S-and. 1. Mqw Vol. 6. No. 3. pp. IY7-216. IYYIJ Printed in Great Britain

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DESCRIBING MANAGEMENT COGNITION: THE CAUSE MAPPING APPROACH

lLIAUR1 LAUKKANEN

Helsinki School of Economics

(First received December 1989; accepted in revisedform Mny 1990)

Abstract - In management and organization studies. models based on cognitive constructs and processes are increasingly frequent. This means that new methods are needed. and in particular approaches that facilitate comparative designs and more testable argumentation and findings. The paper outlines the cognitively oriented tradition and discusses the related methodological issues in terms of cognitive representation. Cause mapping is suggested as an option for describing and comparing management cognitions that possesses some advantages over the conventional text alternative. Potential applications for pragmatic and research uses are suggested.

Key words: Cause mapping, cognitive mapping. management research. strategy research, cognition. management, organization, firm, empirical studies/methods.

INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses cause mapping (CM) in the research and analysis of managerial cognition. The objective, using an information-processing framework, is to describe the method and its possible uses in general terms. The background is the recent interest in cognitively oriented empirical work and methods, e.g. in strategic management studies, where many scholars seem to consider this a promising direction for research (Porac and Thomas, 1989; Stubbart, 1989). On the other hand, within the emerging paradigm itself, there is some lack of balance in terms of volume and sophistication between the theoretical and the empirical work, in favour of the former. This, and the sometimes excessive robustness of argumentation and findings, suggest a need for more empirical work as well as pragmatic applications.

The paper first outlines the cognitively oriented research in management. Some methodological issues are then analysed, by defining them as a problem in cognitive representation. Third, cause mapping is presented as an alternative tool for the representation task, and is compared especially with the normal text-based alternative for performing a roughly equivalent descriptive task. It is suggested that cause mapping has advantages particularly in a comparative analysis. Lastly, some research and management applications are indicated.

WHY MAP MANAGERIAL COGNITION?

Managerial cognitive research has been around for some time, mainly in the guise of (behavioural) decision-making and organizational learning research. However, it is

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becoming increasingly prominent and multifaceted (cf. Sims and Gioia, 1986). A brief survey of the field is given in Fig. 1, which contains some of the elements and arguments typical of fields such as organizational learning (Hedberg, 1981; Nystrom and Srarbuck, 1985b), strategic adaptation and design (cf. Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; hlintzberg, 1990), or the firm/organization performance paradigm (cf. Lenz, 1981). The common premise implied in these approaches is that managerial cognition matters, whatever the specific units of analysis or variables studied may be called. Some of the elements and linkages typical of cognitive models are displayed in Fig. 1. Their main research problems can be identified and characterized as follows:

(i) In terms of theformation of managerial beliefs or thinking patterns, research can be directed towards understanding the general patterns of thinking, or explaining the acquisition of situation-specific beliefs or strategic environmental knowledge. These are questions of cognitively based and more or less veridical adaptation or simple comprehension (e.g. Bartunek, 198-t; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989; Salancik and Meindl. 1984).

(ii) In between, there are the cogjzirive strucrures themselves, with various theoretical conceptualizations referring to the assumed base phenomena. Of these, constructs such as schema or script (Gioia and Poole, 1984; Lord and Foti, 1986; Lord and Kernan, 1987; Rumelhart, 1984; Schank and Abelson. 1977) and mental model (Johnson-Laird. 1983; Norman, 1983) are traceable to a cognitive psychological base. The frame as a general situation-image structuring framework has become an Arrificinf ftlfefligence or AI-related notion (Minsky, 1977; Stillings et al.. 1987). On a more general social level there are constructs such as beliefs. ideologies, interpretive schemes or subjective theories (Bartunek, 1984; Beyer. 1981; Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983; Hewitt and Hall, 1973; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984a,b; Roos and Hall, 1980; Salancik and Porac. 1986: Sproull, 1981; Starbuck, 1982). The cognitive structures constitute an independent, legitimate object of research, but are a key issue in any design, e.g. in explaining a dominant “culture” or “ideology”.

(iii) The issues that perhaps most concern management researchers are about cognitive factors as an explanatory basis for managerial/organizational action or performance.

Fig. 1. A survey outline of cognitive models in management studies.

DESCRIBING XIANAGEMENT COGNITION: THE CACSE MAPPING APPROACH 1YY

Such hypotheses imply an assumption that the actors’ innate structures somehow influence the subsequent processing. e.g. strategy formulation or decision-making. and thereby also organizational action and performance (cf. Hall, 1981: Lenz, 1981).

Cognitive determination models need theoretical mechanisms to mediate the influence of the internal structural elements. In Fig. 1, “noticing” and “meaning-giving” refer to such perception-related effects. They may constrain attention to environmental stimuli and influence their specific interpretation as “threats” or “opportunities”. for example, and thus also their relevance to action. This is assumed to depend on whether the actor has a corresponding concept system with adequate empirical referents.

Such models originate partly from the old idea of social actors building or acquiring mental replicas of their action domains. physical or social, and then acting according to these internal representations (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rumelhart, 1983). Besides a static, structure-emphasizing picture, there are also notions of processual and influence links among the internally represented phenomena, as is implied by constructs such as mental models or scripts. Importantly, the introduction of subjective ideas of causality and temporal dynamics creates a bridge to overt action at the individual level in the external world, through some form of menraf simdution (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Kelley, 1972). Using their own internal situation models, individual actors may be assumed to produce, “in the mind’s eye”. explanations and predictions of system behaviour as thought simulations. This also makes system control. and meaningful adaptation to changes in the system, cognitively feasible.

