RADIOWEALTH V. PALILEO (May 20, 1991)

FACTS:

Spouses Castro sold a parcel of unregistered coconut

land in Surigao del Norte to Manuelito Palileo. The

sale is evidenced by a notarized deed of sale and

Palileo exercised acts of ownership through his

mother and also paid real estate taxes.

Meanwhile, a judgment over a civil case was

rendered agains Enriqur Castro ordering him to pay

22K to Radiowealth Finance Co.

Pursuant to this, the provincial sheriff levied upon and

sold in public auction the subject land that was

previously sold to Palileo. A certificate of sale was

issued in favor of Radiowealth being the lone bidder

and after the expiration of the period of redemption, a

deed of final sale was also executed in their favor and

both deeds was registered to the Registry of Deeds.

ISSUE:

WON the sale in public auction is valid.

HELD:

Had Art.1544 been applied, the judgment should be

rendered in favor of Radiowealth being the one who

registered the land first. But since the subject land is

an unregistered land, a different rule should apply.

Under Act.3344 mere registration of a sale in one's

favor does not give him any right over the land if the

vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having

previously sold the same to somebody else even if

the earlier sale was unrecorded.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to

land not registered under the torrens system. It was

explained that this is because the purchaser of

unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only

steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and

merely acquires the latter's interest in the property

sold as of the time the property was levied upon. As

such, the execution sale of the unregistered land in

favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no

longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time

of the said execution sale.

NAVERA V. CA (April 26, 1990)

FACTS:

Leocadio Navera owns a parcel of land in Albay which

was inherited by his 5 children. His 3 children already

have their share of the inheritance from the other

properties of Leocadio. The subject land was now

owned by his 2 daughters. An OCT was issued in the

name of Elena Navera et.al (et.al refers to his sister

Eduarda Navera)

When Elena died, his share of the land was inherited

by her heirs Arsenio and Felix Narez. The other

portion was owned by Eduarda.

Eduarda sold her portion to her nephew Arsenio and

then one year after to Mariano Navera. Both sales

were made in a public instrument but both sales were

also not registered in the Registry of Property.

ISSUE:

WON the second sale of the property is valid.

HELD:

Since the records show that both sales were not

recorded in the Registry of Property, the law clearly

vests the ownership upon the person who in good

faith was first in possession of the disputed lot.

The possession viewed in the law includes not only

the material but also the symbolic possession, which

is acquired by the execution of a public instrument.

This means that after the sale of a realty by means of

a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it to

another, does not transmit anything to the second

vendee, and if the latter, by virtue of this second sale,

takes material possession of the thing, he does it as

mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this

detention against the rights of the thing lawfully

acquired by the first vendee.

In the case at bar, the prior sale of the land to

respondent Arsenio Nares by means of a public

instrument is clearly tantamount to a delivery of the

land resulting in the material and symbolic possession

thereof by the latter.

CRUZ V. CABANA (June 22, 1984)

FACTS:

Leodegaria Cabana sold his real propery first to

Teofilo Legaspi and Illuminada Cabana and then later

to Abelardo Cruz.

Legaspi and Cabana were able to take possession of

the property but they were not able to register the

deed of absolute sale because the property was still

mortgaged to PNB. They however were able to

register with the RD the sale with the right to

repurchase.

On the other hand, Cruz succeeded to register the

deed of absolute sale in his favor.

HELD:

Even though Cruz was the first to register the deed of

absolute sale, he cannot be given a better right over

the property because he was a buyer in bad faith.

Cruz knew the prior sale of the property because he

was informed by the RD that Legazpi and Cabana

already registered the sale of the said property.

Knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property

by a subsequent purchaser makes him a purchaser in

bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates

his title acquired by virtue of the latter instrument of

conveyance which creates no right as against the first

purchaser.

TAÑEDO V. CA (January 22, 1996)

FACTS:

Lazaro Tañedo executed a deed of absolute sale in

favor of Ricardo Tañedo and Teresita Barrera in

which he conveyed a parcel of land which he will

inherit. Upon the death of his father he executed an

affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale. He

also executed another deed of sale in favor of the

spouses covering the parcel of land he already

inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed of sale in

the registry of deeds in their favor.

Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same

property to his children through a deed of sale.

