Diasporas in Post-conflict Countries

8/13/2019 Diasporas in Post-conflict Countries

1/76

Diasporas in core government functions in post-conflictcountries

Michael Ashkenazi, PhDZoe Sutherland, MAChris Koegler, MA


2/76

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to acknowledge the many individuals who have contributed materially to thereport. First are our field researchers: Mr. Prakash Sharma in Afghanistan, Dr. Max Paul in Haiti, Dr

Alfred Sebit Lokuji in South Sudan, and Ms. Selma Hayati in Timor Leste collected a great deal ofessential data in a brief period of time and helped to make the research a success. In Bonn, Mr. DavidMoorer took precious time away from his own projects to help analyze the data. Ms. AndreaWarnecke, Ms. Clara Fischer and Ms. Ruth Vollmer helped in the early design of the researchinstrument as well as reading early drafts of the manuscript. We are also grateful to Dr AndreasHeinemann-Grder, Ms. Elvan Isikozlu, and Ms. Heike Webb for reading and commenting on draftsof the manuscript. Ms. Katrin von der Moselle at UNV was extremely helpful in putting us in touchwith TOKTEN volunteers. Mr. Garson and Mr. Dumont of the OECD Migration Directorate providedextremely useful insights. Particular thanks are owed to Ms. Bathylle Missika and her team at OECD,as well as to the anonymous reviewers for comments and guidance. Finally, we would like to thank allthose diaspora returnees and non-returnees who patiently answered the numerous questions posed tothem by ourselves and our field researchers.


3/76


4/76

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Goal

The study examines the contribution to reconstruction and capacity building of diaspora returnees incore government positions in four fragile or post-conflict societies: Afghanistan, Haiti, South Sudan,and Timor Leste. The focus of this study is twofold: on the one hand it is on the returnees own work

performance compared to their local, non-returnee colleagues; on the other hand it is on the extent towhich returnees are able to disseminate skills to their work environment. The goal of the study is toassess the effectiveness of programs that encourage and support diaspora return for core governmentfunctions.

Methodology

The study is based on two major sources of information: published data (formal reports as well asscholarly studies) and field interviews in all four countries. Interviewees included diaspora returnees,as well as their supervisors and colleague. The primary data was analyzed with the help of textanalysis software. The literature served as the basis for a survey of the relevant literature, whichincludes material on migration and development, as well as literature from the area of businessstudies.

Core Findings

Both the existing literature and the findings of our field researchers put the effectiveness ofreturnees in the above mentioned areas into question. While some returnees did bring skills that werevaluable or hard to find elsewhere, this advantage was offset by other factors that impeded skillstransfer and were detrimental to their overall performance. Having lived in a different environmentfor many years, returnees often found it hard to adapt to local living and working conditions.Deteriorated language skills, cultural differences, as well as higher salaries for returnees contribute tothe divide between locals and returnees. Overall, we did not find evidence that returnees perform

better than their local peers, nor did we find evidence of systematic and effective efforts to transferskills.

It might be possible to circumvent many of the barriers to effective work performance andcapacity building through volunteer, short-term diaspora recruitment programmes. Non-permanent

returnees do not compete for jobs with their local peers, they are ready to accept lower livingconditions in a temporary setting, and there is no salary gap that could lead to divisions betweenreturnees and locals. This may lead to more effective skills transfer, a higher level of satisfaction ofdiaspora volunteers, and a smoother reintegration of those who choose to resettle permanently, astheir short-term deployment provided them with a low-risk testing ground for return.


5/76

Recommendations

1. As returnees are not more effective in overall work performance and capacity building, werecommend not to invest heavily into long-term diaspora return programmes. Where such

programmes are funded it is crucial: to analyse the social structure of the return society in order to see whether returnees

would be effective or not; to define clear and measurable goals for the programme; to ensure that returnees are able to train local colleagues in a systematic manner

through training of trainers programs, as well as dedicated time and space fortraining;

and to assist returnees adequately in order to overcome barriers to reintegration.

2. Short-term volunteer programmes might be able to address some of the problems we found.However, while they seem to be more effective in achieving skills transfers, long-termstructural changes are not to be expected from such programmes.

3. We strongly recommend to refrain from using diaspora recruitment programmes as a meansto resettle migrant or refugee populations from their countries of residence back to theircountries of origin.


6/76

1

INTRODUCTION

Societies that have witnessed political turmoil and violence often suffer from a collapsedadministrative structure, the lack of qualified personnel, and a general aura of physical andeconomical insecurity that may well emanate into neighbouring countries and lead to thedestabilisation of larger regions. OECD governments, International Organisations, as well as theresearch community, have thus long looked for ways to stabilise and rebuild post-conflict and fragilesocieties. In the last two decades the focus has increasingly shifted towards the role of the diasporacommunity, whichdispersed in neighbouring and distant host countriesis heralded as a potentialsource of qualified and cheap human capital for post-conflict reconstruction.

While a host of programmes have been initiated which, with various means, attempt to recruitdiaspora experts to return to their society of origin, no systematic efforts have been made to evaluate

the impact these programmes might have had on the reconstruction efforts in the respective societies.This study presents a first step in that direction and is focused around two central questions:

Do diaspora returnees function in core government positions significantly better than otherexpatriate government employees?

Do diaspora returnees have added value in the form of identified improvements in localadministrative competencies in the short or long term?

The findings are based partly on four studies each conducted in one of the countries namedabove, in which field consultants interviewed a total of 141 respondents and partly on a literaturesurvey, which encompassed literature on the returnee issue in general as well as some literature onexpatriates and returnees in the commercial sector. The overall goal of the study is to offerrecommendations to governments of fragile and post-conflict states, donors, and to members of theOECD-PDG on the utility of using and financing expert return programs.

States emerging from a condition of civil war or extended civil disorder almost always sufferfrom a lack of qualified personnel able to administer the country and to perform essential governmentfunctions (e.g. administrative tasks, and management of public finances). This is due to two relatedfactors. On the one hand, poor governance often is the cause of civil war. It also often creates asituation in which intellectual elites and educated members of civil societypotential recruits to theadministrationleave the country for abroad (either to an OECD country or to a neighbouringcountry with better economic and political conditions), or, in extreme cases may be eliminated by theregime. The post-conflict period is thus often characterized by a situation in which conflict regimemembers are suspect, whereas other potential recruits to civil administration are absent in the country.Under these circumstances, notably when an international force is appointed to oversee the transitionfrom war to peace and development, the post-conflict government needs a great deal of support in theform of financing, and, critically, skilled personnel. In the absence of such a workforce, it must beimported from abroad. Given that these are to function for a limited period often in difficultconditions, such overseas posts are usually well-paid. These expatriates are drawn from a variety of

backgrounds, including former nationals of the post-conflict country itself (some who have emigrated,others who fled as refugees, or intended to stay for a limited period of time).


7/76

2

Method

Principally, this report relies on three distinct sources of data. We engaged four field researchers,one each in each of the sample countries, to collect primary data. Each field worker was allowed atotal of 20 days work for preparation, interviewing, translation and writing. We conducted awidespread literature survey, which is presented in this report as a survey, but which also furnishedadditional data on return processes and numbers. Finally, we used field notes from other studies thatwe have conducted ourselves in three of the four countries. This includes speaking informally to localacquaintances in each of these countries who are returnees themselves, but for various reasons did notwant themselves included in the survey. All the data were collated, and the field responses wereanalyzed using a text analysis program (TAMS), which provided us with dynamic pictures of the datausing various cuts. Total time allocated to the desk part of the study, including data analysis, writingand editing was also 20 days.

The process of interviewing was conducted in three stages. In the first, we designed acomprehensive list of questions, built around six data clusters (personal data; Biography; HiringProcess; Employment experience; Personal feelings; Work experiences; and Future prospects. Wedesigned four questionnaires (for returnees, their supervisors, local-hire colleagues, and a general dataquestionnaire). The questions were tested on BICC employees, some local, some non-native. Theschedules were then sent to our four field researchers. We emphasized the fact that the forms could beused either as questionnaires, or as discussion points with informants: the choice of how to ask thequestions was left to the field researchers, though we provided some hints. The field workerscollected data over a period of five weeks. Data from each week was sent us on every Friday (one ofour informants was unable to do so). In parallel, we analyzed the data at BICC using a text analysis

program. Some of the responses were, for one reason or another, discarded. Each valid response wascoded by two coders, and codes and tagging were discussed together by the team of three. Overall, wereceived 27 valid responses from Haiti; 39 from Afghanistan (13 had to be discarded); 20 from TimorLeste; and 55 from South Sudan. In addition, two acquaintances from Afghanistan who had worked insenior positions and three from South Sudan, who had not agreed to be interviewed, neverthelessdiscussed the returnee situation in general terms.

