CHAPTER-4
Descartes Dualism and Derridean Deconstruction: A Comparison and Contrast
4.01 INTRODUCTION:
W c, in this chapter, shall expound and cxamll1e the basic
charges leveled by Jacques Derrida on the philosophy of Rene
Descartes. As a matter of fact, Descartes philosophy can be broadly
divided into two parts. First, the issues which are at the centre of his
philosophy like Cogito, rationality, scientific knowledge, existence of
God, existence of matter etc. And secondly, the issues which are at the
margins of his philosophy like dreams, madness, deception, demon,
fantasy etc. Derrida's critic of Descartes implies a deconstruction of
the central issues of Descartes' philosophy. And at the same time
bringing at the centre those issues which arc at the margins of
Descartes' philosophy. I-Iuman subjectivity, rationalism, truth are
subjected to rigorous criticism by Derrida. We shall therefore,
examll1e Derrida's critique of Descartes Cogito, rationality, scientific
knowledge etc. On this basis we shall develop Derridas deconstruclion
which centres around Descartes doctrine of dream, madness,
deception, fantasy, etc.
4.02 DERRIDA & FOUCAULT
We shall also dwell on the debate between Foucault and Derrida
regarding their reading of Cartesian text. To make it so comprehensive
113
we would like to divide this debate into two sections. In the first
section we will discuss about the Foucauldian reading of Cartesian
text and in the section two we will discuss about Dcrrida's rejection of
Foucauldian reading of Cartesian text. Derrida's own reading of
Cartesian text emerges in this process. We will develop the 'doubt'
'Cogito' and the existence of God' of Descartes in order to make a
comparison between Descartes and Den·ida. We will develop the
debate through the Cogito and the "History 0/ Madness" and "Sign.
Structure and play in the Human Science", in Writing And difference
and Foucault's History o/Madness.
4.03 DESCARTES FOUNDATION:
Rene Descartes as we have seen has developed the isslles like
human SUbjectivity, rationalism, Cogito and the existence of God,
which provide the ground work and the elaboration of debate between
structuralism and post-structuralism (particularly between Michael
Foucault and Jacques Derrida). We would like to develop the above
issues in order to understand the debate well. This study will provide
some new understanding by the debate between structuralism and
post-structuralism, i.e. Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida.
114
Rene Descartes has subjected the issues like s u bj ect i v i t y"
rationalism, development of science which are under the rigorious
criticism. Derrida and Michael Foucault, both have rejected Cartesian
concepts by their own ways of interpretation. Foucault has taken the
above issues and interpreted it in a different manner. A new scenario
has been found in the foundation of Cartesian subjectivity. Here to
make clear about Derrida's and Foucault's positions on Cartesian text,
Dalia .ludovitz says "if for Foucault, Descartes exclusion of madness is
instrumental in the fuundation of reason. for Derrida madn(;ss and
dreams, arc merely stages for the introduction of hyporbolic doubt.
which through its figurative function generates an access that comes to
define subjectivity in terms of a rational economy", I
4.04 DERRIDA AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS
Foucault has emphasized over the uses of madness in Descartes
whereas Derrida as madness and dream related with the introduction
of doubt only. Both have defined subjectivity and the exclusion of
madness from foundation of reason in Descartes. Foucault and Derrida
Judovitz Dalia, CUl7tinentu/ Phi/usuphy - II, Derridu und DeconstructiolJ, By Hugh J. Selverman, New York and London, Routledge, 1lJ89, pAO.
115
have given different statlls to the orIgin or reason. Reason is
constructed through the 'totalising gesture' or hyperbolic doubt. This
very 'concept of reason' leads to Saussure's structural foundation
which we already have mentioned.
Derrida in writing and difference says,
" .... Michael Foucault devotes three pages - and moreover
in a kind of prologue to his second chapter to a certain
passage from the first of Descartes' meditations. [n this
passage madness, folly, dementia, insanity seem,
emphasized seen. dismissed excluded, and ostracized
rrom the circle of philosophical dignity ..... Descartes -
this last tribunal of a cogito that, by its essence, could not
possibly be mad".2
[t shows that Derrida took only three pages in Foucault's text
which are taken from Descartes tirst meditation. And Cog ito IS
rational which excludes madness from the philosophical attention of
Descartes. Derrida disagrees with Foucault's explanation of Descartes.
In his Language-
Dcrrida Jacque; Wriling ond Difference, Trans. Allan Bass, (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1(76), p.32.
116
" ... Cartesian Cogito proposed to us engages III its
problematic the totality of this historv o/mudness ... "3
Descartes Cog/to or Sensory foundation is simple denounce In
order to get clarity and certainty in the mcditation. i3ut in order to get
a clear explanation regarding 'madness'-\et's expound his Meditation
where he has used madness two times.
We already have discussed the First meditation in the second
chapter of our thesis, which ends on the note of apparently universal
doubt. Let us IW\V think about the Clrst meditation where both the
thinkers begin tlll.:ir debate. In order to get indubitable knowledgc
Descartes needs to re-examine the foundations and opinions of his
predecessors. llowever lkscartcs effort entailed him a wonderful
result which is certitude.
Though we have mentioned this quotation in our earlier chapter
but still to get a clarity, we will mention it here also. In order to
explain the deceptive and uncertain nature of the senses, Descartes
writes,
Derrida Jacque; Writing and Difference, Trans. Allan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976. p.32.
1\7
"I have sometimes found that these senses played me
false and it is prudent never to tusk entirely those who
have once deceived us".4
This doubt is the turning point and leads Descartes to <: fixed
point from which he reconstructs the world. In the Firs! A1ecii!afiol7
Descartes says
"All that up to the present time I have accepted as most
true and certain, I have learned either from senses or
through the senses~ but it is sometimes proved- to me that
these senses are deceptive and it is wiser 110t to trust
entirely to anything by which we have once been
deceived".5
Descartes has concluded never to trust anything which has once
deceived. Descartes introduced the malign demon who has employed
all his energies in deceiving him. Descartes says,
"S uppose therefore that all the things 1 see are false; I
persuade mysel f that none of those things ever existed
that my deceptive memory represents to me; I suppose I
Descartes Rene, Discourse on method and the meditations, trnas. by fE. Sutdiffe (Penguine book 1979) p.96.
