Digested Case-Eminent Domain_1

8/13/2019 Digested Case-Eminent Domain_1

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THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919

FACTS

The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may the

courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?

The City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein

particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner alleged

that for the purpose of constructing an extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaint iff to acquire

ownership of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo. The defendants the Chinese Community of

Manila, I ldefonso Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgadoalleged in their Answer (a) that no necessity

existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in quest ion was a cemetery, which had been used as such for

many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into astreet for public purposes. One of the defendants, Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered to grant a right of way for the said

extension over other land, without cost to the plaint iff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his

ancestors may not be disturbed.

The Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip

of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any

finding as to costs. On appeal, the plaint iff contended that the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private

lands for public purposes. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the c ity (Manila)

. . . may condemn private property for public use."

ISSUE

Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private property for public use

HELD

No. It is true that Section 2429 of Act No. 2711, or the Charter of the City of Manila states that "the city

(Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use." But when the statute does not designate the property to

be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking particular property is a quest ion for the courts. When the

application to condemn or appropriate property is made directly to t he court, the question of necessity should be

raised (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. [72 Ohio St., 368]). The necessity for conferring the

authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly w ith in the power of the

legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under

the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument.To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but ,

except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends,

should be maintained, and the preventat ive aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company

vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234;

Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)

Whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially

during the lifet ime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemete ry, should be a quest ion of great


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concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest

necessity exists therefor. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in

question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows

that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered by Tambunting to the city free of charge, which will answer

every purpose of t he plaintiff.

The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

RATIO/DOCTRINE

[1] The taking of private property for any use, which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the

inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the

legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545;

Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.) To just ify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain)

where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the

purpose of the incorporation, the party claiming the right to the exercise of the power should be required to show

at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise (New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. [37 Md., 537,

564]).

[2] The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in aparticular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the

State, general authority to exe rcise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general

authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The

moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the

conditions accompanying the authority.

[3] The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporat ion, and before it can exercise the right

some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only

find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or

authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon

the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be

public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it

cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.

[4] The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is

necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strict ly construed.

No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws

more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for

greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of th e law

should not be enlarged by doubt ly interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited

[73 Am. Dec., 576].)

City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilip ino

Police Power Not Valid ly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND

OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF

QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at


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least six (6) percent of the total area of t he memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased

persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be

determined by competent City Authorit ies. QC justified the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the

setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of

deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The

ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who

are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the

city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of Agrarian Reform

on November 22, 2010

The subjects of this petit ion are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petit ioner Nicolas Manaay

and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The

tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The pet itioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers,

due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use

without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said

measure is invalid a lso for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention

limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Art icle VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisite s of a

valid appropriation.

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public

use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is

willing to sell unde r terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed

upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions

offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain w ill come into play to assert the paramount authority of

the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistib le demands of t he

public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the po lice power, that the we lfare of the people is

the supreme law.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCILOF MANDALUYONG CITY,G.R.

No. 156684April 6, 2011

FACTS


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The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meterssituated between Nueve de Febrero Street andFernandez Street in

Barangay Mauway,Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest theyrented out to nine other

families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and onlysource of income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted

ResolutionNo. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to takethe necessary legal steps for the expropriation of

the land of the petitioners for thepurpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving cityinhabitants.

ISSUEWhether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its discretion in adoptingResolution No. 552.

HELDNo. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is alaw that is permanent in character. No rights can

be conferred by and be inferred from aresolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to sayin the light of

attendant circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from aresolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of

thesentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possessesa general and permanent character, but a resolution

is temporary in nature. Additionally,the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but notfor a resolution, unless

decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution, therefore,

theSangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for itsexpression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally

protected right.

Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990)

F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which theGovernment sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities.De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied bythe lower court but upon cert iorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by DeKnecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was

taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the dismissal of thecase on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the samepurpose. The lower court denied the motion. Appeal.

RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between theparties, it is equally t rue that the right of petit ioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of justcompensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws.Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petit ioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land

owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was

based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered.

The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared.

Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own

independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of

properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees

in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent

legislative fiat

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION


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G.R. No. L-69620 September 24, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

ALFREDO PATOG y PARAAN and ARNOLFO OLSIM y BUSTILLO, defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V finding appellants ARNOLFOOLSIM and ALFREDO PATOG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted sale of marijuana andsentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to pay costsaccording to their proportionate shares.

