Desertification and Sea-Level Rise:

New Trends Causing Environmental Refugees in the Twenty First Century

Kiyana Allen

Kayly Ober

American University

April 2008

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Table of Contents

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3

Separating the terms “economic migrant” and “environmental refugee”……………….4

Desertification and its Effects on Forced Migration: The Sahel as a Case Study……6

A Brief History of Desertification……………………………………………………………………………..6

Desertification in the Sahel

Sahelian Migration……………………………………………………………………………………..10

The Fulani of Northern Burkina Faso…………………………………………………………...10

The Maradi Region of Niger

Sea-level Rise and its Effects on Forced Migration: China, Bangladesh, and Small

Island Nations as Case Study…………………………………………………………………………13

Low-Lying Coastal Cities……………………………………………………………………………………….14

Countries with Majority of Land in Low-Lying Deltas……………………………………………….16

Small Islands and Atolls…………………………………………………………………………………………18

Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………………21

“Environmental Refugee” as United Nations Policy……………………………………………………………..21

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Introduction

Norman Myers defines environmental refugees as “people who can no longer gain a

secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification,

and other environmental problems” (752). There is some debate over the difference between

economic and environmental refugees, but Norman argues that the two are intertwined because

the environmental problem leads to the economic hardship that causes involuntary

displacement. Diane Bates argues that “environmental refugee” is too broad a term, and

suggests three classifications: those displaced by disasters (either natural, such as a hurricane,

or anthropogenic, such as an oil spill), those displaced by the expropriation of their environment

(either through economic development, such as China’s Three Gorges Dam, or through warfare

that ravages the land), and those who are displaced due to the gradual, anthropogenic

degradation of the environment. This paper will focus on those migrants who fall into the third

category, or more specifically, those who have been displaced by unpreventable environmental

problems spurred by climate change; namely, desertification and sea-level rise. This paper sets

out to examine if forced migration due to climate change does, in fact, exist. And if it does, what

are its impacts and implications? We will look at recent examples and scientific forecasts to

render a prediction. We predict that environmental forced migration does exist, and the poorest

and least-developed nations take the brunt of ecological disasters.

The first half of our research will explore the relationship between desertification and

migration by approaching the Sahel region of Africa as a case study. It will examine how

residents of this region are coping with desertification, where they are migrating to, and the

effects of their migratory patterns on the rest of the region. We hypothesize that the data will

show an exodus of desertification refugees from rural dryland regions of the Sahel into primarily

heavily-populated urban areas of West African states.

The second half of our paper seeks to examine effect sea-level rise has on migration. We

understand that sea-level rise is a newly-investigated phenomena and inherently future-based.

However, comparing future predictions to occurrences in the last three decades allows us to see

the timeline at which sea-level rise affects, and will affect, various nations. We will use China,

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Bangladesh, and several small island nations as case studies. We hypothesize that not only a

future tend should be expected, but that sea-level rise has forced migration in recent years.

Using these two examples of environmental problems spurred by climate change, we can

then determine if the term “environmental refugee” can be legitimized, and whether or not

measures should be taken to incorporate them into United Nations rhetoric.

Separating the terms “economic migrant” and “environmental refugee”

Dooms-dayers like to predict 50 million environmental refugees by 2010, and those that

scoff at estimates say that people who leave their habitat because of climate change are

“emigrants” and not “refugees” (Bates 468). Richard Black (2001) believes that environmental

refugees do not exist. He states that environmental factors do play a part in forced migration,

but that they are always closely linked to a range of other political and economic factors.

Focusing on environmental factors in isolation does not give us a clear view of the specific

situation in which people are displaced (Castles 2001, Black 2001). Black (2001) also argues

that there is no evidence that environmental change leads directly to millions of refugees. Data

on environmental refugees is far from concrete; this is because there are many definitions and

different categories of environmental refugees. Castles (2001) argues that one should not isolate

environmental issues, but rather understand them as part of much broader processes of societal

change.