Ibid .. p.96.
I 18
•
have no senses: I believe that body, tigure. extension. -
movement and place are only fictions of my mind. what,
then shall be considered true'? Perhaps only this, that
there is nothing certain in the world".6
Here Descartes placed body, figure earth, shapes, sounds all are
simple delusions of dreams.
The "Method of doubt" in Descartes is placed at the center or
the debate between Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Derrida has
expounded his critique of Foucault in his later essay "Sign. structure
and play in the human sciecnes", and "Cogito and the history of
madness" in Writing and Difference.
Derrida observes Foucault, in his book History of Madness, and
it basically deals with two series of questions: First is the
interpretation of Descartes intention, proposed to us justifiable?
Secondly, Can madness be regarded as a philosophical issue?
These questions have two implications namely
Ibid, p.102.
119
(a) I lave \V e fully understood the sign its e I t'? Or do we per c e 1 \ e
what Descartes has mentioned?
(b) The Sccond implication of the first question. does the question
number one has the historical meaning assigned to it? [n other ~ ~
\,,'ords has Foucault given a meaning to Cartesian philosophy or
does it have the historical meaning descend to it? Before \ve
explain the above questions lets have a watch on "interiority of
the mind" in Descartes where he questioned the foundation of
knowledge. authority and legitimization.
An important consequence rollowed rrom Descartes hyperbolic
doubt that in case or dream and madness we are not even able to
rccognize the thing as such. Descartcs says.
"But it may be that although the senses sometimes
deceive us concerning things which we cannot reasonably
have only doubt, although we recognize them by their
means. For example there is the fact that I am here seated
by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper
in my hands and other similar matters. And how could I
deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not
perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons devoid
120
or sense whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by
black vapours of black bile .... I should be any less insane
were I follow example so extravagant".7
Foucault gives importance to this passage and claims a
!'undamental imbalance what he called "the economy of doubt"
between madness and dreams. Foucault says,
"dreams or illusions are surmounted within the structure
of truth but madness is inadmissible for the doubting
s u bj ec t" . X
Derrida responds Foucault's above said claims about the
exclusion of madness. Fouccault goes against the philosophical
tradition or interpretation of madness by differentiating between
dream <ll1d Ill<ldness. hLUcClult brings a different nature to both and can
function independent of each other. By doing this Foucault constitute a
new thought what Derrida calls "the advent of ratio" which leads
madness to silence.
Descartes Rene, Discourse on method and the Meditations trans. by F.E. Sutcliffe (Penguine book), p.1 02.
Foucault ell iehcl, !-'o/te-et-deraision; L 'it istone de la FI/te ul 'uge clussii.fue, quotation from [)aliazudovitz, Descartes and Den'ida, Econumizing thought, in C(}nlinental {'hilos()phy Ii (ed). 11..1 silverman New York, London, Routledge, 1989, pA4.
121
4.05 DESCARTE'S DREAM AND MADNESS:
But before discussing Foucauldian concept of madness,
insanity, dream in details, we would like to develop Descartes' notion
ur dream and madness. Uescartes' hyperbolic doubt brings an
important consequence. i3ut it is not only our problem but also we may
be deceived some times which we even not know or be able to
recognise it as sLlch i.e. in the case or dream and madness. Descartes
"But it may be that although the sense somctimes deceive
us concerning things which are hardly perccptible, or
\'Cry far away. there are yet many others to be met with as
to which we can't reasonably have any doubt although
we recognise dream and Madness".9
No doubt Descartes has emphasised over the things which are
hardly perceptible.
Descartes Rene, Method and Meditations by John cottingham etc. 1l)~6, pp.
122
4.06 DERRIDA AND MADNESS
For Derrida Foucault is the first who isolated madness from
dreams and sensation. In Writing And Difference, Den'ida says,
"Descartes is not concerned here with determining the
notion of insanity but rather to ask questions regarding
the general truth of ideas".1 0
Further Derrida says,
"it is in the case of sleep, and not in that 01" insanity, that
the absolute totality of ideas of sensory origin becomes
suspect" .11
Derrida took some or the totalizing qualities or doubt and
defined madness as a term which includes dream, error etc. Descartes
just used the popular notion of insanity in order to arnve at a
methodology, the truth of ideas. As M. Gueroutlt put it,
'" II
"the hypothesis of insanity is therefore not a good
example, a revelatory example a good instrument of
doubt and for at lest two reasons (a) It does not cover the
Dcrrida Jacques, Writing and DifFerence, etc. pp.51.
Ibid., p.51.
123
totalitv of the field of sensory perception. The madman is
not always wrong about every thing; he is not wrong
otten enough. is never mad enough (b) It is not a useful
or happy example pedagogically. because it meets the
resistance ..... ,,12
Den"ida stressed that doubt' of Descartes IS simply an
amalgamation of hypothesis of insanity, example of madman,
dreaming argument and most of the sensory ongll1. I-Ie also
cmphasised 'doubt' as an idea or truth.
But Foucault's usc of madness is non-medical. Michael Foucault
has devcloped the terminology like psychiatry. h'ontiers or reason.
core or reason, madness in his book Madness (lnd Civilization.
Foucault is the first man who related philosophy to psychiatry core of
reason to frontiers of reason and psychiatry is short lived and leads
towards madness. Which is not a fact rather it is a judgement. Foucault
has not given any definition to it rather he has not used it from the
stand point of 'reason'" The title History of Madness as a 'history' of
'madness' is the counter history of 'other form of madness'. In this
context Foucault wrote in his Madness and Civilization
12 Quoted, Ibid, p.SI. 124
"We have yet to write the history of that other form of
madness by which men, in act sovereign reason. combine
their neighbours and communicate and recognise each
other through the mericiless languages of non-
madness".13
This 'Sovereignty of reason, is the basis of cartesian rationalism
and the use is meaning of madness. Foucault has emphasised
'madness' as the subject of his book and it can speak for itself, on the
basis of its own experience and own authority. The history of madness
cannot be explained within the structure in the language of reason.
rather 'the language or psychiatry on madness'.