The amended information filed against the appellants alleged:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about the 28th day of March, 1984, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within thejurisdict ion of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused (Alfredo Patog, Arnulfo Olsim andJames Balisong), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and therewilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to sell one (1) kilo of marijuana dried leaves atPl,000.00 to an undercover agent without authority of law to do so, in violation of the aforecit edSect ion (Section 21, Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425).

The prosecution's evidence upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt issummarized by the said court as follows:

Sgt. Glenn Logan and Sgt. Pacifico Mugar, both members of the PC Narcotics Command, RegionalUnit I, test ified that on March 28, 1984, they, together with CIC Charlie Duatin, were constitutedby their superior off icer into a team to entrap suspected marijuana pushers at the vicinity of

Carantes Street Baguio City. Logan was to pose as a buyer of the stuff while Mugar and Duatinwere to back him up.

The three thus proceeded to the designated place in the company of a civilian informer. The re, theinformer introduced Logan to a certain Boyet, who, by then, had already been reputed to be abroker in the sale of the prohibited drugs. Boyet's full name is Arnulfo Olsim. Logan asked Olsim ffthe latter bad some marijuana for sale. Olsim repl ied in the affirmative and quoted the price atP1,000.00 a kilo. Olsim further informed Logan that he Olsim would first get a sample from theowner for Logan to see. That was about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

At about 2:30, Olsim returned and handed to Logan a stalk of dried marijuana flowering topwrapped in tin foil (Exhibit "F"). After examining the sample, Logan ordered a kilo of the stuff.Olsim wanted the payment to be advanced but Logan suggested that the owner be brought to himand he would pay only after delivery shall have been effected.

Olsim once more left and went back at about 5:20 on board a Cimarron passenger vehicle with twocompanions who turned out to be Alfredo Patog and James Balisong. Balisong was driving thevehicle and Patog was seated beside him while Olsim was at the backseat. They parked beside theBaguio Park Hotel and invited Logan to join them in the vehicle. Olsim introduced Patog andBalisong as the owners of the marijuana. Thereupon, Logan asked for the marijuana. Patog pulledout a white plastic shopping bag (Exhibit "E-1") from his seat and handed it to Logan whileBalisong demanded the payment. Instead however of paying, Logan signalled Mugar and Duat inand they apprehended the three-Patog, Balisong and Olsim.


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The contents (Exhibit "E") of the bag were later on examined at the PC Crime Laboratory in CampDangwa (Exhibit "D") and they were determined by Forensic Chemist Carlos Figueroa to be a 0.9kilo o f dried marijuana flowering tops (Exhibit "C").

The lower court rendered its dec ision against Arnolfo Olsim and A lfredo Patog only, as James Balisong remained atlarge.

The appellant Patog raised the following assignment of errors in this appeal:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THAT BOTH ACCUSED OLSIM AND PATOG AREPARTICIPANTS IN A CONSPIRACY TO SELL MARIJUANA TO SGT. LOGAN.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT ACCUSEDALFREDO PATOG REALLY LOANED P300.00 TO BALISONG; SO MUCH SO, THAT PATOG READILYCONSENTED TO MEET BALISONG SOMEWHERE IN ORDER THAT HE COULD RECEIVE PAYMENT

OF WHAT HE LOANED TO HIM.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED ALFREDO PATOG WHEN THERE WAS NOEVIDENCE WHATSOEVER TO PROVE THAT HE DID SELL OR DISPATCH IN TRANSIT ANYMARIJUANA TO THE SUPPOSED BUYER.

IV

THAT THE INCULPATORY FACTS IN THIS CASE ARE NOT CLEAR CUT AND ARE SUBJECT OFDIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE INNOCENCE OF

ACCUSED PATOG AND THE OTHER CONSISTENT WITH HIS GUILT, AND THEREFORE THE

EVIDENCE DOES NOT FULFILL THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY AND IS NOT SUFFICIENT TOSUPPORT CONVICTION.

Appellant Olsim raised is assignment of errors in his behalf

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION ANDTHAT OF THE DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT OLSIM HAS BEEN

ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE FACT THAT WITHOUT THEINDUCEMENT HEREIN APPELLANT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.

Both appellants question the failure of the trial court to appreciate their respective defenses.

