47
Desert Storm Lsn 25
Desert Storm
Lsn 25
The Middle East
Background
• Majority of region administered by Britain until post-WWII.
• Long-standing disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. – Iraq argues Kuwait is an Iraqi province.
• Iraq mobilized and prepared for invasion in 1961 immediately after Kuwait was granted independence by Britain.
– Iraq wants Kuwait to forgive debts Iraq owes from Iran-Iraq War.
• Kuwait actually owes Iraq for “defending” it against Iran.
– Iraq accuses Kuwait of overproduction of oil/theft of Iraqi oil.
The Road to War• March 1990 - US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducts a
Command Post Exercise with a Iraqi invasion scenario.• July 25 - US Ambassador April Galaspie tells Iraq that their dispute
with Kuwait is not a US matter • Aug 2 - Iraq invades Kuwait.• Aug 7 - Two squadrons of USAF F-15s are first US forces to arrive
in Saudi Arabia.• Aug 9 - First elements of 82nd Abn arrive in Saudi Arabia.• Aug 25, 1990 - UN authorizes use of force.• Oct 31 - President Bush gives go ahead for two corps offensive
and authorizes doubling of force. • Nov 29 - UN Resolution 678 authorizes all force needed to expel
Iraq if they are not out by Jan 15, 1991.
Combat Operations
• Jan 17, 1991 - Air war begins
• Feb 23 - Ground war begins
• Feb 28 - Cease fire takes effect
• March 2 - 24th ID fights last engagement of the war
• March 3 - Schwarzkopf accepts Iraqi surrender at Safwan
US Army Doctrine: AirLand Battle
• Tenets– Agility– Initiative– Depth– Synchronization
• Stresses synchronization of ground maneuver with artillery and air support– Implicitly assumes possession of air superiority– Attacks enemy in depth
AirLand Battle and Maneuver Warfare
• “The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy… To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander’s goals. The best results are obtained when powerful blows are struck against critical units or areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of enemy operations in depth.”– FM 100-5, Operations (May 1986), p. 14
AirLand Battle and Desert Storm
• Our will
• Powerful blow
• Air superiority
• Off balance and unexpected direction
• Critical units
• Depth
“Our will”
• UN mandate was to liberate Kuwait, not to remove Saddam
• Essential to keep the coalition together
• Wanted to maximize US technological advantage
Initial Concept: One corps
Final Concept: Two corps(“powerful blow”)
Comparison
• Mass– One corps vs two
corps• Original plan likely to
result in higher casualties
• “… if we are serious about ejecting them [Iraq] from Kuwait what we need is more forces to be able to execute a proper campaign”
– “Lucky War,” Swain, p. 81
• Maneuver– Frontal vs flank– Importance of
deception and secrecy
Shaping Operations
• Create and preserve conditions for the success of the operation
– FM 3-0, p. 4-23
• Air operation• Deception
operation
Operational Framework for the Offense
Air War(“air superiority”)
• 100k sorties in 6 weeks.• Initial Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile (TLAM) and Stealth strikes focused on air defense sites, creating gaps that facilitated the remainder of the air campaign.
• Combined manned bombing, UAVs, and propaganda.
• Cut supplies bound for Iraqi forces in Kuwait from 20k tons per week to 2k tons per week.– Deep operations
Deception(“off balance”)
• Two MEBs afloat on amphibious shipping.• Exercise/rehearsal conducted in Oman in January.
– Media allowed to film and report.• SEALs make their presence known on Kuwaiti beaches.• 5th MEB lands on D+1 to perpetuate the ruse and
become sector reserve.• Saddam must commit forces (estimated at four divisions) to protect his flank against an amphibious assault, creating
a gap (or at least weakening a surface) to the Allies front.
The Shift Westward
Results of the Air War and Deception (“unexpected direction”)
With no Iraqi air to fly reconnaissance, the Coalition forces secretly shift west (away from where the Iraqis expect the
amphibious attack to occur
Center of Gravity• Those characteristics, capabilities or localities
from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight
• Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory
• Once identified, the center of gravity becomes the focus of the commander’s intent and operational design
– FM 3-0, p. 5-7
Decisive Point• A geographic place, specific key event, or
enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack
• Keys to attacking or protecting centers of gravity
• Shape operational design and allow commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable
– FM 3-0, p. 5-7
Centers of Gravity
• Enemy– Saddam Hussein
• Friendly– The coalition
Decisive Point(“critical units”)
• Enemy– Republican
Guards
Maneuver
The Ground War• Massive air and
artillery bombardments prior to D-Day reduced front line forces to less than 50% strength and reserves to 50-75%.
• Feb 23 - Iraqis begin torching oil wells.
• Feb 24 - Ground campaign kicks off.– Emphasized speed
and maneuver.