4.07 HISTORY OF MADNESS IN FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA:
1.1
Derrida says,
"Foucault globally rejects the language of reason which
itself is the language of order.... The language of
psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason on madness,
could be established only on the basis of such a silence. I
Foueault Michel, Madness und Civilization, trans. Richard I-Iardward. (New York, I'atheon. 1965 and London, Tavistock, 1967), p.X/'
125
have not tried to write the history of that language but
rather the archeology or that silence" .14
hHlcault has related the history of madness to the archaeology
of a silence. He has used the term archaeology tirst time in his project.
But 'history' is purely imbibed with the Cartesian subject with the term
like continuity, causality and teleology or modern rationality.
But in the middle of the Seventeenth century. the age of reason
was born. In Madness and Civilization Foucault Says,
"The great threat that downed 011 the horizon of the
Ii I"teenth century Subsides, the disturbing powers that
inhabit Bosch's painting have lost their vioknce. Forms
remall1 now transparent and docile, bonning a cortege.
the inevitable procession of reason" ,15
Foucault wants to explain some forms of freethinking, which is
simply exercise of reason and simultaneously linked with unreason in
Derrida. But in Descartes reason is something which is posited as prior
and hierarchically superior to experience. Descartes emphasises that
reason must determine the happenings of the project, which is defined
14 Derrida Jacaues, Writing and Difference, Tr. by Allall3ass, etc., p.51.
r-oueault Michel, Madness and CivilizatIOn, etc. pp.35-36.
126
as an experience. This 'reason' is one of the criteria of his entire
philosophical system and foundation for proper and orderly
knowledge.
In writing and difference Derrida emphasizes over the concept
of reason and stresses it as the language of order. But Foucault
sometimes rejects this language of reason which is the language of
order, the beginning of revolution against reason and from the
beginning it started within reason. Foucault says
"we have just evoked the broken dialogue betv\lcen reason
and madness at the end of' the eighteenth century a break
that was linalised by the annexation of the totality of
language - and of the right to language by psychiatric
reason as the delegate of societal and governmental
reason, madness has been shifted" .16
Foucault has used a word called 'decision' by which he made a
distinction between reason and madness (unreason) in reading
Descartes. In order to get the development of unreason/madness let's
turn to Foucault's History of madness.
II, Den'ida, Writing and difFerences etc., p.34.
127
Derrida says,
"Foucault wanted to write a history of madness itself that
is madness speaking on the basis or its own experience
and under its own authority and not a history of madness
described from within the language of reason - the
language of psychiatry on madness.... On madness
already crushed beneath psychiatry, dominated, beaten to
the ground, interned, that is to say. madness made into an
object and exiled as the other of a language and a
historical meaning which have been confused with logos
itself" .17 Again Foucault says "but of madness itself, in
its most vibrant state, before being captured by
knowledge" .18
Here Derrida opines that Foucault used the concept 'madness'
which speaks for itself. In every sense of word Foucault wants
madness to be its first narrator, author, which speaks for itself only.
Foucault started with madness. Foueault has said that the history of
madness is link to silence. Again he himself admits that one ean not
speak of madness, except in relation to the other form of madness.
17
IX
Derrida Jacques, Writing & difference, etc. pp.33-34.
Ibid., p.34.
128
That allows men "not to be mad" that is except in relation to
reason" .Il) The history of truth can be received frol11 the economy of
negativity, thought and language. Here question comes to our mind
that how Foucault has related the history of madness to silence? What
is that silence? Derrida also questioned that.
"is there a history of silence? Further is not an
archaeology, even of silence a logic, that is an organized
language, a project, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a
work,?"20
Foucault emphasized that silence is an archaeology and an
organised language. But Derrida says that archaeology of silence
would be possible only in two different ways, that,
1'1
2U
21
..... either do not mention a certain silence, or follow the
madman down the road of his exile. The misfortune of
the mad, the interminable misfortune of their silence, is
that the best spokesmen are those two betray then
b 21 S'I . I' . h' h I est;... 1 ence IS a OglC, a project W lC excu pate
one's own language.
Ibid., p.33
Ibid., p.3S.
Ibid., p.36.
129
4.08 FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA: IN READING DESCARTES'
MEDITATION
Let's have a look over the objections and hesitations expressed
by Derrida and Foucault in their reading and interpretation of Rene
Descartes Meditations. Descartes has started a total skepticism and
has denied all the beliefs he gained. Deceptive nature of sensibility
which experienced passively in the case of sleep and madness lead
Descartes to reform a foundation of knowledge. Descartes placed his
madness and dream in the marginal placc v"here Derrida objected
Foucault's reading of Descartes first meditation and has cmphasized
"the philosophical project of excluding and silencing the
voice of madness")2
Again Foucault also responds to Derrida's claim regarding the
first meditation of Descartes. In the book 'histore de la Folie, Foucault
places his reflection on Descartes on the chapter "the great
confinement". He writes,
Derridian Deconstruction, Bernand Flynn. Edited by 1-1.1. Silverman, Routledge, 1989, p_12.
130
"madness. the voices of which were liberated in the
Renaissance but whose violence it had already mastered,
wi II be reduced to silence in the classical age by a strange
act of force"", in the road of doubt, Descartes encounters
madness on one side of the drl:am and all forms of
error",23
Descartes' meditation where he used madness is quite different
from the passage shown above, Descartes' third meditation where in
order to get the essence of his subject, feigning a set of conditions like
close his eyes, shut the ears, suspend the senses only because to reach
a better knowledge of himself. In the words of Dalia Jidovitz,
21
l3ut Descartes efforts to achieve a more familiar
acquaintance with himself could only take place through
an interior conversation with himself which implies the
use of representation and the exchange of signs that is to
say, the material aqd thus necessarily metaphorical
character of language at the very moment when he
pretends to exclude from his thoughts all image of
corporeal things. If madness can not be excluded on
Descartes, this is because in so doing Descartes would
have to eliminate the very medium through which he
Histoire de la I'olic. Cotted in Derridian Decollstructed by Bernard Flynn, p.202.