ISSUE:

WON the Tañedo spouses have a better right over

the property against the children of Lazaro Tañedo.

HELD:

Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a

subject of a contract, the deed of sale and the affidavit

of conformity made by Lazaro has no effect. The

subject of dispute therefore is the deed of sale made

by him in favor of spouses Tañedo and another to his

children after he already legally acquired the property.

Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private

respondents was later than the one in favor of

petitioners, ownership would vest in the former

because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the

other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to

them at all.

Petitioners contend that they were in possession of

the property and that private respondents never took

possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the

one who registered the sale in his favor has a

preferred right over the other who has not registered

his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the

immovable property.

ESPIRITU V. VALERIO (December 23, 1976)

FACTS:

Valerio filed a case to quiet title against mother and

daughter Espiritu who were asserting their adversary

rights over said land and disturbing his possession

thereof.

Valerio presented a deed of sale from which he

acquired the property while the Espiritus allege that

they acquire the same from their deceased father. 

The Espiritus also presented two deeds of sale to

prove that their deceased father have a legal right

over the property which they inherited.

ISSUE:

WON mother and daughter Espiritu have a better right

over the property.

HELD:

Apparently, this case concerns the sales of one parcel

of land by the same vendor but in favor of two

different vendees.

If both allegations of the parties are valid, Espiritu's

contention that they have a better right than that the

claimed by Valerio would seem to be meritorious in

the light of the facts of the case and the provisions of

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, it not being

disputed that the Deed of Sale in favor of them was

registered first.

But since the deeds of sale presented by Esiritu are

found to be falsified, they have no legal right to claim

the disputed property.

ADALIN V. CA (October 10, 1997)

FACTS:

Appellee-Vendors sold their 5-door commercial

building to Appellants Yu and Lim located in front of

Imperial Hotel in Cotabato City.

Since there are lessees in the property, the vendors

offered it first to them twice but they refused both

offers. As such, appellee-vendors and appellants

executed a deed of conditional sale. The contract

states that they appellants will pay the down payment

of 300K first and the remaining balance after the

appellee-vendors completely evicted the lessees

occupying the property.

After the vendors and the tenants made known their

intention to buy the property for a higher price. As

such, the vendors executed three deeds of sale of

registered land in  favor of the lessees.

The vendors offered to return the downpayment paid

by the appellants but the latter refused. The vendors

contend that they can rescind the contract because

the condition to evict the tenants was not completed.

HELD:

Although the contract was a conditional sale, what

was subject to the condition is the payment of the

balance. Both parties have their respective obligations

yet to be fulfilled, the seller the eviction of the tenants

and the buyer, the payment of the balance of the

purchase price. The choice of who to sell the property

to, however, had already been made by the sellers

and is thus no longer subject to any condition nor

open to any change. In that sense, the sale to the

appellants was definitive and absolute. A clear breach

of contract was made by the vendors.

A case double sale occurred when the vendors sold

the property to the tenants. When the tenants bought

the property, they are fully aware of its prior sale to

the appellants. Though the second sale to the said

tenants was registered, such prior registration cannot

erase the gross bad faith that characterized such

second sale, and as such, there is no legal basis to

rule that such second sale prevails over the first sale

of the said property.  

MENDOZA V. KALAW (October 12, 1921)

FACTS:

Federico Cañet sold his land under a conditional sale

to Primitivo Kalaw. Less than two months after, he

sold it again to Agapito Mendoza under an absolute

sale.

Mendoza took possession of the land and enclosed it

with fence. Kalaw attempted to claim possession

but Mendoza refused. Kalaw attempted to have his

title registered in the registry of deeds but was denied

by for the reason that there existed some defect in the

description of the property, and that the title of the

vendor had not therefore been registered. The

register of deeds, however, did make a preventive

annotation.

HELD:

The ruling should be in favor of Mendoza because

even if he acquired the property subsequent to the

conditional sale in favor of Kalaw, a conditional sale,

before the performance of the condition, can hardly

be said to be a sale of property, especially where the

condition has not been performed or complied with.

CORONEL V. CA (October 07, 1996)

FACTS:

Coronel et al. consummated the sale of his property

located in Quezon City to respondent Alcaraz. Since

the title of the property was still in the name of the

deceased father of the Coronels, they agreed to

transfer its title to their name upon payment of the

down payment of 50K. and thereafter an absolute

deed of sale will be executed.