IranEuphrates
Tigris
Hafir al Batin
Kuwait City
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Khafji
Persian Gulf
AlBusayyah
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Third Army
XVIIIAirborne
CorpsVII
Corps
JFCEast
JFCNorthMARCENTxx
x
xxxx
xxx
xxx
RepublicanGuards
Iraqi Defenses
VII Corps will be the decisive operation with the mission to destroy the enemy’s decisive point, the Republican Guards.XVIII Abn Corps will be the shaping operation with the mission to isolate the battlefield
Situation, 23 February 1991Situation, 23 February 1991
Iran
Euphrates
Tigris
Hafir al Batin
Kuwait City
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Persian Gulf
AlBusayyah
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
T
AD
NAL
MH
5152
1710
6
E
2
D
1511
1920282548
26
49
12
47
271630 36
2914 18
71
3
21
US Third Army
XX
6 FR
XX
101
XX
24III
3
XX
82
XX
1 UK JFN
XX
JFEXX
XX
2Marine
XVIIIAirborne
Corps VIICorps
JFCEast
X
2
XX
1Marine
JFCNorth
MARCENT
xxx
XX
1
III
2
XX
3
XX
1
XX
1 xxxx
xxx
xxx
5
Situation, 24 February 1991Situation, 24 February 1991
25
Iran
Euphrates
Tigris
Hafir al Batin
Kuwait City
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Persian Gulf
AlBusayyah
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
US Third Army
XVIIIAirborne
Corps VIICorps
JFCEast
JFCNorth
MARCENT
xxx
xxxx
xxx
xxx
49
NAL
AD
HM
52
T
12
47
272848
26
E
5110
617
2
D
2115
1119
13
18
52914
7
36163020
JFEXXXX
1Marine
XX
2Marine
X
2 JFN
XXXX
1 UK
XX
1
XX
1XX
3
III
2
XX
1
III
3
XX
24
XX
101
XX
82
XX
6 FR
Situation, 25 February 1991Situation, 25 February 1991
Iran
Euphrates
Tigris
Hafir al Batin
Kuwait City
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Persian Gulf
AlBusayyah
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
US Third Army
XVIIIAirborne
Corps
VIICorps
JFCEast
JFCNorth
MARCENT
xxx xxxx
xxx
xxx
JFEXX
XX
1Marine
X
2
XX
2Marine
JFNXX
XX
1
XX
1 UK
XX
1
XX
3XX
1
III
2
III
3
XX
24
XX
101XX
82
XX
6 FR
27
47
12
T
52
17
21
1 319
1115
D
26
10 51
EMH
ADAL
N
49
Situation, 26 February 1991Situation, 26 February 1991
D
Iran
Euphrates
Tigris
Hafir al Batin
Kuwait City
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Persian Gulf
AlBusayyah
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
JFCEast
US Third Army
XVIIIAirborne
Corps
VIICorps
JFCNorth
MARCENT
xxx xx
xx
xxx
xxx
XX
6 FR
XX
82
XX
101
XX
24
III
3
III
2
XX
1
XX
1
XX
3
XX
1 UKXX
147
12
T 17
52
M
H
49
N
ALAD
E
JFNXX
XX
2Marine
JFEXX
XX
1Marine
X
2
5110
62
Situation, 27 February 1991Situation, 27 February 1991
Iran
Tigris
Hafir al Batin
Kuwait City
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Persian Gulf
AlBusayyah
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
JFCEast
XVIIIAirborne
Corps
xxx
US Third Army
VIICorps
JFCNorth
MARCENT
xxx
xxxx
xxx
JFEXX
XX
1Marine
X
2
XX
2Marine
JFNXX
2
610
52 51
M
H
N AL
AD
XX
1 UK
III
2XX
1
XX
3
XX
1XX
1
III
3
XX
24
XX
101XX
6 FR
XX
82
Situation, 28 February 1991Situation, 28 February 1991
Iran
Tigris
Hafir al Batin
Kuwait City
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Persian Gulf
AlBusayyah
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
JFCEast
XVIIIAirborne
Corps
xxx
US Third Army
VIICorps
JFCNorth
MARCENT
xxx
xxxx
xxx
JFEXX
XX
1Marine
X
2
XX
2Marine JFN
XX
XX
1 UK
III
2
XX
1XX
3
XX
1
XX
1
III
3
XX
24
AD
AL
XX
101
XX
6 FRXX
82
Opening Moves
• 1st ID begins breaching operations
• 24 ID moves north largely unopposed
• 3rd Bde -101st Abn Div inserts 155 miles from its AA to the Euphrates Valley, cutting off an Iraqi main line of withdrawal or reinforcement
Immediate Success
• VII Corps begins turning east – Schwarzkopf
becoming increasingly frustrated by what he perceives as an overly cautious and slow VII Corps advance
• 24th ID begins running wild in Iraqi rear
Envelopment
Victory
• Iraqi forces in full scale retreat– Being interdicted
from a partial encirclement
Air Assault Operations(“depth”)
• While this is all going on, the 101st Airborne Division is fighting the deep battle
• “The Air Force and armor were the thunder of Desert Storm, while the 101st was the lightning.” (Norman Schwarzkopf)
Deep Area
• The deep area is an area forward of the close area that commanders use to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area.