131
comes to know himself, which IS the language of the
dialogue in which thoughts are engaged which he can
came into existence as pure subjectivity.,,24
.Iudovitz's acceptance or Descartes madness is the initial
presentation of his philosophy. Descartes has used the concept to
understand pure subjectivity. Descartes has treated everything as no
more true then the reality of dream, illusion of fantasy. Descartes does
not want to feign the madness rather he accepts certain uncertainties of
human faith and belief. In the second meditation also Descartes does
the same which rejects the universal doubt and accepts only one
proposition i.e. Cogito.
Descartes says,
"I existed without doubt by the fact that I was persuaded,
or indeed by the mere fact that I thought at all. But there
is some deceiver both very powerful and very cunning
who constantly uses all his wiles to decieve me to be
nothing so long as I think, I am something. So that after
having thought carefully about it, and having screpously
ludovitz Dalia, "Descartes and Derrida": Economizing thought, in continuetal Philosophy etc., p.46.
132
examined everything, one must thelL in conclusion take
as assured that the proposition: I (1m, exist, IS
necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive of it
in my mind." 2S
Descartes method of doubt was purely to obtain the Cogito and
the Cogito ergo sum, Descartes asserted the mathematical method
which is certain and evidents of reason. By this Criterian Descartes is
even able to apply his reason in everything. Den'ida accept' Cogilo ' as
an impossible fiction. As the some time Dalia J udov itz says,
through a rhetoric of negation whose truth is based
on the totalizing character of fiction and whose evidence
relies on the power of representation to perform even its
own negation, as if the verisimilitude or subjectivity did
not require the substrate of language, even when
attempting not to speak. As Descartes himself later
admits 111 the second meditation, "I am exist IS
necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or that I
mentally conceive it."
This is simply the language which recogl1lses the process of
representation and constitutes subjectivity collectively. Cogito of
Ibid., p.I03.
133
Descartes is the locus or truth and subjectivity. The concept and
method what Descartes adopted is the implicit recognition of the
instrument of language. Cogito as Descartes says,
"A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is
wi lling in unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory
perceptions" .26
Again in the context of objection and replies, Descartes says "I
could not but judge that something which I understand so clearly was
true; but this is not because I was compelled so it judge by any
external force, but because a great inclination in the wilL alld thus the
spontaneity and freedom of my belief was all the greater in propotion
to my lack or indi fTcrencc". Descartes has emphasized over Cogi1o and
its individualistic as well as subjective tendencies which leads two
school of existence namely idealism and materialism. Descartes
established the truth of cogito by Feigning everything to a reality of
dreams.
The Philocophical Writting of Descartes, Trans. John Cattengham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoh, Vol.-ll, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.197.
134
Lcts have a closc look on Descartes text in which the articulated
dream, hyperbolic doubt, deception and its critique. Descartes says
"there are no certain indications by which we may clearly
distinguish wakefulness from sleep".27
Descartes takes for granted not to distinguish between
wakefulness and sleep. On the other hand Derrida analyses Descartes'
dream as an initial hypothesis that, the senses are sometimes
deceptive. In Writing and DUlerence. Derrida says
"In dreams the totality of Sensory images is illusory. It
follows that a certainty invulnerable to dreams would be
a fortiore invulnerable to perceptual illusions of the
sensory kind".2 8
Derrida claims Foucault isolated 'direction' and 'madness' from
sensation and dreams in first meditation where as Michael Foucault
claims that Descartes has taken madness along side dream and all of
sensory error and treated them in same manner. So far the question of
deception is concerned he found some evil genius who constantly
27 Descartes REne, Philosophical writings of Descartes etc., p.146.
Dcrrida Jacques, Writings and Differance, etc, pAS.
135
deceived him and by the cmergence of supreme being 'God' this
concept or deception is over. Dalia Judovitz says
"The fiction of the evil gel11us IS no longer vvithin the
preview of madness, rather its totality IS based on the
figurative power of hyperbole, that IS to say, the
rhetorical appeal to fiction.,,29
4.9 FOUCAULT: IN READING OF CARTESIAN TEXT:
Let us see how docs rOllcault read the Cartesian text. Foucault
strongly stressed that Descartes accepted madness alongside dreams
and all scnsory origins one side and refuses to treat them samely. So in
the economy 01" doubt Foucault says.
"
"there is a fundamental imbalancc betwecn madness, on
the one hand and error on the other..." 30
Again he pursues that
"Descartes does not avoid the peril of madness in the
same way he circumvents the eventuality of dream and
error" .31
Judovitz Dalia, Descartes and Economizing thought, etc., p.52.
Den'ida Jacques: - writing and Defference etc., p.46.
Ibid .. 46.
136
Foucault established two procedures or Descartes regarding
sensory origin. 1\s Foucault claimed that Descartes has said the sense
arc some times deceive us only regarding "things which arc hardly
perceptible or very far away" and he says in the passage where
Descartes says "But it may be that although the senses one away, there
are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably
have any doubt. ..
" unless one is mad, a hypothesis seemingly excluded II1
principle by Descartes in the same passage")2
Descartes shows the limits of the sensory origin which deceive
us II1 any time regarding the perceptible. Descartes also denied the
extention of imagination and dreams for any creativity. Descartes 111
his meditation says,
.12
"corporeal nature in general and its extension, the figure
of extended things, their quantity or magnitude and
number."33
Derrida Jacque, Writing and Difference, etc., p.47.
Derrida Jacues, Writing and Difference, etc., p.46.
