Digested Cases2

8/13/2019 Digested Cases2

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MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Facts:

Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition

praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under

section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified

from running for any local elective position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or

abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in

the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC

dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges

before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.

Held:

NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government

Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final

judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from

justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being

charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be

conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

MARCOS versus COMELEC (208 SCRA 300)

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the

First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition

for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional

requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitutions one-year

residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not the statement in the COC determines whether an individual satisfied the constitutions

residency qualification requirement, to warrant herein petitioners disqualification.

Ruling:

NO. Having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the

House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,

May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order


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the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District

of Leyte.

AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703)

Facts:

Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial

Governor of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a

petition for the disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of

the United States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmea maintained that he is a

Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late

President Sergio Osmea, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that hewas continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six

months, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.

Held:

YES. Osmena is still a Filipino. The court held that Aznars contention was not meritorious. Aznars argument

that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office

of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof

that Osmea has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for underC.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by

naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of

allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmea did not lose his Philippine

citizenship in any of the modes provided.

By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmea is a Filipino remains. In this case,

Osmea denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and

subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since

1963.

The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmea obtained certificates of

Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979,

he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The court in

this case held that Osmea is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual

citizen.
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JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner withdrew hiscertificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the

COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of

contributions and expenditures.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and

expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days

after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the

political contest, and should have either won or lost".

Issue:

Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures after he has

withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.

Held:The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not

affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners

withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable

that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in

the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts

have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,

vs.

FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F.

RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

Facts:

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with

the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April

18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the

Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos

Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal

due to his close association with petitioner.

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang

Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23,

1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,

disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to

COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed

petitioner to run.On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. In

accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not

proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of

SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was "without prejudice to any

further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran

in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.


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quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such

justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and

unconstitutional.

ELECTION LAWPre-proclamation controversies and manifest errors

FACTS

Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Taytay, Rizal during the

May 2004 elections. Private respondent wonthe election and was proclaimed as Vice-Mayor.P e t i t i o n e r a f t e r

c o m p i l i n g a l l c o p i e s o f e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c or re ct io n o f m an if es t e rr or s

in the ele ct io n re tu rn s and fo r a nul li fi cat ion of the proclamation of the private respondent as Vice-Mayor.

The COMELEC FirstDivision dismissed the petition and was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE

Whether or not

COMELEC is required to go beyond the face of election returnsand make the necessary correction in a

petit ion for co rrection of ma ni festerrors in the election returns.

RULING

The COMELE C, in a peti tion for co rrecti on of manifest error s, is limit ed to an examination of the

election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction togo beyond or behind the face of the returns.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for

certiorari

and prohibition is

DISMISSEDforlack of merit, and the Resolutions dated June 30, 2006 and October 16, 2006 of th e CO MEL EC Fi rst

Division and

E n B a n c

, respectively, are

AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner.

[ A D E L I N A T A M A Y O -

R E Y E S , M . D . v s . C O M M I S S I O N O N ELECTIONS and

FERNANDO R. CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121. June8, 2007. Nachura, J

.]

ELECTION LAWPre-proclamation controversies and manifest errorsFACTS

Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Taytay,

Rizal during the May 2004 elections. Private respondent wonthe election and was proclaimed as

Vice-Mayor .Pet i t ioner af ter compi l ing al l copies of elect ion returns f i led ap e t i t io n fo r co rrec tion of mani fest errors in the el ect ion re tu rns and fo r a

null if icat ion of the proclamation of the private respondent as Vice-Mayor. The COMELEC

FirstDivision dismissed the petition and was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.ISSUEWhether or not

COMELEC is required to go beyond the face of election returnsand make the necessary

correction in a petition for correction of manifesterrors in the election returns.RULING


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The COMELEC, in a petition for correction of manifest errors, is limited to

anexamination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction togo beyond or

behind the face of the returns.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit, and the Resolutions dated June 30, 2006 and October 16, 2006 of the COMELEC First

Division andEn Banc, respectively, areAFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner.[ A D E L I N A T A M A Y O -

R E Y E S , M . D . v s . C O M M I S S I O N O N ELECTIO

NS and FERNANDO R. CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121. June8, 2007. Nachura,J

.]

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party GO!

