recognizing the truth of the proposition that “Whatever thinks, exists” isconcomitant with discovering one’s own nature. Since the proposition is aneternal truth, once it is considered, one knows that it is true, and one thereforeknows that thought is an essential attribute, that is, one knows that it isone’s nature to think. Consequently, one need not appeal to memory inproving one’s essence, and Descartes justifiably responds:

Thirdly, when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we areaware that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only ofknowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are nolonger attending to the arguments by means of which we deducedthem. Now awareness of first principles is not normally called‘knowledge’ by dialectitians.

(AT 7: 140, CSM 2: 100)

Both knowledge of one’s nature and knowledge of the eternal truth that“Everything that thinks exists,” are instances of knowledge of first principles.Both are recognized as materially true by the natural light. Further, knowledgeof one’s essence is concomitant with the recognition of the material truth ofthe proposition “Whatever thinks, exists”: both are eternal truths, andwhichever one is prior in the order of consideration would provide theoccasion for considering the other. Since eternal truths are evident as soonas they are considered, one need not prove the existence of God prior tocoming to know one’s own nature or essence. Thus, as a reply to theobjection, reading the passage in terms of the order of consideration seemsreasonable.

Hence, by acknowledging the distinction suggested in the Conversationwith Burman between the order of consideration and the order of epistemicprimacy, one can show that no inconstencies exist between the discussionsof the Cogito in the Principles and that in the Second Replies. While thediscussion in the Principles addresses both the order of consideration andthe order of epistemic primacy, the response in the Second Replies primarilyaddresses the order of consideration. Notice that this distinction between

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the order of consideration and the order of epistemic primacy is preciselywhat one would expect, given our account of the method in the first threechapters. When employing the method of analysis “there are many truthswhich – although it is vital to be aware of them – this method often scarcelymentions, since they are transparently clear to anyone who gives them hisattention” (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 110), so one should not be surprised thatDescartes states conclusions without citing the etemal truths upon whichthose conclusions rest. This is particularly important given his dictum that“according to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existenceof anything until we first understand its essence” (AT 7: 107, CSM 2: 78),since, as we shall see, in his first proof of his own existence, the Descartesof the Meditations does not explicitly allude to his essential nature prior toclaiming his own existence. Before returning to the Meditations, however,we examine two other passages that tend to support our account of theCogito arguments.

In the Discourse on Method, Descartes provides an abbreviated versionof the Cogito. After setting forth the dream argument, Descartes continues:

But immediately I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everythingfalse, it was necessary that I, who was thinking this, was something.And observing that this truth “I am thinking, therefore I exist” was sofirm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the scepticswere incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it withoutscruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.

(AT 6: 32, CSM 1: 127)

This passage tells us little about how Descartes comes to know his ownexistence. Two paragraphs later, in the context of discussing clear and distinctideas, he explains why he is justified in claiming his own existence. Hewrites:

I observed that there is nothing at all in the proposition “I am thinking,therefore I exist” to assure me that I am speaking the truth, except thatI see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist [ouremphasis]. So I decided that I could take it as a general rule that thethings we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true; onlythere is some difficulty in recognizing which are the things that wedistinctly conceive.

(AT 33, CSM 1: 127)

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Here Descartes appeals to the clarity and distinctness of the general principlethat if something thinks then it exists as a justification for accepting theCogito as an instance. Hence, this passage supports our interpretation ofthe reasoning that led him to affirm his own existence.

The second passage is in his letter to Clerselier of 12 January 1646. There,in referring to a series of objections that had been raised against theMeditations, he writes:

Your friends note six objections against the Second Meditation. Thefirst is this. The author of the Counter-Objections claims that when Isay ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ I presuppose the major premiss‘Whatever thinks exists’, and hence I have already adopted apreconceived opinion. Here he once more misuses the term‘preconceived opinion.’ For although we can apply the term to theproposition in question when it is put forward without attention andbelieved to be true only because we remember that we judged it to betrue previously, we cannot say that it is always a preconceived opinion.For when we examine it, it appears so evident to the understanding thatwe cannot but believe it, even though this may be the first time in ourlife that we have thought of it – in which case we would have nopreconceived opinion about it. But the most important mistake ourcritic makes here is the supposition that knowledge of particularpropositions must always be deduced from universal ones, followingthe same order as that of a syllogism in Dialectic. Here he shows howlittle he knows of the way in which we should search for the truth. It iscertain that if we are to discover the truth we must always begin withparticular notions in order to arrive at general ones later on (though wemay also reverse the order and deduce other particular truths once wehave discovered general ones). Thus when we teach a child the elementsof geometry we will not be able to get him to understand the generalproposition ‘When equal quantities are taken from equal amounts theremaining amounts will be equal,’ or ‘The whole is greater than itsparts,’ unless we show him examples in particular cases. It is by failingto take heed of this that our author has gone astray and produced allthe invalid arguments with which he has stuffed his book. He has simplymade up false major premisses whenever the mood takes him, as thoughI had used them to deduce the truths which I expounded.

(AT 9A: 205–6, CSM 2: 271)

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Descartes focuses on two issues in replying to his critic. First, he arguesthat one expresses no prejudice in claiming that one’s knowledge of thetruth of the Cogito presupposes knowledge of the general proposition“Whatever thinks exists.” Second, he argues that knowledge of particulartruths does not always depend upon knowledge of universal truths. Let usexamine each of these issues in turn.

In his discussion of prejudice, Descartes refers back to an attempt toclarify that notion earlier in the letter. There he writes:

The first of these objections is based on the fact that the author of thisbook has not realized that the term ‘preconceived opinion’ applies notto all the notions which are in our mind (which I admit it is impossiblefor us to get rid of) but only to all the opinions which we have continuedto accept as a result of previous judgements that we have made.

(AT 9B: 204, CSM 2: 270)

Insofar as Descartes systematically doubts, no judgment previous to thatprocess of doubting should be accepted as true. Hence, in the initial stagesof the resolution of those doubts, he should be free of “preconceivedopinions” based upon previous judgments. Nonetheless, he holds thatcertain eternal truths are innate within the mind, and as eternal truths theyare neither based upon previous judgments nor can we “get rid” of them bysystematic doubt; moreover, once we explicitly consider them, we recognizethem as true (P 1: 48–9). Because the general maxim that “Whatever thinksexists” is an eternal truth, it is “so evident to the understanding that wecannot but believe it, even though this may be the first time in our life thatwe have thought of it – in which case we would have no preconceivedopinion about it” (AT 9B: 205, CSM 2: 271). Therefore, Descartes exercisesno prejudice in contending that the general proposition is epistemicallyprior to the Cogito. Consistent with the tenets of the Cartesian method, oneinitially construes the Cogito as a hypothesis that one confirms by deducingit from the eternal truth “Whatever thinks exists.” Even so, as a hypothesis,the Cogito is prior in the order of consideration to the eternal truth.

The remainder of the passage from the letter to Clerselier is also consistentwith the reasoning we attribute to Descartes. He claims that:

if we are to discover the truth we must always begin with particularnotions in order to arrive at general ones later on (though we may also

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reverse the order and deduce other particular truths once we havediscovered general ones).

(AT 9B: 206, CSM 2: 271)

One can know by intuition that one thinks (AT 10: 368, CSM 1: 14).7 Giventhis particular truth as the starting point of one’s reasoning, one can inquireinto the implications of that truth, positing the Cogito as a hypothesis. Thisoccasions the consideration and recognition of the general proposition’smaterial truth, and from this, together with one’s knowledge that one thinks,one can infer that one exists. In this way, consistent with the letter to Clerselier,one begins with particular truths, discovers a general truth, and subsequentlyinfers another particular truth.

Thus, we see that the Cogito passages outside the Meditations areconsistent with our account of the method, and we may now turn to theparallel passages in the Second Meditation.8

The first Cogito arguments in the Meditations

Recall that in the second paragraph of the Meditation, Descartes askedwhat remains certain if one rejects all the evidence of sense perception, andwith it the assumption that bodies exist. He concludes “So what remainstrue? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain” (AT 7: 24, CSM 2: 16).He then asks whether anything exists. In his words:

Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there isnot something else which does not allow even the slightest occasionfor doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts intome the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since Imyself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case amnot I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses andno body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not sobound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist withoutthem? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing inthe world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now followthat I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then Icertainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunningwho is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I tooundoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as

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much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long asI think that I am something. So after considering everything verythoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, isnecessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in mymind.

(AT 7: 24–5, CSM 2: 16–17)

Descartes begins the search for an existent. As we shall see, his procedurehere typifies the upward phase of his analysis, that is, the search for generalprinciples or general (simple) ideas. The argument takes the form of adisjunctive syllogism. Its form is as follows: Either A or B or C exists (isessential to X). But A cannot be known to exist (be essential to X) because .. . B cannot be known to exist (be essential to X) because . . . So C exists (isessential to X).

In the present case, after asking whether something exists, Descartesconsiders two cases. Might not God exist? Might not I exist? Consistentwith the deceiver-God hypothesis, the concept of God is delineated as thatwhich puts thoughts into the person who is thinking. Descartes jettisonsthis existential hypothesis on the grounds that one might cause one’s ownthoughts, which is a corollary of the defective-faculties hypothesis.

With the rejection of the first alternative, Descartes shifts to the second,namely the hypothesis that he, Descartes, exists. Here his dictum that “wemust never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand itsessence” (AT 7: 107, CSM 2: 78) comes into play. In order to determinewhether or not he exists, he has to place himself under a concept, that is, hehas to know enough about his nature to determine what kind of possibleentity he is considering. In effect, he first asks whether he exists as a bodilyentity, rejects that claim, and in so doing rejects the concept of himself as apurely bodily entity. “But I have just said that I have no senses and nobody. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so boundup with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them?” (AT 7: 24,CSM 2: 16). His existence as such an entity (and his concept of himself assuch an entity) falls prey to the malicious-demon hypothesis: “But I haveconvinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, noearth, no minds, no bodies” (AT 7: 25, CSM 2: 16; cf AT 7: 22–3; CSM 2: 15).He then reformulates the concept of himself in three ways: first, as somethingthat can be convinced of something, second as something that can bedeceived and, third, as something that can entertain the proposition, “Iexist.” In his words:

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Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself ofsomething then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supremepower and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. Inthat case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let himdeceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I amnothing so long as I think that I am something. So after consideringeverything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that thisproposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forwardby me or conceived in my mind.

(AT 7: 25, CSM 2: 16–17)

Notice his theme and variations. First, Descartes says I convinced myself ofsomething, therefore I exist. Second, he says I am deceived, therefore I exist(see also The Search After Truth, AT 10: 515, CSM 2: 409–10). Finally, hesays I entertain the proposition “I am,” therefore I exist. Each of these is avariation on the Cogito argument. None of these comes to the same statementas “I think, therefore I am.” Each pertains to a particular type of thought ora thought with a particular propositional content. Why, in the context of theanalytic procedure in the Meditations, does the proof of his own existencefall short of the generality of the standard form of the Cogito?

What Descartes knows about himself rests on what has already occurredin the Meditations. In Meditation One, he doubted his previous beliefs.Therefore, he is justified in conceiving of himself as a thing that doubts.Further, he took his doubts seriously, that is, he convinced himself thatsome of his previous beliefs fall short of knowledge. Therefore, he is justifiedin conceiving of himself as a thing that is convinced of various propositions,even if the propositions of which he is convinced begin with the clause, “Itmight be false that . . .” Finally, he has entertained the proposition, “I exist,”which implies that he is justified in conceiving of himself as a thing thatentertains that proposition. Each of these concepts is singular. Each is posedin terms of a very low grade of generality: they are complex ideas, that is,they are not (yet) conceived as forms of thought.

But how does he reason? Does he propose the proposition “I exist” as ahypothesis to be confirmed? And does he appeal to an implicit premise, towit, “Anything that is convinced of something (doubts, entertains theproposition ‘I exist’) exists?”

The proposition “I do not exist” functions as a hypothesis to be refuted.Notice the way Descartes sets the discussion, “Does it not follow that I too

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do not exist?” (AT 7: 25, CSM 2: 16). Since each of the initial formulations ofthe Cogito implies his existence, these formulations serve as reasons whichfalsify the hypothesis “I do not exist.” He formulates the hypothesisnegatively because he continues to apply doubt as a heuristic with respectto limiting existential claims. Through the refutation of the hypothesis posed,he proves his own existence.

But does his conclusion rest on an implicit premise? One should not besurprised if it does, since, in the method of analysis, “there are many truthswhich – although it is vital to be aware of them – this method often scarcelymentions, since they are transparently clear to anyone who gives them thisattention” (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 110). And it seems that each formulation of theargument requires a premise of the form “Anything that is convinced ofsomething (doubts, entertains the proposition ‘I exist’) exists,” althoughonly his remarks regarding the third formulation tend to show that.

When Descartes claims, “I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it isput forward by me or conceived in my mind” (AT 7: 25, CSM 2: 17), one mustask why he could say it is “necessarily true” (necessario esse verum). If, aswe contend, the existential conclusion rests on the eternal (necessary) truth,“Whatever entertains the proposition ‘I exist’ exists,” then the conclusionis necessitatem ex hypothesi, that is, necessary on the hypothesis that theimplicit major premise is true. For this reason he claims “I am, I exist, isnecessarily true whenever it is put forward by me [our emphasis] orconceived in my mind.” And, of course, he employs this same sense of‘necessity’ in the next paragraph when he alludes to “this ‘I’. . . that nownecessarily exists (qui jam necessario sum)” (AT 7: 25, CSM 2:17).9

Res cogitans and the second Cogito

Having proven his existence under the three descriptions we have justconsidered, Descartes next attempts to develop a better understanding ofhis nature by determining whether those descriptions fall under a moregeneral description of his nature. Ultimately, he concludes with the familiarclaim that he is a thing that thinks. As he did at the outset of the meditation,he begins in a strictly procedural manner by reminding himself what heknows and informing his reader of his plans (AT 7: 25, CSM 2: 17). He knowshe exists, and he indicates that he will take the various conceptions he hadof himself and subject them to careful scrutiny. Here, as in the case of theinitial proofs of his existence, he presents a complex disjunctive syllogism,restating three hypotheses (his previous conceptions of himself) and

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rejecting all but the last on the ground that either it lacks clarity or that it fallsvictim to his systematic doubts.

Descartes introduces and eliminates the first disjunct in a attempt toreject Scholasticism, but also to advamce to what he takes as the moreserious competitors of his disjunctive syllogism. Beginning as any goodScholastic might, he writes that he formerly believed he was a man, but,given the ambiguity in “man,” he moves quickly to introduce the standardScholastic definition: man is a rational animal. He rejects this first hypothesis,since:

I should have to inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and inthis way one question would lead me down the slope to other harderones, and I do not now have the time to waste on subtleties of this kind.

(AT 7: 25, CSM 2: 17)

By adopting the standard Scholastic definition, one would face the specterof a regress without a definite end. If one term is defined in terms of twoothers, this suggests that each of those terms must also be defined in termsof two others, and so on. Such a regress bodes ill as a means for clarifyinga concept, and Descartes rejects it as a false start.

But one might ask whether something more is at work in this quickdismissal. Georges Dicker indicates that Descartes dismisses the “Aristotelianmethod of definition” in favor of “a better method, involving ‘clear anddistinct ideas,’ for grasping the meanings of important notions” (Dicker1993: 65). While Dicker’s suggestion seems right, he does not make explicitwhat such a rejection implies. The rejection would seem to raise a criteriologicalquestion: when does one know that one has provided an adequate definitionof the thing under consideration? Furthermore, in attacking the Scholasticapproach to defining ‘man,’ Descartes implicitly attacks the Scholastic useof Porphyrian trees to capture the Aristotelian Categories.

These trees get their name from the neo-Platonist Porphyry and hiscommentary (the Isagoge) on Aristotle’s Categories. In it Porphyry repesentseach of the ten Aristoteian categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation,place, time, position, state, action and affection) in terms of a tree. In thedispute at hand we are interested in the Porphyrian tree representing thecategory of substance. A Porphyrian tree representing the category ofsubstance divides reality up in terms of the different substances. In a typicalScholastic Porphyrian tree, one would find an exclusive and exhaustivebranching between corporeal and incorporeal substances above the trunk,

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which represents the category of substance. The one side represents bodiesand the other represents spirits. Up the first branch one finds animals andhumans; up the second branch one finds angels and God. Further up thebranch of corporeal substance one finds a division between the animateand non-animate, and beyond that a division between rational andnonrational animate corporeal substances. Ultimately, the good Scholasticwould place individuals among the twigs. So, for example, the individualClarence Bonnen would be placed up the rational, animate, corporeal branch(though his wife might from time to time beg to differ). Thus, we not onlyfind the definition of humanity reflected in the tree, but all of the individualsthat would fit that definition.

Such a tree also allows for a way of understanding possibility andimpossibility in terms of what the essences will allow and what they will notallow. This presents us with a different notion of logical possibility than theone with which we are familiar. One might say that a human lion (a chimera)is impossible because such a being would simultaneously fall into twoinconsistent categories: the rational and the nonrational.10

Descartes’s dismissal of the definition of man as “rational animal” may bea veiled attack on the Scholastic concept which relies on such trees withoutcarefully considering the criterion underlying them. Thus, the methodologicalfoundation of these trees is arbitrary. We find two pieces of evidence tosupport our claim here.

First, Pierre Bourdin objects to Descartes’s move from knowledge ofone’s self to one’s own existence in the Seventh Objections (section eight,entitled, “A fourth attempt to find a way in, which is abandoned as hopeless”).In the course of that objection, Bourdin appeals to a portion of a Porphyriantree (see AT 7: 506, CSM 2: 344). There he breaks the category of substancedown into the subcategories of corporeal and incorporal thinking substances.In response, Descartes writes:

His [Bourdin’s] first blast is the comment that “the inference fromknowledge to existence is not a valid one,” and he produces, like afluttering flag of victory, a diagram which contains a completely arbitraryclassification of thinking substance.

(AT 7: 517, CSM 2: 352)

The context in which Bourdin offers his “classification” and Descartes rejectsit is interesting. The nature and the existence of the self is what is at issue.

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Bourdin, being the good Scholastic and sensitive to Descartes’s rejectionof the definition of man as a rational animal, wants to force him to deal withthe implication of that rejection, namely, a dismissal of a tradition inScholasticism. Though Descartes originally dismisses the Scholasticapproach as miring one in a regress, here he rejects the Scholastic approachto the definition as arbitrary. In short, the Scholastic approach ismethodologically unsound.

One might object that Descartes would have made this explicit if thiswere really what was at issue in rejecting the Scholastic definition. But hisquick dismissal appears quite consistent with attacks on other Scholasticshibboleths. Indeed, Descartes counsels his one-time follower HenricusRegius not to draw attention to his implicit rejection of the Scholastic notionsof substantial forms and real qualities. Though we have quoted Descartes’scounsel earlier in chapter one, it bears reiterating here:

[W]hy did you need to reject openly substantial forms and real qualities?Do you not remember that on page 164 of my Meteorology, I said quiteexpressly that I did not at all reject or deny them, but simply found themunnecessary in setting out my explanations? If you had taken thiscourse, everybody in your audience would have rejected them as soonas they saw they were useless, and in the mean time you would nothave become so unpopular with your colleagues.

(AT 3: 492, CSM 3: 205)

Where Descartes wishes to provide a doctrine which is contrary to currentScholastic doctrine, but need make no reference to it, he avoids any suchreference. In the case at hand, he offers a different criterion for defining‘man,’ and draws no direct connection between his criterion and that of theScholastics; furthermore, notice that he merely mentions the difficulty withthe Scholastic approach without clearly delineating the nature of thatapproach. So, in his own approach to his conflicts with the Scholastictradition he generally minimizes the explicit rejection or even therecapitulation of any Scholastic doctrine. So why mention the Scholasticdefinition of man at all? At this point in Meditation Two, he must introducehypotheses to arrive at the best explanation of what it is to be a man. Becauseof the prevalence of the Scholastic definition among the learned, and becauseof his own method, he cannot ignore it completely.

Interestingly, by trying to imagine his Porphyrian tree we can see how

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Descartes believes he undermines the Scholastic approach. Descartes’stree would look different from that of Bourdin and his Scholastic predecessorsin that the first basic branch might be between supremely perfect (infinite)and imperfect (finite) substances, rather than corporeal and incorporealsubstances. One might note that during the course of Meditation ThreeDescartes discovers that what makes him different from God is that he isimperfect (finite) while God is supremely perfect (infinite), and what ultimatelygrounds Descartes’s distinction is the criterion of clarity and distinctnessgenerated through his contemplation of himself and the nature of his idea ofGod. He believes that once the person meditating along with him sees hiscriterion, he or she will naturally reject the arbitrariness of the Scholasticalternative. Whatever tree one ultimately draws for Descartes, it will have toreflect his discovery of the basic categories through the method of clarityand distinctness as reflected in the Meditations.11

The second piece of evidence to show that Descartes rejects theScholastic reliance on Porphyrian trees as arbitrary can be found in hisunpublished work, The Search after Truth. In that work he attempts to putthe message of the Meditations into dialogue form. Having one of thecharacters, Epistemon, represent the Scholastic perspective, Descartes forceshimself to defend his position through his protagonist, Eudoxus, more clearlythan he does in the relevant passages of Meditation Two. In the case athand, the third character, Polyander, responds to Eudoxus’s question, “Whatare you?” by saying, “I shall say I am a man” (AT 10: 515, CSM 2: 410).Eudoxus complains that Polyander leaves himself open to the complexity ofthe Scholastics, which will ultimately render no progress. In doing so,Descartes has Eudoxus reject the Scholastic tendency to head for the treeswhen anyone asks about the essence of a thing:

First, what is an animal? Second, what is rational? If, in order to explainwhat an animal is, he were to reply that it is a ‘living and sentient being’,that a living being is an ‘animate body’, and that a body is a ‘corporealsubstance’, you see immediately that the questions, like the branchesof a family tree, would rapidly increase and multiply. Quite clearly, theresult of all these admirable questions would be pure verbiage, whichwould elucidate nothing and leave us in our original state of ignorance.

(AT 10: 516, CSM 2: 410)

That the Scholastic approach is described as “pure verbiage” evinces a

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sense that this approach is arbitrary. But, of course, Epistemon would hardlysit still for this and Descartes has that character defend the Scholastics:

I am sorry you despise the tree of Porphyry, which the learned havealways admired, and it annoys me that you would try to convey toPolyander what he is in a different way from the one which has longbeen universally accepted in the Schools. To this day no better or moreappropriate way has been found for explaining what we are thandisplaying all the levels which make up our whole nature, for in thisway, by passing up and down through all these levels, we can learnwhat our nature has in common with the natures of all other things, andin what respects it differs from them. And this is the highest point towhich our knowledge can reach.

(AT 10: 516, CSM 2: 410–11)

Through Epistemon, Descartes expresses the idea that the trees representthe essences of things and the relations between them. Not surprisingly, hefollows the same advice that he gave Henricus Regius in January of 1642and avoids confronting the Scholastic solution to a philosophical problemand simply offers his own alternative explanation in the hope that others willsee it as the better solution. So, Descartes praises the Schoolmen by havingEudoxus say, “I have never had any intention of condemning the method ofexplanation ordinarily employed in the Schools, nor shall I ever wish to”(AT 10: 516–17, CSM 2: 411). Then Descartes has Eudoxus return to thealternative Cartesian solution to the question, “What am I?” dismissing theScholastic solution to the problem in favor of his own. Whether this is a fairstrategy is not our point. We only wish to demonstrate that Descartesdismisses the Scholastic answer to that question as methodologicallyarbitrary.

Returning to the Meditations, Descartes next turn to a fairly naive accountof himself for his second hypothesis, a combination of body and soul (AT 7:25–6, CSM 2: 17–18). He considers the concept of body to be fairly clear; theconcept of soul is less clear. While the body is something that possessesshape, occupies space, and so forth, the soul is conceived as somethingthat is responsible for nourishment, sense perception, and movement. Soconceived, the soul is merely an aspect of the human body, a conceptionembraced by the Scholastic tradition and Aristotle’s De Anima (See DeAnima 2.2 413a11–414a29: Aristotle 1941: 557–9); it is not conceived as

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something inherently distinct from the body (See De Anima 2.2 413b27–30;Aristotle 1941: 558). It is that something-I-know-not-what that is responsiblefor certain functions of the body. The clearest conception available is that itis “like a wind or fire or ether, which permeated my more solid parts,” aconception which is obscure and takes the soul to be fundamentally corporeal(AT 7: 26; CSM 2: 17).

The body falls victim to the hypothetical doubts, and Descartes focuseshis attention on the notion of the soul (AT 7: 26–7, CSM 2: 18). Again, hisargument is a disjunctive syllogism. Either he is a body or a soul. But themalicious demon hypothesis raises the possibility that what appear to bebodies are merely delusions. So there are no firm grounds for claiming theexistence of the body. So one must identify one’s self with the soul. Thisraises the question of the nature of the soul.

Descartes’s discussion of the nature of the soul is a discussion in whichthe obscure notion of a soul is replaced with a fairly precise notion of mind.It is the first case in the Meditations of attempting to make an idea clear anddistinct, although the terms ‘clarity’ and ‘distinctness’ (in their various forms)do not surface until late in this Meditation, and their significance is notnoted until Meditation Three.

We find the same method or process in conceptual clarification as wefind in the first Cogito arguments, namely, the process of positing hypothesesand giving reasons for rejecting them until one is found for which no suchreason can be given. Notice the progression: one, am I qua soul essentiallya thing that explains nutrition and movement? No. Why not? Both theseactivities are intimately tied to the body. Two, am I qua soul essentially athing that engages in sense perception? No, for two reasons. Senseperception as such requires the existence of a body, and the existence ofbodies is called into doubt by the malicious demon hypothesis. Second, asthe dream argument shows, sense perception produces false beliefs. Thissuggests that whatever will count as the essential attribute of the soul mustbe what it appears to be and not deceive one in any way. This remark isinteresting because it departs from the previous reasons, all of which concernexistential claims, and shifts attention to epistemic considerations.

This shift leads us to consider and accept the third hypothesis, namely,that I, qua soul, am essentially a thing that thinks. As Descartes puts it:

At last I have discovered it – thought; this alone is inseparable fromme. I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am

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thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, Ishould totally cease to exist.

(AT 7: 27, CSM 2: 18)

Several aspects of this passage should be noticed. While Descartes mighthave introduced the notion of thinking as an attribute of the soul by simplyfollowing out common conceptions, he obtains the confirmation of thoughtas essential to the soul by means of another Cogito argument: “I am, I exist– that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking.”12 Noticethat this is very close to the classical “I think, therefore I am.” If one followsour account of the method, then one understands that the justification ofthe existential statement rests on the general proposition “Whatever thinks,exists.” Such a general statement, known by the light of nature, not onlyjustifies the claim to existence, given the fact that one is thinking, it alsoshows that thought is an essential attribute of the existent object.

While the general proposition might be obtained by starting with thethree versions of the Cogito argument in paragraph three of the meditationand asking under what more general characteristic doubting, beingconvinced, and entertaining the proposition “I exist” might be subsumed,Descartes does not seem to proceed this way. Instead he reaches theconclusion that thought is essential to his nature and entertains theproposition “Whatever thinks, exists” by considering the commonlyaccepted attributes of the soul, one of which is thinking. Notice how theprevious Cogito arguments relate to present argument. By eliminating theseveral hypotheses regarding the nature of the soul, he discovers a generalattribute under which all the more particular qualities are subsumed. It is atonce the occasion for recognizing that thinking is an essential attribute ofthe soul (mind) and recognizing the truth of the proposition “Whateverthinks, exists.” On this occasion he confirms that thought is essential to hisbeing, and raises the discussion to a higher level of generality. In the upwardphase of the analysis, earlier conclusions suggest new hypotheses, andlater conclusions yield greater coherence by explaining why the earlierconclusions were justified. The grounds for claiming his existence havebeen raised to a higher level by discovering the essential attribute of theself, that is, an attribute the presence of which guarantees the existence of athing of that kind.

But Descartes says something stronger than this. He might claim thatthought is essential to his nature in the sense that he is at least a thing that

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thinks, leaving open the possibility that there are other essential attributes.But famously, this is not what he says. He says, “I am, then, in the strictsense only a thing that thinks” (our emphasis). Is this justified? No. Nor isit clear that he was committed to the claim at this point in the Meditations.Notice that in the preface he writes:

From the fact that the human mind, when directed towards itself, doesnot perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing, it doesnot follow that its nature or essence consists only in its being a thinkingthing, where the word ‘only’ excludes everything else that could besaid to belong to the nature of the soul. My answer to this objection isthat in that passage it was not my intention to make those exclusions inan order corresponding to the actual truth of the matter (which I wasnot dealing with at that stage) but merely in an order corresponding tomy own perception. So the sense of the passage was that I was awareof nothing at all that I knew belonged to my essence, except that I wasa thinking thing, or a thing possessing within itself the faculty of thinking.

(AT 7: 7–8, CSM 2: 7; cf. AT 7: 422–4, CSM 2: 285–6)

This prefatory remark suggests that the wording is ambiguous, and thatDescartes was concerned only with what he could know about himself atthat point. One finds more evidence that this is his concern in the nextparagraph where he asks whether he can know himself to be somethingmore than a thinking thing. Indeed, one might treat this so-called knowledgeas a hypothesis to be confirmed, though the confirmation comesconsiderably later. As we shall see, he adduces the grounds for claimingthat he is only a thing that thinks in Meditation Six.13

Having concluded that he is a thinking thing, Descartes attempts toclarify the idea of a thinking thing (AT 7: 27–8, CSM 2: 18–19). Thisconstitutes a partial enumeration of the modes of thought, and it is a dualclarification. It clarifies the notion of thinking by means of its kinds, and itclarifies the notions of the several kinds of thought by revealing theimplications of considering them as modes of thought. He claims to use hisimagination in an attempt to clarify what he is. In fact, the discussion doesas much to clarify the notion of imagination as the notion of the self. Herepeats the limitations placed on knowledge due to the malicious-demonhypothesis: he cannot currently identify himself with either a physical bodyor a bodily conception of the soul, while allowing that such elements

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ultimately might be identical with the “I”. He notes that imagination isinventive and takes corporeal entities on as its subject matter. Neitherfunction of the imagination will provide knowledge. The focus is thedistinction between imagination and understanding, and, insofar asimagination and sense perception involve images, the discussion also showsthat imagination and sense perception have only a minor role in theacquisition of knowledge. This is reflected in the conclusion he reaches:“But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts,understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines andhas sensory perceptions” (AT 7: 28, CSM 2: 19). Here perceiving andimagining appear as afterthoughts and are ascribed minor roles insofar asthe objects of those acts are epistemically suspect, but still, as he affirms inthe following paragraph, they are powers of thought.

The piece of wax

Having completed his examination of the nature of the self as a thinkingthing, Descartes now turns to the piece of wax. He ostensibly introducesthe assumption that the wax exists because of the difficulty of suspendingbelief in the material world (AT 7: 29–30, CSM 2: 20), although nothing hesays about the wax requires the existential assumption. He later claims thatthe exercise teaches us at least as much about the mind as it does about thewax (AT 7: 33, CSM 2: 22). We examine it as an exercise in conceptualclarification.

Descartes’s familiar piece-of-wax argument is as follows:

Let us take, for example, this piece of wax. It has just been taken fromthe honeycomb; it has not yet quite lost the taste of the honey; itretains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; itscolour, shape and size are plain to see; it is hard, cold and can behandled without difficulty; if you rap it with your knuckle it makes asound. In short, it has everything which appears necessary to enable abody to be known as distinctly as possible. But even as I speak, I putthe wax by the fire, and look: the residual taste is eliminated, the smellgoes away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases; itbecomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, itno longer makes a sound. But does the same wax remain? It must beadmitted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So

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what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness?Evidently none of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses;for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has nowaltered – yet the wax remains.

(AT 7: 30, CSM 2: 20)

Descartes’s thought experiment is based on two assumptions. First, heassumes that we are concerned with an ordinary piece of wax as it is sensiblypresented. Second, he assumes that the wax retains its identity throughchange. Notice that the latter is strictly an assumption: the sole evidence forthat assumption is that “no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise.” Whenit is placed by the fire, all the sensible qualities of the wax change. On theassumption that the wax retains identity through change, what does thisshow?

Descartes’s answer reflects two aspects of his thought experiment: first,the wax itself possesses no characteristics available to his senses; second,he does not have access to the wax’s essential character through the senses.In his words:

Perhaps the answer lies in the thought which now comes to my mind;namely, the wax was not after all the sweetness of the honey, or thefragrance of the flowers, or the whiteness, or the shape, or the sound,but was rather a body which presented itself to me in these variousforms a little while ago, but which now exhibits different ones. But whatexactly is it that I am now imagining? Let us concentrate, take awayeverything which does not belong to the wax, and see what is left:merely something extended, flexible and changeable. But what is meanthere by ‘flexible’ and ‘changeable’? Is it what I picture in my imagination:that this piece of wax is capable of changing from a round shape to asquare shape, or from a square shape to a triangular shape? Not at all;for I can grasp that the wax is capable of countless changes of this kind,yet I am unable to run through this immeasurable number of changes inmy imagination, from which it follows that it is not the faculty ofimagination that gives me my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable.And what is meant by ‘extended’? Is the extension of the wax alsounknown? For it increases if the wax melts, increases again if it boils,and is greater still if the heat is increased. I would not be making acorrect judgement about the nature of wax unless I believed it capableof being extended in many more different ways than I will ever encompass

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in my imagination. I must therefore admit that the nature of this piece ofwax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by themind alone. (I am speaking of this particular piece of wax; the point iseven clearer with regard to wax in general.) But what is this wax whichis perceived by the mind alone? It is of course the same wax which I see,which I touch, which I picture in my imagination, in short the same waxwhich I thought it to be from the start. And yet, and here is the point,the perception I have of it is a case not of vision or touch or imagination– nor has it ever been, despite previous appearances – but of purelymental scrutiny; and this can be imperfect and confused, as it wasbefore, or clear and distinct as it is now, depending on how carefully Iconcentrate on what the wax consists in.

(AT 7: 30–1, CSM 2: 20–1)

Fundamentally, the wax is extended – it takes up space – flexible andchangeable. To claim that it is flexible is to claim that it is capable of takingon an indefinitely large number of shapes. Are these characteristics knownby sense perception and imagination? No. They are perceived by the mindalone; these characteristics are incapable of being “pictured.”

One should notice that the word “judgment” has slipped into Descartes’sdiscussion. In his parlance, judgment is neither a function of sense perceptionnor a function of imagination; it is a function of the mind as a thing thatreasons or understands. He searches for a general characterization of aparticular piece of wax. In characterizing the wax as something that isextended, flexible, and changeable, he moves from considerations ofparticular states of the wax – having a particular extension and shape, thenanother, and another – to those characteristics under which the particularinstances fall. In effect, he looks at the particular extensions and shapes ofthe wax in its various stages of heating and asks under what generalcharacteristic might all of those particulars be subsumed? The melting ofthe wax is the occasion on which these general characteristics are considered.These general characteristics are not perceived by the senses, rather theyare “perceived” by the mind. This observation reinforces his earliersuggestion that, while sense perception and imagination qua powers of themind are modes of thinking, they are fairly low-grade powers. As such, theydo not provide one with knowledge. Nonetheless, instances of senseperception and imagination more often than not provide the occasions forinquiry. Thus this imaginative reconstruction of the various changes in thewax occasions the discovery of the clear and distinct idea of the wax.

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Notice also that this represents the first appearance of the notion ofclarity and distinctness in the Meditations. As he writes:

the perception I have of it [the wax] is a case not of vision or touch orimagination – nor has it ever been, despite previous appearances – butof purely mental scrutiny; and this can be imperfect and confused, as itwas before, or clear and distinct as it is now, depending on how carefullyI concentrate on what the wax consists in.

(AT 7: 31, CSM 2: 21)

The piece-of-wax argument shows how an idea becomes clear and distinct(or, to follow the French, how an act of perception becomes clear and distinct).By considering the changing characteristics of the wax under the hypothesisthat the wax itself remains one thing, Descartes engages in a disjunctivesyllogism that leads to positing the characteristics of extension, flexibility,and changeability as essential to the wax. Consider a list of the perceivedcharacteristics of the wax in the course of the changes observed. The waxwas round, the wax was not round; the wax had a volume of ten cubiccentimeters, the wax had a volume of twelve cubic centimeters, the wax hada volume of fourteen cubic centimeters . . . the wax had a flavor, the wax didnot have a flavor; the wax was aromatic, the wax was not aromatic; etc.. Inlooking for essential characteristics of the wax, Descartes is guided by aprinciple known by the natural light to the effect that “For any characteristicp, if p is a characteristic of x at time t1 and not-p is a characteristic of x at timetn (t1 ≠ tn), then neither p nor not-p is essential to x.” By this means particularcolors,flavors, sounds, shapes are eliminated. But on this occasion theinquirer forms a hypothesis that extension and flexibility (the ability to takeon various shapes) are essential. The natural light presumably confirms thishypothesis. Except for the principle involved, this is precisely the sameprocess involved in Descartes’s consideration of his own nature. His processof mental scrutiny, a whittling away of characteristics in an attempt to findone characteristic (or a small number of characteristics) that is essential to athing of a particular kind, results in a clear and distinct idea. The piece-of-wax argument provides, along with the res cogitans discussion, an exampleof the process involved in making an idea clear and distinct, and, in sodoing, it anticipates the role of clarity and distinctness in the remainingmeditations.

By extending his meditation to the wax, Descartes also claims to havegained an insight into the nature and powers of the mind. He writes:

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But as I reach this conclusion I am amazed at how [weak and] prone toerror my mind is. For although I am thinking about these matters withinmyself, silently and without speaking, none the less the actual wordsbring me up short, and I am almost tricked by ordinary ways of talking.We say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that wejudge it to be there from its colour or shape; and this might lead me toconclude without more ado that knowledge of the wax comes from whatthe eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But then if Ilook out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I justhappen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, justas I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coatswhich could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And sosomething which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact graspedsolely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind.

(AT 7: 31–2, CSM 2: 21)

Here Descartes contrasts the natural tendency to assume that the world isas it appears – the naive realism of the pre-philosophical individual – withthe degree of sophistication reached as we approach the end of MeditationTwo. At the beginning of Meditation One, the precritical individual assumedthat the world is as it appears to the senses. The Meditation One doubtsdashed this assumption. But by reintroducing the hypothesis that a materialworld exists – an introduction which is strictly a hypothetical and temporaryloosening of the doubts – Descartes asks what we can know about aparticular object. What he discovers is that even ifhe assumes a materialobject’s existence, his sensory experiences do not reveal its essential nature.Assuming that objects retain identity through change, an object’s constitutiveproperties are imperceptible. No particular extension is common to all thephases of the wax; however, he finds some extension or other in each phaseof the wax.

At this point, Descartes recognizes that wax falls under the general conceptof extension. General concepts are not sensibly perceived. Hence, it is noton the basis of sense perception or imagination that one discovers thenature of the wax, although these mental operations might provide theoccasion for the considerations that yield knowledge. It is on the basis of ajudgment one comes to know the nature of wax, that is, through a judgmentone knows the wax as an extended, flexible, and changeable thing. Hence, ajudgment furnishes the ground on which one knows or believes that the

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raincoat-clad objects that one sees from one’s window are humans, ratherthan machines or perceptual illusions.

The piece-of-wax episode also tells us something more about the mind.To this point, Descartes has concluded that the self is “A thing that doubts,understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines andhas sensory perceptions” (AT 7: 28, CSM 2: 19). Is this a complete enumerationof the several powers of the mind? No. The piece-of-wax argument showsthat there must be at least one more property falling under the generalheading of “thinking,” to wit, judging. If a rule of the method is that one“make enumerations so complete . . . that I could be sure of leaving nothingout” (AT 6: 19, CSM 1: 120), then any enumeration may be revised. Seen inthis way, the piece-of-wax argument is a test case regarding the completenessof the enumeration of the kinds of thinking, a test case showing that animportant element of that enumeration had been ignored.14

Arguably, this fails to fit with what occurs subsequently. Descartes’snext enumeration of the activities of the mind is exactly the same as hisearlier enumeration, adding only the conclusions he reached regarding theobjects of thought and sense perception. At the beginning of MeditationThree he writes:

I am a thing that thinks: that is, a thing that doubts, affirms, denies,understands a few things, is ignorant of many things, is willing, isunwilling, and also which imagines and has sensory perceptions; for asI have noted before, even though the objects of my sensory experienceand imagination may have no existence outside me, none the less themodes of thinking which I refer to as cases of sensory perception andimagination, in so far as they are simply modes of thinking, do existwithin me – of that I am certain.

(AT 7: 34–5, CSM 2: 24; cf. AT 7: 28, CSM 2: 19)

If there is no change, why could Descartes claim that discovering the powerof judging provides an increased understanding of the mind? Is judging agenuine addition to the enumeration he had already provided, or is it merelyinvolved in understanding?

One should notice two points. First, unlike the first enumeration of thepowers of the mind, the second enumeration clearly indicates that perceptionand imagination, as powers of the mind, provide one with no knowledge ofexistents: the acts of sense perception and imagination leave open thequestion of the existence of the objects of those acts. Nonetheless, this

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difference does not detract from the facts that sense perception andimagination are powers of the mind, and that they depend on the mind fortheir existence. Descartes explicitly mentions these points in the thirdparagraph from the end of Meditation Two:

However, one who wants to achieve knowledge above the ordinarylevel should feel ashamed at having taken ordinary ways of talking as abasis for doubt. So let us proceed, and consider on which occasion myperception of the nature of the wax was more perfect and evident. Wasit when I first looked at it, and believed I knew it by my external senses,or at least by what they call the ‘common’ sense – that is, the power ofimagination? Or is my knowledge more perfect now, after a more carefulinvestigation of the nature of the wax and of the means by which it isknown? Any doubt on this issue would clearly be foolish; for whatdistinctness was there in my earlier perception? Was there anything init which an animal could not possess? But when I distinguish the waxfrom its outward forms – take the clothes off, as it were, and consider itnaked – then although my judgement may still contain errors, at leastmy perception now requires a human mind.

(AT 7: 32, CSM 2: 21–2)

The piece-of-wax argument unequivocally demonstrates that a mind isrequired for one to have an understanding – even if it is an inadequate one– of the nature or existence of an object. It clarifies the status of senseperception and knowledge.