137
Descartes has looked for not a sensory origin or dreaming image
to a confidence rather it to be like mathematics and geometry which is
invulnerable in any condition and in any doubt. Foucault in his reading
Descartes says
" that Descartes wishes to find in the analysis (taking
this word in its strict sense) or dreams and sensation a
nucleus, an clement or proximity and simplicity
irreducible to doubt. It IS in dreams and 111 sensory
perception", Again Foucault says, that "! circumvent
doubt and reconquer a basis of certainty,,)4
Again hHlcault says "Descartes docs not avoid the peril of
madness in the same way he circumvents the eventuality of dreams or
of error. .. Neither image - peopled sleep, nor the clear consciousness
that the senses can be deceived is able to take doubt to the extreme
point of its Universality; let us admit that our eyes deceive us, 'let us
assume that we are asleep - truth will not entirely step out into the
night, for madness, it is otherwise," later
14 Descartes Rene, The Philosophical Work of Descartes Trans. by Elizabeth, S. Holdane and G.R.T. Ross, Cambridge: The University Press, 1970, p.146.
138
"in the economy of doubt, there is an imbalance between
madness on the one hand and dream and error on the
other".35
Foucault clearly mentioned that the use of madness, dream and
doubt are quite different in Descartes. He has distinguished the
magnitude of truth in both dream and madness. Truth can be had from
the sleeping state and it can't vanish during the act. But in the question
of doubt madness is little different from dream and error. In order to
give the status of madness dream and error Foucault says
" dreams arc surmounted within the structure of truth;
but madness is in admissible for the doubting subject")6
Derrida claims Foucaults above distinction is first time isolating
madness from dream and error madness is not admissible in the
doubting subject. Truth is not completely impossible during sleep and
dream state. In the first meditation Foucault has interpreted Descartes
madness differently. Foucault has used 'madness' in his book madness
and civilization as the first narrator, and nucleus of foundation.
Descartes use of madness is not right and the way he interprets
" Ibid., pA7.
Ibid., pA7.
139
madness is not necessarily included in doubting subject. Also
Descartes has made a mistake by giving the same status to madness
and dream in search of 'Cogito I. Descartes has emphasized this
concept and simply reduced to 'doubt' which is one of important
feature of Foucault's interpretation of Descartes. Doubt consciousness
- madness, - dream- error- all placed in his first meditation shows an
inattentiveness of certainty. Most of all concepts are L1sed somehow in
the same manner and denounced to arrive at a central point without
doubting, 'a method'. Descartes never used the concept of madness as a
hypothesis and reduced it by decree which Foucault says "the advent
ora ratio".
4.10 DERRIDA: IN READING CARTESIAN TEXT:
Let liS have the same look to Derrida's reading of Descartes and
his interpretation of madness, dream and error. Derrida agrees with
Descartes statement over the world is no more real than his dreams.
And Descartes generalizes the hyperbole the hypothesis of dream and
sleep which leads to the natural 'doubt'. The presence of evil genius -
leads a capitulate and artificial truth. Derrida has also emphasized over
the decissive interpretation of first meditation where Descartes ruins
the old foundation and submits all his opinions to doubt. Derrida
140
somehow explained Descartes attempts to reach a conclusion. a truth,
Cogito on the basis of his method of doubt and use or madness, dream
- error - deception - doubt - etc. Derrida says.
"Descartes IS not interested in madness, he does not
welcome it as a hypothesis, he does not consider it. He
excludes it by decree")7
But Foucault explained as,
"Impossibility of being mad that is essential not to the
object orthought but to the thinking subject."3~
But Descartes - expels madness and denounces it in the
movement 'Cogito' emerged and has rejected from the inferiority of
mind.
4.10a DERRIDA: RE-READING OF CARTESIAN TEXT:
Again in re-reading Descartes, Derrida noticed two things. In
the first meditation where Descartes has used the passage for doubt
which is founded on natural reasons. Derrida says
Ibid., p.47.
Ibid., p.47.
141
"Descartes does not circumvent the eventuality of sensory
error or of dreams and does not 'surmount' them "within
the structure of truth;"39
Descartes has never placed the truth in dream or the knowledge-
Descartes dream IS radical, though radical, Descartes did not
accept the sensory error or dreams which Surmounted within the
structure of truth. Also Descartes has not accepted the total error for
all knowledge rather the formation of knowledge. Sensory images are
illusory in dreams. Derrida says:
... a certainty invulnerable to dreams would be a fortiori
invulnerable to perceptual illusions of the Sensory kind. It therefore
suffices to examine the case or dreams in order to deal with, on the
level which is ours for the movement, the case of natural doubt, of
Sensory error in general. Now which are the certainties and truths that
escape perception, and therefore also escape sensory error or
imaginative and oneiric composition? They are certainties and truths
of a non-sensory and non-imaginative origin. They are simple and
Ibid., p.4 7.
142
intelligible things".40 During the dream state what we perceived arc
raise and illusory. roucault has mentioned insanity with dream. On the
movement Descartes perception in dream is 'False and illusory'.
Denying the existence of body, hand, opening of eyes are simply
insanity which is admissible in the dreaming arguments. Descartes
says,
"let us suppose that all my oneirical representations are
illusory. Even in this case, there must be some
representations of things as naturally certain as the body,
hands etc ... ".41
In Cartesian sense all these things are illusory and the
representations are fictitious and is false. The painting of painter and
its representation also 'extravagant: but Derrida simply has taken
Descartes' concept of extravagant and detined it differently. He says at
the time of painting one should have final element which is not
illusion rather it is an analogy. Derrida has given an analogy between
'dream' and 'painting'. In case of colour Descartes has not accepted the
necessary existence of colour in general and colour is an object of the
40
41
Ibid .. 48.
Ibid.
143
senses among others'. Colour is always remalI1lI1g 111 a painting
whether it is imaginative or inventive. Derrida says,
"there IS 111 dreams an element of non-counterfeit
simplicity presupposed by all fantastical compositions
and irreducible to all analysis. But this time - and this IS
neither sensory nor-imaginative. It is intelligible" .42
Derrida's interpretation regarding painting and dreaming is a bit
difference. That, in painting, finality is there which include colour and
a qualified concept. Painter and colour are existing in an analogy.
which is quite different from sensory origin nor imaginative rather it is
an intelligible. Dream of Descartes and this analogy is different in
Dcrrida's interpretation. Derrida points out some point of Descartes -
which Foucault is not concerned about. And Den"ida has read
Descartes part that,
42
"for as a matter of fact, painters, even when they study
with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by
forms the most strange and extraordinary, can not give
them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a
certain medley of the members of different animals; or if
Derrida Jaques, Writing und diIJerence etc., pAS.