Alcaraz’s mother paid the down payment in behalf of

her daughter and as such, Coronel made the transfer

of title to their name. Notwithstanding this fact,

Coronel sold the property to petitioner Mabanag and

rescinded its prior contract with Alcaraz.

ISSUE:

WON the rescission of the first contract between

Coronel and Alcaraz is valid.

HELD:

The case is a contract of sale subject to a suspensive

condition in which consummation is subject only to

the successful transfer of the certificate of title from

the name of petitioners' father, to their names. Thus,

the contract of sale became obligatory.

With regard to double sale, the rule that the first in

time, stronger in right should apply. The contention of

the petitioner that she was a buyer in good faith

because the notice of lis pendens in the title was

annotated after she bought the property is of no merit.

In case of double sale, what finds relevance and

materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was

a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second

buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is,

without knowledge of any defect in the title of the

property sold.

The ruling should be in favor of Alcaraz because

Mabanag registered the property two months after the

notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title and

hence, she cannot be a buyer in good faith.

CHENG V. GENATO (December 29, 1998)

FACTS:

Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell to

spouses Da Jose pertaining to his property in

Bulacan. The contract made in public document

states that the spouses shall pay the down payment

and 30 days after verifying the authenticity of the

documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase

price.

Da Jose spouses was not able to finish verifying the

documents and as such asked for a 30 day extension.

Pending the extension and without notice to the

spouses, Genato made a document for the annulment

of the contract.

Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the property

and paid 50K check with the assurance that the

contract between Genato and the spouses Da Jose

will be annulled. Da Jose spouses protested with the

annulment and persuaded Genato to continue the

contract. Genato returned the check to Cheng and

hence, this petition.

HELD:

The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose

was a contract to sell which is subject to a suspensive

condition. Thus, there will be no contract to speak of,

if the obligor failed to perform the suspensive

condition which enforces a juridical relation.

Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be

made to apply to the situation in the instant case

because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose

spouses since the 30-day extension period has not

yet expired.

Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the

contract also cannot be validly rescinded because no

notice was given to them. Thus, Cheng's contention

that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da

Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to

Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this

case.

The contract between Genato and Cheng is a

contract to sell not a contract of sale. But But even

assuming that it should be treated as a conditional

contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force

since it was subject to a suspensive condition that the

earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da

Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded.

Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the

contract between herein respondents first in time; it

was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion

as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR

JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of

Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have

been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the

Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly

annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of

Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further

elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad

faith in entering into such agreement.

STA.ANA V. HERNANDEZ (January 17, 1966)

FACTS:

Spouses Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto.

Domingo sold a land in Bulacan to respondent Rosa

Hernandez for P11,000 lump sum. (there were two

other previous sales to different vendees of other

portions of the land)

The boundaries of the land were stated in the deed of

sale and its approximate land area.

Petitioners-spouses caused the preparation of the

subdivision plan but Hernandez didn’t agree to the

partition. As such, petitioners-spouses filed a case

alleging that Hernandez is occupying in excess of

17000 square meter of the land sold. Hernandez

claims that the excess area is part of the land she

bought.

ISSUE:

WON the excess area occupied by Hernandez is part

of the land sold.

HELD:

The sale involves a definite and identified tract, a

corpus certum, that obligated the vendors to deliver to

the buyer all the land within the boundaries,

irrespective of whether its real area should be greater

or smaller than what is recited in the deed.

To hold the buyer to no more than the area recited on

the deed, it must be made clear therein that the sale

was made by unit of measure at a definite price for

each unit. The sale in this case only involves the

definite boundaries but only approximate land areas.

As such,  Art 1542 concerning the sale for lump sum

must be considered.

VILLARTA V. CA (May 29, 1987)

FACTS:

Respondent Rosalinda Cruz entrusted to petitioner

Victoria Villarta seven pieces of jewelry on November

1968. On December of the same year, Villarta

exchanges one jewelry to another and issued a post-

dated check in favor of Cruz. Cruz deposited the

check but it was dishonored for lack of funds.

An estafa case was filed against Villarta but she

argued that she can only be civilly liable because

even though the check bounced, she only gave it for a

pre-existing obligation. She contends a person cannot

be imprisoned for non-payment of debt.