Second, as we shall see in our examinations of the Third and FourthMeditations, judging plays an important role in obtaining knowledge. Oneuncovers existential truths by judging; indeed, judging is proper to thedomain of formal truth and falsity, that is, to questions of existence (see AT7: 43, CSM 2: 30). This goes beyond the fundamental sense of“understanding,” which pertains to explanation and determination of whatsomething is, rather than that it is. The examination of the wax is peculiarinsofar as it proceeds on the assumption that the wax exists. As we shall seein the Third Meditation, when Descartes introduces the distinction betweenformal falsity and material falsity, the latter notion will concern primarily thequestion of the clarity and distinctness of ideas, while the former notion willprimarily concern the status of judgments involving existential claims. Giventhis, one might suggest that even though his inspection of the wax provides

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one with greater insight into the functions of the mind, it does not whollyclarify the function of judgment.

Descartes continues by noting that his discussion has supplied him withadditional reasons for claiming his own existence. He writes:

But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? (So far, remember,I am not admitting that there is anything else in me except a mind.)What, I ask, is this ‘I’ which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly?Surely my awareness of my own self is not merely much truer and morecertain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct andevident. For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it,clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself alsoexist. It is possible that what I see is not really the wax; it is possible thatI do not even have eyes with which to see anything. But when I see, orthink I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possiblethat I who am now thinking am not something. By the same token, if Ijudge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it, the same resultfollows, namely that I exist. If I judge that it exists from the fact that Iimagine it, or for any other reason, exactly the same thing follows. Andthe result that I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied toeverything else located outside me. Moreover, if my perception of thewax seemed more distinct after it was established not just by sight ortouch but by many other considerations, it must be admitted that I nowknow myself even more distinctly. This is because every considerationwhatsoever which contributes to my perception of the wax, or of anyother body, cannot but establish even more effectively the nature of myown mind. But besides this, there is so much else in the mind itselfwhich can serve to make my knowledge of it more distinct, that it scarcelyseems worth going through the contributions made by consideringbodily things.

(AT 7: 33, CSM 2: 22)

This paragraph needs careful examination, for it shows how part of theconfirmatory phase of analysis functions. Remember how Descartes hadproven his own existence earlier in the meditation. First, he argued thatsince he doubted, was persuaded of something, or entertained a specificproposition, it followed that he existed. Next he inquired into his nature anddetermined that he was a thing that thinks, providing an enumeration of thevarious kinds of thought. His discussion of the wax helped clarify the status

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of sense perception and imagination. In this paragraph he takes what he hasjust clarified, namely, the status of sense perception and imagination asmodes of thought, and asks what follows from granting that status to them.It follows that he exists. This is part of the downward phase of the initialanalysis. This downward phase tends to confirm sense perception andimagination as modes of thought, since, at this stage of the Meditations,only modes of thought provide evidence for claiming his existence. It placesthese modes of thought, qua modes, on a par with doubting, beingpersuaded, and understanding. Thus, the initial analysis of mind is coherentin that each of those modes entails his existence.

Conclusions and cautions

In this chapter we examined the Second Meditation. We argued that, sinceDescartes constructs the Meditations in accordance with the method ofanalysis (see AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 111), the meditation should build step-by-step from the minimal knowledge obtained at the end of Meditation One,namely, “I doubt,” to something more.

We found that the Cogito argument proceeds in two stages. During thefirst stage, Descartes proves he exists on the basis of the factual claim, “Idoubt.” In the second stage he analyzes his nature, which serves as thebasis for something closer to the standard version of “I think, therefore Iam.” The analysis of his nature is a conceptual analysis – an exercise inideational clarification – and is consistent with his principle that the essenceof a thing must be known before the corresponding existential claims arejustified. Only after he analyzes his nature as a thing that thinks does hebelieve that he can move from the general claim that he thinks to his existence.We also argued that the piece-of-wax argument plays two roles in his analysis.It is an exercise in ideational clarification relative to ideas both of the waxand the self. Regarding the latter, it is particularly a clarification of the natureof sense perception and imagination as modes of thought. The confirmationof the status of sense perception and imagination as modes of thought isthat the statements “I sensibly perceive” and “I imagine,” together with theappropriate general statements known by the light of nature, explain thepreviously established fact that I exist.

One should also notice what we have not said. We have not suggestedthat Descartes’s arguments at any point presuppose a notion of substance.Since others have argued that a doctrine of substance is at least implicit in

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the piece-of-wax argument (e.g. see Curley 1986: 164), and some have arguedthat the Cogito assumes a doctrine of substance (Dicker 1993: 53–6), a fewwords should be said about substance.

Do Descartes’s arguments in the Second Meditation presuppose adoctrine of substance? Yes, but in a more important sense, no. If by“presuppose” one means that given a complete or fairly complete analysisof the subject-matter in question one will introduce a doctrine of substance,the answer is trivially affirmative. It is trivially affirmative since one of theobjectives of analysis is to make explicit what is implicit in the assumptionswith which one begins. In the last chapter, for example, we suggested, notunreasonably, that many of Descartes’s conclusions are implicit in the doubtsraised in Meditation One. In particular, he concludes that the light of natureis a non-empirical source of knowledge. While he implies this conclusion inthe opening doubts regarding the empiricist criterion of knowledge, it wouldbe unreasonable to suggest that the light of nature is clearly understood atthat point. Similarly here, if one wishes to claim that he implicitly assumesthat the self is a substance, then that claim is true only in a trivial sense. Thisclaim is neither recognized nor necessary for one to reach the conclusion“sum”: a notion of substance does not and need not play a philosophicallysignificant role in that proof.

Much the same can be said regarding the piece-of-wax argument. In allprobability, Curley is correct in suggesting that:

Descartes prepares us to regard the term substantia, when it appears,as simply a very general term for referring to objects conceived asthings which may continue to persist in existence in spite of radicalchanges in the way they exist.

(Curley 1986: 164)

This does not prove his point, however. If one assumes that the presence ofany doctrine of substance is sufficient to show that Descartes presupposesa doctrine of substance, then some doctrine of substance was presupposedfrom at least the point of the earliest Cogito arguments, namely, Aristotle’smundane doctrine of substance as simply a subject of predication. (SeeCategories 5 2a11ff., Aristotle 1941: 9.) But that is not Descartes’s doctrineof substance, a doctrine couched in terms of the independence of existents(see P 1: 52; Meditation Three, AT 7: 44, CSM 2: 30). Descartes’s doctrine ofsubstance is not couched in terms of either being a thing or being a thing

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that retains identity through time – indeed, identity plays no explicit role inany of his discussions of substance. In the case of the piece of wax, heaccepts identity through change as a working hypothesis only because itstrikes him as a generally accepted, commonsense notion. His doctrine ofsubstance, as such, plays no systematic role in that argument. So, while thepiece-of-wax argument might prepare one for a consideration of substancein Descartes’s distinctive sense of that term, it is, at most, “hovering in thewings” at this point in the Meditations.

One of the objectives of the Cartesian method is to order our thoughts.“The items which are put forward first must be known entirely without theaid of what comes later; and the remaining items must be arranged in such away that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone before” (AT7: 155, CSM 2: 110). Does this suggest that a doctrine of substance is presentin the Second Meditation? No. It plays no systematic role and no clear ideaof substance has been introduced. Hence, to claim that a doctrine ofsubstance is “presupposed” violates Descartes’s dicta regarding themethod.

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6 Meditation Three

Reaching the peak, orvariations on the existenceand idea of God

In the Third Meditation, Descartes presents his first two arguments for theexistence of God. They are variations on classical versions of the cosmologicalargument; moreover, both arguments comply with the basic pattern ofattempting to give the best explanation of a phenomenon. In this case, Godas causal agent best explains why I have an idea of God with a certaincontent in one case, and why I exist as a thing having an idea of God with acertain content in the other. As a preliminary study for the arguments,Descartes elaborates his conceptual schema. He formally introduces thenotion of a clear and distinct idea. He introduces a threefold classification ofideas as adventitious, factitious, and innate. He distinguishes formal andmaterial falsity. He introduces and assigns a major role to the natural light.Finally, he implicitly clarifies the idea of God as he proceeds through hisarguments in the Third Meditation.

We begin this chapter by perusing Descartes’s preliminaries to the proofsof the existence of God. Next we examine the two proofs. Finally, we showthat he presents a progression in the ideas of God and argue that thepenultimate and ultimate ideas of God are innate only insofar as they arecomprised solely of innate elements; these ideas might equally well beclassified as factitious.

Clarity, distinctness and a classification of thoughts

After remarking that one should place oneself in a meditative posture andset aside all those beliefs one has not yet proven, Descartes begins theThird Meditation with an enumeration of things he knows, namely, he is “athing that thinks: that is, a thing that doubts, affirms, denies, understands afew things, is ignorant of many things, is willing, is unwilling, and also

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which imagines and has sensory perceptions” and he knows that there areideas “in so far as they are simply modes of thinking.” (AT 7: 34–5, CSM 2:24) He then enumerates the various modes of thought. Notice what he doesnot explicitly say: he does not say that he exists, although that might betaken to be implicit in his remark that these modes of thought “do existwithin me.” (AT 7: 34–5, CSM 2: 24)

If one of the primary objectives of the Second Meditation was to provethat he exists, why is the existential claim played down here? The reasonseems to be that he has shifted his focus. His concern here is with clear anddistinct ideas. Clear and distinct ideas are ideas of the essences of things ofvarious kinds. They are materially true, but, as we shall see repeatedly, thepresence of a clear and distinct idea does not guarantee the existence of anentity of the relevant kind. Rather, following the true logic (AT 7: 107, CSM2: 78), the presence of a clear and distinct idea is necessary for knowledge ofa thing of a kind.1

Of clear and distinct ideas Descartes writes:

In this brief list I have gone through everything I truly know, or at leasteverything I have so far discovered that I know. Now I will cast aroundmore carefully to see whether there may be other things within mewhich I have not yet noticed. I am certain that I am a thinking thing. DoI not therefore also know what is required for my being certain aboutanything? In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear anddistinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough tomake me certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out thatsomething which I perceived with such clarity and distinctness wasfalse. So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule thatwhatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.

(AT 7: 35, CSM 2: 24)

Here Descartes introduces his famous criterion of truth, namely, all clear anddistinct perceptions are true. What is the epistemic status of the principle?Is it a generalization from a single case, as the passage suggests, or is it ahypothesis? We are inclined to understand it in the latter way. Notice whatDescartes says, “[T]his would not be enough to make me certain of the truthof the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived withsuch clarity and distinctness was false.” The phrasing suggests that oneaccepts the criterion until such a point as one discovers a case in which anidea is clear and distinct but false, that is, one treats it as a hypothesis to be

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confirmed or refuted. The refutation of the hypothesis would consist offinding an idea that is clear and distinct but inconsistent. The confirmationwould consist in giving reasons why the criterion should be taken as true.As we shall see later, Descartes takes the fact that God is not a deceiver asconfirmation that the criterion itself is true (AT 7: 62, CSM 2: 43), whichtends to support our suggestion that one should treat the criterion as ahypothesis. But what does it mean for a perception to be clear and distinct?Is he concerned with perception as an act, or with the object of perception,or both? And what does he mean in claiming that clear and distinct perceptionsare true?

Regarding the second question, the passage is ambiguous. WhenDescartes first alludes to the clarity and distinctness of the perception, hesays, “there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting”(quàm clara quædam & distincta perceptio ejus quod affirmo; AT 7: 35,CSM 2: 24): this could be an allusion to the object perceived or to the act ofperceiving. The later instances seem to refer to characteristics of an act, thatis, how one perceives an object, for he refers to “something I perceived withsuch clarity and distinctness” (ut aliquid, quod ita clare & distincteperciperem) and “whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true”(illud omne esse verum, quod valde clare & distincte percipio).2 Further, ifone takes the object to be an idea (a term Descartes has yet to introduce intothe Meditations) and if an idea is somehow like an image (AT 7: 37, CSM 2:25), one might be disinclined to grant that one can clearly and distinctlyperceive the truth of propositions. But only two paragraphs later he alludesto clearly and distinctly perceiving the truth of arithmetic and geometry,claiming that the only ground he has for questioning such beliefs is thepossibility that God is a deceiver (AT 35-6, CSM 2: 25).3 Again, Descarteswrites with reference to the ideas of corporeal things later in the Meditation,“I notice that the very things I perceive clearly and distinctly in them arevery few in number” (AT 7: 43, CSM 2: 29). The grammatical form of theseand other passages (see AT 7: 119, 245, 379, 519; CSM 2: 85, 171, 260, 353)suggests that it is the act of perceiving that is clear and distinct. Still, inusing the expression “clear and distinct ideas” (see AT 7: 53, 78, 387, 476;CSM 2: 37, 54, 265, 321) Descartes suggests that the object of thought iswhat is clear and distinct. Can he have it both ways? It would seem so.

As we have seen in Meditation Two, to render an idea clear and distinctrequires acts of mental scrutiny. When Descartes writes of perceiving clearlyand distinctly, he introduces these kinds of acts together with the resultantpsychological compunction to deem the resultant idea “true.”4 The resultant

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idea is clear and distinct. This does not mean, however, that the resultingidea differs qua existent from the idea prior to the exercise in mental scrutiny.Given his remarks on the formation of universals (P 1: 59), we may rightlysuggest that one attends selectively to aspects of the original idea.

But how should one understand this clarity and distinctness of aperception or idea? Descartes answers this question in the Principles. Therehe writes:

I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is present and accessible to the attentivemind – just as we say that we see something clearly when it is presentto the eye’s gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strengthand accessibility. I call a perception ‘distinct’ if, as well as being clear, itis so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains withinitself only what is clear.

(P 1: 45: AT 8A: 22, CSM 1: 207–8)

To understand this, we must carefully examine the analogy to visualperception. Assume you are nearsighted. The world at a distance appearsblurred or fuzzy, much like the images in a Cezanne painting. Assume youare looking at the top of a hill at some distance from you. You see a red patchat the top of the hill. What is that patch?5 You do not know; all you can sayis that it is something that is red. How would you find out what it is? Youwould move closer to it. Why? It puts the object in better focus. What doesthis mean? You are able to discern more of its characteristics. Now let usassume you move half the distance to the object, and you are now able todiscern that it is a car. Do you now have a clear and distinct idea of theobject? Perhaps, but this will depend on your objectives. If your questionwas merely, “Is the red thing a car, a building, a tree, or something else?” youhave answered it. The visual clarity of the perception was adequate toanswer that question: you could discern enough characteristics of the objectto distinguish it from others insofar as that object is a car. Hence, theperception is clear and distinct insofar as its resultant idea falls under theconcept of a car. But there are cars and there are cars. You might want tohave a more distinct idea of the object. You might ask, “Is it a Ford or aChevrolet or a Mercedes Benz? Is it a family car or a muscle car? Is it a recentor an older model?” You walk closer. More characteristics become clear.This allows you to identify it as a muscle car, a relatively recent Ford Mustang.The visual idea is now clear and distinct vis-à-vis the concept of a recent

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Ford Mustang. But you might need to take a very close look to determinewhether it is a 1995, 1996, or 1997 Mustang.

These considerations show several things. First, clear and distinct ideasare ideas of kinds of things. Insofar as one might claim to have a clear anddistinct idea of an individual, for example God or the piece of wax or the self,the idea is still treated as an idea of a kind. Second, ideas that are alreadyclear can become clearer. As our example shows, an idea might be sufficientlyclear vis-à-vis one sortal term to determine that it is an idea of a thing of thatsort, but it may not be sufficiently clear to determine whether the object is anobject of a more specific sort.6 Hence, the degree of clarity necessary fordistinctness is sortally relative.7 Third, even though clear and distinct ideascontain all or a sufficient number of properties to allow one to distinguishone kind of thing from another, an idea’s clarity and distinctness do notassure the existence of a thing of that kind. Descartes claims that the clarityand distinctness of an idea guarantee only the possibility of the existenceof such an object (AT 10: 351, CSM 1: 299; AT 7: 150, CSM 2: 107; see alsoAT 7: 78, CSM 2: 54). One would expect this, given that “according to thelaws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything untilwe first understand its essence” (AT 7: 107–8, CSM 2: 78). Finally, whenDescartes concerns himself with an idea’s clarity and distinctness, theessence of a thing is the primary topic. Consequently, the components of aCartesian clear and distinct idea are simple (general) relative to the particularobject that presents the occasion for seeking a clear and distinct idea.

Thus our analogy might be somewhat misleading with respect to Cartesianpractice. While the route from a red patch to a recent red Ford Mustangresults in an enlarged enumeration of the particularizing properties, theCartesian practice would require us to seek an increasingly limited numberof increasingly general properties by which one can distinguish the objectin question from other kinds of things.

But if clear and distinct perceptions show only that the object of theperception might exist, rather than that it does exist, in what sense canDescartes claim that these ideas are true? They are at least materially true,that is, they provide no material for false judgments. We show below thatnothing in the Third Meditation requires that clear and distinct perceptionsbe true in anything other than a material sense. Because his concern liessolely with material truth, the criterion is little more than a reassertion thatwhatever is known by the natural light is materially true, which we haveargued is the foundational principle on which he rebuilds his epistemichouse. Thus, insofar as clear and distinct ideas represent the essences of

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things, they represent the possible essences of possible things. To claimthat clear and distinct ideas are materially true commits one to no existentialpropositions.8

Descartes continues his meditation by inquiring into the source of hiserrors. He writes:

Yet I previously accepted as wholly certain and evident many thingswhich I afterwards realized were doubtful. What were these? The earth,sky, stars, and everything else that I apprehended with the senses. Butwhat was it about them that I perceived clearly? Just that the ideas, orthoughts, of such things appeared before my mind. Yet even now I amnot denying that these ideas occur within me. But there was somethingelse which I used to assert, and which through habitual belief I thoughtI perceived clearly, although I did not in fact do so. This was that therewere things outside me which were the sources of my ideas and whichresembled them in all respects. Here was my mistake; or at any rate, ifmy judgement was true, it was not thanks to the strength of myperception.

(AT 7: 35, CSM 2: 24–5)

He reviews his doubts. While one has doubts regarding the existence of theearth, the sky, and so forth, there is no question that one has thoughtsabout these possible things. It is here that Descartes first introduces theterm ‘idea’ as a thought with at least the potential for representative content.The implicit argument for ideas goes like this. It is possible – indeed we areassuming – that the earth, the sky, and all material objects do not exist. YetI have thoughts (sense perceptions) which, in a naive way, I take to beidentical with the objects I have called into doubt. I have no question whetherthese thoughts exist, even though the existence of material objects is dubious.Since the existence of a particular object cannot be at once certain anddubious, two distinct objects must exist which are somehow related. So letus call those objects of thought of whose existence I am certain ‘ideas,’ andlet us call those objects of whose existence I am uncertain ‘external objects’or ‘material objects.’ Given the distinction, Descartes indicates that he hadassumed that external objects were the sources of these ideas and perfectlyresembled them.9 He rejects this assumption, thereby leaving open thequestion of the causes of ideas and their representational function.

While ideas might not actually represent objects, Descartes’s furtherremarks assure us that they are at least potential representatives (AT 7: 36–

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7, CSM 2: 25–6). He enumerates the various kinds of thoughts and affirmsthat ideas properly so called are like images, that is, they have (or can have)a representational function. Further, all thoughts involve ideas, sinceDescartes refers to the “additional forms” these thoughts have: the severalpsychological attitudes (affirming, denying, willing, and judging) have ideasas their objects. By assuming that ideas qua objects of thought have apossible representational function, he leaves open a number of questionsregarding the potentially represented object. Does the object presentedexist? Is the idea qua object of thought clear and distinct, that is, can itpossibly represent a determinate thing? Are claims one would make regardingthe object as represented in the idea (formally) true or false? Claims basedon the representative function of any idea are the domain of the faculty ofjudgment, and, as he says in the next paragraph, truth and falsehood properlypertain only to judgments (AT 7: 37, CSM 2: 26).

Not only do truth and falsehood properly pertain only to judgments, butthe most common source of error stems from judgments regarding therepresentative function of ideas. Recall that, at the beginning of MeditationOne, Descartes suggested that he assumed the world is as it appears to thesenses. The introduction of ideas as the objects of thought indicates thatthe common errors of perceptual judgment change in description. Whileprior to the introduction of the theory of ideas one might have said, “I see around tower in the distance” only to find that the tower was square or thatone was dreaming, the description would now be posed like this: “I amaware of an idea which represents a round tower in the distance and judgethat there is, in fact, such a tower.” While this mere redescription of thesituation only accommodates the theory of ideas, it brings with it animportant point, namely, judgment is the only psychological attitude in whichformal truth and falsehood are at issue.

Descartes continues by enumerating the kinds of ideas he has (AT 7: 37–8, CSM 2: 26), suggesting that ideas are of three sorts: innate, adventitious,and factitious (made up). This is only a preliminary classification. As weshow below, the classification of ideas as factitious or made up is misleading.While we certainly construct some ideas out of the components of otherideas in our mind, the category of factitious ideas is not basic: any of thecomponents of a factitious idea are either adventitious or innate. Moreover,even these two basic categories apply only to occurrent ideas, that is, ideasof which we are aware at a time; for, as we noted in Chapter Two, in theComments on a Certain Broadsheet Descartes went so far as to claim thatinnate ideas are fundamentally dispositions to form occurrent ideas with a

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certain cognitive content, and, as such, all ideas are innate. Nonetheless,the innate/adventitious/factitious ideas distinction is useful when heattempts to explain the formation of ideas.

Descartes focuses on ideas of sense perception and explains why onebelieves that those ideas represent objects outside oneself: one has a naturaltendency to believe so (AT 7: 38, CSM 2: 26). This is little more than areformulation of the assumption operative at the beginning of the FirstMeditation. Initially, one assumes that one perceives the physical worlddirectly (naive realism). This leads to two problems: first, one’s judgmentsbased on visual perceptions are often inconsistent; and second, as one’sexperience increases, one must weigh one appearance against another toavoid error. When he introduces a distinction between the objects of thoughtand material objects, Descartes must reformulate his previous assumption.By suggesting that we have a natural disposition to assume a similaritybetween our ideas and the physical world (the resemblance thesis), heaccommodates a representative theory of ideas with the original assumptionthat all knowledge is derived from sense experience. This explains, at most,the origin of adventitious ideas. And this disposition to believe that physicalobjects cause and resemble adventitious ideas might be bolstered by thefact that the mind passively receives the ideas.

But at this point in the Meditations, neither the disposition nor thepassivity thesis should be taken as evidence that extramental things causeadventitious ideas, since the divine deceiver hypothesis is still operative.10

Later in his discussion, Descartes draws a distinction between naturaltendencies to believe and what is known by the natural light.

I will now see if these arguments are strong enough. When I say ‘Naturetaught me to think this’, all I mean is that a spontaneous impulse leadsme to believe it, not that its truth has been revealed to me by somenatural light. There is a big difference here. Whatever is revealed to meby the natural light – for example that from the fact that I am doubting itfollows that I exist, and so on – cannot in any way be open to doubt.This is because there cannot be another faculty both as trustworthy asthe natural light and also capable of showing me that such things arenot true. But as for my natural impulses, I have often judged in the pastthat they were pushing me in the wrong direction when it was a questionof choosing the good, and I do not see why I should place any greaterconfidence in them in other matters.

(AT 7: 38–9, CSM 2: 26–7)

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Experience indicates that natural tendencies to believe have led one intoerror in the past. So, until one can provide grounds for claiming that naturaltendencies to form an opinion have some evidentiary weight, they must beviewed as suspect. Yet, the natural light is the innate faculty that allows oneto discern the truth. What one knows by the natural light has epistemicwarrant; at least, it is immune from doubt. In drawing a distinction betweennatural tendencies to form an opinion and the natural light, Descartes hasintroduced a potential source of knowledge of general principles, a sourcethat he fully utilizes in his arguments for the existence of God. Since thefaculty of the natural light allows one to perceive material truth, what thatfaculty perceives is clear and distinct.

In continuing his discussion, Descartes provides reasons for discounting,first, the passivity thesis and, secondly, the resemblance thesis (AT 7: 39,CSM 2: 27). Since the passivity thesis provides evidence that somethingother than oneself causes one’s adventitious ideas, it is incumbent uponhim to determine whether an alternative, yet equally plausible, hypothesisexists. Here he draws upon his previous doubts. Even granting that the willdoes not cause the ideas in question, it remains possible that an unknownfaculty of the mind causes those ideas. The dream phenomenon bolsterssuch a supposition, since ideas in a dream state are not conscious productsof the will. So the passivity thesis does not unequivocally support theassumption that some of our ideas arise from an extramental reality.

Further, even if the passivity thesis provided evidence for an externalcause of one’s adventitious ideas, one still would have no grounds foraccepting the resemblance thesis. Descartes continues:

And finally, even if these ideas did come from things other than myself,it would not follow that they must resemble those things. Indeed, Ithink I have often discovered a great disparity <between an object andits idea> in many cases. For example, there are two different ideas of thesun which I find within me. One of them, which is acquired as it werefrom the senses and which is a prime example of an idea which I reckonto come from an external source, makes the sun appear very small. Theother idea is based on astronomical reasoning, that is, it is derived fromcertain notions which are innate in me (or else it is constructed by me insome other way), and this idea shows the sun to be several times largerthan the earth. Obviously both these ideas cannot resemble the sunwhich exists outside me; and reason persuades me that the idea which

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seems to have emanated most directly from the sun itself has in fact noresemblance to it at all.

(AT 7: 39–40, CSM 2: 27)

Here Descartes renders the resemblance thesis problematic. If the world isas it appears to the senses, then there should be no conflicts between thecontents of sensory ideas. However, the doubts in the First Meditationcalled the resemblance thesis into question. The tower that appears roundand small at a distance of two miles might appear large and square from adistance of twenty feet. Both ideas cannot accurately represent the sameobject. So, at best, some means must be found for determining which sensoryperceptions are epistemically privileged.

His consideration of the contrasting astronomical and sensory ideas ofthe sun undermines both the resemblance thesis and and the passivitythesis more radically than the initial examples of the First Meditation. Giventhe disparity in content between the (incorrect) sensory idea of the sun andthe (correct) idea based on scientific reasoning, there is no ground for theresemblance thesis. Similarly, with the loss of the resemblance thesis, thepassivity thesis proves dubious because the strongest claim it could supportis the claim that some-thing-I-know-not-what causes the sensory idea ofthe sun. Finally, the passivity thesis loses epistemic warrant in light of theCartesian dictum that knowledge of essence precedes knowledge ofexistence. Thus, Descartes refuses to grant sense experience any epistemicwarrant. As he writes:

All these considerations are enough to establish that it is not reliablejudgement but merely some blind impulse that has made me believe uptill now that there exist things distinct from myself which transmit to meideas or images of themselves through the sense organs or in someother way.

(AT 7: 40, CSM 2: 27)

The first argument for the existence of God11

Descartes has been asking whether anything exists apart from himself. Hisinitial attempt failed: one’s natural disposition to believe that ideas representobjects external to one’s mind is not sufficient to show that ideas representextramental objects, nor can elements of the idea do so. Now he attacks the

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problem in a different way. Notice how this parallels what he did in MeditationTwo. There he enumerated various conceptions of himself and gave reasonsfor rejecting some of them before settling on the conception of himself as athinking thing. Though his enumeration here consists of only two cases, hedoes enumerate two hypotheses that might lead him to knowledge of thingsoutside of himself. The first hypothesis – the position of the unsophisticatedrepresentative realist – is rejected, so he tries an alternative approach.12

Descartes’s alternative approach lays the groundwork for his first proofof the existence of God by distinguishing objective and formal reality. Hewrites:

But it now occurs to me that there is another way of investigatingwhether some of the things of which I possess ideas exist outside me.In so far as the ideas are <considered> simply <as> modes of thought,there is no recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to comefrom within me in the same fashion. But in so far as different ideas <areconsidered as images which> represent different things, it is clear thatthey differ widely. Undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substancesto me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain withinthemselves more objective reality than the ideas which merely representmodes or accidents. Again, the idea that gives me my understanding ofa supreme God, eternal, infinite, <immutable,> omniscient, omnipotentand the creator of all things that exist apart from him, certainly has in itmore objective reality than the ideas that represent finite substances.

(AT 7: 40, CSM 2: 27–8)

Descartes distinguishes between the reality of an idea qua idea and thereality of the content of an idea. As modes of thought, all ideas possess thesame degree of reality. Nonetheless, ideas as potential representatives differfrom one another. Ideas representing substances represent entities thathave more reality than those representing modes. Ideas representing aninfinite substance have more reality than those representing finitesubstances. The objective reality of an idea is the degree of reality of theobject of thought, the possible object represented by the idea. As Descartesindicates in the “[a]rguments proving the existence of God and thedistinction between the soul and the body arranged in geometrical fashion”appended to the Second Replies, there are but three degrees of reality:mode, finite substance, and infinite substance (AT 7: 165–6, CSM 2: 113-17;cf. Curley 1978: 131). Introducing degrees of objective reality leads to

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interesting consequences. The degree of objective reality of an idea dependsupon how one conceives of an object. By misconceiving an object, onecould plausibly assign it a degree of reality higher than it would have if itexisted, for Descartes does not say that the idea to which one assigns acertain degree of objective reality must be clearly and distinctly conceived.Indeed, the description of God he presents in this paragraph – the first ofthree descriptions provided in the Third Meditation – is not portrayed as aclear and distinct idea.

Descartes next introduces his notorious causal maxim. He continues:

Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least asmuch <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of thatcause. For where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from, if not fromthe cause? And how could the cause give it to the effect unless itpossessed it? It follows from this both that something cannot arisefrom nothing, and also that what is more perfect – that is, contains initself more reality – cannot arise from what is less perfect. And this istransparently true not only in the case of effects which possess <whatthe philosophers call> actual or formal reality, but also in the case ofideas, where one is considering only <what they call> objective reality.. . . The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires no formal realityexcept what it derives from my thought, of which it is a mode. But inorder for a given idea to contain such and such objective reality, it mustsurely derive it from some cause which contains at least as much formalreality as there is objective reality in the idea. For if we suppose that anidea contains something which was not in its cause, it must have gotthis from nothing; yet the mode of being by which a thing existsobjectively <or representatively> in the intellect by way of an idea,imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so it cannotcome from nothing.

(AT 7: 40–1, CSM 2: 28–9)

The natural light convinces one “that there must be at least as much realityin the total efficient cause as there is in the effect.” Let us call this“Descartes’s causal maxim.” Given his threefold division of degrees of reality,this maxim implies that a mode may be caused by another mode or by a finitesubstance or by an infinite substance, while a finite substance can be causedeither by another finite substance or an infinite substance, and an infinitesubstance can be caused only by an infinite substance. While the causal

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maxim is “known by the natural light,” this is not the first time that theprinciple has come into play in the Meditations. As we argued in ChapterFour, Descartes assumes the principle in the second hypothetical doubt. Ifthe cause of one’s being is something less perfect than God, then the lessperfect one’s cause, the more probable it is that one will err. That doubtbecomes plausible only on the assumption of the causal maxim.

From the maxim, Descartes contends, two corollaries follow, namely, “thatsomething cannot arise from nothing, and also that what is more perfect –that is, contains in itself more reality – cannot arise from what is less perfect.”The latter claim does little more than restate the maxim itself. The former isambiguous. What does it mean to claim that something cannot arise fromnothing? If taken literally, namely, that nothingness, having no degree ofreality, cannot cause any thing that has a higher degree of reality, that is,having any degree of reality whatsoever, then it follows from the maxim. Butsome commentators, for example Georges Dicker (1993: 116-17), contendthat Descartes takes it to imply something stronger, namely, that everyexistent object has a cause, which does not follow from the principle.

Does Descartes take the former principle to imply the latter? Perhaps,though it is unclear whether he considers the principle that the more perfectcannot arise from the less perfect as a direct implication of or equivalent tothe principle that something cannot arise from nothing. Descartes acceptsthe principle that every existent has a cause. The whole analytic method ispredicated on the assumption that there are explanatory relations that obtainamong propositions. In some cases, as in his Geometry, these relations areconceptual. In other cases, an existential claim is implicit in the explanation,that is, the existence of an object can be explained only on the basis of theexistence of some other object. This, certainly, is the gist of the contentionthat something cannot arise from nothing. However, insofar as the explanatoryassumption is implicit in the method of analysis, the maxim that somethingcannot arise from nothing is neither equivalent to nor implies that everyevent has a cause (every existent object is caused by some other existentobject). Rather, both the principle that there must be at least as much realityin the total efficient cause as in the effect and the maxim that somethingcannot arise from nothing are insights of his methodological assumption asit applies to the explanation of existents. And it is a function of the naturallight to provide such insights.

Taken at the level of formal (actual) existence, Descartes’s causal maximprovides limits to the direction of causal relations. Descartes, however,extends the scope of this maxim from the formal realm (the realm of actual

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existence) to the realm of ideas, contending that the object that causes anidea with a certain degree of objective reality X must have at least an equaldegree of formal reality. This extension of the scope of the maxim providesthe bridge between objective reality and formal reality. This bridge allowshim on the one hand to move from the ideational realm to the formal realm(actual existence), and on the other hand, to introduce the notion of eminentcausation.

In eminent causation, a more perfect thing can cause the existence of aless perfect thing or the idea of a less perfect thing, but not vice versa. Thus,a finite substance can cause the existence of a mode or an idea of a mode,but a mode can cause neither a finite substance nor the idea of one. Thiskind of causation seems to remain close to the content of Descartes’s causalmaxim. Nonetheless, it provides an essential bridge between the realm ofideas and that of extramental reality. If one allows eminent causation (oreminent containment), then one provides a basis for the existence of an ideawith a certain degree of objective reality: the sole explanation for the presenceof an idea of God is the existence of a thing that has all the properties of God.

In the following passage, Descartes explains the theoretical conditionsthat the connection between formal and objective reality must satisfy.

And although the reality which I am considering in my ideas is merelyobjective reality, I must not on that account suppose that the samereality need not exist formally in the causes of my ideas, but that it isenough for it to be present in them objectively. For just as the objectivemode of being belongs to ideas by their very nature, so the formal modeof being belongs to the causes of ideas – or at least the first and mostimportant ones – by their very nature. And although one idea mayperhaps originate from another, there cannot be an infinite regress here;eventually one must reach a primary idea, the cause of which will be likean archetype which contains formally <and in fact> all the reality <orperfection> which is present only objectively <or representatively> inthe idea. So it is clear to me, by the natural light, that the ideas in me arelike <pictures, or> images which can easily fall short of the perfection ofthe things from which they are taken, but which cannot contain anythinggreater or more perfect.

(AT 7: 41–2, CSM 2: 29)

Descartes emphasizes causes. A cause as such possesses one of the threedegrees of formal reality. In attempting to bridge the gap between the objective

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reality of an idea’s content and the formal reality of an idea’s cause, hemakes one of the standard moves found in versions of the cosmologicalargmnent; he claims that while ideas can cause one another, the chain ofcauses must be finite. Eventually one must confront an idea that cannot beexplained on the basis of other ideas. This ultimate idea he calls a “primaryidea,” and it must represent its causal archetype, because the cause of theprimary idea must contain at least as much formal reality as is foundobjectively in the primary idea.

The implications of this principle prove pivotal to the first argument forthe existence of God. To this point in the Meditation, Descartes can only layclaim to his own existence and the existence of his ideas (modes of histhought). Eminent causation permits Descartes to find an idea that has anobjective reality so high that its existence can be explained only by theexistence of a cause external to his thoughts and himself, such that thepossible object that the idea represents has at least as great a degree offormal reality as the idea has objective reality. Only two possibilities exist:one, Descartes cannot construct the idea from the idea of himself andelements of other ideas of which he is aware, and thus, he would havegrounds for claiming that something external to him causes the idea; or two,Descartes can construct the idea from the idea of himself and the elementsof other ideas of which he is aware, and thus, his meditation would end inepistemological solipsism, since he would fail to produce grounds forclaiming the existence of something external to himself (AT 7: 42, CSM 2: 29).With these preliminaries in mind, we turn to the first argument for God’sexistence.

The structure of the first argument is quite simple. Descartes presents alist of the various kinds of ideas he finds in his mind. He then asks whetherhe could explain the presence of each kind of idea without positing theexistence of an external cause. He argues that each idea, except the idea ofGod, can so be explained. Since the presence Of an idea of God cannot so beexplained, he concludes that God exists.

He presents his list of kinds of ideas as follows:

Among my ideas, apart from the idea which gives me a representationof myself, which cannot present any difficulty in this context, there areideas which variously represent God, corporeal and inanimate things,angels, animals and finally other men like myself.

(AT 7: 42–3, CSM 2: 29)

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He then asks whether he can explain the existence of each kind of ideawithout positing an extramental existence. He begins with the ideas ofhumans, angels, and animals (AT 7: 43, CSM 2: 29), and argues that if onehas ideas of corporeal things, oneself, and God, elements of those ideas canbe recombined to form ideas of animals, human beings, and angels, even ifthose kinds of beings do not exist. For example, insofar as an angel isconceived as a winged human, the idea of an angelic body can be formedfrom that of a bird and a human body. Assuming that an angel is an intelligentbeing, rather than merely a complex machine, one conceives of the body aspossessing a mind like that of a human, although more powerful.13 Insofaras God is conceived as a thinking thing that is more powerful than a human,an angelic mind is conceived as more powerful than a human mind, thoughless powerful than a divine mind. Thus, by recombining elements of theideas present in his mind, Descartes can explain how it is possible to formideas of angels.

Turning to the idea of corporeal substance, Descartes shifts the natureof the explanation. He writes:

As to my ideas of corporeal things, I can see nothing in them which isso great <or excellent> as to make it seem impossible that it originatedin myself. For if I scrutinize them thoroughly and examine them one byone, in the way in which I examined the idea of the wax yesterday, Inotice that the things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them arevery few in number. The list comprises size, or extension in length,breadth and depth; shape, which is a function of the boundaries of thisextension; position, which is a relation between various itemspossessing shape; and motion, or change in position; to these may beadded substance, duration and number. But as for all the rest, includinglight and colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold and the othertactile qualities, I think of these only in a very confused and obscureway, to the extent that I do not even know whether they are true or false,that is, whether the ideas I have of them are ideas of real things or ofnon-things. For although, as I have noted before, falsity in the strictsense, or formal falsity, can occur only in judgements, there is anotherkind of falsity, material falsity, which occurs in ideas, when they representnon-things as things. For example, the ideas which I have of heat andcold contain so little clarity and distinctness that they do not enable meto tell whether cold is merely the absence of heat or vice versa, orwhether both of them are real qualities, or neither is. And since there

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can be no ideas which are not as it were of things, if it is true that coldis nothing but the absence of heat, the idea which represents it to me assomething real and positive deserves to be called false; and the samegoes for other ideas of this kind.

(AT 7: 43–4, CSM 2: 29–30)

One cannot simply recombine elements of other ideas to form the idea ofcorporeal substance: this idea is more general than that of any kind ofcorporeal substance.14 Nonetheless, as he shows a few paragraphs later, hisaccount of eminent causation allows him to explain how the properties ofcorporeal substance can be formed. Like most substance theorists, Descartesheld that substance is known only mediately, that is, by means of its attributes(P 1: 52). Since corporeal substance is a finite substance, its status in thelevels of reality is no higher than that of a human finite substance. Sinceeminent causation allows him to contend that a finite substance can constructideas of modes of a finite substance, he has the basis for explaining thepresence of the constitutive properties of material substance.

To explain his idea of corporeal substance, Descartes initially attempts toclarify it by generalizing from his clarification of the idea of the wax. Noticethat he articulates the clarification in terms of those properties that he clearlyand distinctly perceives as constituting a corporeal object, namely:

size, or extension in length, breadth and depth; shape, which is a functionof the boundaries of this extension; position, which is a relation betweenvarious items possessing shape; and motion, or change in position; tothese may be added substance, duration and number.

(AT 7: 42–3, CSM 2: 28–9)

With the exception of substance, duration, and number, these arecharacteristics discerned in the analysis of the piece of wax. Substance,duration, and number are characteristics that could be drawn from Descartes’sconsideration of his own nature, as he acknowledges in the next twoparagraphs (AT 7: 44–5, CSM 2: 30–1). He wants to determine thosecharacteristics that he perceives as essential to a thing qua corporeal entity.One does not clearly and distinctly perceive such characteristics as heatand cold; one can conceive of a corporeal entity even in the absence ofsuch properties. Ideas that are not clear and distinct are materially false:they provide the basis for formally false judgments. Hence, ideas of properties

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that are not clearly and distinctly perceived cannot be ideas of constitutiveproperties of material substance.

As Descartes continues, he stresses the epistemic weakness of ideasthat are not clear and distinct. He writes:

Such ideas obviously do not require me to posit a source distinct frommyself. For on the one hand, if they are false, that is, represent non-things, I know by the natural light that they arise from nothing – that is,they are in me only because of a deficiency and lack of perfection in mynature. If on the other hand they are true, then since the reality whichthey represent is so extremely slight that I cannot even distinguish itfrom a non-thing, I do not see why they cannot originate from myself.

(AT 7: 44, CSM 2: 30)

Descartes’s argument takes the form of a dilemma. Either ideas of propertiesthat are not clearly and distinctly perceived, e.g. heat and cold, representconstitutive properties of material objects or they do not. If they do notrepresent constitutive properties of material objects, then material objectscould exist without such properties and the best explanation of one’sawareness of these properties rests upon defects in one’s nature. If they dorepresent constitutive properties of material objects, then the fact that theyare not clearly and distinctly perceived implies that they have a low status inreality, that is, they are modes rather than attributes. Thus, given his accountof eminent causation, he himself could be the cause of these ideas. So, ineither case, he is not forced to posit the existence of an external entity as thecause of his idea of corporeal substance.