Literature was gathered from a variety of sources. It includes papers directly relating to returneesand returnee programs, but also data from expatriate workers in the business world, some of which isrelevant, general background material on the countries concerned, and relevant anthropologicalliterature about networks, cultural issues and so on.

A final dataset was retrieved from field studies that we had conducted at BICC in three of thefour countries concerned. Data from a lengthy field presence by MA in South Sudan, including astudy of returnees, was examined to test the validity of the report findings. MAs field diaries fromTimor Leste and Afghanistan (neither study dealt with return) were examined for the same reason.

Methodological Issues

For the purposes of this report, we operatively defined members of the diaspora as individualswho had lived in their country of origin during their formative years, and then left to live for a periodof several years in another country (or countries). We explicitly excluded those members of a nationalcommunity who had been born as second generation diaspora members outside their parentgeneration's place of origin, since these represent a somewhat different set of issues. We also defined'returnees' operatively as members of a diaspora who spent some time (measured in months ratherthan days) working at a salaried position in the country of origin. We recognise of course that other,more sophisticated definitions are possible, but feel that greater complexity would hinder this studyrather than help. We did not make a distinction between different categories of migrants (e.g.refugees, IDPs, asylum-seekers) except where, in a few instances, this made a difference to the


8/76

3

analysis. In retrospect, this was a good choice, inasmuch as respondents were extremely reluctant todisclose the legal status of their stay in the diaspora.

We did experience some major difficulties in the process of this study. While somemethodological errors are almost unavoidable in practice, some of the issues need to be highlighted inorder to clarify the limits of this report.

1. We could find no evidence that the returnee programmes we discuss here, were based onany kind of standard (or even non-standard) qualitative evaluative criteria. Where

programme literature (most of which was from internal sources, and thus less reliable inany case) said a programme was successful, what is generally meant is that a certainnumber of returnees ranging from 43 in the case of the Sudan TOKTEN to severalthousand in the case of MIDA participated in a programme.

2. We could find very few ways to operationalized 'effectiveness' of a programme, or of its participants. In the Afghan case, co-workers and line managers flatly refused to provideinformation about their colleagues (even anonymously) and our field contractorindicated strongly that in his opinion this question could not be asked in the Afghancontext.

3. The same can be said of measures of a programme's 'success'. Programmes can bedeemed successful if they are completed on time and on budget. However, that tells uslittle of use for the core questions of this study. Given that none of the programmes (toour knowledge at least) or the non-programmatic return processes provided any measurefor success, our own measure can be no more than impressionistic.

4. Individual 'success' (in job performance or capacity upgrading) is similarly inherentlysubjective. There was simply no way within the framework of the study to devise andexecute an objective, empirically-based measurement procedure to measure whetherreturnees could be found objectively and with some statistical reliability to have

performed better than local hires or expatriates with the same level of education andexperience.

5. Senior government officials, returnee and not, were almost inaccessible to our fieldresearchers. They demanded lengthy lead times for appointments, often cancelling themat the last moment, and often refused to respond directly to questions. Five seniorofficials known personally to the lead investigator were prepared to discuss their returnin general terms with the lead researcher, but were unwilling to provide specific data.Thus we have had to infer about the nature of high-ranking returnees, rather thanworking from direct evidence.

6. All of our field researchers felt that they needed more time to make approaches to theirsubjects. Notably, none of them received the data that had been requested fromgovernment offices concerning numbers of returnees in government, recruitment

procedures, etc (the one exception being the request from GRM, a commercial company,which did not maintain any data on returnees). This could have been foreseen: thesubject of the study is the poor administrative functioning of the states being studied.

7. Informants were rarely systematic in their responses to requests for specific items ofinformation. Many gave vague responses, even when prompted, and few were preparedto provide details. Whether this is due to the sensitivity of the questions to the returnees,or the nature of the inquiry, we find it hard to say. Many informants also gavecontradictory responses, leading to a situation in which we could give little more thanindications of trends, since a statistical analysis would have very low reliability.


9/76

4

8. The number of case study countries (=4) and the final number of interviewees (=157, ofwhich some 20 were discarded or seemed invalid) is too small to serve as a significantstatistical sample. At best we can say that certain trends seem apparent from the dataavailable.

The methodological issues therefore require us to start this report with a warning. Given thenature of the difficulties, we have tried to avoid indicating numerical certainties that could beinterpreted, wrongly, as statistically significant. While we do feel that the conclusions we havereached will be borne out by further research, we also urge any donor or government to engage in adetailed baseline study to assess the utility in that specific case of engaging in a diaspora return

programme.

In this study we examined four post-conflict and/or fragile countries: Afghanistan, Haiti, SouthSudan, and Timor Leste. Each of the four sample countries is recovering from years of war or violentcivil turmoil. A key problem all four face is the poor to very poor quality of governance: all foursuffer from corruption and nepotism, and sometimes from abuse of power, lawlessness, and aninability to deliver services to their citizens due to limited capacity (mostly at the enablingenvironment level and at the institutional level.; individual capacity varies but is often missing at theintermediate administrative level). Violence has managed to adversely affect, if not destroycompletely, administrative order and governance competencies. This destruction has partly beencaused by, and partly is the cause of an initial low level of governance. The government of all four ofthese countries have virtually no experience in delivering core government functions and services tothe public. Each of the four countries has also suffered under the twin burdens of imposedgovernment from abroad and heavy IO/NGO presence which blur accountability structures evenfurther. Both of these, for the best of all intentions, tend to foster aid dependency (a major issue inSouth Sudan, for instance), and, paradoxically, lead to an internal brain drain in which talented andtrained locals are sucked away into better paying IO and INGO jobs.

Better educated and experienced refugees and expatriates have found it relatively easy to find acareer outside their troubled country in all four samples. And, as a consequence, governmentsengaged in early recovery and IOs such as the UNDP TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge ThroughExpatriate Nationals) projects, have assumed that diaspora members with useful skills may be tappedas a good source of qualified local expertise, since they have local ties, cultural proximity and manyexpress a desire to assist the country of origin. They have also assumed that the skills these returnees

bring will be translated relatively easily into country of origin governance practices. Indeed, theformal programs such as TOKTEN which help in bringing in returnees claim that these programs dohave such an effect. The claims for success of returnee programs require some critical overview fortwo reasons. First, because claims such as that returnees provide an expanding space of bettergovernment are made with little reference to intervening variables, such as the contribution of non-returnee staff, a general improvement to living conditions, and reduction of violence. Second, theliterature on returnees in the business world argues that features such as network embeddedness and

personal circumstance need to be taken into consideration as well.

The report is structured into four parts.

Part 1 details contextual factors concerning the four countries and presents the main factualfindings of the study regarding the returnees, as well as the respective return programmes.

Part 2 gauges the success of diaspora returnees regarding work performance, capacity building,and social integration in comparison to other relevant groups, like local colleagues, as well as nearand far expatriates.


10/76

5

Part 3 condenses the findings of the previous chapters into concrete recommendations for partnergovernments, donor organisations, and policy makers in OECD countries.

Finally, Part 4 draws conclusions for the design of return programmes.


11/76

6

PART 1: TURNING TO THE DIASPORAS

In this part we present our overall findings (that is, those that crosscut all four countries in oursample). We summarize them here under three major headings: issues that derive from policy (ofinternational bodies, donor countries, and the study countries) and the context of the four countriesstudied; the nature of the returnees themselves (who and what they are, and what motivations theyclaim); and technical aspects of return programs. We also devote a separate section to short-termexpert return programs such as TOKTEN.

