Umali vs. Estanislao May 29, 1992

Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting the basic and additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold level). The said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the CIR promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.

Issue: Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its publication in “Malaya”), whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.

Ratio: The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more often than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels.

The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do so. The poverty threshold level refers to the level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress. The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers.

Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall have become effective. These exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 are not available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid (The law does not state retroactive application). The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income received during 1992 because it would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993. The implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval”.

The revenue regulation should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991. Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have already paid are entitled to refunds or credits.

Balatbat v. CAFacts:

A parcel of land was acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their conjugal union. Maria died on August 28, 1966. On June 15, 1977, Aurelio filed a case for partition. The trial court held that Aurelio is entitled to the ½ portion at his share in the conjugal property, and 1/5 of the other half which formed part of Maria’s estate, divided equally among him at his 4 children. The decision having become final and executory, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a transfer certificate of title on October 5, 1979 according to the ruling of the court. On April 1, 1980, Aurelio sold his 6/10 share to spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan, as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. On June 21, 1980, Aurora caused the annotation of her affidavit of adverse claim. On August 20, 1980, Aurelio filed a complaint for rescission of contract grounded on the buyers’ failure to pay the balance of the purchase price. On February 4, 1982, another deed of absolute sale was executed between Aurelio and his children, and herein petitioner Clara Balatbat, involving the entire lot. Balatbat filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was granted by the court on September 20, 1982, subject to valid rights and interests of third persons. Balatbat filed a motion to intervene in the rescission case, but did not file her complaint in intervention. The court ruled that the sale between Aurelio and Aurora is valid.

Issues:

(1) Whether the alleged sale to private respondents was merely executory

(2) Whether there was double sale

(3) Whether petitioner is a buyer in good faith and for value

Held:

(1) Contrary to petitioner's contention that the sale dated April 1, 1980 in favor of private respondents Repuyan was merely executory for the reason that there was no delivery of the subject property and that consideration/price was not fully paid, we find the sale as consummated, hence, valid and enforceable. The Court dismissed vendor's Aurelio Roque complaint for rescission of the deed of sale and declared that the Sale dated April 1, 1980, as valid and enforceable. No appeal having been made, the decision became final and executory.

The execution of the public instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from the vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same.In the instant case, vendor Roque delivered the owner's certificate of title to herein private respondent. The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties. Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.

(2) Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980. Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque (6/10) and his children (4/10), represented by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on February 4, 1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.

Evidently, private respondents Repuyan's caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property on July 21, 1980. The annotation of the adverse claim in the Registry of Property is sufficient compliance as mandated by law and serves notice to the whole world. On the other hand, petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens only on February 2, 1982. Accordingly, private respondents who first caused the annotation of the adverse claim in good faith shall have a better right over herein petitioner. As between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor, has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property. Further, even in default of the first registrant or first in possession, private respondents have presented the oldest title. Thus, private respondents who acquired the subject property in good faith and for valuable consideration established a superior right as against the petitioner.

(3) Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. If petitioner did investigate before buying the land on February 4, 1982, she should have known that there was a pending case and an annotation of adverse claim was made in the title of the property before the Register of Deeds and she could have discovered that the subject property was already sold to the private respondents. It is incumbent upon the vendee of the property to ask for the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of the title from the vendor. One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs.

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc., vs. Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association was organized on February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), as the sole homeowners' organization in the said subdivision. For unknown reasons, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.

In July, 1989, when Soliven, the developer and president of LGVHAI inquired about the status of the corporation, the head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed the former that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved because, among other reasons, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code.

Issue: May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution?

Held: No.The records of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 suggest that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on time was never the intention of the legislature. Moreover, the law itself provides the answer to the issue propounded by petitioner.

Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence of Section 46 of the Corporation Code.

There can also be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright "demise" of corporate existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and remedy the same.

JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commision and Ulpiano L. Delos SantosG.R. No. 109835, November 2, 1993

Facts:

            NLRC dismissed JMM Promotions and Management, Inc.’s appeal in the ground of failure to post the require appeal bond un accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code and Rule VI Section 6 of the new rules of procedure of the NLRC, which provides:

Article 223. In a case of a judgment involving monetary award, an appeal of the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from

Section 6. Bond – In case the decision of a labor arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the commission or Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award

            The petitioner insists that the appeal bond is not necessary for it already paid a license fee of P30,000.00, a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P50,000.00 as required under section 4, rule II, book II of the POEA Rules. Also, the petitioner paid P200,000.00 in compliance with section 17, rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, as escrow.

Issue:

            Whether or not petitioner is required to post an appeal bond?