Descartes continues his scrutiny of ideas of material objects. To disposeof such ideas as candidates for primary ideas, he appeals to characteristicsof himself and eminent causation (AT 7: 44–5, CSM 2: 30–1). He divides theclass of properties he clearly and distinctly perceives into two subclasseson the basis of whether the ideas of them are actually in him. Those propertiesthe ideas of which he finds in himself are substance, duration, and number.Defining substance as a thing that can exist independently (cf. P 1: 51), heargues that insofar as he himself is a substance, he may attributesubstantiality – whether correctly or not – to material objects: the conceptof substance is derived from the self and applied to a non-self. He arguesthe same way with regard to duration and number. Those properties he doesnot find in himself are peculiar to material (nonmental) substances. He lists

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the properties of extension, shape, position, and movement as meeting thisdescription; however, these properties are nothing more than attributes ormodes of a substance. Since they are attributes or modes, while Descarteshimself is a substance, they could be contained in him eminently, that is,insofar as he is a substance, it is possible for him to create from his ownnature ideas of attributes or modes, even if they are modes of a materialsubstance. Thus, he can explain the presence of the ideas of material objectsin his mind even if no such objects exist.15

At this point Descartes has explained how he can form each of the ideasof things in his mind except the idea of God. Recognizing this, he askswhether the idea of God as “infinite, <eternal, immutable> independent,supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both myselfand everything else (if anything else there be) that exists” (AT 7: 45, CSM 2:31) represents an external existent.16 He does this by contrasting the idea ofGod with those ideas that he has already explained as possibly derivingfrom himself, but, he writes, “[T]he more carefully I concentrate on them [theproperties of God], the less possible it seems that they could have originatedfrom me alone” (AT 7: 45, CSM 2: 31). Being bereft of any alternativeexplanation of the presence of the idea of God, he concludes that God exists.

Descartes has done little more than stipulate that he could not constructthe idea of God. Why would he claim that? How does the idea of God differfrom the previous ideas he considered? Fundamentally, it differs in that it isan idea of an infinite being, while the ideas he had considered previously areideas of finite beings. He now addresses the importance of that difference,that is, why only the existence of an infinite being could explain the possibilityof an idea of an infinite being. To this topic he devotes the next severalparagraphs.

He begins by contrasting infinite substance with finite substance (AT 7:45, CSM 2: 31). He argues that the sole basis for explaining one’s idea of aninfinite substance is another infinite substance. The infinite is logicallyprior to the finite. But why should one claim that the idea of infinity containsanything more than the negation of the idea of finitude? Descartes explains:

And I must not think that, just as my conceptions of rest and darknessare arrived at by negating movement and light, so my perception of theinfinite is arrived at not by means of a true idea but merely by negatingthe finite. On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more realityin an infinite substance than in a finite one, and hence that my perception

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of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of thefinite, that is myself. For how could I understand that I doubted ordesired – that is, lacked something – and that I was not wholly perfect,unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect being which enabledme to recognize my own defects by comparison?

(AT 7: 45–6, CSM 2: 31)

Notice Descartes’s argument. He contends that the idea of the infinite isprior to that of the finite, and, therefore, it cannot be a negative idea. Why?Descartes is imperfect. Were this not so, he could not doubt, desire, or fallinto error. He claims to possess an archetypical idea of perfection to whichhe compares himself. In the process of comparing himself to this idea ofperfection, he recognizes his own imperfection. If the idea of perfection istruly archetypical, it must be prior to the idea of imperfection, and its causemust be something distinct from himself.

Descartes continues by asking whether the idea of God is materiallyfalse. In his words:

Nor can it be said that this idea of God is perhaps materially false and socould have come from nothing, which is what I observed just a momentago in the case of the ideas of heat and cold, and so on. On the contrary,it is utterly clear and distinct, and contains in itself more objectivereality than any other idea; hence there is no idea which is in itself trueror less liable to be suspected of falsehood. This idea of a supremelyperfect and infinite being is, I say, true in the highest degree; for althoughperhaps one may imagine that such a being does not exist, it cannot besupposed that the idea of such a being represents something unreal, asI said with regard to the idea of cold.

(AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 31–2)

There are two related issues here. First, Descartes raises the question whetherthe idea of God is materially false. This he emphatically denies, arguing thatthe idea of God is the clearest and most distinct of all ideas. Second, thedefinition of God has changed. While two paragraphs earlier he defined theterm ‘God’ by means of an enumeration of several attributes, here theenumeration is limited to supreme perfection and infinite being. If the idea ofGod is expressed by the definition, the idea here is clearer and more distinctbecause Descartes has specified a pair of attributes under which all the

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previous attributes fall, namely, perfection and infinity. He then discussesthis idea of God. In the parlance found in the replies to Arnauld, Descartesindicates that the idea of God as a perfect being is an idea of a completething and a complete thing is “a substance endowed with the forms orattributes which enable me to recognize that it is a substance” (AT 7: 221,CSM 2: 156). Yet, his idea of God is inadequate because it fails to “containabsolutely all the properties which are in the thing which is the object ofknowledge” (AT 7: 220, CSM 2: 155). Since his mind is finite, Descartescannot have an adequate idea of an infinite entity, that is, an idea of all theconstitutive properties of an infinite being. Nevertheless, each of thoseproperties he perceives in the idea of God implies a perfection. The idea ofperfection itself is simpler (more general) than that of any sort of perfection,and consequently, in keeping with his own account of degrees of clarity anddistinctness, Descartes justifiably claims that the idea of a perfect being isthe “most clear and distinct of all my ideas” (AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 31–2).

Descartes concludes the argument by considering the objection that hisown perfection is greater than he thinks (AT 7: 46–7, CSM 2: 32). His objectionis straightforward: perhaps I’m more perfect than I believe myself to be.Since he finds himself increasing in knowledge, does it follow that he ispotentially perfect? He provides a response with a rather Socratic flavor byindicating that such improvement only reveals how much further fromperfection he actually is. He distinguishes between actual properties andpotential properties. The idea of God is that of an actually infinite being thatcontains nothing potentially; the most Descartes could claim for himself isthe potentiality of infinite knowledge. This alone sufficiently shows that hecannot be the cause of the idea of an actually perfect being: the actual canbe the cause of the potential, but not vice versa. Further, being only potentiallyperfect is a mark of actual imperfection. He stresses this point by claimingthat the more knowledge he obtains, the more clear it becomes that hisknowledge will never be infinite (AT 7: 47, CSM 2: 32). Hence, any degree ofimperfection is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the cause of hisidea of an infinite being.

Thus ends Descartes’s defense of the claim that only God could causehis idea of God. He has argued in two phases. First, he showed that one canconstruct the ideas of all kinds of things except God by recombining elementsof the idea of himself and the idea of God, or, when the idea cannot beformed by simple recombination, it can be explained through eminentcausation. During the second phase, he raised and replied to objections to

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the claim that only God can be the cause of the idea of God. As Descartesconcludes, “If one concentrates carefully, all this is quite evident by thenatural light” (AT 7: 47, CSM 2: 32). We now turn to his other argument forGod’s existence.

The second argument for the existence of God

Having completed his argument for the existence of God based onconsiderations of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existenceof an idea of God, Descartes turns to an argument for the existence of Godbased on the fact that he exists and has an idea of God. Why would he dothat? He suggests that the previous proof is abstruse, that considerations ofobjective reality cannot retain one’s attention given the continualbombardment of sensuous images (AT 7: 47–8, CSM 2: 32–3).

We hope to show that more is going on than Descartes initially suggests.Appeals to abstruseness alone would fail to justify a second proof. In thefirst argument, Descartes assumes that a cause with a certain degree offormal reality will explain effects with an equal or lesser degree of objectivereality. The second argument rests only on considerations of formal reality.He knows he possesses the degree of formal reality attributed to a finitesubstance. Because a substance is an entity that is capable of existingindependently (AT 7: 44, CSM 2: 30; P 1: 52), it possesses a certain duration,a fact he already acknowledges regarding himself (AT 7: 44–5, CSM 2: 30–1).During the course of the first argument, he acknowledges a distinctionbetween finite and infinite substances, but the nature of that difference isnot clearly understood there. The aim of his second argument is todemonstrate that he can explain his own existence, the existence of a thinghaving both an idea of God and which exists for an extended period of time,solely on the presumption that he is caused by an infinite substance.

The second argument for God’s existence begins with an enumeration. Inthe previous argument he began by enumerating his various ideas to askwhat would sufficiently explain their presence. Here he enumerates thepossible causes of his existence to see which, if any, could have caused hisexistence. As in the previous argument, he constructs a complex disjunctivesyllogism, eliminating the various options until he reaches the conclusionthat only God could be the cause of his existence. What are the possiblecauses of his existence other than God? The options are himself, his parentsor some being “less perfect than God,” or God (AT 7: 48, CSM 2: 33). He

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rejects the first three of these possibilities, leaving God as the only adequateexplanation of his existence.

Before examining Descartes’s treatment of the first option, we shouldattend to an oddity: he goes on for three paragraphs about the apparentlyself-contradictory notion of self-causation. Keep three points in mind here.First, Descartes believes that a cause is not temporally prior to its effect, it issimultaneous with it. Second, he seems willing to grant that an efficientcause need not be existentially distinct from its effect. We have discussedthese two points at length in the first three sections of Chapter Three. Whilewe admit that the argument’s success turns on a very tenuous blurring ofthe distinction between formal and efficient cause, we wish to attend moreto the structure of the argument than to its success. Finally, given the threedegrees of formal reality and eminent causation, a finite substance could beresponsible for all of its own modes; moreover, since finite substances couldcause finite substances, it remains an open question whether a finitesubstance could be the cause of itself at distinct points in time, since anefficient cause is simultaneous with its effect.

In attending to the first option, Descartes distinguishes two ways inwhich he might be said to cause his own existence: he could be the initiatingor the preservative cause of his own existence. He rejects the possibilitythat he caused himself. At first, he reasons that he would have done betterby himself if he had been self-caused. The idea that he would have createdhimself without limits with respect to any of his abilities naturally leads himto believe that he would have made himself more knowledgeable or powerfulthan he is. Here, again, he contrasts himself with his idea of perfection andrelies on the assumption of his finiteness. To drive this point home Descartesdiscusses what he must believe in order to think that he brought about hisown existence.

I must not suppose that the items I lack would be more difficult toacquire than those I now have. On the contrary, it is clear that, since Iam a thinking thing or substance, it would have been far more difficultfor me to emerge out of nothing than merely to acquire knowledge ofthe many things of which I am ignorant – such knowledge being merelyan accident of that substance. And if I had derived my existence frommyself, which is a greater achievement, I should certainly not havedenied myself the knowledge in question, which is something mucheasier to acquire, or indeed any of the attributes which I perceive to be

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contained in the idea of God; for none of them seem any harder toachieve. And if any of them were harder to achieve, they would certainlyappear so to me, if I had indeed got all my other attributes from myself,since I should experience a limitation of my power in this respect.

(AT 7: 48, CSM 2: 33)

If he had caused himself, he would have given himself all the perfections heattributes to God, but he lacks these perfections. The degrees of formalreality dictate that it would be harder to create a finite substance (a thinkingthing) than to create a mode (knowledge); similarly, it would be more difficultto create a substance out of nothing than to create one of its accidents(knowledge). He concludes that he did not cause himself, since he wouldhave limited neither his knowledge nor his other properties, since, as modes,their existence is less problematic than his own substantial existence.

The second way Descartes might understand himself as the cause ofhimself is to assume that he has always existed and ask whether he is hisown preservative cause. He asks himself whether he has any evidence thathe has always existed. He has none. Here he stresses the duration of hisexistence. If he always existed, he would need to account for his preservationin existence. This he cannot do. He knows by the natural light that he canonly distinguish conceptually between creation and preservation. Dividinghis life into temporal segments, Descartes claims that the same power wouldbe necessary to preserve his existence – or to create him anew at everymoment – that is required to create him initially (AT 7: 48–9, CSM 2: 33).Thus, the case of his preservative cause collapses into the case of his initialcreative cause. Given his previous conclusion that he could not be theinitial cause of himself, he has no reason to believe that he is the cause of hiscontinued existence. Indeed, he continues, if he had such a power, he wouldbe aware of it, but he is aware of no such a power, so he does not have it.Thus, since no entity can continue to exist without a cause, some otherbeing must account for the cause of his preservation (AT 7: 49, CSM 2: 33–4). What then is that preservative power?

Descartes rejects the second and third options, his parents or some beingless perfect than God, as the causes of his existence. Though he presentsthem as separate options, his argument against the third option shouldcount equally well for his parents, since they, too, are less perfect than God.Nevertheless, his parents furnish a natural starting point for him to generatehis regress. His argument takes the form of a dilemma (AT 7: 49–50, CSM 2:

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34). Either his parents are the cause of his being, or they are not. If they arethe cause of his being, then given that there must be at least as much realityin the cause as in the effect, it must account for his existence as a thinkingthing with an idea of God. Assume his parents met that condition, then thequestion is simply pushed back one step, for either they are the cause oftheir own being or they are not. If they are, then they are self-caused. If theyare not, then the chain goes back another step. Ultimately, whatever wouldbe the first cause must be self-caused, that is, God.

But even this is more than Descartes needs. Assuming that the regresscannot be infinite does not account for the current preservation of his being.At most, it explains coming into existence in the past. Since there is only adistinction of reason between the initial cause of a being and the cause of itspreservation, a parental cause cannot explain the phenomenon of Descartes’scontinued existence. Hence, his parents cannot be the cause of his being(AT 7: 50, CSM 2: 34).

Descartes temporarily shifts to considerations of non-parental causes ofhis being. Assume there were several partial causes of one’s being, takingparents as a cause would be one special case of this. Will this allow Descartesto explain his existence? No. On this assumption, each of the partial causesmight contribute one element – one kind of perfection – to the idea of aperfect being. He rejects this possibility on the ground that “unity, thesimplicity, or the inseparability of all the attributes of God is one of the mostimportant of the perfections which I understand him to have” (AT 7: 50,CSM 2: 34). He is dealing here with the idea of one thing that is “a supremelyperfect and infinite being” (AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 31). Insofar as it is one being,the perfections must be united. Furthermore, unlike the idea of God operativein the earlier argument (cf. AT 7: 40, 45; CSM 2: 28, 31), perfection is taken tobe a simple, indivisible attribute, that is, he is concerned with perfection perse, rather than an enumeration of specific types of perfections. For thisreason the simplicity and inseparability of the kinds of perfection is germaneto the argument. The presence of an idea of God construed as perfection perse would not be explained by the presumption of several partial causes ofhis being. This idea is complete, even if not adequate; the idea of God as acollection of specific kinds of perfections is not guaranteed to be complete.So Descartes rejects the assumption that he, as a thing containing the ideaof God as a perfect being, could be the result of several partial causes.

Descartes returns to the contention that his parents cannot be the causeof his being. He repeats the earlier claim that they could not be the cause of

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his preservation. Furthermore, he reflects on what he considers himself tobe. He considers his parents as a cause only to the extent that he himselfmay be a material entity (AT 7: 50–1, CSM 2: 35). At this point in theMeditations he does not know himself as a material entity; he may onlycategorize himself as a thinking being (mind). So, considerations of thecauses of his existence as a material object – if, indeed, he has such anexistence – are irrelevant. Having dismissed alternative possible causes ofhis existence as a thing with an idea of God as a perfect being, he concludesthat only God could be the cause of his being as a thinking thing: no otherpossibility will adequately explain his existence. Thus ends his secondargument for God’s existence.

Let us briefly review the nature of his two proofs. In the first proofDescartes searched for the necessary and sufficient conditions for havingan idea of God. It focused on the objective reality of the idea and the degreeof formal reality necessary to explain the idea. After considering the variouspossibilities, he concluded that only God could be the cause thereof. In thesecond proof he primarily concentrated on formal reality (actual existence),concerning himself with objective reality only when he had to explain theexistence of a being with an idea of God as a supremely perfect being. Giventhe strict construal of himself as a thinking thing containing an idea of Godas a supremely perfect being, he concluded that only the existence of a Godcorresponding to his idea could be the cause of his initial and continuedexistence as a thinking thing.

Odds and ends

With the conclusion of the second proof of the existence of God, Descarteshas completed the fundamental objective of the meditation. In what remains,he considers questions regarding the nature of the idea of God – whether itis adventitious, factitious, or innate – and implications of the existence ofGod as a supremely perfect being.

Descartes claims that the idea of God is innate. In his words:

It only remains for me to examine how I received this idea from God. ForI did not acquire it from the senses; it has never come to me unexpectedly,as usually happens with the ideas of things that are perceivable by thesenses, when these things present themselves to the external sense

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organs – or seem to do so. And it was not invented by me either; for Iam plainly unable either to take away anything from it or to add anythingto it. The only remaining alternative is that it is innate in me, just as theidea of myself is innate in me.

(AT 7: 51, CSM 2: 35)

As Descartes noted earlier, ideas are either adventitious, factitious(constructed), or innate. In this paragraph he argues that the idea of God isinnate. The idea cannot be adventitious, since it is not derived from thesenses. His proofs have shown that he cannot have invented it, and so itcannot be factitious. Therefore, it follows by disjunctive syllogism that itmust be innate. We shall return to this argument in the next section.

Descartes then reflects on the conclusion that the idea of God is(somehow) innate within him:

And indeed it is no surprise that God, in creating me, should haveplaced this idea in me to be, as it were, the mark of the craftsman stampedon his work – not that the mark need be anything distinct from the workitself. But the mere fact that God created me is a very strong basis forbelieving that I am somehow made in his image and likeness, and that Iperceive that likeness, which includes the idea of God, by the samefaculty which enables me to perceive myself. That is, when I turn mymind’s eye upon myself, I understand that I am a thing which isincomplete and dependent on another and which aspires without limitto ever greater and better things; but I also understand at the same timethat he on whom I depend has within him all those greater things, notjust indefinitely and potentially but actually and infinitely, and hencethat he is God. The whole force of the argument lies in this: I recognizethat it would be impossible for me to exist with the kind of nature I have– that is, having within me the idea of God – were it not the case thatGod really existed. By ‘God’ I mean the very being the idea of whom iswithin me, that is, the possessor of all the perfections which I cannotgrasp, but can somehow reach in my thought, who is subject to nodefects whatsoever. It is clear enough from this that he cannot be adeceiver, since it is manifest by the natural light that all fraud anddeception depend on some defect.

(AT 7: 510–2, CSM 2: 35)

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Descartes emphasizes two themes here. First, he reflects on the meaningof the theological claim that humans are made in the image of God (Genesis1: 27). He suggests that since God causes his initial and continued existence,one should not be surprised that some similarity exists in nature betweenGod-as-cause and himself.17 The extent to which Descartes reflects the imageof God seems limited to the fact that both God and Descartes are thinkingthings, even though he claimed that, as a finite substance that recognizesits finitude, he is no more than a pale image of an infinite and perfect God.

The second theme is Descartes’s rejection of the view that God is adeceiver. Since God is a perfect being, God can have no defect, and insofaras deception is dependent upon a defect, deception cannot be predicated ofGod. So God is not a deceiver. Methodologically this is a very importantconclusion: it answers the first hypothetical doubt of the First Meditation.Furthermore, the implications of this conclusion for the three specific doubtsunder the deceiver-God hypothesis are the subject matter of the last threeMeditations.

Descartes concludes his Third Meditation by slipping into a theologicalreverie, which requires no philosophical commentary.

Clarifying the idea of God

While God’s existence provides the primary theme of the Third Meditation,we have noted that Descartes’s descriptions of the idea of God also haveundergone a subtle change. As we argued in our discussion of the method,questions of ideational clarification always stand in counterpoint to thesearch for principles. In this section we turn to Descartes’s ideas of God,beginning with a more primitive idea of God than is found in the ThirdMeditation. We show how his dispositional account of nonoccurrent in-nate ideas allows him to explain the several transformations in the idea ofGod. We argue that the idea of God is innate only insofar as each of thecomponents of an occurrent idea of God is an occurrent innate idea. We alsoargue that since one systematically reconstructs the idea of God, one canreasonably construe the idea of God as factitious.18

Factitious ideas

Descartes wrote little regarding factitious ideas, although what he wroteshows that they are compound ideas: factitious ideas are “made up” (factis)

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or “invented by me (a me ipso facae mihi videntur) from other ideas” (cf. AT8B: 358, 7: 38; CSM 1: 303, 2: 26). Given that he cites ideas of sirens andhippogriffs as examples of factitious ideas, one might be tempted to identifyfactitious ideas with what the British empirical philosophers called “ideas ofthe imagination” – which would imply that they are composed solely ofadventitious ideas (cf. Williams 1978: 132; Grene 1985: 13) – but one shouldnot yield to that temptation. Factitious ideas can be composed either ofadventitious ideas, or innate ideas, or some combination of the two. This isclear from a comparison of Descartes’s discussions of the two ideas of thesun in the Meditations with his remarks on the division of ideas intoadventitious, factitious, and innate in his letter to Mersenne of 16 June1641.19 In the Meditations Descartes defends the claim that adventitiousideas need not resemble their putative causes. In that Third Meditationpassage, he introduces one of the two ideas of the sun as the adventitiousidea that we passively form on a sunny day. That idea derives directly fromsense perception, and leaves us with the impression that the sun is quitesmall. The other idea derives from astronomical reasoning. The second moreaccurately represents the nature of the sun itself in that the sun is understoodas larger than the earth. Notice that this astronomical idea of the sun is“derived from certain innate notions which are in me (or else constructed byme in some other way)” (AT 7: 39, CSM 2: 27). This is a factitious ideaconstructed from innate ideas.

In his letter to Mersenne, Descartes makes this point explicitly. There hewrites:

I use the word ‘idea’ to mean everything which can be in our thought,and I distinguish three kinds. †Some are adventitious†, such as the ideawe commonly have of the sun; †others are constructed or made up†, inwhich class we can put the idea which the astronomers construct of thesun by their reasoning; and †others are innate, such as the idea of God,mind, body, triangle, and in general all those which represent immutableand eternal essences. . .†.

(AT 3: 383, CSM 3: 183)

This passage tells us several things. First, it indicates that one constructsthe factitious idea of the sun in the course of astronomical reasoning. Second,it shows that one’s astronomical idea of the sun has innate components.Third, it presents us with a partial list of the ideas that are innate. Finally, andmost importantly, it shows that the distinction between adventitious ideas

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and innate ideas is exclusive and exhaustive. At bottom, all simple ideas areeither adventitious or innate, for factitious ideas can be composed of ideasof both kinds.20 If we examine Descartes’s discussion of the formation of anidea of a triangle, we shall be in a position to determine the relationship thatobtains between innate and factitious ideas.

In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes provides a brief account ofhow universal ideas arise. After commenting that “number, when it isconsidered simply in the abstract or in general, and not in any createdthings, is merely a mode of thinking; and the same applied to all the otheruniversals” (P 1: 58: AT 8A: 27, CSM 1: 212), he writes:

These universals arise solely from the fact that we make use of one andthe same idea for thinking of all individual items which resemble eachother: we apply one and the same terms to all the things which arerepresented by the idea in question, and this is the universal term.When we see two stones, for example, and direct our attention not totheir nature but merely to the fact that there are two of them, we form theidea of the number which we call ‘two’; and when we later see two birdsor two trees, and consider not their nature but merely the fact that thereare two of them, we go back to the same idea as before. This, then, is theuniversal idea; and we always designate the number in question by thesame universal term ‘two.’ In the same way, when we see a figure madeup of three lines, we form an idea of it which we call the idea of atriangle; and we later make use of it as a universal idea, so as to representto our mind all the other figures made up of three lines. Moreover, whenwe notice that some triangles have one right angle, and others do not,we form the universal idea of a right-angled triangle; since this idea isrelated to the preceding idea as a special case, it is termed a species.And the rectangularity is the universal differentia which distinguishesall right-angled triangles from other triangles. And the fact that thesquare of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of theother two sides is a property belonging to all and only right-angledtriangles. Finally, ifwe suppose that some right-angled triangles are inmotion while others are not, this will be a universal accident of suchtriangles. Hence five universals are commonly listed: genus, species,differentia, property, and accident.

(P 1: 59: AT 8A: 27–8, CSM 1: 212–13)

Several things should be noticed in this passage. First, universals are not

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“in” the objects one observes. The universals to which Descartes refers arenothing more than general ideas of the respects in which two or more objectsresemble one another. Second, the mind actively forms or becomes aware ofa universal idea. In the examples he mentions here, one “directs one’sattention” or “notices” a particular aspect of a complex state of affairs.Finally, the universal ideas one forms are actualizations of innate dispositions.

We need to make note of three further points. First, Descartes’s accountof how one forms universals is similar to John Locke’s account (1975: 408–20) of how one forms abstract ideas: if one attends to a complex state ofaffairs, then one can form an idea of a component of that state of affairs, and,by comparing various individuals, one can form an idea of the respect inwhich those individuals resemble one another.21 Of course, a significantdifference exists between Lockean abstraction and its Cartesian counterpart.Locke rejects the doctrine of innate ideas and suggests that by abstractingone can form general notions without appealing to innate ideas. InDescartes’s case, the putative fact that innate ideas are dispositions allowsone to explain the formation of the general ideas. Thus, if one attends to aparticular three-sided figure, this might trigger a disposition to form an ideaof triangularity.

Second, the process by which one forms a Cartesian universal idea iscomparable to that process by which one forms clear and distinct ideas of apiece of wax or oneself, for, in both of these cases, the properties conceivedare extremely general. In forming a clear and distinct idea of a piece of wax,one assumes that the wax one removes from the hive at time t1 is identicalwith the wax that is dripping from one’s hand at a later time t2, and one asks,consistent with that assumption, which of the qualities of the wax haveremained throughout that time. In concluding that the wax is extended,flexible, and movable, one goes beyond the sensibly given; the ideas interms of which the wax is defined are innate (AT 7: 30–1, CSM 2: 20–1). Theprocedure was the same, of course, in Descartes’s earlier inquiry into hisown nature (AT 7: 27–8, CSM 2: 18–19). This, together with the fact thatastronomical reasoning led to the factitious idea of the sun, suggests thatone triggers innate ideas as dispositions when one reasons analytically andcritically.

Finally, the examples we have considered suggest that when one’sreasoning triggers an innate disposition to form an occurrent idea, onebegins with either an adventitious or a factitious idea, and one concludeswith a factitious idea. The resulting factitious idea might be composed offour innate ideas, that of, one, a thing (genus) differentiated on the basis of

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two, extension, three, moveability, and four, flexibility. Even in the case ofthe self or the most general notions of body, the analysis yields an idea ofthe genus (”thing” or “substance”) and its differentia.

This is precisely what one would expect, given our account of analysis inChapters One and Two. Further, this allows us to understand the evolutionof the ideas of God in the Third Meditation.

The ideas of God

Up to this point we have shown that factitious ideas can be composed ofany combination of adventitious and innate ideas. We also have suggestedthat if all ideas of substances are complex ideas, then they are factitious. Inreturning to the Third Meditation, we examine the journey that takes us fromthe least clear and distinct idea of God – the idea Descartes described toHobbes – to the most clear and distinct idea of God, the idea of a perfectbeing. During this journey, there are two intermediate stops: the originalidea is clarified to the idea of God whose attributes are non-finite, which isclarified to the idea of God whose attributes are infinite, which is clarified tothe idea of a perfect being.

As we noticed above, at least two different ideas of God appear in theThird Meditation. At the beginning of the meditation, God is described as“eternal, infinite, <immutable,> omniscient, omnipotent and the creator of allthings that exist apart from him” (AT 7: 51, CSM 2: 35; cf. AT 7: 45, CSM 2:31). At the end of the meditation, God is described as “a most perfect being”(AT 7: 51, CSM 2: 35; cf. AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 31 and AT 7: 65, CSM 2: 45). Todistinguish these, let us refer to the first idea of God as “IG1” and the secondas “IG2”. One will notice two things initially. First, IG2 differs in its degree ofgenerality from IG1: perfection is a single attribute that subsumes ideas ofthe several distinct attributes of God in IG1. Second, IG1 ostensibly differsfrom the idea of God Descartes described to Hobbes, which we shall call theHobbesian idea of God (HIG).22

In his reply to Hobbes, Descartes claims that one forms an idea of God(HIG) by “extending” the idea of one’s own understanding and otherattributes (AT 7: 188, CSM 2: 132). Such a process will yield indefinitelygreat attributes. In IG1, the attributes ostensibly are infinite. What are theconsiderations that take one from HIG to IG1?23 Properly speaking, HIG isdistinct from IG1 insofar as no indefinite extension of one’s own attributeswill be sufficient to yield an infinite attribute.24 It is less clear that Descartes

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initially acknowledged a distinction between HIG and IG1, or that thedistinction between them came to be recognized on the basis of a process ofreasoning. If our account is correct, then one would expect that reasoningabout HIG triggers an innate disposition or set of dispositions which yieldsIG1. Evidence to this effect appears in the Third Meditation. Notice whatDescartes writes at the initial stage of his argument for the existence of Godbased upon his idea of God:

By the word ‘God’ I understand a substance that is infinite, <eternal,immutable,> independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful,and which created both myself and everything else (if anything elsethere be) that exists. All these attributes are such that, the more carefullyI concentrate on them, the less possible it seems that they could haveoriginated from me alone. So from what has been said it must beconcluded that God necessarily exists.

(AT 7: 45, CSM 2: 31, our emphasis)

How does one form IG1? Let us say that one considered the traditionaldescription of God and attempted to construct an idea corresponding toit.25 In one’s initial attempt to construct such an idea, one might well expandupon one’s idea of oneself and form HIG. But a modicum of considerationwill reveal the inadequacy of HIG. As Hobbes noted, “to say that God isinfinite is the same as saying that he belongs to the class of things suchthat we do not conceive them as having bounds” (AT 7: 187, CSM 2: 131). Ina Cartesian framework, by considering HIG, one’s considerations triggercertain innate dispositions that lead one to a version of IG1. Initially, onemight recognize that there is a distinction between an indefinitely greatextension of one’s own attributes and infinite attributes. Thus, one mightrevise HIG to form HIG* by replacing the positive notion of indefinitelygreat attributes with the negative notion of non-finite attributes. Aconsideration of infinity, however, will take one from HIG* to IG1.

Having noticed that he could derive the idea of substance from himself,but not the idea of infinite substance (AT 7: 45, CSM 2: 31), Descartes goeson to discuss the conception of infinity. He writes:

And I must not think that, just as my conceptions of rest and darknessare arrived at by negating movement and light, so my perception of theinfinite is arrived at not by means of a true idea but merely by negatingthe finite. On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality

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in an infinite substance than in a finite one, and hence that my perceptionof the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of thefinite, that is myself. For how could I understand that I doubted ordesired – that is, lacked something – and that I was not wholly perfect,unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect being which enabledme to recognize my own defects by comparison?

(AT 7: 45–6, CSM 2: 31)

By contemplating the idea of infinity, Descartes concludes that hisunderstanding of infinity is not the negation of the finite, rather, it is prior tohis understanding of the finite. With respect to the ideas of God, this suggeststhat one’s consideration of the idea of infinity (what is involved in thenotion of infinity) triggers an innate disposition or set of dispositions thatallows one properly to form IG1. The exercise of clarification allows one tomove from HIG to IG1: the same exercise is involved in forming a clear anddistinct perception of the piece of wax or of oneself (cf. (AT 7: 25–8, CSM 2:17–19; AT 7: 30–1, CSM 2: 20–1; AT 8A: 21–2, CSM 1: 207–8). Notice alsothe factitious nature of IG1: it is complex, and the mind puts together theseveral component ideas of the attributes in the sense that the componentsof HIG* are systematically replaced with more adequate ideas of the attributesof God. Moreover, each component of IG1 is an innate idea, even though IG1

is complex, and thus factitious.While we have moved from HIG to IG1, we have yet to arrive at the idea

of God as a perfect (or supremely perfect) being (IG2). If the account of theformation of a universal idea that Descartes presents in the Principles ofPhilosophy applies to the ideas of God, then the move from IG1 to IG2

should be nothing more than recognizing that one can subsume all thedistinct attributes of God included in IG1 under the idea of perfection. Incontinuing his discussion, Descartes asks whether IG1 might not be materiallyfalse.26 He writes:

Nor can it be said that this idea of God is perhaps materially false and socould have come from nothing, which is what I observed just a momentago in the case of the ideas of heat and cold, and so on. On the contrary,it is utterly clear and distinct, and contains in itself more objectivereality than any other idea; hence there is no idea which is in itself trueror less liable to be suspected of falsehood. This idea of a supremelyperfect and infinite being is, I say, true in the highest degree; for althoughperhaps one may imagine that such a being does not exist, it cannot be

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supposed that the idea of such a being represents something unreal, asI said with regard to the idea of cold. The idea is, moreover, utterly clearand distinct; for whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as being realand true, and implying any perfection, is wholly contained in it. It doesnot matter that I do not grasp the infinite, or that there are countlessadditional attributes of God which I cannot in any way grasp, andperhaps cannot even reach in my thought; for it is in the nature of theinfinite not to be grasped by a finite being like myself. It is enough thatI understand the infinite, and that I judge that all the attributes which Iclearly perceive and know to imply some perfection – and perhapscountless others of which I am ignorant – are present in God eitherformally or eminently. This is enough to make the idea that I have ofGod the truest and most clear and distinct of all my ideas.

(AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 31–2)

In this paragraph Descartes introduces IG2. By considering the possibilitythat IG1 is materially false (that is, one or more of the attributes of IG1

represents nothing as if it were something), one triggers the innate dispositionto form IG2. As one notices each of the attributes of God in IG1 is perfect inkind, one subsumes each of the attributes of IG1 under perfection, and thusone forms IG2. One can have no clearer and more distinct idea of God thanIG2 since one presumes that the notion of perfection is broader than theindividual perfections found in IG1 and, therefore, IG2 subsumes more distinctperfections under it than are enumerated in IG1.27

Thus, consistent with his contention that analysis alone is used in theMeditations (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 111), Descartes’s idea of God evolves fromthe Hobbesian idea of God, which is nothing more than an expanded idea ofoneself, into the idea of God as a supremely perfect being. In the course ofconsidering the several attributes of God in HIG, certain innate dispositionsare triggered which replace the ideas of indefinitely great attributes withideas of properly infinite attributes. Thus, one arrives at IG1. In consideringwhat is common to each of the attributes in IG1, one triggers another innatedisposition, and the ideas of the several perfections of God that aresubsumed under the general idea of perfection, which constitutes IG2. Oneshould remember that IG1 and HIG are both factitious or constructed by us:however, all the components of IG1 are innate, whereas the components ofHIG are not all innate. Further, even IG2 might reasonably be deemed afactitious idea, for causal considerations form the basis of the adventitious/

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factitious/innate distinction, and, on the basis of the innate dispositionswithin us, we replace the ideas of the several distinct attributes of Godfound in IG1 with one overarching attribute. If this account is plausible,then both IG1 and IG2 are innate ideas to the extent that they are composedsolely of innate ideas, but they are factitious since we are the ones whoput these ideas together, and, at the very least, they are factitious insofaras HIG was a factitious idea and both IG1 and IG2 are modifications of HIGthat occur in the course of proper reasoning.

But even if one would grant that both IG1 and IG2 are innate onlyinsofar as each of its components is innate, one could well raise an objectionbased on Descartes’s reply to Caterus. There Descartes distinguishedtrue and immutable natures from natures that are merely “invented and puttogether by the intellect” (AT 7: 117, CSM 2: 83). The latter kind of idea“can always be split up by the same intellect, not simply by abstractionbut by a clear and distinct intellectual operation, so that any ideas whichthe intellect cannot split up in this way were clearly not put together bythe intellect” (AT 7: 117, CSM 2: 83–4). IG2, the objection would continue,is the idea of a true and immutable nature, and consequently it cannot besplit up by an act of the intellect. Hence, IG2 cannot be deemed factitious.

In reply one must distinguish between forming an idea and recognizingthat the idea formed represents a true and immutable nature. Even with themost inadequate idea of God (HIG), one seems to have an intellectualoperation by which one recognizes that the several attributes of God mustbe inseparably joined together. Of course, this makes sense if and only ifthe idea under consideration is an idea of God. Such a position is consistentwith the reply to Caterus. There Descartes writes:

But I think of a triangle or a square . . . then whatever I apprehend asbeing contained in the idea of a triangle – for example that its threeangles are equal to two right angles – I can with truth assert of thetriangle. And the same applies to the square with respect to whateverI apprehend as being contained in the idea of a square. For even if Ican understand what a triangle is if I abstract the fact that its threeangles are equal to two right angles, I cannot deny that this propertyapplies to the triangle by a clear and distinct intellectual operation– that is, while at the same time understanding what I mean by mydenial.

(AT 7: 117–18, CSM 2: 84, our emphasis)

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On the basis of a clear and distinct intellectual operation, one recognizesthat the attributes of a triangle, and similarly the attributes of God, must beinseparably joined.28 One can distinguish this operation from the operationof merely forming the idea. Given the clarity and distinctness of theintellectual operation, one can conclude that even IG2 is a factitious ideacomposed of innate ideas.

Thus, each of the ideas of God is factitious given that each is complexand formed by the operations of the human mind. We have shown that inthe journey from the Hobbesian idea of God to the idea of God as a perfectbeing, one’s reasoning triggers certain innate dispositions which allow oneto form ideas of greater generality. Hence, even the most general idea of Godis factitious.

If our argument is sound, the conceptual journey from HIG to IG2 preparesone for the ontological argument in Meditation Five. As we shall see, theontological argument is founded on IG2, and the “upward” movement ofCartesian analysis found in the Third Meditation explains how IG2 is formed.The Third Meditation provides nothing more than the “upward” phase ofthat analysis. Descartes completes his analysis on the basis of the deductionof the existence of God from IG2, a factual claim already established in theThird Meditation. It is this “downward” movement that tends to confirm IG2

as a clear and distinct idea of God.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined the Third Meditation. After inspectingDescartes’s preliminaries to the arguments for the existence of God, we haveshown that the arguments for the existence of God may be construed asarguments to the best explanation of certain phenomena, namely, the factthat Descartes has an idea of God and the fact that he exists as a thinghaving an idea of God. The arguments for the existence of God constitutethe major theme in the Third Meditation. The minor theme is the clarificationof the idea of God. While all the components of the idea of God are innate,the fact that it is constructed by a systematic replacement of components ofa given idea of God by more adequate components makes it reasonable tosuggest that the idea of God is factitious.

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7 Meditation Four

Truth and falsity:reflections from the summit

We have argued that the method of analysis consists of two phases, asearch for principles and a confirmation of the propriety of the principles.There are three elements in Cartesian confirmation: first, the principle inquestion is recognized as (materially) true by the natural light, second, itexplains the phenomenon that provided the occasion for the search for theprinciple, and third, the principles discovered coherently unify the variouselements of a conceptual system or are shown to have a determinate place insuch a system. One might expand on Descartes’s famous house metaphorby suggesting that the natural light (clear and distinct perception) providesa foundation for the house, but the stability of the house requires thatuprights be constructed on that foundation and that lateral beams supportthose uprights. In Meditations Two and Three, he provides some of theuprights from which his conceptual house is built; in Meditations Fourthrough Six, he completes the framing and installs beams that laterally supportthe uprights. In each of the last three Meditations, he draws out theimplications of the conclusion that God is not a deceiver.

This does not mean that everything is a matter of deductive entailment.Although Descartes was wont to say that one could deduce all the lowerprinciples of his metaphysics as well as his scientific principles from hismost fundamental metaphysical principle, that God exists and is not adeceiver (cf. AT 1: 563, CSM 3: 87), the double method of coherence towhich he alluded in Part Six of the Discourse continues to operate. Heremarks:

as experience makes most of these effects quite certain, the causes fromwhich I deduce them serve not so much to prove them as to explainthem; indeed, quite to the contrary, it is the causes which are proved bythe effects.

(AT 6: 76, CSM 1: 150)

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This is as applicable mutatis mutandis to the ontological argument in theFifth Meditation as it is to his scientific writings, Similarly, while his officialtask in the Sixth Meditation is to prove the existence of a material world, itimplicitly reintroduces and explains the limits of an empiricist principle. Norhas he dispensed with ideational clarification: the unifying theme ofMeditations Four through Six is the clarification of the notion that God isnot a deceiver. So in looking at the last three Meditations, we must beconscious of the interplay of explanation and justification, on the one hand,and the role of ideational clarification on the other.

In this chapter we show that Descartes introduces his theory of judgmentas a means of explaining how human error is compatible with the conclusionthat God is not a deceiver: he shows that, in proving that God is not adeceiver, he has not proven too much. In the process, he argues that clearand distinct ideas are true. We argue that with this “exoneration”of thedoctrine of clear and distinct ideas he shifts from considerations of materialtruth to considerations of formal truth.

God and error

Descartes begins the chapter in the familiar manner of summarizing hisprevious conclusions. Not only does he claim greater clarity for ideas of hisown nature and the nature of God than he claims for ideas of the materialrealm, but he also claims more certainty for his own existence and the existenceof God than he claims for the existence of the material world. Through aconsideration of the nature of God and the implications of God’s perfectnature, he seeks to ground all subsequent knowledge.

Descartes frames the principal problem of the Meditation by setting theperfection of God in opposition to the fact that one has a faculty of judgmentwhich occasionally errs: this is the third specific doubt under the deceiver-God hypothesis (AT 7: 21, CSM 2:14).1 He repeats the conclusions reachedat the end of Meditation Three that “the will to deceive is undoubtedlyevidence of malice or weakness, and so cannot apply to God” (AT 7: 53,CSM 2: 37; see also AT 7: 52, CSM 2: 35; and CB §3: AT 5: 147, CSM 3: 333).If God were a deceiver, then either God would be intentionally malicious orimpotent. Both properties are incompatible with God’s perfection. Neithermalice nor impotence may be attributed to God, so God cannot be theimmediate cause of deception. Hence, one must seek some other explanationof human error.

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Descartes locates the basis for human error in the faculty of judgment.God created that faculty and, given the perfection of the Deity, Descartesconcludes, “he surely did not give me the kind of faculty which would everenable me to go wrong while using it correctly” (AT 7: 53–4, CSM 2: 37–8).This sets the stage for the analysis of judgment and his exoneration of Godfrom the charge of deception vis-à-vis human error: error arises from themisuse of the faculty of judgment.

How does Descartes reconcile God’s perfection with human error? Is thefact that humans are subject to error a sufficient condition for deeming Goda deceiver (AT 7: 54, CSM 2: 38)? No. If God were charged with deception, itwould be necessary to find a positive faculty that causes one to err. ThisDescartes does not find. Nonetheless, if God can be exonerated from thecharge of deception, it is incumbent upon him to explain the possibility oferror. Toward this end, he notes the contrast between the idea of God as apositive idea of supreme perfection and the idea of nothingness. Descarteslocates himself at some intermediate position between perfect being andnothingness. Insofar as error is a defect, the fact that one is imperfect willexplain the possibility of error without positing a positive faculty to accountfor it. Since one’s faculty of judgment is not infinite, one can explain howerror arises without a faculty that causes one to err.

