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Digest Cases 3 and 4

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    3. Homeowners S avings an d Loan Bank versus F elonia (GR no. 189477,Feb. 26, 2014)

    FACTS:Felonia and De Guzman mortgaged a parcel of land to Delgado tosecure a loan. However, instead of a real estate mortgage, t e partiese!ecuted a deed of a"solute sale wit an option to repurc ase t usFelonia and De Guzman #led an action for reformation of instrument.

    $nspite of t e pendenc% of t e &eformation case in w ic s e was t edefendant, Delgado #led a 'etition for Consolidation of (wners ip of 'ropert% Sold wit an (ption to &epurc ase and $ssuance of a )ewCerti#cate of Title. T e &TC declared Delgado t e a"solute owner andordered t e &egistr% of Deeds to issue a new certi#cate of title in t ename of Delgado.

    Delgado mortgage t e propert% to Homeowners Savings and *oan+an -HS*+ using er newl% registered title. Felonia and De Guzmansu"se/uentl% caused t e annotation of a notice of lispendens onDelgados title. (n )ovem"er 0112, H*&+ foreclosed t e propert% andlater consolidated owners ip in its favor.

    Felonia and De Guzman instituted a complaint "efore &TC of *as 'inasfor reconve%ance of possession and owners ip of t e su"3ect propert%in t eir favor. As defendant, H*&C contended t at it was a mortgageein good fait . &TC ruled in favor of Felonia and De Guzman. CA a4rmedt e &TC decision

    $SS56: 7 et er or not HS*+ is a mortgagee and a purc aser in goodfait

    H6*D: )o. Decision of CA sustained.

    Alt oug t e doctrine of mortgagee in good fait , upon w icpetitioner relies, was clari#ed as 8"ased on t e rule t at all personsdealing wit propert% covered "% t e Torrens Certi#cate of Title, as"u%ers or mortgagees, are not re/uired to go "e%ond w at appears ont e face of t e title. $n turn, t e rule is "ased on pu"lic interest inup olding t e indefeasi"ilit% of a certi#cate of title, as evidence of lawful owners ip of t e land or of an% encum"rance t ereon.8

    $nsofar as t e HS*+ is concerned, t ere is no longer an% pu"lic interestin up olding t e indefeasi"ilit% of t e certi#cate of title of itsmortgagor, Delgado. Suc title as "een nulli#ed in a decision t at ad

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    "ecome #nal and e!ecutor%. $ts own title, derived from t e foreclosureof Delgado9s mortgage in its favor, as li ewise "een nulli#ed in t ever% same decision t at restored t e certi#cate of title in respondents9name. T ere is a"solutel% no reason t at can support t e pra%er of HS*+ to ave its mortgage lien carried over and into t e restored

    certi#cate of title of respondents.

    oreover , HS*+ utterl% failed to ta e t e necessar% precautions. Att e time t e su"3ect propert% was mortgaged, t ere was %et noannotated )otice of*is 'endens. However, at t e time HS*+ purc asedt e su"3ect propert%, t e )otice of*is 'endenswas alread% annotatedon t e title. 7 en a prospective "u%er is faced wit facts andcircumstances as to arouse is suspicion, e must ta e precautionar%steps to /ualif% as a purc aser in good fait .

    $ndeed, at t e time HS*+ "oug t t e su"3ect propert%, HS*+ ad actualnowledge of t e annotated )otice of *is 'endens. $nstead of eedingt e same, HS*+ continued wit t e purc ase nowing t e legalrepercussions a notice of lis pendens details.

    4. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC., Petitioner,vs.

    FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS AND HECTOR I. GALURA

    Facts: +onier, t en t e 'resident of petitioner corporation -'inausu an ,e!ecuted four real estate mortgages in favor of Far 6ast +an and TrustCompan% -now +'$ w ic was registered in name of 'inausu an. After'inausu an defaulted, "an commenced proceedings for t ee!tra3udicial foreclosure of t e mortgages. 'inausu an "roug t anaction for t e annulment of real estate mortgages in t e &TC, averringt at +onier ad o"tained t e loans onl% in is personal capacit% and

    ad constituted t e mortgages on t e corporate asset wit out'inausu an;s consent t roug a "oard resolution.

    T e counsels of t e parties did not appear in court on t e earingsc eduled. &TC dismissed t e case for failure to prosecute. T e orderof dismissal attained #nalit%. 'inausu an "roug t t e petition forannulment in t e CA see ing t e nulli#cation of t e order dismissingt e Civil Case salleging t at its counsel ad "een guilt% of gross andpalpa"le negligence in failing to eep trac of t e case e was andlingamounting to e!trinsic fraud. CA dismissed t e petition for annulment.

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    $ssues: -a 7() counsel;s failure to apprise 'inausu an of t edevelopments in t e case constitutes e!trinsic fraud.

    -" 7() it is t e CA t at as 3urisdiction over an action to annul t e

    3udgment.

    Held:

    -a T e allegations do not spea of t e e!trinsic fraud contemplated "%&ule 1 -?udiciar%

    &eorganization Act of 01@ . Among several innovations of t islegislative enactment was t e formal esta"lis ment of t e annulmentof a 3udgment or #nal order as an action independent from t e genericclassi#cation of litigations in w ic t e su"3ect matter was not capa"leof pecuniar% estimation, and e!pressl% vested t e e!clusive original

    3urisdiction over suc action in t e CA. T e action in w ic t e su"3ectof t e litigation was incapa"le of pecuniar% estimation continued to "eunder t e e!clusive original 3urisdiction of t e &TC, w ic replaced t eCF$ as t e court of general 3urisdiction. Since t en, t e &TC no longer

    ad 3urisdiction over an action to annul t e 3udgment of t e &TC,eliminating all concerns a"out 3udicial sta"ilit%. To implement t is

    c ange, t e Court introduced a new procedure to govern t e action toannul t e 3udgment of t e &TC in t e 0112 revision of t e &ules of Court under &ule t ereof t at t e annulmentma% "e "ased onl% on t e grounds of e!trinsic fraud and lac of

    3urisdiction.

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    5G.R. No. 199595 April 2, 2014PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION,INC., 'etitioner,vs.

    TEO ORO R. !ANGCO 2N AN "R GENERATION HEIRS#OUN ATION, INC., &espondent.