While classical migration literature generally ignores the influence of environmental

change, a recent review of case studies from around the world maintains that environmental

disasters and degradation can be a cause for forced migration. This rings especially true for

groups with the least political and economic power, which are most susceptible to human-

induced and natural disasters. To put the idea of environmental forced migration into

perspective, we must remember that when poor rural farmers face the immediate loss of their

life and property, environmental variables convene a force as threatening as any political or

military action (Wood 621). Further, examples like desertification and sea-level rise are

inherently natural, unpreventable, and long-term. These factors are separate from other

economically induced disasters like deforestation, crop failure, or fishery exhaustion; because

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they are naturally induced and unstoppable. The migrants produced by these phenomena have

no choice but to move. Below is a table outlining the difference between naturally and

economically induced disasters.

Note: Found in Hugo 112.

We should note that “floods (freshwater)”, “floods (saltwater)”, “droughts”, and

“famines” are included on the list of naturally induced disasters; therefore underscoring the

distinction of trends like “sea-level rise” and “desertification” against other economically

induced disasters. Given that sea-level rise and desertification are both slow-onset natural

disasters, their influence on forced migration has the potential to be regarded as even more

legitimate and separate from other political or social motivations.

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Desertification and its Effects on Forced Migration: The Sahel as a Case Study

Desertification is an environmental problem inextricably linked with environmental

refugees. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report regards 41% of the world’s area being

drylands, of which 10-20% are already desertified. There is much debate over whether

desertification describes a process in and of itself, or a final end result. And, because of its slow,

progressive nature (rather than a sudden environmental catastrophe such as an earthquake),

there is a great deal of controversy over whether victims of desertification can be classified as

environmental refugees. In order to understand how desertification is linked with

environmental refugees, we must first understand what desertification is, how it works, and in

what ways it has been defined.

A Brief History of Desertification

The first use of the term “desertification” came from Andre Aubreville in 1949, where he

described the creation of deserts in tropical African forests by the removal of trees and excessive

cultivation, which caused the nutrient-weak soil to erode, thus leading to the creation of deserts

via soil desiccation. He noted that forest was transformed into savannah and savannah into

desert. A deadly, extended drought in the Sahel led to further attention to the concept in the

1977 United Nations Conference to Combat Desertification in Nairobi. In the conference’s

statement they placed responsibility for desertification firmly on anthropogenic causes, defining

it as:

“the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of the land, (which) can lead

ultimately to desert-like conditions. It is an aspect of the widespread deterioration of

ecosystems, and has diminished or destroyed the biological potential, i.e. plant and

animal production, for multiple use purposes at a time when increased productivity is

needed to support growing populations in quest of development. …In general, the quest

for ever greater productivity has intensified exploitation and has carried disturbance by

man into less productive and more fragile lands. Overexploitation gives rise to

degradation of vegetation, soil and water, the three elements which serve as the natural

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foundation for human existence. In exceptionally fragile ecosystems, such as those on

the desert margins, the loss of biological productivity through the degradation of plant,

animal, soil and water resources can easily become irreversible, and permanently reduce

their capacity to support human life. Desertification is a self-accelerating process,

feeding on itself, and as it advances, rehabilitation costs rise exponentially.”

This definition makes similar observations to Aubreville’s original, concentrating on the

exploitation of the land as the primary causal factor behind desertification. The U.N. conference

also makes note of the fragility of certain ecosystems, primarily drylands, who are most sensitive

to desertification.

The causes of desertification are varied and interlinked between many disciplines.