From a general conceptual base of this kind, the intuitive step is short to the aorld of managerial problem-solving, the generation of alternatives and decision-making, producing overt referents in internal communications or public statements. The resulting models feel plausible. It appears an almost unavoidable conclusion that managerial cognition must matter, although not necessarily always or in any optimal or ideal sense. Apart from theoretical and research applications, there is also of course a tradition of social action building more or less on the same premise and manifest. for example. in education and in consulting and scanning activities linked with management.

COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION: SOME GENERAL ISSUES

Studies of managerial cognition involve describing the object of analysis in a situation where the “real thing”, i.e. management thinking in a structural or processual sense. is not immediately and objectively - i.e. independently of the respondent - available for observation. Instead it is necessary to build on assumed. available overt products of the internal phenomena, which in empirical work usually means raw data consisting basically of communications originating from the actor-subjects. This applies to cause mapping as well as to many other methods. The actors in this case are typically managers, studied as actors in a specific social situation or as surrogates for their organizations. The communications are available in either or both of two forms:

(i) Natural speech, elicited as responses to stimuli in an interview, or noted or taped and transcribed in an observational situation, a group discussion, etc. Raw data may be verbatim or interpreted, i.e. equipped with new meanings of a different frame of reference.

(ii) Documents, e.g. public statements, minutes kept at meetings, official or private

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notes or memos, etc. Such data may be a product of considerable deliberation and of several people. Also, the purposes of their production may vary. The researcher has seldom full control over the data production and may not be aware of the context. On the other hand. documentary data may be the only alternative.

It is useful to explicate. in terms of basic human information processing, what must happen when or before a subject produces a communication that later becomes raw data (cf. Ericsson and Simon, 1980; Taylor and Fiske. 1981). These underlying phenomena are. after all. a necessary precondition of such data, although that may not ahvays be sufficiently appreciated.

Figure 2 characterizes the position, suggesting that the cognitive substance of a manager which is being mapped. measured, described, represented etc., should be perceived as consisting of several phenomena. There does not seem to be any definitive

consensus about the “real” nature of the human cognitive content or processes. or more accurately about how to model these phenomena. In particular. the same information - “same” refers to having an identical overt extension in communication - may exist in the human brain in more than one format, i.e. as a process- or structure-related internal

representation (Cantor el af., 1982, p. 48). Also, there are probably evolutionary stages in the creation of concepts, with essentially different, e.g. differentially subsuming. referents. They could range from visual image traces of external events. used as cognitive raw material, through sets of their categories and structured internal representations. and ultimately to fairly subsuming formulations such as general scripts. models. theories

THEORETICAL COGNITIVE ELEHENTS/INTERNAt REPRESENTATIONS

VISUAL/EPISOOIC DECLARATIVE PROCEDURAL & ELEMENTS/TRACES KNOWLEOGE INFERENCE TOOLS images/events causal beliefs heuristics/rules attiibutesldata models/theories algorithms concepts categories frames/scripts

do A. I C affects B, let’s coun t Rules, taxies (Ue believe in A

: Natural language (oral b written) : Attitude (value) measures/scales t Concept lists, seeantic networks t Causal mapping, argument mapping t AI-foraalises (e.g. production rules)

Fig. 2. Managerial cognitions and their representation.

DESCRIBING MASAGEMENT COGNITION: THE C.-iI‘SE >lAPPING APPROACH 201

and concepts. This appears an obvious implication of prevalent ideas about the way in which concepts. categories and other cognitive structures gradually develop, in so far as this is an internal and not a social copying process (Bandura, 1986; Rosch, 1977; Rumelhart, 19S4).

As regards the productive processes and what thus must obviously happen during an interview or the creation of a document, we may ask ourselves: what is it that a researcher really observes or studies’? At least. or at most. we can say that the researcher is observing overt linguistic production. To go further than that implies a theoretical reconstruction. This is, however, unavoidable, since what is assumed to be functioning and represented inside must somehow be modelled externally, before it can become an object of study. There is an obvious problem in cognitive research, however. The respondents may well use almost anything they possess in the way of relevant cognitive substance or tools, without the researcher having necessarily any way of knowing it. When responding orally or in writing, respondents may resort to the more structural, memory-trace types of elements. the production-oriented cognitive capacities, such as inferential heuristics (e.g. Hogarth, 1985; Sherman and Corty, 1983). or both at the same time’.

In an adequate study researchers may be able to argue that they are truly tapping some specific theoretical cognitive entity. In real-life management research. however. which is typically based on retrospective interviews or on analyses of docrrmenrary data. we usually cannot be sure what it is that we are going to represent. It thus seems reasonable to suggest that in management research we should not perhaps be too anxious, or at least not over-dogmatic, about how we conceptualize the internal and invisible basic phenomena. An analogous point was recently made by Kidd (1987. p. 3) about knowledge acquisition (KA) for expert systems, something that is closely related to our present issue:

“The underlying assumption is that some magical one-to-one correspondence exists between the verbal comments made by an expert. . . and real items of knowledge . within his head . . . (once) transcribed . . . they are considered to be nuggets of the truth about that domain. The analogy is misleading; there is no truth in that sense . KA involves. . . . interpreting these verbal data . . . to infer what might be the expert’s underlying knowledge and reasoning processes.”