    Facts:' ilant ropist Teodoro &. Bangco -Bangco donated on a% 01, 01 < a01.'7CT5$;s corporate term e!pired in Septem"er 0121. 00 Five %earst ereafter, using t e same corporate name, '7CT5$ o"tained S6C&egistration )o. 0>> @@ 0> and fort wit applied for t e issuance of anew owner;s duplicate cop% of TCT )o. > 12 over t e su"3ect propert%t ru *&C Case )o. >>2 >. T e application was granted and '7CT5$was issued a new TCT )o. > 12 T=>>2 > 0 w ic , owever, "ore onl%t e #rst condition imposed on t e donation.

    &ecounting t e foregoing episodes, T&B Foundation claimed t at t ee!piration of '7CT5$;s corporate term in 0121 eEectivel% rescindedt e donation pursuant to t e 8unwritten resolutor% condition8 deemedwritten "% Article 0 0J of t e Civil Code 0< prescri"ing t at t eCorporation Code, speci#call% Section 0>> 0J t ereof, "e read into t edonation.+eing comprised of t e eirs of t e donor, T&B Foundation claimed t atit is entitled to petition for t e issuance of a new title in t eir name

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    pursuant to Section 0 @ of 'residential Decree -'.D. )o. 0J>1. 0K T&BFoundation pra%ed for t e issuance of a new title in its name after t ecancellation of '7CT5$;s TCT )o. > 12 T=>>2 >.'7CT5$ opposed t e petition.&TC denied t e (pposition 0@ of '7CT5$. According to t e trial court,

    w en t e corporate life of '7CT5$ e!pired in 0121, t e propert%ceased to "e used for t e purpose for w ic it was intended, ence, itautomaticall% reverted to Bangco. As suc , T&B Foundation, "eingcomposed of is eirs, is considered 8ot er person in interest8 underSection 0 @ of '.D. )o. 0J>1 wit a rig t to #le a petition for t eissuance of title over t e propert%.

    T e &TC granted T&B Foundation;s petition "% ordering t e cancellationof '7CT5$;s TCT )o. > 12 T=>>2 > and t e issuance of a new title int e name of T&B Foundation. '7CT5$ appealed t e decision "ut CAdenied t e appeal and t e assailed decision was a4rmed in toto.

    $ssue:7() t e 3udgment was proper.

    &uling:t e &TC, acting as a land registration court, ad no 3urisdiction over t eactual su"3ect matter contained in T&B Foundation;s petition forissuance of a new title. T&B Foundation cannot use t e summar%proceedings in Section 0 @ of '.D. )o. 0J>1 to rescind a contract of donation as suc action s ould "e t res ed out in ordinar% civilproceedings. $n t e same vein, t e &TC ad no 3urisdiction to declaret e donation annulled and as a result t ereof, order t e register of

    deeds to cancel '7CT5$;s TCT )o. > 12 T=>>2 > and issue a new onein favor of T&B Foundation.

    T e &TC, acting as a land registration court, s ould ave dismissed t eland registration case or re=doc eted t e same as an ordinar% civilaction and t ereafter ordered compliance wit stricter 3urisdictionalre/uirements. Since t e &TC ad no 3urisdiction over t e action forrevocation of donation disguised as a land registration case, t e

    3udgment in *&C Case )o. =0@0>K- < is null and void. +eing void, itcannot "e t e source of an% rig t or t e creator of an% o"ligation. $tcan never "ecome #nal and an% writ of e!ecution "ased on it isli ewise void.

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    0@0>K- < , CA=G.&. CL )o. 1 2K and G.&. )o. 01 01 are ere"%A))5**6D and S6T AS$D6.

    T e &egister of Deeds of uezon Cit% is ere"% (&D6&6D to CA)C6*an% Transfer Certi#cate of Title issued in t e name of Teodoro &. Bangco>nd and rd Generation Heirs Foundation, $nc. as a conse/uence of t e

    e!ecution of t e disposition in *&C Case )o. =0@0>K- < , and to&6$)STAT6 Transfer Certi#cate of Title )o. > 12 T=>>2 > in t e nameof ' ilippine 7oman;s C ristian Temperance 5nion, $nc.

    KG.R. No. 1$290$ A%&% ( ), 2014HEIRS O# #RANCISCO I. NAR*ASA, SR., + - HEIRS O# PETRAIM ORNAL + - PE RO #ERRER, r/pr/ / (/- ( /ir A((or / 3i 3#+ (, MRS. REME IOS . NAR*ASA3REGACHO, 'etitioners,

    vs.EMILIANA, *ICTORIANO, #ELIPE, MA TEO, RA!MUN O, MARIA,+ - E UAR O, +ll %r + /- IM ORNAL, &espondents.

    Facts:+asilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sa"angan, 'angasinan w ics e conve%ed to er t ree - daug ters +al"ina, Ale3andra, andCatalina -$m"ornal sisters sometime in 01> .

    eanw ile, Catalina;s us"and, Ciriaco A"rio -Ciriaco , applied for andwas granted a omestead patent over a 0, K2=s/. m. riparian land

    - ot erland ad3acent to t e Ca%anga &iver in San Fa"ian,'angasinan. 0< He was eventuall% awarded Homestead 'atent )o.>

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    portion. 01 (n )ovem"er 0 , 012@, (CT )o. >02,01@< anAmended Complaint > for reconve%ance, partition, and or damages

    against respondents, doc eted as Civil Case )o. D=K12@. T e%anc ored t eir claim on t e allegation t at Ciriaco, wit t e elp of iswife Catalina, urged +al"ina and Ale3andra to sell t e Sa"anganpropert%.