144
their imaginations IS extravagant enough to invent
something so novel that nothing similar has even before
been seen, and that then their work represents a thing
purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the
same that the colours of which this is composed are
necessarily real. And for the same reason, although these
general things, to wit, a body, eyes, a head, hands, and
such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same
time to confess that there are at least some other objects
yet more simple and more universal which are real and
true; and of these just in the same way with certain real
colours, all these images to things which dwell in our
thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic, arc
rormed.
To such a class or things pertains corporcal nature in general,
and its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or
magnitude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time
which measures their duration, and so on.
That is possibly why our reasonll1g IS not unjust when we
conclude from this that physics, Astronomy, medicine and all other
sciences which have as their end the consideration of composite
things, are very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain
145
whether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure of
certainty and element or the indubitable. For whether I am awake or
asleep, two or three together always form five, and the square can
never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that
truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity.43
4.10b FOllcault: Derrida: in Re-I"eading of Cartesian Text:
I n the second phase of re-reading Descartes. Derrida has given
importance on the hypothesis of Insanity Descartes has simply said in
the first meditation that
44
"since the senses are sometime deceptive it is wiser not to
trust entirely to anything by which we have once been
deceived".44
Again Descartes has written
"And how could I deny that these hands and this body are
mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain
persons, devoid of sense, and I should not be any less
insane were I to follow examples so extravagant" .45
Descartes Rene, The Ph i losoph ical Work of Descartes, etc., pp. 146- 147.
Descartes Rene, The Philosophical Work of Descartes, etc., p.145.
Ibid., p.
146
Descartes has stressed over the knowledge of sensory origin
which are deceptive in nature. Derrida says.
"He (Descartes) pretends to put to himself the astonished
objection of an imaginary non-philosopher who IS
frightened by such audacity and says: no, not all sensory
knowledge, for then you would be mad and it would be
unreasonable to follow the example of madmen, to put
1'orth the ideas of madmen."46
Den'ida has clarified the uses of madness of Descartes and says
that 'I am sitting here, writing and you understand me, r am not mad
nor are you and we are sane. If 'X' is writing and 'y' understands x
then x and y both are not mad but sane. So Derrida interpret that can y
doubt about 'x' to be mad to doubt. The example of madness IS
therefore not indicative of the fragility of the sellSory idea.
Descartes acqUiesces this point and can think mad to doubt
about sitting near the fire etc. and also insane to follow the example of
madness. Descartes has elaborated all the possibility of formation of
truth, knowledge and intellectual foundation of certainty.
41> Derrida Jacques, - Wriling und difference etc .. p.50.
147
So far the question of dream is concerned Descartes has never
placed it in one side and has only excluded madness simply. Derrida in
his writing and difference says,
"Descartes is concerned here not with determining the
concept of madness but with utilizing the popular notion
of insanity for juridical and methodological ends, in order
to ask questions of principle regarding only the truth of
ideas".47
It is clear that Descartes intention of using madness and insanity
IS for a juridical and methodological ends. Descartes IS given
importance not for the notion of insanity but for the truth oj" ideas.
Derrida claims the sensory origin become suspect 1\1 case of insanity.
As Derrida notes echoing, Gueroult:
47
"The hypothesis of insanity is therefore not a good
example, a revelatory example, a good instrument of
doubt - and for at least two reasons.(a) It does not cover
the totality of the field of sensory perception. The
madman is not always wrong about everything, he is not
wrong often enough, is never mad enough. (b) It is not a
useful or happy example pedagogically, because it meets
Den'ida Jacques, Writing and DifTerence, etc. [l.51.
148
the resistance of the non-philosopher who docs not have
the audacity to follow the philosopher \vhen he
speaks. ,,48
Insanity what Derrida has agreed with Guarolt, is not proper
example and simply is a revelatory example which is unable to cover
all the tield of sensory perception.
4.10c Foucault: Re-interpretation of Cartesian Text
After the close reading of Descartes text by Foucault and two
times by Derrida lets have a look over Foucaults re-reading of
Cartesian text which emphasizes on two truths and a different
interpretation with Derrida. Madness is simply a single case which is
not taken seriously in Descartes. It is treated as one of sensory and
corporeal fault. As Den'ida says,
.x
"madness is only a sensory and corporeal fault, a bit more
serIOUs than the fault which threatens all walking but
normal men, and much less serIOUS, within the
epistemological order, than the fault to which we
succumb in dreams" .49
Ibid., p.Sl.
Ibid., p.Sl.
149
Foucault qucstioned whether this reduction or madness does not
constitute an exclusion, also claimed madness is related to Cogito and
relation to the intellect, reason from madness. Foucault has stressed
certain factual determination of the concept madness, used by
Descartes (see reference below). When the question of madness exist
and we are taking it as the perversion of the senses or of the
imagination then it IS corporcal in relation with body. As Derrida
observe Foucault has given importance to the madness and it should
110t expel in the outer shadow 01" the cogilO. Derrida says
"Madness to usc an expressIOn proposed c1snvhere by
Foucault is confined to the interior of the exterior and to
the exterior of the interior. It is the other side of the
CogiIO". 50
Madness is just the other side of Cogito as Foucault claims in
the above passage. When I am thinking and distinguishing ideas from
other ideas is Cogito. 51
~o Ibid., p.52.
Reference: What is significant is that Descartes, at bottom, never speaks of madness itself in this text. Madness is not his theme. He treats it as the index of a question of principle, that is, of epistemological value. It will be said, perhaps that this is the sign of a profound exclusion. But this silence on madness itself simultaneously signifies the opposite of an exclusion. Since it is not a question of madness in this text, if only to exclude it, it is not in the mcditations that Descartes speaks of madncss itself.( W&D. pp.308).