Policy and country context

The value of recruiting diaspora members from the perspective of potential donors and outsideobservers rests on one overt, and one covert assumption. The overt assumption argues, roughly, thatthe diaspora of a country, who probably speak the language, are familiar with the environment, andhave family and social ties in the country of origin, should be able to function more effectively, adaptfaster and better than other expatriates, and may also have the potential for longer-term return. Theremay be (and in one case, there evidently is) a possible second motivation: some host countries whohave received large numbers of refugees are anxious to repatriate them, and return to a government

post in the country of origin serves to initiate such return for some refugees. Both of theseassumptions are seriously challenged by our findings.

International and donor policies

The repatriation of co-ethnics or diaspora members to supplement crucial weaknesses ingovernment is by no means a new phenomenon. A number of developed and developing countriesincluding Israel, the Philippines, Iran, and Albania owe at least some of their success to their ability to

bring in diaspora members, for the short-term or permanently. Formal international interest indiaspora volunteers emerged during 1977 with the establishment of the UNDP (now UNV) TOKTEN.Similar programs such as MIDA (initially an Italian initiative) and some national programs emergedwith time. As noted, support for returnee programs rests on three assumptions. The first is thatdiaspora returnees can function better than other expatriates or locals in helping develop goodadministrative government practices, since they are trained in the developed world or had valuableskills even before fleeing the country, and yet retain interests and ties to their country of origin. Thesecond, not often articulated publicly, is that the political and economic improvements in the country

of origin as it recovers from conflict, and the example set by successful (that is, long term, stable, prosperous) return of high-calibre diaspora members, is likely to reduce the pressure created in e.g.OECD countries by migration, inasmuch as many migrants are likely to emulate the successful casesand relocate back to their home countries. The third is that return programmes can go somewhattowards addressing the brain drain of highly qualified people from the developing world (fragile and

post-conflict states included), by having some of them return to their country of origin.

Donor policies, and the degree donors invest in returnee programs are a function of these threeassumptions. Donor polices have thus dictated the funding of a large number of return programs. In


12/76

7

our four sample countries, Afghanistan has had the most support. This is most likely due to the factthat governance problems, including capacity are one of the major issues at the heart of Afghanistanas a security and current issue. Supported by the International community, the government ofAfghanistan has developed an elaborate system for recruiting from the diaspora for the short and longterm. In 2003, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) allotted USD 10 million for theExpatriate Services Program for 2004-2010 (Capacity Development Secretariat 2009), to provideshort and long term experts from the Afghan diaspora as well as local hires. In parallel, short-termvolunteer recruitment was offered through UNV and TOKTEN programs. In Sudan, politicalconsiderations (e.g. the division of the country into two functional administrations, and reportedobstructions by the Khartoum-based program to Southern assignments) has meant that internationalsupport for returnees has not emerged as a major program. International involvement in thegovernment of Timor Leste is extremely high, but international donors have showed no major interestin developing diaspora returnee programs. Instead, the recruitment of diaspora members has beenfolded into a recruiting process that does not distinguish between diaspora members and otherexpatriates or locals. Haiti, though on record as opposing TOKTEN programs has in recent years

benefited from TOKTEN as well. However, there is no systematic attempt by international donors toencourage the recruitment of diaspora personnel nor any structured attempt from the government toattract them back.

The conclusions we can derive from this description are limited. Nevertheless, we tentativelyfeel the following points summarize the initial position

1. Where a government (as e.g. the Afghan government) has expressed an interest in diasporareturn, international donors have responded accordingly.

2. Donor priorities are the major impetus for returnee programs. Afghanistan is currently amajor international issue, and thus unsurprisingly heads the list in terms of investment inreturnees. Haiti, South Sudan, and Timor Leste are lower down on the priority list since the

problems they represent are, at present, seemingly quiescent.

3. It seems fairly obvious, but needs restating, that attempts to use return programs asspringboards for general repatriation programs from developed nations to developing or post-conflict home nations are unsustainable.

4. Overall, investment by the international donor community in return programs is relatively low(without going into the issue of efficiency and efficacy which we do in Part 2 of this report).

5. Countries of origin, notably in Africa, have argued that the attractiveness of positions in thedeveloped world is creating a brain drain in these countries, which needs to be countered.Projects such as MIDA attempt to address the issue. The MIDA data indicates that fundedreturn may work but provides little empirical data on the question of efficacy of such

programs.

6. The picture in regard to return, return programs, and retention of returnees in government posts is different in each of the countries studied, and depends on specific local factors. Thismakes generalization extremely difficult.

Country context

In contrast to the international donor interest, we found little evidence that diaspora candidateswere systematically sought out by countries of origin, with the exception of Afghanistan. Theappended case studies give details of the issues in each country, and should be read for more details.Here we briefly summarize the findings in regard to formal or informal programs for diaspora return.

In Afghanistan the government is making an official effort to recruit diaspora members for theshort and long terms (Embassy of Afghanistan, 2006). It has placed diaspora returnees in senior


13/76

8

positions, including ministers and deputy minister. However, some of these, to our knowledge, haveleft their positions relatively quickly, either due to political pressure (since senior government

positions represent major resources for politicians), because of frustration with the political and/orsecurity situations, or for other reasons. Short-term volunteer programs seem to be more successful,

both TOKTEN and Afghan-run volunteer programs, in placing and utilizing diaspora skills. 1

Members of the government of South Sudan, and public South Sudanese sentiment expresses aninterest in recruiting diaspora members and encouraging their return. However, in practice, with theexception of what appears to be a relatively anaemic TOKTEN program, there is no systematicgovernment program. Nevertheless, much of the South Sudan government at all levels includesreturnees from the near diaspora (see case study). Given the nature of South Sudanese return, wherethe average skill level is very low, and where the principle of a foot in both camps is the norm, this isnot surprising.

In Timor Leste, GRM, the commercial company charged with recruiting professionals for theTimorese government, makes no attempt to recruit diaspora members per-se , though given that theyare more likely to have Tetum language skills, they may have a slight natural advantage. Diasporamembers are recruited to the government (President and Prime Minister are both returnees), but this ison the basis of personal selection, and possibly politically based. Returnees from the near diaspora(Indonesia) are less likely to return, given that many are associated with and identified with theIndonesian colonial regime. The government otherwise appears to make no concerted effort to recruitfrom the diaspora, either for the short or the long term. In fact there is evidence of public fears thatdiaspora recruitment is a major vehicle for corruption (Tempo Semanal, 2009), and thus support forsuch programs in the general public is low.

Haiti recruitment of diaspora returnees is without an organized returnee recruitment program.Though the Haitian government is on record as not supporting TOKTEN programs, in practice,TOKTEN volunteers and short expert exchange programs do take place. Haiti maintains a Ministryfor Contact with the Diaspora, but this Ministry is not charged with repatriating or encouraging returnof members of the diaspora. Certainly one reason is that overseas remittances from the diaspora are amajor source of funds both for the government and for the people of Haiti. We know that remittancesand investment by diaspora are important in Afghanistan as well (Hanifi 2006) but this does not serveas a brake on diaspora recruitment. 2 The administration in Haiti is well established, and though itsrecord of efficiency and efficacy are low, it has not crumbled as an administrative organ as in theother three sample countries. Finally, administrative posts at all levels appear to be stronglydetermined by patronage. Ministers appointed from overseas normally bring associates with them toserve as their advisors, and quite often stack government offices with their supporters and clients.Thus the overall demand for high level administrators is low. The demand for technocrats on theother hand is high, so that individuals with no political (or career) ambitions who can exhibit neededtechnical expertise are welcomed. Given the poor economic position of the country, however, and theconsequent need for jobs in all sectors, they must compete with local hires, and, indeed, since most ofthem have self-repatriated, constitute, in effect, a variant of local hires.

The Returnees

Returnees to the countries studied represent a cohort of individuals with similar characteristics.They are educated and several have tertiary degrees (four of the Haitians, three of the Timorese)Given their ages which, in our samples, ranged from late 30s on up, most of them have families,sometimes with grown children. We attempted to ensure a gender balance in respondents, but in the

1 The extent of diaspora engagement in the Afghan government is unknown. We were unableto access any such database if it exists.2 Remittances are important for individuals in South Sudan and Timor Leste as well, but it didnot feature in responses to our questions there.