Hermann and Hutchinson note that the cause and effect relationships between desertification,

drought, and human activities are characterized by multiple linkages and feedback mechanisms,

making it difficult to tease out the true source, and pointing instead to a complex network of

interrelated causes. We do know that desertification occurs primarily in arid drylands, complex

and fragile ecosystems receiving little rainfall. One cause of desertification is drought, defined

as a period of below-average rainfall. They are short-term episodic phenomena that may occur

anywhere but tend to be more associated with drylands due to their more variable climate

conditions. Land degradation is also strongly linked with desertification, and generally comes

from human activities in the forms of overgrazing, overcultivation, and deforestation (Thomas

and Middleton). Climate change is also a hypothesis for explaining desertification. LeHouerou

notes that an increase in dryland temperature, coupled with no substantial change in terms of

rainfall and unchanged human-use pressure, leads to drier conditions and desiccation of the

soil. Desertification can also exacerbate global climate change through the release of carbon

dioxide from cleared vegetation and reduce the carbon sequestration potential of degraded

land.

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FIGURE 1

There is a great deal of debate amongst the scientific community about whether

desertification refers to a process of change or the end result of a process of change. Glantz and

Orlovsky, in a review of scientific desertification literature, describe the desertification-as-

process position as “a series of incremental (sometimes step-wise) changes in biological

productivity in arid, semi-arid, and subhumid ecosystems. It can encompass such changes as a

decline in yield of the same crop or, more drastically, the replacement of one vegetative species

by another maybe equally productive or equally useful, or even a decrease in the density of the

existing vegetative cover” (1). Desertification-as-an-event is generally defined as “the creation of

desert-like conditions (where perhaps none had existed in the recent past) as the end result of a

process of change. To many, it is difficult to accept incremental changes as a manifestation of

desertification” (1). This paper will utilize the definition put forth by the United Nations

Convention to Combat Desertification, which is “land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry

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sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human

activities.”

Primary areas of the world that are affected by climate change include the Sahel region of

Africa, as well as the borders of the Kalahari Desert in southwestern Africa. The Gobi Desert in

China and the Taklimakan region of Central Asia are also affected, as well as parts of northern

Thailand and northern Brazil. Large regions of Mexico, specifically the Oaxaca province are also

undergoing severe desertification. Other regions such as the western United States, sections of

Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, as well as large swaths of the Middle East are at a high risk of

desertification. Essentially any area that can be classified as a dryland is threatened by

desertification. This section will focus on the case study of the Sahel region in central Africa as

an example of desertification and its effects on human migration flows.

Desertification in the Sahel

The Sahel is an arid dryland region in Africa that serves as the belt separating the Sahara

desert to the north and the tropical forests of Central Africa. Definitions of which countries are

included vary, but it is generally assumed to include Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina

Faso, and Chad. Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Togo, Benin, Ghana,

Nigeria, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia are also variably included, depending on the

defining source. The Sahel is on the front lines of desertification, with at least 80% of Sahelian

land being degraded through desertification and soil erosion, according to estimates from the

Climate Institute. The total population in the Sahel is approximately 140 million, depending on

which countries are included. Of these 140 million people, approximately 67.5 million are

estimated to be directly affected by desertification. The Sahel suffers disproportionately,

making up half of the people affected by desertification world wide.

Hulme estimates that from 1967 to 1992, annual rainfall was 20-40% less that from 1931

to 1960, signaling a long-term trend towards desiccation. The following graph of rainfall

estimates in Niamey, Niger illustrates this trend:

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FIGURE 2 Rainfall Data in Niamey, Niger

Sahelian Migration

Many Sahelian peoples are traditionally semi-nomadic, migrating in the dry season to

less harsh areas, but migration flows are demonstrating increasing patterns of permanent

migration away from the Sahel as conditions worsen. The severe drought in the 1980’s, widely

believed to have precipitated conditions for increased desertification, displaced millions of

people. About 20% of Mauritania’s population (400,000 people) left their homes, while 17% of

Niger’s population (1.5 million people) also fled. Overall about ten million people left home

during this period, with two million being in the countries of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and

Burkina Faso. During this period many people migrated to towns, as the Sahel’s urban

population quadrupled from the mid-1960’s to the mid-1980’s. Burkina Faso’s urban

population increased by one million. Many also went to neighboring countries, with Côte

d’Ivoire taking in 1.4 million of these refugees (Myers for the Climate Institute).