Here, the quotation is meant to refer to excessively firm stands about whether it is in fact a cognitive map, a schema, a script or a theory, a frame of reference, an ideology, etc. that an observer is trying to capture or map for some sort of subsequent use. Several conceptualizations seem permissible, provided that they are used logically, that they are rooted in solid theory and studies, and that they appear cognitively possible to produce. Moreover, researchers might be more aware and explicit about the theoretical alternatives and their implications and about their conformity with the particular explanatory scheme.

To sum up: it is evident that more than one representation option might be contemplated by a researcher of management cognition. even for the same explanatory scheme or underlying mechanism. This is parallel to the representation problem in expert system projects (cf. Hayes-Roth ef al., 1983; Stillings et al., 1987). The issue is to some extent one of evaluating relative strengths and weaknesses from a given research viewpoint, as well as evaluating the specific demands which they make in relation to the resources available (cf. Huff, 1990).

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My present intention is not to propose a more cavalier attitude towards managerial cognitive research and its methods. The point is simply that there are serious problems in knowing and understanding the underlying cognitive phenomena. and in acquiring strong independent evidence to rely on when it comes to the validity of measures of cognition. In the meantime we should perhaps concentrate on more related empirical research, to produce a cumulative, multiple assessment of validity (cf. Taylor & Fiske, 1981, pp. 511-515).

Furthermore, as the accepted division of labour indicates. instead of individual-level cognitive issues, the main operative domain of management studies is at a higher level of analysis, broadly directed towards the interface and control problems of organizations in relation to their contexts of action. Instead of trying to contribute to cognitive science, management theorists can use the theories or models of this field - for example to provide mediating mechanisms for the phenomena that management research alone is supposed to explain. These are, after all, also important. For example, they anchor the micro-level operations to the broader social context, making sustained, effective action possible.

FROM TEXT TO A CAUSE MAP: AN EXAMPLE

Basically, cause mapping is an operationalizing tool for externally representing a subject’s cognitive content. CM can be more easily understood if it is compared with the most common mode of representation, i.e. written text, which is also utilized to transmit information about cognitions - subjective theories, ideologies, belief systems, etc. To base the discussion on a real case. an interview excerpt is reproduced in the Appendix with the CEO of a major consumer electronics importer-distributor firm (Laukkanen, 1989). The anchor concepts (codes 03, 07), used to elicit these remarks, were obtained from the same subject in an earlier non-structured interview.

In order to describe the manager’s thinking, one alternative would be to leave the transcript intact and let it speak for itself. This is obviously one solution. The researcher might then argue that the statement is illustrative of the dealer-related thinking patterns of this manager, or even of this industry. Depending on the purpose, it could be offered as evidence of some specific model or argumentation. It has the advantage of originality, naturalness, even plausibility. The more customary solution is to produce a new text. in which the researcher interprets the ideas distilled from the transcript from a specific theoretical viewpoint. Obviously several interpretations could be envisioned. depending on the paradigm. This text might be used, for example, as data for analysing marketing strategy or dominance relations in a capitalist economy.

The transcript could also be used in constructing a cause map to represent the causal dimension inherent in the natural expressions of the manager subject, and thus also the unseen causal beliefs and thought patterns that are assumed to underlie these. As shown in Fig. 3, a cause map is a pictorial presentation, a logical array of arrow-linked concepts, referring for instance to a social system’s constituent elements and the causal relationships between them, as they. appear to exist in the mind of the subject.

The method known as cause mapping (or sometimes cognitive or causal mapping) and referred to as CM, was originally devised for the study of political decision-makers’ thinking patterns (Axelrod, 1976). It has since also been used in organizational and

DESCRIBING MANAGEMENT COGNITION: THE CAUSE MAPPING APPROACH 203

10 fira’s irage

t I

09 d’s market posit’n

I

(Legend: lain influence directions: t = direct, - = inverse, t/- = unclear or unstable effect)

Fig. 3. Cause map based on the Appendix.

management studies (cf. Weick & Bougon, 1986). Cause maps were originally constructed from documentary data such as minutes or public speeches (Wrightson, 1976). More recently specific interview data have also been used (Laukkanen, 1989; Sevon, 1984).

There is some ambiguity about method labels, particularly about the notions of internal and external representation. As Huff (1990) suggests, the term cognitive mapping might be used to refer generally to any attempt at modelling an assumed cognitive content. The terms cause or causal mapping could then be reserved for maps specifically concerned with concepts and the causal relationships within these. There is sometimes also uncertainty as to whether an author is referring to the internal or external representations or to some actor-independent “reality” or context.

As regards their origins, cause maps were recently described (Stubbart. 1989) as a special case of semantic networks, used in studies of human information processing to model cognitive elements and their meaning-defining relations. such as category membership and/or attributes (cf. Johnson-Laird et al., 1984). There could be problems here, however. For example, scripts or frames might now also count as semantic networks, since their underlying temporal and category relations are sometimes represented with the help of a map-like notation. The important distinction, it would seem, is the underlying notion of representing meaning in human cognition, i.e. the theoretical basis rather than the overt appearance. Moreover, notions of meaning and causality in an everyday sense are separate and not necessarily logically related.

