PADILLA v. JUGOHeld: In the present case the court did not base the removal of the petitioner on any of the cause specified in the respondent’s motion for said relief, but on the conflicts and misunderstandings that have continuously existed between them. It is undeniable, however, that said conflicts have really existed from the inception of the administration and have redounded to the detriment of the interests of the administration. Due to such conflicts and to the lack of good harmony between the petitioner and the respondent, the former showed incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, which gave rise to the filing of inaccurate inventories and accounts which, in turn, required the filing of oppositions thereto, the hearings of which absorbed the attention of the court for quite a long time.
COBARRUBIAS V. DIZONHeld: Loss of confidence in the integrity of the administrator is a ground for his removal.
DE BORJA v. TANHeld: An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. On the other hand, an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable. The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. A special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of the estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed. A special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration.
HERMANOS V. ABADAFacts:Caponong died, owing plaintiffs sum of money. His widow Abada was administratrix. Commissioners to appraise estate and pass on claims against estate were appointed. Abada leased Hacienda Coronacion to Zayco. Abada married Alvarez. Lease was transferred to Alvarez by Zayco. Nearly 7 years after death of Caponong, plaintiffs filed suit in CFI against Abada personally and as administratrix, alleging that Caponong owed plaintiffs P12783.74; that Abada, personally and as administratrix, had been receiving money and effects used by her for Hacienda Coronacion; that account of defendant showed balance in favor of plaintiffs of P62437.15; and that defendant recognized only about P14000 which however hadn’t been paid.
Defendant admits that she owed P8555.78 as administratrix, and the balance was due by her personally. Guardian of minor children of Caponong asked permission to intervene. He denied the claim and alleged that the estate of Caponong didn’t owe plaintiffs anything. Parties presented motion stating that they made an amicable settlement. Court dismissed the action. The settlement was that defendants recognized that Caponong’s estate was indebted to plaintiffs in sum of P68,611.01, to be paid with 10% interest in 7 equal annual installments; defendants agreed to give plaintiffs first mortgage on all property of Caponong and all property belonging exclusively to Abada; and defendants agreed to mortgage also the carabaos on the hacienda.
The mortgage of the hacienda was executed. But the carabaos were not mortgaged. The compromise was approved by the court.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants had let 2 installments go by without paying anything; defendants refused to sign the agreement mortgaging the carabaos; and defendants were about to transfer their property not mortgaged.
Plaintiffs prayed for attachment on property of defendants. Court granted attachment order. Plaintiffs filed a motion and asked court to appoint a receiver. Court granted this motion. Receiver took charge of property and defendants were ousted from the house.
Abada and the guardian filed answer that claim of plaintiffs against the intestate proceedings of Caponong had been allowed in sum of P12,783.74 by commissioners; the property belonged to children of deceased; the only interest of Abada was her usufructuary interest in 1/6 of the property; all the property was in custodia legis and could not be attached; and the compromise agreement and the mortgage executed were obtained through fraud and false representation.
Judge dissolved the attachment and discharged the receiver. Judgment was also given for plaintiffs to recover from administratrix P8555.78 with interest. Personal judgment was also given plaintiffs against Abada and Alvarez for P79970.21. Abada appealed personally and as administratrix.
Issues:1. whether the compromise agreement and the mortgage were valid2. whether the carabaos could be attached3. whether appointment of receiver was proper
Held:1. No. The claim of plaintiffs against estate of Caponong had been fixed. Court says that its approval was meant to include only the amt actually due by estate; the balance was intended to be approved as against Abada personally.
Plaintiffs allege that their orig claim against estate was only P12783.74 and that the balance was due from Abada as administratrix and personally without stating how much was owed by her personally and how much was owed by her as administratrix. Can the court authorize the mortgage in this case? Commissioners shall pass upon claims against estate. The law fixed the limit of the estate’s liability. The court could not charge it with debts that were never owed by it. The administratrix could only charge the estate with reasonable expenses of administration.