The Fulani of Northern Burkina Faso

Michele Leighton notes that one million people left Burkina Faso alone during the

drought from 1968-1973. The majority of these migrants are men, and they are primarily

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leaving rural areas in Burkina Faso for urban regions within the country as well as crossing

international borders. Much of this migration has followed a circular pattern, with remittances

being sent back to family in the Sahel in order to help them get by.

Research by Hampshire on the Fulani tribe of Northern Burkina Faso confirms this

trend. Her 1995 study of 40 villages and a total of 8834 Fulani individuals allows us great

insight into the migration trends of the Sahel. The Fulani work primarily in extensive

pastoralism, as well as agriculture, which is possible only in the rainy season from July to

September. The population is highly mobile, as they often travel with their herds, however,

since the 1970’s men have been traveling to large cities to earn money on a temporary basis, a

new phenomenon within the Fulani’s home region. At first, only a few young men migrated, but

many more began to make the trip after a second drought hit in 1984. This migration was

defined specifically by three factors: movement beyond the Sahel region of Burkina Faso,

migrating for a period of one month to two years, and migrating with the intention of earning

money. Nearly all those who undertake this journey are men between the ages of 18 and 64, and

36.6% of all men in the study had ever migrated for work, with a median length of five months.

The middle-aged cohort of men (aged 28-40) were most likely to travel, while the oldest cohort

(41-64) was least likely, with the youngest productive cohort (18-27) in the middle. They

generally leave directly following the harvest and are away for most of the dry season, returning

in time for the rainy season in order to cultivate the land. It is not considered socially acceptable

for women to leave in order to pursue economic activities, and the few who do travel to the cities

are accompanying their husbands rather than engaging in some sort of economically beneficial

activity themselves. The most popular destination is Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire (79.5% of migrants

went there in 1994-1995). Only 5.5% traveled to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso’s capital, while

another 5.8% went to Bobo Dioulassou, another Burkinabè city.

Migrants typically depend on social networks within their villages once they arrive at

their destination. Cousins, brothers, and fellow villagers from the same hometowns help one

another out. They are employed in a variety of jobs, such as wage labor, animal market work

(for example, transporting goods with a donkey cart), contract herding, begging, and animal

trading. It is also important to note that of the Fulani, only the most comparatively wealthy can

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afford to make these journeys—the most destitute and affected cannot afford to make the trip.

Those who become “failed migrants”—those who do not find profitable work or make enough

money to make their travel worthwhile often end up trapped in Abidjan, both because they have

no money to return home and because the stigma of returning home empty-handed is so

shameful.

This process of migration was essentially unknown to the Fulani before the early 1970’s,

when a severe drought hit and the world started realizing the impact of desertification. As

desertification in the Sahel has increased, making pastoral and agricultural livelihoods more

difficult, circular migration of the productive male cohort has developed as a dynamic strategy

to maintain the Sahelian communities of northern Burkina Faso.

The Maradi Region of Niger

David Rain offers a similarly instructive case study through his research on migrants in

the Maradi Department of Niger, which consists of the city of Maradi and its immediate area in

southern Niger, just across the border from Nigeria. He discusses the concept of circular

migration, known as masu cin rani in the local Hausa language. This means literally “eaters of

the dry season” and refers to those who leave their villages of origin during the dry season

because they cannot eat.

Maradi is the third-largest city in Niger, and is essentially the gateway to Nigeria, thus its

markets thrive on smuggled Nigerian goods, and its Hausa social structure is based on the

values of Islam and merchant capitalism. The city has absorbed large number of peasant

immigrants, primarily Hausa farmers, but also small numbers of Tuareg, Bougajé, and Fulani

pastoralists and herders. The city also receives a huge number of seasonal migrants, estimated

at 25,000 in a typical year, as well as briefly hosting those who pass through on their way to

cities in northern Nigeria.