14/76

9

event, most of our respondents were males, so females are underrepresented, though we have no sensethat this affects the overall results in terms of government service, since, with the exception of TimorLeste, women are underrepresented in government in the rest of our sample. Length of stay in thediaspora varied (not all respondents provided detailed information) from a low of 2 years to a high of35 years. The average was 13.1 years abroad in a sample of 37. Afghan returnees had spent theshortest time abroad on average (8.5 years) and Haiti the longest (average 16.8 years).

Motivations

The most common motivation people gave for return was the possibility of contributing to thecountry. This response needs to be taken with some caution. While it may be a genuine emotion, it isunlikely to be a strong motive for making the effort of relocation. Other stated motivations include thereturn of peace and security to the country (which may equate to the contribution motivation, thedesire to raise children in the home land, economic reasons such as the possibility of finding a job,specific personal issues (e.g. Caring for an elderly relative)and personal negative feelings about livingin the diaspora. Unsurprisingly, very few people offered a single motivation for return. As is wellknown, whatever the initiator of international relocation, numerous issues are always considered bymigrants and returnees alike (Lu 1999).

Skills and background

The respondents came from a wide variety of skills backgrounds. At the higher education levelthese included doctors, engineers, and specialized PhDs (n=8). At the medium educational level itincluded IT specialists, teachers, and medical personnel. Most had acquired their advanced educationsoverseas. However, some Haitians (n=3) noted in their biographical data that they had spent periodsof time, often extensive periods, working at manual or low-level clerical jobs in the diasporanotwithstanding higher level qualifications. The same applied to This implies, and is borne out by thedata on country of origin employment, that for some of those with higher education and greater careerexpectations, moving to the country of origin represents a career upgrade, in terms of position andresponsibilities. This feature was particularly noticeable among some Haitians and Timorese. Afghanreturnees in our sample were not forthcoming about their biographical details. External evidence(Capacity Development Secretariat, 2009), indicates that even those who are in the middle of a career

path in the diaspora, and seem to have higher career expectations, seem happier to return in avolunteer short term framework. The South Sudanese diaspora population has a smaller number ofhighly educated individuals, and thus it seems the attraction to come back is lower, and most comefrom the near diaspora (where, among other things, they may have few career prospects as refugees).

Employment in country of origin: functioning and features

Amongst core government functions the positions occupied by returnees in their home countriesdivide into two rather different profiles. On the one hand are returnees who fulfil advisory roles in theadministration. For various reasons (see case studies) we feel that many of these appointments are

political and returnee incumbents may well have acceded to the position (in some cases) because of patronage or membership in specific ethnic or other associative groups. On the other hand, weidentified a number of respondents who were very clearly occupying positions as technocrats. Largelythese were individuals with specific skills, who were happy with the responsibilities and scope ofactivities that their country of origin position offered them. The length of stay in the diaspora washighly varied: one individual in Afghanistan had left after the Soviet invasion (that is some time after1979) and in Haiti, one individual had left "during the Duvalier regime". The most recent returnee hadleft Afghanistan in 2006.


15/76

10

Returnees occupy every level in the governments of the countries in our sample. In practice, political leaders in all four countries are returnees who left for political or security reasons, or in orderto acquire an education. This implies that the mere fact of having been in the diaspora is neither anadvantage, nor, perhaps more importantly, a disadvantage for an individuals positioning in thecountry of origins government. None of the countries, to our knowledge, has an accessiblecomprehensive list of diaspora members working for government, so the degree of involvement ofdiaspora is impressionistic: very high in South Sudan, lower in the other three countries.

Most of our respondents said that they were treated no differently, and sometimes better, thantheir local-hire colleagues. The no differently response is significant: it implies that our respondents,at least, did not experience any discrimination in their work loads, or the ways in which theirsupervisors dealt with them professionally. The treated better response is puzzling. However, wefeel that that may be the result of a methodological error in the question asked. 3 Nevertheless, it may

be a result of the perceived better skills that local supervisors felt returnees have.

Effectiveness

We were not able to define a usable measurement of the effectiveness of returnees, largely formethodological reasons (capacity-building is dealt with separately below). Subjectively, many of ourrespondents indicated initially that they felt extremely effective in executing their tasks. Others, incontrast, were extremely (and overtly) frustrated in their work, and felt that they were unable torealize their desires for work effectiveness and using their skills. Even those who claimed they wereeffective, noted that the overall enabling environment as well as political, infrastructural, andsocial barriers limited this effectiveness in practice. We do have observations from some of the localhire peer group, and from supervisors, that returnees were indeed effective in their positions, but thistoo is a subjective assessment. 4

Training and dissemination

A critical issue for the recruitment of diaspora members is the issue of what we have called heredissemination. We mean by this the ability of the returnee to change administrative and government

behaviours and processes into those that are more rationalized and effective, and less particularisticand ineffective. In other words, to have an effect not only on the individuals immediately around thereturnee but to some extent on the systems and organizational structures within which individualoperate. Many of our respondents indicated that they were able to influence their colleagues,demonstrating and teaching new practices. This was, not unnaturally, more common among trainedteachers (including university lecturers) and to some degree technocrats, and among those returneeswho head autonomous administrative or implementation units, such as e.g. a government statisticsoffice. On the other hand, many respondents (including some who noted they had successfullydisseminated new practices) were frustrated with both slow and unresponsive administrative

procedures (for example, seven of the Haitian respondents indicated frustrations at work due to localwork culture; five felt the political and social nature of the country made life difficult; one indicatedfrustration in his social life due to isolation from other Haitians. Timorese respondents did notrespond to this issue. Four Afghans indicated frustrations at work due to 'old-fashioned' practices andattitudes) and with their local hire colleagues, whom they characterized as unwilling to learn, slow torespond to timely needs, and inertia-prone.

3 Frequently the same individual answered that he was treated the same and better whichindicates a non-discriminate question pair.4 We had no access to personnel evaluation forms, nor were any of our respondents willing orable to compare peer or subordinate performance to a ToR, which were non-existent in many cases.


16/76

11

A second element of training and capacity building we addressed was whether space 5 was provided for structured and sustained training efforts. Educational institutions aside, we found somesmall evidence that such space was allocated by the higher ups. In Timor, recruitment ToRs specifythe need for capacity building. This is not generally the case in government hires elsewhere, though inAfghanistan, some government appointments from the diaspora programs include that as well. In

practice, however, capacity enhancement varied from Haiti, where department heads did claim tomake efforts to train their subordinates, through technical appointments were the respondents reports

being forbidden to train his peers, to what amounts to complete indifference to capacity building inSudanese government appointments.

We did find a great difference between short-term volunteer programs where capacity buildingwas emphasized, and long-term recruitment where it was not. However, even the short-term projects,capacity building for technical subjects (e.g. computer use, engineering and development planning)was encouraged, but not administrative capacity building such as procedures, reporting, and goal-setting, which are often a core problem.

Relations with peers

Long-term diaspora residents have, in effect, immigrated to a foreign country. In order to survivein the new context, they need to adapt a large range of strategies Berry, 1997; Cobas, 1987) in whichcountry of origin and society legacy behaviours are blended in with newly learned survival, social,and economic skills in the country of residence. The legacy behaviours often include an idealized

picture of the country of origin, social networks, and exploitation of economic niches available to people in a intercessionary position, between the old country and the new (cf. Hanifi, 2006). In practice, ties with the country of origin are selective (Phinney et al. 2001) and punctuated (e.g.remittances), notably where the country of origin has endured major violent upheavals. Returnees aretherefore not precisely natives, but perceived, at least partially, as foreigners. Time has passed, andtheir social skills may be those of a decade earlier. This implies that they might have difficulties oftheir own in adjusting back to the country of origin.

A second critical social feature is the resentment returnees encounter from their local-hirecolleagues. This derives from several causes. In all four countries, international posts (that is, thoseoffered by international bodies and INGOs) are highly paid. Skilled returnees often employed byINGOs/IOs are paid higher salaries than local peers. Volunteers, who are not paid, nevertheless havethe alternative of returning to the country of residence. Returnees who have not endured the war yearsare sometimes viewed with some disdain. Jobs are scarce in post-conflict societies, and a job taken bya returnee at any level of skill is perceived as one not available for locals. This complex negative viewof returnees is modified in individual cases by specific circumstances, for example, volunteers whoreturn for the short-term are envied for their ability to return to the country of residence, but not fortheir higher salaries in the country of origin. In Timor Leste, this has led to investigations in the localmedia of the salaries paid returnees, who still retain foreign passports, and who use their access to job

postings as nexi for generating political power (Tempo Semanal 2009). The resentment is muted incountries such as South Sudan, in which there is an expressed state and popular ideology welcomingall returnees. However, the accusations against returnees (notably, but not exclusively, educated

women) of spreading aids and of witchcraft6

which we recorded in 2008 in Sudan indicate that,contrary to expressed ideology, a great deal of resentment exists there too.