    *i ewise, Francisco, et al. alleged t at t roug deceit, fraud, false ood,and misrepresentation, respondent Lictoriano, wit respect to t e FirstAccretion, and t e respondents collectivel%, wit regard to t e SecondAccretion, ad illegall% registered t e said accretions in t eir names,notwit standing t e fact t at t e% were not t e riparian owners -ast e% did not own t e ot erland to w ic t e accretions merel%

    formed ad3acent to . $n t is relation, Francisco, et al. e!plained t att e% did not assert t eir in eritance claims over t e ot erland andt e two -> accretions "ecause t e% respected respondents; rig ts,until t e% discovered in 01@ t at respondents ave repudiated t eir-Francisco, et al.;s s ares t ereon. >> T us, "ewailing t at respondents

    ave refused t em t eir rig ts not onl% wit respect to t e ot erland,"ut also to t e su"se/uent accretions, Francisco, et al. pra%ed for t ereconve%ance of said properties, or, in t e alternative, t e pa%ment of t eir value, as well as t e award of moral damages in t e amountof '0 , . , actual damages in t e amount of '0J , . ,including attorne%;s fees and ot er costs. >

    (n August > , 011K, t e &TC rendered a Decision>K

    in favor of Francisco, et al. and t ere"% directed respondents to: -a reconve% toFrancisco, et al. t eir respective portions in t e ot erland and in t eaccretions t ereon, or t eir pecuniar% e/uivalent and -" pa% actualdamages in t e amount of '0 , . , moral damages in t e amountof'0 , . , and attorne%;s fees in t e sum of '0 , . , as wellas costs of suit.(n )ovem"er >@, > K, t e CA rendered a Decision >1 reversing andsetting aside t e &TC Decision and entering a new one declaring: -at e descendants of Ciriaco as t e e!clusive owners of t e ot erland-" t e descendants of respondent Lictoriano ast e e!clusive owners of

    t e First Accretion and -c t e descendants of 'a"lo -i.e., respondentscollectivel% as t e e!clusive owners of t e Second Accretion.At odds wit t e CA;s disposition, Francisco et al. #led a motion forreconsideration w ic was, owever denied "% t e CA in a&esolution J dated a% 2, > @, ence, t is petition ta en "% t elatter;s eirs as t eir successors=in=interest.

    $ssues:

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    -a 7() t e descendants of Ciriaco are t e e!clusive owners of t eot erland -" 7() t e descendants of respondent Lictoriano are t e

    e!clusive owners of t e First Accretion and-c 7() t e descendants of 'a"lo -respondents collectivel% are t ee!clusive owners of t e Second Accretion on t e "asis of t e following

    grounds:-0 prescription of t e reconve%ance action, w ic was dul% raised asan a4rmative defense in t e Amended Answer, and-> t e e!istence of an implied trust "etween t e $m"ornal sisters andCiriaco.

    &uling: T e petition is "ereft of merit.A. 'rocedural atter: $ssue of 'rescription.At t e outset, t e Court #nds t at t e causes of action pertaining tot e ot erland and t e First Accretion are "arred "% prescription.

    To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co=owners ip over t eot erland, alleging t at Ciriaco agreed to old t e same in trust fort eir predecessors=in=interest Ale3andra and +al"ina upon issuance oft e title in is name. *i ewise, t e% alleged t at respondents ac/uiredt e First and Second Accretions "% means of fraud and deceit.

    7 en propert% is registered in anot er;s name, an implied orconstructive trust is created "% law in favor of t e true owner.

    An action for reconve%ance "ased on an implied trust prescri"es in 0%ears. T e reference point of t e 0 =%earprescriptive period is t e date

    of registration of t e deed or t e issuance of t e title. T e prescriptiveperiod applies onl% if t ere is an actual need to reconve% t e propert%as w en t e plaintiE is not in possession of t e propert%. However, ift e plaintiE, as t e real owner of t e propert% also remains inpossession of t e propert%, t e prescriptive period to recover title andpossession of t e propert% does not run against im.

    +ased on t e foregoing, Francisco, et al. ad t en a period of ten -0%ears from t e registration of t e respective titles covering t edisputed properties wit in w ic to #le t eir action for reconve%ance,ta ing into account t e fact t at t e% were never in possession of t e

    said properties. Hence, wit respect tot e ot erland covered "% (CT)o. 0 issued on Decem"er J, 01 in t e name of Ciriaco, an actionfor reconve%ance t erefor s ould ave "een #led until Decem"er J,01< wit respect to t e First Accretion covered "% (CT )o. '= 0@issued on August 0J, 01J> in t e name of respondent Lictoriano, anaction of t e same nature s ould ave "een #led until August 0J,01K> and, #nall%, wit respect to t e Second Accretion covered "%(CT )o. >0

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    respondents, a suit for reconve%ance t erefor s ould ave "een #leduntil )ovem"er 0 , 01@@.

    A 3udicious perusal of t e records, owever, will s ow t at t eAmended Complaint covering all t ree - disputed properties was

    #led onl% on Fe"ruar% >2, 01@

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    automaticall% "elongs to t e owner of t e estate to w ic it ma% ave"een added. T e onl% restriction provided for "% law is t at t e ownerof t e ad3oining propert% must register t e same under t e Torrenss%stem ot erwise, t e alluvial propert% ma% "e su"3ect to ac/uisitiont roug prescription "% t ird persons. J

    $n t is case, Francisco, et al. and, now, t eir eirs, i.e., ereinpetitioners are not t e riparian owners of t e ot erland to w ic t eFirst Accretion ad attac ed, ence, t e% cannot assert owners ip overt e First Accretion. Conse/uentl%, as t e Second Accretion ad merel%attac ed to t e First Accretion, t e% also ave no rig t over t e SecondAccretion. )eit er were t e% a"le to s ow t at t e% ac/uired t eseproperties t roug prescription as it was Mnot esta"lis ed t at t e%were in possession of an% of t em. T erefore, w et er t rougaccretion or, independentl%, t roug prescription, t e discerni"leconclusion is t at Francisco et al. and or petitioners9 claim of title overt e First and Second Accretions ad not "een su"stantiated, and, as a

    result, said properties cannot "e reconve%ed in t eir favor. T is isespeciall% so since on t e ot er end of t e fra% lie respondents armedwit a certi#cate of title in t eir names covering t e First and SecondAccretions coupled wit t eir possession t ereof, "ot of w ic giverise to t e superior credi"ilit% of t eir own claim. Hence, petitioners9action for reconve%ance wit respect to "ot accretions mustaltoget er fail.

    7H6&6F(&6, t e petition is D6)$6D.

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    11.

    G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT ,Petitioner , v. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT , Respondent . D EC I S I ONDEL CASTILLO, J.:

    This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks t o set aside the February 1 4,

    2012 Decision2

    of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954affirming with modication the May 2 6, 2003 Decision 3 of the Regional TrialCourt of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10 in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as wellas i ts J uly 2 6, 2012 Resolution 4 denying petitioner’s M otion forReconsideration 5 of the herein assailed judgment.