The transcript shown in the Appendix is basically a set of natural expressions referring to certain entities and their properties in the action domain of this particular manager. Expressions denoting key phenomena are itaficised and equipped with codes, referring

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to pertinent sfundardized* terms. From these building blocks a cause map with its matrix counterpart was constructed (Figs 3.4). The implied direction of the causal relationships is given (+I-) alongside the influence arrows. Provided the concepts are familiar, a cause map is self-explanatory. A cursory analysis should confirm the essential compatibility of the present map with the base text.

The matrix representation is an important adjacent tool in the analysis of cause maps. In addition to the causal links usually indicated by absolute cell entries of unity. it includes in its margins the numbers of links (“effects”, “causes”) flowing from (outdegree) and into (indegree) each variable. Matrix notation allows for a mathematical manipulation and analysis of the maps, e.g. in terms of the existence and lengths of the paths to and from a given variable. A unique ordering of variables or the construction of quantitative map indexes are also possible (cf. Axelrod, 1976; Hage and Harary, 1983; Stubbart. 1989). Importantly, matrices are amenable to common computerized solutions such as spreadsheet applications (Laukkanen, 1989; cf. also Stubbart, 1989).

Large maps and their matrices, with a great many concepts, are difficult to handle or comprehend. On the other hand, natural data generally contain very large numbers of concepts. This can be handled sometimes using a computerized database solution, whereby each cell entry, i.e. each causal link, is transformed into single database records (Laukkanen, 1989). This has some advantages for CM with natural data. A database approach is convenient, starting with the basic vocabulary-generating operations from natural language into a standard system and in the basic matrix arithmetics such as

06 dealer purchases 07 dealer loyalty 08 dealer’s margin 09 d:s aarket posit’n 10 firs’s image 11 marketing strategy

(Legend: outdegree = ION sum, indegree = column SUI; out-/inflowing effect/link numbers)

Fig. 4. Cause matrix based on the Appendix and Fig. 3.

*The excerpt and the codes are based on a recent study by the present author (Laukkanen, 1989). Tape transcripts were used as raw data to obtain the core concepts and causal belief patterns in two groups of managers. The respondents’ natural expressions were coded with a set of standard expressions, considered a satisfactory approximation of their originals with the same referent. As a result of this operation, the expressions and the causal beliefs became converted into a standard concept space, capturing enough of the original meaning. If the research concerns only one person or group’s thinking or a small cognitive domain, this type of conversion may not be useful. If, however, the study calls for a clustering and a comparison of the thinking patterns of a group or for an analysis of large cognitive domains, as was the case in the above study, such operations would become necessary.

DESCRIBING MANAGE~IENT COGNITION: THE CAUSE hlAPPING APPROACH 205

calculating outdegree and indegree values. A further advantage is the rapid conversion facility from natural language levels. via a standardized vocabulary system, to successively higher levels. Furthermore. it is relatively easy to construct. with conditional search and list programs, sub-maps as cuts of an imaginary total map area. And there are certainly further computerization possibilities. In particular, a concurrent conversion capability between a matrix- or text-format and a graphical map format would be very useful, especially in the analysis of map implications. This is not yet available in a developed form (cf. Eden, 1988; Ramaprasad and Poon. 198.5).

ASSESSING CAUSE MAPPING

Cause mapping can be analysed according to various dimensions. The present objective is to discuss the method at the level of everyday research and real-world experience. The following criteria seem relevant, but they are also intertwined, which suggests that the discussion should be considered more or less as a whole.

Facilitation of description and analysis In managerial cognition studies, the interesting thing is often the knowledge base,

which it is presumed the actor is using. A concurrent process is implied, but we often feel that it is “enough” to know the knowledge base, as we presume that it more or’less determines the outcome. This could be called an envelope-hypothesis, implied by cause mapping. At the level of the study task, researchers usually want to describe and understand the behaviour of actors or social systems, analysing action units or broad action tendencies.

What a CM may do is to function as a rough approximation or sometimes as a simulation tool, with regard to the thinking patterns and bases that are assumed to underlie managerial decision-making. This is because cause maps capture at least two elements that appear to be necessary to action-related thinking. These may be referred to as phenomenological and causal beliefs, respectively, with obvious functional roles (Sproull, 1981). As a corollary, it may be argued that a cause map accomplishes simultaneously at least three important descriptive outcomes:

(i) It defines the things or entities apparently seen by the actor, i.e. the subjective territory in Weickian terms. (ii) It reveals the influence links among those entities, appearing as operative means and end states or valued variables to the actor. (iii) It links conceptions of some internal, controllable events and external, less controllable phenomena, as seen from the actor’s point of view.

The mapped entities and the links between them, representing actors’ phenomeno- logical and causal beliefs, intentions or action rationales, are what - with varying degrees of accuracy or veridicality - allow the actor the mental simulation mentioned above. They should thus logically be at the centre of the actor’s comprehension of a system’s behaviour and subsequent problem-solving (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rumelhart, 1984). It does seem difficult to provide a totally different type of cognitive productive model, in so far as this is a conscious and deliberate and not an externally driven or a random process. What may be less recognized is that observers and

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researchers face a cognitive task similar to that of the actor, when they seek to visit the cognitive world of management and to understand it from inside.