ISSUE:

WON the transaction is a “sale or return”

HELD:

The transaction is not a sale or return but a sale on

approval or sale on acceptance.

When Cruz gave the jewelry to Villarta on November,

the clear intention is to make the latter choose which

item she wanted to buy. There was no meeting of the

minds yet at this point and hence, it cannot be

considered as delivery.

If ownership over the jewelry was not transmitted on

that date, then it could have been transmitted only in

December 1968, the date when the check was

issued. In which case, it was a "sale on approval"

since ownership passed to the buyer. Vallarta, only

when she signified her approval or acceptance to the

seller, Cruz, and the price was agreed upon.

It is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a

check which is made punishable under the Revised

Penal Code, and not the non-payment of the debt.

POWER COMMERCIAL V. CA (June 20, 1997)

FACTS:

Petitioner asbestos manufacturer Power Commercial

and industrial corporation bought the property of

spouses Reynaldo and Angelita Quiambao located

in Makati City.

Since there are lessees occupying the subject land,

part of the deed of sale is a warranty of respondents

that will defend its title and peaceful possession in

favor of the petitioners.

The property is mortgage to PNP and as such,

petitioners filed a request to assume responsibility of

the mortgage. Because of petitioners failure to

produce the required papers, their petition was

denied.

Petitioners allege that the contract should be

rescinded because of failure of delivery.

ISSUE:

WON the contract is recissible due to breach of

contract.

HELD:

There is no breach of contact in this case since there

is no provision in the contract that imposes the

obligation to the respondents to eject the people

occupying the property.

There was also a constructive delivery because the

deed of sale was made in a public document. The

contention of the petitioners that there could be no

constructive delivery because the respondents is not

in possession of the property is of no merit. What

matters in a constructive delivery is control and not

possession. Control was placed in the hands of the

petitioners that is why they were able to file an

ejectment case. Prior physical delivery or possession

is not legally required and the execution of the deed

of sale is deemed equivalent to delivery.

DY V. CA (July 08, 1991)

FACTS:

Wilfredo Dy bought a truck and tractor from Libra

Finance Corporation. Both truck and tractor was also

mortgage to Libra as security for a loan and as such,

they took possession of it. Brother of Wilfredo,

Perfecto Dy and sister Carol Dy-Seno requested Libra

that they be allowed to buy the property and assume

the mortgage debt. Libra agreed to the request.

Meanwhile, a collection suit was filed against Wilfredo

Dy by Gelac Trading Inc. On the strength of a writ of

execution, the sheriff was able to obtain the tractor on

the premises of Libra. It was sold in a public auction in

which Gelac Trading was the lone bidder. Gelac

subsequently sold it to one of their stockholders.

The respondents claim that at the time of the

execution of the deed of sale, no constructive delivery

was effected since the consummation of the sale

depended upon the clearance and encashment of the

check which was issued in payment of the subject

tractor

ISSUE:

WON the William Dy is still the owner of the tractor

when it was obtained through the writ of execution.

HELD:

The tractor was not anymore in possession of William

Dy when it was obtained by the sheriff because he

already sold it to his brother.

William Dy has the right to sell his property even

though it was mortgage because in a mortgage, the

mortgagor doesn’t part with the ownership over the

property. He is allowed to sell the property as long as

there is consent from the mortgagee such as in this

case. But even if there is no consent given, the sale

would still be valid without prejudice to the criminal

action against the mortgagor.

When William  Dy sold the tractor, he already

transferred the ownership of it because NCC states

that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the

vendee from the moment it is delivered to him or in

any other manner signing an agreement that the

possession is transferred from the vendor to the

vendee. In the instant case, actual delivery of the

subject tractor could not be made but there was

constructive delivery already upon the execution of a

public instrument which in this case is a deed of sale.

The payment of the check was actually intended to

extinguish the mortgage obligation.

PASAGUI V. VILLABLANCA (November 10, 1975)

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar bought a

property in Leyte from Estaquia and Catalina Bocar

for P2,800. Before they could take possession of the

property, defendant spouses Ester T. Villablanca and

Zosimo Villablanca took possession of it and

harvested from the coconut plantation thereon.

Plaintiffs demanded the return of the property but the

defendants refused.