As with the Fulani of Burkina Faso, large-scale migration from rural areas did not occur

until the heavy droughts of the 1970’s, and rates have increased as desertification has

intensified. 44% of Rain’s interviewees stated that they were directly motivated to migrate as a

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result of food shortage. Here also, the great majority of circular migrants are men of the

productive cohort. However, unlike the Fulani in Côte d’Ivoire, there is a higher degree of

permanent migration to Maradi, although circular seasonal migration is still very prominent.

Hundreds of shantytowns, with small shacks built in traditional rural Hausa style surround the

edges of Maradi, and they swell considerably during the dry season. Even those who have

permanently migrated serve as social networks for circular migrants from their villages, which

allow these social linkages to continue. As desertification continues to encroach, both circular

and permanent migration increase accordingly in order for Sahelian communities to continue

their traditional way of life.

Sea-level Rise and its Effects on Forced Migration: China, Bangladesh, and Small

Island Nations as Case Study

Desertification seems a logical conclusion to global warming. But, there exists an

inherent conundrum in the process of climate change. While there is less water in one area of

the world, there is more water in another. On the opposite end of the spectrum, but equally as

concerning for migration patterns, is the effect global warming has on rising seas. The sea can

definitively change coastlines, wipe out human settlements, and devastate many other things in

its path. It is one of the components of the environment that is least predictable. Taking this

into account, we can begin to see why a drastic change in sea-level rise could lead to unforeseen

repercussions; namely, forced mass migration patterns. These subsequent refugees would be

those who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat because of a marked environmental

disruption that jeopardized and/or seriously affected their quality of life (El-Hinnawi 1985), and

thus would be appropriately coined “environmental refugees.”

The term “environmental refugee” has been investigated, ever since Essam El-Hinnawi

(quoted above) published a paper of the same name for the United Nations Environment

Program (UNEP) in 1985. Curiosity has solidified as the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) released figures of global warming-induced sea-level rise scenarios ranging from

22 centimeters to 34 centimeters between 1990 and 2080 (Nicholls 2004). With unexpected

collapses from the West Antarctic or Greenland ice shelf, the rise could be even higher. A sea-

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level rise of just 38 centimeters would increase the number of people displaced by flooding five-

fold (Nicholls et al 1999). However, all of these estimates remain just that, estimates.

While desertification gives us a fine example of the impacts environment has on

migration, sea-level change has yet to be as concretely proven. Though there may be few case

studies, a pattern between those affected and those who will be in the future emerges, and can

be broken down into the following: 1) low-lying coastal cities – ex. Shanghai, China – where

coastal urbanization with growing populations and a degraded infrastructure leaves populations

susceptible to sea-level change; 2) countries with a majority of its territory in low-lying deltas –

ex. Bangladesh; and 3) small islands and/or atolls that are on the verge of being, or that have

already been, inundated.

Low-Lying Coastal Cities

Gordon McGranahan, Deborah Balk, and Bridget Anderson argue that low elevation

coastal populations are at particular risk from sea-level rise, stronger storms, and other seaward

hazards induced by climate change (McGranahan et al, 1). Indeed these low coastal zones, with

a coast equal to or lower than 10 meters above sea level, account for only 2 percent of the world’s

land mass, but up to 10 percent of the world’s population; and 13 percent of the world’s urban

population (McGranahan et al, 1). Any fluctuation in the ocean environment could trigger

massive migration, and even death. This is particularly worrying in China, the country with the

greatest number of residents living in coastal urban hubs (McGranahan et al, 16). China’s

problems are particularly pressing because of its trade-oriented growth strategy which favors

development along the coast, with migration to coastal megacities like Shanghai, Guangdong

and Guangzhou. More concerning is that the problem is only getting worse – the population in

China’s low-lying coastal region grew at three times the rate of the national population growth

rate between 1990 and 2000 (McGranahan et al, 16). This kind of rapid urbanization incites

coastal degradation, which in turn leaves an inadequate infrastructure open to flooding and

other weather-related disasters spurred by climate change. To gain a perspective, a one meter

sea-level rise would drown Shanghai and displace its 12.4 million residents alone (Myers 755).