In terms of comprehending and transmitting comprehension, CM has some advantages compared with the sets of verbal statements that are typical of much management research reporting. First, it packs in more information. Second, it explicitly links the various relationships and entities together into a whole, which may not be as visible in a

typical text. Third, it makes it possible to deduce something that is not explicitly stated in the text, as regards both the system which the actor is facing as well as his reactions and their probable grounds. Thus, for descriptive or “verstehen” purposes (Bougon. 1983). a cause map appears to be a useful tool.

However, cause maps also have limitations. For example a cause map representation of temporal relations seems difficult (Stubbart, 1989. p. 337). In addition, it is difficult to represent normative beliefs or operative maxims in CM-terms, i.e. what is or should be done. A CM is indeterminate in this respect; it is not possible to read such assertions directly from a cause map and thus to use it for accurate descriptive or predictive purposes regarding specific behaviour on the part of the actor or the organization - for example their overt competitive actions. However, it could be claimed that a cause map may define a maximum envelope or shell of potential action alternatives. This limitation may be partially alleviated with the help of matrix-analysis (cf. e.g. Axelrod. 1976). which gives some indication of how instrumental various actions could be - and thus how probable in terms of goal variables. As regards the limitations, however, we can also reasonably ask ourselves just how much cargo cause mapping should be expected to carry.

Comparative analysis of cognitive structures Valid comparison is a precondition in measurement and in meaningful explanatory or

predictive research designs. CM provides some possibilities that are not available in text- based analysis for comparative studies of managerial thought patterns, at least in the causal dimension. To illustrate this, let us assume a set of transcripts similar to that shown in the Appendix, based on interviews with this manager’s colleagues in the industry. Given such data, how specifically would a researcher compare the individual thought patterns in this CEO group or reconstruct something that could plausibly be called core thinking typical of that industry (cf. Spender, 1983)?

In a purely text-based approach the contents and the concepts or some distilled themes in the transcripts would be analysed (cf. e.g. Tesch, 1989). Analyses of various theme or expression pattern frequencies could be made. A coherent picture would undoubtedly gradually emerge, which could be reported in a new set of natural language sentences i.n the explanatory framework. The researcher and the audience would then feel that they “understood” the subjects’ thinking. They might also be able to make reasonably accurate predictions about the behaviour of the industry participants.

If cause mapping were used, the task would first involve (cf. Laukkanen. 1989) locating the relevant causal assertions of each respondent in the raw data. The next step would be to construct, by an iterative meaning comparison, a common standard concept space and then to convert the individual natural expressions into the new artificial space. As shown in the Appendix and Fig. 3, the original wordings were defined as same- denoting and were replaced by the respective subsuming standard concept. The original

DESCRIBING MASAGEMENT COGNITION: THE CAUSE MAPPING APPROACH x7

causal assertions are thus also converted into a new set of causal statements. This conversion operation produces comparability among the respondents. Obviously there could be more than one standard concept system, each enabling a mapping into a different frame of reference or level of analysis.

Various alternatives are available when it comes to further analysis, depending on the volume and scope of the data and the processing methods. If a database approach is used. with single standard-language causal assertions as the basic units. then simple sorting, listing and counting operations may suffice. For example, the frequencies of all located causal beliefs, i.e. influence-linked concept pairs, may be calculated for the respondent group. The application of a cut-off frequency makes it possible to define a core causal thinking pattern as a cause map or matrix, constructed using only such causal beliefs as are shared to the degree specified.

For meaningful map-based comparison of thought patterns, a fived concept order in the matrix and map representations is necessary. This creates a virtual scale in terms of a two-dimensional standard causal element space, with the character of a maximum shell. To make this more explicit. we have to envisage a set of matrices like Fig. 4. Their row/ column labels and their ordering would be identical - only the cell entries might be different depending on the underlying causal beliefs as expressed by the respondents.

As with scales in general. several operations now become feasible. First, in the case of the two tasks above, the standardized matrices of each respondent can be added or subtracted. Again, given a cut-off criterion, a definition for a core thinking pattern inthe respondent group becomes possible. Second, on theoretically interesting grounds it now becomes possible to construct sub-groups and to compare their common patterns. This can be done with the help of appropriate matrix operations or in visual terms, by directly comparing and analysing the respective group-based cause maps (Laukkanen, 1989). In addition, mathematical measures of the total patterns such as the density of the cause maps also become possible (cf. Axelrod, 1976; Hart, 1977).

In operations such as these the validity of the mapping process from a natural subjective expression set into a standard common space is critical. This is mainly a question of getting the meanings right at the various levels of analysis. This depends on the target level of generality, i.e. how far we want to go from the natural original level. Conversion processes can be helped by familiarity with the industry jargon, by carefully studying local usage of the relevant terms, by feeding the interpretations back to the respondents, by using panels of judges, etc. Such operations are especially important if the domain is unfamiliar and if the mapping is performed in successive stages. It is also a question of the quality of the raw data, as will be discussed below.

To sum up: it is evidently possible to obtain useful devices for measuring the similarities and differences between some of our subjects’ cognitions and to use this for comparing groups, individuals or different time-frames. Thus, it is possible to “measure” and “compare” managers’ causal thought patterns or cognitions in quite a normal sense. To do so has by no means been common. The important point, however, is how useful, meaningful and valid could such operations be, as well as the new artificial causal spaces and measures devised, in terms of relevant research purposes. As has been suggested, this cannot be decided on a priori grounds alone. Before a reasonably well-founded assessment can be made we need more studies, more raw research experience, and a cumulative feedback - of both an empirical and a more firmly grounded theoretical kind.