    Factual Antecedents

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    Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat (Wenifreda) were m arried

    on September 16, 1965. 6 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several

    real properties, including a 700-

    square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose delMonte, Bulacan (the subject

    property), 7 which was bought on November 17, 1991. 8 The deed of saleover the said property was si gned by Adriano alone as ve ndee; one of thesigning witnesses to the deed of sale was p etitioner

    Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who signed therein as “RosarioBanguis.” 9 When Transfer

    Certicate of Title No. T-145321(M) (TCT T-145321) covering the subjectproperty was issued, however,

    it was made under the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married toROSARIO E. BANGUIS.” 10

    All this t ime, petitioner Banguis r emained married to Eduardo Nolasco(Nolasco). They were married on

    October 15, 1975, and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was a live,and his marriage to petitioner

    subsisted a nd was ne ver annulled. 11

    On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate. 12

    On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda led a Petition for Cancellation13

    of TCT T-145321, which was do cketed as LRC Case N o. P-443-99 and assigned toBranch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos R TC).

    She alleged therein that she was t he surviving spouse of Adriano; that TCTT-145321

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    was e rroneously registered and made in the name o f “ADRIANO M.TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.

    BANGUIS

    ;” that

    per annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis w as st ill married to Nolasco; thatBanguis co uld

    not have been married to Adriano;

    that the issuance of the title in Banguis’s n ame as Adriano’s sp ouse wasdue to “an insidious m achination by her and the person who brokered thesale of the subject

    property, allegedly a cousin or relative of hers;” 14 and that consequently,she suffe red damages. Thus,

    Wenifreda prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled; that a new certicate oftitle be made out in Adriano’s

    name, with her as t he spouse indicated;

    that Banguis b e ordered to surrender her copy o f TCT T-145321; and thatmoral and exemplary d amages, attorney’s f ees, and costs o f litigation beadjudged in her favor.

    In her Opposition 15 to the petition for cancellation,

    Banguis d enied specically that the subject property

    was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda

    during their marriage. alone bought the subject property u sing her personalfunds; that

    that on the other hand, she

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    that their union produced a son, who was b orn on April 1, 1990; that thetrial court has n o jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation,

    which is m erely a summary proceeding – c onsidering that a thorough

    determination will have to be made as t o whether the property is co njugalor exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rightswill be adversely affected by a ny judgment in the case; and that Wenifredais g uilty of forum- shopping in ling LRC Case No. P-443-99, consideringthat a prior similar case was a lready led by h er and dismissed on April 22,1999 by Branch 76 of the Malolos R TC. Banguis p rayed for the dismissal ofLRC Case No. P-443-99 and to be paid moral damages a nd attorney’s feesby w ay of counterclaim.

    During the course of the proceedings, the parties presented the followingevidence, among others:

    She claimed

    September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a married couple;

    she and Adriano were m arried on

    1.Marriage Contract of Adriano and Wenifreda; 16

    2.Publication of Adriano’s d eath; 17

    3.Social Security S ystem (SSS) data record of Adriano indicating that Wenifreda is h is s pou

    4.Barangay Council Certicate indicating that Adriano and Wenifreda were legally m arried aPhase V, Pilar Village, Las P iñas C ity si nce 1981; 19

    5.Marriage Contract of Banguis a nd Nolasco dated October 15, 1975; 20

    6.Banguis’s S SS Member’s D ata Change or Addition Report indicating that Banguis: a) souBanguis” to “Rosario B. Nolasco”; b) listed Nolasco as h er husband; and c ) changed

    7.Banguis’s cor respondence at work – O cean East Agency C orporation (Ocean East), whic

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    which she signed as “Rosario B. Nolasco;” 22

    8.Banguis’s r ésumé on le with Ocean East, reecting that she was m arried; 23

    9.Negative Certication of Marriage issued by t he Civil Registrar of Bulacan to the effect tha of Adriano and Banguis’s m arriage which was supposedly sol emnized on September

    10. Certication dated April 17, 2002 issued by R ev. Fr. Narciso Sampana, Parish Priestparish never had a parish priest by the name of Fr. Roberto de Guzman – who is cl aimarriage b etween Adriano a nd Banguis; 25

    11. Banguis’s testimony on direct examination that she and Adriano were m arried on SepAdrian; that Adriano purchased the subject property o n November 17, 1991 per Deed

    Adriano as the purchaser – entered as “ Document No. 173; Page No. 3550; series ofTubig; that she paid for the same with her own money; and that she stayed at the subjnight; 26

    12. Banguis’s t estimony on cross-examination that she is m arried to Nolasco, who is st illsubsisting and has n ot been annulled; and that she knew that Adriano was m arried to

    13. Photographs depicting Adriano and Banguis a s a couple and with a child, supposedly

    On May 2 6, 2003, the Malolos R TC rendered its D ecision, decreeing thus:

    WHEREFORE, premises con sidered, judgment is he reby RENDERED in favor of the petitio

    1.Directing the Register of Deeds o f Meycauayan, Bulacan to cancel TCTNo. T-145321 (M) and in lieu thereof to issue a new certicate of titlein the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda “Winnie”Balcom Tambuyat;

    2.Directing the defendant Rosario Banguis N olasco of 1714 Ibarra St.,Sampaloc, Manila to surrender to the Register of Deeds f orMeycauayan, Bulacan, the owner’s d uplicate copy o f TCT

    No. T-145321 (M) within ve (5) days from receipt of the order, failing which

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    the Register of Deeds s hould proceed with the cancellation of said TCT.

    3.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis N olasco to pay petitioner the sumof P100,000.00 as a nd by way of moral damages.

    4.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis N olasco to pay petitioner the sumof P100,000.00 as an d by way of exemplary damages; and

    5.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis N olasco to pay p etitioner attorney’sfees i n the amount of P100,000.00, and the cost of suit.

