DEUTSCH the I Some Suggestions for Usingpeople.oregonstate.edu/~flayb/MY PUBLICATIONS... · social...

112 DEUTSCH

productive interplay between the two orientations because our present institutional settings foster their segregation. It should also be evident that my theory about the causes and consequences of cooperation and competition has implicit in it many other suggestions. I leave it to the reader to draw out these implications.

REFERENCES

Deutsch, M. An experimental study of the effects of cooperation and competition upon group process. Human Relations, 1949, 2. 199-231. (a)

Deutsch, M. A theory of cooperation and competition. Human Relations, 1949, 2. 129-151. (b) Deutsch, M. Cooperation and trust: Some theoretical notes. Nebraska Symposium on

Motivation, 1962, JO, 275-319. Deutsch, M. Socially relevant science: Reflections on some studies of interpersonal conflict.

American Psychologist, 1969, 24, 1076-1092. Deutsch, M. The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes. New Haven,

Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973. Deutsch, M., & Collins, M. E. Interracial housing: A psychological evaluation of a social

experiment. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951. Deutsch, M., & Hornstein, H. A. (Eds.). Applying social psychology: Implications for research,

practice, and training. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1975. Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957. Pettigrew, T. School segregation in current perspective. Urban Review, 1969, 3, 4-9. Proshansky, H., & Seiden berg, B. Basic studies in social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehan

& Winston, 1965.

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I

"Give Me the I-acts .. : Some Suggestions for Using Social Science Knowledge in National Policy-Making

Karen M. Hennigan University of Southern California

Brian R. Flay University of Waterloo

Thomas D. Cook Northwestern University

INTRODUCTION

How should social science knowledge be used in policy making? Should substantive knowledge be used to design individual strategies for solving a social problem? Should social science methods be used to choose the most effective (or cost-effective) among several alternative ways to meet a policy goal, or to decide on the priorities of various problems? In all of these cases, social science knowledge is expected to play a major role in deciding what social policy should be adopted. Such approaches to utilization have been variously characterized as problem-solving approaches (Rein & White, 1977; Weiss, 1977), engineering approaches (Crawford & Biderman, 1969; Hauser, 1949), and decision-constitutive approaches (Knorr, 1977). They are all similar in casting social science in the role of generating the major information on which policy decisions should be based.

Although a few individuals expect or advocate such direct decision-related use of social science knowledge, most scholars doubt its feasibility and desirability (cf. Campbell, 1971; Crawford& Biderman, 1969; Hauser, 1949; Rein & White, 1977; Weiss, 1977). For example, Campbell ( 1971) stipulates that social science should not be used to decide "what is to be done, but rather to say what has been done [p. 8)." He stresses the use of social science research methods to evaluate the impact of social policies and programs in order to develop information that may enrich decisions without in any obvious way

113

114 HENNIGAN, FLAY, COOK

determining them. From this perspective, the major role in determining policy decisions should be in the hands of politicians and, in the short run, the most useful social science tool in contributing to decisions may be methods rather than theories.

Along similar lines, Rein and White ( 1977) point out that policy making is a value-expressive process that takes place in a political arena, which depends heavily on the identification and expression of contending values. They note that in a political democracy the "facts" should be "subordinate to and sustaining of values, and only contribute to the delineation of an issue [p. 135]." As a system, science is not supposed to be value-expressive. Indeed, it seeks, however imperfectly, to be value-neutral by having individual values "wash out" in the collective work of the scientific community, even though the values of individual investigators will necessarily be present in their own work to varying degrees. Given these assumptions, Rein and White contend that social science knowledge, by which they mean theoretical knowledge as well as seemingly atheoretical findings, should contribute to policy making by illuminating the validity of any "factual" assumptions that are made by the various constituencies in a policy debate. They further contend that such knowledge should not carry over into the value-laden process of making policy decisions.

We shall not discuss further definitions of decision-related usage that depend on data being the primary determinate of policy decisions. Rather, we think that social science information should play a more modest role in which it affects decisions by enriching the policy debate where values, preferences, and interests usually play more major roles than social science information. Although social science knowledge can be used in important ways that are not decision-related, we shall focus on issues where such knowledge might contribute directly or indirectly to policy decisions, that is, where a few crucial "facts" might play some role in swaying policy decisions.

Despite widespread interest in the use of social science i?formation _in policymaking, several students of the process have ~ome t~ behe~e that so~1al science research has not contributed much to social pohcy (Rem & White, 1977) and this pessimism has been particularly acute with regard to applied social research in general (Weiss, 1977, p. 5) and evaluation research in particular (Patton, 1978, pp. 17-19). Let us turn our attention, then, to the question of whether or not social science information is being used to any significant extent.

Is Social Science Research Routinely Used?

Several researchers have attempted to determine the extent to which social science research is used by government officials (e.g., Caplan, Morrison, & Stambaugh, 1975; Knorr, 1977; Patton, 1978; Rich, 1977). Their strategy has

6. USING SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE IN POLICY MAKING 11

been to interview officials who might have had the opportunity to use soci science knowledge. Without exception, the researchers were encouraged find that government policy makers report "using" social science know led more than occasionally. However, the policy makers report that they rare "use" social science knowledge directly, in ways where there is an obvio direct causal link between the knowledge and a decision. Rather, they us1 social science information most often to aid in conceptualizing, defining, redefining the nature of a social problem, or to help understand t implications of one of several possible policy alternatives that were und consideration. Such interview findings are by no means definitive (i example, in all but one study officials were asked retrospectively about use But such findings do nonetheless represent the first available body systematic information on utilization. Thus, they are worth considering more detail.

The largest of these studies was conducted by Caplan, Morrison, ar Stambaugh ( 1975). In this study 204 persons holding important positio1 across various departments and major agencies and commissions of ti executive branch of the United States Government were interviewed 1 trained interviewers. The interviews focused on the use of empirically base social science knowledge (with economics being excepted) in policy-relah decision making. There were 575 self-reported instances of recent use of soci science knowledge, but the nature of use was typically indirect. Tl information used most often was from surveys, social statistics, progra evaluation, and scientific generalizations. Caplan (1977) states that "on rarely was policy formation determined by a concrete, point-by-point relianc on empirically grounded data [p. 188]." Rather, he reports that "there widespread use of soft information, and its impact on policy, although ofte indirect, may be great or even greater than the impact of hard information [J 188]." Hard information was defined as explicitly research-based, quantit: tive, and couched in scientific language, whereas soft information was define as not explicitly research-based, qualitative, and couched in lay language. I short, it seems that the policy makers interviewed tended to use social scienc generalizations or perspectives rather than findings from specific studies.

In a study of utilization in Austria, Knorr ( 1977) interviewed 70 mediun level decision makers employed in Austrian federal and municipal agencie The interviews were designed to probe whether the primary use of kn owled~ from social science research was "symbolic" (i.e., for post hoc legitimizatio of decisions already made) or "instrumental." Knorr's interviewing reveale primarily instrumental rather than symbolic utilization. But she reports th< the instrumental usage did not follow the pattern typical of the natur; sciences, with point-by-point similarities between the findings and tt actions. Rather, the main pattern of utilization was indirect, diffuse, an difficult to localize to a particular decision.


Rich (1977) repeatedly interviewed 38 persons associated with a year-long project designed to provide certain U.S. agencies with useful social information. He interviewed officials from the participating agencies, the staff of the project, and some officials from the sponsoring agency, NSF/ RANN. Rich defined use as information that "influences the discussion of policy [p. 200]." The specific types of use most often reported to him included using social science information in: writing memos to supervisors, to counterparts, and downward to others in the agency; briefing the secretary, the assistant secretary, and joint cabinet-level meetings; writing papers; or simply as general background information that influenced a policy maker's thinking. He characterized his findings as evidence of use of knowledge for understanding, not for immediate action.

Patton (1978; Patton, Grimes, Guthrie, Brennan, French, & Blyth, 1977) interviewed a government project officer, a project "decision maker," and a project evaluator for each of 20 completed national health project evaluations. As reported in the other studies, Patton and his colleagues found little evidence of immediate or direct use of social science knowledge in program decisions. They did find that the information generated was often used in the sense that it reduced decision makers' uncertainty with regard to their impressions of the efficacy of a health project and it sometimes provided background information on a related policy or administrative question.

