The Sourhern Journal off‘hilosophy (1986) Vol. X X I V , No. 1

DETERMINISM, AFFIRMATION, A N D FREE CHOICE Jeffrey Cobb Brown University

Many philosophers are convinced that the determinist goes wrong, perhaps even contradicts himself, in stating his position. Nevertheless, attempts to say just how the determinist errs have not met with clear success. In their book Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument‘ Joseph M. Boyle Jr . , Germain Grisez, and OlafTollefsen attempt a new and rigorous argument for the claim that determinism is self-refuting. The authors argue that “rationally affirming” a proposition, including the proposition that no one can make a free choice, necessarily presupposes a capacity for free choice, defined as follows:

DI Someone makes a free choice if and only if he makes a choice (C) in the actual world, and there is a possible world such that he does not makeC in this possible world and everything in this possible world except his making C and the consequences of his making C is the same as in the actual world.2

Thus any attempt to affirm that the proposition that no one can make a free choice is more reasonable to believe true than its contradictory is futile, because such an affirmation is possible only if the affirmed proposition is false.

This argument is an interesting and a promising one. As it is developed in Free Choice, however, it is unconvincing. I think that Boyle, Grisez and Tollefsen contradict themselves. I argue that their account of rational affirmation, together with their views about the impact of established priorities on choice, entail that rational affirmation presupposes a capacity for a kind of choice that does not satisfy D1, and, consequently, that they fail t o show that rational affirmation is impossible unless someone can make a free choice. I then try to show that the views that lead the authors into contradiction are either simply mistaken, or can be abandoned without altering their central argument. Finally, I say why the argument in Free Choice must still be considered unsuccessful.

On page 163 of Free Choice Boyle, Grisez and Tollefsen give the following concise formulation of their refutation of t he proposition that

Jeffrey Cobb teaches at Brown University and has written on topics that include the paradox of analysis and self-referential arguments.

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no one can make a free choice. (The authors employ the following abbreviations: “Nfc”-the proposition that no one can make a free choice; “Sfc”-the proposition that someone can make a free choice; “PNfc”-a proponent of Nfc; “PSfc”-a proponent of Sfc.)

(1) The PNfc rationally affirms Nfc (By assumption) (2) If Nfc is rationally affirmed, then the conditions obtain whereby Sfc

is rationally excluded (By clarifications in chapter 5, section E) (3) The conditions obtain whereby Sfc can be [sic] rationally excluded

(From 1 and 2) (4) If the conditions obtain whereby Sfc is rationally excluded, then

some rationality norm must be in force (By clarifications in chapter 5, section F)

(5) A rationality norm adequate to warrant an affirmation which excludes Sfc is in force (From 3 and 4)

( 6 ) Any norm by which a PNfc can rationally exclude Sfc has a normativity which prescribes unconditionally and prescribes one of two open alternatives (Established in section D)

(7) Any norm which prescribes unconditionally and prescribes one of two open alternatives is in force only if the person to whom it is addressed can make a free choice (To be established . . . .)

(8) Any norm by which the PNfc can rationally exclude Sfc is in force only if the person to whom it is addressed can make a free choice (From 6 and 7 together with clarifications in chapter five, section F)

(9) Someone can make a free choice (From 5 and 8) (10) Nfc is inconsistent with 9 ( 1 1) Nfc is falsified by 9 (9 states what the PNfc does in rationally

affirming Nfc, assuming the conditions obtain whereby one can rationally affirm Nfc.)

The argument stated informally runs something like this. The proponent of Nfc rationally affirms Nfc. That is, he holds it to be rationally preferable, more reasonable to believe true, than its contradictory, Sfc. In order to do this the PNfc must adduce reasons for Nfc’s preferability. In so doing he appeals, implicitly or explicitly, to a “rationality norm”-a principle or set of principles that show the “relevance and argumentative force”3 of those reasons. These principles indicate that “certain sorts of reasons and evidence provide adequate grounds for affirming a conclusion.”4 For example, an argument that a particular theory should be accepted because it accounts most economically for the relevant data appeals to the norm of Ockham’s razor.

By rationally affirming Nfc, the PNfc invokes a norm that prescribes the “un~onditional”~ rational preferability of Nfc over Sfc. This norm “rationally excludes” Sfc. This means that while the principles that comprise the norm do not eliminate Sfc as a candidate for affirmation,

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they render a choice of Sfc unreasonable: “if the affirmation of one alternative is rational, the other [contradictory] alternative is not open to a person who is committed to the rational pursuit of truth.”6 This does not mean that there cannot be another norm that prescribes the rational preferability of Sfc over Nfc. To say that a norm N prescribes alternative a unconditionally is to say that N cannot also support an affirmation of a’s contradictory.