Plaintiffs filed a case in the CFI but respondents

contend that the case is a forcible entry and as such,

CFI has no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON the case is of forcible entry.

HELD:

In order that an action may be considered as one for

forcible entry, it is not only necessary that the plaintiff

should allege his prior physical possession of the

property but also that he was deprived of his

possession by any of the means provided in section

1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute

sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of

the land subject of the sale. This presumptive delivery

only holds true when there is no impediment that may

prevent the passing of the property from the hands of

the vendor into those of the vendee. It can be negated

by the reality that the vendees actually failed to obtain

material possession of the land subject of the sale.

DANGUILAN V. AIC (November 28, 1988)

FACTS:

A residential and farm lot in Cagayan owned by

Dominggo Melad were being claimed by petitioner

Felix Danguilan and respondent Apolonia Melad.

Apolonia contends that she acquired the property

when Dominggo Melad sold it to her when she was

just three years old in which her mother paid the

consideration. She contends that she just moved out

of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan

approached her and asked permission to cultivate the

land and to stay therein.

Dangguilan presented for his part 2 documents to

prove his claim that the properties were given to him

by Dominggo Melad through an onerous donation.

The onerous part of the donation includes the taking

care of the farm and the arrangement of the burial of

Dominggo.

HELD:

The ruling should be in favor of Danguilan. The

contention of Apolonia that the deed of donation is

void because it was not made through a public

document is of no merit. The deed was an onerous

one and hence, it was not covered by the rule in

Article 749 requiring donations of real properties to be

effected through a public instrument. An onerous

donation is effective and valid if it embraces the

conditions that the law requires. Since it has been

proven that Danguilan did the conditions in the

onerous donation particularly the arrangement of

Dominggo’s burial, the deed is deemed valid.

On the other hand, the deed of sale made in favor of

Apolonia is suspicious. One may well wonder why the

transfer was not made to the mother herself, who was

after all the one paying for the lands. The averment

was also made that the contract was simulated and

prepared after Domingo Melad's death in 1945.

Even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the

record shows that the private respondent did not take

possession of the disputed properties and indeed

waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the

lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession,

she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by

her own sworn admission, and moved out to another

lot belonging to her step-brother. In short, she failed

to show that she consummated the contract of sale by

actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual

possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.

Ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only

by delivery.

ADDISON V. FELIX (August 03, 1918)

FACTS:

Petitioner Addison sold four parcels of land to

Defendant spouses Felix and Tioco located

in LucenaCity. Respondents paid 3K for the purchase

price and promised to pay the remaining by

installment. The contract provides that the purchasers

may rescind the contract within one year after the

issuance of title on their name.

The petitioner went to Lucena for the survey

designaton and delivery of the land but only 2 parcels

were designated and 2/3 of it was in possession of a

Juan Villafuerte.

The other parcels were not surveyed and designated

by Addison.

Addison demanded from petitioner the payment of the

first installment but the latter contends that there was

no delivery and as such, they are entitled to get back

the 3K purchase price they gave upon the execution

of the contract.

ISSUE:

WON there was a valid delivery.

HELD:

The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the

thing sold. With respect to two of the parcels of land,

he was not even able to show them to the purchaser;

and as regards the other two, more than two-thirds of

their area was in the hostile and adverse possession

of a third person.

It is true that the same article declares that the

execution of a public instruments is equivalent to the

delivery of the thing which is the object of the

contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may

produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the

vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold

that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery

could have been made. It is not enough to confer

upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of

possession. The thing sold must be placed in his

control. When there is no impediment whatever to

prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the

purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic

delivery through the execution of a public instrument

is sufficient. But if there is an impediment, delivery

cannot be deemed effected.

LACANILAO V. CA (September 26, 1996)

FACTS:

Respondent Encarnacion owns a parcel of land

in Quezon City where a certain Deogracia La Torre

built a house. The house was bought by petitioner

Lacanilao.

Lacanilao and Encarnacion entered a contract of

lease. Encarnacion also leased a portion of the land

to another petitioner Cadurnigara. After some time,

Encarnacion offered to sell his land to the petitioners

for 120K. Since petitioners doesn’t have the money

yet, they requested for another month extension.