The results of these interview studies may quiet fears that social science research is not being used at all. Knowledge from social science researcher is acknowledged to be useful by a wide spectrum of government policy makers, and it serves to enlighten their understanding of the problems with which they deal. However, the studies also indicate that at the level of national policy, the social science information is not being routinely used in a direct, decisionrelated way. Those persons who held high hopes for the contribution of social science knowledge may be disappointed that social science know ledge has not contributed more directly to policy decisions.

Impediments to Decision-Related Use of Social Science Knowledge

Suggestions for increasing the use of social science research in public policy making abound and behind each is an explicit or implicit assumption about the factor(s) that impede use. Some commentaries locate the blame for underutilization on the intractable nature of the social problems that our nation faces (e.g., Merton, 1949), the inadequacy of our methods to arrive at practical solutions (e.g., Rose, 1977), the low methodological quality of the research conducted (e.g., Bernstein & Freeman, 1975; Merton, 1949), the lack of institutionalized incentives in the research system for conducting research relevant to social problems (e.g., Deutsch, 1975), or the lack of multidisciplinary research efforts directed at specific social problems (e.g.,

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Deutsch, 1975; Rose, 1977). Other commentaries emphasize the complexity of findings and perspectives that the research system generates. Cohen and Weiss (1977) note that research rarely succeeds in laying bare unambiguous "facts" and often seems to generate uncertainty and confusion about the "facts". Other commentaries focus on the temporal and political pressures that lead policy makers to limit the amount of information they seek (Dreyfus, 1977) or lead any one policy maker to assume that someone else would gather all the pertinent information (including opposing information) and would bring it to bear on the substantive issue to be resolved (Weiss, 1977).

Instead of focusing on the shortcomings of the system of conducting social science research or the system of formulating social policy, other commentaries focus on the problems that arise where the two systems meet. The twocommunities perspective on limitations to use (Caplan, Morrison, & Stambaugh, 1975; Horowitz, 1971) stresses the mistrust, miscommunication, and misunderstanding that often arise between researchers and policy makers. Many policy makers seem to have the impression that social science can be used to "prove" anything, and many researchers become cynical when policymakers ignore data-based recommendations in favor of more politic choices. According to Caplan ( 1977), his interview study provides support for the notion that the underutilization of social science knowledge is attributable to a "gap between social scientists and policy makers due to differences in values, language, reward systems, and social and professional affiliations [p. 194]." But he also reports that most policy makers in his sample held very positive attitudes toward social science in general and toward using social science knowledge in the formulation of policy. Further, although Rich ( 1977) reports that the policy makers in his sample did report some distrust of social scientists, he also noted that the distrust did not seem to impede use and that many policy makers do say they value social science knowledge.

But the meeting of the two systems does present some problems and these can perhaps best be understood by considering the incompatibility of the "raw" output of the research system as an input into the social policy system. Ori some important issues (e.g., the effects of school desegregation or of deterrents), the research system outputs a proliferation of studies. For a number of epistemological reasons (briefly outlined in Cook & Campbell, 1979), one can never be certain of the veracity of any single study's findings, let alone its implications. Consequently, confidence in one's knowledge is built on multiple replications of a particular finding by independent re~earchers using a variety of different methods. But multiple replication is likely to lead to short-term confusion, since the same pattern of results may not appear consistently, and considerable effort has to be devoted to understanding the conditions under which a given relationship holds, does not hold, or is even reversed. Thus, at many points of time in the research process, one is aware of multiple perspectives guiding research questions, lack of homo-


geneity in findings, and multiple interpretations of the same findings. Only slowly does the chaos gel into incremental bits of knowledge, but even the validity of these can be challenged during many years of subsequent research. At any one time, then, it is difficult to discern the"facts" and "valid" theories. Furthermore, disagreements among the scientists themselves are commonplace.

The social policy system is based even more explicitly on an adversarial model. In such a system, uncertain information may be worse than no information at all. Best guesses by one "expert" can always be countered by the best guesses by another "expert." Or the guesses can simply be challenged and disregarded because no assurance exists that any guesses are true. The policy system favors a simple yes or no answer to important questions, in part because the adversarial system makes it difficult enough to reach a consensus without the added confusion of wading through technical qualifications, seemingly contradictory "facts," and seemingly promiscuous interpretations. This is why many politicians call on scientists to give simple answers to technical questions. Senator Muskie, for instance, called for a one-armed scientist (without an "on the one hand" and "on the other hand") and Senator Pastore called for a report on television's effects on violence that would have no "ifs and buts."

Students of the utilization process are focusing more and more on the deeper problems that arise out of the meeting of the scientific and policy systems, and there is much less emphasis on the organizational problems that were once thought to be most critical. In her summary of the state of the art, Larson ( 1978) states that it has been generally

believed by the producer and user communities alike that factors such as timeliness of data, objectivity, communication barriers, cost of research, and political feasibility play major roles in limiting levels of utilization, and if these barriers could be overcome, utilization would automatically follow. This assumption is now being seriously questioned. Utilization and non-utilization may be associated with institutional and bureaucratic arrangements quite different from those factors traditionally considered important [p. 3].

More and more observers are beginning to realize that what was once considered a problem of lack of credibility and effective communication betwen social scientists and policy makers reflects more fundamental problems. These involve the need of the policy-making system for consensual, bottom line, issue-focused summaries of relevant social science knowledge, and the corresponding absence in the research community of institutionalized mechanisms for producing such products. The policy community says "Give me the facts," and the research community says "We are not sure if there are many things called 'facts.' Accepting your definition of'facts,' we are not sure of most of the claims about facts that have been raised. And in the minority of

cases where we are reasonably sure, we don't know what they mean for action." One system requests certainty, and the other answers that truth is elusive.

It is on this last problem that we focus in this chapter, and we later discuss some strategies that have been proposed for institutionalizing the means of honestly responding to requests for "bottom line" answers about social scientific "facts." First, however, we attempt to flesh out the nature and implications of this problem through three examples.

The first example concerns the role of social science knowledge in decisions with regard to the regulation of televised violence, and here the "fact" to be ascertained is: "Does televised violence increase the level of spontaneous violence?" The second case concerns school desegregation, and the "facts" to be ascertained are: "How does school desegregation affect achievement, prejudice, and self-esteem?" The third example deals with the funding of public service mass media campaigns, and here the"fact"to be determined is: "When are public service campaigns effective?" These examples were chosen because they are compelling and visible, but they are not meant to be representative of all the cases where social science knowledge might have been used.

THREE EXAMPLES

The Surgeon General's Report on the Impact of Televised Violencet

History. Since television's earliest days, the fear has been expressed that violence on television would lead to increased violence in society. The fear has been most strongly expressed with respect to children, buttressed by the assumption that children are more "impressionable" than adults. Laboratory research on modeling, in which visual acts of violence demonstrably led to higher levels of apparent violence, may well have given an additional edge to these fears about television's effects, but the fears were there before the modeling studies took place. It is not surprising, then, that in the middle 1960s more and more persons advocated an end to televised violence, particularly during the so-called children's viewing hours.

Senator Pastore of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications called for an investigation into the effects of televised violence and stressed that he wanted a report that would not be hedged by "ifs and buts." His motives in

'This account of the circumstances surrounding the Surgeon General's Report on Television and Violence is based on the book written about the report by Cater and Strickland (1975), and on conversations one of the authors has had with several persons directly involved.

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calling for the study were not entirely clear. In fact, some of the more skeptical observers raised the suspicion that the purpose of the study was more to stall action than to create a more rational basis for deciding on action. But whatever the motives, an investigation was mounted and the responsibility for the study was entrusted to the then Surgeon General, William H. Stewart.