    Accordingly, the counterclaim of the oppositor is h ereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO O

    In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court held among others t hat under SectioRegistration Act – now Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) or the Propeauthorization is r equired for any alteration or amendment of a certicate of title when any errentering a certicate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certicate, or when tamendment or alteration of the title; that it has b een established that Wenifreda is t he survivproperty was a cquired during their marriage, but it was e rroneously registered in the namemarriage with Nolasco when TCT T-145321 was issued with her being erroneously includedspouse; that Adrian’s l iation may not be proved collaterally through LRC Case No. P-443-9moral and exemplary damages without proof of pecuniary loss, for the damage caused upoby the wanton, fraudulent, malicious and unwarranted inclusion of Banguis’s name in the titlattorney’s f ees a s s he was c ompelled to litigate and incur expenses t o protect her interests

    Ruling of the Court of Appeals

    Petitioner appealed the trial court’s D ecision with the CA. Docketed as C A-G.R. CV No. 849thesis that the trial court erred in applying Section 108 of PD 1529; that with the serious objthat she is t he actual owner and possessor of the subject property, a proper action in a diffeshould be led, rather than in the current trial court which sits merely as a land registration c148 of the Family Code 31 which provides f or the division of properties a cquired by individualcourt erred in awarding damages, attorney’s f ees a nd costs o f suit; that the trial court erred idespite the absence of any good or special reasons; and that the denial of her counterclaim

    Meanwhile, on October 30, 2003, Wenifreda m oved for execution pending a ppeal. It appear

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    Banguis failed to oppose the motion; she did n ot appear during the scheduled hearings o n tissued a March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Such writ was145321 was ca ncelled, and a new title – TCT T-433713(M) – was issued in its p lace.

    On February 1 4, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decreta

    WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 26,Branch 10 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED with the modication that the award of moral acost of the suit in favor of Wenifreda Tambuyat is h ereby d eleted.

    SO ORDERED. 33

    The CA sustained the trial court’s a pplication of Section 108 of PD 1529, noting that Bangui

    error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda – and not Banguisa valid and subsisting marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to suin the trial court; and that Banguis’s opposition to Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCplace the latter’s title to the subject property in doubt. 34

    The CA added that contrary to Banguis’s p osition, a separate and different proceeding is n opetition in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as: 1) she in effect acquiesced and freely su bmitted hercomplete determination, submitting all her relevant documentary a nd other evidence to theparticularly that she is the lawful spouse of Adriano and that she is the actual owner and po

    property; and 2) pursuant to law 35 and jurisprudence, 36 the distinction between the trial courtcourt of general jurisdiction has b een eliminated with the passage of PD 1529. It held furtheAdriano and Banguis a re not co-owners o f the subject property a s i t has b een shown that: amarriages w hen they c onducted their adulterous r elations; b) Banguis f ailed to present evencontributed to the purchase of the subject property; and c) the deed of sale itself indicated tdenying Wenifreda’s pecuniary awards a nd Banguis’s c ounterclaim, the CA held that the parlegal and factual basis to grant them.

    Banguis m oved for reconsideration, but in a July 26, 2012 Resolution, the CA was u nconvin

    Issues

    Banguis c ites t he following issues f or resolution:

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    I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THERTC WHICH CANCELLED AND CORRECTED THE QUESTIONEDENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) FROM “ROSARIO E. BANGUIS” TO“WENIFREDA ‘WINNIE’ BALCOM TAMBUYAT” UNDER SECTION 108 OF

    THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE DESPITE THE LACK OFJURISDICTION TO HEAR THE SAME IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS ANDWEIGHTY OBJECTIONS OF THE PETITIONER AND THAT THEINSTITUTION OF ESTATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LATE ADRIANO M.TAMBUYAT AND THE CONSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF ANEXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR WHICH IS THE PROPER REMEDYWHO CAN GO AFTER HIS PROPERTIES HELD BY OTHER PERSONS.

    III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAININGTHE RTC WHICH CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THEQUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) IN CLEARVIOLATION OF ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDINGFOR THE SHARING OF PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY PERSONSUNITED IN A DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE.

    IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAININGTHE RTC WHICH GRANTED THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF

    ITS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEASONABLE

    II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THERTC WHICH

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    CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO.T-145321 (M)

    THROUGH AN ABSOLUTE AND COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THEPROOF OF OWNERSHIP

    AND POSSESSION BY THE PETITIONER OVER THE SUBJECTPROPERTY.

    APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER AND THE UTTER LACK OF ANY GOODOR SPECIAL REASONS JUSTIFYING THE SAME. 37

    Petitioner’s Arguments

    In her Petition and Reply 38 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailedCA dispositions and thus dismiss Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation inLRC Case No. P-443-99, Banguis insists o n her original position adoptedbelow that Section 108 of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of the contentiousand controversial nature of her opposition to the petition for cancellation,which can be threshed out only in a separate proper proceeding where thecourt sits n ot merely a s a land registration court, but as a court of general

    jurisdiction. She ci Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. Courtof Appeals ,39 Liwag v. Court of Appeals ,40 and Vda. de Arceo v. Court ofAppeals, 41 which m ade pronouncements to such e ffect.

    Banguis adds that the instant case involved the partition of Adriano’s estatewhich in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests

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    her and her son Adrian of their rights a nd interests t herein; that based onthe evidence she introduced, it should be concluded that the propertybelongs to h er as it was a cquired using s olely her own funds a nd moneyborrowed from her sister, and because she has b een in c onstantpossession thereof, introducing improvements t hereon through the years;that the subject property is o wned in common by her and Adriano since itwas a cquired during their cohabitation; and that the CA erred in refusing torule on the propriety of the trial court’s grant of execution pending appeal.

    Respondent’s Arguments

    In Wenifreda’s C omment, 42 it is s tressed that the distinction between thetrial court acting as a land registration court, on one hand, and its acting as

    a court of general jurisdiction, on the other, has b een removed with theeffectivity o f PD 1529; thus, trial courts a re no longer fettered by t heirformer limited jurisdiction which enabled them to grant relief in landregistration cases o nly w hen there is u nanimity a mong the parties, or whennone of them raises a ny a dverse claims o r serious o bjections. It is f urtherargued that Banguis’s claim of ownership cannot stand, for the evidencefails to indicate that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property,even as t he deed of sale to the property itself shows that Adriano alone is

    the vendee thereof, and Banguis si gned merely a s a witness t hereto.Finally, respondent explains t hat during the proceedings c overing themotion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, Banguis w asaccorded the opportunity to participate, but she did not; as a result, the oldtitle was ca ncelled and a new one was a ccordingly issued in its st ead.