But this alone is not sufficient to exonerate God from a charge ofdeception. Since God is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent, it wouldseem that God could – perhaps indeed, should – have created humans insuch a way that they would not err. Even if God did not create a positivefaculty that causes one to err, does not the presumption that God couldhave done so but did not do so raise the specter of the deceiver once again?Does it not suggest that God lacked either the power or the will to createhumans free from error? Are the following three statements compatible:firsst, one makes mistakes; second, God could have created humans so thatthey would not make mistakes; third, God wills what is best (AT 7: 55, CSM2: 38)?

Descartes’s initial reply comes in two parts and stands as a preamble tohis analysis of judgment. First, he rejects teleological explanation. Second,he reflects on the implications of the contention that God always acts for thebest.

He rejects teleological explanations, in this case, explanations based onfinal causes (AT 7: 55, CSM 2: 38–9). Assuming that one construes any finalcauses as purposes of the Deity, he suggests that a finite entity can neithercomprehend the nature nor the purposes of an infinite entity. Since divine

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purposes might simply be unknowable to finite beings, Descartes rejectsany appeal to final causes in physics.

Descartes continues by anticipating Leibniz’s famous dictum that this isthe best of all possible worlds.

It also occurs to me that whenever we are inquiring whether the worksof God are perfect, we ought to look at the whole universe, not just atone created thing on its own. For what would perhaps rightly appearvery imperfect if it existed on its own is quite perfect when its functionas a part of the universe is considered.

(AT 7: 55–6, CSM 2: 39)

While at this point Descartes knows only that he and God exist, this doesnot entail that they are the only existents. If other beings exist, one mustunderstand their perfection or imperfection in terms of the whole createduniverse. Thus, even in the best of all possible worlds one has no guaranteethat any individual created entity must be perfect.

Having completed this preamble, Descartes turns to analyze judgment interms of two faculties: the faculty of will and the faculty of understanding.The role of the intellect is limited: it only allows one to perceive ideas thatfunction as the objects of possible judgments. The understanding, as such,does not account for errors in judgment. Nor should one fault it for nothaving ideas of all existents, since one cannot produce any positive reasonto explain why God should have provided one with all such ideas. Thus, theabsence of a certain number of ideas – the limited nature of the understanding– does not of itself entail that God is a deceiver; God might be charged withdeception only if there were a reason why humans should have those ideasthey do not have and God chose not to allow humans to have them (AT 7:56–7, CSM 2: 39–40).

In terms of the will, the second faculty operative in judgment, there seemto be no limits to the freedom of choice. The will or ability to choose is thefaculty with the fewest limits placed upon it, and Descartes suggests “thatit is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in someway the image and likeness of God” (AT 7: 57, CSM 2: 40). No essentialdifference exists between the human will and the will of God, although thelatter is infinitely greater: the difference is one of degree rather than of kind.The essential identity of human and divine will is supported by themeditator’s sense that there are no external constraints on the will when one

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is inclined to act or judge. The real difference is found between human anddivine understanding (AT 7: 57, CSM 2: 40).

Given the distinction between understanding and the will, Descartesfurther analyzes judgment by assigning them their respective roles. The willis perfect in its kind – it is the faculty in terms of which humans are mostclearly created in the image of God. The will, as such, causes no error. Nordoes the understanding. If one actually understands something, then oneunderstands it correctly and one’s understanding is adequate: this followsfrom the meaning of the word ‘understands.’ When one’s ideas are clear anddistinct (when one has genuine understanding), one unavoidably inclinestowards assenting to the idea (to affirm its material truth). Insofar as a perfectGod creates humans, that God would be a deceiver if one could err undersuch circumstances. Error raises its ugly head only when one’sunderstanding is incomplete, when the ideas on which one’s judgment restsfail to meet the standards of clarity and distinctness. In such cases, the willaffirms (or denies) on the basis of insufficient evidence, and one falls intoerror. To avoid error, the will must be restrained to instances in which oneclearly and distinctly perceives ideas (AT 7: 58, CSM 2: 40–1).

Descartes continues by reflecting on his doubts and their resolutions(AT 7: 58–9, CSM 2: 41). The conclusions he has reached to this point haverested upon the inclination of the will to follow the natural light. In thoseinstances in which the natural light has shown that a proposition is materiallytrue, the will was strongly inclined to accept that truth. He stresses that theinclination of the will to judge that propositions recognized as true by thenatural light are true is an inclination that is free from external constraint.Further, he contends that the degree to which one can deem oneself freestands in proportion to the degree to which those propositions, whosetruth the natural light recognizes, psychologically compel one’s assent.Freedom, here, is freedom from error: it is not the question of freedom andresponsibility that is raised in standard discussions of free will.2 At thispoint Descartes only knows himself as thinking thing; he has no compellingreasons to claim either that he also has or is identical with a corporealnature. In this absence of compelling reasons, the will remains indifferent; “Iam indifferent as to whether I should assert or deny either alternative, orindeed refrain from making any judgement on the matter” (AT 7: 59, CSM 2:41).3

Reflecting on this psychological indifference, Descartes remarks:

What is more, this indifference does not merely apply to cases where

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the intellect is wholly ignorant, but extends in general to every casewhere the intellect does not have sufficiently clear knowledge at thetime when the will deliberates. For although probable conjectures maypull me in one direction, the mere knowledge that they are simplyconjectures, and not certain and indubitable reasons, is itself quiteenough to push my assent the other way. My experience in the last fewdays confirms this: the mere fact that I found that all my previousbeliefs were in some sense open to doubt was enough to turn myabsolutely confident belief in their truth into the supposition that theywere wholly false.

(AT 7: 59, CSM 2: 41)

Descartes’s concern lies in his lack of a psychological compunction to affirmor deny. Whenever the mind fails to produce sufficient evidence for thetruth or falsity of a certain proposition, the will remains in a state ofindifference. Such a state is unstable. Considerations of probability tend topush one toward assent; recognizing and emphasizing the evidence’sprobable nature tends to pull one toward denial. Descartes cites hisexperiences in raising methodological doubts as confirming such an interplaybetween the recognition that certain propositions are merely probable andthe doubts raised with respect to those propositions.

Descartes wishes to avoid error as much as he wants to attain truth;avoiding error is, at least, a good secondary position in which to find oneself.If one refrains from making judgments – if one’s will refrains from affirmingor denying – one cannot err. When one does not clearly and distinctlyperceive the truth of a proposition, the only epistemically correct behavioris to suspend judgment. In an epistemically proper world, the determinationof the intellect – the recognition of truth by the light of nature – shouldalways precede acts of judgment. No epistemic worth can be assigned toaccidental correctness; such an abuse of the will results in a privation,which constitutes the essence of error. This privation lies in the operation ofthe will insofar as its acts are caused by a human agent, not in the facultyper se. Thus, the individual, not God, is responsible for error (AT 7: 59–60,CSM 2: 41).

By following through on his own suggestion that any evaluation ofhuman faculties is holistic, Descartes continues to exonerate God from thecharge of deception. He considers the limits of human understanding (AT 7:60, CSM 2: 42). Human beings are finite, so human understanding is limited.Since God is not obligated to make humans more perfect than they are, the

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limits on human abilities are no ground for complaint. This piece of reasoninggains plausibility through Descartes’s earlier remark that humans do notknow God’s intentions. Thus, no ground exists for claiming that God intendedto make humans more perfect than they are. In as much as the idea of God isclear and distinct, one can take God to be a perfect being. The assumptionthat God intended to make humans more perfect than they are, together withGod’s perfection, would imply that God is impotent rather than omnipotent.Hence, it follows that a perfect God would intend humans to be only asperfect as they are. On the basis of the earlier assumption that the world isthe best of all possible worlds, it follows that even if humans are intellectuallylimited, the world taken as a whole is better because of such limitations. IfGod intends to create the best of all possible worlds, then no humans oughtto complain about their essential limitations.

Further, Descartes says, no one has grounds for complaining that the willis more extensive than the intellect. The will is a single faculty: unlikeunderstanding, it is not subject to divisibility into degrees. If anything it isa mark of greater perfection to have the faculty of the will than not to haveit. Hence, no one may object to having that faculty (AT 7: 60, CSM 2: 42).

Descartes’s final remarks reveal his sympathies with at least one elementof the Augustinian account of free will. Like Augustine (Augustine 1964:99), Descartes maintains that human beings are more perfect for having afaculty of will (and limited understanding) that yields the capacity of fallinginto error than they would be if they lacked it (AT 7: 60–1, CSM 2: 42–3).This position should surprise no one since it is properly in the faculty of thewill that humans are made in the image of God (AT 7: 57, CSM 2: 40). WhileGod could create humans in such a way that they would never fall into error,such a human would be a less perfect entity. Perfection is found in thefaculty per se; error and privation occur only in the imperfect use of thatfaculty: and in that imperfect use God does not concur (AT 7: 60–1, CSM 2:42). The sole imperfection in humans vis-à-vis the will is in the imperfect useof it, in judging on the basis of incomplete evidence. Descartes appeals tothe possibility that more perfection exists in the universe because humanshave the ability to err than would exist if humans lacked that ability, that is,if they either perceived everything clearly and distinctly or were disposedto judge only on the basis of clear and distinct perceptions.

In the penultimate paragraph of the meditation, Descartes appeals to theactual abilities of humans to withhold judgment as the means of avoidingerror. While humans are imperfect in that they do not have clear and distinctideas of all things, they remain capable of suspending judgment when ideas

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are not clear and distinct. This is, in fact, the only means of avoiding error,and Descartes recommends that one repeatedly impress on one’s mind, inan attempt to instill a good epistemic habit, the need to suspend judgmentexcept when the ideas providing the basis for the judgment are clear anddistinct (AT 7: 61–2, CSM 2: 43).

Clear and distinct ideas are true

Having explained the possibility of human error consistent with theperfection of God, and thus exonerated God from the charge of deception,Descartes concludes that God could be a deceiver only if it were possible toerr regarding clear and distinct ideas.

It is here that man’s greatest and most important perfection is to befound, and I therefore think that today’s meditation, involving aninvestigation into the cause of error and falsity, has been very profitable.The cause of error must surely be the one I have explained; for if,whenever I have to make a judgement, I restrain my will so that it extendsto what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, and no further, thenit is quite impossible for me to go wrong. This is because every clearand distinct perception is undoubtedly something, and hence cannotcome from nothing, but must necessarily have God for its author. Itsauthor, I say, is God, who is supremely perfect, and who cannot be adeceiver on pain of contradiction; hence the perception is undoubtedlytrue. So today I have learned not only what precautions to take to avoidever going wrong, but also what to do to arrive at the truth. For I shallunquestionably reach the truth, if only I give sufficient attention to allthe things which I perfectly understand, and separate these from all theother cases where my apprehension is more confused and obscure.And this is just what I shall take good care to do from now on.

(AT 7: 62, CSM 2: 43)

Clear and distinct perceptions, and only clear and distinct perceptions,guarantee that the object of the perception is possible. They guarantee thatthe object perceived is “something,” even if they do not guarantee that theobject actually exists.4 Insofar as God is not a deceiver and one cannot helpbut give assent to ideas clearly and distinctly perceived, such perceptionsmust be deemed at least materially true.

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But is Descartes introducing a stronger claim here, namely, that clearand distinct ideas must be formally true? We believe he is. The putativetopic of Meditation Four is truth and falsity, even though his de factofocus is on judgment. Only judgments are formally true or false (AT 7: 43,CSM 2: 30), and “the chief and most common mistake which is to be foundhere consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, orconform to, things located outside me” (AT 7: 37, CSM 2: 26). Theavoidance of error is the avoidance of formal falsity. Given that the topicof Meditation Four is the avoidance of error – the avoidance of formallyfalse judgments – we believe that this provides prima facie evidence thathe was concerned with formal truth in his contention that all clear anddistinct ideas are true. Such a claim would entail that things exist to whichthe clear and distinct ideas comply, but this does not entail that the entitiesare material objects.

Notice Descartes’s cautious language, claiming only that “every clearand distinct perception is undoubtedly something, and hence cannot comefrom nothing” (AT 7: 62, CSM 2: 43), and since it is caused by God, “theperception is undoubtedly true” (AT 7: 62, CSM 2: 53). If it is merelymaterially true, it is only the idea of a possible object; if it is formally true,then something exists extramentally to which it conforms. What could thatbe? In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes introduces the notion of a true andimmutable nature. A true and immutable nature is not an existent in spaceand time, as his reflections on the true and immutable nature of a triangledemonstrate (AT 7: 64, CSM 2: 44–5). A true and immutable nature can benothing more than an idea in the mind of God.5

Clear and distinct ideas are ideas of essences. If they are materiallytrue, then they are internally consistent: they show that it is possible foran object to exist that is conformable to the idea. Since they are formallytrue – in as much as they represent a true and immutable nature, an idea inthe mind of God – they represent something with an ontological status,even though it is a status less than full existence (see AT 3: 545–6, CSM 3:211). The shift from material truth to formal truth is the shift from thepossible essence of a possible thing, to the actual essence of a possiblething.

Is the move from the material to the formal truth of clear and distinctideas significant? Yes. If an ontological basis exists for one’s clear anddistinct ideas of the essences of things, then it increases the explanatorycoherence of Cartesian metaphysics. Notice what Descartes says in theSynopsis:

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In the Fourth Meditation it is proved that everything that we clearlyand distinctly perceive is true, and I also explain what the nature offalsity consists in. These results need to be known both in order toconfirm what has gone before and make intelligible what is to comelater.

(AT 7: 15, CSM 2: 11)

If we have correctly accounted for Cartesian confirmation, namely, that theconfirmation of a general principle consists in the deductive subsumptionof a phenomenon to be explained under a principle and the subsumption ofthat principle under a more general principle, Descartes’s concern withconfirmation of his earlier conclusions is exactly what one would expect. Inproving God’s non-deceptiveness, he explains why the material truths centralto Meditations Two and Three are justified: they are formally true, becausethey are rooted in divine ideas. Nor should one see this as an instance inwhich the Cartesian circle rears its ugly head. Recall that in the preface tothe French edition of the Principles Descartes claimed that the “first level[of wisdom] contains only notions which are so clear in themselves thatthey can be acquired without meditation” (AT 8B: 5, CSM 1: 181). These,certainly, are the eternal truths and clear and distinct ideas of essencesconstrued as materially true.

This however is not the highest level of wisdom. The highest level“consists in the search for the first causes and the true principles whichenable us to deduce the reasons for everything we are capable of knowing”(AT 8B: 5, CSM 1: 181). In this highest level of wisdom, one finds the claimthat God exists and does not deceive. Because God is not a deceiver, clearand distinct ideas must represent true and immutable natures, they must beformally true. The relation between formal truth and material truth is analogousto the relation between between causal and logical possibility: just aseverything that is causally possible is logically possible, so everything thatis formally true is materially true. Since clear and distinct ideas reflect trueand immutable natures (ideas in the mind of God), they explain why thematerial truths are true, they confirm the conclusions reached in MeditationsTwo and Three.6

Hence, if Descartes is successful in explaining the possibility of error onthe basis of his theory of judgment, he has exonerated God from charges ofdeception based strictly on the fact that humans err and has shown that, atleast with respect to ideas clearly and distinctly perceived, God cannot be a

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deceiver. Two further points are worthy of notice. First, God does notguarantee the truth of ideas clearly and distinctly perceived.7 Instead,because God is not a deceiver – but would be a deceiver if it were possiblefor one to err with respect to ideas clearly and distinctly perceived – one canconclude that clear and distinct perceptions are formally true and therebyexplain their material truth. Second, this is a general strategy Descartes usesin the following Meditations. He claims that we have certain dispositions tojudge various propositions as true. Given certain sets of circumstances,God would be a deceiver if one had a disposition to judge that a certainproposition p was true when, in fact, p was false. On this basis, the propositionthat God is not a deceiver increases its scope.

So we have seen that the Descartes of Meditation Four explains howhuman error is possible given that God is not a deceiver. In turning to theremaining Meditations we show how Descartes draws out furtherimplications from that principle of divine non-deceptiveness.

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8 Meditation Five

The beginning of thedescent

Having provided a theory of judgment that allows for human error compatiblewith divine perfection, Descartes begins to see what fruit the nondeceptive-God thesis will bear. We have already seen that the thesis initially impliesthe formal truth of clear and distinct ideas, since they psychologically compelhumans to accept their truth and, consequently, God would be a deceiver ifclear and distinct ideas were false. This entails only that these ideas representtrue and immutable natures, that is, ideas in the mind of God. As we shallsee, the nondeceptive-God thesis drives the main arguments in MeditationsFive and Six, and the general form of those arguments is as follows:

1. There is a phenomenon that I am psychologically compelled (ordisposed) to believe.

2. There is no means (faculty) which allows me to show that thephenomenon is not as it appears.

3. Therefore, God would be a deceiver if the phenomenon were not asit appears.

4. God is not a deceiver.5. Therefore, the phenomenon is as it appears.

Notice that the argument for the formal truth of clear and distinct ideas fitsthis argument form.

In this chapter we examine Descartes’s discussion of mathematical entities,the ontological argument for the existence of God, and his discussion at theend of the meditation which suggests that all remembered clear and distinctideas are true. We show that the conclusions reached follow from thecontention that God is not a deceiver and tend to support various claimsthat were raised as hypotheses in the earlier Meditations. To put it

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metaphorically, Descartes not only builds a wall of his epistemic house, butprovides lateral supports for the wall as he builds.

True and immutable natures

Descartes begins the Meditation by telling us that the descent from theheights of analysis will be a descent to the material realm, a descent that iscompleted only in Meditation Six. Issues regarding “the nature of myself, ormy mind” (AT 7: 63, CSM 2: 44), that is, issues regarding the substantialnature of the mind, are postponed until Meditation Six. His initial concern iswith what can be known regarding the essences of material objects, “theideas of these things, insofar as they exist in my thought, and see which ofthem are distinct, and which confused” (AT 7: 63, CSM 2: 44). Why does heconcern himself with these ideas first?

At this point, Descartes knows that all clear and distinct ideas are true onpain of making God a deceiver. We have argued that ‘truth’ here should beunderstood as formal truth: clear and distinct ideas represent “true andimmutable natures.” While this provides an ontological ground for clearand distinct ideas, it makes no methodological difference whether one isconcerned with material or formal truth vis-à-vis mathematical claims.1 Bothconcern the essence of things. At the psychological level, one cannot discernthe difference between a material truth and a formal truth. Clear and distinctideas represent the essences of things: as formally true they represent actualessences; as materially true they represent possible essences. Except in thecase of God, no essential claim entails an existential claim. As ideas of theessences of things, clear and distinct ideas are epistemically prior toexistential claims, since “God can bring about whatever we clearly perceiveto be possible” (AT 8B: 352, CSM 1: 299). Since “we must never ask aboutthe existence of anything until we first understand its essence” (AT 7: 107,CSM 2: 78), and since geometry describes the essential nature of extendedobjects, Descartes’s methodological constraints require that he inquire intothe (geometrical) essence (examine clear and distinct ideas) of material objectsbefore inquiring into their existence.

It is helpful to remember that Meditation Two contains Descartes’s initialinquiry into what can be clearly known about bodies. The piece-of-waxargument, whatever else it might show, is at least an initial attempt to clarifythe notion of body. However, to claim that body in general is extended,movable, and flexible, while perhaps clear, is not distinct: it will not allow one

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to distinguish among bits of extension in such a way that those bits ofextension could exist as determinate entities. While the Descartes of thepiece-of-wax argument might have discovered the genus under which thewax falls (extension), he does not have the differentia necessary to showthat any given temporal phase of the ever-changing wax is a possible entity.Having shown, however, that clear and distinct ideas are (formally) true, andtherefore that the clear and distinct ideas of mathematical entities are true,he may now differentiate kinds of extended entities.

He continues by examining quantity:

Quantity, for example, or ‘continuous’ quantity as the philosopherscommonly call it, is something I distinctly imagine. That is, I distinctlyimagine the extension of the quantity (or rather of the thing which isquantified) in length, breadth and depth. I also enumerate various partsof the thing, and to these parts I assign various sizes, shapes, positionsand local motions; and to the motions I assign various durations.

(AT 7: 64, CSM 2: 44)

On the face of it, this paragraph is odd. The Descartes of Meditation Two,who had attributed to imagination little more than the status of an unwantedstepchild (AT 7: 28, CSM 2;19), who in the piece-of-wax argument is at painsto show that it was by the understanding – not by the senses or theimagination – that the nature of wax is known, now is concerned with quantityas “something I distinctly imagine.” But this is merely a prima facie oddity.He begins with an idea that is an object of the imagination and proceeds toanalyze that idea. As it becomes understood, “quantity” becomes “extensionof the quantity” of a particular object, which is reduced to a mathematicaldescription in terms of length, breadth, and depth. Insofar as he is concernedwith a particular object, this is also analyzed in terms of its component parts,that is, such simple qualities as its “sizes, shapes, positions and local motions;and to the motions I assign various durations,” that is, its mathematicallydescribable properties. It is on those properties that his continuingdiscussion focuses.2

Descartes notices the ease with which he understands extensionalquantities (AT 7: 63, CSM 2: 44). His remarks suggest that one has innateideas of geometrical entities. As he tells Gassendi, “we could not recognizethe geometrical triangle from a diagram on paper unless our mind alreadypossessed the idea of it from some other source” (AT 7: 382, CSM 2: 262).

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But if our arguments in earlier chapters are sound, this innateness itselfdoes not account for the apparent truth of mathematical propositions. Rather,we recognize the (material) truth of certain innate ideas on the basis of thenatural light. This suggests that we construe mathematical propositions aseternal truths (cf. P 1: 48), since eternal truths possess the apparent intimacyascribed to mathematical truths: “we cannot fail to know them [eternal truths]when the occasion for thinking of them arises” (P 1: 49: AT 8A: 24, CSM 1:209).

Yet, he introduces the notion of a true and immutable nature, whichsuggests that one should understand a geometrical object as somethingother than a collection of eternal truths. In his words:

But I think the most important consideration at this point is that I findwithin me countless ideas of things which even though they may notexist anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing; for althoughin a sense they can be thought of at will, they are not my invention buthave their own true and immutable natures. When, for example, I imaginea triangle, even if perhaps no such figure exists, or has ever existed,anywhere outside my thought, there is still a determinate nature, oressence, or form of the triangle which is immutable and eternal, and notinvented by me or dependent on my mind. This is clear from the factthat various properties can be demonstrated of the triangle, for examplethat its three angles equal two right angles, that its greatest side subtendsits greatest angle, and the like; and since these properties are oneswhich I now clearly recognize whether I want to or not, even if I neverthought of them at all when I previously imagined the triangle, it followsthat they cannot have been invented by me.

(AT 7: 65, CSM 2: 44–5)

We have suggested that true and immutable natures are ideas in the mindof God. At some points Descartes seems to ascribe considerable epistemicimportance to “true and immutable natures” as the essences of kinds ofthings (AT 7: 116, CSM 2: 83). In the First Replies he writes:

But if I think of a triangle . . . then whatever I apprehend as beingcontained in the idea of a triangle – for example that its three angles areequal to two right angles – I can with truth assert of the triangle. Andthe same applies to the square with respect to whatever I apprehend as

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being contained in the idea of a square. For even if I can understandwhat a triangle is if I abstract the fact that its three angles are equal totwo right angles, I cannot deny that this property applies to the triangleby a clear and distinct intellectual operation – that is, while at the sametime understanding what I mean by my denial.

(AT 7: 117–18, CSM 2: 84)

If our account of true and immutable natures as ideas in the mind of God iscorrect, they are ontologically significant. Are they also epistemologicallysignificant? Returning to a distinction at the heart of the Cartesian method,we may ask whether the order of consideration is the same as the order ofepistemic primacy. In understanding that the interior angles of a triangle areequivalent to two right angles, is the triangle qua triangle epistemicallyprimary or merely primary in the order of consideration? If geometrical figureshave an archetypical existence as ideas in the mind of God, does that solvean epistemic problem for the thinker?

No. Assuming that the perfection of God requires that all possibleknowledge be available to anyone who makes a diligent and methodologicallysound inquiry, and assuming that true and immutable essences are ideas inthe mind of God, a mechanism must be provided by which the inquirer couldmetaphorically “see into the mind of God” (though only metaphorically).How can this be done? Innate ideas as dispositions allow one to explainhow the idea of a geometrical object can be formed, but this does not accountfor our knowledge of true and immutable natures. How can one haveknowledge of such natures?

Notice that Descartes claims that since “various properties can bedemonstrated of the triangle . . . it follows that they cannot have beeninvented by me.” If God creates all minds from the same mold, as he seemsto assume (cf. AT 6: 1–2, CSM 1: 111), then the collection of innate ideas quadispositions is virtually identical from one human mind to another. This willexplain why anyone can form the idea of a triangle and why, under theappropriate circumstances, virtually everyone will grant certain eternal truths.Eternal truths are common notions or axioms (P 1: 49). As anyone who hasever studied geometry will attest, given the definitions, axioms, and postulatesof a geometric system, everything in the system follows from them. If one isnot distracted by Descartes’s example of the triangle and considers insteadthe more basic elements of a geometrical system, one may reasonablysuggest that the definitions, axioms, and postulates of Euclidean geometry

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are eternal truths.3 Given Descartes’s emphasis on the demonstrability ofthe properties of a triangle, one could account for the uniformity ofknowledge regarding properties of triangles (and any other geometricobjects) on the basis of deductions from axioms qua eternal truths.4

If this is correct, then a “true and immutable nature” as known is nothingmore than a set of eternal truths and its deductive consequences. As known,geometrical objects are constructs. While the idea of a triangle might be firstin the order of consideration, the basic elements of a geometric system arefirst in the order of epistemic primacy. So to attain knowledge of theproperties of a triangle, the triangle must first be reduced to (analyzed interms of) the basic geometric elements, and once this is done, one can provethat a triangle has certain properties. Insofar as one clearly and distinctlyperceives an idea of a triangle, triangles are possible and are describable interms of all those properties that an existent triangle would possess.

However, given the nature of Cartesian and classical geometrical analysis,to clearly and distinctly perceive the nature of a triangle one must reduce itto its fundamental elements and then deduce from those elements theproperties that a triangle possesses, for example, the property that the interiorangles of a triangle are equal to 180°. This implies that the doctrine of trueand immutable natures plays no epistemic role in the Cartesian system.Such natures are known only if one understands the nature of a triangle interms of the fundamental elements of Euclidean geometry. So understood, atriangle is constructed out of those fundamental elements. Indeed, insofaras God creates the etemal truths, including the fundamental principles ofgeometry, the true and immutable natures need be nothing more than allconsequences that God “perceives” to follow from those essentialprinciples.5

Descartes’s next paragraph supports our reading. He says:

It would be beside the point for me to say that since I have from time totime seen bodies of triangular shape, the idea of the triangle may havecome to me from external things by means of the sense organs. For I canthink up countless other shapes which there can be no suspicion of myever having encountered through the senses, and yet I can demonstratevarious properties of these shapes, just as I can with the triangle. Allthese properties are certainly true, since I am clearly aware of them, andtherefore they are something, and not merely nothing; for it is obviousthat whatever is true is something; and I have already amply

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demonstrated that everything of which I am clearly aware is true. Andeven if I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such thatI cannot but assent to these things, at least so long as I clearly perceivethem. I also remember that even before, when I was completelypreoccupied with the objects of the senses, I always held that the mostcertain truths of all were the kind which I recognized clearly in connectionwith shapes, or numbers or other items relating to arithmetic or geometry,or in general to pure and abstract mathematics.

(AT 7: 64–5, CSM 2: 45)

Descartes stresses that the ideas of geometrical objects are innate; it is theinnateness that explains how one can form the idea of a geometrical objectthat one has not seen and, perhaps, never will see (a chiliagon, for example).Again, he stresses the demonstrability of properties of such objects and theclarity and distinctness of one’s perceptions of them. The fact that oneclearly and distinctly perceives provides the grounds for claiming that thepremises for and the conclusion of the demonstration are true. Descartesnotes, first, that “the nature of my mind is such that I cannot but assent tothese things, at least so long as I clearly perceive them,” and second, thateven before he engaged in his meditative inquiry, “when I was completelypreoccupied with the objects of the senses,” mathematical truths attainedthe greatest degree of certainty (cf. AT 6: 7–8, CSM 2: 114). Since thepsychological force of ideas clearly and distinctly perceived indicates thatthey must be true on pain of making God a deceiver, he now is warranted inaccepting their truth.

An additional point should be noticed. The allusion to the psychologicalcompulsion of the clear and distinct ideas of mathematical truths alludesback to Meditation Three. Recall that, after introducing the criterion of clearand distinct perception, Descartes turned briefly to mathematics. He deemedthe possibility of a deceiver God the sole ground for questioning thereliability of mathematics (AT 7: 36, CSM 2: 25). In examining the mathematicalprinciples themselves, however, this purely hypothetical doubt had nopsychological force. As he wrote:

Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive veryclearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: letwhosoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I amnothing, so long as I continue to think I am something . . . or bring it

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about that two and three added together are more or less then five, oranything of this kind in which I see a manifest contradiction.

(AT 7: 36, CSM 2: 25)

In the Third Meditation, the criterion of clear and distinct perception wasintroduced as a hypothesis. Descartes indicates that what is perceived clearlyand distinctly is psychologically compelling. But only in the FourthMeditation does he provide reasons for taking this psychological compulsionas a reason for declaring that clear and distinct perceptions are (formally)true. So the discussion of geometry in Meditation Five is warranted by thediscussion in Meditation Four and confirms the implicit trust he had placedin the truths of mathematics already in Meditation Three. This is one of thelateral connections in the Meditations.6

An ontological interlude

Descartes has not completed his discussion of mathematics: he returns to itat the end of the Meditation. In between he introduces the ontologicalargument for the existence of God. In one respect this is puzzling: he hasalready provided two proofs of the existence of God in Meditation Three. Inanother respect it should surprise no one: the focus in Meditation Five is onclear and distinct perception and what can be known on the basis of clearand distinct perception. The truths of mathematics are so known, but theyentail no existential claims. The ontological argument, if sound, entails anexistential claim. In examining that argument, our interest will be primarily inthe role it plays in the Cartesian system of analysis.

Assuming that mathematical truths are justified insofar as they are clearlyand distinctly perceived, Descartes urges the meditator towards therecognition that there is another argument for the existence of God. In hiswords:

But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea ofsomething entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceiveto belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possiblebasis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly,the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one which I find withinme just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And myunderstanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no

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less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape ornumber that some property belongs to its nature. Hence, even if itturned out that not everything on which I have meditated in these pastdays is true, I ought still to regard the existence of God as having atleast the same level of certainty as I have hitherto attributed to thetruths of mathematics.

(AT 7: 65–6, CSM 2: 45)

The argument may be put as follows:

1. I have a clear and distinct idea of God as a supremely perfect being.2. The existence of anything of which I have a clear and distinct idea is

possible.3. Therefore, it is possible that God exists as I conceive of God.4. Existence is contained in the idea of God.5. Therefore, God exists.

The argument is familiar, as are criticisms of various forms of the argument.7Basing his argument on the contention that his idea of a supremely perfectbeing is clear and distinct, and therefore is an idea of a being whose existenceis possible, Descartes notes that his idea of God contains existence andconcludes that God exists.8 Interestingly, he claims that God’s existence is atleast as certain as the truths of mathematics: just as geometrical proofs arebased on the ideas of the fundamental elements of geometry, so the proof ofthe existence of God is based solely on the idea of God.

Even in Descartes’s time, the ontological argument had been the subjectof significant criticism, and, by raising and replying to some of thosecriticisms, Descartes extends the argument. He writes:

At first sight, however, this is not transparently clear, but has someappearance of being a sophism. Since I have been accustomed todistinguish between existence and essence in everything else, I find iteasy to persuade myself that existence can also be separated from theessence of God, and hence that God can be thought of as not existing.But when I concentrate more carefully, it is quite evident that existencecan no more be separated from the essence of God than the fact that itsthree angles equal two right angles can be separated from the essenceof a triangle, or than the idea of a mountain can be separated from the

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idea of a valley. Hence it is just as much of a contradiction to think ofGod (that is, a supremely perfect being) lacking existence (that is, lackinga perfection), as it is to think of a mountain without a valley.

(AT 7: 66, CSM 2: 45–6)

Just as one would contradict oneself to claim that a mountain (an uphillslope) can exist without a valley (a downhill slope), one would contradictoneself to contend that a supremely perfect being lacks a supreme perfection.9Insofar as existence is a perfection, God must be conceived as existing: toclaim that God does not exist is a contradiction.

But Descartes raises another objection to his position. He writes:

However, even granted that I cannot think of God except as existing,just as I cannot think of a mountain without a valley, it certainly doesnot follow from the fact that I think of a mountain with a valley thatthere is any mountain in the world; and similarly, it does not seem tofollow from the fact that I think of God as existing that he does exist. Formy thought does not impose any necessity on things; and just as I mayimagine a winged horse even though no horse has wings, so I may beable to attach existence to God even though no God exists.

(AT 7: 66, CSM 2: 46)

The gist of the objection is this. While granting that a mountain cannot existwithout a valley, such a truth does not entail that mountains exist. All that itshows is that if a mountain exists, then necessarily there is a valley as well.Does not the ontological argument show the same, namely, that if Godexists, then God’s existence is necessary?

Descartes replies:

But there is a sophism concealed here. From the fact that I cannot thinkof a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that a mountain andvalley exist anywhere, but simply that a mountain and a valley, whetherthey exist or not, are mutually inseparable. But from the fact that Icannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence isinseparable from God, and hence that he really exists. It is not that mythought makes it so, or imposes any necessity on any thing; on thecontrary, it is the necessity of the thing itself, namely the existence ofGod, which determines my thinking in this respect. For I am not free to

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think of God without existence (that is, a supremely perfect being withouta supreme perfection) as I am free to imagine a horse with or withoutwings.

(AT 7: 66–7, CSM 2: 46)

The idea of God itself entails that God exists. Since the idea is clear anddistinct, one cannot help accepting its (formal) truth. Since existence itself iscontained in the idea of God, and since the idea of God is clear and distinct,it is psychologically impossible to conceive of God as not existing. Whilethe case of the mountain and the valley entail no existential claims, the ideaof God differs in that regard. God cannot be conceived as not existing. Theidea of God is formally true. Therefore God exists.

Descartes considers a third objection:

And it must not be objected at this point that while it is indeed necessaryfor me to suppose God exists, once I have made the supposition that hehas all perfections (since existence is one of the perfections),nevertheless the original supposition was not necessary. Similarly, theobjection would run, it is not necessary for me to think that allquadrilaterals can be inscribed in a circle; but given this supposition, itwill be necessary for me to admit that a rhombus can be inscribed in acircle – which is patently false.

(AT 7: 67, CSM 2: 46)

The objector questions the fundamental assumption of the ontologicalargument, namely, whether one must assume that God has all perfections.The objector compares the case with the false assumption that allquadrilaterals can be inscribed in a circle. Descartes responds that whileone need not necessarily form an idea of God, whenever one does form thatidea, one attributes all perfections to God. Once one recognizes that existenceis a perfection, one recognizes that God exists. This is comparable to ascribingproperties to a triangle after one forms an idea of a triangle: the propertiesare entailed by the idea. It differs from the assumption that all quadrilateralscan be inscribed in a circle, for that state of affairs is not conceived clearlyand distinctly. Descartes appeals to three reasons in defending the pointthat the idea of God as a supremely perfect being is an idea of a true andimmutable nature: first, God is unique because existence belongs only toGod’s essence; second, no more than one God of this kind could exist; and

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third, no attributes of God could be removed or altered. The second andthird of these require some comment.

If one conceives of God as a supremely perfect being, why does thatentail God’s uniqueness? The reason seems to relate to Descartes’s divisionof reality into three degrees, namely that the reality attributable to a mode, afinite substance, and an infinite substance. Insofar as God is perfect, thisperfection requires that God have all perfections to an infinite degree. As aperfect being, God must be an infinite substance. Assuming there is but oneinfinity – a common assumption before Cantor (1915) – the presumption ofGod’s infinity entails God’s uniqueness.10 Furthermore, one would not stretchDescartes too far to suggest that he accepted a principle of the identity ofindiscernibles.11 If there were two entities falling under the concept of God,each would contain all perfections. But if there were two entities containingall perfections, they would be indistinguishable, and therefore identical.Thus, both considerations regarding infinity and questions regarding theidentity of indiscernibles explain why Descartes claimed that no more thanone God could exist.12

The third point is superfluous. According to Descartes, one has clearand distinct ideas of things of a certain kind: a clear and distinct idea is theidea of the essence (essential properties) of a thing of a certain kind. Tochange any property in any idea of an essence would be an essential change,that is, it would be sufficient to change a thing of one kind into a thing ofanother – assuming the idea would remain clear and distinct. In this regard,the idea of God qua idea of a kind differs in no way from any other clear anddistinct idea qua idea of the essence of a kind. It is sufficient only tounderscore the claim that if any of the perfections contained in the idea ofGod were removed, it would cease to be an idea of God.

The following two paragraphs are transitional. They return one to moregeneral considerations regarding the implications of conclusions drawnfrom clear and distinct ideas and are followed by considerations regardingdemonstrations based upon clear and distinct ideas. Descartes reiteratesthat assenting to clear and distinct ideas is psychologically compelling. Hedistinguishes, however, between those ideas that are immediately obviousand those that require closer examination. The (material) truth of the idearemains the same no matter how much or how little one examines an idea,and he explains why some ideas are initially less compelling on the basis ofthe preconceptions and sensible perceptions. Were it not for these, hesuggests, the ontological argument would be obvious to all.

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But what is one to make of Descartes’s ontological argument? Is one tofollow the Kantian line and suggest that Descartes takes existence to be apredicate, while holding that existence is presupposed by any predication?We are not convinced that such a criticism is as devastating to Descartes’sargument as many might think. While we find his ontological argument lessthan convincing, we will attempt to develop a plausible account of it basedon Descartes’s ontology. First, we argue that not all predication presupposesexistence. Second, in light of his account of degrees of reality, his argumentcannot be dismissed as completely implausible. Third, and finally, since hehas already proven the existence of God twice, we explore the role of theontological argument in the context of the Cartesian method.

If Kant is right, then any ascription of a predicate to a subject presupposesthe existence of the subject. It is implausible to ascribe such a position toDescartes. If Descartes held such a position, then categorical propositionswould have existential import. As we saw in chapter five, he rejects such aview. He notes in Principles 1: 10 that even a general principle such as “it isimpossible that that which thinks should not exist . . . provides us with noknowledge of anything that exists” (AT 8A: 8, CSM 1: 196). Further, inMeditation Five, he explicitly claims that, although one can prove variousproperties with respect to a triangle, such proofs do not entail that trianglesexist (AT 7: 64, CSM 2: 45).

Moreover, if our earlier argument concerning ideas of geometrical figuresand true and immutable natures is sound, then Descartes need notpresuppose subsistence in discovering geometrical truths. If, as we suggest,geometry is reduced to its definitions, axioms, and postulates, which areeternal truths known by the natural light, those general principles entail noexistential claims; rather they are true of extended objects if such objectsexist. Seen in such a way, geometrical objects, as such, are nothing morethan bundles of properties that follow from the fundamental elements of ageometrical system; while geometrical truths apply to extended objects ifsuch objects exist, geometric truths neither presuppose nor entail theexistence of extended objects.

Could one not employ the same argument with respect to the idea ofGod? An affirmative response would imply that, at the most, a clear anddistinct idea of God shows that if God exists, then God exists (or, perhaps,exists necessarily). How does the case of God allegedly differ from that of atriangle? In a Cartesian context, what does it mean to claim that existence isan essential property of God but not of anything else?

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Many things exist. My current idea of Hume’s missing shade of blueexists. I exist. God exists. Is the word “exists” univocal in each of thesecases? The first thing to notice is that one means three very different thingswhen one asserts the previous three existential claims: my idea of Hume’smissing shade of blue exists as a mode of the mind; I exist as a finitesubstance; God exists as an infinite substance. These existents reflectDescartes’s three degrees of reality. Here we restrict “reality” to formalreality (real existence), rather than objective reality. In noting the distinctionamong the degrees of reality, we shall construct a plausible Cartesianontological argument.

Either Descartes uses the word ‘exists’ univocally or he uses it equivocally.On the one hand, if he uses it equivocally, then existence as applied to amode is different in kind from existence as applied to a finite substance,which is different in kind from existence as applied to an infinite substance.So understood, the kinds of existence correlate with degrees of independence.

Such a position is problematic, for either kinds of existence and kinds ofindependence reflect two sides of the same ontological coin, distinguishableonly in reason, or they are distinct but correlated properties. It is inconsistentwith Cartesian principles to suggest that they reflect the same reality.Supposing that Descartes did hold this view, he could not conceive of amode or finite substance without conceiving of it as existing, since conceivingof a mode or finite substance as such is to conceive of it as having a certaindegree of independence. Given his remarks on geometrical properties –which, if they did actually exist, would exist as modes of a material substance– it is inconsistent to claim that conceiving of such properties as modesentails that such modes exist.13

On the other hand, if ‘existence’ is used equivocally, but it is not identicalwith independence, Descartes’s position approaches unintelligibility. Wemight know what ‘existence’ means with respect to finite substances andmodes, since we exist as finite substances that have certain modes. But ifthe meaning of ‘existence’ as one applies it in the case of God differsfundamentally from the meaning as one applies it in the case of a finitesubstance or its modes, how Descartes understands what is meant by “Godexists” is a mystery. Would the difference in applying the word ‘exists’ toboth God and a finite substance be like the difference between applying theword ‘round’ to a circle and a pudgy person’s belly (which is, at best,semicircular)? Or would it be like the difference between applying the word‘heavy’ to a piece of lead and to Hegel’s philosophy (or Hegel’s writing

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style)? Since answering these two questions seems impossible, and sincewe know of no place where Descartes explicitly claims that the meaning of‘exists’ differs vis-à-vis the degrees of reality, the use of the word “exists” ismost likely univocal.

If Descartes uses ‘exists’ univocally, then it is a transcategorial predicate(a transcendental term). Nonetheless, if the what of existence istranscategorially identical, the how of existence is not. The issue of themeaning of existence within the context of the ontological argument is oneof independence, and focusing on that, one may construct a variation onthe ontological argument.