5

By space in this context we mean the time, location, students and resources necessary fordedicated in-house training sessions.6

Analyses of African witchcraft accusations have often emphasized the fact that suchaccusations are generally made against those whom the accuser is socially expected to treat withrespect and amity. See Evans-Pritchard, 1969; Gluckman, 1972)


17/76

12

The resentment is not purely one-sided. Returnees, notably in Haiti and to a lesser extent inSouth Sudan and Timor Leste sometimes claim that their local-hire colleagues are slow to respond totheir suggestions, often resist changes, and do not accept instruction. Local hires, in turn, argue thatreturnees are pushy, clannish, often express their superiority by speaking the metropolitan language(e.g. French instead of Creole in Haiti, English rather than local languages in South Sudan). Veryclearly, returnees do differ from their local hire compatriots. Many have been away for years or evendecades. Their perception of the country of origin is probably somewhat romantic, but theirimmediate personal and social interactions and expectations are, unsurprisingly, with and derivedfrom their immediate peer group: other returnees, and, probably, expatriates from the country ofresidence, with whom they share goals and experience.

This is not to say that the relations between returnees and local hires are always bad, but that aclear tension exists between the two positions. We did not ascertain how far this tension reacheswithin the social lives of returnees. In Timor, local hire informants noted that socializing after work isnot the custom. In Haiti, where it apparently is, there was evidence that returnees were accused of not

being sociable, associating only with other returnees.

Near and far diasporas

In each of the diasporas under consideration, people had dispersed to both near and far locations.However, this distinction is overshadowed by the issue of the type of country they relocated to. Poorerand less well-educated Afghans relocated to nearby countries (notably Pakistan), which themselveshave severe social and employment problems. Wealthier and better educated Afghans, on the otherhand, relocated to Europe and North America, where major concentrations of Afghans exist, andwhere many have engaged in professional careers. The Timorese diaspora is mainly located inAustralia and the former colonial powers Portugal and Indonesia. South Sudanese diaspora has smalloutposts in Australia and North America, but the majority of returnees who participate in governmentcome from Uganda and Kenya, which served as convenient rear bases for the SPLA and othergroups. In Haiti, few educated Haitians dispersed in neighbouring Caribbean countries, but the largerconcentrations are in French-speaking North America, the US, and metropolitan France. The questionof whether being in the near or far diaspora seems to matter less than the issue of the educational andeconomic opportunities offered by the host country. For example, education in Uganda, while inmany ways very good, does not offer the same career prospects as education in North America.

Technical aspects of the returnee program

In this section we briefly summarize our findings about some of the technical aspects of returnwhich may be of interest.

Candidate Selection

We have no systematic evidence about the process of selection within and outside of structuredreturn programs. Nevertheless, respondents seemed to hint that in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti it isfairly common for a returnee (who may return on his/her own) to seek out an available positionthrough network ties. Sometimes an individual in a position to hire someone for government (aminister, a senior adviser), will hear of a candidate through a third party, and approach the candidatewith a job. The assumption that recruitment to government posts is an orderly, rational-bureaucratic

process in these post-conflict states is untenable. We also could find no systematic needs assessmentfor government posts (though such have been conducted, to our knowledge, in specific cases). .

We found it difficult to assess the number of competitors for government positions, either because records were not held, or because they were not made available to us. However, it must be


18/76

13

kept in mind that, notably in post-conflict countries, government positions represent a resource. Theyare, in effect, contested prizes in survival strategies of the populace. Politicians habitually use accessto government positions as rewards to followers. This means that administrative positions are ofteneither reserved for, or given as reward to political followers, kin, or network members. This is

particularly notable in South Sudan, where government positions are part of a well-entrenched spoilssystem. We found similar, though perhaps less pervasive similarities in the other countries of oursample. Insofar as we have been able to ascertain, this is true at all levels, from the most senior(ministers' assistants) to junior and technical levels. This is not to say that all posts are awarded on the

basis of patronage, but that patronage is a 'trump' criterion in choosing one individual among others.

Salaries

Given the absence of a ToR in most cases, and the highly personalistic view of government position as a resource (of an individual, kin-group, or political power) we could find little evidence ofa Western-style negotiation for conditions. Haitian respondents were unanimous in stating that therewas no negotiation over the position, and that a government job offer was on a take-it or leave-it

basis. The same is true to a greater or lesser degree in all the other sample countries. With theexception of the Timor Leste case for long-term recruitment, and for all volunteer programs, whichwere time bounded, most job offers were open-ended. Certainly in South Sudan they are open-ended,contingent, often, on the availability of donor funds.

Returnee remuneration (excluding unpaid volunteer programs such as TOKTEN) falls into tworather distinct formal classes, and there are hints that a third class needs to be considered as well.Returnees, such as those in Timor Leste who are paid by an international body enjoy the benefits andsalaries of their expatriate peers. This is often greatly in excess of what their local-hire counterpartsreceive for the same position. It also often means that the returnees identify, and are identified, as partof the expatriate group. In other cases, notably in Haiti and South Sudan, and many cases inAfghanistan, returnees are paid on a local scale. This creates severe problems for the returnees. InSouth Sudan, this is one major reason cited for returnees not bringing their families (though otherfeatures count as well). Virtually all the returnees in this remuneration class find it very difficult tocope financially. As a result, they either search for a dual career (notably in Haiti, where virtuallyevery respondent had a private business activity) or is quickly attracted to work in the INGO/IO sectorwhere they receive a much higher salary (notably in South Sudan and to a degree in Afghanistan).The third, more hidden mode of remuneration is due to the fact that some government posts provideopportunities for corruption. This may be direct corruption, in which public services are offered for afee, as well as indirect corruption (notably in Haiti, Afghanistan, and South Sudan) where governmentofficials owe their position to a patron, and repay this with political and other loyalties. We suspectthat this income supplementation is practiced in all of the countries under consideration, particularlyin regards to political loyalty.

Duration

Volunteer programs and the contracts offered by IO/INGOs are generally time limited. Thisincludes advisory positions in the Timorese government that are handled by GRM. Generallyspeaking, TOKTEN positions range from a few weeks to a few months. International contract

positions generally last up to three years, and some may be renewable, though, to our knowledge,rarely exceed that period. Our data indicate that full-time recruitment to government positions inAfghanistan, Haiti, and South Sudan are, effectively, open-ended.


19/76

14

Management of Return Process and Recruitment

The governments of most fragile and post-conflict states are heavily reliant on donor money to perform core government functions. This is due partly to poor taxation and fiscal policies, absence ofa useful tax-base, general poverty, and often lack of administrative capacity (individual andorganizational). Therefore, as a matter of course, many of these governments rely heavily on donormoney, from developed countries, either directly (budget support or programme support) or throughuncoordinated projects which may employ technical advisers from UN, donor agencies or INGO, tosupport essential government functions. This tends to have gravely deleterious consequences, rangingfrom a dependency syndrome (Moss et al. 2006) to a real threat of internal brain drain, as better

paying INGO/International jobs draw off those people with government expertise (Ansah, 2002) orattract them to work for PIUs. Government positions are a highly contested ground. They represent aresource for the countrys politicians. Job seekers are constantly jockeying for such positions in thealmost total absence of a high-paying private sector. IO/INGOs who are paying for these positions notunnaturally see these positions as means of influence. Governments want control over their

bureaucracies. As a result, procurement rules or whatever is said on paper are a central arena forconstant negotiation and change. The Weberian view of a rationalistic, disinterested, effectiveness-driven bureaucracy is little more than a myth in developed countries (Hilbert 1987): so much more soin post-conflict states. The recruitment process in all four of our countries presents a mixed picture, inwhich the formalities of ToRs and rational job appointments are only a part, sometimes a very small

part of the picture. For example, all our Afghan respondents except two indicated they had beeninterviewed for their positions, but we have no idea of the content of the interview, nor of the natureof the competition. In practice, therefore, rather than asking who conducts the procurement process asa matter of course, it becomes more useful to ask how, in particular cases, was the recruitment processcarried out in practice.