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In general, many coastal city populations are at risk from flooding – particularly when

high tides combine with storm surges and/or high river flows. Between 1994 and 2004, about

one-third of the 1,562 disasters, half of the 120,000 people killed, and 98 percent of the 2

million people affected by flood disasters were in Asia, where there are large populations in the

flood plains of major rivers (McGranahan et al, 3). This is especially telling in China, where

floods are the number one cause of displaced people. Eight out of the top ten natural disasters

affecting the population in China’s recent history are floods (EM-DAT). After comparing data

spanning thirty years, we can see that the impact of flooding in the region is steadily increasing.

In 1989, flooding affected some 100,010,000 people; while in 2003, the number of those

affected rose to 150,146,000 (EM-DAT).1

GRAPH 1

The figure above shows that while the number of people affected varies throughout the

years (even with a slight positive slope – or an increase of .1%), the rate at which flooding occurs

is becoming more frequent. We can thus conclude that with rising sea-levels as the newest

flood-causing factor, China will be facing higher numbers of affected people; and ultimately

greater numbers of forced migrants.

Countries with Majority of Land in Low-Lying Deltas                                                             1 “People affected” as defined by the Emergency Events Database: People requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency; also includes displaced or evacuated people.  

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Bangladesh is in a unique position – in that, almost half of its population lives in lower

coastal plains (McGranahan et al, 16). If displacements from flooding were to occur at a steady

rate, the first waves of migration would be between 200,000 and 300,000 persons annually

(Suhrke 11). Over the next 60 years, 13-15 percent of Bangladesh’s population could be

completely displaced, with few refuges to turn to (Suhrke 11). Just one meter in sea-level rise

would inundate all of Bangladesh’s rice land, forcing some 40 million to evacuate (Brown 2004).

These are striking potential outcomes, but we must remember that changes in sea-level and its

effects are not only limited to the future.

In 1993, due to flooding and river bank erosion, the Farakka people of the Khulna region

of Bangladesh found that their traditional jobs as agricultural farmers were no longer lucrative.

The poor, rural Farakka migrants chose to settle principally in urban areas, but once they found

opportunity lacking there they headed to India via the West Bengal border. A survey of the

Indian area later showed that 43 out of 52 Bangladeshi immigrants hailed from Farakka (Swain

195). Of the 43 immigrants, 41 cited environmental problems as their reason for leaving, 18 of

those specifically because of river bank erosion and flooding (Swain 196). Bangladeshi

immigrants have been consistently rising due to land degradation and flooding. Sea-level rise is

only set to exacerbate the situation, as seen in contemporary case studies.

The number of families and villages who lose their homes permanently to rivers every

year are perhaps one of the highest in Bangladesh. It has been reported that many of the slum

dwellers in the metropolitan areas are the victims of riverbank erosion. In the decade of 1982 –

1992, over 106 thousand hectares of land has been eroded in the three major rivers of

Bangladesh (the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna) against an accretion of only 19

thousand hectares. About 350 thousand people were displaced due to riverbank erosion in that

decade, who suffered severe economic and social consequences (Climate Change Cell 9).

Substantial numbers are also being displaced from coastal islands, chars, and along the coastline

as their settlements are destroyed due to frequent and intense storm surge and tidal bores.

On Bangladesh's southern coast, erosion driven in part by accelerating glacier melt and

unusually intense rains already has scoured away half of Bhola Island, which once covered an

area nearly 20 times the size of Chicago (Goering 2007). Because of climate change, a sea level

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rise of 0.5 meter over the last 100 years has already eroded 65 percent landmass of 250 square

kilometer Kutubdia, 227 square kilometers of the aforementioned Bhola and 180 square

kilometer of Sandwip islands. Over the past 100 years, the once 1,000 square kilometer island

into a small 21 square kilometer landmass (Climate Change Cell 5). In case of any further sea

level rise, islands like these and the entire coastal area would be hit hard resulting in billions of

dollars of losses in GDP, economic downturn, ecological damage and livelihood assets and

options. And land disputes, many driven by erosion, now account for 77 percent of Bangladesh's

legal suits, giving some banal insight into the whiplash of environmental degradation. The

extent of Bangladesh's coming problem is most evident in Antarpara, a village stuck between the

Jamuna and Bangali rivers five hours northwest of Dhaka, the capital. In this and other low-

lying villages nearby, more than half of the 3,300 families have lost their land to worsening river

erosion (Goering 2007). Some have moved their homes a dozen times and are running out of

places to relocate.