In maintaining that Nfc is unconditionally more reasonable than Sfc, the PNfc says in effect that “everyone ought to be reasonable enough to accept Nfc.”’ This ‘ought’, the authors suggest, will be without force unless one can, but need not, choose Nfc over Sfc:

. . . the PNfc’s affirming of his position depends upon some prescription which directs persons interested in the issue to accept one of two coherent possibilities . . . . Such a prescription presupposes that persons to whom it is given cun choose the option which is prescribed although someone might nor choose it.*

The claim here is that ‘ought implies can’, or, more accurately, ‘ought implies can and can do otherwise.’g The rational affirmation of a proposition p is grounded on a set of principles that prescribe the superior reasonableness of p over its logically possible contradictory q. Implicit in such an affirmation is the demand that others act reasonably too and accept p because of its rational superiority. If one’s choice of p or q is determined, however, the authors insist that this demand can have no force. One cannot be “directed” by the norm invoked by the proponent of p’s affirmation to affirm the proposition it prescribes if one is already determined to accept or reject that proposition. In other words, one cannot act reasonably, as the proponent of p asks, unless one is free to accept or reject the prescription of the principles which ground reasoned assent to p.

The PNfc’s demand for reasoned assent to his position, therefore, rests on the possibility of a choice between alternatives guided by principles that direct but that do not determine one’s choice:1°

In other words, the norms to which the PNfc must at least implicitlyappeal when he tries to show that one ought to accept his position can have no force unless one cun accept it although one neednot accept it.11

Since Nfc entails that one is determined by antecedent causes to choose one alternative and reject the other, the PNfc’s demand that Nfc be accepted on the basis of its rational superiority to Sfc cannot be met if Nfc is true. The PNfc’s demand for accent to Nfc on the basis of its rational superiority is, the authors conclude, pointless, as it can only be met if Nfc is false.

The heart of the argument on p. 163 is captured in premise 7 : One cannot rationally affirm a proposition without having the capacity to make a free choice, as defined in D1. I will try to show in what follows that the authors’ views about the impact of established priorities on

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choice entail that a choice between two logically possible contradictory alternatives based on the rational preferability of one alternative cannot satisfy D1.

Suppose one must choose between alternatives a and b (circum- stances preclude not choosing). Suppose also that one wants t o choose the alternative that satisfies a certain set of conditions. After careful calculation it is determined that only alternative a satisfies these conditions. Is a subsequent choice of a, based on the outcome of this calculation, a free choice? The authors’ answer appears to be “no”:

Of course, when a person does something following a calculation which has led to the exclusion of every possibility but one, . . . he can proceed with a sense of ‘freedom’- meaning physical freedom or the freedom to d o as one pleases. He need not feel constrained, compelled, restrained, or in any way forced. But he is not deliberating and choosing, and thus there is no question of free choice.12

The idea here seems to be something like this. Suppose I choose alternative a because it is the alternative singled out by calculation C. If my choice of a based on C is a free choice, then there is a possible world identical13 to the actual world prior to my choice where I choose another alternative based on C. But calculation C singles out alternative a and no other. Thus there cannot be a world where I choose alternative b because it is the alternative singled out by C. My choice of a based on a calculation that eliminates every alternative except u is not, therefore, a free choice as defined in D1.

While calculation, and other mechanical decision proceedures, single out one alternative as preferable, on the authors’ view the deliberation that preceeds a free choice does not make one alternative seem “unqualifiedly better”:

At the moment of [free] choice, the possibility one does not choose does not seem less good than the possibility one chooses, nor d o the two seem equally good. Rather, the possibilitywhich isnotchosen . . . isattractiveafteritsownfashion whichdiffersin kind rather than in degree from the attractiveness of the possibility which is ch0sen.1~

The point to note is that on the authors’view the important difference between alternatives in a free choice is one of kind and not of degree. Neither alternative at the moment of a free choice seems “definitely better,”” and hence nothing but “the choosing itself” settles which alternative is finally selected.

In order to account for our conviction that we often choose what we believe to be the better alternative, the authors suggest the following:

. . . cases in which the alternatives d o seem definitely more and less good are ones in which natural dispositions and previous choices have established a definite order of priorities for one’s action, . . , . I 6

It is only in retrospect, the authors insist, that an alternative freely chosen seems the better alternative:

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In retrospect one considers alternatives in the light of the priority established by one’s choosing. In this light, one has a principle by which one alternative isdefinitely better than the other.”

In brief, a choice made on the basis of a priority established by a calculation, a natural disposition, a previous choice, or a principle is not a free choice in the authors’ sense.