The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13000 when commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this was paid, leaving balance of P8555.78. Plaintiffs made advances to administratrix until their claim was more than P68000. It is urged that a major part of this P68000 is administration expenses but no reason is given why such expense of administration should be so great.
Administration expense would be the necessary expenses of handling prop, protecting it against destruction or deterioration. But if plaintiffs let the administratrix have money and effects till their claim grow to P68000, they can’t be permitted to charge this amt as expense of administration. By expense of administration we understand to be the reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the prop and managing it till debts are paid, and of dividing it so as to partition it and deliver to the heirs.
The court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate debts it never owed. If it did, its approval is a nullity.Neither executors, unless specially authorized by will, nor administrators, have power to bind estate of deceased by borrowing money.
The statute grants no power to administrator to borrow money upon mortgage of real estate of decedent. Such an act is foreign to the policy and purpose of administration which aims to close up, not to continue the estate.
The mortgage was void. Trial courts should exert themselves to close up estates within 12 months from time they are presented; they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors or administrators who do not actively labor to that end.
2. No. If they were in the name and possession of administratrix, they were in custodia legis, and could not be attached.
3. No.
Case rulings on inter-country adoption
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALSFacts: James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.
Issue: whether or not James Anthony Hughes and Lenita Mabunay Hughes are qualified to adopt under Philippine law
Held: No. James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt. Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as “The Family Code of the Philippines,” is explicit.
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of Executive Order No. 209, expressing as follows:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
REPUBLIC v. TOLEDANOFacts: Private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.
Private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Issue: whether private respondents spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt under Philippine law
Held: No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as “The Family Code of the Philippines”, private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
Private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
Cases on habeas corpus
MONCUPA v. ENRILEFacts: Efren C. Moncupa was arrested on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member. After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33. Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33.
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner’s detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated. “Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.
Issue: whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner’s temporary release
Held: No. It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner’s temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not “participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security.”
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely ‘temporary’ it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.
A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
TOYOTO v. RAMOSFacts: Gerry Toyoto, Eddie Gonzales and Dominador Gabiana belong to a group called the “Urban Poor” which conducted a march, demonstration and rally along Northbay Boulevard in Navotas, Metro Manila, on October 23, 1983. Subsequently, Toyoto, Gonzales and Gabiana (among others) were accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1835 (Codifying the Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing the Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations. The petitioners were arraigned and they pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The order of dismissal was dated November 9, 1984, but on December 5, 1984, when the petition for habeas corpus was filed, the respondents had not released and they refused to release the petitioners on the ground that a Preventive Detention Action had been issued against them. It is to be noted that the petitioners had been in detention for over one year for they were arrested on October 23, 1983.
The return filed by the respondents states that petitioners Toyoto, Gonzales and Gabiana were released to their relatives on December 8, 1984, pursuant to the order of the Minister of National Defense. The order is dated November 30, 1984, and orders the “temporary release” of the petitioners. The respondents pray that the petition be dismissed for having become moot and academic in view of the release of the petitioners from detention.
Issue: whether the habeas corpus case is moot and academic because petitioners were already released from detention
Held: No. Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely “temporary” it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.
ALIMPOOS v. COURT OF APPEALSFacts: The Accused Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case, which was a prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. The place allegedly robbed belonged to the Offended Parties. Contending that the Warrant was issued without the observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof, the Accused, then detained, and his wife instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. The Complaint of the Accused was premised on the alleged violation of Article 32cranad(4), (8), (15), (16), (17) and (19) of the Civil Code, and Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, by defendants therein who were said to have been instrumental in causing the detention and arrest of the Accused. After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case, respondent Trial Judge issued the appealed Order declaring the detention of the Accused illegal and granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Issue: What is the nature of a writ of habeas corpus?
Held: A Habeas Corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties. While the issuance of the writ is to all intents and purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the proceedings by Habeas Corpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. It is an inquisition by the government, at the suggestion and instance of an individual, most probably, but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign. It may be analogized to a proceeding in rem and instituted for the sole purpose of fixing the status of a person. The person restrained is the central figure in the transaction. The proceeding is instituted solely for his benefit. As it is not designed to obtain redress against anybody, and as no judgment can be entered against anybody, and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there can be no suit in the technical sense.