The lower court held:

The Court has found no cogent reason to doubt the narration Of the prosecution of what hadhappened. it has all the earmarks of sincerity to the truth. It bears no exaggeration or fabrication.


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On the other hand, the versions of Olsim and Patog are far from credible. ...

Olsim denies his role in the transaction between Balisong and Sgt. Logan as described by the prosecution witnesses.He gives the follow ing narration to support his content ion that his involvement in the deal was due to the instigationof Sgt. Logan:

xxx xxx xxx

... [A]t the time of the incident he was waiting for his mother at Carantes Street, Baguio City. Hewas not selling any "stuff" (marijuana). Neither was he offering something for sale to somebodynor was he in possession of any prohibited drugs.

While waiting, an unidentified student approached Olsim It was about 1:30 o'clock in theafternoon. The student asked him if he knows somebody selling the 'stuff'. Olsim told the studentthat he does not know of anyone. But the latter begged of him to look for one. Then, the studentinvited Olsim to see the former's cousin at the Baguio Park Hotel The student's cousin turned outto be Sgt. Logan whom Olsim did not know to be a peace officer. Sgt. Logan too asked Olsim tolook for a seller of marijuana. He wanted to buy a kilo of marijuana at P1,000.00. Because of theinsistence of Sgt. Logan, appellant Olsim made efforts to look for a seller. He found one namedJames Balisong. And at about 5:30 o'clock in the afte rnoon of same date appellant Olsim brought

James Balisong accompanied by Alfredo Patog to Logan on board a cimarron (sic) car at TomasClaudio St reet, just beside the Baguio Park Hotel Alfredo Patog, upon instruction from JamesBalisong, got the plastic bag containing marijuana from t he back seat of the car and handed it toLogan. James Balisong asked Logan to hand over the P1,000.00. Instead, Logan gave the pre-arranged signal to the back-up team and arrested the suspects. Logan did not give the amountthat the accused were asking. ...

Patog denies any involvement in the deal alleging that he was completely unaware of the transaction. He allegesthat.

xxx xxx xxx

... On March 28, 1984, at about 2:00 P.M. he was at home resting, that after sometime, James

Balisong whose Ford Fiera vehicle he used to ride came to his house to borrow P300.00 and heloaned him the said amount after asking him what purpose win he use the money and Balisongsaid: "Don't ask me that because I am going to pay you a litt le later." He got the money from hiswife and Balisong to ld Patog he shall see him at the Empire Cinema but Balisong was not there buthe waited for him up to 5:15 that same afternoon (TSN, pp. 2 -4) hearing of September 10, 1984).

When Balisong arrived Patog asked him about his money and Balisong to ld him to ride in thevehicle because they are going to Baguio Park Hotel to meet a friend and he rode with him; thatupon arrival at said place, he saw Balisong talking with two persons whose names he does notknow; that while Balisong was inside the jeep the two persons were outside beside him that theytalked for about 10 minutes and Balisong to ld him to get a plastic bag and he got one and gave itto the person with whom Balisong was talking, that afte r handing the bag to said person, Balisongasked for the P1,000.00; then Patog told Balisong. "Let' s go because I'm going somewhere," butthe person with whom Balisong was conversing with held him. (TSN, pp. 4-6, infra). When he was

held, Patog protested by saying "What I have done?"; that he was told: He (Patog) made a bigmistake Thereafter, they were brought to the NARCOM at the City Camp, Baguio; and the PCofficers were urging him to admit but he did not admit anything. (TSN, pp. 6 -7. infra.).

The issues raised are factual. They center on what actually transpired. The trial court 's appreciation of the evidenceof the prosecution and that of the defense focusses on the credibility of the witnesses. When the issue is one ofcredibility of witnesses, we have always accorded the highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial court(People v. Jones, 137 SCRA 166; People v. Egas, 137 SCRA 188; People v. Rosario, 134 SCRA 496), unless the courthas plainly ove rlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the same(People v. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280). The case at bar is no exception to the rule.


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Moreover, as held in People v. Gamayon,(121 SCRA 642), we give credence to the narration of the incident by theprosecution witnesses, especially as they happen to be police officers who are presumed to have performed theirduties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Logan, Mugar and Duatin were members of the PC Narcotics Command who were constituted into a team preciselyto operate against marijuana pushers in the area where the crime was committed. There is nothing in the records tosuggest that they were motivated by any reason other than to accomplish t heir mission. Where there is no evidence,and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, thepresumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People v. Campana,124 SCRA 271).