GO Philippines, et al[G.R. No. 147589. G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001]

Facts:

On the registration period, the COMELEC approved the accreditation of 154 parties and

organizations but denied those of several others in its assailed Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Moreover, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a petition to delete from

the Certified List of Political Parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions and that said

certified list be accordingly amended. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petitionfor cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some herein respondents.

Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party filed a petition assailing the COMELEC Omnibus

Resolution No. 3785. Also, Bayan Muna filed a petition challenging the said resolution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus

Resolution No. 3785

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections

3. Whether or not party-list system is exclusive to marginalized sectors.

Ruling:

1. From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of

the law and the Constitution in connection with the due process clause. Basic rudiments of due

process require that the organizations or parties should first be given an opportunity to show that


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they qualify under the guidelines promulgated before they can be deprived of their right to

participate in and be elected under the party-list system.

2. Yes, political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives

may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties

or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,

political parties may be registered under the party-list system.

For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,

regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly

states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

3. No, the state policy focused mainly on proportional representation by means of Filipino-style

party-list system.

Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,

because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in

a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and

underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor,

peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,

youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list

system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute

are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words

and the phrases with which they are associated or related.

PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC ET AL.

G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002

Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita Lazaro succeeded to the office of the

Governor of Laguna when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed Secretary of the DILG. Upon

assumption of office as Governor, Lazaro publicly declared her intention to run for Governor in the

coming May 2001 elections. Subsequently, she ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs,volleyballs, chessboard sets, t-shirts, medals and pins, and other sports materials worth P4.5

millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded 79 public works projects on March 28, 2001. Pangkat Laguna, a

registered political party, filed a petition for disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for premature

campaigning.

Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent

distribution thereof of Laguna, in line with the local government units sports and education


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program is not election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly

prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds were released,

disbursed, or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and

implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof, the factual findings of the COMELEC

cannot be disturbed considering that the COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to decide,

except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.

Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T. Yorac, G.R. No.93867, December 18 1990Brillantes vs. YoracG.R. 93867, 18 December 1990

FACTS:

In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact findingcommission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate hischairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes thenquestioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall anymember of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantesclaimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matterthat should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violatesthe independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.

ISSUE:Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of

the COMELEC.

HELD:The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive innature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. Thedesignation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quoteadministrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification,it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional.

10. LABO VS. COMELECGR No. 86564, August 1, 1989

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who,through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance asan Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled.Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of hisPhilippine citizenship.


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ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD:

Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lostthrough naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath ofallegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

11. Caasi vs. Comelec

FACTS:

Mateo Caasi is seeking the disqualification of Merito Miguel as candidate for municipal mayor ofBolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he (Miguel) is a green card holder, hence, a resident of theUnited States. Miguel admits possessing a green card but contends that he only uses it forconvenience to freely enter US for his medical treatment and to visit his children. He also alleges

that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratificationof the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987.

ISSUE:

WON a green card is a proof that the holder is a US resident

HELD:

In Miguels Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230,Department of State) which he filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy inManila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21

therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,"Permanently." On the green card itself, it identifies Miguel as a Resident Alien. Miguels immigrationto the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in thePhilippines. To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that thecandidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident orimmigrant of a foreign country. Also, Miguel only resided in Bolinao for 3 months after returning tothe country which is in violation of the 1 year residency requirement.

12. DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC258 SCRA 483, 1996

Facts:

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elections from running forthe position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by theCOMELEC was Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section provides thatthose sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offensepunishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence aredisqualified from running for any elective local position. It was established by the COMELEC that thepetitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. It wascontended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him because he was granted


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probation by the MTC.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)s applicability.

Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that propertyreceived is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as thatwhich animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.Anent the second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend theexecution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing which already declared as a crime ofmoral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsistsand remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

*Miguel is disqualified to run for mayor.

Grego vs COMELEC [274 SCRA 481]

Facts:Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code) which took effect on

January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any elective position on the ground that had been

removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of

serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.

He ran as a candidate for Councilor, won and assumed office for three terms during the Elections

of January 18, 1988; May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995. As in the past, respondents right to officewas contested.

On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the respondents disqualification, pursuant to the above

provision, contending that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an

administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the

Code, the disqualification applies.

Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b of

the LGC may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do

so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested

rights

Issue:WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed

from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992.