God is a perfect being. What does that mean? God has all perfections.What does that mean? Among other things, it means that one conceives ofGod as an infinite substance. What does that mean? It means that God iscausally and ontologically independent of all other things. What is entailedby claiming that a possible entity is causally or ontologically independent?It means, as Descartes puts it, “It is not that my thought makes it so, orimposes any necessity on any thing; on the contrary, it is the necessity ofthe thing itself, namely the existence of God, which determines my thinkingin this respect” (AT 7: 67, CSM 2: 46). It is the independence of God – infinitesubstance – that explains why one must conceive of God as an existent. Ifone conceived of God as merely a possible – not an actual – being, then theidea of God, like the idea of a winged horse (AT 7: 67, CSM 2: 46), would bedependent upon the thinker creating the idea. But the idea of God as aperfect being is clear and distinct, and therefore at least materially true.Insofar as the idea qua clear and distinct cannot be the basis for formallyfalse judgments, and insofar as the idea is that of an absolutely independentbeing, these conditions only could be met if there actually is a beingcorresponding to the idea, that is, if God exists.14

Whether or not this reconstruction of Descartes’s reasoning is plausible,the question still remains, “Why did Descartes construct another argumentfor the existence of God?” We believe, with Gueroult (1984: 257ff.), that theontological argument constitutes one of the lateral connections betweenthe search for principles (the analysis in Meditations Two and Three) anddrawing out the consequences of those principles. In Meditation Three,Descartes concluded that the idea of God as a supremely perfect being isthe clearest and most distinct of ideas (AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 32). Since he arguedin Meditation Four that clear and distinct ideas must be (formally andtherefore materially) true on pain of making God a deceiver, the ontologicalargument, if sound, tends to confirm that the idea of God as a supremely

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perfect being is true. If God’s existence can be proven from the clear anddistinct idea of God alone, that is, if an analysis of the idea itself proves thatGod exists, this confirms the primacy of the idea in that it establishes what isalready known, namely that God exists. This yields a coherence across theMeditations. Insofar as it establishes deductively what was known by anargument to the best explanation, it tends to support the claim that the ideaof a supremely perfect being is clear and distinct.

Notice how Descartes does this. The ontological argument should beviewed in two ways, both of which are “demonstrations.” As Descarteswrites Morin on 13 July 1638:

You say also that there is a vicious circle in proving effects from acause, and then proving the cause by the same effects. I agree: but I donot agree that it is circular to explain effects by a cause, and then provethe cause by the effects; because there is a big difference betweenproving and explaining. I should add that the word “demonstrate” canbe used to signify either, if it is used according to common usage andnot in the technical philosophical sense. I should add also that there isnothing circular in proving a cause by several effects which areindependently known, and then proving certain other effects from thiscause.

(AT 2: 197–8, CSM 3: 106)

How should the ontological argument be seen? As we have discussed it,the ontological argument is seen as a proof that God exists. So seen, theclear and distinct idea of God as a perfect being is a given: it is first in theorder of consideration, and assuming that considerations of essence areepistemically prior to claims of existence, it proves that God exists. However,consistent with Descartes’s double method of coherence, one may interpretit as an explanation. So construed, the claim that God exists is known first,and one is seeking an explanation of that fact. The existence of God wasproven on the basis of two arguments in Meditation Three. If the claim “Godexists” is first in the order of consideration, the ontological argument is aformal explanation of the existence of God. Which is the correct way to seethe ontological argument? Both are. At the end of Meditation Three,Descartes claimed to know the highest existential claim and the highestessential claim. If the ontological argument is construed as both a justificationand an explanation, the clear and distinct idea of God is sufficient to provethat God exists and to explain the existence of God. Given his double method

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of coherence, we believe Descartes would have us look at it in both ways: itshows that, in the case of God, the existence/essence distinction collapses.

Related to that collapse is the fact that the distinction between formaland material truth makes a difference. For mathematical objects it makes littledifference whether one considers a possible essence or an actual essence.The clarity and distinctness of one’s idea in considering an imagined triangleversus an actual triangle would be the same, namely that it is possible thatsuch an object exists. In the case of God, the notion of formal truth carriessome weight. If the idea of God is merely materially true, this implies that it ispossible that it represents something. If the idea of God is formally true, itactually represents something that is at least possible (a true and immutablenature). The material/formal truth distinction sheds light on the breakdownof the essence/existence distinction in the case of God. The only way inwhich the idea of God could be materially true is if it represents an existentbeing (is formally true).

Memory and divine non-deception

The nominal topic of Meditation Five is to demonstrate the possibility thatmaterial objects exist and (again) demonstrate the existence of God. The defacto topic of the meditation is clear and distinct ideas and what they allowus to know. Of course the topics are related: insofar as material objects areconstrued geometrically, their existence is possible, and insofar as God isconstrued as a perfect being, God must exist. In his concluding remarks,however, Descartes returns to the examination of mathematics in particularand demonstration in general.

Descartes considers past instances of clear and distinct perception, andthereby broadens the implications of the proposition “God is not a deceiver.”He writes:

Admittedly my nature is such that so long as I perceive something veryclearly and distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true. But my nature isalso such that I cannot fix my mental vision continually on the samething, so as to keep perceiving it clearly; and often the memory of apreviously made judgement may come back when I am no longerattending to the arguments which led me to make it. And so otherarguments can now occur to me which might easily undermine myopinion, if I were unaware of God; and I should thus never have true

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and certain knowledge about anything, but only shifting and changeableopinions. For example, when I consider the nature of a triangle, it appearsmost evident to me, steeped as I am in the principles of geometry, thatits three angles are equal to two right angles; and so long as I attend tothe proof, I cannot but believe this to be true. But as soon as I turn mymind’s eye away from the proof, then in spite of still remembering thatI perceived it very clearly, I can easily fall into doubt about its truth, if Iam unaware of God. For I can convince myself that I have a naturaldisposition to go wrong from time to time in matters which I think Iperceive as evidently as can be. This will seem even more likely when Iremember that there have been frequent cases where I have regardedthings as true and certain, but have later been led by other argumentsto judge them to be false.

(AT 7: 69–70, CSM 2: 48)

Supposedly, Arnauld alludes to this paragraph in raising his famous questionabout the Cartesian Circle.15 We will examine the circle in detail in ChapterTen. Our current concern is with the relationship between this paragraphand what has gone before.

So long as one clearly and distinctly perceives something, one ispsychologically compelled to deem it materially true, and the considerationsin Meditation Four indicate that this is a formal truth regarding the essenceof a thing. In fact, however, there are relatively few times when one perceivesclearly and distinctly. Many times, the most one can do is remember that atsome previous point one clearly and distinctly perceived that x. For example,I can remember that at one time I constructed a proof of the Pythagoreantheorem, but I no longer remember the proof. Can I claim to know that thePythagorean theorem is true? Yes, says Descartes, so long as I haveknowledge of God. He continues that theme in the next paragraph. In hiswords:

Now, however, I have perceived that God exists, and at the same time Ihave understood that everything else depends on him, and that he isno deceiver; and I have drawn the conclusion that everything which Iclearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true. Accordingly, even ifI am no longer attending to the arguments which led me to judge thatthis is true, as long as I remember that I clearly and distinctly perceivedit, there are no counter-arguments which can be adduced to make medoubt it, but on the contrary I have true and certain knowledge of it.

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And I have knowledge not just of this matter, but of all matters which Iremember ever having demonstrated, in geometry and so on. For whatobjections can now be raised? That the way I am made makes me proneto frequent error? But I now know that I am incapable of error in thosecases where my understanding is transparently clear. Or can it beobjected that I have in the past regarded as true and certain manythings which I afterwards recognized to be false? But none of thesewere things which I clearly and distinctly perceived: I was ignorant ofthis rule for establishing the truth, and believed these things for otherreasons which I later discovered to be less reliable. So what is left tosay? Can one raise the objection I put to myself a while ago, that I maybe dreaming or that everything which I am now thinking has as littletruth as what comes to the mind of one who is asleep? Yet even thisdoes not change anything. For even though I might be dreaming, ifthere is anything which is evident to my intellect, then it is wholly true.

(AT 7: 70–1, CSM 2: 48–9)

The first sentence is reminiscent of the conclusions drawn in the ThirdMeditation and elucidated in the Fourth. God exists. God is a perfect being.Deception is inconsistent with perfection. There is no basis on which onecould discover that an idea perceived clearly and distinctly is false, and oneis psychologically compelled to acknowledge its truth. Therefore, on painof making God a deceiver, clear and distinct ideas are true. But here Descartesbroadens that argument by remembering that he clearly and distinctlyperceived something in the past; he claims that no argument can be producedto make him doubt it. Why does he claim this? Pragmatically, somethinglike this must be assumed if one is to construct even fairly involvedgeometrical proofs. In proving Euclid’s Theorem 28, one might allude backto earlier proofs. For example, one might derive the proof from the definitions,axioms, and postulates as well as, let us say, Theorems 23 and 26. Thesetheorems have been proven, although the proofs might not presently bebefore one’s mind. If there is a divine “guarantee” that having clearly anddistinctly perceived that Theorems 23 and 26 are true is sufficient to removeall doubt regarding them, then, of course, they can be used in the proof: oneis warranted in accepting anything that follows from them. And the situationis the same if one derives the proof of Theorem 28 directly from the definitions,axioms and postulates, for then the proof is very involved and in the latersteps one must take one’s memory that one clearly and distinctly perceivedsomething at an earlier step in the proof as a sufficient reason for using it todraw a conclusion later in the proof. Without good reasons to believe thatthe memories of clear and distinct perceptions are true, one would alwayshave insufficient evidence for the conclusion of any extended argument or

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proof. But one must be very circumspect in ascribing fiduciary properties toGod.

Since Descartes held that God creates all eternal truths (AT 1: 145–6,CSM 3: 23), a temptation exists to read the passage in terms of God asguarantor of the truth of clear and distinct perceptions, whether immediatelyconsidered or remembered. We believe that one should resist this temptation.Even in a pre-analytic (pre-meditative) state, Descartes held that clear anddistinct perceptions and eternal truths are self evident.16 Deductive argumentsyield certainty if any do. But rather than seeing God as a guarantor of clearand distinct perceptions and one’s memories of them, Descartes seems toclaim that with the proof that God exists and is not a deceiver, one doesaway with the “very slight and, so to speak, metaphysical” reasons fordoubting the certainty of mathematical truths, mathematical demonstrations,and all beliefs based on clear and distinct perception (AT 7: 36, CSM 2: 25).Surely, the absence of grounds for doubt predominates any other theme inthese two paragraphs. The previous knowledge of God’s existence andnondeceptiveness eliminates any reasons to dislodge a belief deduced fromclear and distinct ideas. In the last two sentences of the paragraph we firstquoted in this section, Descartes claims that this previously discoveredknowledge about God sets aside the possibility of doubting mathematicaltruths. And one finds the same theme in the second sentence of the secondlengthy quotation on page 231. Again, God does not guarantee the truth ofclear and distinct perceptions and memories of them; rather, no skepticalarguments regarding clear and distinct ideas can be forthcoming sincearguments based on clear and distinct perceptions are psychologicallycompelling, and God exists and is not a deceiver. To understand this point,one need only look at Descartes’s discussion of the atheistic geometer.

In his Second Replies, Descartes grants that an atheist can clearly beaware of a geometric truth, even though “he cannot be certain that he is notbeing deceived on matters which seem to him to be very evident,” and forthat very reason denies that the atheist can have true knowledge of it, until“he acknowledges that God exists” (AT 7: 141, CSM 2: 101). The atheisticgeometer might well recognize that the interior angles of a triangle are equalto 180°, but the belief falls short of knowledge. Why? The geometer orsomeone else might be able to develop doubts regarding his or herconclusion. These doubts might be purely hypothetical and as outrageousas one might like: “What if my mental faculties are radically deficient?”“What if there were an infinitely powerful malicious demon who deceivesme?” So long as the doubts have any force, the geometer’s beliefs fall short

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of knowledge. Only with the proofs that God exists and is not a deceiver inMeditations Three and Four does the Cartesian theist undercut the groundsfor raising hypothetical doubts. With the destruction of those doubts, thetheist attains knowledge. Hence, the hypothetical doubts of MeditationOne remain significant only for the atheist or agnostic; given the proof ofthe existence and nondeceptive nature of God, no grounds for doubt can beadduced for anything that is clearly and distinctly perceived. Since thisargument now applies even to remembered instances of clear and distinctideas, Descartes has broadened the implications of the principle that God isnot a deceiver.

One should also notice that the considerations in these paragraphs areparallel to those in Meditation Three, paragraph four: these paragraphs inMeditation Five might be taken as reply to the doubts raised there. InMeditation Three, paragraph two, Descartes introduced the principle thatall clear and distinct ideas are true. In paragraph four, there are questionsand an epistemic doxology. First he says:

Did I not see at least these things clearly enough to affirm their truth?Indeed, the only reason for my later judgement that they were open todoubt was that it occurred to me that perhaps some God could havegiven me a nature such that I was he deceived even in matters whichseemed most evident.

(AT 7: 36, CSM 2: 25, our emphasis)

Second, he alludes to his “preconceived belief in the supreme power ofGod” to the effect that such a God could easily be a deceiver. Third, there isan epistemic doxology:

Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive veryclearly, I am so convinced of them that I spontaneously declare: letwhoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I amnothing so long I continue to think I am something . . . or anything ofthis kind in which I see a manifest contradiction.

AT 7: 36, CSM 2: 25)

Finally, Descartes reiterates the grounds for doubting the truth of clear anddistinct ideas:

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And since I have no cause to think that there is a deceiving God, and Ido not yet even know for sure whether there is a God at all, any reasonfor doubt which depends simply on this supposition is a very slightand, so to speak, metaphysical one.

(AT 7: 36, CSM 2: 25, our emphasis)

Even in Meditation Three, the possibilities either that God does not existor that God is a deceiver constitute the only grounds to doubt the truths ofclear and distinct ideas. Both of these possibilities would be based on a“preconceived belief” in the nature of God, and not upon a clear and distinctidea of God. This preconceived belief is based on the supposition that one’snature is inherently defective and only a deceptive God or a being distinctfrom God could explain one’s nature (cf. AT 7: 21–2, CSM 2: 14–15). Noticethat in the Fifth Meditation he says virtually the same thing. How can onecall one’s belief in the soundness of a geometric proof into question? Onecan do so only if one is “without knowledge of God. For I can convincemyself that I have a natural disposition to go wrong . . . in matters which Ithink I perceive as evidently as can be” (AT 7: 70, CSM 2: 48, our emphasis).If one were to have such a natural disposition to err, either the cause ofone’s being is something less perfect than God, or God is a deceiver. Descarteshas dismissed both positions. So to anyone who has acknowledged thatGod exists and is not a deceiver, no reasons exist for doubting evenremembered clear and distinct ideas. Another lateral connection isestablished between the earlier and later Meditations.

So what has Descartes done in these two paragraphs? Has he, as it mightfirst appear, shown that God is a guarantor of memory, at least in those casesin which one has memories of clear and distinct ideas (cf. Doney 1955)? No.What he has shown is that the principle that God exists and is not a deceiverhas broader implications than might initially be realized. His position mightbe constructed as to parallel the proof of the truth of clear and distinct ideasin Meditation Four. Demonstrations – valid deductive arguments from self-evident premises (based on clear and distinct ideas) – are psychologicallycompelling: it is psychologically impossible to work through thedemonstration and reject the conclusion, even if one only remembers thatindividual elements of the demonstration were clearly and distinctlyperceived. If God is nondeceptive and would be deceptive if one werepsychologically compelled to believe that a demonstrated proposition istrue when it is false, then one must accept the truth of a demonstrated

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proposition, and any memories of clear and distinct elements of thedemonstration must be taken as true on pain of making God a deceiver.Hence, each of the elements of the demonstration must be true: all skepticaldoubts have been undercut. This is a slight broadening of the implicationsof the claim, “God is not a deceiver,” but only a slight broadening.

With his explanation of why clear and distinct ideas are true and whymathematical demonstrations are justified, Descartes has proven thatcorporeal entities are possible in as much as their essences are clearly anddistinctly perceived. This sets the stage for proving that corporeal entitiesexist.

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9 Meditation Six

The world restored

By the end of the Sixth Meditation, virtually everything is as it was at thebeginning of Meditation One. Among the exceptions masked by the“virtually” are heat and cold, colors (including black and white), and,presumably, flavors, aromas, sounds, and anything else that is not subjectto geometric description. While these absences might suggest that theDescartes of Meditation Six was anti-empirical, we argue that he championeda cautious empiricism, what we called the Enhanced Principle of Acquaintance(EPA) in Chapter Four.

Descartes’s initial arguments in Meditation Six concern the existence ofthe material world. He presents a series of arguments that show withincreasing probability that the material world exists. Ultimately, the warrantfor the belief that a material world exists rests on the nondeceptive Godthesis.

Material objects as probable, and the realdistinction between mind and body

Descartes begins the Meditation with a look back and a look ahead. Hemakes two main points. First, insofar as God could create anything oneclearly and distinctly perceives, it follows that material objects possiblyexist. Further, material truth is understood as consistency or possibleexistence: “I have never judged that something could not be made by him[God] except on the grounds that there would be a contradiction in myperceiving it distinctly” (AT 7: 71, CSM 2: 50). Second, he suggests thatconsiderations of the imagination imply that material objects exist, for theimagination appears to apply the cognitive faculty to a body. Descartesdevelops an argument for this thesis in the next two paragraphs.

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To imagine a triangle is to form of a picture of a triangle in the mind,although one might understand what a triangle is without a pictorialrepresentation. Descartes illustrates this point in terms of a chiliagon, athousand-sided plane figure, which can be understood but not imagined.1Even if one could imagine a chiliagon or a myriagon, the image itself wouldnot increase one’s understanding of the figure; understanding the propertiesof a multi-sided object requires an understanding of the fundamentalelements of geometry plus the ability to draw out the consequences ofthose definitions, axioms, and postulates with respect to the kind of figurein question. Of course, in cases of objects with fewer sides – triangles,squares, pentagons, hexagons, etc. – it is possible not only to understandtheir natures but to imaginatively construct an image of the relevant kind offigure. Descartes claims that imagination is something more than pureunderstanding; it requires a peculiar effort of the mind that is not requiredfor understanding, which shows that a difference exists between theimagination and the understanding (AT 7: 72–3, CSM 2: 50–1).

Given the distinction between the understanding and the imagination,Descartes argues for the probability that material objects exist, that is, theexistence of material objects offers a plausible (and perhaps the best)explanation of the phenomenon of imagination. He writes:

Besides this, I consider that this power of imagining which is in me,differing as it does from the power of understanding, is not a necessaryconstituent of my own essence, that is, of the essence of my mind. Forif I lacked it, I should undoubtedly remain the same individual as I nowam; from which it seems to follow that it depends on something distinctfrom myself. And I can easily understand that, if there does exist somebody to which the mind is so joined that it can apply itself to contemplateit, as it were, whenever it pleases, then it may possibly be this verybody that enables me to imagine corporeal things. So the differencebetween this mode of thinking and pure understanding may simply bethis: when the mind understands, it in some way turns towards itselfand inspects one of the ideas which are within it; but when it imagines,it turns towards the body and looks at something in the body whichconforms to an idea understood by the mind or perceived by the senses.I can, as I say, easily understand that this is how imagination comesabout, if the body exists; and since there is no other equally suitableway of explaining imagination that comes to mind, I can make a probableconjecture that the body exists. But this is only a probability; and

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despite a careful and comprehensive investigation, I do not yet seehow the distinct idea of corporeal nature which I find in my imaginationcan provide any basis for a necessary inference that some body exists.

(AT 7: 73, CSM 2: 51)

In Meditation Two, when Descartes explicated the meaning of the claim thathe is a thing that thinks, he included “also imagines and has sensoryperceptions” (AT 7: 28, CSM 2: 19) as little more than an afterthought. Hisposition here explains why imagination was ascribed little more than thestatus of an unwanted stepchild: the ability to imagine is not essential tohim, that is, he would still be a thinking thing even if he were incapable offorming images in the imagination. Since the imagination’s presence orabsence would not affect the nature of the mind, its occurrence suggeststhat imagination is essentially related to something other than the mind. Butif imagination is not essential to the mind or thinking thing, this opens thedoor to some other explanation of the presence of the imagination. If a bodywere associated with his mind, Descartes would have an explanation of theoccurrence of the imagination: through this body one can imagine things.2

The difference between pure understanding and imagination, then, wouldbe the difference between the mind turning and looking within and inspectingideas – an operation that does not require images – and the mind lookingoutward at something in the body.

Descartes suggests that this is a very plausible explanation, indeed, it isthe best explanation available that accounts for the occurrence of imagination.Nonetheless, this explanatory justification of the existence of the body isonly probable.

Descartes next develops an argument to demonstrate the probability thatat least one material object exists, namely, that body one considers one’sown. This is an argument from sense perception. It extends the argumentconcerning imagination insofar it presumes that the senses supply thematerials on which the imagination works. His argument consists of threephases:

To begin with, I will go back over all the things which I previously tookto be perceived by the senses, and reckoned to be true; and I will goover my reasons for thinking this. Next, I will set out my reasons forsubsequently calling these things into doubt. And finally I will considerwhat I should now believe about them.

(AT 7: 74, CSM 2: 51)

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This passage reflects standard Cartesian procedure. In Meditation Two,when he asked what he was, he began by considering what he formerlybelieved himself to be and then gave reasons why he no longer could deemall those elements essential (AT 7: 25–8, CSM 2: 17–19). The same procedurewas employed regarding the piece of wax (AT 7: 30–1, CSM 2: 20–1). Here hecompletes the procedure through evaluating the extent to which his previousdoubts are justified in light of the conclusions drawn regarding thenondeceptive nature of God.

In a rather lengthy passage (AT 7: 74–6, CSM 2: 51–3), Descartes beginsthe first phase by listing his pre-critical beliefs about his body and sensoryexperience, and the reasons, if any, he had for those beliefs. Prior to hisdoubts, Descartes assumed that he had a body. By his senses he perceivedthat his body was one of many bodies and that the other bodies could affectit in various ways. Some of these apparent affects he welcomed becausethey yielded sensations of pleasure; others repelled him because theyyielded sensations of pain. He had sensations such as hunger, andpropensities toward various emotions. He had sensations of color, heat andcold, and ideas of the other sensible modalities. Since he does nothing toform and cannot prevent the occurrence of those ideas he calls ideas ofsensation, and since they are more lively and vivid than those intentionallycreated by the mind, it seems reasonable to assume that something externalto himself caused them; moreover, he naturally assumes the ideas resembletheir external causes. The fact that the use of his senses occurs before thedevelopment of his ability to reason, and the fact that the ideas formed bythe reason are less vivid than those of the senses explains why he hadassumed the truth of the empiricist principle. Similarly, the belief that a certainbody is his own seemed justified because, one, he could never be separatedfrom it as he could from other bodies, two, he felt his appetites and emotionsin it, and three, and he was aware of pain and pleasure in that body ratherthan some other. His only available explanation of why he associates certainsensations with the need to eat or drink is that “nature taught me so” (AT 7:76, CSM 2: 53). And, with regard to his pre-critical judgments about sensoryobjects in general, he discovers that, he “was apparently taught to make[them] by nature” (AT 7: 76, CSM 2: 53).

Descartes begins to undermine these pre-critical beliefs when he findsthat experience itself tends to undercut the assumed reliability of experience.He provides a litany of misjudgments based on sense perception (AT 7: 76–7, CSM 2: 53–4). What appeared to be a round tower when seen from asignificant distance, appeared square when perceived from a lesser distance.

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Amputees testified that they suffered from (phantom) pains in their missinglimbs. A further difficulty arises when he realizes that he has no more reasonto believe that external objects cause wakeful sense perceptions than hehas for believing that dream states derive from external causes. Finally,Descartes examines the consequences of the assumption that his facultieswere inherently defective. All these provide reasons why one should notplace a great deal of confidence in what was “taught by nature” (AT 7: 77,CSM 2: 53), even if sense perceptions are independent of the will.

With the coming of knowledge of his own nature and God’s nature andexistence, Descartes claims grounds for dispelling some of the doubts hehas raised regarding the existence of the material world and the reliability ofsense experience. He begins:

First, I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understandis capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with myunderstanding of it. Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctlyunderstand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certainthat the two things are distinct, since they are capable of being separated,at least by God. The question of what kind of power is required to bringabout such a separation does not affect the judgement that the twothings are distinct. Thus, simply by knowing that I exist and seeing atthe same time that absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature oressence except that I am a thinking thing, I can infer correctly that myessence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It is truethat I may have (or, to anticipate, that I certainly have) a body that isvery closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the one hand I have aclear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, inso far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly,it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist withoutit.

(AT 7: 78, CSM 2: 54)

Here Descartes argues for the real distinction between mind and body,namely, that a mind and body can exist independently of one another. Alreadyin Meditation Two, Descartes argued that he had a clear and distinct idea ofhimself as a thinking thing (AT 7: 33, CSM 2: 22). From Meditation Five, hehas a clear and distinct idea of an extended object in that it can be understood

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as an object of pure mathematics. Hence, the mathematical conception ofhis own body is the conception of an object whose existence is possible.Since he has a clear and distinct idea both of his mind and of his body as anobject of pure mathematics, each can exist as he conceives of it, or, moreproperly speaking, the mind can exist apart from the body.3

As Descartes indicates in the Synopsis (AT 7: 3, CSM 2: 12) and in replyto an objection in the Preface (AT 7: 78, CSM 2: 7), only and until he has thisreal distinction argument before him can he lay claim to indubitableknowledge of himself as a thinking substance (see also Sievert 1975). Wesuggested in Chapter Five that one might understand Descartes’s prematurerestriction of his essence to thinking in Meditation Two as a hypothesis tobe confirmed. Before the real distinction argument, he can (mistakenly)maintain that his essence consists solely in thinking: that is, he does not yethave the sufficient reason to believe that such an assertion would not leadto an erroneous judgment. Since Descartes finds himself so closely relatedto his body, and since one must know exactly what attributes are essentialto something to understand that thing as a substance, he must be able todistinguish clearly between body as such and mind as such. Prior to thisargument he does not have a clear and distinct idea of his body. Thus, priorto making the real distinction he cannot clearly and distinctly understandthe difference between his mind and his body.

This conclusion is borne out by the fact that he feels he must clarify thestatus of sense perception and imagination before he introduces the realdistinction. Descartes must know whether these powers are essential to himas a thinking thing or not. Knowing that imagination and sense perceptionare not essential allows him to make three claims: one, he can claim that hehas an even clearer idea of himself as a thinking thing; two, it allows him todraw a starker division between himself and those things related to body;and three, it allows him to eliminate himself (a thinking thing) as a candidatefor the causes of his sensorial ideas. All three of these points must beestablished before he can claim to distinguish clearly and distinctly betweenmind as substance and body as substance.

The argument for the nature and actual existenceof the corporeal world

From the implications of imagination and sensory perception as modes ofthought, Descartes develops the argument for the existence of the corporealworld. The argument rests on considerations of the nature of substance and

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an understanding of the implications of the principle of God as anondeceiver.

Imagination and sense perception are essentially mental acts.4 Hence,they are modes of thinking: they necessarily inhere in a mental substance,although a mental substance could exist without those modes of thought.Not all modes are modes of thought. Some faculties such as changingposition and taking on a certain shape include no mental act. If such facultiesexist, they must exist as modes of extension. One passively perceives ideasof sensible objects. Since the mind passively perceives sensory ideas, itcannot be the active cause of the ideas of sensible objects. In eliminatinghis mind as the cause, Descartes realizes that he must find some othersubstance as the cause of those ideas. This other substance “containsformally or eminently all the reality which exists objectively in the ideasproduced by this faculty” (AT 7: 79, CSM 2: 55). Having already discountedthe possibility that he himself caused his sensory ideas (the passivity thesis),Descartes enumerates the possible causes: it is either a corporeal substance,or God, or some intermediary between God and corporeal substance whichcontains eminently what is objectively in the ideas. But God does not deceiveand one naturally believes in the existence of corporeal substance, so thecause of the idea must be a corporeal substance.

Notice how the God-is-not-a-deceiver argument goes and compare itwith earlier versions of that argument.

1. God has given me a great propensity to believe that sensory ideas areproduced by material objects.

2. God has given me no faculty by which I could recognize that materialobjects are produced by anything other than material objects.

3. If something other than material objects produces sensory ideas inme while I have a propensity to believe that material objects producedthose sensory ideas and no faculty to show that the belief is false,then God is a deceiver.

4. God is not a deceiver.5. Therefore, sensory ideas are produced by material objects.

This is Descartes’s third argument from the nondeceptive nature of God. Ineach case the form is the same:

1. I have a psychological propensity to believe that x.2. If I have a propensity to believe that x even though x is false and there

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is no way to show that x is false, then God would be a deceiver.3. God is not a deceiver.4. Therefore, the belief that x is not false.

The notion of falsehood differs between the first two uses of thenondeceiver argument and the last insofar as the first two need be concernedwith only material falsehood while the third is concerned with formalfalsehood. One should note a significant link between the two previoususes of the nondeceiver argument and the nondeceiver argument whichproves the existence of material objects: the argument applies to materialobjects and their properties only if one conceives of material objectsmathematically, that is, material objects having those and only thoseproperties that one perceives as clear and distinct. So, the third instance ofthe non-deceiver argument depends upon the first two.

This dependency also shows how the appeal to the natural tendency tobelieve in the existence of material objects here differs from that rejected inMeditation Three. In Meditation Three, Descartes was concerned with thenatural impulse to believe in the existence of material objects as they aresensibly perceived. He rejected this natural impulse as an epistemic warrantsince, as he puts it:

I have often judged in the past that they [natural impulses] were pushingme in the wrong direction when it was a question of choosing the good,and I do not see why I should place any greater confidence in them inother matters.

(AT 7: 39, CSM 2: 27)

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes delimits the conception of a materialobject inasmuch as he clearly and distinctly perceives each element of theconception, and he applies the nondeceptive-God argument only with respectto his tendency to believe in the existence of a material object so construed.Descartes’s conception of material objects explicitly does not show thatmaterial objects are colored and so forth.

What “nature” can teach about minds and bodies

Descartes continues the meditation by considering ideas of those properties

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of material objects which are not clear and distinct. He begins his discussionby asking two questions simultaneously:

What of the other aspects of corporeal things which are either particular(for example that the sun is of such and such a size or shape), or lessclearly understood, such as light or sound or pain, and so on?

(AT 7: 80, CSM 2: 55)

One question concerns the status of singular judgments; the other concernsproperties of objects that are not clearly and distinctly perceived. The formerquestion suggests something about the limits of the nondeceiver argument.Human beings not only assume the existence of material objects in general,they assume the existence of particular (individual) material objects. Wereone to assume that the latter was Descartes’s concern in the previousparagraph, his complex question suggests otherwise. Here he takes thestatus of judgments regarding individual objects as central. This suggeststhat he was concentrating on more general, that is, simpler, properties in theprevious paragraph. If this is the case, then the nondeceptive-God argumentonly demonstrates the existence of objects to which geometrical propertiesapply; from one’s belief in the existence of one’s own body and from one’sgeometrical construal of that presumptive body, the nondeceptive-Godargument does not entail that one’s own individual body must exist on painof making God a deceiver. Nor should this be surprising. Remember, thesecond rule of method in the Discourse requires that one concern oneselfwith simplest things, that is, general properties, before concerning oneselfwith complex things, that is, things composed of assorted kinds of properties(AT 6: 18, CSM 2: 120). Thus, in the previous paragraph, Descartes may betaken to prove nothing more than that things exist to which the principles ofgeometry apply on pain of making God a deceiver; he should not be taken tohave proven the existence of any particular object. Particular objects areexistentionally determinate; the geometric properties of objects qua geometricproperties are merely determinable. Methodologically, Descartes shouldconcern himself first with establishing that there is a domain of existents towhich the laws of geometry apply and only then turn to a more detaileddescription of specific individuals within that domain.5

In the remainder of the paragraph, Descartes examines those aspects ofmaterial objects which escape mathematical description. He puts it this way:

Despite the high degree of doubt and uncertainty involved here, the

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very fact that God is not a deceiver, and the consequent impossibilityof there being any falsity in my opinions which cannot be corrected bysome other faculty supplied by God, offers me a sure hope that I canattain the truth even in these matters. Indeed, there is no doubt thateverything that I am taught by nature contains some truth. For if natureis considered in its general aspect, then I understand by the term nothingother than God himself, or the ordered system of created thingsestablished by God. And by my own nature in particular I understandnothing other than the totality of things bestowed on me by God.

(AT 7: 80, CSM 2: 55–6)

Here Descartes sets the stage for the argument for the existence of individualmaterial objects. He claims that if I hold an opinion for which God has givenme no faculty by which I can show the opinion is false, then the opinionmust be true on pain of making God a deceiver. Once again, he broadens thescope of the God-is-not-a-deceiver argument. Here Descartes is notconcerned with ideas clearly and distinctly perceived. The expansion of thecriterion and his remark that “everything I am taught by nature containssome truth” lays the groundwork for claiming that one’s spontaneous impulseto believe that individual material objects exist has some warrant (cf. AT 7:38, CSM 2: 26–7; see also AT 2: 599, CSM 3: 140). Although the identificationof God and nature in his justificatory remark, “nature is . . . nothing otherthan God himself, or the ordered system of created things established byGod,” appears curious, when one considers it in conjunction with theparagraph’s last sentence, one might reasonably construe the identificationas the claim that all things depend on God.

Since Descartes claims that we can know that material objects exist onpain of making God a deceiver, he can now lend some credence to thosespontaneous natural impulses that yield beliefs, the kind of impulses towhich he contrasted knowledge by the natural light in Meditation Three(AT 7: 38–9, CSM 2: 26–7). In the next three paragraphs Descartes tells ussome of the things nature teaches. This is followed by a paragraph in whichhe, once again, warns us of the limits of natural education.

First, nature teaches us that we have a body and that we know variousstates of that body. He writes:

There is nothing that my own nature teaches me more vividly than thatI have a body, and that when I feel pain there is something wrong with

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the body, and that when I am hungry or thirsty the body needs foodand drink, and so on. So I should not doubt that there is some truth inthis.

(AT 7: 80, CSM 2: 56)

There is a lot going on here, and not everything that Descartes mentions isequally certain. Nature teaches me that I have a body, that is, since I have anatural tendency to believe that I have a body, and since God is not adeceiver and I have no faculty that shows that my belief is false, the beliefthat I have a body must be true. How is this “taught”? Is it merely aspontaneous belief, or is it something else? This is not clear. What oneclearly knows, however, is that one is taught not only that a body exists butthat a correlation exists between certain bodily states and certain mentalstates. This knowledge suggests that nature teaches one that a body existsthrough certain types of sense perception, particularly the sensations ofpain or discomfort. Assume that one knows by the natural light that everyevent, including sensations, has a cause (cf. P 1: 49). If one seeks the causeof a certain repeated sensation of pain, one might notice that each sensationof pain is correlated with an appearance of a pin being jabbed into whatappears to be a hand. One might notice, further, that this hand is perceivedfrom a certain perspective: one perceives various parts of a body into whichthe pin is jabbed when one feels pain. This paragraph shows not only thatone’s body exists, but that one has perceptual knowledge of some states ofthat body.

Nature also teaches that one’s mind and body are closely, indeed intimately,united (AT 7: 81, CSM 2: 56). When one injures one’s foot, one does notmerely notice it as one might notice an injury to some other body, rather onesenses pain. One is more directly aware of the states of one’s body than oneis aware of the states of other objects. One’s knowledge is sensitive, notintellectual. While sensations of hunger and thirst are correlated with statesof the body, these sensations are confused modes of thinking: one does notknow what states are represented by such sensations, only that a certainkind of state is represented. As Descartes tells Elizabeth, “[i] t is the ordinarycourse of life and conversation, the abstention from meditation and fromstudy of things which exercise the imagination, that teaches us how toconceive of the union of the soul and the body” (AT 3: 692, CSM 3: 227).

What does this mean? As we have shown in Chapter Three, Descartesasserted the existence of a primitive notion of the union of mind and body,as well as primitive notions of body as extended and mind as thinking (AT 3:

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665, 691; CSM 3: 218, 226), and that there are natural laws that join mind andbody. But one comes to know the union of mind and body by experience.Presumably this includes the discovery that the pain of hunger can bealleviated by eating. Notice that, one, Descartes here concerns himself withthe gross relationships between states of mind and presumptive states ofthe body, rather than the more precise correlation between states of themind and states of the pineal gland, and two, all this is known by experience.

Finally, nature teaches that bodies exist which are distinct from and in thevicinity of the meditator’s own body (AT 7: 81, CSM 2: 56). Descartes appearsto offer a nearly blanket warrant of experience. One perceives bodies thatare distinct from one’s own. One notices correlations between states ofthose bodies and states of one’s own mind-body complex. Except whenthere are empirical or theoretical reasons for calling one’s sensibleobservations into question, one is warranted in one’s use of experience.

Descartes has not retreated to the naive empiricism found at the outset ofMeditation One, but he does offer a cautious or informed empiricism. Hereminds us that we ought not be hasty in our empirical judgments. He givesa partial list of unwarranted judgments:

There are, however, many other things which I may appear to havebeen taught by nature, but which in reality I acquired not from naturebut from a habit of making ill-considered judgements; and it is thereforequite possible that these are false. Cases in point are the belief that anyspace in which nothing is occurring to stimulate my senses must beempty; or that the heat in a body is something exactly resembling theidea of heat which is in me; or that when a body is white or green, theselfsame whiteness or greenness which I perceive through my sensesis present in the body; or that in a body which is bitter or sweet there isthe selfsame taste which I experience, and so on; or, finally, that starsand towers and other distant bodies have the same size and shapewhich they present to my senses, and other examples of this kind.

(AT 7: 82, CSM 2: 56–7)

What theoretical limits is Descartes imposing on judgments from senseperception? No guaranteed correspondence exists between each element ofempirical experience and material reality. As he later stresses in his physics,no vacuum exists (P II: 16; See also AT 11: 16–23, CSM 1: 85–8): apparentemptiness does not correspond to actual emptiness. One still constrainsone’s judgment by considerations of clarity and distinctness: insofar as

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one’s ideas of color, aroma, savor, and sound are not clear and distinct, onehas no warrant to conclude that any similarities exist between those sensoryideas and states of the material objects to which they supposedlycorrespond.

Furthermore, one must balance experience with experience: one must usethe enhanced principle of acquaintance (EPA). If one discovers conflictingevidence regarding the shape or size of an object, one should withholdjudgment until one can place the evidence within a general framework thatwill resolve the conflicting appearances by providing a basis for judgingwhich appearance (hypothesis) is most probably true. For example, oneshould base one’s judgment of the size or shape of a star on the best available(scientific) evidence.

Descartes held that what one knows on the basis of the mind–bodyunion is quite limited. The mind produces judgments, including thoseregarding the nature and existence of the material world (AT 7: 82–3, CSM 2:57). The information one obtains from the mind-body union is purelypragmatic: it allows one to come to know the needs of the body and thekinds of things to seek or avoid if one is to retain a healthy body; it providesonly very obscure information regarding the nature of the body (AT 7: 83,CSM 2: 57–8).

Human error and divine non-deception revisited

At this point Descartes returns to the problem of human error. While theissue in the Fourth Meditation was the exoneration of God from charges ofdeception based on the fact that people occasionally err, the issue herecenters on the explanation of errors arising from the union of mind andbody. Descartes entertains cases of desiring that which is unhealthful,whether that desire is for the relish of a sumptuous meal which, unbeknownstto the eater, is laced with poison (AT 7: 83–4, CSM 2: 58), or the desire forwater by a person who is suffering from dropsy (AT 7: 84–5, CSM 2: 58–9passim), or a case of a phantom pain (AT 7: 86–8, CSM 2: 60–1). Given thatthe senses provide “only very obscure information” regarding the body(AT 7: 83, CSM 2: 58), Cartesian principles suggest that errors should beexpected. The discussion focuses on the mechanisms operative in the bodyand the connections between mind and body.

Descartes holds that bodies are complex machines. As complex machines,they operate in accordance with the laws of mechanics. He explains what

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happens in the case of illness on the basis of an analogy to a clock (AT 7:84–5, CSM 2: 58–9). Human bodies are like clocks: both function inaccordance with natural laws, and this fact obtains whether the body orclock functions well or poorly. Just as one can explain why a clock fails tokeep time on the basis of laws of nature, similar laws will explain why onemight be deceived into desiring water when consuming water would proveharmful. To suggest that a malfunctioning clock or an unhealthy body isoperating “unnaturally” is to introduce the myth of substantial forms orfinal causes: such presumptive purposes provide one with no understandingof the nature of the kind of body in question.6

Descartes makes other observations on the relationship of mind andbody. First, body is divisible; mind is indivisible. An injury to one’s bodyhas no concomitant effect on one’s mind (AT 7: 86, CSM 2: 59). Second, themind is not intimately related to the whole of a body, but only to a part of thebrain, the seat of the common sense (the pineal gland) (AT 7: 86, CSM 2: 59–60). Since the mind is lawfully related to only a small part of the brain, thelawful relation between mind and body can obtain – the law that if the pinealgland is in state Sb then the mind is in state Sm can obtain – even if not all thestates that normally result in state Sb obtain. Descartes’s extended exampleis the case of a phantom pain. If a person has a foot amputated, the nervethat had led to the foot might be stimulated, which results in a state of thepineal gland Sb and the corresponding mental state Sm. The amputee mightcome to believe that a tack has been inserted into his or her foot, althoughsuch a deception should be short-lived. Once the amputee realizes that hisor her foot has been removed, he or she realizes that the causal chain cannotbegin in his or her foot. There is a balancing of experience with experience inseeking a coherent explanation of the phenomenon: one appeals to EPA.