Held:

            YES, the rules are clear, in interpretating a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect.            In addition to the amount paid by the petitioner, an appeal in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision provided.            In Statutory Construction, construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of harmonious whole. We find that section 6 compliments section 4 and section 17.

Land Titles: Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals; July 5, 1996Facts:

The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.

The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985.

Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.

Issue:Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.

Decision:The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion:

“Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verifiedpetition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.”

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such

that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.

Garcia vs. COMELEC and Osmena, G.R. 170256, January 25, 2010

In this case, AG himself averred that the advertisement in question was paid for by the organization named “Friends of AG”. This advertisement may be considered as a donation to AG under Section 4 of R.A. 9006 which explicitly requires that it shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate, which written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the COMELEC. Since the advertisement was published there arises a presumption that there was written acceptance by AG of the said advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Hence there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that he participated in the act complained of.

Probable cause does not mean actual or positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. It does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

The requirement for a written acceptance by a candidate of donated advertisements is a safeguard provided by law against the danger of publishing or broadcasting election propaganda beyond the required frequency, size and other limitations imposed by law without the candidates’ express agreement since the violation thereof results in the prosecution of the candidate for an election offense punishable by Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Fair Elections Act (Section 6, R.A. 9006) requiring that print advertisements shall not exceed page in a broad sheet and page in a tabloid and that the same shall be published only thrice a week per newspaper, magazine or other publication during the campaign period. Also involved is Section 4 which requires that any published or printed political matter shall be identified by legible words “political advertisement paid by” followed by the true and correct name and address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was printed and that if it is donated, it shall not be published without the written acceptance by said candidate.

Hence the Information already filed in the Regional Trial Court must be allowed to take its due course.

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez GR L-41631, 17 December 1976 En Banc, Martin (J): 7 concur, 1 concur with qualification, 1 reserved vote

Facts:

In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof.The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others the non-compliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The respondent alleged that only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code

Issue:

(- Whether the publication requirement was complied with.-) (The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval.)

Held:

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments.Section 17 of the Charter speaks of “ordinance” in general. Whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular.While the Charter requires publication, before the enactment of the ordinance and after approval thereof, in two daily newspapers of the general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government.Being a general law with a special provision applicable in the case, the Local Tax Code prevails. Decision: the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila, dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted. No costs

AZARCON VS SANDIGANBAYANGR NO. 116033 February 26, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned andoperated am earth-moving business, whoseservices were contracted by the Paper IndustriesCorporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at itsconcession. Jaime Ancla was a sub-contractor of the petitioners business who left his trucks at thepremises of the latter. On May 25, 1983, a Warrantof Distraint of Personal Property was issued by theBIR to Ancla a delinquent taxpayer. Azarcon onthe other hand was issued a Warrant of Garnishment, ordering him to transfer, surrenderor remit to BIR the property of Ancla which were inhis possession. He singed a receipt and assumedthe responsibility of safe-keeping the properties of Ancla. However, Ancla took the said propertieswhich were at the premises of the petitioner, thelatter claiming that the propert was surreptitiouslywithdrawn from his custody.Later on, Azarcon, together with his co-accused Ancla were charged before theSandiganbayan with a crime of malversation of public funds or property under Arrt. 217 in relationto Art.222 of the RPC. Such was based on thereport of the Revenue Document Processor of of Revenue Region 10 B suggesting that if the reportof the surreptitious taken were true, a warrant of garnishment be reissued until such time as Anclastax liabilities are deemed satisfied.

ISSUE:1.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of thecontroversy.2.

Whether or not petitioner can beconsidered a public officer, be reason of hisbeing designated by the BIR as depositary of distrained property

.HELD:1.

NO. Sec. 4 of PD 1606 unequivocally specifythe only instances when the Sandiganbayanwill have jurisdiction over a privateindividual,

i.e., when the complaint chargesa private individual as a co-principal,accomplice of accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime withinits jurisdiction.

Unless otherwise it is proventhat Azarcon falls under such conditionstated hereto, the Sandiganbayan will haveno jurisdiction over the crime chargedagainst him.2.

NO. granting arguendo that the petitionercommenced to take part in the activityconstituting public functions , he may notbe deemed authorized by popular election.BIRs power to authorizing a privateindividual to act as a depositary cannot bestretched to include the power to appointhim as public officer. The court findspetitioner

Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Ancla to be private individuals both erroneously charged before and convictedby the Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them.