The first step in the process was to decide on a panel of experts who would commission new research and then issue a report based on both past research and any new findings. A point about the composition of the panel is worth noting. A list of potential panel members was submitted to the television networks for their approval. Two of the networks (CBS being the exception) expressed opposition to a number of academics whose research had suggested that television caused violence. These scholars were excluded from the panel on the grounds that their evidence might be prejudiced. However, each of the networks had a representative on the panel, and there were also academics on the panel who had regularly consulted with the networks. No attempt was made to exclude these persons on the ground of potential prejudice, the ostensible reason being that the conclusions from a final report would not be credible to the television industry unless the industry's own representatives endorsed them. From the viewpoint of reaching a balanced judgment about television's effects, it might seem strange to exclude persons with one type of presumed prejudice but to include persons with the opposite presumed prejudice. However, from a viewpoint of having the industry under attack comply with any recommendations that might be forthcoming, it was believed necessary to include industry representatives and to exclude industry critics. 2

The panel was empowered to commission some new research in the pursuit of its goal, and a decision was reached to fund many small studies.Most of the studies were aimed at probing causal connections in controlled laboratory settings. There were also correlational studies that probed noncausal connections in field settings. Only one study (Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder, & Huesmann, 1972) promised a naturalistic longitudinal probe of the causal proposition that televised violence causes violent behavior. The decision to commission many studies was contested within the panel and its staff, with the major opposition argument being that a single, large-scale, and expensive study should be conducted, which would be outstanding and above controversy. In retrospect, one can see how dangerous such a focus might have been, for it is difficult to design field research that will guarantee a strong probe of causal links especially (1) when the experimental stimulus (repeated viewing of high levels of televised violence) cannot readily be brought under experimental control in the home settings to which generalization is desired,

21n other contexts industries under attack are routinely asked to nominate representatives to wfact-finding" commissions (e.g., the tobacco industry and studies on the effects of smoking). However, they typically do not have veto power.


and (2) when the effects of television might be restricted to particular (but unknown) kinds of children. (For a discussion of the difficulties with doinB causal research on television in realistic settings, see Milgram & Shotland, 1973). However, the alternate strategy of funding many research studies was precarious because, with the exception of Lefkowitz et al. (1972), inferences about television's effects would be based on whatever composite impression about natural causal relationships could be formed from laboratory experiments on the one hand and cross-sectional field studies on the other hand. We might surmise that it would be difficult to produce a conclusive report with such a funding plan because if policy is to be influenced by studies at all, it is presumably most readily influenced by studies that are simultaneously high in internal and external validity.

When the studies were completed, the panel had to take a stand on the basis of the evidence. The members of the panel fell into three camps: a group of persons who had little to say; the industry representatives and consultants who argued that the evidence was inconclusive, being based on irrelevant laboratory experiments and cross-sectional paper-and-pencil surveys; and a third group, composed primarily of academics, who argued that the laboratory experiments, the cross-sectional surveys, and the one causeprobing longitudinal field study, all pointed toward the conclusion that viewing television violence could lead to aggressive behavior in children. However, the third group also acknowledged that no single study or set of studies was definitive, even though they placed most weight on the results of Lefkowitz et al., 1972. Reconciliation of the different viewpoints was not easy, but was helped by outside reviews of the Lefkowitz et al. study that found its major conclusion warranted. A decision was finally reached that a unanimous report would be issued, which expressed all the limitations but nonetheless concluded that prolonged exposure to violence on televsion can cause violence in some children.

Before the Surgeon General's Report was released, an account of the panel's conclusions was leaked to The New York Times. The story that appeared was biased, stating that the panel's conclusion was that telvision violence is not harmful to children. This story was widely circulated by The Times'news service although it is not clear why an incorrect conclusion came to be qisseminated, or who leaked the story. However, the story that did appear may have created an initial impression that lessened the impact of later, scattered, and more veridical reports of the panel's major conclusion. To counteract possibly erroneous first impressions, several persons who had written chapters for the final report called press conferences after the report was formally released and tried to increase the visibiity of the major conclusion. But as accusations began to flow, the public was probably left confused and perhaps even suspicious of the report.

Senator Pastore convened hearings in March 1972 to hear testimony about the Surgeon General's Report. Before he gave testimony, the Surgeon


General (then Jesse Steinfeld), went to Palo Alto and consulted with several prominent social scientists about the implications of the report. Like others, the Surgeon General was confused because of the quaiifications and conflicting evidence contained in the five volumes he had received from the panel. He also wanted guidance as to how much certainty the evidence warranted. He left Palo Alto determined to tell Senator Pastore's committee that the evidence called for a clear conclusion that television violence causes real violence. This was indeed the essence of his testimony. Perhaps the most important testimony of all, though, came from Dr. Joseph Klapper of CBS, who was a member of the panel and was acknowledged by network executives as the foremost authority on behavioral science research into television. His prepared testimony stressed the difficulties of drawing any conclusions at all from the Surgeon General's Report. However, in cross examination he was asked point-blank whether he believed that the evidence generally supported the conclusion that watching violence on television causes violence. When pressed for a simple yes or no answer, he answered yes. With this answer, it became clear that the evidence was sufficiently strong so that even the network representatives were begrudgingly persuaded.

Assessment. Was this an example of social science research being used? If the criterion is discussion in a policy debate, the social science research outlined in the Surgeon General's Report was clearly used. Indeed, it was a major element in the formal debate at Senate hearings as well as in informal debates in the media and in professional publications. By the criterion of contributing to a policy shift, we can also surmise that the social science knowledge in the Surgeon General's Report was used. At the Senate hearings in March 1972, some network executives indicated that there would be an attempt to reduce the level of violence on television, and at a second round of hearings convened by Senator Pastore in April 1974, spokespeople from all three networks reported that violent programming had decreased. Further, the networks announced the impending introduction of family viewing hours in the early evening when the level of violence would be significantly reduced. Formally speaking, the networks' actions were voluntary, for the Congress was reluctant to enact any guidelines that could be interpreted as censorship. However, it is clear that the Surgeon General's Report and subsequent hearings served to highlight the problem and raise public concern. They presumably also raised the concern of television sponsors who, in turn, may have sought to pressure the networks into reducing the level of violence, particularly in children's programming.

What can we learn from this example of use? Factors that probably contributed to usage include:


l. A key question was identified and agreed upon by all parties .. 2. All parties agreed that social science evidence was relevant to the

question. 3. A ~Jue_ ribbon pa~el of.social scientists was convened and charged with

rev1ewmg the social science evidence. 4. The panel was authorized to commission new research to "fill in the

gaps" in knowledge. 5. The panel completed its task relatively quickly-it was 2Yi years from

the time of its appointment to the time its reports were issued. 6. The panel included some representatives of the industry "under attack "

which enhanced the credibility of the panel's conclusions to the industry.

7. The committee strove to reach conclusions to which all members of the panel could unanimously agree.

8. The committee focused on judgments of "fact" and left the determination of action to policy makers.

9. In the face of public confusion, Senate hearings were held, which forced a greater public commitment to a bottom-line, easy-to-understand conclusion from both the panel (including network representatives) and also the authority commissioning the panel.

Factors that may have worked against optimal usage include:

l. The television industry was given veto power over the composition of the panel, leading to the exclusion of several key social scientists and raising public suspicions about the credibility of the paneJ.3

2. The research commissioned by the panel did not represent a careful attempt to fill in the gaps of our knowledge, perhaps because the research community was not able to respond quickly and produce high quality research that was carefully planned to extend the most important frontiers of knowledge.

3. An erroneous conclusion was widely disseminated and discussed. 4. The final report may have been written so unclearly for the layman that

its release did not quickly serve to correct the previous erroneous conclusion that was circulated.

3Actually because the ultimate conclusion was against the best interests of the industry, in the long run this could have increased the credibility of the panel's report. But due to the suspicions of bias, coupled with the early dissemination of an erroneous conclusion, the panel was criticized and its final credibility may not have matched its initial credibility.


Social Science and School Desegregation

The Supreme Court Decisions of 1954and1955. Social sCience information formed a small part of the total input into the deliberations that resulted in the landmark Supreme Court decisions on dejure school desegregation in 1954 (Brown vs. Board of Education) and into the 1955 deliberations on how to implement the Brown decision. At least 11 different social scientists testified at one or more of the five lower court trials prior to the Supreme Court hearings (see Clark, 1963; Kluger, 1976; and Stephan, 1978 for details). In addition, Stuart Cook, Isadore Chein, and Kenneth Clark prepared a review of the social science literature on the effects of segregation and desegregation that was signed by 32 prominent social scientists and attached to the Appellants' Supreme Court Brief(Allport et al., 1953). A second review was prepared by Clark ( 1953), and this was integrated with other material into a brief concerned with how the 1954 Brown decision should be implemented (Clark, 1963).