In Habeas Corpus cases, the judgment in favor of the applicant cannot contain a provision for damages. It has to be confined to what is provided for in Section 15, Rule 102, which reads:
“SEC. 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. — When the court or Judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.”
The sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and ordinarily it cannot properly be used for any other purpose. Thus it has been held that the writ cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to determine whether a person has committed a crime; in determine a disputed interstate boundary line; to punish respondent or to afford the injured person redress, for the illegal detention; to recover damages or other money award.
Issue: whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy for the accused
Held: No. The remedy available to the petitioner is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy, such as appeal or writ of error. But the existence of another remedy does not necessarily preclude a resort to the writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from illegal detention, especially where the other remedy is deemed not to be as effective as that of habeas corpus.
SALVAÑA v. GAELAFacts: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by by the spouses Francisco Salvaña and Modesta Saliendrato recover the custody of their daughter Felicisima Salvaña, a 15-year old single girl who is in the custody of the respondent and appellee, Leopoldo Gaela, justice of the peace of Lucban, Tayabas. Gaela answered that he never had the slightest intention of detaining said Felicisima Salvaña and depriving her of her liberty, her stay in the undersigned’s home being due not only to the request of the petitioners herein, but also to that of Felicisima Salvaña, herself, who does not want to live in her parents’ home, because they maltreated he and wished her to marry a certain individual named Andres Laguador, whom she does not care for.
Issue: whether habeas corpus will lie for the recovery of the custody of an unemancipated minor daughter who is under the custody of a third person of her own free will
Held: Yes. Section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted.
Article 154 of the Civil Code provides that the father or, in his default, the mother may exercise parental power over their unemancipated legitimate children; and article 155 imposes upon them the duty of keeping such children in their company, educating and instructing them. Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure recognized this parental power in providing that the parents are the natural guardians of their minor children entitled to their custody and care for their education.
Since the petitioners-appellants are entitled to the custody of their minor daughter Felicisima Salvaña, they are also entitled to recover her by habeas corpus, in accordance with the provision of section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure cited above.
The fact, then, that a minor daughter is in the custody of a third person of her own free will, and without said person’s having the slightest intention of detaining her, is no hindrance to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpusto enable her parents to regain custody of her person.
Issue: whether the mere fact that the parents of a minor daughter have sought to compel her to marry a young man of their choice, whom she does not care for, and the mere fact that they have refused to consent to her marriage to another young man whom she favors, and with whom she has eloped and by whom she is pregnant, are sufficient reasons for depriving said parents of their parental power and custody of said minor daughter
Held: No. Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while recognizing, as stated heretofore, the parental authority of the parents over their unemancipated minor children, with the right to their custody and education, empowers courts to appoint some suitable person as guardian of said minors, as the best interests of the latter may require.
Now then, to what extent and within what limits may courts exercise this discretional power to deprive parents of patria potestas and the custody of their unemancipated minor children?
In regulating the relations between parents and children in regard to the custody and education of unemancipated children, the Civil Code, as well as the Code of Civil Procedure, has had in view the interests and welfare of said children; for this is the basis of article 171 of the Civil Code, which authorizes courts to deprive parents of patria potestas or to suspend its exercise, if they treat their children with excessive cruelty or, by orders or advices given them or example set them, tend to corrupt them; and section 770 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants the courts the same authority, “when the parent or parents of any minor child shall be unable through vagrancy, negligence, or misconduct to support such child, or if able, shall neglect or refuse to support such child, or when such parent or parents shall unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat such child, or cause or allow it to engage in common begging. . . .”
Taking the provisions of the Civil Code and of the Code of Civil Procedure together, it appears that the discretional power conferred upon courts by section 553 of the procedural law above cited is limited or conditioned by the provisions of article 171 of said Civil Code and section 770 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enumerating the cases when parents may be deprived of patria potestas and, consequently, of the custody of their unemancipated minor children.