Held:No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any

retroactive effect. Laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively.


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ruling inthe case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a

bar to his disqualification.

Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes, intervened, contending that

because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc

denied Garcias prayer.

ISSUES:

1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not beenserved a copy thereof.

2. WON petitioners reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and

academic

3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed

winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.

HELD:

1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to

the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been

made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused toreceive the decision. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable

to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly

served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not

for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyess refusal to receive the decision may,therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he shouldhave received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with

R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final

30 days after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of a petition

for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An

original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the

principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari

proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the

appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restrainingorder was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued.

The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no

more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.


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2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a

public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his

reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting

off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition

questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, theterm of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannotextend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official

is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter

reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an

action to question the decision in the administrative case, thetemporary restraining order issued

in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and itthereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the

President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local

Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar

to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground

that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed todo so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that

he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date

set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for

postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the patternof delay heemployed to render the case against him moot by his election.

3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner

in case the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer

would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of thevoter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated

by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified

candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would

have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under thecircumstances. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes

was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent

finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the

votes cast for him.

Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgments

either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery,which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it


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in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known.

Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioners counsel in his

office in Manila on March 3, 1995.

In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered

mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was notclaimed by him, service was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March27, 1995.

If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service isdeemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it

can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his

counsels refusal to receive it.

Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been

rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in theRegional Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be

construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading,order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests,

i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision

becomes final.

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in

a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal

effect.

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required that,rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the

Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. But petitioner did not do so.

Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service uponpetitioner.


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Mercado vs . Manzano

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for

vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Eduardo B. Manzano won with a total of 103,853 over Ernesto S. Mercado with only 100,894

votes.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for

disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not acitizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of

candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under LocalGovernment Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective

position.

The petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of

Vice-Mayor of Makati City was filed before May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and

alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a

Filipino mother. He was born in the United States and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But

notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Issue:

Whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of

candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Held:
http://www.thelawchic.com/mercado-vs-manzano/http://www.thelawchic.com/mercado-vs-manzano/


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To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a

result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is

simultaneously considered a national by the said states.

Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following

classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle

of jus soli;(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their

fathers country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are consideredcitizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine

citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing anyact, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the

constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation

in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,

effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he isnot a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the

Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so

without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are

concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said

before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered

with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced hisprofession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his

election of Philippine citizenship.

1. Paras v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The

recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that underSec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no

recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one

year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)

election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.


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ISSUE:

W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:

No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be

considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to

subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.

(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the

phrase regularlocal election toinclude SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for

there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the

Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should

be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,

inoperative or nugatory.

2. LUCERO VS. COMELEC

DAVIDE, JR.,J.:

After the issues had been joined in these consolidated cases, the Court resolved to give due

course to the petitions therein and to decide the cases on the merits. It can no longer allow the

parties to delay these cases. Their legal skirmishes, which have unduly magnified uncomplicated

issues, have effectively deprived the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar

of representation in the House of Representatives for more than two years now.

These cases are sequels to G. R. No. 105717, entit led "Jose L. Ong, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

and Wilmar P. Lucero," which we finally resolved on 22 April 1993. 1The petitioners were two of

the five candidates 2for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar in the synchronized

national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.

The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L.

Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes.

However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos,

where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of

Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was

held; and of Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election returns were

missing.

On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282, to:

1. Forthwith order Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar

to suspend the proclamation of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.;

2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to

correct the Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas and, accordingly, to


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correct the total votes so far counted by it for Petitioner from 24,068 to 24,088,

thus reducing the margin it found in favor of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.

from 204 to 184 votes only;

3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos,

pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;

4. Order a recount of the votes for Representative of the Second District of

Northern Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay Tubgon, and Precinct 7, Barangay

Camayaan, both of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 234 of the Omnibus

Election Code;

5. Order a recount of the votes for Representative in the 52 precincts herein

above enumerated in order to correct "manifest errors" pursuant to Section 15 of

Republic Act 7166 and for this purpose order the impounding and safekeeping of

the ballot boxes of all said precincts in order to preserve the integrity of the ballots

and other election paraphernalia contained therein. 3

On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the PBC todesist from reconvening until further orders.