It is not clear what role the social scientists' testimony and reviews played in the Supreme Court decision. At one of the lower court trials (Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka) the testimony of psychologists Louisa Holt and Horace English was accepted in the court's finding of fact, which was later quoted in the Supreme Court decision in 1954. Although social scientists testified at three of the four other lower court trials, it remains unclear to what extent the testimony influenced the thinking of the judges. Similarly, in the case of the Supreme Court deliberations, it is difficult to determine to what extent the social scientists' opinions, the social scientists' testimony in the lower court transcripts, or the two specially prepared reviews influenced the thinking of the judges. Some observers believe that the social science input had little influence on the judges (Cahn, 1955; Van der Haag, 1960), whereas Clark disagrees (1963). The skeptics maintain that the harm to minorities from segregation was obvious to everyone, and that the social science input served only to bolster a decision that would have been reached anyway. The skeptics further maintain that the social science knowledge was only relevant to one of three arguments that were presented for ending segregation, any one of which would have been sufficient to influence the judgment (Friedman, 1968; Stephan, 1978). We will never know for sure how much influence the social scientists had, and all we can conclude is that they were given an opportunity to make their expertise count in the debate about school desegregation policy.

The social science information was aimed at demonstrating that segregation is bad for the self-esteem of black children and leads to negative attitudes (prejudice) on the part of whites toward blacks and also blacks toward whites. It is also clear from the testimony of the social scientists in the individual trials


that they believed that self-esteem and prejudice affected the school achievement of minority students.

The second social science review, presented for the Supreme Court deliberations on how the 1954 decision should be implemented, outlined the social science theories and findings that were judged to be relevant for implementing effective means of public school desegregation. It was argued in the review that desegregation would take place more effectively if it was implemented quickly and with authority, rather than gradually with many opportunities for indecision, objection, and obstruction.

Now, let us consider how adequately the state of the art was conveyed by the social scientists in the desegregation hearings. There was not a great deal of evidence underlying the argument that school segregation damaged the self esteem of children. Cohen and Weiss (1977) have recently pointed out that "the research was often thin, and the ratio of speculation to empirical findings was sometimes remarkably high (p. 69)." But what evidence there was, did seem to support the arguments made about the negative effects of segregation in general, and it seemed reasonable to apply these to school segregation in particular. However, it seems doubtful to us that the evidence available in 1954 provided support for the inferences about the favorable impact of school desegregation on self esteem, prejudice, and achievement.

Many studies on desegregation in areas such as housing, employment, the armed services, and the merchant marines had been completed before 1954. Allport et al. (1953) suggested that desegregation had "under certain circumstances . .. been observed to lead to the emergence of more favorable attitudes and friendlier relations between races [p. 437, emphasis ours]. "They mentioned the following conditions only triefly at the end of their review for the Supreme Court: (l) there should be no competition for a limited number of facilities or benefits; (2) the cross-racial contacts should permit individuals to learn about one another as individuals; and (3) there should be an equivalence of positions and functions among all the racial groups in the desegregated setting. These conditions are among those deemed necessary for "favorable" contact in the more recent research literature on the "contact hypothesis" (Amir, 1969), where they are relabeled as: cooperation rather than competition, close or intimate contact rather than casual, and equal. status within the contact situation.

A great deal of evidence existed about these contingencies prior to 1954 (e.g., Allport, 1954; Allport & Kramer, 1946; Brophy, 1945; Deutsch & Collins, 1951; Dodd, 1935; Gray & Thompson, 1953; Gundlach, 1950; Irish, 1952; Jahoda& West, 1951; Kramer, 1950; MacKenzie, 1948; Mannheimer& Williams, 1949; Ram & Murphy, 1952; Rose, 1948; Saenger & Gilbert, 1950; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star, & Cottrell, 1949; Watson, 1950; D. H. Williams, 1948; R. M. Williams, 1947;


Wilner, Walkley,& Cook, 1952; Winder, 1952). Thus, it is probably fair to say that the research strong!~ suggested, even then, that the hypotheses regarding the effects of desegregation would be true only under certain very specific conditions that might not hold in schools that were desegregated in a society where competition between races might be expected, where intimate interracial contact was not guaranteed, or where unequal status characterized black-white relations in the aggregate. These contingencies were not made salient in the record of social science testimony offered to the Supreme Court, especially in the 1955 decision about how to implement desegregation and in later lower court decisions on desegregation plans. The subsequent failure of school desegregation to raise achievement levels and to reduce the prejudice of whites toward blacks and vice versa (Stephan, 1978; St. John, 1975) may perhaps be traced to the failure to incorporate these contingencies into desegregation plans.

By our analysis of the situation, this example is a disappointing case of underutilization. It is encouraging that s·ocial scientists (who clearly did have a great deal of relevant knowledge to offer) were asked to contribute to the policy debate, but it is distressing that the knowledge available may have been underutilized by the social scientists themselves. Indeed, there were probably far-reaching repercussions in the failure to pay considerable attention to the contingencies that were already known prior to 1954 and on which the effects of desegregation depended. Why did the social scientists who engaged in the debate not concentrate on this message about contingencies instead of stressing a less accurate contingency-free conclusion from the literature?

We have to be careful, in trying to answer this question, to remember the realities of the early 1950s. On the one hand, the contingency dependence of the contact hypothesis was not as widely appreciated then as it is now. And on the other hand, the issue of de jure segregation may have seemed to many persons-including the social scientists-to be an issue of values rather than "facts." It is possible, therefore, that the review signed by the 32 social scientists reflected their personal beliefs as much as a summary of the knowledge that was agreed upon by competent social scientists. Certainly, the review contained a great deal of speculation and extrapolation, and the failure to accord much emphasis to the contingency issue may have been due to the committed scientists wanting to present as clear and as decisionrelevant a conclusion as they could. To have dwelt on contingencies, and to have estimated whether the contingencies discovered in nonschool settings also held in schools, involved complex communication problems that the signatories may have felt would hurt their case rather than help it. In any event, through the course of many trials, Kenneth Clark (who testified more than any other social scientist) came to be seen by some as an advocate rather than an objective scientist (Cahn, 1955; Van der Haag, 1960). Even the social science review signed by 32 "outstanding" social scientists did not avoid the


suggestion that it represented the view of a select group of scientists with a spe~ial "liberal'.' bias (Friedman, 1968; Kluger, 1976), perhaps because the review so obv10usly speculated beyond the' data, and common-sensical counter instances (where cross-racial contact escalates intergroup conflict) these accusations were not quieted. The acceptability of social science information probably depends, especially in court deliberations, on the expert's recognized legitimacy, freeness from bias, and his or her ability to withstand challenge.

The Coleman Report. Following the Supreme Court decisions, the next major impact of social science knowledge on school desegregation was a report commissioned by the Office of Education in fulfillment of Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, M o.od, V: einfeld, & York, 1966). The Coleman report was based largely on a nat10nw1de survey of students, teachers, and administrators of public elementary and secondary schools. The basic findings were that the level of educational resources (buildings, books, quality of teachers, etc.) did not have much measured impact on achievement, whereas the racial and social composition of classrooms did. The suggestion was that the achievement of black students was more likely to be raised by placing them in schools with whites than by increasing the resources devoted to the segregated schools that most blacks attended at the time.

These findings constituted the major social science evidence that was used both to justify desegregating some de facto segregated schools and also to justify the methods, such as busing, that were used to implement the policy of desegregation. The Coleman report was timely, was authored by esteemed social scientists, and implied a course of action that was also suggested by moral, political, and judicial concerns. The use of data to justify, rather than form, decisions should not worry us in a democratic society. The "side" whose viewpoint is more justified by the data is likely thereby to have some advantage conferred on it in the policy debate, and the antagonists are all the more likely to be on the defensive. Political interests or less parochial value concerns may easily be more powerful than data in forming decisions. To play such a marginal role is not at all trivial. At least the role suggests that a particular course of action does not conflict with the major implications of relevant literature.

With the Coleman report, the contingencies under which desegregation could be expected to be successful were once again largely ignored. Yet, even though more evidence about the contingencies had accumulated by this time, the Coleman report took the limelight. As it turned out, there were several inadequacies with the report. First, it was a cross-sectional study concerned with the correlates of spontaneously occurring variation in educational resources and classroom composition; yet it led commentators to draw


conclusions about the effects of manipulating variables (i.e., school desegregation) solely because the nonmanipulated variables of the study (racial composition of the class) appeared to be cognate with what a manipulation would have to be (i.e., formal desegregation). Second, the Coleman report neglected related social science evidence on the effects of desegregation, producing a "stand alone" document whose major conclusions would have been called into question by an examination of already existing longitudinal studies of the effects of school desegregation. Third, the focus in the Coleman report was almost entirely on achievement, and there was little concern for other outcome measures such as self-esteem or prejudice, or for side effects such as the later discovered "white flight."