The concrete facts upon which the trial court relies to deprive the petitioners-appellants of the custody of their minor daughter, denying their petition for habeas corpus are: That they have sought to compel their aforesaid daughter to marry a young man against her will, and refuse to consent to her marriage with another young man with whom she eloped and by whom she is to-day six months pregnant.
Neither the act compelling their unemancipated minor daughter to marry against her will, nor the act of refusing to give their consent to her marriage, is included in the causes established by the laws we have cited for depriving parents of patria potestas and the custody of their unemancipated minor children.
Although in the majority of cases when parents oblige their unemancipated minor children to marry against their will they have at heart the welfare of those children, we disappove of such a practice, for while in time and through fond and tender treatment, affection may follow and with it the happiness of the family, above all should there be children, since marriage should be based upon mutual love and sympathy, there are not a few cases where marriages not precluded by such sentiments have been unfortunate; and when the means employed by parents to make their unemancipated minor children marry against their will is such as bring about moral or physical sufferings, the intervention of the courts to deprive such parents of patria potestas and the custody of said children will be justified.
In the present case, however, it does not appear that the parents of the minor Felicisima Salvaña insist upon her marrying against her will, nor do we believe they will insist upon it on account of her present physiological condition; the cruelty having ceased thereby, which would otherwise have justified depriving them of parental authority, and if they now desire to keep her in their company, notwithstanding such condition, it is because they love her.
It may be that by marrying the man by whom she is now pregnant, she would be happier than by living with her own parents, but since the law does not authorize the deprivation of parental authority on the ground that parents refuse to consent to the marriage of their unemancipated minor children, it would be a direct violation of that law, depriving said parents of their parental authority. Unemancipated minor children, due to the incomplete development of their mind and intellectual faculties, and to their lack of experience in the world, need the counsel, care, and guidance of their progenitors
in order to prevent the impulse of passion, excited by worldly illusion which their undeveloped intellectual faculties are not strong enough to overcome, from leading them to serious consequences.
SUAREZ v. COURT OF APPEALSFacts: Respondent Manese filed with the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus against petitioner Renato Suarez. Before she could finish the presentation of her evidence, respondent Manese filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice to her right to file another action for custody of minor under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, contending that the issue as to who between the parties has the rightful and legal custody of the minor child could be fully adjudicated in another action and not in the present action for writ of habeas corpus.The trial court issued a resolution granting the motion with prejudice.
Thereafter, respondent Manese filed another action for custody of minor and support before the trial court against petitioner. The latter moved to dismiss the action on the ground of bar by prior judgment. The motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied by the trial court. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the denial which was also denied.
Issue: whether or not the order of dismissal with prejudice in the action for the writ of habeas corpus is res judicata to the present action for custody of minor and support
Held: No. There are four well known requisites to the principle of res judicata: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff states that it was without prejudice to the filing of an action for the custody of minor on the ground that the issue as to the custody of the child would be properly determined in a second action to be filed under Rule 99 of the Revised Rules of Court. Clearly, the purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing the first action for a writ of habeas corpus was not to end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody of her child but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this time for custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the ground upon which respondent Manese filed her motion for dismissal is erroneous since the question as to who shall have the custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court without the necessity of filing a separate action under Rule 99 of the said rules for that purpose. Nevertheless, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the first case with prejudice to the filing of the second action without stating the reasons or basis thereof This should not prevent the filing of the second action for custody of minor, since no opportunity was granted by the trial court to the plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court in the habeas corpus case. Hence, the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on the merits which would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.
GALVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALSIssue: whether a petition for habeas corpus can be properly filed together with petitions for certiorari and mandamus
Held: Yes. The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter.
Issue: What is the nature of writ of habeas corpus?
Held: A writ of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. It has to be an exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. In the absence of special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of a determination of his case in court.
In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.
ENRILE v. SALAZARFacts: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
Senator Enrile filed the petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;(c) denied his right to bail; and(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause.