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Data avaiiubilit~inccess An interesting property of cause mapping is the applicability of severai kinds of raw

data. As we have seen, the main types have been documents where the cause mapping follows the tradition of content analysis (cf. Wrightson, 1976), and various types of interviews which may eventually be treated as transcripts for content analysis. Questionnaires have also been used (Roberts, 1976).

Both interviews and questionnaires depend on access and on genuine cooperation. Documents may have the advantage of availability and unobtrusiveness, with well- known trade-off problems of validity, particularly in terms of respondent sincerity. However, instead of summarily discarding public statements. etc. as useless because they sometimes contain intentional image or impression management, it would be better to study their limits and to broaden the theoretical base to include the logic behind varying validity; these data could then be used within the limits thus explicitly recognized (Schwenk, 1989). It is often a question of doing some satisfactory research, or none at all. The more broad-minded approach therefore seems the more productive and sensible one.

Cause maps - ~*alidity artd reliability The question of validity is central, but it is not immediately clear what it should mean

in the case of Cbl. Validity usually refers to the ability of an instrument to measure the theoretical construct it is supposed to stand for, and to faithfully reflect its variability from case to case. The conspicuous difficulty is that in the representation of cognition there are no objective and direct data of the unseen “real thing”. Validity could thus be roughly understood in either one of two ways:

(i) In terms of the theoretically expected or explainable consistency of several related measures; this is variously known as construct, convergent or theoretical validity. This enlarges the scope of the studied theoretical model to provide for plausible accounts of the productive processes and of the various observable phenomena and their linkages (Ericsson and Simon. 1980). or (ii) In terms of content coverage, implying an argument that the measure, here a cause map. is so close to or identical with the “real thing” - thinking patterns, causal beliefs. ideology, a cognitive map, etc. - that there is plausible reason to believe that the true object is being measured. One version of this is called face validity.

If a face-validity type of interpretation is accepted, then there does not appear to be much to discuss. The more productive and in the long run unavoidable interpretation is concerned with the consistency between the cause maps and other output or behaviour measures. This point was already made by Axelrod (1976, p. 266), who maintained that decision-makers use their (cognitive) maps, i.e. they act in agreement with their expressed causal beliefs. More recently there has been some evidence for the construct validity of cause maps in terms of temporal stability, defined as congruence with the same subjects’ causal statements in sentence form about 2 or 3 weeks later (Billings and House, 1989).

To put CM’s validity in perspective, it should be remembered that any overt communication, a document, a transcript, etc. can be doubted as a representation of internal states. A cause map - and the corresponding cognitive measures - are by definition an extension of natural communication, a distillation of one dimension of its

DESCRIBING MANAGEMENT COGNITION: TtlE CXL’SE MAPPIYG APPROACH 3JY

contents. Validity assessment in real life is therefore mostly a problem of respondent sincerity and other factors that influence the formation of the assertions. Raw data are

often a product of retrospective processing and are more or less intentionally polished and contaminated by hindsight interpretation. In management interviews. provided there are no serious insincerity-producing factors. it should generally be possible to tap the “real thing”, at least what is close to the surface in terms of long-term memory access. However, the data and their predictiveness should be kept separate, just as any person’s

speech or expressed intentions are useful only within limits as predictors of future behaviour.

Furthermore, any discussion of the validity of cause maps is contingent on the specific theoretical model and related assumptions about cognitive structures or processes. For example, for a closely process-related model it seems preferable to use data which the respondent is directly able to heed to in short-term memory and which are thus not too contaminated by ad hoc inference or retrospection (Ericsson and Simon, 1980). For models with structural-type constructs. belief patterns, strategic worldviews, etc., it is

perhaps the more stable and dominant cognitive content. the declarative elements in memory, that seem more relevant. Although not devoid of problems, they often appear more likely to be elicited reliably and validly than process-related data (cf. Ericsson and Simon, 1980; Taylor and Fiske, 1981).

As to the reliubifity of cause maps, most of the evidence concerns documentary analysis (Axelrod, 1976; Huff, 1990). Reliability is then a question of consistency between coders in picking out and correctly interpreting the causal elements in the raw data such as a position paper or a public speech. This reliability is high, if the coders are properly instructed, and accords with the standard definition of reliability. ahich requires stability in the measurement of an entity in repeated measuring operations. Although this is an important piece of information, it is hardly surprising, since it is mainly a function of the coders having a stable and sufficiently shared base in their interpretation of words. Apart from their shared cultural and training backgrounds. their specific instructions together with examples and practice should take care of this. No such data appear to have been reported regarding other methods. In the case of interviewing it is reasonable to expect interviewer effects to be much higher than in the case of document coders, and this will cause distortions. Reliability will also vary, depending on the distance or familiarity of the studied domains. However. such problems are not specific to cause mapping alone.

USING CAUSE MAPPING IN RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT

Cause mapping is based on the information processing paradigm (cf. e.g. Stillings et al.. 1987). making it generally more applicable in uses with a dominant theoretical or pragmatic coupling to belief bases, thinking patterns, decision-making, learning. etc. In this context CM would be used according to the basic logic described above. i.e. for representing managerial cognition for its causal dimension. Cause mapping as a method is formal and semi-quantitative, particularly compared with text-based research. CM should therefore be especially applicable to studies in which comparison or the aggregating of subjects’ cognitions is important.