GREGO v. COMELECG.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997FACTS:

On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff bythe Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodgedby Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in theSecond District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and,accordingly, assumed office.After his term, he sought reelection in the 1992 election. He again won.However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate forcouncilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman andin the DILG. In 1995, Basco ran again for councilor.William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II,City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco'sdisqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. The Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the SecondDistrict of Manila.In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul theillegal proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling thatthe administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condonedby the electorate who elected him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applyretroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1,1992

HELD: NOPetitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992,Section 40 (b) must

nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco'sdismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of thelaw as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of thecandidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from officedue to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to theeffectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe topetitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to departtherefrom.Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to passretroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriouslyvested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended tohave a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent isexpressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of theenactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that thesame operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the LocalGovernment Code is not applicable to the present case."

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELECG.R. No.119976September 18, 1995Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formalcomplaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on thecomplaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3,

paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of AmityTrading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets andLiabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

Balatbat v. CAFacts:

A parcel of land was acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their conjugal union. Maria died on August 28, 1966. On June 15, 1977, Aurelio filed a case for partition. The trial court held that Aurelio is entitled to the ½ portion at his share in the conjugal property, and 1/5 of the other half which formed part of Maria’s estate, divided equally among him at his 4 children. The decision having become final and executory, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a transfer certificate of title on October 5, 1979 according to the ruling of the court. On April 1, 1980, Aurelio sold his 6/10 share to spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan, as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. On June 21, 1980, Aurora caused the annotation of her affidavit of adverse claim. On August 20, 1980, Aurelio filed a complaint for rescission of contract grounded on the buyers’ failure to pay the balance of the purchase price. On February 4, 1982, another deed of absolute sale was executed between Aurelio and his children, and herein petitioner Clara Balatbat, involving the entire lot. Balatbat filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was granted by the court on September 20, 1982, subject to valid rights and interests of third persons. Balatbat filed a motion to intervene in the rescission case, but did not file her complaint in intervention. The court ruled that the sale between Aurelio and Aurora is valid.

Issues:

(1) Whether the alleged sale to private respondents was merely executory

(2) Whether there was double sale

(3) Whether petitioner is a buyer in good faith and for value

Held:

(1) Contrary to petitioner's contention that the sale dated April 1, 1980 in favor of private respondents Repuyan was merely executory for the reason that there was no delivery of the subject property and that consideration/price was not fully paid, we find the sale as consummated, hence, valid and enforceable. The Court dismissed vendor's Aurelio Roque complaint for rescission of the deed of sale and declared that the Sale dated April 1, 1980, as

valid and enforceable. No appeal having been made, the decision became final and executory.

The execution of the public instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from the vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same.In the instant case, vendor Roque delivered the owner's certificate of title to herein private respondent. The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties. Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.

(2) Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980. Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque (6/10) and his children (4/10), represented by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on February 4, 1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.

Evidently, private respondents Repuyan's caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property on July 21, 1980. The annotation of the adverse claim in the Registry of Property is sufficient compliance as mandated by law and serves notice to the whole world. On the other hand, petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens only on February 2, 1982. Accordingly, private respondents who first caused the annotation of the adverse claim in good faith shall have a better right over herein petitioner. As between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor, has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property. Further, even in default of the first registrant or first in possession, private respondents have presented the oldest title. Thus, private respondents who acquired the subject property in good faith and for valuable consideration established a superior right as against the petitioner.

(3) Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. If petitioner did investigate before buying the land on February 4, 1982, she should have known that there was a pending case and an annotation of adverse claim was made in the title of the property before the Register of Deeds and she could have discovered that the subject property was already sold to the private respondents. It is incumbent upon the vendee of the property to ask for the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of the title from the vendor. One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs.

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC [174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989]

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.

Rufino Nuňez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines

“Equal Protection” – Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuňez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the

Sandoganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-

accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuňez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, 

equal protection, and ex post facto  clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuňez’s

right to equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal

likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one

chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are

entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter

to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuňez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original

jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of

the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied,

namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been

aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused

therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of

the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be based on substantial

distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing

conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached

by a unanimous decision from 3 justices -  a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other

trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or

agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts – first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and

malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the

decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal – to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the

Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.

Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by

one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by

two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC

through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and

not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft

and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater

guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court’s judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can

appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and

prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.

Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of

discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be

overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).

CASE DIGEST ON In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI [35 SCRA 429 (1970)]

November 10, 2010

Facts: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process rights of association, freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law

Issues:

1. WON it violates three rights?

No. It’s set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal protection of laws.

2. WON it is an ex post facto law?

No. Ex post facto law defined:

a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when done.

b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was

c. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed

d. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests

e. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of right which when done was lawful

f. deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.

Held: Petition denied. Constitutional act.

Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed after approval of law