Long-term and longitudinal studies, some of which were finished at the time of the Coleman report (see St. John, 1975; Stephan, 1978 for recent reviews), had demonstrated that desegregation probably does not lead to any appreciable additional achievement by blacks or, at most, only to trivial gains. The studies also demonstrated that desegregation causes an increase in disciplinary problems in mixed classrooms and schools, with no reductions in prejudice. Thus, to use the Coleman report alone to make or justify decisions entails ignoring a portion of the available social science information and relying on a single study that was at odds with the results of other studies of similar phenomena. This again illustrates the need for establishing what the bulk of the relevant social science evidence suggests, and it demonstrates how easily isolated social science findings can be misused when they come from a credible source and appear to support already popular policy options.

The Coleman document also illustrates the danger of conducting empirical research at great speed in order to produce a timely report. Coleman and his colleagues conducted their large scale research in an incredibly short period and, considering the speed, the quality of the work is remarkable. But it was still wrong in its major conclusion, little thought was given to unanticipated side effects, and the relevant literature was not combed to discover information about the conditions under which desegregation has beneficial or harmful impacts.

Social Science and Public Service Mass Media Campaigns

A Missed Opportunity. The last decade has seen an increasing number of attempts to use mass media campaigns to prevent disease, promote health and public safety, and generally to contribute to the "social good." Such campaigns have been sponsored by a number of public and private agencies, and many have been nationwide in scope. Some media campaigns have been of a pilot nature and others have emerged as fully developed, well-funded,


integrated programs designed to influence people's awareness, knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and/ or behavior. 4

Of the numerous mass media campaigns that have been mounted, some have been reported in public outlets, but many have been described only in internal documents that are not made easily available to the public. Indeed, some have not been documented at all. Of the known campaigns, some have been formally evaluated, but most have not. Hence, the success or failure of many media campaigns remains unknown or "known" only at the anecdotal level. Of the evaluations undertaken, many have turned out to be uninterpretable or invalid because of unresolved methodological, technical, administrative, and I or political issues (e.g., Flay DiTecco, & Schlegel, in press; Haskins, 1970; Salomon & Clark, 1977; Stickell, 1963).

If we consider only those media campaigns that have been evaluated "reasonably well," most seem to have been unsuccessful in influencing attitudes and behaviors to any significant degree or for any length of time (e.g., Allen, 1971; Bauer, 1964; Butler & Paisley, 1977; Cohen & Abelson, 1976; Evans, 1973; Fleischer, 1972; Haskins, 1969; Hiett, Youngren, Freund, Kennerly, Schanilec, Wong, & Rucher, 1969; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947; Jamison, Suppes, & Wells, 1974; Klapper, 1960; Martin & Stanley, 1965; Mendelsohn, 1963; Mielke & Swinehart, 1976; Minor & Bradburn, 1976; O'Keefe, 1971; Ontario Department of Transport, 1970; Porter, 1969; Robertson, 1976; Robertson, Kelley, O'Neill, Wixom, Eisworth, & Haddon, 1974; Salomon & Clark, 1977; Sundell & Schanie, 1978; Thompson, 1978). This recurring result suggests that mass media campaigns are not effective and should not be funded unless there is a reasonable presumption that something very special is likely to be achieved.

Despite such pessimism, many goverment and private agencies continue to fund media campaigns. This may be because some campaigns have had some beneficial impact, albeit rarely in the behavioral domain (e.g., Best, 1979; Biener, 1975; Douglas, Westley & Chaffee, 1970; Farquhar, Maccoby, Wood, Alexander, Breitrose, Brown, Haskell, McAlister, Meyer, Nash, & Stern, 1977; Kerpelman, Fax, & Nunes, 1978; Mendelsohn, 1973; Salcedo, Read, Evans, & Kong, 1974; Shattuck, 1978a; Sundell & Schanie, 1978; and some components of the "Feeling Good" series, e.g., Minor & Bradburn, 1976). Moreover, when they are effective, the campaigns can sometimes be presumed to have a large impact because of the large size of the audience they have reached (e.g., the "Stanford Three Community Project"-Farquhar et al., 1977; and nutrition promotion via radio in developing nations-Cooke &

4We are not concerned here with media campaigns designed to convince consumers to buy a commercial product (i.e., commercial promotion or advertising).


Ronweber, 1977). Every planner and developer may hope that his or her particular campaign will be one of the few successful ones.

However, a quite different possibility is that many planners are not acquainted with the conditions under which, according to research findings, mass media campaigns are more likely to be successful. As Mendelsohn ( 1973) and Butler and Paisley ( 1977), among others, have already suggested, planners and developers need to be more cognizant of what the social science research literature has to say with regard to the conditions under which mass media campaigns are likely to be successful.

Theory and findings from the literature on attitude change (see Cook & Flay, 1978; McGuire, 1969 for reviews), attribution (e.g., Kelley, 1967), mass media, and advertising suggest that some of the conditions that might improve the effectiveness of media campaigns are: repetition of the message by several sources, via multiple media, in different and novel ways, over long periods of time; high quality production of materials (equal to that of commercial mass media production); designing the message for change of very specific attitudes and behaviors of very specific target audiences; the provision of alternative attitudinal structures and behaviors that are consistent with the proposed change; and a supportive social environment (Flay, DiTecco, & Schlegel, in press). Social science research also suggests that interactions between audience variables and source, message, or channel variables may be important (cf. McGuire, 1969; Salomon & Clark, 1977). In addition, those mass media campaigns that have been most successful have included add-on, face-to-face, interpersonal outreach, or "encouragement" components (e.g., Farquhar et al., 1977; Kerpelman, Fax, & Nunes, 1978; Cook, Appleton, Conner, Shaffer, Tamkin, & Weber, 1975). Most unsuccessful mass media campaigns have omitted at least one, usually most, of the foregoing conditions that facilitate effectiveness. .

Further support for the argument that these conditions are associated with effective mass media campaigns can be obtained by examining the long-term trends in attitudes and behavior regarding smoking. Although few individual mass media attempts to change smoking have been successful(O'Keefe, 1971; Thompson, 1978), it is illuminating to examine long-term trends in smoking and to relate them to the media. As Warner ( 1977) has illustrated, the general trend in smoking behavior is toward increasing consumption. However, consideration of the time-series data leads one to suggest that several antismoking "media events" have reversed or halted this increase at various stages. The first possible shift caused by media events was in the early 1950s when evidence linking smoking to heart disease provoked the first health scare about smoking. This was followed by a sharp reduction in smoking over the next two years. Consumption then increased again until 1964. T~e Surgeon General's Report at that time was followed by another decrease m consumption. A subsequent small increase in the 1964-66 period was probably largely due to an increasing number of women taking up smoking.


Between 1966 and 1970, a further decrease in consumption accompanied the television and radio antismoking "corrective advertising" required by the Federal Communication Commissions Fairness Doctrine. After termination of corrective advertising, consumption again increaseds until the mid-70s when antismoking militancy and legislation banning smoking in public places again contributed to a decrease in consumption.

The successive media events of 1964 and onward are so close together that they may be regarded as constituting an antismoking "campaign." Although not a single orchestrated program, the collective, mostly uncoordinated activities of a variety of organizations were united in their objective of encouraging people to quit or reduce smoking. It is noteworthy that such united actions have resulted in an overall small absolute decrease in cigarette consumption since 1964 and a very large reduction relative to the consumption that would have been expected on the basis of pre-1964 consumption trends and changes in relative cigarette prices (Warner, 1977). 6 We would suggest, therefore, that this antismoking campaign further illustrates that the conditions that may facilitate successful media campaigns. These conditions may be when the basic message is

l. targeted to a very specific action; 2. repeated many times; 3. repeated over different media; 4. repeated by different sources; 5. repeated in different, novel, and sometimes dramatic and involving

ways; 6. repeated over long periods of time (years instead of weeks or months); 7. using high quality materials; 8. reaching a large audience on prime-time spots; 9. inducing a supportive environment;

10. leading to legislation that could be supported by the public and enforced. 7

'The number of people smoking did not increase, only the number of cigarettes smoked increased. All the other times both these indicators showed the same trends.