As regards effort and economics, it is usually costlier to produce a set of cause maps

210 M. LAUKKANEN

than to cover roughly the same area with a set of sentences. However. in comparative studies and in studies where the analysis of the implications of actors’ beliefs is important (see below), a cause map approach may be more powerful. On the other hand. cause mapping may not be appropriate if an accurate prediction of outcomes or of the dynamics of action is important. Again, if the purpose is simply to transmit or exchange operative information, it is probably more functional to use familiar natural language representation. But this might not hold if those involved are used to thinking in causalistic and/or formally modelled terms, or if an analytical or developmental effort is crucial (cf. Eden. 1988). To facilitate an assessment of CM. some uses of cause mapping will be indicated below.

Supporting management thinking and decision-making Cause maps need not be used exclusively for research; they can also function as a

management tool. provided management wants to question and analyse its own thinking. However. some recent efforts notwithstanding (e.g. Einhorn and Hogarth, 1987; Isenberg, 1984; Prietula and Simon, 1989), practicing managers may not yet always regard the explicit critical analysis of their own beliefs as a compelling necessity, perhaps partly because of common biases in human inference and belief formation (Bandura, 1986; Hogarth, 1985) and organizational decision-making pathologies (Janis, 1982). However, it may also depend on the absence of the kind of practical methods that would help to solve the knowledge-generating difficulties inherent in conventional text or speech-based discourse. As a heuristic device of this kind, cause mapping appears to be a useful way of explicating and keeping track of the complex system of phenomena that management is trying to understand and control - or at any rate of management’s own view of that system. Management or a team or a consultant could use CM as a blackboard on which critical system elements and their influence links can be jointly recorded and revealed for analysis and/or discussion (cf. Diffenbach, 1982; Eden, 1988; Roberts, 1976). In this way the current beliefs will become literally visible, which makes it easier to assess their accuracy, to add missing entities and causal links, or to weed out outright false beliefs. Obviously CM can also function as a communication or training aid.

Prediction or prevention of management conflict This type of cause mapping, which is a corollary of the above, has been used in

political science to compare the positions of nation states (Hart, 1977). A similar approach could be applied to the negotiation positions of firms or to fostering cooperation, for example in connection with mergers. The logic would be to reveal the belief patterns of the parties more accurately, to map them and then to use this information as a tool for predicting or managing conflicts. This last could mean removing false beliefs about the intentions of the various parties or attempts to provide missing links or phenomena. This is of course what negotiations are usually about. The new twist would be a higher level of explicitness and a conscious effort to analyse the belief bases of those concerned.

Strategic management studies Analyses of corporate strategy have typically relied on measures that are indirect and

preferably quantifiable indications of corporate strategy and its hypothesized deter-

DESCRIBING MANAGEMENT COGNITION: THE CAUSE MAPPING APPROACH 211

minants or consequences (cf. Snow and Hambrick, 1980; Venkatraman. 1989). On the other hand. when strategy refers to stable configurations of the behaviour or attributes or decisions of the organization, it is natural to assume that these will have some cognitive correlates inside the organization. This is a major idea of many strategy authors and studies, as Stubbart (1989) has shown, and also a rationale for teaching or consulting strategy-making. Studies in this category need to explore how firms - or their managements - construct their situations and interpret and react to environmental stimuli (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985; Weick and Bougon, 1986). Moreover, the mapped management thinking patterns could be interpreted as identical to or as a correlate of strategy. In other words, strategy could be conceptualized as an internal logic or recipe (Spender, 1983) supporting a coherent overt behavioural pattern of the organization.

As suggested recently (Lenz and Engledow, 1986; Pfeffer. 1981) and applied in some strategy studies (Fahey and Narayanan, 1989; Hall, 1984), cause mapping can indeed be helpful. Cause maps are used as a sort of blackboard on which traces of apparent cognitive changes are registered and cognitions can be compared and contrasted, as described above, with changes in the strategic environment and with management’s knowledge of this. However, for more detailed predictions or explanations or short-term process descriptions some other approach might be better, such as argument mapping (Fletcher and Huff, 1984; Huff, 1990), which imitates the syllogistic inference process assumed to lead to or to sustain a given strategy. Cause maps would seem more natural for defining, explaining or predicting the broad action sphere or behaviour tendencies. something that might be called a strategy envelope.

Formation of management beliefs, effects of experience-studies Formative studies, which have close links with the above paradigm, seek to understand

how managers’ specific beliefs or general, stable patterns such as world views, ideologies, etc. are generated. The cognitive elements have been operationalized in several ways including interpretive reporting (Bartunek, 1984; Spybey, 1984) and cause mapping (Laukkanen, 1989) or combinations of these (Roos and Hall. 1980).

Managerial or organization culture and ideology studies As is well known, there are many related theories and constructs (cf. Allaire &

Firsirotu, 1984; Smircich, 1983). Some of their core elements, such as values, beliefs. ideologies. etc., sometimes appear cryptic and rather difficult to operationalize. In some cases they could perhaps be described, at least in part, with the help of cause maps which explicate the prevalent phenomenological and causal beliefs of a subculture. Further- more. this research sometimes involves questions concerning how shared or idiosyncratic the components are or how they have been formed. This implies problems of comparison which are sometimes amenable to cause mapping (cf. D’Andrade, 1976).