When the designated time came, petitioners still was

not able to produce the payment for the land and as

such, Encarnacion sold his property to spouses

Acebo. Acebo demanded the petitioners to vacate the

lot.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners have the right to purchase the

land over the Acebo spouses.

HELD:

It is well established that where the seller promised to

execute a deed of absolute sale upon completion of

payment of the purchase price by the buyer, the

agreement is a contract to sell. In such a case, failure

of payment failure is not really a breach but an event

that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey

title.

Petioners also failed to show any evidence to prove

that they were ready to fulfill the condition (of full

payment) imposed on the obligation to sell.

The verbal offer of Encarnacion to petitioners is also

unenforceable under the Stature of Frauds.

VDA. DE JOMOC V. CA (August 02, 1991)

FACTS:

A parcel of land in CDO owned by late Pantaleon

Jomoc was fictitiously sold to third persons in which

the last transferee are the spouses Mariano and

Maria So. Maria Vda de Jomoc filed suit to recover

the property and won.

While pending appeal, Vda de Jomoc executed

executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale

of Land with private respondent for P300,000.00. The

document was not yet signed by all the parties nor

notarized but in the meantime, Maura So had made

partial payments amounting to P49,000.00.

So demanded from the heirs of Jomoc for the

execution of final deed of conveyance but the latter

did no comply. As such, So filed a civil case and a

notice of lis pendens were placed in the title of the

land.

On the same date, the heirs of Jomoc executed

another extra-judicial settlement with absolute sale in

favor of intervenors Lim Leong Kang and Lim Pue

claiming that they believe that So already backed-out

from the agreement.

ISSUE:

WON the sale is enforceable.

HELD:

Since petitioners admit the existence of the extra-

judicial settlement, the court finds that there was

meeting of the minds between the parties and hence,

there is a valid contract that has been partly executed.

The contract of sale of real property even if not

complete in form, so long as the essential requisites

of consent of the contracting parties, object, and

cause of the obligation concur and they were clearly

established to be present, is valid and effective as

between the parties. Public document is only needed

to bind third persons.

The payment made by So is a clear proof of her

intention to acquire the property and the petitioners

cannot claim about the respondent backing out. The

sale to the intervenors Lim cannot be recognized

because when they bought the property, there was

already a notice of lis pendens and the sale cannot be

said to be in good faith.

DALLION V. CA (February 28, 2009)

FACTS:

Petitioner Segundo Dalion allegedly sold his property

in Southern Leyte to respondent Ruperto Sabesaje

through a private deed of sale.

Dalion denies the sale and claims that his signature in

the document was forged.

ISSUE:

WON there has been a contract of sale between the

parties.

HELD:

The authenticity of the signature of Dallion was

proven by the testimony of several witness including

the person who made the deed of sale. Dalion never

presented any evidence or witness to prove his claim

of forgery.

Dallion’s claim that the sale is invalid because it was

not made in a public document is of no merit. This

argument is misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on

the necessity of a public document is only for

convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not

a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a

parcel of land that this be embodied in a public

instrument. Sale is perfected upon meeting of the

minds of both parties.

GOLDENROD INC. V. CA (November 04, 1998)

FACTS:

Respondents Barreto realty owns 43 parcels of land

in Quiapo Manila which they mortgaged in UCPB.

Respondent sold the property to petitioner Goldenrod

who In turn pays 1M earnest money and promise to

pay respondent’s debt to UCPB. Respondent caused

2 land titles to the property.

Petitioner was not able to pay UCPB and the latter did

not agree for and extension. Hence, petitioner

rescinded the contact and demands the return of the

earnest money.

Respondent did not oppose the recession but did not

gave the earnest money. They even sold the first lot

to Asiaworld Trade Center and the other lot to UCPB

for payment of their mortgage.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should return the earnest money of

the petitioner.

HELD:

Earnest money is a part of payment of a sale. Art.

1385 of the Civil Code provides that rescission

creates the obligation to return the things which were

the object of the contract together with their fruits and

interest. Since the respondent did not oppose the

extra-judicial recission, they should return the earnest

money of the petitioner. It would be most inequitable if

resondent BARRETTO REALTY would be allowed to

retain petitioner's payment of P1,000,000.00 and at

the same time appropriate the proceeds of the second

sale made to another.