These case studies can be furthered bolstered by statistics, which reflect trends much like

China’s. In 1968, flooding affected 15,889,616 Bangladeshis, with the number rising to

36,000,000 in 2004 (EM-DAT). In fact, floods in 2004 were some of the severest seen in

decades, leaving 1,000 people dead and more than 30 million people homeless (Ward 2004).

GRAPH 2

As the graph above shows, those people affected by flooding have increased steadily by

close to two percent since 1968. It is true that flooding and erosion are part of life in

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Bangladesh, and are vital for the renewal of land. However, severe floods with devastating

effects on people’s livelihoods used to happen once every twenty years. But they are now

occurring every five to seven years, taking place in 1987, 1988, 1995, 1998 and 2004. Dr Atiq

Rahman of the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies adds: “We simply do not know if

climate change is definitely increasing erosion…what we can say is that patterns of rainfall and

flooding have changed in the past few years. Severe floods used to come once every 20 years,

but now seem to occur around every five to seven years” (Christian Aid 2006). The most

disturbing reality: this increase in flooding is only poised to multiply as temperature rises and

sea-level follows.

Small Islands and Atolls

Over the next 100 years, small islands are likely to experience a rise in sea surface and air

temperatures (between 1.4°C and 5.8°C) and a rise in sea-level (as much as 9mm per year)

(Tompkins et al, 4). If these predictions were to prove true, this could mean serious

consequences for the concentration of large settlements (with associated economic and social

activities) at, or near, the coast. On Pacific and Indian Ocean atolls, villages are located on the

sand terrace or on the beach itself, and in the Caribbean more than half of the population lives

within 1.5 km of the shoreline. In many small islands, such as in Jamaica and the west and

south coasts of Barbados, continuous corridors of development now occupy practically the

entire coast. Such land is also occupied by a range of other settlements, like fishing villages, and

on many small islands government buildings and important facilities such as hospitals are

frequently located close to the shore.

More people and activity on the coast mean a greater chance of sea-level rise devastating

island populations. Projections based on several scenarios show that for a one meter rise in

sea-level, 98 coastal settlements in Cuba would be inundated affecting a population of over

50,000 (Sem 12). A 50 cm in sea-level would lead to 60 percent of beaches in Grenada being

lost. For the Maldives, however, a one-meter rise in sea level amounts to the complete

disappearance of the nation (Sem 14).

On the Cateret atolls, off the coast of Papua New Guinea, residents already must find a

new place to call home. A little more than 1,500 residents living on the islands are being

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relocated to Bougainville, a larger island in the north, because Cateret is about to be engulfed by

rising sea-levels (Shears 2007). They are often called the first “climate change refugees” in the

news, but they are certainly not the only small island country under constraints. With small

populations on heavily concentrated low-lying islands, many pacific nations are becoming

alarmed at global warming. Those considered particularly vulnerable, are Vanuatu; the

Marshall Islands; Tuvalu and parts of Papua New Guinea, as well as Kiribati (Marks 2006).

Kiribati, an archipelago of 33 coral atolls barely 6 feet above sea-level, is vanishing as warming

temperatures spurs rising tides. Its president, Anote Tong, warned Australia and New Zealand -

the two developed countries in the region - to prepare for a mass exodus within the next decade.

FIGURE 3

Figure 3: Projected inundation of Bikenibeu Island Tarawa, Kiribati under Worst Case

Scenario (Sem 16). Top: Present status; Middle: Residual island under worst case scenario 2100;

Bottom: Residual island under worst case scenarios and storm surge, 2100.