What kind of choice is it that one makes in order to affirm a proposition to be more reasonable to believe (true) that its logically possible and coherent contradictory? Recall that on the authors’ view whenever someone rationally affirms a proposition he at least implicitly appeals to a rationality norm. A norm not only supports the arguments and reasons adduced in favor of the proposition affirmed, it also serves as a guide for someone who wishes to rationally affirm a proposition, by making explicit the “licenses and warrants legitimating the moves one makes in taking one proposition rather than its contradictory as more likely to be true of the world.”‘8 Suppose, then, that one accepts the guidance of a norm and affirms the prescribed alternative-does one make the kind of free choice defined in Dl?

The answer, I think, must be no. If one alternative is determined to be rationally preferable to its contradictory in the light of the principles that constitute a rationality norm, then the (rationally) excluded alternative is “not open to a person committed to the rational pursuit of truth.”lg Consequently, if proposition p is prescribed as rationally preferable to its contradictory q by norm N, then p is “definitely better” than q according to the standard by which we are supposed to judge (i.e., the rationality norm N invoked by the proponent of p’s affirmation of p). The authors are clear that in a situation where such a priority exists, where one alternative is deemed definitely better prior to one’s choosing, a subsequent choice of the prescribed alternative based on this priority is not a free choice.

It appears then, that an alternative cannot be freely chosen on the basis of its rational preferability over its contradictory. The authors’ remarks about the relation between established priorities and choice suggest that the demand implicit in any rational affirmation of Nfc, the demand that it be accepted because it is more reasonable to believe true of the world than Sfc, can only be met by a kind of choice that, by their own account, does not satisfy D1. Thus the authors have failed to show that rational affirmation is possible only if someone can make a free choice.

While the authors seem to plainly contradict themselves, it is by no means clear that contradiction is unavoidable. I think, in fact, that the authors’belief that choices based on established priorities cannot satisfy D l is mistaken. Even if a calculation, for example, excludes every alternative but one, surely one can still ‘perversely’ choose an excluded alternative. If, after calculation, one can still choose either the

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prescribed alternative or some other, then isn’t a subsequent choice of the prescribed alternative ‘free’ in the authors’ sense? Why, exactly, do the authors think otherwise? Recall their definition of a free choice:

D1 Someone makes a free choice if and only if he makes a choice (C) in the actual world, and there is a possible world such that he does not make C in this possible world and everything in this possible world except his making C and the consequences of his making C is the same as in the actual world.

What, then, does the actual world contain, prior to a choice based on a calculation, that makes it such that any world identical to the actual world prior to that choice is also a world where the alternative picked out by calculation is chosen? We must speculate here about the authors’ views because they do not specify the element(s) of the actual world that will cause such a choice to fail DI . It seems clear that it cannot be merely the calculation itself. The fact that a calculation exists that picks out one alternative over others in no way determines or compels a choice of that alternative. If this were the case it would render non-free the choice of any alternative that is the outcome of a calculation, whether or not this calculation plays a part in one’s choice. I think, in fact, that there is only one plausible candidate to be discerned in Free Choice for the element of the actual world that, on the authors’view, makes choices based on calculation, etc., fail D1, and that is a true future-tense proposition.

In chapter 3 (page 5 5 ) the authors suggest that the assumption that there are true future-tense propositions about the outcome of choices is consistent with Sfc. Let us assume, then, that there are such propositions. The authors can now argue as follows: “Suppose that in the actual world S must make a choice between alternatives a and 6 . S chooses alternative a because it is the alternative arrived at by calculation C. On the above assumption it follows that the world prior to S’s choice contains a true future-tense proposition like: ‘S will choose alternative a because it is the alternative arrived at by calculation C.’ Because this proposition is true in every possible world identical to the actual world prior to S’s choice, S’s choice of a cannot satisfy the definition of a free choice given in Dl.”

The assumption that there are propositions of this sort, however, is not consistent with the claim that we can make a free choice as defined in D1. If the actual world prior to any choice of x contains a true future-tense proposition like “S will choose x,” then no possible world identical to the actual world prior to such a choice can be a world where x is not chosen. Consequently, no choice of x can satisfy D1.

In remarks about the law of the excluded middle (p. 5 5 ) the authors appear willing, although they believe it unnecessary, to consider revisions of this logical principle. In order to preserve something from the above account, and to secure a foundation for the authors’ views about choice and priorities, let us assume that future-tense propositions

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of the form “S will choose either p or q”can be true, while denying that it follows from this that either “S will choose p”or “S will choose q”is true prior to S’s choice. The authors can now argue in this way: “Suppose that in the actual world S must choose between a and b and that S chooses a because it is singled out by calculation C. On the above assumption, the actual world prior to S’s choice contains a true future- tense proposition like: ‘s will choose either a or b because it is the alternative singled out by C.’It does not follow that either ‘S will choose a’or ‘S will choose b’is true prior to S’s choice. However, since C picks out alternative a and no other, no world that contains C and the above true disjunctive proposition can be a world where S chooses b, or where S fails to choose at all. Because C and this true disjunctive proposition are in every world identical to the actual world prior to S’s choice, S’s choice of a based on C cannot be a free choice as defined in DI.”