On the specific issue of whether the case involved entrapment or instigation, appellant Olsim contends that he didthe act not out of his own volition but upon the instigation of Sgt. Logan. Accordingly, he alleges that he should beexempt from criminal liability. The contention is w ithout merit.

In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breakers in theexecution of their criminal plan; whereas, in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant intothe commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution andconviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted (People v. Valmores, 122 SCRA 922).

Olsim, in the early part o f his testimony, denied knowing anyone who sells marijuana. Yet when asked to look forone, he was able to find a seller on the very same day. Furthermore, we agree with the lower court that Balisongwould not have readily admitted to Olsim that he (Balisong) had marijuana available for sale if Balisong did not knowand trust him very well. As a matter o f fact, Olsim alias "Boyet" was reputed to be a broker in the sale of prohibitiondrugs. He was approached because of his reputation.

Therefore, we sustain the trial court's f inding that Olsim's pose that he was instigated, first by the unidentifiedstudent and then by Sgt. Logan is without factual and legal basis. The mode of detection and arrest resorted to wasentrapment which is perfectly legal.

With respect to Patog, his alib i that he was with Balisong at the t ime of the incident to collect a P300.00 debt whichhe loaned earlier that same day is not credible. Not only his manner of test ifying but the attendant circumstancesmade his testimony unbelievable to the trial court . Patog himself admits that he and his wife were jobless save for

the fact that his wife buys and sells bananas. The trial court found it hard to believe that Patog would readily partwith P300.00, a considerable sum for him at the time, to someone who is not even a relative and whom he knowsonly because he (Patog) usually r ides in his Ford Fiera. W e also agree w ith the lower court that it is unthinkable thatBalisong the borrower, would unnecessarily burden Patog with the inconvenience of following the fo rmer to the c ityproper later the same day for the repayment of the loan instead of Balisong going back in his vehicle to pay. The it isalso strange that upon seeing Patog at the designated place, Balisong would ask him to ride at the backseat of thevehicle when it would have been more natural for them to sit beside each other in front, they being the only personson board and whose only purpose was to effect payment of a debt.

Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as thecommon experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (Salonga v. Pano,134 SCRA 438).

The question that then presents itself is whether the appellants conspired to sell marijuana to Sgt. Logan.

This issue is important in ascertaining the proper penalty to mete out. The pert inent provisions of Republic Act No.6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) to the instant case are:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration De livery, Distribut ion and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-Thepenalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from 20 thousand to thirty thousandpesos, shag be imposed upon any person, who, unless, authorized by law, shall sell administer,deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or


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HELD:Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, w hich provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdict ion

over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . The present

action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

What are the two phases of expropriation cases?

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain

and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of

dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaint iff has a lawful right to take the property sought to

be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to

be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a

final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the

merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the

proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exe rcise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety

thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just

compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than

three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of t he evidence before, and findings of,

the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing

more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its

instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the

authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the

main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise o f eminent domain, a matter that is incapable

of pecuniary estimation.

Visayan Refining Company et. al vs. Camus et. al G.R. No. L-15870December 3, 1919 Street, J.

FACTS: Upon the direction of the Governor-General, t he Attorney-General filed a complaint with the CFI (Rizal) in the

name of the Government of the Philippines for the condemnation of a certain t ract of land in Paranaque for military

and aviation purposes. The petitioners herein are among the defendants named. Likewise, it was prayed that the

court w ill give t he Government the possession of the land to be expropriated after the necessary deposit (provisional)


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of P600, 000.00 as the total value of the property. Through the order of the public respondent, Judge Camus, the

prayer was granted.

During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a demurrer quest ioning the validity of the proceedings

on the ground that there is no law authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Likewise, they moved

for the revocation of the order on the same ground stated and with additional allegation that the deposit had been

made without authority of law since the money was taken from the unexpended balance of the funds appropriated

by previous statutes for the use of the Militia Commission and t he authority for the exercise of the power of eminent

domain could not be found in those statutes. The demurrer and motion were overruled and denied respectively by

Camus. This prompted the petit ioners to file this instant petition to stop the proceedings in the CFI.