    Our Ruling

    The Court denies the Petition.

    The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was n ot precluded from resolvingthe objections raised by B anguis i n her opposition to the petition forcancellation; a separate action need not be led in a different

    Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration,or amendment of a c erticate

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    of title may be resorted to

    (3) when any error, omission or mistake

    court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis s hould be considered to haveacquiesced and freely s ubmitted the case to the trial court for completedetermination o n h er opposition, when s he w ent to trial and a dduced andsubmitted all her relevant evidence to the court. “The active participation ofthe party a gainst whom the action was b rought, coupled with his f ailure toobject to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the actionis p ending, is t antamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and awillingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said partyfrom later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.” 43

    in seven instances: (1) when registered interests o f any d escription,whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated andceased; (2) when n ew interests h ave

    arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certicate;

    was m ade in e ntering a ce rticate o r any memorandum thereon or on anyduplicate certicate

    ; (4) when the name of any person on the certicate has b een changed; (5)when the registered owner has b een

    married, or, registered as m arried, the marriage has b een terminated andno right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when acorporation, which owned registered land and has b een dissolved, has n otconveyed the same within three years a fter its d issolution; and (7)

    4

    Proceedings u nder Section 1 08 a re “summary in nature, contemplatingcorrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainlynot controversial issues.” 45 Banguis’s o pposition to the petition forcancellation ostensibly raised controversial issues i nvolving her claimedownership and the hereditary rights o f Adrian, which she claims t o be her

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    son by Adriano. However,

    “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and in

    fact, respondent Wenifreda –and not Banguis – is A driano’s lawful spouse.

    evidence of Banguis’s o wnership is i rrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, theevidence apparently indicates

    is i rrelevant and unnecessary t o the complete determination of Wenifreda’spetition. The Court is thus led

    when there is

    reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. 4

    where the Registrar of Deeds o f Bulacan committed an error in issuingTCT T-145321 in the name o f

    The present case falls u nder (3) and (7),

    apart from the fact that

    that Banguis c ould not be the owner of the subject property, while aresolution of the issue of succession

    to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds o f Bulacan simply e rred inincluding Banguis in TCT T-

    145321 as A driano’s sp ouse.As c orrectly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidencepoints t o the fact that Wenifreda is t he legitimate spouse of Adriano.Documentary e vidence – among others, the parties’ respective marriagecontracts, which, together with marriage certicates, are considered theprimary e vidence of a marital union 46 – indicates that Adriano was married

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    to Wenifreda, while Banguis was m arried to Nolasco – a nd b oth marriageswere subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property andissuance of the certicate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said thatAdriano and Banguis w ere husband and wife to each other; it cannot evenbe said that they h ave a common-law relationship at all. Consequently,Banguis can not be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’sspouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.

    x x x I ndeed, Philippine Law does n ot recognize common law marriages. Aman and woman not legally married who cohabit for many year s ashusband and wife, who represent themselves to the public a s h usband andwife, and who are reputed to be h usband a nd wife in the community where

    they live may b e considered legally m arried in common law jurisdictions b utnot in the Philippines.

    While it is t rue that our laws d o not just brush aside the fact that suchrelationships a re present in our society, and that they p roduce a communityof properties a nd interests w hich is g overned by law, authority e xists i ncase law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires t hat the manand woman living together must not in any way b e incapacitated to contractmarriage. In any c ase, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with

    another woman, a legal impediment which disqualied him from evenlegally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr.Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of SurvivingSpouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:“Be it noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be thelegitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).”

    There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term“spouse” embraces co mmon law relation for purposes of exemption fromcriminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischiefcommitted or caused mutually b y sp ouses. The Penal Code article, it issaid, makes n o distinction between a couple whose cohabitation issanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband andwife de facto. But this v iew cannot even apply to the facts o f the case at

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    bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing tothe contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfullywedded spouse . Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-weddedspouse to her; in fact, he was n ot legally c apacitated to marry h er in her

    lifetime. 47 (Emphasis supplied )

    The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is –who should be included in the

    title to the subject property as A driano’s s pouse, Banguis o r Wenifreda? Was t here error inAdriano’s sp ouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s sp ouse, then there would be n o need to amend oWenifreda is A driano’s s pouse, the inclusion of Banguis w ould then be erroneous, and TCTthat is r equired in resolving this issue is t o determine who between them is A driano’s s pousthat she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different from the certica

    x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals , the Court made a clear distinction between title areferred to is t hat document issued by the Register of Deeds k nown as t he Transfer Certicaownership which is r epresented by that document. Petitioner apparently c onfuses c erticatemantle o f the Torrens syst em does n ot mean that ownership thereof can n o longer be d isputof title. The TCT is o nly t he best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the

    certicate cannot always b e considered a s co nclusive e vidence of ownership. Mere issuancperson does n ot foreclose the possibility that the real property m ay be under co-ownershipthat the registrant may o nly b e a trustee or that other parties m ay h ave acquired interest subtitle. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereofbe confused with the certicate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are intenot vest title; it is m erely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holhas. 48

    Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is t he true

    convince the trial court that there is n o need to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was n ot preeffect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence, Babeyond the certicate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Coownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not haveshe failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject propsubject property s howed that Adriano alone was t he vendee. This C ourt is n ot a trier of fact

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    the Court of Appeals, which are thus co nsidered conclusive and binding. 49 Moreover, the Coalone paid for the property u sing her own funds a nd money borrowed from her sister, she nco-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its a cquisition. Such contradictory statbasically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only b e logical and naturalon the deed of sale as t he vendee, and not as m ere witness – which is w hat actually occurrcontributed to its p urchase, Banguis w ould have required that her name be p laced on the defailure to explain why – despite her claims t hat she is t he purchaser of the property – she allsole vendee, renders h er claim of ownership doubtful. “Where a p arty has t he means in his

    rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, thinference against him.” 50 One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules o f evidence in tcommon sense.” 51

    Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s a ssertion that Wenifreda’s p etition for cancellation oAdriano’s e state which in effect transfers t he subject property to Wenifreda and thus d ivestsand interests t herein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is si mply a case for the correction of the wroto reect the truth in the certicate of title – that Adriano is m arried to Wenifreda – and nothiproceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which arstated, registration is not the equivalent of title.

    Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes u nnecessary to resolve

    the other issues raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to thetrial court’s March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a writ ofexecution pending appeal, as w ell as t he April 14, 2004 Writ of Executionissued, as t hey have become moot and academic.

    WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED . The February 14, 2012 Decisionand July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.84954 are AFFIRMED .

    SO ORDERED.

    G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015MANUEL JUSAYAN,ALFREDO JUSAYAN,AND MICHAEL JUSAYAN , Petitioners , v. JORGE

    SOMBILLA , Respondent . D EC I S I O N BERSAMIN, J.:

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    The Court resolves whether a lease of agricultural land between therespondent and the predecessor of the petitioners w as a civil law lease oran agricultural lease. The resolution is d eterminative of whether or not theRegional Trial Court (RTC) had original exclusive jurisdiction over theaction commenced by the predecessor of the petitioners a gainst therespondent.cralawred

    The Case

    Under review on certiorari is t he decision promulgated on October 20,2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals ( CA) reversed the judgment in favorof the petitioners r endered on April 13, 1999 in CAR Case No. 17117entitled Timoteo Jusayan, Manuel Jusayan, Alfredo Jusayan and Michael Jusayanv. Jorge Sombilla by t he RTC, Branch 30, in IloiloCity. 2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

    Antecedents

    and would deliver 110 cavans o f palay a nnually to Timoteo without need foraccounting of the cultivation expenses p rovided that Jorge would pay theirrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Timoteo and Jorge followed thearrangement. In 1975, the parcels o f land were transferred in the names o f

    Timoteo’s sons, namely; Manuel, Alfredo and Michael (petitioners).

    Wilson Jesena (Wilson) owned four parcels o f land situated in NewLucena, Iloilo. On June 20, 1970,

    Wilson entered into an agreement with respondent Jorge Sombilla (Jorge), 3

    wherein Wilson designated

    Jorge as h is a gent to supervise the tilling and farming of his r iceland in

    crop year 1970-1971. On August

    20, 1971,

    before the expiration of the agreement,

    Wilson sold the four parcels o f land to Timoteo Jusayan

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    (Timoteo). 4 Jorge and Timoteo verbally a greed that Jorge would retainpossession of the parcels o f land

    terminating his a dministration and demanding the return of the possessionof the parcels of

    In 1984, Timoteo sent several letters t o Jorge

    land

    against Jorge in the RTC

    Timoteo led on J une 3 0, 1986 a co mplaint for recovery of possession a ndaccounting

    In his a nswer, 6 Jorge asserted that he enjoyed security o f tenure as t heagricultural lessee of Timoteo;

    and that he could not be dispossessed of his l andholding without validcause

    .5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

    Due to the failure of Jorge to render accounting and to return thepossession of the parcels o f land despite demands,

    (CAR Case No. 17117). Following Timoteo’s d eath on October 4, 1991, thepetitioners substituted him as the plaintiffs.

    Ruling of the RTC

    .cralawred

    In its d ecision rendered on April 13, 1999, 7 the between Timoteo and Jo rge;and p etitioners.cralawred

    Judgment of the CA

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    Jorge appealed to the CA.In the judgment promulgated on October 20,2003, 8 the

    ; and that the demand of Timoteo for the delivery o f his sh are in the harvest

    and the payment of irrigation fees

    constituted an agrarian dispute that was o utside the jurisdiction of the RTC,and well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture(DAR) pursuant to Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657

    RTC upheld the contractual relationship o f agency

    ordered Jorge to deliver the possession of the parcels o f land to the

    declaring that the contractual relationship between the parties w as o ne ofagricultural tenancy

    CA reversed the RTC and dismissed t he case,

    (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 ).cralawred Issues The petitionersnow appeal upon the following issues, namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

    Whether or not the relationship between the petitioners a nd respondent isthat of agency o r

    agricultural leasehold;

    a.)

    and

    b.) Whether or not RTC, Branch 30, Iloilo City a s R egional Trial Court andCourt of Agrarian Relations, had jurisdiction over the herein case. 9

    Ruling of the Court

    The petition for review lacks merit.

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    To properly resolve whether or not the relationship between Timoteo andJorge was t hat of an agency o r a tenancy, an analysis o f the concepts o fagency and tenancy is i n order.

    r.1011

    the elements of which are, namely: (a) the relationship is e stablishedby the

    parties’ consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the execution of a juridical act in

    representative and not for himself; and (d) the agent acts w ithin the scopeof his authority. 12 Whether or not an agency h as been created isdetermined by the fact that one is r epresenting and acting for another. 13

    .14

    chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

    The claim of Timoteo that Jorge was h is a gent contradicted the verbalagreement he had fashioned with Jorge. By a ssenting to Jorge’spossession of the land sans a ccounting of the cultivation expenses andactual produce of the land provided that Jorge annually delivered to him110 cavans o f palay a nd paid the irrigation fees b elied the very n ature ofagency, which was representation. The verbal agreement between Timoteoand Jorge left all matters of agricultural production to the sole discretion ofJorge and practically divested Timoteo of the right to exercise his authorityover the acts t o be performed by J orge. While in possession of the land,therefore, Jorge was a cting for himself instead of for Timoteo. Unlike Jorge,Timoteo did n ot benet whenever the p roduction increased, and did n otsuffer whenever the production decreased. Timoteo’s interest was limitedto the delivery o f the 110 cavans o f palay annually without any co ncernabout how the cultivation could be improved in order to yield more produce.

    On the other hand, to prove the tenancy relationship, Jorge presentedhandwritten receipts 15 indicating that the sacks o f palay d elivered to andreceived by one Corazon Jusayan represented payment of rental. In thisregard, rental was the legal term for the consideration of the lease. 16

    Consequently, the receipts s ubstantially p roved that the contractualrelationship between Jorge and Timoteo was a lease.

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    In agency, the agent binds h imself to render some service or to dosomething in representation or on

    behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority of the latte

    agency is r epresentation,

    The basis of the civil law relationship of

    The law does n ot presume agency; hence, proving its e xistence,

    nature and extent is i ncumbent upon the person alleging it

    Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a civil law or anagricultural lease.

    the members of his immediate farm household,

    and of

    17

    In the civil law lease,

    one of the parties b inds h imself to give to another the enjoyment or use ofa thing for a price certain, and

    for a period that may b e denite or indenite.