6Making corrections for movements in relative cigarette prices probably lends to conservative estimates of consumption reduction because much of the tax-induced rises in relative prices was probably due to the antismoking campaign.

Tfhe history of seat belt campaigns demonstrates a similar story though less dramatically. Individual short campaigns have not been successful in changing behavior (Fleischer, 1972; Haskins, 1969; Robertson, 1976; Robertson et al., 1974). However, people now believe that seat belts save lives, and this may have helped pass legislation requiring seat belts and, in some countries at least (e.g., Australia, Canada), it may have helped pass legislation requiring the wearing of seat belts. This is a dramatic change from the 1950s when the Ford Motor Company tried unsuccessfully to use "safety" as a marketing tool (Shattuck, I 978b). Again, a long-term commitment with much repetition and high visibility was required to create these changes.


Assessment. There have been many failures in using mass media campaigns to change entrenched attitudes and behaviors. This may be because even what we tentatively "know" about how to create successful campaigns is not being used by many agencies, or may not be known by them. Several reasons for the failure to use social science knowledge about effective mass media campaigns are possible. First, planners may only have heard about the few campaigns that have been noticeably successful-campaigns whose effects they would like to recreate. Second, although some of the contingencies that may mediate effective use have been known to researchers for some time, they have usually been discussed primarily in terms of laboratory studies dealing with attitude changes caused by persuasive messages. There has not been much concern with extrapolation to applied settings that involve persuasion attempts from the mass media, or much concern with long-term effects (Cook & Flay, 1978). Consequently, the audience seeking to apply social science knowledge may not trust the source of such knowledge or may not even monitor the types of journals or books where such findings first appear.

Third, the research community has not communicated the knowledge very well, at least not to the audience (planners and developers) that needs it. This may be due to the complexity of the contingencies involved, because one might presume that complex social science findings are not communicated easily to audiences that are unfamiliar with the methods of social science. However, this lack of communication may also be due to a reluctance on the part of some social scientists to become involved in seeing their own research findings, and the accumulated findings into which they fit, being disseminated and used. Fourth, practitioners who do have some of this knowledge (e.g., advertising executives) work in competitive and secretive settings and so do not share their knowledge with others. There are probably some large advertising research organizations who produce new and important knowledge that they do not share.

Finally, it is worth noting that the conditions suggested as necessary for a successful media campaign are probably expensive to implement. Planners and developers seem to hope that the simplest and least expensive messages aired at strange hours for a short time period (e.g., public service messages) will induce large and persistent changes in large numbers of people. They are reluctant to spend large sums in order to effect the changes that they seek. And maybe they should be reluctant, given the low success rate of even heavily funded media campaigns to date. However, as the examples cited earlier demonstrate, well-funded campaigns can sometimes be successful if the contingencies are built in that have thus far been tentatively identified as necessary for impact.


How could the social science community increase its contribution to the effective use of knowledge about the media? First, there needs to be more enthusiasm by scholars to have their work contribute to applied undertakings. In being reluctant to make explicit contributions to commercial undertakings, scholars may also have failed to contribute to related applications, such as corrective advertising and promotions for the social good. Second, and more important from our perspective, there needs to be some mechanism to accumulate the social science knowledge that is relevant to important policy/ action issues, and to deliver this knowledge in usable form. Reviews are needed that communicate the state-of-the-art knowledge to administrators, policy makers, and planners in a form that is perceived as credible and legitimate by those audiences. Otherwise, it is difficult for planners to stay abreast _of the knowledge gained from theoretical research and from the practices (successes and failures) of other agencies. Such reviews need to be aimed, not at reducing the complexities of contingencies, but at making them explicit. If this had been done in the past, the planners of public interest mass media campaigns would not have expected to obtain large effects from short promotions that lacked many of the tentatively identified elements crucial to success. Perhaps, different kinds of campaigns would have been funded, or completely different alternatives to media campaigns would have been undertaken.

INSTITUTIONALIZING MECHANISMS FOR FACILITATING UTILIZATION

The preceding examples are important, we think, in two major respects. First, they illustrate how social science information sometimes could help clarify policy debates. The information required is often disarmingly simple in form, and at first glance seemingly easy to provide. Second, the examples highlight some factors that may facilitate the use of social science knowledge. Taking the examples as a whole, the factors that may increase responsible usage by influencing the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information are: (1) gaining an understanding of the substantive area under investigation from social scientists with different disciplinary backgrounds; (2) paying close attention, when examining relevant theor~ and findings, to specifying the conditions under which particular generalizations are likely to hold true; and (3) considering all the relevant information from a variety of sources, and not just directly relevant findings. Thus, results from direct empirical tests of a specific issue should be considered together with the opinions of people experienced in the substantive area, related theories, and individual findings


· from overlapping areas. It is extremely important not to rely on single studies

or single measures. . The credibility of reports can presumably be increased by: (I) involving

persons or institutions whose reputations command public respect and confer legitimacy on the reports they produce; and (2) avoiding an exclusive use of persons who share the same value predilections about the topic under investigation. Clarity could be facilitated by: (I) organizing all the accumulated social science knowledge around the policy issue; (2) encouraging consensual judgments about the "facts" that the data support and the conditions under which they are thought to hold; (3) striving hard to identify the central issues on which crucial information is lacking or where real disagreements exist; (4) encouraging the production of concise, carefully written reports that avoid the use of jargon. The ready availability of state-ofthe-art summaries of the accumulated knowledge on a topic could be facilitated by: (I) encouraging members of the summarizing body to be willing to give testimony, to participate in press conferences, and to consult with public and private agencies; (2) encouraging these same members to help draw attention to instances where relevant social science knowledge could be, but is not being, used and (3) circulating written reports to all interested government and private parties. .

The foregoing factors may result in credible information becoming more widely available for debates about public policy. But they do not imply that the information will play the major role in shaping decisions. So long as the information accurately represents the weight of accumulated knowledge, it is irrelevant to us whether the information is used by some parties to help reach an opinion as to what should be done, or whether it is used to justify decisions that were made on political or value grounds before the social science information became available. In either case, the information serves to put the position that the social science information supports in better standing than it would have been, and it forces the opposition into a defensive position wherein they have to refute the social science evidence.

Increasing utilization will probably not be easy, as any quick reading of the 12 preceding factors will show. It will be all the more difficult because only under exceptional circumstances will the persons in policy-making positio~s in the federal government radically alter their behavior to become more avid seekers of social science wisdom. Nor is it realistic to expect that social scientists will want, or be able, to volunteer their services. Reflections such as these compel us not to rely on motivational means of increasing usage. Rather we would like to conceive of institutionalized procedures that, once imple~ented, might help circumvent some of the current barriers to utilization. These procedures cannot be indifferent to motivational issues, of course; otherwise very little utilization would take place. Rather, their purpose is to decrease the dependence of utilization on the private initiative of social scientists, policy makers, and planners.


Current Procedures

The principal institutional mechanism that is currently used for facilitating utilization is poor. It consists of requiring federal contractors to complete a plan for the dissemination and utilization of any findings. No followup mechanism exists within federal agencies for ascertaining whether the plan is followed; and our guess is that no serious consideration is given to the plan in the evaluation of contract proposals. A large element of"lip service"seems to be involved. This may be fortunate because in many cases the eventual final reports are not worth disseminating and considering for utilization.

For extremely important policy issues where crucial questions have been identified, many federal agencies set up ad hoc review panels to consider the evidence about some issue, or they fund review studies by individuals or groups. Such reviews strike us as more desirable than filing dissemination and utilization plans, but they suffer from some drawbacks, too. Many commissioned reviews from outside individuals or single companies Jack legitimacy and do not seem to reflect anything like the breadth of perspective and experience that a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel, for example, could have.Moreover, they are reactive mechanisms that are activated only at the request of operating agencies. They presuppose, therefore, that crucial issues have been identified and that no need exists to give feedback to agencies about possible deficiencies in the processes whereby problems and possible solutions are identified. As we saw with the example of media campaigns in "the public interest," it would be useful if outside bodies could comment without solicitation on activities that are doomed to be unsuccessful in light of prior experience or research with which the agency personnel might not be familiar.