ISSUE: Can the Philippine Government initiate expropriation proceedings in the absence of a statute authorizing t he

exercise of the power of eminent domain?

RULING: Yes, it can. The Philippine Government has the general authority to exercise the power of eminent domain

as expressly conferred by Section 63 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902). It says that the Philippine

Government is authorized to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey tit le to real and pe rsonal property, and

may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right to eminent domain.The same is subject to

the limitation of due process of law. In consonance with this, Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine

Islands (Act No. 2711) expressly confe rs on the Government General the power to determine when it is

necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of t he Government of the Philippine

Island; and to direct the Attorney-General, where such at is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation

proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdict ion.There is no question as to the Governor

Generals authority to exercise this power.

However, this authority is not absolute. It is subject to two limitations, namely, that the taking shall be for public

purpose and there must be just compensation.

Apparently, the reason behind the taking of the subject land was for military and aviation purposes. This considered

a public purpose g iven the importance of the military and aviation in the operation of the State.

As to the second requirement, it must be remembered that at that time there was no law requiring that

compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation. The deposit was made, despite the

absence of said law, to afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an

unwilling owner until compensation is paid. This is in conformity with the just compensation requirement.

Given these reasons, the proceedings were made in accordance with law.

DISPOSITION

Petit ion is denied. Proceedings of the lower court were in all respects regular and within the jurisdiction of the court.

Gr no. 107916


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Moday vs Court of Appeals

on June 24, 2011

Municipal Corporation Eminent DomainDisapproval by SP of SB Resolution

Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution

authorizing t he mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which

is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was

transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is

not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor

pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was

disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD:

Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental

State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government s right to appropriate, in the nature of acompulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national

legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entit ies and

public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use

and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal

resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is w hen such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred

upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated

that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB re solution

as inval id. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998

J. Panganiban

Petit ion for review on certiorari

Facts:

Under a city council resolut ion, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint forexpropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters.

The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didnt accept .

The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject

property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on

its current tax declaration.


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According to the respondent, t he complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a

resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local GovernmentCode); and (b) the cause of action,

if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petit ioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.

The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues:

1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will

not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is

primarily involved.

Held: No to 1stYes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

1. Petit ioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an

expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and

resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestow ing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief

executive to init iate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare

through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its

chief execut ive to init iate expropriation proceedings.

Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the

exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to

expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints,

imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

Sec 19, RA 7160

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the powerof eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment

of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pert inent laws.

Thus, the follow ing essential requisite s must concur before an LGU can exercise the power ofeminent domain :

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU,

to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.


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2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and

the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other

pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but

said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domainpursuant to a resolution

of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance w ith the first requisite that the mayor be authorized

through an ordinance.

We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A

municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolut ion is merely a dec laration of

the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent

character, but a resolution is temporary in nature .

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply

adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the

previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act

pursuant to an ordinance.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the

people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to

ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a st rict construct ion.

When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual

without his consent, the p lain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation .

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an

LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear lette r of the law is controlling and cannot be amended

by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.

Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior domain,

since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.

2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application of res judicata

are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving

identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdict ion over it.

Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and

proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.

Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use wheneve r they need it .

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply

to specific issues decided in a previous case.


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In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exerciseeminent domain is not

diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of

the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate

the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with.

G.R. No. 135087 March 14, 2000

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN,petitioner,vs.CITY OF MANDALUYONG,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, petitioners1pray for the reversal of the Order dated July 28,1998 issued by Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 entitled "City of Mandaluyong v.

Alberto S. Suguitan, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED and an ORDER OFCONDEMNATION is hereby issued declaring that the plaint iff, City of Mandaluyong, has a lawful right to takethe subject parcel of land together with existing improvements thereon more specifically covered byTransfer Certificate Of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District II for the public useor purpose as stated in the Complaint, upon payment of just compensation.

Accordingly, in order to ascertain the just compensation, the parties are hereby directed to submit to theCourt w ithin fifteen (15) days from notice he reof, a list of independent appraisers from which the Court w ill

select three (3) to be appointed as Commissioners, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.2

It is undisputed by the parties that on October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issuedResolution No. 396, S-19943authorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings overthe property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of414 square meters and more particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry ofDeeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the MandaluyongMedical Center.

Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 of fering to buy his property, butSuguitan refused to sell.4Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint 5for

expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The case was docketed as SCA No. 875.

Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss6the complaint based on the follow ing grounds(1) the power of eminentdomain is not be ing exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation ofsubject property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of justcompensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for the payment of the property beingexpropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan's property is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire thesame for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the motion. On October 24, 1995, thetrial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.7
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On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an order allow ing theCity of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 represent ing15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration of such property. OnDecember 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ ofpossession issued by the trial court on December 14, 1995.8On July 28, 1998, the court granted the assailed order ofexpropriation.

Petit ioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by meansof an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, 9and not by means of a mereresolution.10Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; thatpursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolut ion is asufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court . Respondent's position,which was upheld by the trial court, was explained, thus:11

. . . in the exercise of the respondent City of Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a "resolution"empowering the City Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings and thereafter when the court hasalready determine[d] with certainty the amount of just compensation to be paid for the propertyexpropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungosd appropriating funds for the paymentof the expropriated property. Admittedly, t itle to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to theexpropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.12

Petit ioners refute respondent' s content ion that only a resolut ion is necessary upon the init iation of expropriationproceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for the payment of justcompensation, explaining t hat the resolut ion mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of grantingadministrative authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation case in court and to represent the localgovernment unit in such case, but does not dispense with the necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the powerof eminent domain under section 19 of the Code. 13

The pet ition is imbued with merit.

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses topromote public welfare.14It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty ofgovernment to serve the common need and advance the general welfare.15Thus, the right of eminent domainappertains to every independent government without the necessity for const itutional recognition. 16The provisionsfound in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not byimplication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. 17Thus,our own Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation."18Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses19act as additional safeguards againstthe arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual's right to private property, a constitutionally -protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected withthe rights to life and liberty,20the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manilavs.Chinese Community of Manilawe said:21

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is

necessarily in de rogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strict ly

construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by theconstitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When thelegislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriat es the land of an individualwithout his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation.(Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Gal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicateexercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power maybe to the government, the inviolable sanct ity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property ofthe cit izens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as
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modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. . . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5thEd.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)

The power of eminent domain is essent ially legislative in nature. It is firmly set tled, however, that such power maybe validly de legated to local government units, other public entities and public ut ilities, although the scope of thisdelegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised instrict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.22

The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is section 19 of RA 7160 whichprovides that:

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise thepower of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless,upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinentlaws;Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and

definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided,further,That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of theexpropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to beexpropriated; Provided,finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined

by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts todetermine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. 23In fact,the courts have adopted a more censorious att itude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of thisdelegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is direct ly exercised by the national legislature. 24

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the localgovernment unit concerned:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf ofthe local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedingsover a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of thepoor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of t he Constitution, andother pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be

expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 25

In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners'property by means of a resolut ion, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from

ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent

domain. We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation26

regarding the distinctionbetween an ordinance and a resolut ion. In that 1998 case we held that:

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" aresynonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution ismerely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinancepossesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the twoare enacted differentlya third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unlessdecided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
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We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court hasdetermined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance isnecessary to authorize the filing of a complaint w ith the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power ofeminent domain is already being exercised.

Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages:

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaint iff to exercise the power ofeminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends withan order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring t hat the plaint iff has a lawful right totake the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon

the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for theproperty sought to be taken; this is done by the court w ith the assistance of not more than three (3)

commissioners.27

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transferof ownership in favor of the plaint iff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrivedat without an initial finding by the court that the plaint iff has a lawful right to t ake the property sought to be

expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at t hisstage would be final, resolving t he question of whether or not the plaint iff has properly and legally exercised itspower of eminent domain.

Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter upon thepossession of the real property involved upon depositing with the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fairmarket value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. 28Therefore,an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power ofeminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint w ith the proper court, and not only afterthe court has determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is ent itled.

Neither is respondent's position improved by its reliance upon Article 36 (a), Rule VI of the IRR which provides that:

If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, LGU mayexpropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiateexpropriation proceedings.

The Court has already discussed this inconsistency between the Code and the IRR, which is more apparent than real,in Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation,29which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolut ion to

authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, thelaw itself, surely prevails over said rule w hich merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clearletter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for itsimplementation. Besides, what the d iscrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of theimplementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent

domain, the chief execut ive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.