• The deep area relates to the close area not only in terms of geography but also in terms of purpose and time.
XVIII Airborne Corps Missions
• XVIII Airborne Corps
– Penetrate approximately 260 kilometers to the Euphrates River, cut the Iraqi lines of communication (LOC) along Highway 8 to Baghdad, isolate Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO), and help destroy the theater reserve - the Republican Guards Forces Command (RGFC)
Division Missions
• 24th Infantry Division – Attack through Iraqi
forces in their zone to the Euphrates River, then turn east to destroy RGFC forces trapped in the KTO.
• 101st Abn Div (Air Aslt)– Penetrate rapidly by
air assault to the Euphrates River, cut the LOC between Baghdad and Iraqi forces in the KTO, destroy all enemy forces along those routes, and turn east to block north of Al-Basrah.
EA
ThomasAO
Eagle
120 Km (75 Miles)120 Km (75 Miles)
Washington D.C.Washington D.C.
Nashville, TNNashville, TN
New York, NYNew York, NY
150 Km (93 Miles)150 Km (93 Miles)
914 Km (567 Miles)914 Km (567 Miles)
Air Assault DivisionArea of Operation
150 Km (93 Miles)150 Km (93 Miles)
250 Km 250 Km
(154 Miles)(154 Miles)
TAA
Campbell
FOB
ViperFOB
Cobra
Camp Eagle II
KENTUCKY
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW YORK
Philadelphia, PAPhiladelphia, PA
Williamsport, PA Williamsport, PA
Harrisburg, PAHarrisburg, PA
Feb 26
• By Feb 26, the XVIII Airborne Corps had interdicted the LOC in the Euphrates River Valley, blocked reinforcement of Iraqi forces in the KTO, and completed the envelopment of Saddam Hussein's forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait.
Feb 27• At 12:00, the first XVIII Airborne Corps and 101st
attack helicopter battalions closed on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Viper, 200 km east of FOB Cobra which had been secured by the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division assaulting at 10:00.
AS-SAMAWAH
SAUDI ARABIASAUDI ARABIA
IRAQIRAQ
KUWAITKUWAITCITYCITY
IRANIRAN
KUWAITKUWAIT
AOEAGLE
OBJCOBRA
TAA CAMPBELL
EUPHRATES RIVER
JALIBAH
NEUTRAL ZONENEUTRAL ZONE
EATHOMASTALLIL
AN-NASIRIYAH
150
Km
150 KmHIGHWAY 8
121 Km
OBJVIPER
BASRAH250
Km
Feb 27
• Attack helicopter battalions destroyed vehicles on and across the Al-Basrah causeway.
• With the last escape route now cut, most of Iraqi units were caught between advancing forces of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the VII Corps and the Euphrates River.
Feb 27
• However much of the Hammurabi Division escaped intact– Throughout the fighting
Schwarzkopf had been pressing VII Corps commander Frederick Franks to pursue faster while Franks felt he still had enemy in contact to deal with
– The two never effectively communicated and a gap in the encirclement was the result
Franks and Schwarzkopf would provide conflicting versions of events in their post-war writings
Ceasefire
• Cessation of hostilities declared was declared at 8:01 a.m. on Feb 28
• Many would later argue that the US should have pressed on to Baghdad but there would have been several problems with that– The UN mandate was to liberate Kuwait, not replace
Saddam– The coalition would have likely fractured over this
expanded mission– More US casualties would have been inevitable– The US would have then been saddled with
responsibility for governing Iraq
Review• Ground war emphasized mass, speed, and maneuver
– Still largely a linear battlefield– Iraqi Freedom would be much more nonlinear and trade mass for
speed• Renewed Air Force arguments about the relative superiority of air power• Technology, low casualties, short war would lead to increased demands
for use of military• Importance of media
– Felt somewhat used• Would lead to embedded journalists in Iraqi Freedom
• Limited objective (liberate Kuwait) left Saddam in power and the Republican Guards largely in tact– Set stage for Iraqi Freedom
Legacy of Desert Storm
• Won with an operational concept that sought in a single climatic operation to destroy the enemy’s center of gravity
• In 100 hours of combat, American forces destroyed or captured more than 3,000 tanks, 1,400 armored carriers, and 2,200 artillery pieces
• The “Great Wheel” swept over and captured almost 20,000 square miles of territory
• Only 140 soldiers died in direct combat• Erased the “Vietnam Syndrome”
• Scales, Certain Victory, p. 382-383
Next
• MOOTW: Beirut, Weinberger Doctrine, Somalia