Thus, the explanation of the phantom pain or a state of illness occurs onthe bodily side, and it does not speak against the goodness of God (AT 7:88–9, CSM 2: 61). When the amputee misjudges that he or she has a pain inan amputated foot or when the dropsical individual suffers thirst, God is notguilty of deception since the system of mind-body laws is generally beneficialto humans. When the body is diseased, the sensory “mistakes” result fromaltered states of the body. The natural laws relating states of the pinealgland with states of the mind remain intact. The erroneous judgment onemight make regarding the states of the body by means of states of the mindstems from insufficient empirical information. Were one able to diagnosethat one is suffering from dropsy, one would not take the sensation of thirstas a sufficient ground for believing that one’s body needed liquid. One

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balances experience with experience to provide a basis for a sound judgment.Here, unlike the case of clear and distinct perception, one has a faculty thatwill allow one to provide grounds for claiming that one’s “natural belief” –that one’s body needs liquid, that there is a tack in one’s foot, that thepoisoned food is healthful – is false. Once again, Descartes’s God avoidscharges of deception. Experiential coherence not only allows Descartes todefend God, but also yields a criterion that allows one to distinguish wakingfrom dreaming states (AT 7: 89–90, CSM 2: 62).

Conclusions

So what has happened in the Sixth Meditation? Descartes has replied to thefirst specific doubt in the deceptive-God argument, namely,

How do I know that he [God] has not brought it about that there is noearth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while atthe same time ensuring that all these appear to me just as they do now?

(AT 2: 21, CSM 2: 14)

He broadens his contention that God is not a deceiver. Just as he arguedthat clear and distinct ideas must be (formally) true because we arepsychologically disposed to believe that they are true and we have nofaculty to discern their falsehood, we similarly have an innate disposition tobelieve in the existence of the material realm and no faculty to show that thatgeneral belief is false. Yet, we do have faculties which allow us to show thatsome of our beliefs about the nature and existence of some bodies is false.In the process of developing the argument for the existence of bodies,Descartes supplants the Aristotelian definition of ‘man’ as a rational animalwith that of a combination of mind and body, each of which is substantial.And he reintroduces an empiricist principle, although the principle is farless naive than that with which he began the First Meditation. It is anempiricist principle which is subordinate to reason, a principle that bringsempirical data before the tribunal of reason to judge and explain therelationships among its multiple bits of data. Through the enhanced principleof acquaintance first found in the fourth paragraph of the First Meditation,one discovers an empiricism that can help set out the problems for Cartesianscience.

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10 Circles

If we have correctly accounted for the Cartesian method in the first threechapters and have shown how it functions with respect to the Meditationsin the last six chapters, then our work should shed light on classical problemsof interpreting Cartesian texts. In Chapter Three we argued that Cartesiancauses are formal, and that the mind-body connection reflects nothing morenor less than a lawful correlation. Insofar as that connection is only a lawfulcorrelation, the differences between mental and physical substances poseno special problems.

While we believe that we have provided a fresh look at the problem ofinterpreting Cartesian mind-body relations, anyone who offers an accountof the Cartesian method as it applies to his metaphysics should offer someinsight into what has come to be called “the Cartesian Circle.” To meet thisresponsibility, we put our account to the test in this chapter. We argue thatour interpretation of the Meditations by way of the method exoneratesDescartes from the charge of circular reasoning raised by his contemporarycritics, although the exoneration comes at a price.1

One finds charges of circular reasoning at several points in the Objections.As early as the Second Set of Objections, there are anticipations of theCartesian Circle. There we find this:

Thirdly, [in the Second Meditation] you are not yet certain of theexistence of God, and you say that you are not certain of anything, andcannot know anything clearly and distinctly until you have achievedknowledge of the existence of God. It follows from this that you do notyet clearly and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, onyour own admission, that knowledge depends on the clear knowledgeof an existing God; and this you have not yet proved in the passagewhere you draw the conclusion that you clearly know what you are.

(AT 7: 124–5, CSM 2: 89)

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If Descartes held that one can know the truth of ideas clearly and distinctlyperceived only once he has proven that God is not a deceiver, then his claimin the Second Meditation that he knows that he is a thing that thinks isunwarranted. A justified claim of knowledge that p requires that p is true.But clear and distinct ideas are not proven to be true until Meditation Four.Thus, in Meditation Two he assumes a criterion of truth that he only laterproves. While this might not properly be a circular argument, it at least begsthe question of the truth of clear and distinct ideas. Such is the objection.

Descartes replies that the “awareness of first principles is not normallycalled ‘knowledge’ by dialectitians” (AT 7: 140, CSM 2: 100). While thisappeal to common practice is hardly adequate, our account of the methodshows why the objection lacks force. In acknowledging the distinctionbetween material and formal truth, Descartes has the basis for claiming thatclear and distinct ideas are known to be materially true prior to thenondeceptive-God arguments: the natural light recognizes only material truth(possibility). This recognition does not entail the formal truth of his idea; itonly reveals the consistency of his idea of himself as a thinking thing, andthus, the idea of a possible essence. If our account of Descartes’s search fora foundational epistemic principle is correct, that search culminates in thenatural light. If so, then he has methodological warrant to claim that the ideaof himself as a thinking thing is true, but only materially true. Thus, the forceof the objection rests on an equivocation on “truth”, and once the distinctionbetween material and formal truth is acknowledged, the objection loses itsforce.

The classic version of the Cartesian Circle is found in Arnauld’sobjections. Arnauld wrote:

I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids reasoning in acircle when he says that we are sure that what we clearly and distinctlyperceive is true only because God exists.

But we can be sure that God exists only because we clearly anddistinctly perceive this. Hence, before we can be sure that God exists,we ought to be able to be sure that whatever we perceive clearly anddistinctly is true.

(AT 7: 214, CSM 2: 150)

Call this the Arnauld Circle. Put simply, it asserts that since God exists, itfollows that clear and distinct ideas are true. And since clear and distinctideas are true, it follows that God exists.

There is no question that the Meditations exemplify this pattern of

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argumentation. In Meditation Three Descartes shows that God exists. InMeditation Four he shows that, since God exists and is not a deceiver, clearand distinct ideas are formally true. And given the formal truth of clear anddistinct ideas in general, and the idea of God as a perfect being in particular,he argues in Meditation Five that God exists. But this, as such, does notconstitute circular argumentation. The Arnauld Circle becomes problematiconly if the arguments in the Third Meditation assume the formal truth ofclear and distinct ideas and the notion of formal truth plays a pivotal role inthe arguments for the existence of God. Such an argument would take thefollowing form:

1. The idea of God is clear and distinct.2. All clear and distinct ideas are formally true.3. Therefore the idea of God is formally true.4. Formal truths possess existential import.5. Therefore, God exists.

Given this argument, the Arnauld Circle would be generated by the followingargument in Meditation Four:

6. If clear and distinct ideas were not formally true, then God would be adeceiver.

7. God exists and is not a deceiver.8. Therefore, clear and distinct ideas are formally true.

We grant that the second argument is found in Meditation Four. We denythat the first argument is found in Meditation Three.

If our account of the method is correct, charges of an Arnauld Circle arecurious. In examining the arguments for the existence of God in MeditationThree, we noticed that the proofs of God’s existence depend on the claimthat one has a clear and distinct idea of God only insofar as the idea must besufficiently clear to distinguish the idea of God from the idea of other actualor possible things.2 Descartes raises no concerns regarding the material orformal truth of the idea within the arguments themselves. This is not to sayno concern exists with respect to clear and distinct ideas; far from it. As weargued, in the course of the Meditation Descartes clarifies the idea of Godfrom that of a being with many omni-attributes to that of a supremely perfectbeing (AT 7: 45–6, CSM 2: 31). It is true that part of this clarification occursin the course of refuting the possibility that the idea of God is materially

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false, and therefore cannot represent a real essence (AT 7: 45, CSM 2: 31).Nevertheless, substantive questions of clarity and distinctness do not ariseas such within the context of either argument.

Furthermore, the objection is reasonable only if one assumes, first, thatin claiming an idea is clear and distinct Descartes is concerned unequivocallywith formal truth and, second, that there are no degrees of clarity anddistinctness. As we have argued throughout this book, the primary mode oftruth which pertains to clear and distinct ideas is material truth. Materialtruth pertains to possibility. In claiming that all clear and distinct ideas arematerially true in Meditation Three, Descartes commits himself to nothingmore than that a clear and distinct idea is the idea of a possible essence.Further, as we argued in Chapter Six, ideas possess clarity and distinctnessto varying degrees: only the idea of God as a perfect being is “utterly clearand distinct” (AT 7: 45, CSM 2: 31).3 This concern with degrees of clarityand distinctness complies with degrees of possibility. Consistent with that,one can claim that there are degrees of material truth, while in the case offormal truths – particularly existential claims – it is incoherent to say thatsome propositions are “truer” than others.

Given this distinction, Descartes can well use the notion of material truthin the cosmological arguments for the existence of God in Meditation Three.On the same basis, he can argue in Meditation Four that the nondeceptive-God thesis commits one to the claim that clear and distinct ideas represent“true and immutable natures,” that they are formally true in that they representactual essences of things that possibly exist (ideas in the mind of God). So,while the clear and distinct ideas of Meditation Three are true, they are onlymaterially true. As such, they show nothing more than the possible existenceof a thing of a kind. If only material truth remains operative in MeditationThree, the proofs of divine existence there avoid concerns about the formaltruth of ideas of God, the mode of truth that follows from the nondeceptive-God thesis. Thus, Descartes does not trap himself in the Arnauld Circle.

Unfortunately, Descartes’s avoidance of the Arnauld Circle rests, in part,on a philosophical mistake. In the second argument for the existence of Godin Meditation Three, Descartes argues that God is the efficient cause ofhimself. As we noted in Chapter Three, Arnauld argues at length that thenotion of a thing being an efficient cause of itself is incoherent (see AT 7:207–13, CSM 2: 146–50). He concludes:

The author says that the light of nature establishes that if anythingexists we may always ask why it exists – that is, we may inquire into its

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efficient cause, or if it does not have one, we may demand why it doesnot have one. To this I answer that if someone asks why God exists, weshould not answer in terms of an efficient cause, but should explainthat he exists simply because he is God, or an infinite being. And ifsomeone asks for an efficient cause of God, we should reply that hedoes not need an efficient cause. And if the questioner goes on to askwhy he does not need an efficient cause, we should answer that this isbecause he is an infinite being, whose existence is his essence. For theonly things that require an efficient cause are those in which actualexistence may be distinguished from essence.

(AT 7: 213, CSM 2: 149–50)

When discussing Arnauld’s objections to the second argument for theexistence of God in Chapter Three, we concluded that Arnauld was correct.As Descartes himself acknowledges in his reply:

To give a proper reply to this, I think it is necessary to show that, inbetween ‘efficient cause’ in the strict sense and ‘no cause at all’, thereis a third possibility, namely ‘the positive essence of a thing’, to whichthe concept of an efficient cause can be extended.

(AT 7: 239, CSM 2: 167)

If the meaning of ‘efficient cause’ when applied to God’s self-causation isdistinct and different from the meaning of ‘efficient cause’ when applied tocausal relations among finite beings, then Descartes’s argument falls on thegrounds of an equivocation on ‘efficient cause.’

Descartes goes on, however, and offers a partial reconciliation. He writes:

But to reconcile our two positions, the answer to the question why Godexists should be given not in terms of an efficient cause in the strictsense, but simply in terms of the essence or formal cause of the thing.And precisely because in the case of God there is no distinction betweenexistence and essence, the formal cause will be strongly analogous toan efficient cause, and hence can be called something close to anefficient cause.

(AT 7: 243, CSM 2: 170)

Let us ignore Descartes’s attempt to conflate the notions of efficient andformal causation in the case of God’s causal activity and focus on the

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reconciliation. If Descartes allows that, strictly speaking, the causal regressin the second proof is stopped by an appeal to a formal cause, he hasstepped directly into Arnauld’s Circle. Why? If he claimed that the idea ofGod is clear and distinct but only materially true, this will not stop theregress. On the one hand, a clear and distinct idea as materially true is onlyan idea of the possible essence of a possible thing. Claims of material truth,by themselves, entail no existential propositions. On the other hand, if aclear and distinct idea of God is formally true, then it is an idea of an actualessence of a possible thing. Since God’s essence entails existence, the causalregress is stopped. In the Third Meditation, however, Descartes has providedno grounds for claiming that clear and distinct ideas are formally true: thatthey are ideas of actual, rather than possible, essences. If his second argumenthad successfully proven that God qua supremely perfect being exists – andtherefore that God’s essence is actual – it might be plausible to examine thatessence, draw the conclusion that God is not a deceiver, and conclude thatclear and distinct ideas are formally (not only materially) true. But in allowingthat “the answer to the question why God exists should be given . . . in termsof the essence or formal cause of the thing,” Descartes attends to the actualessence of God, to the formal truth of the idea of God. And in so doing,Descartes becomes ensnared in Arnauld’s Circle.

Thus, Descartes’s argument in the Meditations ultimately fails, since thesecond proof of the existence of God either equivocates on ‘efficient cause’or assumes that the idea of God as a perfect being is formally true at a pointwhen he is warranted only in claiming that it is materially true. Nonetheless,if our study has been successful, it shows that Descartes’s Meditations arestructured in accordance with the method of analysis. This method helpsguide one’s search for eternal truths, whether those truths be causal(explanatory) principles or essential truths. The natural light recognizesthem as materially true. They are shown to be formally true to the extent thatthey explain the phenomenon in question. This is a double method ofcoherence, a method with roots in both the analysis of the ancient geometersand the Aristotelian tradition. Throughout the Meditations, Descartesconducts an upward search for principles followed by a downwardexplanation based on those principles. One should not be surprised todiscover that the Meditations as a whole follows this structure. Descartesworks upward to the principle that God exists and is not a deceiver, anddownward, showing that the nondeceptive-God thesis has broaderimplications than initially are acknowledged. If our account is correct, thedistinction between material and formal truth is central to an understandingof the main arguments in the Meditations.

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Notes

Introduction

1. Our naiveté extends to other topics as well. The dissimulation thesis holds thatthe Descartes of the Meditations was insincere with respect to many aspects ofhis metaphysics, particularly with respect to questions concerning God (Caton1973, Loeb 1986, 1988, Softer 1987). We do not explicitly discuss that issue;however, if our project is successful, it will falsify the dissimulation thesis.

2. Evert van Leeuwen argues that there are few substantial changes in the Cartesian method in the Regulae vis-à-vis the Discourse, while granting a change inthe nature of the presentation of the method (Leeuwen 1993). Both DanielGarber and Stephen Gaukroger distinguish between the early method and themature method (see Garber 1992: 30–62, and Gaukroger 1992: 585–602). EricPalmer contends that while many of the differences are merely cosmetic, adistinction should be drawn between his pre-1629 and post-1629 works. After1629 Descartes concerns himself with foundational issues and employs themethod of doubt; before 1629 he writes with little, if any, attention to foundational issues and never employs doubt in anything but a fragmentary fashion(Palmer 1997: 26–30).

Part I Descartes’s method

1 Analysis: the search for laws

1. In this we follow Gerd Buchdahl 1988: 135.2. As we show in Chapter Four, the “method of doubt” is a propaedeutic to

metaphysical analysis, but it is not an element of the method of analysis as such:it is only in his metaphysical writings that Descartes introduces doubt.

3. As Stephen Gaukroger notes, in geometrical analysis Descartes’s “algebra is theonly thing that constrains what is possible” (Gaukroger 1989: 84).

4. In this regard, one might characterize Descartes’s procedure by the Peirceanterm “abduction.” See Peirce 1955; cf. Hanson 1958: 85ff.

5. The difference between the use of “supposition” and “hypothesis” is the difference between French and Latin. Compare the French and Latin versions of theDiscourse (AT 6:76 and AT 6: 582).

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6. Some will claim that in alluding to Descartes’s Aristotelian predecessors weare blurring the distinction between geometrical and Aristotelian analysis(see Hintikka 1978: 78–9). We grant this. What we shall see, however, isthat some of the remarks of Descartes’s Aristotelian predecessors anticipatealmost to the word Descartes’s remarks in Discourse, Part Six. So whilegranting the distinction between geometrical and Aristotelian analysis, weare inclined to believe, with Hintikka, that Descartes himself blurred thedistinction.

7. It should not be surprising that Descartes recognized such a distinction. It isnot far removed from Aristotle’s distinction between “prior and more knownwithout qualification.” See Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a1–5 in Aristotle 1941:112.

8. John Herman Randall notes that this double method was known quite widelyin the fifteenth century (Randall 1968: 234). Other philosophers who de-fended this method were Cajetan of Thiene (1465) and Nifo Agostino (1506).

9. Notice that in the Regulae Descartes indicates that any problem at handmust be delineated. He writes:

In every problem, of course, there has to be something unknown –otherwise the inquiry would be pointless. Nevertheless, this unknownsomething must be delineated by definite conditions which point usdecidedly in one direction of inquiry rather than another. These con-ditions should, in our view, be gone into from the very outset.

(AT 10: 434–5, CSM 1: 54)

It is by looking for the cause of a given phenomenon – by subsuming thephenomenon under the eternal truth that “Nothing comes from nothing” –that one sets the problem, that one focuses the mind on an entity or prin-ciple to be found. To follow Russell’s distinction between knowledge byacquaintance and knowledge by description (Russell 1912: 4–59), to knowthe phenomenon sought at the second level in the order of consideration isto know that phenomenon by description.

10. George Gale (1979: 227–30) has some interesting remarks on the politics oftheory acceptance.

11. For an extensive discussion of arguments to the best explanation, see Lipton1991.

12. We know of only one place where Descartes uses the expression “materiallytrue” (AT 7: 151, CSM 2: 107), and that discussion sheds little light on themeaning of the expression. Nonetheless, since Descartes claims that someideas are not materially false, we consider it reasonable to use the expression“material truth.” (Cf. Wilson 1978: 105–19, especially page 113, and Frank-furt 1970: 129.)

13. Though Norman Wells uses different terminology in his 1984 article on material falsity, we roughly follow the account found there. Where he uses

“true or false object,” we tend to use “formal truth or falsity.” Like us, he believes that the material falsity of an idea may provide the basis for a

formalfalsehood, but in itself the materially false idea does not involve mistakingan object of one kind for an object of another kind. As Wells puts it:

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Descartes’ position, however, is obviously not restricted to the pre-judg-mental level nor does it have to do with ideas as formally representative ofthe truth and falsity of objects such that a materially false idea misappre-hends and misrepresents its object by representing another object. Descartesinsists that his discussion of material falsity must be understood on the planeof idea taken materially, as an intellectual operation in which the truth andfalsity of objects are not at issue. Therefore, there is no basis for anymisrepresentation or misapprehension. There is, however, ground for mis-judgment, not because of any reputed misapprehension or misrepresenta-tion on a prejudgmental level.

(Wells 1984: 46, author’s emphasis)

He also seems to agree with us that the material falsity of an idea will be locatedin its confusedness or obscurity, as when he writes of Descartes’s distrust ofsensory ideas:

Contrary to our cognitive status in the presence of the clear and distinctideas of God and the triangle, revealing a genuine res on the metaphysicaland mathematical planes of intelligibility, when we are in the presence ofsensory ideas, we are confronted with the less than clear and distinct andrather beclouded intelligibility of the physical world and the bodies in it. Thesensory ideas of light, colors, sounds, odors, flavors, heat and cold, etc., areso confused and obscure that one does not know, on this pre-judgmentallevel of intellectual knowing, whether these ideas represent a true object ora false object in the fashion in which ideas, formally taken, inevitably do.Descartes is obviously struck by the failure of these ideas truly to representand to represent truly a res, a true object, or a non res, a false object. Due tothis failure to represent, in any adequate fashion, an object either true orfalse, Descartes considers it appropriate to acknowledge a pre-judgmentalmaterial falsity on this level of sensory ideas, and one which is not to beconfounded with the formal falsity or judgments.(Wells 1984: 35–7, author’s emphasis)

Though he might agree with our reading of “material falsity,” nowhere does hejoin us in suggesting that Descartes has an implicit notion of material truth.

Wells might believe that another difference exists between our treatment ofthe “objective reality of ideas” and his treatment thereof. He writes:

“Idea”, then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designated the act of repre-senting as well as the “thing represented.” Yet, for all this, and despiterepeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency inthe history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret “idea” taken“objectively” as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to beDescartes’s constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers thatfunction which is proper to the cognitive activity, the function of repre-senting, to the thing known and represented by that activity. In all this, asignificant villain of the piece would appear to be a misinterpretation of

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Descartes’s use of the term imago to characterize some of our “knowingactivities” (cogitationes). For he has indicated that certain cogitationes are“images [or ‘representations’] of things” (imagines rerum) to which alonethe term “idea” properly belongs.

(Wells 1990: 34–5)

At least with to respect eternal truths, we seem to follow that “persistent ten-dency” of Cartesian scholarship to understand “‘idea’ taken ‘objectively’ as insome way representative.” If an eternal truth is the material truth of a true andimmutable nature, then even Wells would be hardpressed to criticize scholarswhen they extended the representational function beyond that cognitive activ-ity which produces an idea which is materially true (an idea that is not materiallyfalse in any way). If eternal truths are material truths, there is nothing obnoxiousabout admitting that our idea of a triangle, taken objectively, represents a trueand immutable nature. One might wonder whether true and immutable natures areobjects in the requisite sense or not. In fact, Wells seems tobelieve that they are:

not only the idea of God taken “objectively”, but the idea of the triangle,taken “objectively” as well, however intramental they may be, must be seenas independent of the mind. . . . The “things represented,” then, in the caseof ideas of God and the triangle, however intramental they may be, areindependent of the representing activity of the human mind.

(Wells 1990: 46–7)

As for our ideas of objects of experience, this would be another matter and wewould tend to agree with Wells. However, we will find in Chapter Two that theconceptual clarification of any of our sensory ideas will always end in a conceptwhich is more like that of a true and immutable nature than a sensory idea. Ourclearest ideas of material objects will be those that have been whittled down to acompound idea composed only of ideas of extension and motion. For example,take Descartes’s examination of the piece of wax in Meditation Two. Ultimately,Descartes would express the idea of the wax in terms of an idea which is acompound of mathematical ideas of true and immutable natures. When oneengages in conceptual clarification, one attempts to eliminate from a compoundsensory idea all of those elements that might contain a material falsity. Underour interpretation of a Cartesian clarification of a sensory idea of an object, onewould make no reference to the object as such, and thus one would not necessarilytake the idea before or after clarification as representative of the object. Thatrepresentation would be made whenever one asserts of the clarified idea that itrepresents something in extramental reality, that is, one makes a judgment.Thus, we believe that we remain in agreement with Wells on the non-representa-tional nature of “ideas taken objectively.”While the clarity and distinctness (material truth) of an idea are necessary con-ditions for a judgment of the formal truth or falsity, they are not sufficientconditions. The clarity and distinctness of an idea shows only that the object so

14

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conceived could exist. They do not show that the object so conceived actuallyexists (AT 7: 151, CSM 2: 107). We discuss the sufficient conditions below.

15. If one feels uncomfortable with the suggestion that there might not be triangles,while one maintains that the idea of a triangle is materially true, consider the caseof a thousand- or a million-sided plane figure. In both of these cases, one knowswhat the thing is and what is demonstrably true of a thing of that kind. One wouldnot claim that the material truth of either idea shows that the idea is formallytrue, because one is not inclined to assert that a thousand- or a million-sidedobject exists.

16. One may wonder why we say that eternal truths are only material truths, whenonly ideas are materially true (or false). This seeming incongruity can be explained in two ways. First, Descartes classifies his thoughts into three differentkinds in the Third Meditation (AT 7: 36–7, CSM 2: 25–6): ideas in the strictlyappropriate sense (e.g. God, the sky, a man); volitions (e.g. desiring, willing,fearing); and judgments (e.g. denying and affirming). Given that Descartes considers the first category of thought as ideas in the strict sense, then by implication the other two categories of thought are ideas in a much more general sense.This general sense of “idea” can be anything that is “in the mind,” and certainlyeternal truths or common notions can only be found “in the mind.”

Second, Descartes treats eternal truths or common notions as having “noexist ence outside our thought” (P 1: 48: AT 8A: 22, CSM 1: 208). If we take himat his word, then eternal truths are not formal truths. Formal truths concernextramental reality. Since the formal/material distinction is exhaustive of alltruths, the only category of truth that eternal truths or common notions can fallunder is material truth.

17. Even though Descartes does not allow that our ideas of hunger, thirst, pain andother physical sensations are clear and distinct (see P 1: 45, 46), had he done so,one would not be permitted to judge that those ideas represented real physicalstates.

18. One of the few uses of “intuition” outside the Regulae is in the Second Replies(AT 7: 140, CSM 2: 100). See also the letter to Silhon, May 1637 (AT 1: 353,CSM 3: 55); letter to Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637 (AT 1: 415, CSM3: 62); and the letter to Silhon, March or April 1648 (AT 5: 136–9, CSM 3: 330–2).

19. Given the distinction between material and formal truth, we cannot agree withDesmond Clarke that “An intuitus is not a judgment (X, 420), and hence has notruth-value (X, 432)” (Clarke 1982: 58). None the less, to claim that intuitionprovides only material truth does not guarantee that it provides knowledge offact.

Gaukroger will take exception to our suggestion that, throughout his works,Descartes takes the natural light to provide evidence for the truth of a proposition. He argues that in the later works this is no longer the case. He writes:

Secondly, the criterion by which we recognize truths is said to be the “lightof nature”, although the Discourse has made it clear that this light of nature,which takes the form of grasping things clearly and distinctly, is no longer

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self-legitimating, as I’ve argued it was earlier, but now requires a divinelegitimation, because of hyperbolic doubt.

(Gaukroger 1995: 327; see also p. 317)

Taken at face value, Gaukroger’s claim seems false, since even in the PrinciplesDescartes claims that eternal truths are immediately recognized as true by thenatural light (P 1: 48) and the causal maxim in Meditation Three gains itsepistemic warrant on the ground of the natural light (AT 7: 40, CSM 2: 28).Nonetheless – and this is Gaukroger’s point – there is some kind of “divineguarantee” of the truth of clear and distinct ideas to which Descartes alludes inMeditation Four, and before that point, Gaukroger claims, the truth of clear anddistinct ideas cannot be known. For Gaukroger’s claim to be plausible, one mustassume that all truth is of a single kind, namely, formal truth. If we are correct indistinguishing between material and formal truth, Gaukroger’s claim that “grasp-ing things clearly and distinctly, is no longer self-legitimating” loses its plausibiity.

As we argued above, and as we will argue at length in Chapters Six and Seven,the claims that clear and distinct ideas are true and that propositions known bythe natural light are true pertain fundamentally to materiai truth. Material truthshave no existential import. We argue in Chapter Seven that one, the “divineguarantee” of clear and distinct ideas marks a shift from concerns with materialtruth to formal truth and two, a nondeceiving God does not (actively) guaranteethe formal truth of clear and distinct ideas. Rather, one must infer that clear anddistinct ideas (eternal truths) are formally true on pain of making God a deceiver.Thus, we believe Gaukroger’s claim is either false or misleading insofar as it failsto take into account the distinction between material and formal truth.

20. As we show in examining Meditation One (Chapter Four), the purpose of systematic doubt is primarily to alleviate pre-philosophical biases.

21. Compare CB§1: AT 5: 146, CSM 3: 332–3; the letter to Hyperaspistes (AT 3:423–4, CSM 3: 189–90).

22. Peter Markie (1992a) discusses the distinction between moral and metaphysicalcertainty in the context of the Cogito argument.

23. One forms what later philosophers called a “relative idea” or “relative notion”or “relative conception,” which functions in the realm of ideas much as a definitedescription functions in the linguistic realm. (See Reid 1969:7–10.) Relativeideas have a very low degree of clarity and distinctness (Flage 1981; Flage 1987;Flage 1989: 152). It is by a partial specification of the problem that Descartesavoids Meno’s paradox that it is impossible to look for something until oneknows what one is looking for, and once one knows what one is looking for, thesearch is pointless. (See Meno 80d5–e5, in Plato 1961: 363.)

24. This is a case of using a more general model to explain the phenomena oneobserves, specifically, the behavior of the moving ball.

25. For a more complete development of this position see Malebranche 1980: 40–7; Reid 1970: 122–33. For a further development of this position see GeorgeBerkeley, New Theory of Vision (Berkeley 1948–57: vol. 1: 161–239)

26. It is proper to suggest that Descartes’s theory is a precursor of what is now call

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the “atomic theory,” although Descartes himself was not wont to consider all theparticles “atoms,” insofar as that connoted an indivisible particle. See AT 6: 238,O 268.

27. The third rule of the Discourse is commonly known as the rule of synthesis. SeeBeck 1952: 156.

28. This, of course, is not the same sense of “simplicity” that one finds in theprinciple of parsimony. As we noted, Descartes’s discussions of the principle ofparsimony are virtually parenthetical. None the less, we believe it is consistentwith the third rule to suggest that he is implicitly concerned with parsimony aswell. This would imply that he is seeking not only the general principles that willallow one to explain a phenomenon, but also the smallest number of principlesthat commit one to the fewest fundamentally different kinds of entities. If we arecorrect in suggesting that this was one of the intentions of the rule, it is no morethan implicit. Should the reader disagree with us on this point, it is of littledifference.

29. Notice Descartes’s remarks on what he attempted to discover and, once discovered, the synthetic (deductive) relationships among them at AT 6: 63–5, CSM 1:143–4. See also Pappus (Hintikka and Remes 1974: 9) on the proof of theanalysis.

30. Descartes, of course, was far more optimistic than this. See AT 10: 389, CSM 1:26.

31. We consider this in greater detail in Chapter Two, since the enumeration ofactual or possible elements is the first move in the clarification of an idea.

32. Nor are we alone in making such a suggestion. Unlike Gaukroger (1989: 75), whofinds Descartes’s use of inference to best explanation systematic, Flora Leibowitzand Gerd Buchdahl recognize that Descartes uses the argument form, but do notsuggest that he employs it systematically. The scope of Buchdahl’s work (1963,1988) is limited to Descartes’s scientific writings, and thus he only suggests thatDescartes uses inference to best explanation in his attempts to explain physicalphenomena. While noting that Buchdahl implicitly limits his remarks to expla-nations of physical phenomena, Leibowitz (1981: 81) remarks that the argu-ment form also appears in metaphysical contexts. She finds that Descartesemploys an inference to best explanation when he denies that animals have“thinking souls” (ibid.: 86–7).

33. While most proponents of inference to the best explanation accept a deductive-nomological model of explanation, there is nothing inherent in the model thatrequires this. Indeed, Peter Lipton (1991: 23–31) recently has argued that nei-ther the reason model nor the familiarity model nor the deductive-nomologicalmodel of explanation is wholly consistent with our explanatory practices.

34. Harmon seems to allow that one can assign initial plausibilities to one’s explanatory hypotheses. (Harmon 1965: 32–8, especially p. 325.) Such a view has beenchallenged (Lipton 1991: 61–6).

35. In our discussion of the Meditations, we show that Descartes was concerned withshowing that the several insights by the natural light yield consistent conclu-sions.

36. As Lipton notes (1991: 58), the accounts of inference to the best explanationhave not been terribly well-defined. Some proponents, notably N. R. Hanson,

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have contended that one of the characteristics that make an explanation “best”is its ability to deal with the anomalies with which other explanations cannotdeal. (Hanson 1958; Hanson 1971, especially pp. 65–6.) Were one to contendthat the ability to account for anomalies is a mark of the “best” explanation,there is only limited evidence that Descartes’s account manifests this character-istic. The anomalous cases with which Descartes deals are in the Geometry, e.g.his analysis of conic sections in the second part of that work.

2 Analysis: the clarification of ideas

1. Martial Gueroult (1984: 16, 87) goes so far as to identify innate ideas withintellectual (nonsensible) ideas, which effectively reduces the Cartesian methodto a search for innate ideas.

2. See Flage and Bonnen 1992b. While the metaphysical issue is secondary vis-à-vis questions of method, we shall see that the dispositional account fits in wellwith questions of conceptual clarification, and it is the dispositional account thatis in the background when we discuss the method of concept clarification. There is one issue vis-à-vis the dispositional account that should be broachedAnthony Kenny writes:

Descartes, with his disdain for the Aristotelian notion of potentiality, wasunable to distinguish between the unrealized capacity to acquire knowledgeand the nonexercise of knowledge already acquired. There seems no realroom in his system for the concept of learning.

(Kenny 1968: 103; see also Cottingham 1976: xxxii-xxxiii; Williams1978: 134–5; but cf. Cottingham 1986: 145–6)

Kenny’s suggestion that a dispositional account of innate ideas implies thatDescartes was an unwitting Aristotelian is plausible only if one assumes theepistemic thesis that all innate ideas are true and potential bits of knowledge. Ifour argument in this section is sound, innate ideas on any metaphysical construc-tion are epistemically neutral. This implies that, on the dispositional account,innate ideas do no more than explain how it is possible to form an idea with aparticular cognitive content. As for his suggestion that “There seems no realroom in his system for the concept of learning,” whatever further function theCartesian method may have, it at least explains how learning is possible.

3. Even those who maintain that all innate ideas have eternal truths as their objectscan agree with this third assumption, since it is a weaker claim. This thirdassumption only commits one to the view that at least some innate ideas haveeternal truths as their objects.

4. If our discussion in Chapter One is sound, the sense of ‘truth’ in (b) must bematerial truth, which reduces (b) to a form of (a), but since few Descartesscholars acknowledge the distinction between material and formal truth, wevirtually leave open the sense of “truth” in the following discussion.

5. In Chapter Six we discuss how these principles flow from his method. 6. We have argued elsewhere that factitious ideas are not properly a distinct cat

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egory of Cartesian ideas, since it is possible that a factitious idea be composedsolely of innate ideas, but this issue need not concern us at the present. See Flageand Bonnen 1989 and Chapter Six of this work.

7. We return to the explanatory value of the thesis of innate ideas below. 8. Descartes also mentions innate ideas in the letter to Mersenne of 22 July 1641

(AT 3: 417–18, CSM 3: 187) and the letter to Clerselier of 23 April 1649 (AT 5:354–5, CSM 3: 376–7), but neither of those remarks concerns the epistemicthesis.

9. It is worthy of notice that Herbert of Cherbury is the only proponent of a theoryof innate ideas Locke mentions by name in his polemic against innate ideas, andthat, like Descartes, Locke’s attack is on the contention that any innate ideawould yield “general assent.” See Locke 1975: 77, 58.

10. See Chapters Four and Five, where we show exactly how the preparation ofMeditations One and Two are attempts to place the mind in a state receptive tothe natural light.

11. This is the principal theme of Meditation Four.12. Were one still to object that there is no reason why a good God should create

human beings with false innate ideas, Descartes has available two kinds of reply.First, as we indicated above, Descartes’s primary concern is with exonerating Godfrom any charge of being the cause of error or deception and, as we discover inthe Fourth Meditation, such deception or error occurs in the realm of judgment,not in the realm of ideas. At most, false innate ideas would provide the basis forcertain false judgments. Second, if our account below is correct and innate ideashave only an explanatory function, then Descartes might argue that in creatinghuman beings as things that might err, human beings are more perfect than theywould be if they were unable to err, in the way that Augustine argued that free willmakes humans more perfect than they would be without free will (see Augustine1964: 99). Since the possibility of forming materially false ideas is a necessarycondition for error, the fact that some innate ideas are false might be taken toimply that human beings are more perfect than they would be if they werelacking a basis for an erroneous judgment. Just as the doctrine of free will makeshuman beings responsible for their non-intellectual sins, the doctrine of free willtogether with the possibility that some innate ideas are false makes them respon-sible for their intellectual sins (errors).

13. Should the dispositional analysis of the nature of innate ideas be false, this makesno difference. Anyone holding that innate ideas are actual full-blooded, thoughnonoccurrent, ideas must grant that there are situations which bring such ideasbefore the mind. If Descartes’s method does anything, it maximizes the occa-sions on which such innate ideas are brought before the mind in an orderly way.So even the nondispositionalist must grant that dispositions play a role in bring-ing ideas with a particular cognitive content before the conscious mind, or, if oneshuns disposition-talk, that there are laws of nature which indicate that whenevera specifiable set of conditions obtain, an idea with a particular cognitive contentis brought before the conscious mind.

14. Note that Descartes calls this sensory experience an idea in the face of Hobbes’seighth objection (AT 7: 184, CSM 2: 129–30).

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15. For further discussions of astronomical reasoning, see AT 7: 39, 363–4, 440,446; CSM 2: 27, 251, 296, 300.

16. Descartes distinguishes a sufficient enumeration from a complete enumerationin the Regulae:

The enumeration should sometimes be complete, and sometimes distinct,though there are times when it need be neither. That is why I said only thatthe enumeration must be sufficient. For if I wish to determine by enumera-tion how many kinds of corporeal entity there are or how many are in someway perceivable by the senses, I shall not assert that there are just so manyand no more, unless I have previously made sure I have included them all inmy enumeration and have distinguished one from another. But if I wish toshow in the same way that the rational soul is not corporeal, there is no needfor the enumeration to be complete; it will be sufficient if I group all bodiestogether into several classes so as to demonstrate that the rational soulcannot be assigned to any of these. To give one last example, say I wish toshow by enumeration that the area of a circle is greater than the area of anyother geometrical figure whose perimeter is the same length as the circle’s.I need not review every geometrical figure. If I can demonstrate that thisfact holds for some particular figures, I shall be entitled to conclude byinduction that the same holds true in all other cases as well.

(AT 10: 390, CSM 1: 26–7)The point is that the context and level of certainty that one seeks will determinewhether one seeks a complete or a sufficient enumeration. Thus, an adequateenumeration will depend upon the context and the level of certainty that oneseeks.

17. See the Tenth Discourse of the Optics (AT 6: 211ff., O 162ff).18. Close to the end of the First Discourse of the Optics he remarks:

For in the end, I venture to say, the three comparisons which I have just usedare so appropriate that all the particular features which may be observed inthem correspond to certain features which prove to be entirely similar inthe case of light; but I have tried to explain only those which have the mostbearing on my subject.

(AT 6: 104, CSM 1: 163, O 83)

Though this comment is made with respect to Descartes’s three models of refrac-tion (throwing a ball at the ground, throwing a ball at a finely woven linen sheet,throwing a ball that glances off or enters a body of water) it could equally be saidof the other two models of light in the Optics (the walking-stick and the winevat). Descartes wishes to clarify his conception of light only so far as he canadequately explain the behavior of lenses and how to grind them properly. Anyfurther clarification would be unnecessary for his purposes.

19. Descartes lists and briefly explains the properties of light in The World (AT 11:98–103, M 171–83). There he lists one more property than appears in theOptics, namely, that light rays of stronger intensity can affect light rays ofweaker intensity. Two things should be noted about the treatment of light in The

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World as opposed to the treatment of light in the Optics. First, The World is notwritten according to the analytic mode of presentation. Descartes’s interestcenters on the definitions of items and their properties, and not how one arrivesat those definitions and properties. Chapter Fourteen of The World does nothingmore than list the properties of light. One should note that Descartes refers backto the Optics when he believes that the reader may not follow how he understandsreflection and refraction (AT 11: 102, M 181). Second, since the goal of TheWorld (correcting and enhancing our understanding of the heavens and the Earth)is more extensive than that of the Optics (explaining how to grind lenses toimprove human vision), one should expect a richer notion of light in The Worldthan in the Optics, even though the conception is actually not that much richer.One task in The World is to explain why the stars fail to appear in the sky wherethey really are, and this task requires a richer conception of light than any taskin the Optics (AT 11: 105ff., M 189ff.).

20. One might think that Descartes should be completely happy with using thewalking-stick example to draw our attention to the fact that light moves instraight lines. But the analogy breaks down rather quickly, for Descartes believesthat, unlike the walking-stick, light itself is not a substance but a mode of sub-stance. Note that he highlights this linear aspect of light when he considers thewine-vat model, which is discussed later.

21. This might be why Descartes reemphasizes that light is movement at AT 6: 85,CSM 1: 153.

22. All of the properties of light that Descartes discusses in the Optics show up inChapter Fourteen of The World. There he gives a list of twelve properties (AT11: 98, M 173).

23. One should also note that the hypothesis of the existence of a void would raisehavoc with Descartes’s clear rejection of the void in The World (AT 11: 17–21,34, 37; CSM 1: 85–7, 91, 93) and the Principles (P 2: 16, 18, 33; 3: 157; 4: 22,202). During the wine-vat comparison, Descartes rejects the void without argu-ment by remarking that “nearly all philosophers” do the same (AT 6: 86, CSM1: 154).

24. n rejecting the void, Descartes acquires an explanation of how action can occurat a distance. The sun can cause us to see light because light is actually the motionor action of intervening bodies.

25. See AT 6: 103, CSM 1: 163–4; AT 6: 234, O 265; and AT 6: 331, O 336. Incomprehending the wine-vat model, Descartes makes a crucial assumption aboutthe physical world, namely, that there is no void (AT 6: 86, CSM 1: 154). Thus,when understanding the analogy between the wine vat and the world, one mustunderstand that light cannot itself be a substance. One might think that thisassumption is unfounded, but since the object of the Optics is to improve vision,Descartes certainly is allowed such an assumption. If his goal were more compre-hensive, e.g. had he wished to provide a general account of matter in motion,then he would have had to justify the assumed nonexistence of a void.

26. Though Descartes does not explicitly spell out the analogy between the liquid inthe vat not moving in exactly straight lines and the movement of light notmoving in exactly straight lines, it can be done. If one understands groups ofgrapes as analogous to transparent bodies, then one can understand that the

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principles of reflection or refraction also apply to the movement of wine to thebottom of the vat. It seems that the only reason he does not make it explicit inthe wine-vat passage is that he needs the tennis-ball analogy to make this move-ment clear. Thus, one can understand that the wine moves through the grapesreflecting off one grape after another but ultimately moving in what can be calleda straight line. If one understands this analogy applying to the context in whichlight is transmitted, then one understands how the light would be seen as exactlystraight, even though light at the microscopic level must reflect off very smallbodies as well.

27. Descartes notes in the next paragraph that the laws that apply to potentialmotion also apply to actual motion (AT 6: 89, CSM 1: 155). He reiterates thisposition in a letter to Mersenne (5 October 1637) in response to an objectionthat Pierre de Fermat raises in this connection. There Descartes finds groundlessFermat’s worry that the laws governing potential movement might differ fromthe laws governing actual movement (AT 1: 450–1, CSM 3: 73–4).