Issue: whether a petition for habeas corpus was the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial
Held: No. The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner’s right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
PAREDES v. SANDIGANBAYANFacts: Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, applied for a free patent for Lot No. 3097-A, PLS-67, with an area of 1,391 square meters, located beside the Washington Highway in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. His application was favorably acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando Luison.
Eight years later, on June 27, 1984, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Francisco passed Resolution No. 40, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur to assist it in recovering Lot No. 3097 from Attorney Paredes because the land had been designated and reserved as a school site. The Sangguniang Bayan requested the provincial fiscal to file a perjury charge against Attorney Paredes, Jr. The resolution was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. A civil case for annulment of Attorney Paredes’ title was filed in court.
During the pendency of the case, Teofilo Gelacio, former vice-mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, filed with the Tanodbayan a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with having violated Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application.
The fiscal issued a resolution finding aprima facie case of violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 committed by the accused. The Fiscal’s resolution was approved by Tanodbayan.
An information was filed against Governor Paredes in the Sandiganbayan and a warrant for his arrest, fixing bail of P20,000 for his provisional liberty, was issued and served upon him He refused to post bail in protest against the injustice to him as Governor. Consequently, he was detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife, Mrs. Eden Paredes, against the Sandiganbayan. She alleged that the warrant for her husband’s arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information against him had already prescribed.
Issue: whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy in this case
Held: No. The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
ILAGAN v. ENRILEFacts: On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.
A petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders.
Issue: whether the filing of an information in court renders a petition for habeas corpus moot and academic
Held: Yes. The petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention. Now that the detained attorneys’ incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies.
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused.
LUNA v. PLAZAFacts: There is a valid complaint charging the accused Simon Luna with the crime of Murder filed with the respondent Judge authorized to conduct the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause before the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest. The complaint is supported by the statements of the witnesses under oath in writing in the form of questions and answers and other documents attached to the complaint. Before the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, the respondent judge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution on their statements taken by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa by reading the questions and answers all over again to the affiants who confirmed to the respondent Judge that the statements contained in their sworn statements are true. Being satisfied that the questions and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law, the respondent Judge adopted them as his own personal examination of the witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause, the order and the warrant of
arrest were issued to take the accused into custody for the commission of the offense charged. The petitioner waived his right to the preliminary investigation and applied to be admitted to bail.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without the due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation of Republic Act No. 3828.
Issue: whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this case
Held: No. The remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Change of name
YU v. REPUBLICFacts: Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name changed to Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen who has been a resident of Manila for more than three years prior to the filing of the petition. As grounds for the change of name he alleges that as far as he can remember has been using the name “Ricardo Sy,” that he grew up under the care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in school under the said name and that he was baptized “Ricardo Sy with his real name also stated.”
Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens.
Issue: whether Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens
Held: No. Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. Section 1 provides that “a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.” Here the word “person” is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.
A change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one’s existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one’s legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. The situation is no different whether the person whose name is changed be a citizen or an alien.
Case rulings on change of name
REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZFacts: Private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Issue: whether the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee can be made jointly in the adoption case
Held: No. Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
The subject petition is deficient insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action.
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter’s fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly. On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name.
Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other.
Issue: whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name
Held: No. A person’s name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The giver or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.
*** Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name.
A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
YASIN v. JUDGE, SHARI’A DISTRICT COURTFacts: Hatima C. Yasin, a Muslim, filed a petition to resume the use of her maiden name considering that she and her former husband are already divorced under the Muslim Code and the latter is married to someone else.
Issue: whether or not petitioner who has been divorced needs judicial approval to resume the sue of her maiden name
Held: No. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register. While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register.
Petitioner’s registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs.”
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband’s name by prefixing the word “Mrs.” before her husband’s full name or by adding her husband’s surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right. Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband’s name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALSFacts: Cynthia Vicencio was born on 19 January 1971 to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On 10 January 1972, after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode then situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan. Since then Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres and her children.