On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by the PBC, which Lucero

opposed on 10 June 1992 on the ground that the canvass could not be completed even if the

PBC were to reconvene because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of

Silvino Lobos and there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camayaan)

and Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos.

On 13 June 1993, the COMELECen bancpromulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

Accordingly, the Commission hereby orders the Provincial ElectionSupervisor of Northern Samar to bring to the Commission within three (3)

days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 of Silvino

Lobos, to be escorted by representatives from the petitioner and the

respondents as well as other parties who have an interest to protect, and

to notify said parties hereof. The Municipal Treasurer of said town is

directed to turn over custody of said ballot boxes to the Provincial Election

Supervisor, and the keys thereof shall likewise be turned over by the

appropriate officials in custody thereof to the PES, who shall in turn give

one key for each ballot box to the duly authorized representatives of the

petitioner and the respondent.

The Commission likewise orders the Election Registrar of Silvino Lobos,Northern Samar, and the Chairman and members of the Boards of

Election Inspectors of Precincts 7 and 16 of said municipality to appear

before the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof.

Below the signatures of the Chairman and the six Commissioners, however, Chairman Christian S.

Monsod and Commissioners Haydee B. Yorac, Dario C. Rama and Regalado E. Maambong

directed as follows:


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We vote in favor of this resolution except that portion which denied the

correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas. Correction of the

Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas is in order in view of the testimony of

the election registrar of Las Navas to the effect that Wilmar Lucero

garnered 2,537 votes for Las Navas and not 2,517. Petition for correction

was duly filed by Lucero with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of

Northern Samar on May 19, 1992. The Provincial Board of Canvassers ofNorthern Samar is therefore directed to retabulate the total number of

votes for Las Navas for Lucero and enter the same in the Provincial

Certificate of Canvass. 4

On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of Election

Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. 5

On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action for certiorarifiled with this Court and subsequently

docketed as G. R. No. 105717, questioned the order for the recount of ballots in Precincts No. 7

and 16. Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the recount of the ballots

in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero and 2 votes for Ong. 6

On 25 June 1992, this Court issued in G. R. No. 105717 a temporary restraining order against the

implementation by the COMELEC of its Order of 2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June 1992.

On 23 December 1992, this Court promulgated its decision in G. R. No. 105717, 7the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorariis GRANTED and a writ of

preliminary injunction is hereby ISSUED directing the COMELEC to

CEASE and DESIST from implementing its order of June 2, 1992, and

its resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same are hereby

declared NULLIFIED. Consequently, the election returns based on

the recounted ballots from Precinct 16 are hereby DISCARDED andin lieu thereof, authentic returns from said precinct should instead

be made a basis for the canvassing. The Provincial Board of

Canvassers of Northern Samar is hereby directed to PROCEED WITH

DISPATCH in the canvassing of ballots until completed and to

PROCLAIM the duly elected winner of the congressional seat for

the Second District of Northern Samar.

This decision is immediately executory. 8

Acting on the motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by the COMELEC

and Lucero, this Court, on 22 April 1993, modified 9its aforesaid disposition in G. R. No. 105717 as

follows;

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the dispositive portion of the December 23, 1992

Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows;

"WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE JUNE 2, 1992 ORDER OF

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN SPA NO. 92-282 IS

HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. ITS JUNE 13, 1992 RESOLUTION

THEREIN IS LIKEWISE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE INSOFAR AS IT


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AFFECTS PRECINCT NO. 7 OF SILVINO LOBOS, THE RECOUNT OF

VOTES IN THE 52 OTHER PRECINCTS AND THE CORRECTION OF THE

CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OF LAS NAVAS, BUT IS AFFIRMED WITH

RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN

PRECINCT NO. 13 AND THE RECOUNT OF THE BALLOTS IN PRECINCT

NO. 16.

THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY DIRECTED

TO ASSIGN SPA NO. 92-282 TO ANY OF ITS DIVISIONS PURSUANT TO

ITS RULE ON RAFFLE OF CASES FOR IT TO RESOLVE THE PRE-

PROCLAMATION ISSUES THEREIN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE

ABOVE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR

IN SECTION 15 OF R. A. NO. 7166.

WHENEVER WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE

COMMISSION MAY (A) CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO.

13 OF SILVINO LOBOS, NORTHERN SAMAR, AND (B) RECONVENE

THE SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS AND THE SPECIAL

PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IT HAD EARLIER CONSTITUTEDOR CREATE NEW ONES.