In summary, who is recruited to a post depends on a complex of factors: the nature of the post inquestion, the position's political implications (often not visible to an outside observer) and the social

position of the candidate in question (individual network, membership in specific group, educationalqualification, probably in that order). Who pays for a post is only one of, and not the sole determinantof choice of candidates. Overall, following this logic, we are most likely to find that job recruitment isoften very context-dependent in all four countries, and elsewhere. From the candidates perspective, anindividuals personal network (friends, colleagues, and family) appear to be the major single factor inall forms of recruitment. These findings should not be surprising. A number of authors (Brinkerhoff,2006; Fink, 2003; Gammage, 2004; Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006) have noted oremphasized how important this feature is for recruitment. The performance of an individual in-post isrelated to these factors as well. Tapping into these factors (e.g. through social networks) would seem agood way to access candidates but for the fact that networks are, in effect, competitive: candidateswith strong network support in post-conflict states owe their position, and are likely to be biasedtowards, fellow network members, which may interfere with job efficiency.

ToRs

Very few of the posts held by diaspora returnees appeared to have hard and fast ToRs or even job descriptions. In Haiti there is effectively no formal designation of duties, merely a post to beassumed. Decisions on the need to fill a spot often depend on a multitude of factors, including fundsavailable, perceived need by a coalition of interested parties, and sometimes the need to find a

position for a hanger-on. Quite often negotiations about salary, responsibilities, and rights are at aminimum: in all four countries the government determines what it wants, and there is little room fornegotiation, nor is there an expectation by job seekers that they can negotiate. It is likely that a certainamount of negotiation goes on at the upper end of government posts, but there, we feel, thediscussions revolve around relative power and influence that can be brought to bear, rather thansubstantive administrative issues.


20/76

15

Where ToRs were/are in existence (e.g. Timor Leste; Afghanistan) they are written byconsultation between the executive authority (the government or the managing UN agency) and therecruiting agency (in the case of Timor). It is not uncommon for government officials to construct atable of organizationoften reflecting their assumed budget, and inflated for that purposes, as well asfor purposes of prestigeand then determine ToRs, if at all. 7 Many of our respondents simply had noidea whether there was a ToR at all or what were its contents. Even in cases where a ToR had been

published, several of our respondents, notably in Timor Leste, noted that the ToR was not adhered to,and individuals hired under a particular ToR may well have engaged in completely different duties. Inconclusion, we feel that the ToRs are a side issue: in many cases they do not exist, and even whenthey do, they are hardly viewed as binding by the government concerned, or by the job holder. Theissue is slightly different with external agencies: those recruited by GRM in Timor Leste, and byexternal agencies in Afghanistan noted that their employers adhered to the ToR, and, in fact, checkedthat it was adhered to.

Monitoring

Aside from the commercial firm GRM in Timor Leste, we found little evidence that return programs were carefully monitored for effectiveness, nor any indication that, beyond numbers ofreturnees, there was any measure of program effectiveness. There is no monitoring of return

programs, or of the effectiveness of returnees in their posts in either Haiti or South Sudan. In Haiti,given the fact that there is no intentional return program, this is unsurprising. The same is true inSouth Sudan, which in any case lacks the capacity to engage in such monitoring. The efficacy ofinternational advisors, some of them returnees, is monitored, if at all, with little vigour. Certainlythere is little evidence that monitoring takes place. The Afghan return programs are supposed to bemonitored by a local board, but we were unable to ascertain what results, if any, the board came upwith. Certainly none of our Afghan respondents indicated that any form of monitoring of theirsuccesses or failures was being conducted. In Timor Leste, the commercial firm GRM monitors

performance of its hires, but does not distinguish between returnees and other expatriates. Given theevidence, and the highly politicized nature of high government positions, it is unlikely that asystematic monitoring is carried out at that level.

Return to the diaspora

The evidence we have collected has a major and inevitable lacuna: we found it impossible toassess how many returnees go back to the diaspora without having been able to acclimate themselvesthoroughly. The examples from a Norwegian study (Strand et al, 2008) may not be representative fortwo reasons: the Norwegian program study was overtly intended to relieve the pressure of Afghanrefugees on the government of Norway (a problematical approach, as we discuss below), and many ofthe returnees under this program do not fit the profile of government service (many returned asindividual entrepreneurs). Nevertheless, we believe that some returnees, at least, do not stay long intheir country of origin, but return to the diaspora, for various reasons including security, inability toadjust socially, and frustration with their jobs. This phenomenon requires additional investigation.One indicator that this is the case is the large number of returnees who retain overseas citizenship.Even in Haiti, where government positions are conditional on having no other citizenship thanHaitian, many of our respondents noted that immediate family members remained abroad. Thisimplies that even these are ensuring that they have the opportunity to move back to the diaspora underfavourable conditions.

7 In one case, observed in detail in a South Sudan agency, a table of organization was created based on a model from another country, with no reference to local needs, and without defining anyform of ToR.


21/76

16

Modes of Return

Many diaspora returnees are self-repatriated. That means that the initiative, as well as the processof return were engendered by the returnee him/herself. Often in such cases, the government positionwas offered after self-return had occurred. We found a high rate of self-return in Haiti where most ofour respondents had returned on their own, before seeking out a government post. A common factorin the decision to return was family circumstances: the need to attend to an aging relative was citedseveral times. Different family forms make the findings here inconclusive. Most of our Timoreserespondents were unmarried or returned on their own. Afghans, notably from the near diaspora,returned with their families, and, indeed, cited the desire to educate their children in Afghanistan as amotive. The South Sudanese form of return is influenced by the polygynous nature of Sudanesesociety: men would return with one wife, while another would normally stay behind in Kenya andUganda with all the familys children. Haitians often left their adolescent and adult children behindwith their spouse.

The Timorese case was different from the others in that we found a high proportion of returneeswho had been recruited by a personnel agency. This agency, GRM, has been contracted by AusAid to

provide personnel for civil government deployment in Timor Leste. GRM makes no special attempt torecruit from the Timorese diaspora. Nor does it notably differentiate between Timorese returnees andother expatriates in terms of salary or for assessment purposes. GRM was unable or unwilling toestimate how returnees performed in contrast to expatriates, though they accepted that such aninvestigation might be merited. In Afghanistan, which appears to have the most robust return

programs in our sample, diaspora members were recruited directly into jobs in government at positions which include ministerial and deputy ministerial appointments.

The Afghan government appeared, of our four samples, to be the only government engaged in asystematic effort to recruit diaspora experts, both for the short- and long-terms. Modes of returninclude short-term volunteer programs, 'push' programs, such as the one by the Norwegiangovernment, in which job and financial incentives were offered qualified Afghan refugees (Strand etal 2008), long-term return programs, and self-return. This indicates that a number of differentinfluences can bring about different attempts to institute return processes, from different (donor statesand country of origin) motives.

The high frequency of self-return in all of the countries we studied also suggests that moreattention be paid to retaining such self-returnees (who, after all, have already invested in themselves,taking the burden of relocation off of government shoulders) in the country. Indeed, some of thenational returnee programs we have evidence of (e.g. in India, China, and the Philippines. SeeVolunteer short-term Programs box) are based on supporting and encouraging self-returnees as wellas those who return within the framework of government program.

Modes of Job Recruitment

Recruitment on the basis of universal competition and professional selection was found only inTimor Leste, where government job recruitment is conducted by a professional firm (GRM) for

positions supported by AusAid. This means that specific job descriptions/job requirements are published in the media and the internet, and openings are competitive. The recruitment firm does notsearch specifically for diaspora members. Candidates are selected based on objective criteria,including skills, track record, and language skills. Under those circumstances, some diasporamembers have been chosen (they have the willingness, they know the language, and they have the

professional skills) but presumably, also, others have not.

In all four countries, positions are sometimes advertised and supposedly competitive. However, politiciansincluding those who have returned from exile in the diasporaoften recruit or bring withthem their favourites as senior advisers. Thus more often than not, senior positions are held on the


22/76

17

basis of political favour, and the senior posts are vacated once a politician leaves his post. At themiddle levels of the administration in Haiti, notably technical department heads and juniors are filledon the basis of job advertisements. Similar positions in South Sudan are still based on affiliation andviewed as political spoils. We have no data that is unambiguously from a political appointee, thoughsome of the more senior position returnees in our samples may have had political connections.