Therefore, while we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, we cannot grantjudicial sanct ion to a local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention ofthe very law giving it such power.

It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case will not preclude the City of Mandaluyong from enacting thenecessary ordinance and thereafter reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied with allother legal requirements.30
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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Courtof Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF PASIG,

METRO MANILA, digested

Posted byPius Morados onNovember 8, 2011

GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Valid and Definite Offer)

FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent municipality (now cit y) as having

the right to expropriate petit ioners property for the construction of an access road. Petit ioner argues that there was

no valid and definite offer made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules

and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was

offered to the previous owners and the same was not accepted.

ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate .

HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance w ith the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will result in the

dismissal of t he complaint . The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to encourage

sett lements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay

of a court of action.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,vs.

AURELLANO S. TIANGCO, LOURDES S. TIANGCO and NESTOR S. TIANGCO,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petit ioner National Power Corporation(NPC) seeks the annulment and sett ing aside of the Decision1dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inCA-G.R. CV No. 53576, as reiterated in its Resolution2of December 2, 2005 which denied the petit ioners motion forreconsideration. The assailed decision modified that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, byincreasing t he amount of just compensation due the respondents in an expropriation case filed against them by thepetitioner.

The facts:
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Herein respondents Aurellano, Lourdes and Nestor, all surnamed Tiangco, are the owners of a parcel of land w ith anarea of 152,187 square meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal and registered in their names under TCT No. M -17865 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.

On the other hand, petitioner NPC is a government -owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose ofundertaking the development and generation of power from whatever source. NPCs charte r (Republic Act No. 6395)authorizes the corporation to acquire private property and exercise the right of eminent domain.1awphi1.net

NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPCs Segregation Plan3for the purpose shows that the desiredright-of-way will cut through the respondents land, in such a manner that 33,392 square meters thereof will be leftseparated from 99,372 square meters of the property. Within the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit -bearing tress, such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintonesand coconut trees.

On November 20, 1990, after repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed with the RTC of

Tanay, Rizal a complaint for expropriation4against them. In time, the respondents filed their answer.

On March 14, 1991, the trial court issued a Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of thearea sought to be expropriated. In the same Order, the court directed the part ies to nominate their respect ivecommissioners, w ith a third member to be nominated and appointed by the court itself, to determine the proper

amount of just compensat ion to be paid to the respondents. As constituted in the manner thus indicated, the boardof commissioners was composed of the follow ing: for NPC, Atty. Restituto Mallo o f its Legal Department; for therespondents, Mr. Basilio A fuang, a geodetic engineer and a real estate broker by profession; and for the court, Clerkof Court V Ms. Amelia de Guzman Carbonell.

On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order d irecting NPC to pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurerthe amount of P81,204.00, representing the temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation priorto the taking of possession thereof. On April 22, 1991, with NPC having complied with the deposit requirement, a writof possession was issued in its favor.

Thereafter, an ocular inspect ion of the premises was conducted and hearings before the board of commissionerswere held, during which the Municipal Assessor of Tanay, Rizal was presented. He submitted a record of theSchedule of Values for taxation purposes and a certification to t he effect that the unit value of the respondents

property is P21,000.00 per hectare.

On August 7, 1993, commissioner Basilio Afuang for the respondents f iled his report. He pegged the price of the areasought to be expropriated at P30.00 per square meter or P582,690.005in the aggregate; and for the improvementsthereon, Afuang placed a valuation of P2,093,950.00. The figures are in contrast with the respondents own valuationof P600,600.00, for the area, and P4,935,500.00, for the improvements.

On September 14, 1993, NPC filed an amended complaint t o acquire only 19,423 square meters of the respondentsproperty. The original area of 20,220 square mete rs initially sought to be expropriated under the original complaintturned out to be in excess of the area required.