19  

The beaches on Tarawa, an island nation which is pancake-flat and barely 500 yards

wide, are so eroded that sand has been imported from Australia (Marks 2006). Dozens of

families have been forced to move, dismantling their wooden huts piece by piece and

reassembling them further back from the water. Now the population is being squeezed into an

ever narrower strip of land between an inland lagoon and the Pacific. In Vanuatu, an entire

coastal village on the island of Tegua is being forced to move to higher ground, its huts flooded

by surging seas (Marks 2006). As the number of affected islands, and case studies of sea-level

rise forcing migration, continue to grow; the only question remaining is: how long will island

states survive?

This is not the only question we have to ask as we continue to wrestle with the idea of

climate change and the migrants it will invariably produce. We need to determine if those

migrants can be classified as genuine “environmental refugees” and whether or not they should

be included in the official United Nations definition upheld by many countries as the basis for

their asylum law.

Conclusions

The aforementioned case studies demonstrate the severe impact that environmental

issues have on human migration flows. Desertification affects 135 million people worldwide,

with another billion estimated to be at risk (UN Convention to Combat Desertification). Sea

level rise is projected to affect approximately 50 million people in a best-case scenario (IPCC).

In Bangladesh alone, the number of those potentially under pressure reaches 40 million. In the

Sahel, 67.5 million people are already living under the effects of desertification, causing them to

either be permanently displaced or to temporarily leave their homes for a period of time in order

to ensure the economic stability of their families.

Already existing cases of displaced persons make a strong call for the recognition of the

term environmental refugees. For, all have been forced to leave their places of origin, not

voluntarily, but out of necessity. While these refugees may be leaving for economic reasons,

they are not leaving for economic reasons alone, which puts them in a separate category from

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solely economic refugees. Environmental refugees are forced to migrate because the destruction

of their environment is preventing them from being able to survive.

“Environmental Refugee” as United Nations Policy

The term refugee, as defined by the United Nations, refers to “people outside of their

own country, because of well founded fear of persecution on account of their race, religion,

nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion and where there is a failure of

state protection in the country of origin or habitual residence” (UN Refugee Convention 1951).

Under this current definition, people fleeing from environmental problems are not be protected

by the UN Refugee Convention.

The lack of a legal status for environmental migrants is often touted as an injustice that

needs to be corrected. Some authors, such as Conisbee and Simms (2003), have argued that

environmental migrants should be given a refugee status, and many call for the creation of a

new category of refugees. And, many international organizations and governments agree. A

resolution passed by the Belgian Senate in 2006 asks the Belgian government to support the

international recognition of “environmental refugees” within the framework of the Geneva

Convention, and Australia’s Labor Party published a brochure recommending that Australia

“should be working at the UN to ensure appropriate recognition of climate change refugees in

existing conventions, or through the establishment of a new convention on climate change

refugees” (Sercombe and Albanese 2006).

While the United Nations has legislation in place recognizing desertification as a serious

issue, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, and has also recognized 2006 as the

International Year of Deserts and Desertification to raise awareness, what remains missing is

the recognition of the people affected. Classifying Sahelian climate migrants as environmental

refugees would afford them a status that could ease their mobility, and would also bring in much

needed international aid to the region that could help combat the spread of desertification, and

in turn, stem the flow of refugees. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an agency

of the United Nations, gives stunning statistics about the millions who will be displaced by sea-

level rise, but their situation could also be helped by affording them a real world solution:

refugee status. With their homes and livelihoods destroyed, it will be necessary to facilitate their

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movement to other regions so that they do not remain internally displaced and a strain on an

already tattered developing country, or even failed state. Climate change is clearly shaping new

patterns in our world that will affect millions, and potentially billions, of people. In order to aid

those displaced due to environmental factors, we recommended that the United Nations add an

additional classification of those who are displaced by environmental factors to their definition

of refugee. Changing a definition is the only way to adapt in a rapidly changing world.

22  

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