150
One cannot be mad when one thinks and has clear and distinct
ideas. Foucault has also emphasized over Descartes' madness and his
cxplanation rcgarding the problematic of knowledge. Madness is not
only error of the body but only the modification of ideas. By doing
this Descartes has originates some error in his language,
"he would even, III the long run, he condemned to
construe it like all errors, not only as an epistemological
deficiency but also as a moral failure I inked to a
precipitation of the will; for will alone: can consecrate the
intellectual finitude of perception as error".
The concept or madness what Descartes has developed is simply
an error, epistemological deficiency in Foucault's language.
Derrida has claimed Foucault's interpretation of two truth is
perfectly correct. First madness - pervasion - relation with corporeal
in alliance with the body. And secondly madness - an error of body
and also a modification of ideas. Foucault has cited Haldone and Ross
that
"however, it seems that these truths becomes vulnerable
in turn, as soon as we come to the properly philosophical
lSI
metaphysical and critical phase or doubt" .52 (See the
re f'erence).
Re(erence: To underline this vulnerability and touch on the greatest
difficult, we could have to specify that the expression "sensory or
corporeal error" could have no meaning for Descartes. There is no
corporeal error, particularly in illness: judice or melancholy are only
the occasions of (In error {hal itself is born only with the concept or
affirmation of the will in judgement yellow. So finally, too, when the
imagination is diseased, as in cases of melancholia. and a man thinks
that his ()'vvn disorderly fencies represent real thing" (Rule XII
Descartes emphasizes this point: the most abnormal sensory on image
native e),perience. cOl1sidered in and of itself as its own level and at
its proper movements never deceive us: or never deceive
understanding. "If it restrict its attention accurately to the o~ject -
presented to it, just as it is given to it either first hand or by means of
an image; and if it moreover retrain from judging that the imagination
faithfUlly reports the objects of the senses, or that the senses take on
Haidane & Russ, p.44.
152
Ihe true forms of things, or in fine that external things always are as
they appear to be p. 53
Derrida absolutely agrees with the two truth of Foucaults
recalling and pointed out Descartes invention of truths in arithmetic,
geometry which are the notions that escape the first doubt and he
writes,
"nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief
that an all powerful God existed by whom I have been
created such as I (1111".54
This is the onset or the well knmvn movement leading to the
fiction of the evil genius. Den·ida in order to understand Foucault's re··
reading turned himself for a close notice of the first meditation.
Descartes' total madness conjures up by the emergence of evil genius
which is beyond control. A total dearrangement inf1icted by evil
genlUs without any responsibility and this dearrangement is of
madness. But in presence of the madness, insanity will spare nothing
This footnotes is an extract from 'Writing and difference' by Jacques Derrida, p.309.
Haldane &Rose etc. p.147.
153
ncithcr bodily nor intellectual perceptions, Derrida In his Writing {[Ild
Difference says
"Now the recourse to the fiction of the evil gelllus will
evoke, conjure up the possibility of total madness, a total
dearrangement over which I would have no control
because it is innicted upon me hypothetically Icaving me
110 responsibility for it. Total dearrangement is the
possibility of a madness insanity, will spare nothing
l1either bodily nor purely intellectual perceptions".55
Descartes has taken some or the Issues when converSlI1g to a
non-philosopher. To cite Descartes,
,,[ shall consider that heavens, the earth, colours, figures,
sound and all other external things are not but the
illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed
himself in order to lay trap for any credulity; I shall
consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no nesh, no
blood, nor any senses yet falsely believing myself of
possess all those things", 56
Den'ida Jacques, Writing and Difference, pp.53
Haldane & Ross, p.14S.
154
Descartes pretends to believe these things and these ideas are
also taken up in his second meditation.
This doubt were actually set inside as Foucault called 'insanity'
related to the interiority or thought, and denied any sorts or
intellectual or sensory origin rrom this new phase of doubt. Derrida
clearly suggests that by the emergence of evi I genius evokes the
possibility or madness. To Foucault "riladness is the absence or a
work". This is the fundamental motif or Foucault's book. Logos is
related with reason, a historical reason. Derrida says
"'and i I' madness in general, beyond any fictitioLls and
determined historical strLlcture is the absence of a work.,
then madness is indeed, cssentially and generally, si lence,
sti ned speech, within a Caesura and a sound that open up
life as historicity in general. Not in a determined silence,
imposed at one given movement rather than at any other,
but a silence - essentially linked to an act of force and a
prohibition which open history and speech" .57
Foucault has related madness to silence and the silence of
madness is the absence of work. But this silence IS not simply any
Ibid, p.54.
155
beginning or epigraph and it IS beyond the fictitious determined
structure. As Dcrrida says,
'"although the silence IS not simply the works epigraph,
nor IS it, as concerns language and meaning outside the
work. Like non-meaning silence is the work's limit and
profound resource of course, in essentiallizing madness
this way one runs the risk of disintegrating the factual
findings of psychiatric efforts. This is a permanent
danger, but it should not discourage the demanding and
patient psychiatrist". 58
Madness is evoked from the interiority or mind and not from the
body. Interiority of mind is possible only through the fiction of
language/language or fiction. In the second phase Dcrrida says
Foucault seems valid during his explanation aboLlt physical doubt.
Descartes rejected madness and radical doubt from knowledge.
Insanity, hypothesis of insanity are not the aspects of knowledge. As
Foucault pointed out Descartes has not raised a point where
knowledge alone be able to dominate madness.
Ibid., 54.
156
4.10£1 Cogito and the Madness:
By the assertion or Cogi/o the madness IS vanished or \ve can
say Cog ito escapes madness for its certainty. It reaches the point
beyond the madness. Foucault says "I who think. can not be mad".
the Cogi/o would escape madness only because as its own moment,
under its own authority it is valid even if I am mad, even if my
thoughts are completely mad. There IS a value and a meanll1g of ~he
Cogi/o, as or existence, which escape the alternative of a determined
madness or a determined reason. Confronted with the critical
experience of the CogilO, insanity, as stated in the discourse on
method. is irremediably on a plane with skepticism. Thought no longer
fears madness.59 It can elaborate further that in the word of Dcscartcs,
<')
Rcmarking that this truth' I think, therefore, am'
was so certain and so assured that all the most
extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics
were incapable of shaking it."60
Den'ida Jacques, Writing and Difference, etc, p.SS.