28. Though Descartes recognizes the importance of the distinction between theinfinite and the indefinite in the following passage, he is not always consistent inpracticing it:

Now I make a distinction here between the indefinite and the infinite. Iapply the term ‘infinite’, in the strict sense, only to that in which no limitsof any kind can be found; and in this sense God alone is infinite. But in caseslike the extension of imaginary space, or the set of numbers, or the divisibil-ity of the parts of a quantity, there is merely some respect in which I do notrecognize a limit; so here I use the term ‘indefinite’ rather than ‘infinite’,because these items are not limitless in every respect.

(AT 7: 113, CSM 2: 81)

One should note that he says that he strictly applies the term ‘infinite’ only toGod. This, of course, would mean that when he speaks loosely of infinities hemay, strictly speaking, be speaking only of indefinite things. The use of ‘infinite’in the wine-vat passage is just such an example. So, to be consistent withDescartes’s technical sense of the terms ‘infinite’ and ‘indefinite,’ our discussionuses the word ‘indefinite’ where consistency with the wine-vat passage wouldrequire us to use ‘infinite.’

29. It seems that Descartes has anticipated the mathematical distinction betweendenumerable and nondenumerable infinities. Since a multiplication of a countablenumber of light rays is countable, it would represent a denumerable infinity;whereas, the qualities of God would be nondenumerably infinite. For a discussionof this distinction see Kleene 1967: 175–83.

30. Any particular light ray requires two kinds of movement. First, there is themovement down the series of small balls that begin at a luminous body and end atan illuminated body. Second, there is the spin of the small balls. This spin ac-counts for the color of the light (see AT 11: 255–6, CSM 1: 323 and AT 6: 327–34, O 336–8). The fastest spin accounts for white light; the slowest spin ac-counts for the blue spectrum of light. Bodies that take on a particular color willbe objects that can create a spin of a particular speed. Black bodies will simply bethe result of bodies which “break up the light-rays that meet them and take away

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all their force” (AT 6: 91, CSM 1: 156). Thus, when Descartes describes theaction of light on soft bodies, he provides an explanation of how bodies can beblack.

3 Causation

1. Some philosophers might argue that the Cartesian texts are so underdeterminedwith respect to a theory of causation that any attempt to delineate such a theoryis a form of wishful thinking. We find this contention premature and leave it toour readers to judge whether we have succeeded in demonstrating that a Cartesiantheory of causation can be gleaned from Descartes’s writings.

2. See Suarez 1994, Disputation 18, §7: 131–77, and Disputation 17, IntroductoryRemarks: 3. For careful discussion of Aristotle’s, Aquinas’s, and Suarez’s criteriafor deeming a cause an efficient cause, see Secada (1990: 49–51).

3. One might think that ‘blur’ is too weak a word here. It appears that Descartes isattempting to make an exception to the standard criteria for efficient causalityin the case of God’s causing himself. But this would make nonsense of theargument in Meditation Three, since it would introduce an equivocation on thenotion of an efficient cause. Taken in this strict sense, such a move mightprovide evidence for elements of the dissimulation thesis, that is, the thesis thatthe Descartes of the Meditations intentionally misrepresented important ele-ments of his philosophy. See Loeb 1986: 243–70 for a discussion of the dissimu-lation thesis. To examine that thesis is beyond the scope of this work.

4. Such a move would conflate Descartes’s cosmological argument with his ontological argument, and we believe he had methodological reasons for not wantingto do so. In Chapter Eight we argue that the ontological argument tends toconfirm that Descartes’s idea of God as a supremely perfect being is correct. (Cf.Gueroult 1984: 240ff.)

5. See Boethius of Dacia, “The Sophisma ‘Every Man is of Necessity an Animal’”in Kretzmann and Stump 1988: 499; cf. Suarez 1994, 18.3.12: 98–9.

6. It is comparable to doing a formal proof in logic. While one is typically asked toshow that the conclusion follows from the premises and a certain set of rules, thesame procedure can be seen as explaining why the conclusion follows from thepremises and a set of rules.

7. This is a position Descartes rejects, as we shall see when examining elements ofhis voluntarism. Further, the contention that essences are uncreated was notuniversally accepted. See Suárez 1983: 31.2: 57–66. This is not to say thatDescartes’s views were in complete compliance with Suárez’s. On the differences,see Hatfield 1993.

8. See note 4 above. 9. We shift from the Cartesian term ‘indefinite’ to ‘infinite’ because Descartes

holds that God’s causal efficacy is truly infinite. See the following note.10. We should note that our explanation is consonant with Descartes’s limitation on

the use of ‘infinite’ and ‘infinity.’ See First Replies (AT 7: 113–44, CSM 2: 81–2), Fifth Replies (AT 7: 286–7; CSM 2: 199–200), and P I: 26–7. Descartes getsquite a bit of mileage from his notion of infinity in Meditation Three. Hisanalogy here is troublesome. In the passages just cited, he admonishes others not

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to believe that they have an adequate enough notion of infinity to apply it togeometrical or physical objects. It should be noted in the passage quoted abovethat Descartes lives by his own rules by choosing the phrases “indefinitely largecircle” and “indefinite number of sides” for his own analogy. However, by doingso he significantly weakens his analogy. One would have hoped for a strictsimilarity between these two geometrical analogues and the nature of divinecausality. But, alas, God is the only truly infinite being in Cartesian reality.

11. Jonathan Bennett suggested an alternative interpretation of this analogy duringhis 1995 NEH Seminar and in personal correspondence with us. He suggests thatDescartes is thinning the notion of efficient causality as it applies to God bytaking away the idea that an efficient cause of something cannot be the cause ofitself. Yet, Bennett believes that an element of efficient causation remains,namely that element which helps stop the question, “Why does x exist?” Fur-thermore, Bennett believes that this interpretation makes Descartes’s geometricanalogy more cogent.

We believe there are two problems with Bennett’’s interpretation. First, hecannot preserve Descartes’s distinction between the infinite and the indefinite.The usefulness of the analogue, which is a rectilinear figure the number of whosesides is indefinitely large, turns on its sides actually being infinite in number.Bennett argues that the theoretical advantage to discussing circle arcs in rectilin-ear terms is that one need not always specify that the circle has a finite radius;Descartes however would maintain that it could not have an infinite radius. Inshort, the analogue fails to supply explanatory insight at precisely the pointwhere one would expect it. (See previous footnote as to how our interpretationpreserves this Cartesian distinction.)

Second, Bennett’s interpretation faces the following dilemma: either the“thin” notion applies only in the case of God or it does not. If Bennett believesthe former, then there is an equivocation on “efficient cause” in the ThirdMeditation (see footnote 3 above). If he believes the latter, then lawful explana-tion becomes impossible. If the “thinning” notion is intended to stop the ques-tion, “Why does x exist?” then in principle anything could cause itself ratherthan be caused by something else, at least from time to time. For example, thiswould defeat Lewis Carroll’s intended literary effect on the reader when theChesire Cat disappears except for its smile, that is, decides to cause only its smile– at least for a while.

12. We examine this is greater detail below.13. See also William of Sherwood 1966: 8–6; Wilson 1972: 111–12; Poinsot 1985:

382. By a hundred years after Descartes, the formal/efficient causality distinction seems distinctly to have fallen out of favor. Thus it is that Hume, giving theresults of his analysis of causation, could write:

We may learn from the foregoing doctrine, that all causes are of the samekind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, whichwe sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; orbetwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and finalcauses. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv’d from the constant conjunc-

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tion of two objects, wherever this is observ’d, the cause is efficient; andwhere it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind.

(Hume 1978, 171)

Hume’s conclusion is unacceptable. Insofar as he held that the truths of arith-metic and algebra (although perhaps not geometry) are known on the basis ofrelations of ideas, they are subject to demonstration (ibid.: 71). Corresponding toevery arithmetic or algebraic demonstration, however, there is an explanationfrom formal causes. Hence, it is false to claim that “where it is not [for efficientcausality], there can never be a cause of any kind.” Nonetheless, as historyshows, Hume was on the winning side in the intellectual war over the number andkind of causes. Hence, insofar as Descartes’s attempt to extend the notion of anefficient cause to God’s self-causality, Descartes was on the winning side in thewar, even though we must grant that Arnauld won the battle.

14. Recall that in his letter to Mersenne of 27 May 1630, Descartes claims that “Forit is certain that he [God] is the author of the essence of created things no lessthan of their existence; and this essence is nothing other than the eternal truths”(AT 1: 152, CSM 3: 25).

15. Descartes’s divine voluntarism regarding essences and eternal truths is not without precedents. See Suárez 1983, 31.2: 57–64. It is beyond the scope of thepresent work, however, to determine Suárez’s position on voluntarism.

16. There is an ambiguity in the expression ‘natural law.’ It is sometimes taken to becertain uniformities in nature; at other times it is taken to be statements describ-ing those uniformities. We are using it within this paragraph and the next in thesecond way, although nothing in our interpretation of Descartes’s treatment ofnatural laws hangs on how we use the expression.

Philosophers of science often distinguish two kinds of natural law: laws ofsimultaneity and transtemporal laws. An examination of Descartes’s examples ofnatural laws suggest that they are all laws of simultaneity, though such a construalmight be more temporal than Descartes requires (AT 9: 38–48, CSM 1: 92–8; PII: 37–52). Descartes has a problem with time. The passage at Principles I: 57suggests that he understands time as a theoretical construct; he maintains motionas primary in his physics and time as measured on the basis of arbitrarily chosenmotions. A thorough examination of this issue, however, is beyond the scope ofthe present work.

17. If we are right on this point, of course, it is ironic that the logical positivists wereboth the foremost proponents of the deductive-nomological account of expla-nation and purported champions of a non-metaphysical philosophy of science.See also Brody (1972).

18. Hume 1975: 35, 37–8. Jonathan Bennett (1994), argues that the domain of theconceivable and the possible are one and the same for Descartes. He is uneasyabout our argument here. He objects that natural laws are not eternal truthsbecause their falsehood is conceivable. This he takes as one upshot of his paper.We grant Bennett the thesis of his paper, but deny this conclusion. To see why,consider two cases. First, one may confront a necessary truth without recogniz-ing it as such. Hobbes relates with delight his astonishment at finding a seemingly

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false, indeed necessarily false, theorem in Euclid’s Elements. Only after tracingits deductive ancestry back to Euclid’s most basic elements did he recognize thatthe theorem was not only true, but necessarily so. Hobbes has discovered afeature of nonbasic eternal truths, namely that those truths derived from themore basic ones need not be self-evident on first consideration.

Second, the apparent conceivability of a state of affairs does not demonstratethat it is possible. Consider a perpetual motion machine consisting of an electricmotor and a generator. The generator produces enough electricity to power themotor, which turns the generator. So far no obvious trouble arises. But uponcloser and more careful scrutiny, one finds reasons that, while the machine maybe possible, it cannot be a perpetual motion machine. Physics tells us that boththe motor and generator are subject to friction. Therefore, the system will slowlylose energy that will need to be replaced if the machine is to run perpetually.When all the laws of physics are brought to bear on this system, we discover thatwhat we had taken as a clear and possible idea was not.

These two cases show that if the eternal truths are arranged in a hierarchicalstructure, then one clearly conceives an eternal truth lower in the hierarchy onlywhen one understands its deductive relationships to the more fundamental eter-nal truths. Thus, if Descartes construed natural laws as lower-level eternal truths,then he can at once reject Hume’s maxim and embrace Bennett’s account ofCartesian modalities.

19. That he held this should be clear from the fact that, in The World, he introducedthe assumption that God will never perform miracles and that “rational souls . .. will not disrupt in any way the ordinary course of nature” (AT 6: 48; CSM 1:97). Note further that, assuming similar principles, the Descartes of the Prin-ciples claimed that all phenomena in the physical world could be explained. SeeP 3: 47.

20. Our discussion assumes that the distinction between God’s action(s) and God’scharacter (immutability) collapses. Following traditional theology, speaking ofchange in God’s case can only be metaphorical. God’s acts are not in time. Thus,all God’s acts are “at the same time” because they are not at any time at all.Descartes accepted the traditional theology in part because he sought to avoidtheological controversy. We believe that his theory of time also supports atraditional theology: see note 24.

21. In the Optics one finds this: “Instead we must hold that it is the movementscomposing this picture which, acting directly upon our soul in so far as it is unitedwith our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations” (AT 6:130; CSM 1: 167). As we argued in the last chapter, we believe that the doctrineof innate ideas suggests that the mind is structured in such a way that there arenatural patterns of thought. The will might be the motive force that begins achain of thought, that affirms and denies propositions, and pushes the process ofanalysis onward, but the lawfully organized innate ideas (as dispositions to formoccurrent ideas with a certain content) prove impervious to the will. For ex-ample, if one begins with an idea of God as a magnified idea of oneself and inquiresinto the adequacy of that idea, this will lead to an idea of God as a being that isinfinite, omnipotent, omniscient, etc., and ultimately to an idea of a supremelyperfect being. (See Flage and Bonnen 1989; 1992b.) If we are correct, this

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explains Descartes’s confidence that anyone following his method will reach thesame conclusions he reached.

22. Garber (1992: 95–103) presents an extended account of Descartes’s views onsubstantial forms.

23. Paul Hoffman (1986) argues that the union between mind and body is substantial.Stephen Voss (1994) argues that Descartes did not have a settled view on thenature of human beings. While the Descartes of the Meditations might have heldthat there is a substantial unity between the human soul and the human body, theDescartes of the Principles and later did not clearly hold that the notion of ahuman being is significant, at least in any sense in which the mind and bodyontologically constitute one entity.

24. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes’sdiscussions of mind–body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have notsolved the problem of mind–body or even body–body interaction in Descartes,since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality.Insofar as he claimed that only a conceptual distinction exists between creationand preservation (AT 7: 49, 109, 110, CSM 2: 33, 79), we must at least explainhow God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way thatthe relations between created entities appears to be lawful. Does not our account,one might ask, follow Garber’s views (1992: 299–305; 1993b) and turn Descartesinto at least a quasi-occasionalist?

No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes’s claim that the best model we havefor divine will is human will (AT 5: 347, CSM 3: 375), and if one recognizes thatCartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of thewill. Any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by someother act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in thedivine case, one has no reason to assume that God continually acts behind thescenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notionthat God is immutable.

Second, the question, “What is God doing?” is properly a theological ques-tion, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly socalled, are beyond the scope of his investigations.Third, he claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul.Notice what he wrote to Clerselier:

These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material,and how can it receive the forms [espèces] of corporeal objects?] presup-pose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul andthe body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for yourbenefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arisessimply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved,namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is differ-ent, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. And yet, thosewho admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt thatthese accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a differencebetween them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there isbetween two substances.

(AT 9a: 213, CSM 2: 275–6)

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Finally, occasionalism seems inconsistent with Descartes’s theory of sub-stance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite sub-stance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT 7: 165–6, CSM 2: 117; P I:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment wouldseem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both afinite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recre-ates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other: thesubstance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finitesubstance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a seriesof temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess agreater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstractedfrom them. And, of course, Descartes’s official ontology provides no slot for atemporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have littleunderstanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we reject occasionalismas a plausible option.

25. Some will surely object at this point that Descartes did not follow such a procedure, since, in the Second Replies, he explicitly claimed that the Cogito does notmake such an appeal (AT 7: 140–1, CSM 2: 100). We consider this objection atlength in Chapter Five. For the present, two points should be noted. First,Descartes explicitly claims that “He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks”(P 1: 49) is an eternal truth, and, in discussing demonstration by analysis, he saysthat “there are many truths which – although it is vital to be aware of them – thismethod often scarcely mentions, since they are transparently clear to anyonewho gives them his attention” (AT 7: 156, CSM 2: 110). Second, we argue belowthat the general proposition is one of these “transparent truths.”

26. As we show in Chapter Five, sometimes there are additional strictures underwhich the natural light works. For example, in the considerations leading to rescogitans in Meditation Two, various methodological doubts constrain the naturallight.

27. See Chapter One.

Appendix: the rainbow

1. Garber claims that this is the “only explicit mention of the method in all of theEssays” (Garber 1993a: 294, Garber’s emphasis). We disagree. First, in the discus-sion of the rainbow, the Eighth Discourse of the Meteorology, Descartes saysnothing explicitly about his method. Second, Descartes certainly sets forth amethod in the Geometry (AT 6: 372, O 19), a method which has much incommon with that of the ancient geometers. In his letter to Mersenne of March1636 he says, “Finally, in the Geometry I try to give a general method of solvingall the problems that have never yet been solved” (AT 1: 340, CSM 3: 51). Whilethis remark might be taken to mean that the method in the Geometry can be usedto solve all and only geometric problems, the contention that there is a methodunique to geometry contradicts his repeated claim that a single, universal methodexists. Nonetheless, since Descartes tells Vatier that the discourse on the rainbowis a paradigmatic example of his method in operation, it is worth careful exami-nation.

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2. This claim is somewhat puzzling. In the original case, Descartes was concernedwith the several bendings of the ray of light in its path from the sun, through thesuper-droplet, and to the eye of the perceiver. In the case of the prism, he isconcerned only with the projection of the light onto a wall. To be consistent, hewould need to claim that there is either a reflection or a second refraction fromthe projected image to the eye of the perceiver.

3. See also Chapter Five. 4. That Descartes seems to have had the energy levels of light completely turned

around – red waves are longer (lower energy) than violet – need not concern us.

Part II Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy

4 Meditation One: doubts and suppositions

1. We argue at length for this point at the beginning of Chapter Five. 2. If our account in Chapter One is correct, these are two sides of the same coin, for

what we call the order of epistemic priority is identical with what Descartes callsthe order of reality. (See AT 10: 418, CSM 1: 44; AT 7: 384, CSM 2: 263–4; CB§4: AT 5: 147, CSM 3: 333.)

3. See the letter to [Vatier] of 22 February 1638 (AT 1: 563, CSM 3: 87) whereDescartes expresses his belief that all of his science can be deduced from hismetaphysical principles.

4. As we show later, this is an exaggeration: the empiricist principle at the end ofthe Meditations is a form of limited empiricism.

5. This is one of the three functions Descartes ascribes to the doubts. In addition,some doubts are used as a means of drawingx the reader away from the supposi-tion that the world is wholly corporeal and known by means of sense experience.Others function as a foil against which Descartes could test the certainty of hissubsequent conclusions. (See AT 7: 172, CSM 2: 121.)

6. Notice that in the preface to the French edition of the Principles, the third levelof wisdom – the level of wisdom immediately below sensory experience – is“what we learn by conversing with other people” (AT 9B: 5, CSM 1: 181). Thistends to support the interpretation of “through the senses” in the Conversationwith Burman.

7. Let us assume for the moment that the concept of an object is unproblematic. Infact, we believe the same kind of dilemma we raise with respect to the principleof noncontradiction below can be raised regarding the concept of an object.

8. Notice that EPA is concerned with one kind of conceptual coherence to whichthe Cartesian method is committed. See Chapter One.

9. Here dream states are not lucid, though one would have to advance grounds fordistinguishing lucid from nonlucid dreams were one to suggest that the differencemakes a difference.

10. As the closing paragraph of Meditation Six makes clear, Descartes’s meta-crite-rion is itself a version of EPA. By that point, of course, he has modified EPA andrelegated it to the status of a secondary or tertiary epistemic principle.

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11. The doubts prior to the deceiver-god argument were not original to the Meditations; Descartes raises the same doubts in Part 4 of the Discourse on Method (AT6: 31–2, CSM 1: 127), although they are not developed in as great detail. Norwere they original to Descartes: the epistemic doubts can be traced back at leastas far as the Islamic philosopher Abû Hamîd Muhammad al-Ghazâlî (1058–1111). See McNeill and Waldman 1973: 206–10. We thank Madeleine Pepin forbringing this latter point to our attention.

12. See Kenny 1968: 34–5; Frankfurt 1970: 79–87; Cottingham 1986: 30–5; Curley1978: 40ff.; Markie 1986: 49, 137ff.; Wilson 1978: 31–42; Popkin 1964: 180–6; Gueroult 1984: 18–26; Williams 1978: 56; Olson 1988. In several of these,the second hypothetical doubt is passed over with little or no comment. Excep-tions to the blurring of the distinction between the doubts are found in Kennington1971 and Softer 1987: 25–47, although their concerns differ significantly fromours.

13. As we show in the next chapter, however, the doubt alone does not allow Descartesto know that he exists.

14. Recall that questions of the existential import of universal propositions weresignificant in Descartes’s time. See Williams 1978: 90ff.; Kneale and Kneale1962: 58, 210–11, 260, 264. Descartes denied that eternal truths have existen-tial import (P 1: 10, 48–9), and insofar as such truths have no existential import,it was incumbent upon him to provide evidence that they have no existentialimport.

15. In the Sixth Meditation Descartes is explicit in claiming that:

The second reason for doubt was that since I did not know the author of mybeing (or at least was pretending not to), I saw nothing to rule out thepossibility that my natural constitution made me prone to error even inmatters which seemed to me most true.

(AT 7: 77, CSM 2: 53)

16. Various commentators have questioned Descartes’s sincerity in offering the proofsof the existence of God in Meditation Three. (See for example Loeb 1988.) Ifour arguments are sound, the appeals to the natural light in Meditation Three dolittle more than make explicit what was implicit in granting the second doubt: inaccepting the doubt, there is at least a faint glimmering of the natural light. IfDescartes’s appeal to the natural light in Meditation Three were insincere, thereshould be no inclination to grant the doubts qua suppositions in Meditation One.

17. In Chapter Eight, we argue that referring to God as a guarantor of clear anddistinct ideas is not quite correct, although we need not go into this issue at thistime. We examine the Cartesian Circle in Chapter Ten.

18. Notice that in addition to earth and sky, the doubts raised in DG1 concern theexistence of extended things, shape, size, and place, that is, those aspects of thematerial world that are subject to mathematical description. It is precisely theseaspects of the material world that Descartes claims can be known. The colors,shapes, and sounds of MD1 remain banished.

5 Meditation Two: the beginning of the ascent

1. There is an ambiguity in the expression “clear and distinct perception.” It can

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mean a perception that is clear and distinct, that is, a clear and distinct idea. Itcan also mean the act of perceiving clearly and distinctly. We consider the latterthe more fundamental sense of the expression. As we argue in Chapter Six, actsof perceiving clearly and distinctly are guided by the natural light and result inideas that are clear and distinct.

2. If one prefers, it is the first entity proven that could obtain the status of asubstance. However one construes the Cogito passages, they require that there bethoughts, but these are only modes of a substance.

3. Recall that in Chapter One we saw such a distinction in the writings of several ofDescartes’s predecessors and argued that such a distinction appears in his works.

4. We show below that this is a maxim Descartes follows religiously in the arguments for his existence in Meditation Two.

5. Some commentators seem not to have noticed this and have conflated clarityand distinctness with indubitability. (Copleston 1963: 100 and Popkin 1964:188; cf. Curley 1978: 117.) We shall argue that Descartes took indubitabilityfrom systematic doubt to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for theplausibility of a metaphysical hypothesis. Nonetheless, there is a sense in whichwe agree with Popkin et al. that he intended to show that the skeptic’s argnmentslead to absurdity. As we argued in the last chapter, his causal maxim that “theremust be at least as much <reality> in the total and efficient cause as in the effectof that cause” (AT 7: 40, CSM 2: 28) is the skeptical engine driving the secondhypothetical doubt and the crucial premise in the proofs of the existence of Godin Meditation Three. Our differences with Copleston, Popkin, and Curley arefound in where we locate the absurdity generated by the skeptical doubts.

6. We suggested in Chapter Two that innate ideas are to be construed solely asdispositions to form an occurrent idea with a certain cognitive content (see Flageand Bonnen 1992b). If the consideration of a particular proposition is the occa-sion on which one considers a general proposition, this is wholly consistent withand can be explained on the basis of an innate idea qua psychological disposition.

7. This is in the Regulae. In the same passage Descartes claims that “everyone canmentally intuit that he exists,” which seems inconsistent with the account ofDescartes’s method which we have offered. However, later in the passage hewrites:

It follows that those propositions which are immediately inferred from firstprinciples can be said to be known in one respect through intuition, inanother respect through deduction. But the first principles themselves areknown only through intuition, and the remote conclusions only throughdeduction.

(AT 10: 370, CSM 1: 15)Since the conclusion “sum” that is deduced from the general proposition iscertainly not “remote,” this passage suggests that in such a context the intuition/deduction distinction is easily blurred and that Descartes himself did not place alot of weight on the distinction in those contexts in which the inference isimmediate or nearly so. This also provides content to the sense in which one’sknowledge of one’s own existence is as if (tanquem) it were intuitive.

8. An additional passage should be mentioned. In the Search After Truth, Descartesmakes Eudoxus say:

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You cannot deny that you have such doubts; rather it is certain that youhave them, so certain in fact that you cannot doubt your doubting. There-fore it is also true that you who are doubting exist; this is so true that you nolonger can have any doubts about it.

(AT 10: 515, CSM 2: 409–10)As we show in the next section, this is one of the reasons Descartes embraces toshow his existence in Meditation Two. Hence, we may safely pass over theSearch After Truth without further comment.

9. Stanley Tweyman (1993: 14–16)has argued that the denial of the Cogito is acontradiction. While we agree with him, we do not locate the contradiction onthe same grounds. Tweyman suggests that “by a ‘contradiction’ in this contexthe means something different from what is meant when we say that the denial of‘All bachelors are unmarried males’ is a contradiction” (ibid.: 15). If our accountis correct, the contradiction is between “I think (doubt, consider a proposition,etc.) but do not exist” and the general principle “Everything that thinks (doubts,considers a proposition, etc.) exists.”

10. We are very much indebted to Jeffrey Coombs’s conversations with us on thetendencies of Descartes’s Scholastic predecessors. He has also allowed us to readan early draft of a paper entitled “Modal Voluntarism in Descartes’s Jesuit Prede-cessors” which he presented to the American Catholic Philosophical Associationin May of 1996, and which has since appeared in the Association’s proceedings,The Philosophy of Technology: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philo-sophical Association, volume 70, 1997: 237–47. He has also been kind enoughto allow us to see an early draft of his “The Ontological Source of LogicalPossibility in Second Scholasticism,” expected to be published by Kluwer in 1998or 1999 under the title, Modality in the Schools: Studies in the Theory of Modal-ity in Second Scholasticism (1500–1750). Our understanding of the chimera (thehuman lion) as a logically impossible beast comes from Coombs’s discussion inthis last article. Even though Descartes may not have been familiar with all ofthe views that Coombs discusses in his “The Ontological . . .,” Coombs helps fillin much of the Scholastic background against which Descartes says he struggles.

11. In his lnstitutiones Philosophicae, Edmundus Purchotius, a Cartesian of the lateseventeenth century, offered a Cartesian version of the Porphyrian tree ofsubstance (reprinted in Risse 1970, vol. 2: 128 note 523). He offers one muchdifferent from the one that we have suggested here. He divides substance intocorporeal and incorporeal, just as Bouridan did, but he then subdivides the incor-poreal into the supremely perfect and the imperfect and the corporeal into livingand non-living. Purchotius has the tree branch back together to provide a cat-egory for humanity. But, this would only better reflect the dual nature of human-ity. (The tree that we offer would have to branch back together as well.) Wewould advocate our tree for the reason that infinite substance is absolutely inde-pendent of any other kind of substance and therefore seems to warrant being oneof the main trunks, since Descartes expresses the notion of substance in terms ofindependence in Meditation Three (AT 7: 44, CSM 2: 30) and Principles, 1: 51(see also AT 7: 185, CSM 2: 130). Purchotius’s tree has the advantage of puttingthe division between the incorporeal and corporeal at center stage, and thus

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emphasizes the nature of humanity. The fact that either tree will contrast withthe typical Scholastic version will do for our purposes. We leave it to the readerto decide which of the trees better reflects Descartes’s work. Such a task is beyondthe scope of this project.

12. Remember his description of the soul: “The next thing thought was that I wasnourished, that I moved about, and that I engaged in sense perception and think-ing” (AT 7: 26; CSM 2: 17).

13. Donald Sievert (1975: 58–9) has also noticed the importance of the Synopsiscomments on the interpretation of the cogito arguments. He indicates that theSynopsis remarks imply that Descartes may still make mistakes about his essenceat this stage in Meditation Two. The particular mistake is that Descartes mightmistake his essence as thinking substance. At this stage of the argument Descarteslacks the premises to make that inference. We would follow Sievert in this andadd that Descartes’s conception of substance is not in play during the course ofMeditation Two. Strictly speaking, he may only refer to himself as a “res cogitans”or “thinking thing.” In general, we sympathize with Sievert’s major contentionthat in Meditation Two Descartes does doubt that he is a thinking substance.

14. Of course this is something of a false oversight insofar as the Descartes ofMeditation Four analyzes judgment in terms of an affirming or denying act of thewill.

6 Meditation Three: reaching the peak

1. There is, of course, an exception: the essence of God entails the exis. tence ofGod, but this issue is not raised until Mediation Five.

2. Similarly, he seems to ascribe clarity and distinctness to the act of perception inthe fourth paragraph of the Meditation, when he alludes to “things themselveswhich I think I perceive clearly” (AT 7: 36, CSM 2: 25).

3. Descartes’s apparent vacillation within this paragraph between the possibilitythat God is a deceiver and the contention that whatever is clearly and distinctlyperceived is (materially) true is widely recognized (see for example Copleston1963: 108; Van Cleve 1979: 67; Markie 1992a: 151). We discuss this at length inChapter Nine. We show there that the meditator in this paragraph is in the sameposition as Descartes’s atheistic geometer (AT 7: 141, CSM 2: 101), that the solereason for doubting the criterion that clear and distinct ideas are true is that Godcould be a deceiver (that one’s faculties could be radically defective).

4. In the case of mathematical truths this act of mental scrutiny is no more thanunderstanding what is claimed and thereby recognizing the truth of the proposi-tion. It is this psychological state that is required before Descartes will claimknowledge by the light of nature.

5. Descartes consistently concerns himself with questions of essence when considering clear and distinct ideas. Recall that the issues in Meditation Two were“What am I?” and “What is the wax?”

6. As we show in the final section of this chapter, there are also cases in which anidea becomes more clear by subsuming a kind under increasingly simpler (moregeneral) predicates.

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7. As Descartes notes in the Regulae, an enumeration of properties, etc. need onlybe sufficient for whatever case is at hand (AT 10: 390–1, CSM 1: 26–7), whichtends to show that questions regarding clarity and distinctness are relative to thequestion posed.

8. We argue in the next chapter that Descartes’s exoneration of clear and distinctideas in Meditation Four involves a shift from material to formal truth. Sinceformal truths are representative (AT 7: 37, 43–4; CSM 2: 26, 30), the shift tothe formal truth of clear and distinct ideas is a shift from the possible essence ofa possible thing to the actual essence of a possible thing, that is, a true andimmutable nature (an idea in the mind of God).

9. One need not necessarily assume that material objects were the efficient causesof ideas; given the Scholastic doctrine of notions or intentional forms, it wouldbe sufficient for external objects to be construed as intentional forms, a doctrineDescartes rejected. See Optics: AT 6: 85–6, CSM 1: 153–4.

10. As we shall see when we come to the Sixth Meditation, Descartes takes both ofthese theses as reasons for granting the hypothesis of a material world. We shallargue in Chapter Nine that Descartes believes this hypothesis is justified becauseit prevents anyone from resurrecting the possibility that God is a deceiver.

11. Some scholars – see for example Timothy Cronin (1966: 75–127) – maintainthat there is but one argument for the existence of God in the Third Meditation.We contend that there are two related arguments, since at paragraph twenty-nine(AT 7: 48, CSM 2: 33) Descartes introduces a second set of premises leading tothe conclusion that God exists. Further, we argue, the idea of God operative in thesecond argument is clearer and more distinct than that in the first. Nonetheless,whether one deems the arguments distinct – whether one claims there is oneargument or two arguments in the meditation – is of little consequence.

12. Any reader of the Sixth Meditation will suggest that what Descartes rejects hereis not far removed from what he accepts by the end of the Meditations. What ishere merely a natural impulse he later takes as a partial reason to accept theexistence of an external world that stands in a relation of partial resemblance toone’s sensible ideas. As we argue in Chapter Nine, it is the methodological orga-nization of the Meditations that allows him later to accept a “mere impulse” asa ground for claiming the existence of an external world that partially resemblesone’s sensible ideas. In the Sixth Meditation, he cannot reject such an impulse asevidence of an external world standing in a partial resemblance relation to hisideas without simultaneously generating grounds for a charge of divine deception.Hence, he will retrieve much of the veracity of sense experience, but underdifferent epistemic conditions.

13. If one follows a traditional angelology, such as that in Aquinas’s De SpiritualibusCreatures, angels at the level of archangels and above, are conceived strictly asspiritual (noncorporeal) entities. For our purposes, however, this makes littledifference.

14. One should notice that Descartes does not express his argument in terms ofsubstance. He is concerned with ideas of corporeal things (ideas rerumcorporalium). Nonetheless, since his account of the three degrees of reality is setforth in terms of the traditional parlance of substances and modes, and since,

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consistent with the method, he assumes concepts that are only later clarified, wefind it reasonable to carry on this discussion in terms of substance and modes.

15. We leave open questions regarding the details of Descartes’s analysis of substance. In particular, we leave open the question whether he held that a substanceis a substratum. For an interesting discussion of his awareness of substance on theassumption that he construed substance solely in terms of independence, seeMarkie 1992b.

16. One should notice that the definition of the term ‘God’ given here is at leastverbally distinct from that given in paragraph thirteen (AT 7: 40, CSM 2: 28)insofar as Descartes replaces ‘omnipotent’ (omnipotentem) with ‘supremelypowerful’ (summe potentem), ‘omniscient’ (omniniscium) with ‘supremely in-telligent’ (summe intelligentem), and adds ‘independent.’ This is but one shiftfound in Descartes’s ideas of God. We shall see that in paragraph twenty-five (AT7: 46, CSM 2: 31), this idea is transformed into the “idea of a supremely perfectand infinite being” (idea entis summe perfecti & infiniti), and in paragraph thirty-six it becomes “an idea of a most perfect being” (quaedamque idea entisperfectissimi) (AT 7: 51, CSM 2: 35), which is the idea of “a supremely perfectbeing” (entis summe perfecti) that is operative in Meditation Five (AT 7: 65,CSM 2: 45). We discuss Descartes’s clarification of the idea of God in section fiveof this chapter.

17. One should not over generalize with this result; for in Chapter Three, we haveargued that Descartes did not hold that resemblance is a necessary condition forcausality.

18. We were pleased to discover that Jean-Marie Beyssade has arrived at some of thesame conclusions that we have. On the one hand, he agrees with us that the ThirdMeditation is best understood as Descartes’s attempt “to generate the idea ofGod by means of a construction that operates in parallel with the proof of hisexistence” (Beyssade 1992: 178). Thus, one of the themes of the Third Medita-tion is a clarification of the idea of God. Moreover, he clearly anticipates thesame objection as we do, that the idea of God must already exist (fully formed) inthe mind prior to its discovery if Descartes insists that the idea of God is innate.Here Beyssade’s opponent would insist that an innate idea cannot be constructed.In response, Beyssade suggests that an “innate idea is the power or faculty of themind for producing the idea” (ibid.: 182). Indeed, this is exactly the strategy wesuggest in “Innate Ideas and Cartesian Dispositions” (Flage and Bonnen, 1992b:72–7).

On the other hand, we detect three differences between his interpretive ap-proach and ours. The first difference may be a matter of emphasis. Beyssadeemphasizes the finite mind’s understanding of God as incomprehensible. Thisallows him to make significant interpretive inroads into understanding that Godhas no principal attribute. We would argue that perfection is the principal at-tribute of God. Beyssade understands perfection as interchangeable with infinity.He would maintain that without this assumption we must abandon the incompre-hensibility thesis concerning the finite mind’s conception of God. Descartes neednot assume that he has a “generative rule” (that is, a rule by which one cangenerate an adequate conception of a thing) when arriving at the conclusion thatGod is the supremely perfect being. So long as he assumes that a finite mind

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cannot truly grasp any specific infinite attribute such as omnipotence, then themore general definition of God cannot function as a generative rule.

Second, Beyssade believes that an adequate idea or one “generative” of God isunattainable because it would require a “complete” enumeration of the attributesof God. In Rule Seven of the Regulae, Descartes maintains that a “complete”enumeration is an enumeration that includes “all the points relating to theproblem at hand” (AT 10: 388, CSM 1: 25). Clearly this would be impossible inthe case of arriving at a thorough knowledge of God. We fail to see why someonecannot treat the definition of God as, in some ways, generative. In the FifthReplies (AT 7: 370–1, CSM 2: 256), Descartes does not seem to shy away fromdiscussing the idea as properly conceived and then later showing that God hasattributes that we did not countenance in previous inspections of our idea of God.Using the language of Rule Seven of the Regulae, all that is necessary for thegoals of the Third Meditation is a “sufficient” enumeration of those attributes:an “enumeration which renders the truth of our conclusions more certain thanany other kind of proof” (AT 10: 389, CSM 1: 26).

Finally, Beyssade rejects the notion that the human mind constructs the ideaof God (Beyssade 1992: 180). Here we believe that Beyssade’s worry stems froman implicit belief that innate ideas carry significant epistemic weight. Note howhe labors to show that the resulting idea of God is innate, as if showing that theidea were factitious would lead to an irreversibly flawed idea. We, however, rejectthe claim that innate ideas carry any epistemic weight. As we have argued and willcontinue to argue, factitious ideas are nothing but ideas that have been manufac-tured by the mind. The raw materials will always be either innate ideas, adventi-tious ideas, or some mixture of both. In the case of the ultimate idea of God, it isa factitious idea composed of innate ideas.

19. Norman Wells agrees with us here when he writes, “What with Descartes’s talk ofchimerae, hippogryphs, sirens, etc., it is not often noted that the astronomicalidea of the sun is a factitious or constructed idea” (Wells 1990: 55 n.121).

20. Even the claim that the distinction between adventitious and innate ideas isexclusive and exhaustive is somewhat misleading. In his Comments on a CertainBroadsheet, Descartes indicates that every idea is innate insofar as it is construedas a disposition to form an occurrent idea with a determinate content (AT 8B:359, CSM 1: 304). Thus, an occurrent adventitious idea and an occurrentnonadventitious innate idea differ only insofar as the former is caused by bodilymovements while the latter is not.

21. Cf. Locke 1975: 408–20. This similarity has not gone unnoticed. See Berkeley,Philosophical Commentaries, §784, in Berkeley 1948–57, I: 94; Weinberg 1965:12; Flage 1987: 20–1, 24.

22. We acknowledge that we here present a somewhat simplified account of theseveral ideas of God found in the Third Meditation. As we indicated in an earlierpart of this chapter, there are intermediate versions of the idea of God betweenwhat we here call IG1 and IG2. For our present purposes, however, these differ-ences are irrelevant. What we show is the mechanism by which Descartes clari-fies the idea of God.

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23. One might object that we claim to find two ideas because we find two descriptionsof God, which would imply that we should really find one idea of God and twodescriptions of God. But remember that Descartes’s interest is in reaching thatidea which best captures the nature of God. These descriptions capture the natureof God to different degrees: some of them are better than others. Taken sepa-rately, each description picks out a different possible being. If one follows ourreading of the Third Meditation as an intellectual journey clarifying the idea ofGod, then nothing should bar us from understanding the products of the differentstages of clarification as distinct ideas.

24. To see that there is a distinction between these two ideas of God, one must see thedistinction between indefinite attributes and infinite attributes. Descartes explic-itly makes use of the distinction in the Principles of Philosophy (see also FirstReplies, AT 7: 113, CSM 2: 81, and Second Replies, AT 7: 136–41, CSM 2: 98–101). At Principles 1: 26, he advises us not to engage in arguments about theinfinite since we have finite minds. We should consider the divisibility of anextended thing as indefinitely small and the largest extended things as indefi-nitely large. At Principles 1: 27, he suggests that we reserve the term ‘infinite’for God alone. His distinction becomes more transparent if one examines a moremundane example. The people living in east Austin, Texas have claimed that theUniversity of Texas at Austin’s property line extends indefinitely into theircommunity, since the University has often used its powers of eminent domain toextend the campus to the east. Nonetheless, for them to say that it extendsinfinitely into their community would be hyperbole of the highest order. Anindefinite attribute has a limit which is not clearly defined, but there is a limitnone the less, while an infinite attribute has no limit whatsoever.

25. On the distinction between a description and a more proper real definition basedupon genus and species, see Arnauld 1964: 165.

26. On material falsehood, see Wilson 1978: 111–16 and our Chapter One.27. Should anyone contend that the consideration of the material falsehood of one’s

idea of God might not be a sufficient condition for recognizing that all thedistinct attributes of God in IG1 can be subsumed under perfection, anotherpassage appears later in the Third Meditation that almost certainly would yieldthis consequence. In the course of the second argument for the existence of God,Descartes considers the question of the unity of God and its consequences foraccounting for one’s existence as a thing with an idea of God (AT 7: 50, CSM 2:34). One should notice, however, that by that time the several distinct attributesof God are already couched in terms of perfections, so it seems reasonable tosuggest that the notion of perfection, and therefore IG2 is introduced prior tothat point in the Third Meditation.

28. In other contexts Descartes refers to this in terms of what is known by thenatural light. See the letter to Mersenne of 16 October 1639 (AT 2: 596–9, CSM3: 139–40).

7 Meditation Four: reflections from the summit

1. The doubt in question is a cognitive version of the problem of evil. 2. There are interesting similarities between the position Descartes advances and

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standard discussions of freedom and responsibility. Like such classical twentiethcentury soft determinists as G. E. Moore (1912: 84–95) and A. J. Ayer (1954:271–84; see also Schlick 1962: 143–58), Descartes emphasizes the will as afaculty of choice. With respect to judgment, the intellect sets forward somethingfor our consideration, and we decide one way or the other. Like the soft deter-minists, Descartes stresses the absence of external constraint, while allowing thatcertain lawful regularities are necessary for deeming oneself free. He claims that“the more I incline in one direction – either because I clearly understand thatreasons of truth and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely produceddisposition of my inmost thoughts – the freer is my choice” (AT 7: 57–8, CSM2: 40). One is free to a greater degree, the more one’s internal dispositions causeone to choose one option – the correct option – rather than another. One is leastfree when in a state of pure indifference: Descartes was certainly aware of Buridan’sass, which starved from the lack of an inclination to choose either of two equallydesirable stacks of hay.