For its part, NPC made it clear that it is interested only in acquiring an easement of right -of-way over therespondents property and that ownership of the area over which the right-of-way will be established shall remain

with the respondents. For this reason, NPC claims that it should pay, in addition to the agreed or adjudged value ofthe improvements on the area, onlyan easement fee in an amount equivalent to ten per cent(10%) of the marketvalue of the property as declared by the respondents or by the Municipal Assessor, whichever is lower, as providedfor under Section 3 -A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by President ial Decree 938.6

The court-appointed commissioner, Ms. Amelia de Guzman Carbonell, found that the risk and dangerous nature ofthe transmission line project essentially deprive the respondents of the use of the area. Nonetheless, sherecommended that the determination of just compensation should be relegated to "expert appraisers." 7
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From the evidence before it, the trial court made a determination that the market value of the property is P2.09 persquare meter, or P40,594.07 for the entire 19,423 square meters needed by NPC, and not the P30.00 per squaremeter claimed by the respondents. Neither d id the trial court consider NPCs reliance on Section 3 -A of Republic ActNo. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938, the court placing more weight on the respondents argument thatexpropriation would result in the substantial impairment of the use of the area needed, even though what is soughtis a mere aerial right -of-way. The court found as reasonable the amount of P324,750.00 offered by NPC for the

improvements, as the same is based on the official current schedule of values as determined by the Municipal

Assessor of Tanay, Rizal.

Hence, in its decision8of February 19, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area of 19,423 sq.m. covered by TCT No.M-17860 owned by the [respondents];

2. Ordering the amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affectedby the expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the improvementson the land expropriated with legal interest from the time of possession by the plaintiff. No pronouncementas to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets supplied.)

The respondents moved for reconsideration, presenting for the first t ime a document entit led "Bureau of InternalRevenue Circular of Appraisal," which shows that for the year 1985, lands in Barangay Sampaloc were valuedatP30.00 per square meter; for the year 1992, at P80.00 per square meter; and for year 1994, at P100.00 per squaremeter. Respondents maintain that the price of P30.00 per square meter for the needed area of 19,423 square metersis the reasonable amount and should be the basis for fixing the amount of just compensat ion due them. The trialcourt denied the motion, stating that the BIR circular in quest ion was belatedly filed and therefore NPC could nothave opposed its presentation.

From the aforesaid decision of the trial court , both NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat theseparate appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53576. The appellate court found merit in the

respondents appeal, and disregarded theP2.09 per square meter valuation of the trial court, which was based ona 1984tax declaration. Instead, the CA placed reliance upon a 1993tax declaration, "being only two years removedfrom the time of taking."9The appellate court determined the time of taking to be in 1991. Thus, the greater valueof P913,122.00 as declared in Tax Declaration No. 011-2667 dated July 23, 1993 should be the basis for determining

just compensation. With regard to the value of improvements, the appellate court found NPCs valuation morefavorable, being based on the current (1991) schedule of values for trees in the provinces of Rizal and Laguna.Hence, in its decision10of March 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80dated February 19, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED and the compensation awarded for the 19,423 square meters of landaffected is increased to P116,538.00, and the reasonable compensation for the improvements thereon is likewiseincreased to P325,025.00, with legal interest from the time of possession by the plaint iff-appe llee NAPOCOR. Nopronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

NPC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the appellate court in its resolution11of December 2,2005.

Hence, NPCs instant petit ion for review, submitting for our resolution only the follow ing issues with respect totheamount of just compensationthat must be paid the respondents for the expropriated port ion (19,423 squaremeters) of their property:
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1. Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation?

2. Should NPC pay for the value of the land being taken, or should it be limited to what is provided for

under P.D. 938, that is, ten per cent (10%) of its market value as declared by the owner or theassessor (whichever is lower), considering that the purpose for which the property is being taken is

merely for the establishment of a safe and free passage for its overhead transmission lines?

There is no issue as to the improvements. Since the P325,025.00 valuation therefor is the very price set by the NPCcommissioner, to which the corporation did not object but otherwise adopts, the Court fixes the amountofP325,025.00 as just compensation for the improvements.

We now come to the more weighty question of what amount is just by way of compensation for the 19,423 square -meter port ion of the respondents property.

In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto.Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 shouldbe considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents. So it is that in Nat ional Power Corporationv. Court of Appeals, et al.,12we ruled:

Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings ofthis Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the t ime of filing of the complaintconsistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into theproperty, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint .

The t rial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at its 1993 worth. Neither of the twodeterminations is correct. For purposes of just compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of theproperty as of the time of the filing of t he complaint which is deemed to be the t ime of taking the property.

It was certainly unfair for the t rial court to have considered a property value several years behind its worth at thetime the complaint in this case was filed on November 20, 1990. The landowners are necessarily short changed,considering that, as a rule, land values enjoy steady upward movement. It was likewise erroneous for the appellatecourt to have fixed the value of

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