Philosophical writings of Descartes by Haldon and Ross etc., p.1 0 I.
157
Certainly followed from the emergence of Cogito. It docs not
depend upon any madness or insanity in order to reach its foundation
of certainty. As Foucault has explained in the above passage that even
if I am mad then also Cogito is certain, true, a supreme confidence
without taking madness into account. Thus, the certainty never
deduced from the madness and Derrida says,
"Descartes never in terms madness, neither at the stage of
natural doubt nor at the metaphysical doubt. lie only
claims to e.\:c\ude it during the first phase of the fIrst
stage, during the 110n hyperbolically moment of natural
Derrida has accepted the framework of 'Cogito and its scope
developed by Descartes. Derrida shows a notion of reason and
unreason in Cartesian CogilO. The concept of madness and its audacity
lead a step to a contradiction in every sense of word is only a case of
thought (within thought) Derrida in his writing and difference says,
"Invulnerable to all determined opposition between
reason and unreason it is the point starting from which
the history of the determined forms of this opposition,
(01 Derrida Jacques. Writings and Difference, p.56.
lS8
this opened or broken - off dialogue, can appear as such
and be stated. It is the impenetrable point of certainty in
which the possibility of Foucault narration as well as of
the narration of the totality, or rather of all the
determined forms of the exchanges between reason and
madness are embedded" .62
Den'ida reduced everything to a historical totality except the
hyperbole project, and a determined opposition (reason and unreason)
is historical totality to certainty. Emphasizing the totality of certainty
Derrida cited the existence of Cogilo is concrete even if he is mad or
insane. Den'ida says,
" ..... cven if the totality of the world does not exist, even
if non-mcaning has invaded the totality of the world, upto
and including the very contents of my thought, I still
think, I am while I embrace it, I still formulate the project
of doing so, and this project is meaningful in such a way
that it can be defined only in relation to a pre-
Writing and Difference, p.56.
159
comprehension of the infinite and undetermined
totality"63
Nothing is assumable than Cogito. And openll1g this can be
narrated as the basis of narrating itself only. It can be explained as the
basis or the pre undetermined totality. The undetermined totality has a
identity with the Descartes concept of the demon, evil genius and in
this way Cogilo is unshakable, determined what Derrida has asserted.
By the assertion or Cogito, Descartes wanted to reassure himself
through the veracity of (iod to furnish the activities of Cogito, what
Derrida called
"to identity the act of Cogito with a reasonable reason".64
But Descartes assures the existence of God who protects from
this madness and insanity. By doing this Descartes has 'temporize'
the Cogito which Derrida has claimed,
(,4
"it is God alone who, by permitting me to extirpate
myself from a Cogito that at this proper moment can
Ibid., p.S6.
Ibid., p.SS.
luO
always remain a silent madness, also II1sures IllV
representations and my cognitive determinations, that is
my discourse against madness,. It is without doubt that
for Descartes, God alone".65
But Descartes interpretation of God is absolute of reason, and
undetermined reason which amounts something - absolutely embrace
madness. Den'ida's view that,
"Descartes knows that, without God, llnite thought never
had the ri ght to exclude madness etc. which amounts to
saying that madness is never excluded, except in fact,
violently, in history, or rather that this exclusion."66
With the reference of God and memory Derrida asserted the link
between Cogtfo and unreason. The exclusion of madness can be
obtained as the basis of God, the supernatural power what Descartes
incorporated in his meditation. Foucault's reading \vas more powerful
and illuminating what Derrida observed. By differentiating madness
from reason he has given birth to a moment against the philosophical
tradition. Against Foucault's emphasis over Descartes Cogito, which
Ibid .. , p.SS.
Ibid., p.310.
161
IS. neither to take part or reason as reasonable order. nor the part of
disorder and madness is more illuminating as Foucault has claimed.
Derrida says "leaving in silence the problem of speech posed by
Cogito, Descartes seems to imply that thinking and saying what is
clear and distinct are the same thing. One can say
other,
What are thinks and that are thinks without betraying one or the
" ... the insane man, someone who could not think.
because he could not think what he said. Madness was for
him too. a silence, the voluble silence of a thought that
did not think its own words".67
Derrida has taken for granted Cogito as foundation and related
it as a work and before this work it is madness.
CONCLUSION:
Descartes followed a series of principles and axioms to pull out
himself from madness on the light of reason, and rationality. The
supreme concept of veracious God protects the existence of madness
{,7 Ibid., 59.
162
in Descartes meditation. Derrida says "this identification of the Cogito
with reasonable - normal - r.eason need not even await - in fact, if not
principle - the proofs of the existence of a veracious God as the
supreme protective barrier against madness. This identification
intervenes from the moment when Descartes determines natural light
(which in its undetermined source should be valid even for the mad)
from the moment when he pulls himself out of madness by
determining natural light through a series of principles and axioms.68
Emphasizing the truthfulness of God and certainty like Cogito
followed by certain axioms by Descartes.
Derrida says by separating the Cogito on the one hand,
hyperbole on the other hand, it follows a historicity of philosophy.
And historicity is impossible without a history. As Derrida in writing
and difference says
"I am not proposing the separation of the wheat from the
tares 111 every philosophy in the name of some
philosophia perennis, indeed, it is exactly the contrary
that I am proposing. In question is a way of accounting
for the very historicity of philosophy, and I believe that
Ibid., 59.
163
the latter would be impossible if we possessed only
hyperbole, on the one hand, or on the other, only
determined historical structures. "69
Historicity IS located only III transition the dialogue between
hyperbole and the finite structure. Foucault agalll says "in doubt's
confrontation with its major dangers, Descartes realized that he could
not be mad -- though he was to acknowledge for a long time to come
that the all powers of unreason kept vigil around his thought")O
Foucault searches out the activities of unreason around Descartes
'CogilO "
hi} Ibid., p.60. 70 Foucault MichaeL Folie et derason, Cotted in Writing and difference, p,61.
164