Environmental and systems analysis Here cause maps, usually derived from a group of experts, are used specifically with

the idea of getting to know the territory, not the existing thinking about it. Such studies have been carried out for environmental systems analysis (Diffenbach, 1982; Roberts, 1976) and organizational processes (Roos and Hall. 1980). The map is not of course the territory, but if it has been validly derived it will contain data that can be used for

212 M LAUKKANEN

understanding and influencing the territory or the system, for adapting more skilfully to it, for teaching it. or for making predictions about its behaviour.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It appears to be becoming increasingly accepted in research that cognitive phenomena such as managerial knowledge, inference or problem-solving and learning, are important elements that should be incorporated into models of management and organization. In management practice. however. this does not yet seem to be very common. That cognition should matter is not new; what is external for the actor must be internalized to be sensibly acted upon; to act intelligently usually calls for conscious processing. However, to know what is inside in terms of cognitive structures or processes is a different thing from believing in its relevance. Such knowledge must be based on overt communication, oral or written. which creates problems regarding the valid representa- tion of the unseen cognitions. This calls for a certain modesty and broad-mindedness in the practice of research, when it comes to claims and hypotheses about the unseen internal phenomena.

This paper has proposed cause mapping as a relatively new method for cognitive description and analysis. Building on the causal elements in overt communication data, its main contribution is to bring into the open the phenomena which the actors claim to see in their situations and the causal influence links which they believe to exist in this concept space. A cause map is thus a representation or model of an actor’s knowledge base or cognitive structures, which are assumed to influence that actor’s thinking and overt actions. The uses of cause maps originate in their nature as analysable and manipulable models of actors’ causal beliefs or knowledge.

In management practice a CM could be used for instance in analysing the thinking about a firm’s strategic situation when major decisions are to be made. This could be a team exercise or a personal discussion with a consultant, using CM as a shared blackboard. There are other conceivable uses. The contribution of cause maps in such contexts is largely analytic and heuristic, stemming from their ability to capture large systems in a compact form and to facilitate their analysis and simulation as controlled thought experiments more effectively than may be possible with the help of conventional natural language alone.

In manugement cognirion research the major instrument up to now for handling related phenomena has been text-based description and analysis. Indeed, there are few serious alternatives to choose from. This paper has sought to explicate the descriptive dilemma in terms of human information-processing-related representation, suggesting that there are variously applicable options for doing at least part of the same job. Cause mapping is a possibility that facilitates the analysis of the implications of causal beliefs and, in standardized CM systems, also the aggregation and comparison of the causal thought patterns of several actors or their groups in a graphical map-like or matrix-format. In the case of large cognitive domains in particular, CM seems to be more powerful and flexible than conventional text-based analysis. However, further empirical applications are needed to show how far CM might be able to go, as well as to develop this and other methods for the study of management cognition.

Acknowledgemenrs - An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Workshop of Thinking and Acting

DESCRIBING .MAXAGEhlEST COGNITION: THE CAUSE MAPPING APPROACH 21?

in Organizations. organized jointly by the Swedish School of Economics (Helsinki) and Linkoping University (Sweden). in Evitskog, Finland. August-September IYXY. The author thanks Professors Leif blclin of Linkoping University, Guje Ssvon of the SSE and Risto Tainio of the Helsinki School of Economics as well as the participants of the workshop for their comments.

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APPENDIX. AN INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

I: Next, let me take up another dealer-related issue -your grip of a dealer or your position within him or how loyui (07) the dealer is towards your brand and firm. I understand from what you have said that these are roughly the same thing?

R: Uhhuh. . I: What do you think that depends on? Earlier (in this interview) you stressed the influence of how profituble the brand is for the dealer (08) plus the effect of the so-called target or yearly agreement (04). What else is there?

R: I’d add the general brand-image of the products (14) as well as the reliability of the distributor (lo), do they see us as a long -term operator and builder of market position (10). . . . Also, how solid (10) we are considered as a firm and how valued (IO) we are within the industry is important. . . Of course, the personal relations (OS) count, too.

I: OK, I see. . . Tell me, what effects or consequences you think dealer loyalty or grip may have?

R: It affects the consumers of that market area because the dealer will project that and is more active in

marketing rhe brund (02). Also his purchuses (06) are affected his willingness to fulfil the goals agreed upon in the yearly agreemenr (04) depends on that.

I: There is another point I’d like to ask you about - rhe number of deulers (03) you have for one market area. You said before-according to my notes - that. as a rule. your murkefing sfrulegv ( 11) would call for only one dealer per market. You also said that if the dcoier’s pwxhtrses (U6) vs his fur@ trprrrrrrrnr (04) are consistently poor. the number may have to grow?

R: That’s right

I: Tell me. is there something else to affect the dealer number’?

R: Yes - a dealer‘s liquidity or slow-down of his paymenrs (01) and a decline of the dealer’s credif-rnfing (01) with us . also. if the deuler’s competitive position in the market (OY) clearly goes down. that will affect the situation.

I: I see. . What about the effects of dealer number? Your previous answer implied that you expect it to affect their total purchases (06) and thus your sales (12).

R: Yes. I’ve seen such sales growth happen, but that may be a short-term effect that fades away. You see, the new dealer has to show us that he was a good choice and the old de&r niq ger rrcrii,e (07). too. to show that we made a mistake. However, the longer-term result of this activity increase may be that the price level in thuf market (13) will go down and both dealers may sturr losing interest (02) and become dislow~l (07). That is contrary to the basis of our distribution strategy.