Afghanistan and South Sudan display yet another pattern of job recruitment. In both cases twoexternal factors determine whether one is offered a job: membership in the resistance/rebel forces (the

Northern Alliance and the SPLA respectively) and the candidates kinship and ethnic associations. In both states there is a struggle for lucrative posts (at the upper administrative levels) or access toeconomic opportunities, and the net effect is a balancing of political access and power, rather than a

job fit. Given the ethnic rivalries between (mainly) the East and (mainly) the West in Timor Leste(Simonsen 2008), ethnic positioning may well be an issue there as well.


23/76

18

Volunteer Short-term ProgrammesA number of short-term volunteer programmes have brought

professional diaspora members back to the country of origin for short periods of time. There are, in effect, two rather distinct modalities: programs within a UN or international framework (e.g. TOKTEN;RQAP; RQAN; and MIDA) and programs initiated by individualcountries, often self-financed (e.g. Balik Scientist Program in thePhilippines [Siar 2008]; the Spring Light Project in China [Siar2008]; the FINCOME project in Morocco [Khachani 2008]; and theReturn project in India [Rao 2003]). The international programs areall roughly similar.

International programmes provide for expenses and a smallliving allowance for the volunteer. The programmes assist inidentifying potential volunteers, and in placing them in positions inthe country of origin. The programmes are assisted by the homegovernment, in the country of origin, and sometimes by diasporanetworks overseas. TOKTEN programmes have been running since1977 when they debuted in Turkey. RQAN projects were initiated in1974, and MIDA in 1990. RQAN, which operated from 1974 and

1990 was able to attract over 2,000 skilled persons to 41 Africancountries. The range of activities of the volunteers were similar, andthe number relatively small. The most detailed breakdown can befound in Hanafi (2008). Palestinian TOKTEN programmes brought160 experts who engaged in programmes in IT, Universitycurriculum, water agriculture and health, and strategic planning(Hanafi 2008). In Lebanon, TOKTEN volunteers initiated 12 projects

between 1995 and 2000, when the programme was terminated. InGuyana, eight TOKTEN volunteers worked in the school curriculumand teacher training areas (Bray, 1991). Morocco (Khachani, 2008),Algeria (Driouchi et al., 2008), and Guinea (Bah et al. ND) alsoattracted TOKTEN volunteers who worked in scientific projects, andin Guinea, in the ministries of commerce, urbanization, and theCentral Bank. The programme in Sudan has recruited 42 TOKTENvolunteers who have functioned in different sectors in both North andSouth Sudan, so the numbers in South Sudan are probably less thanhalf the total. In Afghanistan, the similar AEP (Afghan ExpertsProgramme. CDS 2009) and the IOMs RQAP (Return of QualifiedAfghans Programmeme) which includes both short- and long-termmodalities bring diaspora Afghans to contribute brief periods of timeto the reconstruction of the country. TOKTEN volunteers have alsoworked in Haiti. None of these have benefited from an externalevaluation, and claims for their success rest almost entirely oninternal claims.

All of the international programmes feature: Support from donor governments through an international

body (IOM, UNDP, UNV); Emphasis on placement in technical, scientific, and

commercial positions for periods ranging from several weeks to sixmonths;

Small numbers of participants; The rate of retention (i.e. returnees who stayed) never

exceeds 35%, even though the RQAN programme was specifically


24/76

19

targeted at long-term returnees, there is no evidence that these stayedon.

The national programmes are to some degree more interesting,inasmuch as they represent a hybridization of long- and short-term

programmes. The Filipino Balik scientist programme lasted between1975 and 1998, and succeeded in bringing in 320 scientists, thoughthere is no breakdown on their occupations, they are described asscientists and engineers (Siar 2008). All of these programmesdisplay similar features:

Payment for expenses but not consultancy fees for high-calibre professionals (that is, the work is effectively done on a volunteer basis);

Open subjects of work, Establishing wide network ties in the homeland; Government legislation that eases the transition, whether by

offering tax concessions for some time, lifting custom duties forreturnees, and, often, encouraging through tax breaks what theChinese call a dumbbell or dual career structure, where returneescan pursue a career in the country of origin in parallel to their careerin the diaspora;

Finally, none of these programmes encourage involvement ingovernment core functions, and they focus on technical, scientific,commercial, and planning & development issues.

The data from both international and national programmeshighlights several conclusions that emerge throughout this report:

Short-term returnees are unlikely to be employed in core governmentfunctions. We believe that this is because core government functionseven in non-fragile states are inherently political and, as a result,returnees are probably discouraged covertly or overtly, and for manyreasons, from being appointed in such positions.

Short-term programmes may induce volunteers to return permanently tothe country of origin, though even these numbers are not great (21%of volunteers stayed on in Palestine after volunteering [Hanafi 2008];35% stayed on in the Philippines [Siar 2008]).

What appear to be the most successful programmes include arecognition by the country of origin that returnees, are unlikely to stay

permanently, even if (as in China, India and the Philippines) they are

offered tax concessions and other inducements. The most successful strategy (here too, based on internal evidence rather

than external evaluation, so the conclusion is limited in its validity),in terms of harvesting the skills and abilities of diaspora experts,appears to be providing diaspora experts with the opportunity tocontribute to the homeland while pursuing a career in the diaspora.

More attention needs to be paid to self-returnees, as a pool of talent andeducation that can be tapped for government service. Self-returnees


25/76

20

are, almost by definition, motivated to stay, and providing them withmaterial and non-material support would seem to be a cost-effectiveway of adding trained manpower to government. It must be noted,however, that such a policy is likely to have complications of its own,as for example, increased resentment among those who have not beento the diaspora.

It is an open question, which needs more research, whether the success ofthe national programmes described here is due to the fact that the

programmes have been depoliticized (among other things, that thediaspora returnees are not engaged in core (and thus contested)government functions, or whether it is due to the fact that thecountries with successful programmes have the administrative cultureand educational capacity to absorb and benefit from what thereturnees are able to provide.


26/76

21

PART 2: EMERGING LESSONS: FACTORS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN THE USEOF DIASPORAS IN FRAGILE AND POST CONFLICT COUNTRIES

Measuring success and failure

Measuring success or failure in-post critically depends on how success and failure are defined. Inall four of the countries, accession to government posts is often a political process. As a consequence,without a detailed micro-study, it is impossible to assign an objective measure of success for thework of the returnees (that is the results achieved and local capacities developed). To add to thedifficulties, in several cases, colleagues and supervisors were clearly reluctant to critically analyze theoutputs of their colleagues and even their subordinates. We therefore use two weak measures for

success here. On the one hand, we asked respondents to assess success in post. Not unnaturally, mostreturnees awarded themselves high marks (with some exceptions). Supervisors and local-hirecolleagues were far less sanguine. This is notable in the response to the question of whether thereturnees managed to enhance local skills and capacities. Overall, over half of the returneerespondents indicated that they were able to transfer skills to their colleagues. However, this response,in many cases, was somewhat doubtful, and only in two cases from Timor Leste, one fromAfghanistan, and three from Haiti was there an unambiguous positive answer to the question.

A second measure of success was the length of time in-post, and whether the respondent viewedtheir future in government. We assumed here that those who feel they are more successful aremarginally more likely to seek a career in government in order to capitalize on their investment tothe country. The results indicate that by-and-large, returnees did not feel that they were willing tocontinue in government. One personal acquaintance of the lead researcher, who had held a senior

position in the Afghan government noted wryly that the situation of infighting and general lack ofwillingness to accommodate new ideas meant that he preferred to work outside the system to try andchange it, and he had therefore left for private business, implying that a critical variable for retentionof returnees is a feeling of worth and a sustaining work environment. Two respondents from Haitiwere unambiguous about continuing their government careers: one is a career diplomat who expectsto be appointed ambassador overseas, another heads a specialized department within government, andhas not expressed interest in moving elsewhere.

We believe three factors determine whether returnees are successful at (a) performing their tasks,and (b) disseminating their skills.