In rare cases, an extreme and more desirable version of the group review can be com:nissioned. This involves funding a distinguished body like the National Academy of Sciences to set up a blue ribbon committee to review the evidence on a particular identified issue. The Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences of the National Academy has committees in several major substantive areas that dovetail with most of the major acknowledged social problems of our time-e.g., criminal justice, child and family matters, employment, etc.-and most requests for specific studies can be handled by setting up special panels with the focus implied by the request. The persons serving on such panels include some of the most distinguished social scientists of our day who must pass through a screening procedure designed to weed out any person who might have conflicts of interest. The aim is to create a legitimizing body with both expertise and credibility that can bring the latest theory and methods to bear, as well as considerable experience and judgment. The major vehicle of dissemination is published reports, and these are reviewed by a Report Review Committee, which is composed of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering,


and the Institute of Medicine. Given the panel members and review procedures, quality control is probably therefore higher than is typical with state-of-the-art reviews. . . .

The work of the National Academy of Sciences in the social science domam is basically reactive. It is not part of their planned activi.t~es to provi?e u~solicited information to agencies about, say, the likely fut1hty of. comm~ssioning public interest messages in the media to combat lo~g-standm~ social problems. Moreover, their panels are not. mean~ to .react with grea~ d1sp~tch to requests for the best available information. It 1s difficult for us to 1~agme a planner who needs to know about some issue in a hurry a~d wh~ picks up a telephone and calls the Assembly of Behavioral and S~cial Sciences. The

k of National Academy committees and panels 1s, understandably ::~ugh, not geared to giving advice u~less the.advic~ has been de~iberated ?n by a body of experts representing a variety ofv1ewpomts .o.n a ~art1cula~ to~1c.

Recently, two new proposals for facilitating the ut1hzat10n of scientific information in public policy debates have been forwarded. One ~om~s from Arthur Kantrowitz of Avco Everett Research Laboratory and 1s au:ied at facilitating the usage of natural science information in the formul~tion of policy. However, in the following section, we extend the prop~sal_ to mclude the use of social science information. The proposal of Kant~o'"':1tz 1s based on an analogy with legal practice. It involves an adversa~ prmc1ple where ~he pros and cons of an issue are publicly argued by the ~qu~val~nt of prosecuti.on and defense lawyers in the presence of a court of scientist-Judges who decide on the "facts." Not surprisingly, this proposal is called the scien~e court notion. A second proposal briefly outlined to us by Lee Cron_bach m~olves deliberation and discussion by standing committees of experts ma part~cular substantive area in hopes ofreaching a working consensus about what is and what is not known about a specific issue. We call this the idea of standing substantive committees-a notion that has a superficial resemblance to the activities of the National Academy of Sciences.

Science Courts

A Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology issued a report on science courts that was published in Science(1916). The Depart~ent ofCom~erce, NSF, and A~AS sponsored a colloquium in I 976 on the science court idea and the proceedmgs of this colloquium have been distributed by the Depart.me~t of Commerce.

These reports observe that important "facts" are often m d1sput~ (e.g., what is the effect of disturbances to the ozone layer, or of a part1c~lar food additive?). If known, such "facts" might well_ play a? important ~ole m debat~s about policy actions. But all too often the ev1den_ce 1s u~clear or 1s p~esented m ways that heighten the appearance of uncertamty, dispute, and ignorance.


Consequently, the relevant scientific evidence often serves to obfuscate rather than enlighten decisions. The advocates of science courts stress that the courts are designed to help the persons engaged in policy debates, but that they do not solve issues of value. Because decisions are influenced by many factors other than scientific knowledge-e.g., ethical, legal, and political mattersscience courts are intended to give as confident an assessment of "bottom line" knowledge as is warranted. But they are not meant to decide debates or policy choices.

The advocates of science courts have proposed that courts should be convened when controversial decisions to which scientific evidence seems pertinent are pending before a governmental agency-e.g., Should water be fluoridated? What are the benefits and undesirable effects of Red Dye #40? It is not clear just which issues of the many that meet the general requirement just cited should be subjected to a science court. However, it is obvious that many issues are potentially amenable and that, in the aggregate, science courts could therefore prove costly unless their use was restricted to only the most important issues.

The present plan selects scientist-judges who are impartial on an issue because their own research is not directly concerned with the issue under review, but whose training helps them sort through technical issues. The implicit model is that of an unbiased judge. As in the law courts, the case in science courts is presented by hired advocates called case managers-one for the "prosecution" and one for the "defense." It is up to these case managers to marshal a convincing argument and to cross-examine the opposing case managers. It is the responsibility of the scientist-judges to attend to these arguments and cross-examinations and to decide what is scientifically known and what is unknown. In order to focus the science court on crucial issues of disagreement, the current proposal calls for the case managers to meet before the case begins and to go over a list of points of scientific evidence. Points that each side is willing to accept as proven do not figure largely in the science court proceedings. But points of genuine disagreement do.

One problem with the science court notion is that scientific controversies cannot easily be divided into opposing sides. Unlike real court decisions where the bottom line is deciding guilt or innocence, neither the starting point nor the bottom line in scientific controversies can be easily sorted on a single dimension. In a science court system, much depends on the quality of the case managers' arguments, but a great deal of their effectiveness may actually depend on the manner in which their case is presented rather than the cogency of their arguments. The scientist-judges would presumably attend more to cogency than manner, but being human they are nonetheless still influenced by manner and, being nonexperts in the technical matter under review, they may not be as cogent as substantive experts would be. Moreover, a problem of recruitment remains. How would one recruit impartial scientist-judges for


what might be Jong court cases, and how would one ~e~ruit case mana~e~s who know, or can learn, the substantive issues? Also, tt ts not clear that 1t IS

possible or desirable to have impartial judg~s. l~p~rtiality is ~mposs!bl_e to achieve with individuals and the best approximation 1s to make 1mpart1ahty a system-level variable; that is, a representation of different biases rather than the selection of purportedly unbiased individuals. From a system-level perspective, the important point is to have scientist-judges, some of whom might be acknowledged experts, with different assumptions ab~ut a s~bstantive matter rather than to have scientist-judges who are impartial but inevitably ~onexpert in the particular substantive area under discussion.

After publicly hearing the evidence, the cro_ss-examin_ations, ~nd the witnesses, the scientist-judges are supposed to retire to a pnvate settmg and prepare a case report. This report is supposed to detail the scientific facts agreed upon; to indicate the court's leanings on matters of controversy, perhaps suggesting confidence intervals for "facts" in disp_ute; and to highlight what is known and can be learned as opposed to what 1s not k~own and cannot presently be learned. Such repor~s, it is ~rgued, are m~re hk~ly than other forms of scientific evidence to be mfluential and useful m policy debates. This is because they represent a consensus about what is known. However a verdict or a consensus is not necessarily the truth. and any implicit ~alues or perspectives that all the sci~n~ist-judges share might be the unhelpful foundations of a false consensus. S1m1larly, a fals~ consensus co~ld result from any shared value premises that follow from mterested parties tampering with the selection process so as to obtain scientist-judges who share their interests. We know enough by now to realize that the regulated seek to control both the selection of regulators and the form of information at their

disposal. . . . The charge can be made that science courts are 1_nherent_l~ elitist and that,

though their proponents acknowledge that policy dec1s1ons should be debated in the public arena, they do not readily acknowledge that the nature of the "facts" should also be debated in the public arena. The reason for the need to establish "facts" in public debate is that, as Kuhn (1970) and others have pointed out, the "facts" of a science are theory-laden. They are not theory-neutral observations with an immutable truth value. Rath~r, all "facts" should be treated as tentative and subject to later correct10n as paradigms change. s Given this, the argument goes, scientist-judges should ~ot be treated as though they were endowed with a special ability to recogmze

BThe authors do not subscribe to the implications derived from Kuhn's position, though they agree with the position. Although scientific observations are indeed laden ~ith theory, they need not be laden with a single theory. Consequently, we have m every science some stubborn observations that are repeatedly made by observers with different theoretical value, or paradigmatic orientations. These are the "facts" that deserve to be ueat~d with less tentativeness than observations that have not been repeatedly made across onentat1ons.


what is and is not "fact." They, too, are victims of the paradigmatic assumptions that they implicitly or explicitly accept. To some extent, current plans for science courts could get around these problems. Deliberations in the court are public, and although the deliberations of judges are not, they could easily be. There is a strong emphasis on the scientific consensus about the facts and not about the logical necessity of particular facts. Scientist-judges are free to express different degrees of uncertainty about their belief in particular "facts." And interested parties who are not scientists are presumably free to make their viewpoint known to case managers who can decide whether to use in court any of the information brought to their attention by interested nonscientists. But even so, there is an elitist flavor to science courts, and we think it impossible to avoid this if the purpose of the court is to estimate the current state of knowledge about a given issue and if the estimation of such knowledge depends on acquaintance with a technical background and tradition.