Descartes is not a determinist, however, since he does not hold that all choicesare themselves subject to explanation. As we noticed in Chapter Three, he seemsto hold that, while there are lawful connections between mental states and physi-cal states, the mind qua efficient cause can choose which mental state obtains(cf. AT 4: 314, CSM 3: 272). This implies that, consistent with the standardclassifications on the problem of free will, he is a libertarian.

To reconcile these apparent differences, we should notice that there aredifferences between Descartes’s task and the task in standard discussions of freewill. In the latter, the object is to give an account of human freedom that willleave a place for moral responsibility. The contention is that one must, in somesense, be free to do or refrain from doing some action x if one is to be heldmorally responsible for that action. This is not Descartes’s concern. Descartes’sconcern is with freedom from error. If clear and distinct ideas are (at leastmaterially) true and one has an irresistible disposition to affirm their truth, thisexplains why one is most free from error when the judgment of one’s will is leastindifferent, when one’s choice is psychologically determined by the strength ofa clear and distinct idea.

3. God’s will is wholly indifferent. As Descartes writes to Mersenne on 21 April1641:

indifference in our case is rather a defect than a perfection of freedom; butit does not follow that the same is the case with God. Nevertheless, I do notknow that it is †an article of faith† to believe that he is indifferent, and I feelconfident that Father Gibieuf will defend my position well in this matter; forI wrote nothing which is not in accord with what he said in his book DeLibertate.

(AT 3: 360, CSM 3: 179)

These are at least the remnants of Descartes’s doctrine of the creation of eternaltruths. See the letters to Mersenne of 6 May 1630 and 27 May 1630, AT 1: 149–50 and 1: 151–3, CSM 3: 24–6.

4. As Descartes notes in the Fifth Meditation, the clear and distinct idea of a

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triangle shows that such an entity has some degree of existence – some mightsuggest it subsists – but this does not entail the actual existence of a triangle (AT7: 64, CSM 2: 44–5). Given his commitment to a conceivability criterion ofpossibility (AT 7: 78, CSM 2: 54), this implies that the object of a clear anddistinct perception is at least logically possible.

5. Formal truth is in the domain of judgment. Certainly one judges that the truths ofmathematics are true. Insofar as they are judged to be true, they fail within thedomain of formal truths, and consequently there must be something – if only anidea in the mind of God – to which they correspond.

6. Although our approach differs from that of others given that we rest our consi-erations on the distinction between material and formal truth, it is not whollywithout precedent. Alan Gewirth (1941) developed a similar case on the groundsof the distinction between psychological and metaphysical certainty. (See alsoVan Cleve 1979.)

7. While it is not uncommon to claim that Descartes’s God guarantees the truth ofclear and distinct ideas, we are not clear as to what this phrase means. Certainlythere is no act of God that constitutes such a guarantee unless it is a negative act,an act of not changing. If one alludes to the creation of eternal truths – eternaltruths are true because God makes them so and God does not change them – the“guarantee” still rests on a negative act. In our account, Descartes concludes thatthey must be true since God is not a deceiver: God does not guarantee, rather, thenotion of a nondeceptive God is more fully analyzed.

8 Meditation Five: the beginning of the descent

1. We argue below, however, that the shift to formal truth is significant regardingthe ontological argument for the existence of God.

2. While this argument certainly begins an analysis at a higher level of generalitythan the piece-of-wax argument, one may view it as a continuation of thatargument. While the piece-of-wax argument shows only that the wax is ex-tended, movable, and flexible, the reduction of extension to mathematical de-scription yields a more general understanding of extended entities.

3. Descartes assumed that the principles of Euclidean geometry are basic and universal. In this, of course, he has been proven wrong. Nonetheless, we avoid ananachronism by following Descartes’s assumption in this case.

4. Notice that the Descartes of the Regulae deemed agreement in judgment anecessary, though not a sufficient, condition for knowledge (AT 10: 363, CSM 1:11).

5. We leave open the question whether in creating the eternal truths God does some-thing more than create human minds in such a way that they affirm the truth ofcertain propositions. (See Ishiguro 1983: 312.)

6. While we agree with Walter Edelberg’s (1990: 504) discussion of geometricalentailment, if our discussion is sound, it shows that God creates true and immu-table natures by creating eternal truths, not, as Edelberg suggests, that God cre-ates eternal truths by creating eternal natures (ibid.: 508). While Descartes re-peatedly claims that God creates eternal truths (AT 1: 149–50, CSM 3: 24–5; AT

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1: 151–3, CSM 3: 25–6; AT 7: 436, CSM 2: 294), it is only in the Conversationwith Burman that he talks about the creation of simple natures along with allpossible things (CB §33: AT 5: 159–60, CSM 3: 343). Thus we consider itreasonable to suggest that, as known, “simple geometric natures“ or “true andimmutable natures” are nothing more than eternal truths and the consequencesthat follow from them. Further, our position is consistent with the Cartesiannotion of analysis as a search for general principles. As we construe Descartes’sposition, it is consistent to suggest that geometry has been analyzed down to itsfundamental elements prior to claiming knowledge of triangles. On Edelberg’sreconstruction, it would seem triangles are known, not merely considered, priorto their more fundamental components, namely, lines and angles. Thus, it ap-pears that one cannot reconcile Edelberg’s position with Descartes’s generalmethodological principles.Later in this chapter we discuss the relationship between the views found in thefourth paragraph of Meditation Three and those views found in the closingparagraphs of Meditation Five.

7. Some criticisms are better than others, of course. In his lectures on the history ofmodern philosophy, the nineteenth century German philosopher F.W.J. vonSchelling reconstructed Descartes’s argument as follows:

The perfect being cannot exist only contingently, thus can only exist nec-essarily (major proposition); God is the perfect being (minor proposition),therefore (he ought to conclude) He can only exist necessarily, for thisalone is inherent in the premises; instead of this, though, he concludes:therefore He necessarily exists, and, it is true, thereby apparently bears outthe fact that God exists, and seems to have proven the existence of God. Butit is something completely different whether I say: God can only existnecessarily, or whether I say: He necessarily exists. From the first (He canonly exist necessarily) only follows: therefore He exists necessarily (N.B. ifHe exists, but it does not at all follow that He exists). In this, therefore, liesthe mistake of the Cartesian conclusion.

(Schelling 1994: 50)

This is not Descartes’s argument. Descartes does not begin with the premise thata perfect being can only exist necessarily; he begins with the more modestpremise that the existence of God as a perfect being is possible: this is entailed bythe claim that the idea of God is clear and distinct.

8. Thus, Descartes systematically avoids the question whether the idea of God isconsistent. The sense of possibility, however, is somewhat puzzling. In the caseof ordinary objects, he claims that possibility entails that God could create anobject corresponding to the idea (AT 7: 78, CSM 2: 54). The parallel can beextended to the case of an extraordinary object (God), only if one claims thatGod is self-caused. As we noted in Chapter Three, Descartes himself claims thatthe notion of efficient causality that he applies to God as self-caused differs fromthe notion of efficient causality that applies to ordinary objects (AT 7: 236,CSM 2: 165), and therefore he equivocates on “efficient cause” in the second

6.

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argument for the existence of God in Meditation Three. For the present, we shallcharitably assume his claim that the clarity and distinctness of the idea of God asa perfect being entail merely that the idea of God is consistent. We return to thisissue in note 15.

9. At AT 3: 477, CSM 3: 202, Descartes states that a mountain is understood as anuphill slope and a valley as a downhill slope, and he claims that, by abstraction,one can conceive of a mountain without considering its corresponding valley.

10. It is worthy of notice that in a letter to Mersenne of 15 April 1630, Descartesconsiders questions regarding the sizes of infinities. Notice what he says:

With regard to infinity, you asked me a question in your letter of 14 March,which is the only thing I find in it which is not in the last letter. You said thatif there were an infinite line it would have an infinite number of feet and offathoms, and consequently that the infinite number of feet would be sixtimes as great as the number of fathoms, †I agree entirely.† “Then thislatter number is not infinite.”’ †I deny the consequence.† “But one infinitycannot be greater than another.” Why not? †Where is the absurdity?†Especially if it is only greater †by a finite ratio, as in this case, wheremultiplication by six is a finite ratio, which does not in any way affect theinfinity.† In any case, what basis have we for judging whether one infinitycan be greater than another or not? It would no longer be infinity if we couldgrasp it. Continue to honour me by thinking kindly of me.

(AT 1: 146, CSM 3: 23)

Descartes is here concerned with numbers. While he grants that one infinity canbe proportionately greater than another, his remark that “It would no longer beinfinity if we could grasp it” suggests that the mark of infinity is its inscrutability.This suggests that, while one might intelligibly talk of infinities of differing sizes,ultimately they are indistinguishable, ultimately there is but one. The entirepassage is somewhat curious because Descartes repeatedly claims that infinity isproperly ascribable only to God; everything less than God can be only indefi-nitely great (see Chapter Three, Note 14).

11. Whatever else Descartes means in claiming that an idea is distinct, he means atleast that as an idea of a kind it is distinguishable from ideas of other kinds. SeeFrankfurt 1970: 137–9.

12. We return below to the implications of conceiving God as an infinite substance.13. Here one might object that geometrical properties do possess a kind of existence

insofar as they are true and immutable natures, that is, ideas in the mind of God.We grant that. But existence as an idea in the mind of God is not robust existence;rather, it is subsistence. It is not existence as a mode of a substance: in hisdiscussions of substance and modes, Descartes limits modes to the domain offinite substance. We are inclined to believe that there are ideas in the mind of God,given his voluntarism regarding eternal truths and the doctrine of true and immu-table natures. Nonetheless, we know of but one place where Descartes uses suchlanguage (CB §33: AT 5: 159–60, CSM 3: 343), and we do not believe it isimplausible to suggest, with Hide Ishiguro (1983: 312), that the establishment of

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eternal truths and true and immutable natures is little more than a uniform “hard-wiring” of the human mind.

14. Any plausibility this argument has rests on Cartesian categories and will noteasily transfer to other versions of the ontological argument. Nonetheless, sincethe independence notion of substance was not unique to Descartes (see Blundevile1599: 17), at least a degree of transference may be available.

We are not terribly happy with the reconstruction of the ontological argu-ment we have presented, although we do believe that Descartes might have beenthinking along such lines. We propose another version of the ontological argu-ment which also might reflect his reasoning.

Modes of possibility are ranked as follows: logical possibility is broader thanconceptual possibility which is broader than causal possibility. The highest degreeof possibility is actuality: an actual object is causally, conceptually, and logicallypossible. Thus, an actual object may be described as “maximally possible.” (Givenour common understanding of the distinction between possibility and actuality, itis incoherent to suggest that there are degrees of maximal possibility.) Given themodes of possibility, it is not unreasonable to suggest that there are degrees ofpossibility corresponding to degrees of clarity and distinctness (and correspond-ing degrees of material truth).

Descartes describes his idea of God as a perfect being as “utterly clear anddistinct” (AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 3l). If degrees of possibility correspond to degrees ofclarity and distinctness, then an “utterly clear and distinct idea” is an idea of amaximally possible thing. Does this entail that God exists? No. To see this, let usstart at the bottom, that is, with considerations of material truth.

If one has a clear and distinct idea, one immediately recognizes its materialtruth, that is, one recognizes an idea of a possible essence of a possible thing. Ifthe idea of God as a perfect being is utterly clear and distinct, then it is the ideaof a maximally possible essence: the existence of an actual thing correspondingto the essence as revealed in the idea is possible. But maximal possibility isactuality. So the distinction between a possible and an actual essence collapses:the idea of a maximally possible essence is the idea of an actual essence. Since wehave suggested that actual essences are ideas in the mind of God, let us assumethat God is maximally self-conscious, so God has an idea of God’s essence. Let usassume, further, that such a construal is unproblematic. Now if the idea of God isthe idea of an actual essence of a thing that possibly exists, one can again askabout the degree of possibility. It is the actual essence of a maximally possibleobject. Does this entail that it is the essence of an actual object?

Before we answer that question, consider Descartes’s remark on clarity, dis-tinctness, and possibility: “I know that everything I clearly and distinctly under-stand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with myunderstanding of it” (AT 7: 78, CSM 2: 54). If Descartes is consistent in claimingthat possibility is the capability of being created by God, this implies that Godqua maximally possible object is self-caused. (Later proponents of the ontologi-cal argument are equally willing to claim that “The strength of God implies . . .[God’s] existence” (Hartshorne 1965: 130).) As we noted in Chapter Three,

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however, the notion of self-causation is conceptually inconsistent, and thereforeimpossible. So, while self-causation would explain why the essence of God entailsexistence, the conceptual impossibility of self-causation implies that the argu-ment fails. The only alternatives open to the defender of Descartes’s argumentare to suggest either that the notion of maximal possibility that applies to God isdifferent from that which applies to ordinary actual objects, or that the notion ofpossibility when applied to God means something other than God’s ability tocause himself. But to embrace either alternative implies that the argument failsdue to an equivocation either on ‘maximally possible object’ or on ‘possible’ (cf.Rowe 1974).

15. In their edition of the Philosophical Writings, Cottingham, Stoothoff, andMurdock suggest that this is the paragraph to which Arnauld alludes in raising theproblem of the Cartesian Circle (AT 7: 214, CSM 2: 150; see also CSM 2:150n2), and it is to this paragraph that Descartes alludes in his reply (AT 7: 245–6, CSM 2: 171).

16. Notice that in the Second Replies, Descartes writes, “Now awareness of firstprinciples is not normally called ‘knowledge’ by dialectitians” (AT 7: 140, CSM2: 100). Similarly, in the Preface to the French edition of the Principles, heclaimed the first level of wisdom “contains only notions which are so clear inthemselves that they can be acquired without meditation” (AT 9B: 5, CSM 1:181). And we have argued above that what is recognized by the natural light is thecriteriological foundation on which Descartes rebuilds his epistemic house.

9 Meditation Six: the world restored

1. Descartes’s point here seems to be that although one can imagine a many-sidedplane figure, it would be an image of a chiligon only if it had exactly 1,000 sides.At best, it would be difficult to confirm that the imagined figure has exactly1,000 sides. Should one doubt that point, imagine a chiliagon and try to count thesides. How would one mark each side to show that it has been counted? How wouldone guarantee that the imagined figure does not change subtly as one’s countingapproaches 1,000?

2. It is worthy of notice that the Descartes of the Regulae held that the imagination or phantasy is a part of the body. See AT 10: 414, 416; CSM 1: 41–2, 43.

3. One might notice two points: one, the distinction between mind and body is oneof the first requisites for the proof of the immortality of the soul (AT 7: 13, CSM2: 9); two, the Descartes of the Synopsis suggests that only one bodily substanceexists and all individual bodies are merely modifications of that one substance(AT 7: 14, CSM 2: 10).

4. Recall that in Chapter Five we argued that the piece-of-wax argument establishesthe same, insofar as Descartes could prove his existence on the basis of thepremise “I think” or “I imagine.”

5. This seems a reasonable account of Descartes’s moves, although the openingsentence of the present paragraph is open to an alternative interpretation.Notice that Descartes is parenthetically concerned with a geometrical descrip-

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tion of the sun. He had discussed this earlier, drawing a distinction between theidea of the sun acquired from the senses and that derived from geometricalreasoning (AT 7: 39, CSM 2: 27). If one focuses on the parenthetical example,Descartes might be taken to say that a certain degree of error is implicitlyoperative in astronomical reasonings insofar as they are based upon a set ofassumptions regarding distance, perspective, etc. It would make some difference,for example, if one assumes that the sun is 93,500,000 miles away rather than93,000,000 miles. However, the same problem arises with respect to a geometri-cal description of any presumptively existent object. If I calculate the volume ofmy body based on the presumption that I am 5 feet 10 inches tall, my conclu-sions will be different from those based on the assumption that I am 5 feet 10½inches tall. The difficulty in determining the precise distance between oneselfand the sun that is found in the case of astronomical reasoning is merely a clearexample of the general problem of precision: no matter how carefully onemeasures one’s height, for example, there is always a certain degree of error.

The application of a geometrical framework in the case of any particularobject introduces a certain degree of imprecision, and therefore error. Therefore,in the earlier paragraph, Descartes concerns himself strictly with the applicabil-ity of a geometrical framework to the corporeal realm in general; in this para-graph, he deals strictly with the applicability of it to particular objects.

6. Of course, Descartes attacks the notion of substantial forms using an analogy toa clock in more than one place. In a letter to Jean-Baptiste Morin, 12 September1638, he introduces a clock analogy in admonishing Morin for appealing to thesun’s substantial form to explain sunlight. There he makes the analogy in thefollowing way:

You say that if light is nothing but the action of the sun, then there is nolight in the sun’s nature; and that light is a more actual and more absolutebeing than movement is; and that only God acts by his essence, and so on.You are making difficulties in words where there are none in reality. Thereis no more problem than if I said that a clock shows the time only by themovement of its hands, and that its quality of showing time is not a moreactual or absolute being than its movement, and that this movement be-longs to it by its nature and essence, because it would cease to be a clock ifit did not have it. I know that you will say that the form of the clock is onlyan artificial form, while the form of the sun is natural and substantial; but Ireply that this distinction concerns only the cause of these forms, and notat all their nature; or that the substantial form of the sun, insofar as it differsfrom the qualities to be found in its matter, is an altogether philosophicalentity which is unknown to me.

(AT 2: 367–8, CSM 3: 121–2)

Again, a clock analogy appeared in a piece that Descartes wrote for Regius todefend himself against Voetius and his followers’ attempts to oust Regius from hisChair at the University of Utrecht. In many ways this exposition of his ownposition helps explain the clock passage of the Meditations:

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All the arguments to prove substantial forms could be applied to the form ofa clock, which nobody says is a substantial form.

(AT 3: 505, CSM 3: 208)

The second proof is drawn from the purpose or use of substantial forms.They were introduced by philosophers solely to account for the properactions of natural things, of which they were supposed to be the principlesand bases, as was said in an earlier thesis. But no natural action at all can beexplained by these substantial forms, since their defenders admit that theyare occult and that they do not understand them themselves. If they saythat some action proceeds from a substantial form, it is as if they said thatit proceeds from something they do not understand, which explains noth-ing. So these forms are not to be introduced to explain the causes of naturalactions. Essential forms explained in our fashion, on the other hand, gavemanifest and mathematical reasons for natural actions.

(AT 3: 506; CSM 3: 208–9)

Note that the artificiality of the clock works for him in these passages and in theMeditations passage in two ways. First, advocates of substantial forms introducethem primarily to explain the motion of natural beings. But this explanatorystructure explains too much in the sense that it will explain the motions ofhuman artifacts like clocks. Second, though clocks may be quite intricate, theyare all motion and gears, and thus lend themselves more easily to explanationsbased on mechanical principles. Also, as the Regius passage most clearly shows,dispensing with mechanical explanations of natural phenomena in favor of ex-planations employing substantial forms results in substituting transparent (math-ematically lucid) explanations for explanations that have at their center “oc-cult” or mysterious entities.

10 Circles

1. We make no pretense of exonerating Descartes from all charges of circularreasoning: indeed, we raise one of our own at the end of the chapter. We merelyclaim that in the Meditations Descartes is not guilty of the charge of circularreasoning raised by Arnauld and the other authors of the Objections.

2. Nor do the proofs require a maximally clear idea of God; they require only suchclarity as is sufficient to distinguish the idea of God from ideas of other things.Given Descartes’s remark to Hobbes that “everyone has the form or idea ofunderstanding; and by indefinitely extending this he can form the idea of God’sunderstanding. And a similar procedure applies to the other attributes of God”(AT 7: 188, CSM 2: 132), it seems that even ideas of God that are less clear thanthose found in Meditation Three (see AT 7: 40, 45, 46, 49; CSM 2: 28, 31, 35)would be sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the arguments in that Meditation.

3. As we also argued in Chapter Six, the notion of sufficient clarity varies with thequestions one poses. While an idea composed of a certain number of propertiesmight be sufficiently clear to allow one to distinguish between a cow and a horse,the same idea might not be sufficiently clear to distinguish between a Holsteincow and a Jersey cow.

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Index

adventitious ideas 48, 50, 55, 166,172–5, 191–2, 194, 197, 200,284n.20

analysis, method of 2–4, 13–24, 39;argument/inference to best explanation 43–4; discoveringclear and distinct ideas 45; divi-sions of problems in Meteorologyand Optics 34–45; enthymematicargument 16; in Meteorology andOptics 44; method of demonstration 13–14; and order of argu-ments 38; search for eternaltruths/general principles 144,257, 288n.5; see also best explanation, double method, eternaltruths, innate ideas, intuition,natural laws, natural light

Archimedean point 130–1; see alsocogito

Aristotle 76; on Abstraction 119;Categories 147; De Anima 153;formal cause defined by 72

Arnauld, A.: accusation of circularity5, 253–7; analytic distinct fromsynthetic methods 3; objection todivine self-causation 77–9

atheisitic geometer 233–4Augustinian account of free will: sym

pathies with 209; see also free willaxioms 14; see also eternal truths

Bennett, J.: on Cartesianconceivability and possibility273–4n.18; rejection of naturallaws as eternal truths 273n.18;thinned notion of Cartesianefficient causality 272n.11

best explanation, argument/infer-

ence to 23, 43–4, 166; and discovery 31–2; ill-defined 265n.36; ofimagination 239; ontologicalargument example of 229

Beyssade, J.-M.: on infinity and per-fection 283–4n.18

body: concept of 151; as divisible 250

Caterus: objection to divine self-causation 73–4

causal maxim, Descartes’s 55, 177–8;two corrolaries of 178

causation/cause 72–99; blurring ofefficient/formal causation 75, 81,188, 255–7; creation vs. conservation/preservation 76; distinctfrom effect 77–8; efficient 188(broadened meaning 81–2;meaning 74, 256–7); final 84,205–6, 250; formal 76, 83 (andpsychological laws 91–7; Cartesiancauses as 252; as essence 82, 83; asexplanation of essence 77);formal/efficient distinction 72,75–7, 80; infinite regress of 73–4,79; mind and body 72 (see alsomind/body interaction); self-causa-tion 72, 74–5, 188–9; see alsoeminent causation

certainty 30–2; metaphysical 30–1;moral 31

Cherbury, Lord Herbert:on truth 50–1chiliagon 238, 263n.15, 291n. 1circle, Cartesian 5, 252–8; Descartes’s

mistake 255–7; exposition of 253;failure to escape 256–7; and God’snondeceptiveness 253; and material and formal truth 253–5; see alsoArnauld, truth

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clarification, conceptual/ideational45–71, 152; as opposed to valida-tion of ideas 71; of self 129; ofwax 129, 155; see also God

clarity and distinctness 201–2; ofarithmetic and geometry 168;and conceptual clarification 152;degrees of 24, 255; degrees ofpossibility 290n. 14; distinctnessrelative to investigative context170; and natural light 55; andmaterial truth 56; see also ideas,clarification, natural light, truth

clear and distinct ideas/perceptions25, 161, 167, 185–6, 196, 202; andarguments for God’s existence254–5; and corporeal substance183; as disclosing material truth120; and existence claims 167; for-mally true 211–13; idea of God asparadigm of 185; limited toessences and necessary truths 98,137, 215; mark of the possible170; materially true 210; andmemory 232–6; of rainbow’s cause106–7; representations of trueand immutable natures 212; shiftfrom material truth to formaltruth 211; and true andimmutable natures 255; truth of45–53; of wax 157–60

cold 24, 113, 181–3, 238, 240cogito: as hypothesis 143; material

truth of 143; and res cogitans146–55; and self as thought 152;and sense perception 152

cogito argument(s) 131–55;as nthymematic 131–3; imagination/understanding distinction 154–5; in Meditations 143–55; outsideMeditations 131–43; in Principles132–3; in Second Replies 132,138–9; structure of 163

common notions see eternal truth(s)confirmation, Cartesian 212; three

elements of 203consideration, order of 137–9, 229;

sum prior to whatever thinks exists133–4; as opposed to order epis-temic priority 19, 38–9, 57, 133

contingency/contingent truth(s):as contrasted with eternal truths 31

Conversation with Berman 133–9;orders of consideration andepistemic priority 139–40; on theactual and the possible 25–6

deductive–nomological explanation17, 23, 77, 85; see also causatio

defective faculties: see hypotheticaldoubt

demon, malicious/evil: see hypotheti-cal doubt(s), malicious demon

Dicker, G.: on Cartesian rejection ofScholastic definition of humanity147; on implications ofDescartes’s causal maxim 178

Discourse on Method: and cogito argument 137, 140; methodologicalrules as applied to conceptual/ideational clarification 56–8

disjunctive syllogism: as argumentstrategy 144, 146–7

dissimulation thesis 1–2, 259n.1divine deceiver 93, 111, 126–7, 144,

173, 205, 212, 220, 233; see alsoepistemic thesis

divine nondeceptiveness 240, 258;implications of 210–13, 214,230–7; and material objects/world243–6; see also God, as exonerated,theodicy, material objects/world

double method of coherence 17,18–22, 98–9, 202, 203, 257–8; seealso analysis, method of

doubt, method of: a preliminary tofoundational knowledge 113–14;purpose of 111; systematic application of 32; see also methodological

dream argument: see epistemologicaldoubt, dream argument

dropsy 24, 249–51

eminent causation 179, 180–4enumeration 40–3, 157; activities of

mind 154, 160; causes of self187–8; complete 41; complete vs.sufficient 267–8n.17, 284n.18;divine attributes 135–6; ideas withorigin external to self 176; fivetypes of problem 42; ideas 171–2;kinds of idea 172 (see alsoinnate/factitious adventitious); aslist 41–2; sufficient 41–2;thoughts 166–7; and wax 158

empiricism: limited Cartesian 204,248–9; naive 248; see also empiricist principles

empiricist principles 5, 6–8, 114, 173,204; Enhanced Principle ofAcquaintance (EPA) 116–18, 120,249, 250, 251; naive realism 240;naturally assumed 51–2, 55, 114,

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173; passivity thesis 51, 173–5,194, 243; refutation of 116; resem-blance/resemblance thesis 119,171, 173–5, 194–6, 240, 282n.12;as subordinate to reason 251;Scholastic maxim 112; see alsoempiricism, Scholasticism

epistemic: priority, order of: distinguished from order of considera-tion 38–9, 57, 133–4; whateverthinks exists prior to sum 133–4 (seealso cogito, consideration); pru-dence 115; thesis: 45–6; divine deceiver 55; implicit belief in284n.18; lack of textual evidence46–52; philosophical argumentagainst 52–3; redundant 52; rejec-tion of 45–55; see also analysis,innate ideas, light of nature

epistemological doubts 111, 114–20;dream argument 117–20; dreamopposed to waking states 118–19;see also Principle of Acquaintance

error, human 5, 204–10, 249–51;avoidance of 208–10; degrees of291–2n.5; necessary condition for267n.12; possibility of divinedeception 53; see also divinedeceiver, God, nondeceptiveness,theodicy

essence(s): actual 257; alleged differencesbetween natural laws and87–91; and clear and distinctideas 211–12; prior to existence136; /existence distinction: col-lapse of 229–30; existence in relation to 24; as formal cause 76;formation of ideas of 55; knownby the natural light 137; andPorphyrian trees 147–51; possible257; possible as opposed to actual215; similarities between naturallaw and 86; of self 138–9; of wax156–7; see also essential attribute,eternal truths, God, natural laws,true/immutable natures, true logic

essential: attribute: 138; as simple/general 153–4; of self/soul 152,153; see also attribute, God, cogito/self/soul; change 225

eternal truths 14, 96–7; assumed inanalysis 146; creation of 287n.6;essence 24; explanatory principles131; simplicity generality of 14;hierarchical domains of 14–17;

innate 142; lacking existentialimport 26, 30; and laws of physics90–1; only material truths263n.16; and mathematical truths26; method of analysis as searchfor 14; and natural laws 87–91;psychological laws 93; result ofreasoning 218–19; and self 139;and true and immutable natures 201; see also analysis, essence(s);true and immutable natures

existence: as independence 227;transcategorical term 228; see alsocogito, eternal, formal reality, God,material objects/world, self

extension/extended entities 48, 159,183–4; as continuous quantity 216

Fachwerkhaus 7–8, 203factitious ideas 48, 50, 55, 166, 172–3,

191–2, 193–197, 202, 266n.6falsity, formal: see error, judgment,

truth; material: as function ofobscurity and confusion 24; andideas of sensation 24; see also cold,heat, sense/sensory, truth

forms, Aristotelian doctrine: rejected 83foundations, criteriological 130–1, 150freedom, from error 207; see also

error, humanfree-will 267n.12; see also freedom

Garber, D.: on Descartes’s explicitlymentioning the method 276n.1;on Descartes as occasionalist275n.24; account Descartes’s viewson substantial forms 274n.22

geometry 14–17; and material objects245; truths neither implying norpresupposing existence 226

God, idea(s) of 5, 180–1, 184,197–202; Descartes on the consistency of 288n.8; list of properties197–201; factitious 166, 197–202;formally true 224; Hobbesian(HIG) 197–202; innate 166, 191–3,197–202; maximally possible290–1n.14; perfect 197, 199–202;transformations of 193; unity of190; see also clear and distinct idea

God 184–6, 190–1; analogy betweenmathematics and 222; atemporal-ity 778; attribute(s) 197–8, 200–1;beyond efficient causation 73–4;contrasted with nothingness 205;

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cosmological arguments 175–91,255; and clear and distinct ideas212–13; creator of eternal truths233; existence arguments, pur-poses of 5, 228–230; existenceas essence 26, 79, 80, 226; existence as eternal truth 26; exonerated 204–10, 250–1, 267n.13;and human free–will 205–9; infin-ity as essence of 78; immutable224–5; limited human understand-ing of 186; omnipotence 80, 205;and omnibenevolence in free–willissue 205; perfect being 223–4;unique 224–5; and voluntarism273n.14; will of 206; see alsoscausation, self–causation, divinedeceiver, factitious ideas, humanerror, innate ideas, nondeceptiveGod, ontological argument, perfection, theodicy, true/immutablena tures

Gueroult, M.: on ontologicalargument 228; reduces Cartesianmethod to search for innate ideas266n.1

heat 24, 113, 181–3, 238, 240Hoffman, P.: on substantial union of

mind and body 274n.23house, metaphor for knowledge 6–9,

112–14, 129–30, 170, 203,291n.16; and lateral supports 214–15, 221, 228–9, 235 humanity, nature of 57, 146–55; Aristoteliannotion of 57, 150 human lion 148hypotheses/suppositions 5, 39, 57–8, 158, 159; to be confirmed 145;in breaking code 43; cogito as 143;criterion of truth 167–8; defectivefaculties 121–3; and enumeration40–3, 98; and explanation of light69–70; formation of 17–18;in Geometry 15, 18; in metaphysical writings 115, 120–8; in Meteorology 36; and parsimony 23;refutation of I do not exist 145–6;to be refuted 145; representativerealist thesis as 176; resemblancethesis as (see empiricist principles,resemblance/resemblance thesis);in scientific writings 114–15;three deceiver-God 121–3; threehypotheses concerning God’sexistence 189–91; of wax’s existence 155, 156; see also divine deceiver, empiricist principles,passiv ity thesis

hypothetical doubt 111, 120–7; defec-tive-faculties as 111, 125–6, 144,235; deceiver God as 126–7;irrefutable by atheist 234; malicious-demon as 111, 121–3, 124–5,144, 154; task of 120; seealso divine deceiver, psychologicalcompulsion

idea(s): of angels 181; complex vs.simple 145; of light 58–71;and representation 171–5;of sensation 24; rejection of clarification as validation 71; relative264n.23; see also adventitious,clear and distinct, empiricist principles, factitious, innate, resemblance/resemblance thesis, sense/sensory experience, simple, sun,universal

imagination 157, 158, 160–1, 163;apparently applied to body 237;distinguished from the understanding 237–8; nonessential to self asthinking being 239

immortality of the soul 96, 291n.3indefiniteness; see infinite/indefinite dis

tinctionindifference of the will 207–8, 286n.2indubitability: only a necessary condi

tion for truth 50–1infinite/indefinite distinction 197–9,

285n.24; Descartes’s inconsistentuse of 270n.28

innate/factitious/adventitious distinction166, 172–3, 191–2, 194

innate ideas/innateness 45–58;actualized by reasoning 196, 198;broad sense of 46; dispositional account of 46, 193, 266nn.2,3;dispositions 218; distinctness between truth and 51, 54–5;explanatory of concept formation53–5, 218; naive empiricist principle as 55; narrow sense of 46;seeds of truth 47; sparks of knowledge 46–7; triggered by analyticaland critical reasoning 196–7; seealso adventitious, epistemic, factitious, God, innate, sun, triangle

infinity/infinite substance orattribute 184–6, 198–9, 206,289n.10; anticipation of denumerable opposed to nondenumerable270n.29; distinguished from finitesubstance 184–6, 187; generative

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304 Index

rule 284n.18; incomprehensible283n.18; prior to finite 185;see also substance, God, perfection

instinct: two senses of 51–2; see alsoempiricist principles

intellect: see understanding, faculty ofintuition 27–9; opposed to de uction 27–

9; recognition of truth 28; recognition of deductive valid ity 28; ofthe self 136; see natural light

judgment, faculty of 5, 157, 160–2,206–13; and clear and distinct ideas170–1; existential vs. essential 125;misused 205; formal falsehood asfunction of misuse of 23–4; function of will and understanding 206;perfection of 205; suspension of116; and wax’s nature 160; see alsoanalysis, error, human, theodicy,understanding, will

Kenny, A.: on cogito 135;on dispositional account of innateideas and learning 266n.3

knowl edge: through abstraction 119;based on knowledge of God 231;deduction from fundamental elements 219–20; nonsensuous basisfor 116; of true and immu-tablenatures 218; see analysis, clear anddistinct ideas, intuition, judgment

Leibniz, G.: on Cartesian method ofanalysis 1; Descartes anticipatesbest of all possible worlds 206

light 58–71; and arrangement ofarguments in Optics 35–6;and color as spin of particles 105–6; commonsensical idea 59;geometrical phenomenon 59, 64;illustration of particles 106;illustration of prism 105;as instantaneous 60–1; as particles105–6; reflection 65–7, 103, 104;refraction 67–70, 103–4;as straight-line phenomenon 62–3;tennis ball model of 65–70;two Cartesian accounts 268–9 n.19;walking-stick model 59–60;wine-vat model 61–65; see alsoScholasticism

light of the mind see natural lightLocke, J.: account of abstraction 54

material objects/world: actual existence

of 242–4; general nature of 242–3;individual 245, 246; justification of5; as mathematical objects 244;natural disposition to believe 127;possible existence of 230; prob-able existence of 238–9

mathematics: analogy between Godand 222; as certain 5, 220; andinnate ideas as true 216–18;and true and immutable natures 215;see also material objects/world

Meno’s paradox 264n.23methodologi cal doubt: as propae deutic

to meta physical analysis 259methodological inquiry, two object-

ives of 4mind: indivisible 250; perceptions of

157, 160; see also real distinctionbet. mind and body

mind–body interaction 91–7, 250–1;substantial union 96–7; see also realdistinction

mode(s): light as 60, 62, 269n.20;and second cosmological argument189; sense perception and imagination as 157; of substance 183–4,275–6n.24; thoughts as 157, 163,279n.2

mountain/valley analogy 223

natural laws: essence of material world72 88–90, 98; eternal truths 72,95–6; psychological laws as 91–7;and psychological laws as divinelyordained 92–3; see also deductive-nomological explanations, essence,eternal truths

natural light 27–9, 101, 158, 163, 189,246; clear and distinct perception203; confirma tion 21–2; distinguished from in stinct 51–2, 173;faculty for dis cerning truth 52;guide to material truth 15, 170–1;hypotheses rec ognized by 15–16;inclination to follow 207; and mathematical truth 217; and recognizing truth 48; soul/self as known by136; see also analysis, intuition,epistemic priority

nature, taught by: limitation 246; nec-essary existence 226

necessity/necessary truth (s): and absolute or metaphysical cer tainty 31;as basis for certainty 30; by hypothesis 146; natural laws as 86–7, 88–91; recognition of 273n.18;

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as truths based on deductions 31, 81noncontradiction, principle of 115–16nondeceptive God 5, 168, 204,

230–6, 237, 250, 258; arguments:for formal truth of clear and distinct ideas 212–13; general form of214; to undercut any metaphysicaldoubt of mathematical truths 231–6; for actual existence of materialobjects/world 242–4

occasionalism 275–6n.24ontological argument 214, 221–30,

202; confirmation God’s existenceas consequence of perfection 228–9; entailing existential judgment221; Kantian existence-as-predicateobjection 225–6; rationale for thirddivine existence argument 228;search for and confirmation of principles 228; God-as-independentvariation of 228

Pappus 18parsimony, principle 22–3,

264–5n.28; see also reductionPaul of Venice 20–1perceptions: as act or object 168–9;

see also clear and distinct, ideas,sense/sensory experience

perfection(s) 179, 185–6, 188–90,205–7, 224; as unifying characteristic of idea of God 285n.27;see also God, ontological argument

physics: morally certain 31–3; basedmetaphysically certain principle 33

pineal gland 92–93; and the faculty ofthe will 93; and psychological lawsconnecting the will to 93, 247–8,250–1

Porphyry’s Isagoge 147–151Porphyrian trees 147–151, 280–

1nn.10, 11possible/possibility: and conceivable 87,

273–4n.18; and eternal truth 87;material truth mark of 25–61;Scholastic understanding of 148possible worlds 33, 88, 98;actual world as best of all 206

preconceived opinions 113–14;based on previous judgments 142;rejection of 128

pre-philosophical individual 159; see also empiricist principles, naive

primitive notions 94–6;mind and body 247–8

principal attribute 96; as germane to thedoctrine of substance 94;of mind–body union 94, 96;of the soul/self 152–3;see also cogito, essence(s), God, perfection

Proto-Gorgias, dilemma of 115–16psychological compulsion 207–8,

220–1, 232, 233, 235, 243;of belief in God’s existence 224;degrees of 225; see also clear anddistinct ideas/perceptions, will

rainbow 100–7; phenomenon of refracting light (see light, refraction);super droplet 101; illustration 102;in Meteorology 100–7 Ramus, P. onformal causation 84 real distinction(mind/body) 241–2 reality, formal:179; basis for second cosmologicalargument 187; degrees of 189, 227;three degrees of 180; degrees of independence 227–8; objective: 176;degrees of 177; gap between formalreality and 179–80; see also causalmaxim

real qualities 22, 24; as sec ondaryqualities 113; see also Scholasticism

reason, light of: see natural lightreduction 8–9; of the complex to

the simple/general 36–7, 56–7;and formal cause 77; of geometrictruths to arithmetic truths 14–16;in metaphysics 112; of physical lawsto mathematical laws 89–90;in rainbow explanation 104

representative realism 176

Scholasticism: abstraction 119;Descartes’s rejection of 147–51;Descartes’s avoidance of explicitlyrejecting 149–50; maxim of 112;methodological complexity in 150;and real qualities 22, 149; substantial forms 22, 149; light as intensional form/intelligible species 60;see also humanity, light

secondary qualities 181–3; Scholasticdefinition 113; victim of dream argument 125; and wax 156–7

sense/sensory experience 6, 113, 114,144, 158–63, 173; in analysis 39–40; in conceptual clarification 64–5, 262n.13; erroneous judgments

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306 Index

based on 115, 240–1; independentof will 241; and intuition 27–8;justification 281n.12; knowledgefrom 19–20, 263n.17; limits on judgments 248–9; precritical beliefsabout 240; rejected as foundational133, 143; role in forming naiveempiricist principle 55; role ofimagination 239; and soul/self 152,242; source of material falsity 24,261n.13; source of second level ofwisdom 18; of tower 115, 116–17;vision in Optics 35; see alsoadventitious, cold, empiri cist, heat,nature, sun

simple ideas: innate or adventitious194–5

simple natures 127; see eternal truthssimplicity/generality 37; as reduction

of complex phenomena 38solipsism, epistemological 180soul/self: essential or principal

attribute of 138–9, 152, 241–2;possible cause of God 188–9;parents as cause of 190; as rescogitans or thinking substance 242

substance 163–5; corporeal 147–8,181–3; identity through time 164–5; incorporeal 147–48; as independence 164, 187,227–8,289–90n.14; see also infinity

substantial forms 22, 250; Descartes’srejection 292n.6; see alsoScholasticism

sun: astronomical idea of 58, 175, 194;astronomical idea as factitious 194–5; passively received 194; result ofreasoning 58–9; sensory idea 58–9,175, 267n.14; two ideas 58

synthesis, method of 3, 14

tree, metaphor for knowledge 6, 8–9triangle/triangularity: and essences

of extended things 48, 216–21;illustration 16; chilagon ormyriagon opposed to 237–8;nonsubstantial entity 96; status oftruths about essence 49; subject ofproof that requires memory 230–4; universal idea 195–6

true and immutable natures 96, 211, 215–21; and epistemic role 219–20;and essential principles 219–20;as ideas in mind of God 218;of God 49, 224; ontologically

significant 218; represented by clearand distinct ideas 215

true logic, dictum of 24, 45, 83, 98,136, 140, 144, 167, 170–1, 215,224–5, 229–30, 281n.1

truth: equivocal opposed to univocal263–4n.19

truth, criterion of 167–8; see also clearand distinct, divinenondeceptiveness, God, natural light

truth, formal 23–7; God’s existence as a224

truth, formal/material distinction 204,211–12, 230, 258truth, material 23–7, 166;and clear and distinct ideas 255;in cogito argument 143; of idea ofGod 185–43; and innate ideas 45–55; principles known as 33;recognized by natural light 15;of proposition whatever thinks, exists 139

understanding, faculty of 161,206–10; limited 206;recognizing ideas as true 48

universal ideas 195–6; actualized by innate dispositions 196; formation of196 Urban the Averroist: on analysis 19

void: assumed nonexistence of 269n.25;consequences of rejection of269n.24; Descartes’s rejection of62, 269n.23 voluntarism, divine:see God

Voss, S.: on Descartes’s unsettled viewof human nature 274n.23

wax, piece of 155–63, 196, 239–40;characteristics 156–8, 182;continued examination 216,287n.2; example of conceptualclarification 157–60, 215–16;judgment about nature of 125

Wells, N.: on material falsity260–3n.13

will, faculty of 206–10; belief as aresult of 276n.25; as efficient cause72, 76; function in the dream argument 174; lacking external con-straints 206; made in the imageof God 92, 209; and pineal gland93; sense perception as independentof 241

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