Fe Esperanza Leabres filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, which was granted. Sometime in 1983, petitioner’s mother filed another petition for change of name, that is, to drop the surname of her husband therefrom, and after hearing a decision was rendered. In 1984, petitioner’s mother again filed another petition for the declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, and which petition was granted. On 15 April 1986, petitioner’s mother and Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony in a ceremony.
Issue: whether private respondent can change her surname to that of her step-father’s surname
Held: No. The following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce, (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be “proper and reasonable cause” for which the change is sought. The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent’s parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him.
LIONG v. REPUBLICFacts: Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin. He is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia Trading Company. He has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years. He wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin. He wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen. He came to the Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso.
Issue: whether petitioner can change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin
Held: No. Before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a change of name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always been known by that name by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his father which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. But this claim which is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate. The fact that he claims to be the son of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino is of no moment because if the same were true it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth is Haw Liong and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino citizen. This indirectly belies his claim that the name that should be given him is Alfonso Lantin because that is the family name of his father “to conform with the customs and traditions and also for sentimental reasons.”
The true situation however is that in his business dealings with other people he always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin; that he came to be called Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation his Filipino friends asked him how he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since then they started calling him by that name; and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong and has not contracted with any person under the name of Alfonso Lantin. No proper or compelling reason that may justify the change of name desired by petitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to.
REPUBLIC v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTFacts: Private respondent Kenneth Wong Man Leung was born in Hongkong on November 3, 1953. He came to the Philippines as a British subject sometime in 1969. He was then known as Wong Man Leung, which is the name set out in his Alien Certificate of Registration as well as in his SSS Personal Data Record. He was baptized on March 2, 1975 at the Parish Church of Sta. Maria at Iloilo City, and given the Christian name, Kenneth; his baptismal certificate declares his full name as Kenneth Wong Man Leung. Ten months later, in the same church, he married Maylinda Yap, his name in the marriage contract being Kenneth Wong Man Leung alias Kiana So. He was naturalized as a Filipino citizen on February 10, 1976 in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 836. In his Certificate of Naturalization, his name is given as Kenneth Wong Man Leung alias Kiana so; and this, of course, is how his name is recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Other documents set forth his various names and aliases: the certificate of birth of his son, Dexter, states his name as Kiana Chuen Co; the SSS member’s Data Change or Additional Report states his name as Wong Man Leung Kenneth (Kiana So); his income tax return declares his name as Leung, Kenneth Wong Man, and the official receipt evidencing payment of the tax has his name written as Leung, Kenneth, the official records of Solid Gas Inc., Iloilo, of which he is the General Manager, show his name to be Kenneth Wong Man Leung alias Kiana So; his residence tax receipt and all the clearances obtained by him from the City Court, the Court of First Instance, the City Fiscal, and the police authorities of Iloilo City, give his name also as Kenneth Wong Man Leung alias Kiana So. It was his wish to rid himself of such a burdensomely long name as Kenneth Wong Man Leung alias Kiana So and to avoid confusion resulting from inadvertent but frequent rearrangements of its various parts; his desire to adopt not only a shorter and more easily Identifiable name, but also a Filipino name which would associate himself more closely with his countrymen by adoption; and the further fact that he has since come to be publicly known as Kenneth Kiana So, which prompted Kenneth to seek and obtain judicial approval of his change of name.
Issue: whether petitioner correctly stated his real or official name and fulfilled the jurisdictional requirement for a change of name
Held: Yes. At the time Kenneth filed his petition for change of name, the records of the Local Civil Registrar officially showed his name to be Kenneth Wong Man Leung alias Kiana So, this being the name under which he sought and was granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization pursuant to PD No. 836. His petition did therefore state his real or official name and fulfilled the jurisdictional requirement in this regard. Moreover, the petition also alleged his former name as a British subject, “Wong Man Leung” as then appeared in his alien certificate of registration.