A more fundamental objection to science courts is that they are limited in applicability, being essentially reactive rather than active. That is, they only function once an issue is brought to their attention; they do not function to help a planner learn what the current state of knowledge is before an issue comes to a head; nor do they help if an issue is of minor importance nationally. For what they are designed to accomplish, some form of a science court may well be useful, but science courts cannot be expected to make fundamental inroads into current problems concerning the nonuse, premature use, and misuse of social science information.

Standing Substantive Committees9

We would like to see more exploration into the establishment of permanent, revolving committees in particular substantive areas whose duties would be: (1) to conduct hearings and issue reports on important controversial issues that have obvious social science relevance; (2) to give public testimony on such matters; (3) to be available, themselves or via their staffs, for answering substantive questions posed by federal agencies; and (4) to call public attention to frequent practices that contradict what the current state of the art suggests to be the case.

The first of these functions is the one addressed by science courts and panels of the National Academy of Sciences. The major differences between a science court and a permanent standing committee are: (1) science courts are likely to be ad hoc whereas permanent committees are not; (2) science courts depend heavily on the skills of case managers for presenting the evidence,

90ur thinking about standing substantive committees has been stimulated by conversations with Lee Cronbach, who is currently preparing a book on the issue.


whereas the case-manager role is absent with standing committees; and (3) with science courts the scientists-judges are not substantive experts who can bring much evidence to bear that is not presented, whereas in a standing committee everyone would be a substantive expert.

A standing committee would hear evidence and deliberate on all sides of an issue because many issues are not easily dissected into simple pro and con positions. It should probably determine who shall and shall not be asked to give evidence from among the persons who want to give evidence and from among those that the committee thinks should be asked to give evidence. Moreover, if the members of the committee are substantive experts, deliberately chosen because of different preferences for values, theory, and methodology, the selection of witnesses should be both informed and (in total) relatively unbiased, and information not presented in the formal hearings might still merit consideration. These features help avoid some of the limitations inherent in the use of case managers who are not likely to be especially informed, are not chosen as unbiased, and who seek to win a debate rather than to reach the best approximation to the "truth." In an important sense, the science court locates the heterogeneity of perspectives about an issue in the case managers, whereas the permanent committee locates the heterogeneity among judges who are substantive experts.

The 1954 desegregation case that we cited previously illustrates the danger of presuming a heterogeneity in perspective where there is in fact homogeneity. Except for economists, it is difficult to find politically conservative social scientists, and Republican administrators often have trouble finding Republicans to sit on social science committees. We can see, therefore, how difficult it will be to present truly conservative interpretations of social questions and social science evidence. Thus, we can anticipate reasonable opposition to the idea of permanent committees from commentators with different types of conservative persuasion and from persons with extremely radical views. It is particularly important, therefore, that standing committees include some individuals with articulated perspectives to challenge the dominant perspectives of a particular substantive area. Like it or not, the selection of "facts" to be considered and the determination of the degree of credibility to be assigned to particular "facts" are political acts even when dressed in the garb of "objective science." This is true in all science, but is likely to be especially the case in the social sciences. Having said this, it is worth noting that not all evidence is equally political, and it is important for standing committees to try to the maximal possible extent to separate issues of"fact" from "value." In addition, where"facts" are in dispute, it is crucial to differentiate those on which there is genuine disagreement from those where there is no disagreement. Only real differences should be open to dispute, and


the heat. s~~rounding an issue should not cause protagonists to Jose sight of the poss1bihty that there can be agreement on some "facts" but not th I · · on o ers.

t is important to have committees with revolving members. That is, each men:iber may be appointed for a particular period (e.g., 3 years), and each year a third ~f the member~ leave and new ones are appointed. This way, fresh perspectives keep entering, and any commonalities in perspective that creep m b.eca_use th~ c~~mittee members meet together are reduced by the c~n.tm~mg availa~1hty of new persons. (We are not arguing that commonaht1es m prospective will be eliminated because in most organizations new cohorts tend to be socialized into the behavior patterns of established cohorts. We are merely suggesting that commonalities will be reduced. T 0 facilitate this, it would be useful if the members of the committee were not called on to suggest new members.)

Little benefit derives from standing committees unless the results of their deliberations are made public. There has to be a willingness on the part of members not only to publish reports, but also to take part in press conferences, to conta~t_journalists, and to give testimony at public hearings. Not all experts are w1llmg to engage themselves in this way, speaking either for themselves or some majority or minority of a committee. Nonetheless we consider it. urgent for scientists to take a more active role in forwardin~ an accurate view of the accumulated evidence, even if this evidence serves to complicate issues rather than simplify them. Many of the problems with the non~se of social science knolwedge relate to the nonavailability of a clear, concise a_ccount of such ~noweldge to the public and to the policy-making commumty, even though 1t may be available to the scientific community. (Of course, the willingness and ability to present complex findings and theories in public is not the sole criterion for selecting individuals for committeesexpertise, availability, and judgment are equally important.)

The mass media campaign plans that are doomed before they are implemented suggest a third role that standing committees might play. We wonder how easily planners in many agencies can get speedy access to the current state of the art in a particular substantive area-a problem that is made more complex because most projects require information about several different substantive areas. (For instance, a television campaign to increase the safe use of lawn mowers requires knowing how lawn mower usage causes accidents; who are the particularly afflicted users; when and how such users view television; how programs and commercials can be tailored to meet the needs of the target audience, if they can be so tailored at all; and how such campaigns can be evaluated.) Few planners have all the required expertise, and in any one agency it will be difficult to get together persons with many of the different expertises required. Moreover, even if such individuals were


vailable, eliciting their active cooperation would be difficult. Planners need eady access to substantive expertise, even if their preconceptions about an ssue are rudely shaken by someone explaining, say, all the contingencies on vhich a mass media campaign's effectiveness are thought to depend.

Planners in the federal government do not have the time to read the cientific literature. They get their information from newspapers, a few faceo-face contacts, and from the telephone (cf. Caplan, Morrison & Stam>augh, 1975). We think that it might be useful for each standing committee to 1ave a small staff with easily remembered telephone numbers (say, 811) that lre available in each agency's internal telephone directory. In planning a nedia project, for example, it should be second nature to a planner to call the rnmber of a Mass Media Standing Committee. The planner's concept can be peedily and critically assessed on the telephone by a staff member (if it is a ·epeatedly reinvented concept that has had some "wear'}, or can be referred o a member of the committee if the concept appears novel. The chosen :ommittee member might be someone with a particular highly defined :xpertise that is relevant to the problem on hand. But where narrow expertise snot in question, the staff member could refer callers to committee members ma roster basis so as to share the labor.Note that we are not referring here to ·ace-to-face consultation. The purpose of the telephone conversation would >e to review the concept and to refer the planner to experiences others have 1ad with the topic in question. The purpose would not be to give advice as . nuch as (I) to raise consciousness about hidden implications, and(2) to brief :>lanners on how to gain information quickly about the state of the art of ;ocial science knowledge in the topic area. The latter might involve suggesting :hings to read, or, more likely, people to talk to.

In order to play a more active role than science courts, it would also be fosirable for standing committees to take it upon themselves to comment in helpful and public fashion on recurrent practices that the available evidence mggests are less effective than they should be. Through insider wisdom, by having their staff monitor RFP's, and by keeping up with reviews and commentaries within disciplines, a standing committee could be active in calling attention to areas where known mistakes are being recreated or to areas where social science knowledge can contribute to national policy but is not being used.

Our comments here constitute only a first gross outline of how standing substantive committees might be organized. Because we feel that the institutionalization of some mechanism such as this can have a beneficial impact on the way the social science knowledge is used at a national policy level, we invite others to critique this idea and propose other mechanisms that could be institutionalized to circumvent the current barriers to effective utilization of social science knowledge. At this point, the nation badly needs to experiment with different institutional models of how higher quality social

o. U:::ilNG SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE IN POLICY MAKING 143

science input can be made relevant to decision making in the federal government.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T~e authors would like to thank Brian Hennigan, Robert Kidd, Norman Miller and Michael Saks for their helpful comments on a draft of this chapter. '

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