1. Their personal role . That is, what social and political capital they can bring to bear on their position, as well as their position in government. Technical experts who head their owndepartments are able to make major changes and influence their surroundings within thescope of their affairs. Lower level posts are not so fortunate.

2. The returnees relation with their work colleagues . In many cases, local-hire colleaguesexpressed deep resentment of the returnees. It was often felt that they were singled out, thatthey were overpaid, that they had fled the country during difficult times. Charges ofarrogance, work culture and clannishness (among returnees) were also noted. While someindividuals noted that they had learned personally from returnees (notably from TOKTENvolunteers), systematically the results were very low.


27/76

22

3. Skill set . Very clearly, the social and professional skill sets that returnees bring to bear arecritical. Where they are perceived of experts in their fields, and where expert skills are scarce,we feel that there is more acceptance, notably in short-term return.

Proof of the ability of returnees to enhance the operation of their home governments once theyenter the system is somewhat doubtful. Meyer and Wattiaux (2006) argue strongly that the majorcritical factor in returnees ability to influence their surroundings is the networks within which they

are embedded. In such networks, an intermediary known to employer and potential employee provides information to both, serves as a guarantor of the exchange, and smoothes the transaction. Wehave no first-hand evidence of that from our own research, since, by their nature, such transactionstake place in private, and are difficult to access. 8 Nevertheless, other literature, and observationsoutside this project, on the societies concerned (Afghanistan and Sudan in particular) seems to bearthat out. We suggest tentatively, also, that more attention be paid to local managerial andadministrative culture, with the caveat that these are extremely difficult to change under anycircumstances (Eriksen, 2007; Foster, 1965; Korten and Korten, 1972). Many of our respondents fromall of the samples implied or stated that they find it extremely difficult to deal with localadministrative culture. This implies that returnees, notwithstanding their supposed familiarity withlocal culture and language are often at a disadvantage, be it because they are resented by their localcolleagues for their preferential treatment (see Haiti and Timor case studies) because they haveromanticized and unrealistic views of their country of origin, in which they have not lived for many

years (see Sorenson, 2001), because they try to apply the practices they are familiar with from thediaspora to their home surroundings, or because they have had no or little experience within theircountry of origin's government bureaucracy.

We could find no evidence that length of stay in diaspora, stated reason for leaving country oforigin (e.g. economic reasons, war, studies), or chosen country of residence were major factors insuccess. In South Sudan we did find that far diaspora (US, Australia, Europe) had greater difficultiesacclimatizing to South Sudan's harsh living conditions (heat, limited electricity and water, fewconsumer goods) than did near (Kenya, Uganda, Egypt) diaspora returnees. This is most likely

because of the disparity in living conditions between the two areas. We do find, albeit based on asmall sample from Haiti and Afghanistan, that length of assignment may well be a critical factor:

paradoxically, shorter assignments (e.g. within the TOKTEN program) imply greater influence. Toexamine that it is useful to look at the issue of social integration, which we do subsequently.

Social Integration

The resentment and lack of social ties reflects back on the ability of returnees to serve as rolemodels. In South Sudan, Haiti, and Timor Leste they are viewed as clannish, uncooperative, anduppity. Their language skills may not be as good as they ought, and as a consequence, some returnees

prefer to speak English or French, further opening themselves to accusations that they areuncomfortable with being seen as locals. And, paradoxically, their demands to change localconditions can rebound on them: returnees are often seen as people who are unable to comprehend thereality of the country of origin who make excessive demands for comfort and gadgets. Some returneesfeel at least, that they have socially integrated well, but our feeling is that this is despite thedifficulties, and probably owes much to a combination of short-term diaspora stay, and retaining

social networks in the country of origin.

Long-term return versus short-term

Since 1987, the UNDP (now UNV) has initiated short-term return of diaspora members as ameans of improving government services and developing capacity in developing states. TOKTEN

programs have been operating in over thirty countries, including in post-conflict states such as e.g.

8 Though Meyer 2001 does provide experimental evidence to support this contention.


28/76

23

Haiti and Afghanistan. The TOKTEN program is, critically, a short-term program for volunteers . Thatis (a) participants are not expected to stay in the country of origin, since they are assumed to haveestablished lives, family, and careers in the country of residence to which they have immigrated, and(b) they are only paid a maintenance allowance. Most TOKTEN programs (e.g. Lebanon; Armenia;Palestine, Pakistan) define themselves as a success. Assessing the success of TOKTEN programs isnot within the mandate of this study. However, some of our local-hires have reacted to the presence ofTOKTEN volunteers. As other returnees, they are often perceived as standoffish and arrogant.However, only two of our 130-odd respondents have noted that the TOKTEN volunteers have servedas role models, and that, on the personal level, they have been sources of new knowledge and

procedures. It is perhaps notable that given the short-term nature of the assignments, and particularlygiven the fact that TOKTEN volunteers do not fill real posts (that is, paid posts a local can contest),TOKTEN volunteers may be followed by far less resentment (though envy is undoubtedly there).Moreover, the value of TOKTEN programs appears to be particularly appreciated (at least, accordingto TOKTEN publications on national TOKTEN websites) in states that have well-established, welleducated and trained administrations. Murphy (2006) notes several countries in which, he claims,TOKTEN was a success. What characterizes all of those successful cases is a developed, well-trainedadministration, which is at a stage where it welcomes greater development and administrativeassistance.

Pushing Return

TOKTEN programs (and the similar MIDA [Migration for Development in Africa]) are based ona pull philosophy (attempting to attract diaspora residents, some of whom may choose to stay on). The

Norwegian IRRANA (Information, Return and Reintegration of Afghan Nationals to Afghanistan)was an attempt at push programs: a way to return Afghan refugees to their country of origin.Unsurprisingly, the program managed to repatriate around 270 refugees, three quarters of whom werefacing deportation in any case. The cost (we estimate some 25-30,000 NOK (= 3,000 euro) per personis not excessive, however, as Strand and his colleagues underline, few of the returnees managed tofind a place in government for any length of time. Given the relatively minuscule success of the

Norwegian push program a warning is in order. Given the difficulties developed nations face with thesocial, economic, and other absorption of migrants from conflict and developed states, there arecovert and overt motivations for the developed states to seek ways of repatriating these refugees. Asthe Norwegian governments failed effort shows, return programs are not an appropriate vehicle forrepatriating refugees. In practice, virtually all the returnees in our samples were dual nationals (or atleast had the right of abode) which they maintained by leaving elements of their families behind,displaying their country of residence passports, and otherwise demonstrating that they, while theymay be emotionally and culturally attached to their country of origin they also maintained an identity,and the corresponding legal status, associating them with their country of residence. In sum, expertreturn programs for government capacity building are poor instruments for the repatriation ofrefugee populations, and push programs are unlikely to contribute to a growth in administrativecapacity .

Fit for the purpose: The Advantages and disadvantages of diaspora hiring

Overseas hires in two of the countries studiedAfghanistan and Timor Lesteare a mix ofexpatriates and returnees. In Sudan, a large number of administration officials are returnees as amatter of course: the nature of the Sudan civil war meant that many commanders and officials usedUganda and Kenya as areas to keep their families safely, and for R&R. Some non-Sudaneseexpatriates work for the government on UN or other contracts as advisers, but do not fill formaladministrative roles. In Haiti too, there is a mix, but most of the administration is composed ofHaitians, both returnees and not. The Haitians, in contrast to the other three sample countries, do notaccept bi-nationals for government employment, which may also create limitations on the number ofHaitians returnees available for long-term government positions.


29/76

24

Local hires

In three of the countriesAfghanistan, South Sudan, and Timor Lestehigher educationfacilities virtually ceased their work during the years of violence (even if, as in the case of SouthSudan, they existed nominally). In all cases therefore, younger administrative personnel have lowerskills and administrative experience than returnees. In Haiti, where the administration was perhapsless disrupted, there may also be disparities between those who received higher education at institutesabroad, and the home-educated. Inevitably, therefore, returnees are likely to have better qualifications,

both normative (attended internationally validated institutes) and empirical (varied administrative and business experience, qualitatively better education). This however must be balanced by the fact thatlocal hires may well be much more familiar with the specific and real circumstances of th

Date post:	04-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	hatamoto
View:	221 times
Download:	0 times

Diasporas in Post-conflict Countries

Documents