PADILLA v. REPUBLICFacts: Dolores Gemora and Vincent Co, a Chinese national, were married on May 5, 1954. This matrimonial union begot five children, namely: Michael Copuaco, Abigail Copuaco, Rafael Copuaco, Gabriel Copuaco, and Annabelle Co.
Sometime in November 1960, Vincent Co left the conjugal abode and has since never returned to, or even visited, his family. It is alleged that he was a fugitive from justice, having been charged with several offenses of estafa.
Because of his continuous absence, the court on petition of Dolores Gemora, issued an order declaring Vincent Co as an absentee.
On October 30, 1965, Dolores Gemora contracted a second marriage with Sgt. Edward Padilla, an Americas serviceman stationed at Clark Air Base, Angeles City. The five minor children, who had been living with said spouses, were generously supported by Padilla and were treated by him with affection as if they were his own children.
This harmonious relation existing between said minors and their stepfather prompted Dolores Gemora to file the instant petition for change of the minors’ surname from “Copuaco” or “Co” to “Padilla”, which petition was granted by the lower court after due notice and hearing.
Issue: whether petitioners can change their surname to that of their stepfather
Held: No. Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their father. Said minors are the legitimate children of Vincent Co; and Article 364 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that “legitimate children ... shall principally use the surname of their father.”
To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother’s second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit.
DEL PRADO v. REPUBLICFacts: Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition, praying that her name “Gertrudes Josefina del Prado” be changed to “Getrudes Josefina Calderon.” It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, born on March 17, 1956, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname “Del Prado” which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people; that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from “Del Prado” to “Calderon “which is the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother.
The Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the petition upon the ground that the change of surname of the petition is unwarranted, considering that said petitioner was born out of a bigamous marriage and as such she has the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction and under the law she should bear the surname of her father Manuel del Prado.
Issue: whether the petition for change of name is based upon proper and reasonable cause
Held: Yes. A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child’s using his surname. The mother had considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate father.
While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from taking another surname with the latter’s consent and for justifiable reasons. If under the law a legitimate child may secure a change of his name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a “proper and reasonable cause”. There is no reason why a natural child cannot do the same. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests.
DIVINAGRACIA v. REPUBLICFacts: Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, 1970. They begot two children named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Zosima’s husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. He never returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Congressman Maglana in the sum of P50,000.00, one Galagar in the sum of P10,000.00 also Eloy Gallentes and other persons.
The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two minor children and their scapegrace father, Zosima, filed a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname.
Issue: whether two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their father’s surname and should use only their mother’s surname
Held: No. The minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father’s surname (Art. 364, Civil Code).
To allow them, at their mother’s behest, to bear only their mother’s surname (which they are entitled to use together with their father’s surname) and to discard altogether their father’s surname thus removing the prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. The mother’s desire should not be the sole consideration.
The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court). Where, as in this case, the petitioners are minors, the courts should take into account whether the change of name would redound their welfare or would prejudice them.
In this case, the reasons adduced for eliminating the father’s surname are not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors’ parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records.
Absentees
REYES v. ALEJANDROFacts: Petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes filed a petition to have her husband Roberto Reyes declared an absentee, alleging that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts.
Issue: whether it is necessary to judicially declare the husband’s absence
Held: No. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to he living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings.
JONES v. HORTIGUELAFacts: In December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In October, 1919, proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of Marciana Escaño, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper “El Ideal”. Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette during the month of December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in “El Ideal.” On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.
Issue: whether judicial declaration of absence is necessary
Held: No. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
SILVERIO v. REPUBLICFacts: Petitioner’s name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as “male.” He is a transsexual, having undergone a sex reassignment surgery abroad. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
Issue: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
Held: No. Section 1 of RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
Moreover, under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category “female.”
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Constitution of family home
MODEQUILLO v. SALINASFacts: A judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals against respondents Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay. The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued to satisfy the said judgment on their goods and chattels, among which was their family home. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by Modequillo alleging therein that the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Issue: whether the residential house and lot is exempt from execution
Held: No. Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:(1) For non-payment of taxes;(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.” It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