The truth of this kind of future-tense disjunctive proposition does not preclude free choice. Suppose that in the actual world S ignores calculation C when choosinga. The world prior to S’s choice contains a proposition like “S will choose either a or b”(S’s choice, remember, is not based on C). This proposition can, of course, be true in a world where S chooses b and not a, hence S’s choice of a satisfies D1.

This sort of revision to the law of excluded middle will provide a foundation for the authors’claims about choice and calculation. It also preserves the contradiction noted earlier. Suppose I rationally affirm a proposition p (and so rationally exclude its contradictory q) based on the prescription of norm N. The situation here is analogous to that of a choice made on the basis of a calculation. The world prior to my choice of p based on the prescription of N contains a true future-tense proposition like: “J will choose either p or q because it is the alternative prescribed by N.” Because norm N prescribes “unconditionally” the rational superiority of p, there can be no world that contains, as the actual world does, both N and the above true proposition where I choose alternative q. Hence my choice of p cannot satisfy D1.

Because nothing in the authors’central argument in any way requires that we adopt a modified law of the exclude middle, I suggest that we do not, and that we simply set aside the authors’ peculiar views about choice and established priorities, thereby avoiding contradiction.

While this leaves the authors free to claim that rational affirmation presupposes a capacity for free choice, it also leaves this claim unsupported. It is for want of adequate support for this key assertion, embodied in premise seven of the argument on p. 163, that the authors’ argument must ultimately be counted unsuccessful. The argument in Free Choice is vitiated by a consistent failure to take into consideration compatibilist alternatives to the authors’views. This failure undermines support for the crucial premise 7. The following passage gives the authors’ ‘proof of this premise:

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For our argument, the important aspect of the relationship between free choice and a norm which prescribes unconditionally between two openalternatives is that freechoice is a necessary condition for the fulfillment of such a norm. We argue for this thesis as follows. If one is determined by any factor whatsoever either to fulfill the norm [that is, to choose the prescribed alternative] or not to fulfill the norm, then there are not two open alternatives. The alternative to which one is determined will be the only one which can be realized, whether or not he is aware of this fact. But the sort of normativity relevant here is is just the sort which implies that there are open alternatives;. . . . Thus, nothing determines the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the norm. Although nothing can determine the fulfillment of the norm, still the norm does prescribe; it prescribes unconditionally. Thus, the norm must be able to be fulfilled, but it cannot be fulfilled by a necessitated or determined response.20

In this passage and throughout their book the authors apparently presuppose that “being determined to do A” implies “cannot do other than A”, which, of course, a compatibilist would deny. To provide adequate support for premise 7 the authors need an argument that shows that no compatibilist interpretation of “S can choose either p or q”is consistent with rational affirmation. It is by no means obvious that this is so. For example, among the factors that a compatibilist might argue determine someone’s choice of, say, one physical theory over another could be the conviction that the theory accounts best for the data and/or is supported by the best arguments. Being determined to choose an alternative is not obviously incompatible with choosing that alternative because it seems most reasonable-and this, on the surface at least, is all that rational affirmation requires.

NOTES

Many thanks to Michael Zimmerman for thoughtful criticism of earlier versions of this paper. My thanks also to anonymous referees at the Southern Journal of Philosophy.

I Joseph M. Boyle Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, Free Choice: A Sev- Referential Argument (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976) Hereafter, Free Choice.

2 ibid. p. I I 3 ibid. p. 5 4 ibid. p. 145 5 ibid. pp. 5, 161 6 ibid. p. 162 and see pp. 145-6

8 ibid. 9 I owe this phrase to a n anonymous referee at the Southern Journal of Philosophy. 10 Free Choice p. 145

ibid. p. 5 12 ibid. p. 17 13 I make these assumption here and in what follows: (a) in DI the locution

“everything . . . is the same”is to be understood as stating that the worlds in question are identical prior to the choice of C; and (b) a necessarycondition for worlds Wand W’being identical is that they assign the same truth-values to the same propositions.

ibid. p. 5

14 ibid. p. 76 15 ibid. p. 85 16 ibid. p. 76

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ibid. p. 77 18 ibid. p. 145 19 ibid. p. 162 2o ibid. p. 165

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