    In the agricultural lease, also termed as a leasehold

    tenancy, the physical possession of the land devoted to agriculture is g ivenby its o wner or legal

    possessor (landholder) to another (tenant) for the purpose of productionthrough labor of the latter

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    in consideration of which the latter agrees to share the

    harvest with the landholder, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable

    , either in produce or in money, or in both. 18 Specically, in Gabriel v.Pangilinan, 19 this C ourt differentiated between a leasehold tenancy a nd a

    civil law lease in the following manner, namely: (1) the subject matter of aleasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land, but that of a civil law leasemay b e rural or urban property; (2) as t o attention and cultivation, the lawrequires t he leasehold tenant to personally a ttend to and cultivate theagricultural land; the civil law lessee need not personally c ultivate or workthe thing leased; (3) as t o purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is

    devoted to agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any otherlawful pursuits; and(4) as t o the law that governs, the civil law lease isgoverned by the Civil Code , but the leasehold tenancy is g overned byspecial laws.

    The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective contributions o fthe landholder and tenant, otherwise called share tenancy, 20 was abolishedon August 8, 1963 under Republic Act No. 3844. To date, the onlypermissible system of agricultural tenancy is l easehold tenancy, 21 arelationship wherein a xed consideration is paid instead of proportionatelysharing the harvest as i n share tenancy.

    In Teodoro v. Macaraeg, 22 this C ourt has sy nthesized the elements o fagricultural tenancy to wit: (1) the object of the contract or the relationshipis a n agricultural land that is l eased or rented for the purpose of agriculturalproduction; (2) the size of the landholding is s uch that it is susceptible ofpersonal cultivation by a single person with the assistance of the members

    of his immediate farm household; (3) the tenant- lessee must actually a ndpersonally till, cultivate or operate the land, solely or with the aid of laborfrom his i mmediate farm household; and (4) the landlord-lessor, who iseither the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land, leases t he sameto the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amountof money o r produce.

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    It can be gleaned that in both civil law lease of an agricultural land andagricultural lease, the lessor gives t o the lessee the use and possession ofthe land for a price certain. Although the purpose of the civil law lease andthe agricultural lease may be agricultural cultivation and production, thedistinctive attribute that sets a civil law lease apart from an agriculturallease is the personal cultivation by the lessee. An agricultural lesseecultivates by h imself and with the aid of those of his immediate farmhousehold. Conversely, even when the lessee is in possession of theleased agricultural land and paying a consideration for it but is notpersonally cultivating the land, he or she is a civil law lessee.

    The only issue remaining to be resolved is w hether or not Jorge personally

    cultivated the leased agricultural land.Cultivation is n ot limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, butincludes t he various p hases o f farm labor such as t he maintenance, repairand weeding of dikes, paddies a nd irrigation canals i n the landholding.Moreover, it covers a ttending to the care of the growing plants, 23 and grownplants like fruit trees that require watering, fertilizing, uprooting weeds,turning the soil, fumigating to eliminate plant pests 24 and all other activitiesdesigned to promote the growth and c are of the plants o r trees a nd

    husbanding the earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth moreproducts or fruits. 25 In Tarona v. Court of Appeals, 26 this Court ruled that atenant is n ot required to be physically present in the land at all hours of theday and night provided that he lives c lose enough to the land to becultivated to make it physically p ossible for him to cultivate it with somedegree of constancy.

    Nor was t here any q uestion that the parcels o f agricultural land with a totalarea of 7.9 hectares involved herein were susceptible of cultivation by asingle person with the help of the members o f his i mmediate farmhousehold. As t he Court has a lready o bserved, an agricultural land of anarea of four hectares, 27 or even of an area as large as 1 7 hectares, 28 couldbe personally c ultivated by a tenant by h imself or with

    help of the members o f his farm household.It is e lementary that he who

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    alleges t he affirmative of the issue has t he burden of proof. 29 Hence,

    His a bility to farm the seven hectares o f land despite his r egularemployment as an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal Agriculture

    Office32

    was not physically

    impossible for him to accomplish considering that his d aughter, a memberof his i mmediate farm household, was c ultivating one of the parcels o f theland. 33 Indeed, the law did not prohibit him as t he agricultural lessee whogenerally worked the land himself or with the aid of member of hisimmediate household from availing himself occasionally or temporarily ofthe help of others in specic jobs. 34 In short, the claim of the petitioners thatthe employment of Jorge as an Agricultural Technician at the MunicipalAgriculture Office disqualied him as a tenant lacked factual or legal basis.

    Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides t hat once there is a nagricultural tenancy, the agricultural tenant’s right to security of tenure isrecognized and protected. The landowner cannot eject the agriculturaltenant from the land unless a uthorized by the proper court for causesprovided by law. Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended byRepublic Act No. 6389, enumerates t he several grounds f or the valid

    dispossession of the tenant.35

    It is u nderscored, however, that none of suchgrounds for valid dispossession of landholding was a ttendant in Jorge’scase.

    Although the CA has co rrectly c ategorized Jorge’s c ase as a n agrariandispute, it ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case based onSection 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, which vested in the Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR) the “primary jurisdiction to determine andadjudicate agrarian reform matters” and the “exclusive original jurisdictionover all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform” exceptdisputes falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department ofAgriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

    We hold that the CA gravely erred. The rule is s ettled that the jurisdiction ofa court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the

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    commencement of an a ction. 36 In 1980, upon the passage o f BatasPambansa Blg. 129 ( Judiciary Reorganization Act ), the Courts of AgrarianRelations w ere integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdictionof the Courts of Agrarian Relations was v ested in the Regional TrialCourts. 37 It was o nly on August 29, 1987, when Executive O rder No. 229took effect, that the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to tryagrarian reform matters w as t ransferred to the DAR. Therefore, the RTCstill had jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the complaint was led inthe RTC on June 3 0, 1986.chanrobleslaw

    WHEREFORE , the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari byandORDERS the petitioners to

    pay t he costs o f suit.The parties are ordered to comply w ith theirundertakings as agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee. SO ORDERED.

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