ALL THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DONE WITH PURPOSEFUL

DISPATCH TO THE END THAT THE WINNING CANDIDATE FOR

CONGRESSMAN REPRESENTING THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL

DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR MAY BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE." 10

As to the certificate of canvass of the municipality of Las Navas, this Court explicitly stated;

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even

though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error isallowed under Section 15 of R. A. No. 7166. 11

Conformably with the aforesaid modified judgment in G. R. No. 105717, SPA No. 92-282 was

raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC which conducted hearings thereon and received the

arguments and evidence of both parties who then submitted their respective memoranda on 25

June 1994. However, during the consultations on the case by the Members of the First Division,

the concurrence of at least two of them could not be obtained; accordingly, pursuant to the

COMELEC Rules, the case was elevated for proper disposition to the COMELEC en bancto

which the parties submitted their respective memoranda on 19 November 1993. 12

On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en bancpromulgated a resolution 13whose dispositive portion

reads as follows:

1. To direct the special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar (a) to

include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the forty-three (43)

votes of petitioner Lucero and the two (2) votes of private respondent Ong as

reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared

by the special Board of Election Inspectors constituted by the Commission to

recount the votes (ballots) in said precinct, as canvassed by the special

Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in the municipal


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certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private

respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the

election returns (MBC Copy submitted as "Comelec Copy") of Precinct No. 7

(Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of

Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate the total number of votes of

petitioner Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas and to enter in the provincial

certificate of canvass the correct total which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C. E. Form 20-A) prepared

and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Las Navas; and (d) to

submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties

including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and

private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos and the total

votes of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas as corrected. However,

under no circumstances should the Board proclaim any winning candidate until

instructed to do so by the Commission;

2. To issue an Order calling for a special election in the last remaining Precinct No.

13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result

of the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and tonotify the parties of the schedule of election activities for that precinct; and

3. After including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct

No. 13, to decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7

of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, to resolve

the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such

discrepancy of votes of the candidates concerned would affect the over-all

results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall

have been determined.

Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special civil actions

for certiorarito challenge the Resolution.

In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino

Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his

chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns

for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.

In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the authority of the COMELEC to order the correction of

the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas despite the

absence of any appeal; and (2) the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in

Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.

As we see it, the core issues in these consolidated cases are:

(1) Whether there should first be a count of the

ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos before

determining the necessity of holding a special

election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos:

(2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse

of discretion in ordering the correction of the


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alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate

of Canvass of Las Navas; and

(3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse

of discretion in calling for a special election in

Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more

specifically after one (1) year and ten (10) months,following the day of the synchronized elections.

We shall take up these issuesseriatim.

I.

The answer to the first issue is in the affirmative.

We find the COMELEC's disposition regarding Precinct No. 7 to be unclear. In the first paragraph

of the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, it directs the Provincial Board of

Canvassers "to include in the municipal certificate of canvas of Silvino Lobos the sixty-one (61)

votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in theelection returns (MBC copy submitted as "COMELEC Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay

Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos," and

"to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including

therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in

Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. . . ." On the other hand, in the fourth paragraph of the

said dispositive portion, it orders the Provincial Board of Canvassers, after "including in the

tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13," to "decide the issue of the

recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the

Omnibus Election Code [and] to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the

same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidate concerned would affect the over-all

results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been

determined."

Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of Precinct No. 7, the COMELEC

would first give full faith and credit to the questioned election returns thereof, which it describes

as the "Comelec Copy," and, accordingly, direct the PBC to include in the municipal certificate

of canvass of Silvino Lobos the 61 votes for Ong and the uncertain votes for Lucero29, 30, or

31. The recount would only be made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13 shall have been

held, it shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary.

We fail to grasp the logic of the proposition. First, it is clear to us that the COMELEC, which has in

its possession the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the questioned election returns of Precinct No. 7

and heard the witnesses who testified thereon, doubts the authenticity of the so-called

"Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7;14

hence, it authorizes the PBC todecide the issue of a recount "pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code." Since it

doubts such authenticity, it could not, without arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, order the

inclusion of the "votes" of Ong and Lucero found in the doubtful "Comelec Copy" of the election

returns in the municipal certificate of canvass. Second, it is an uncontroverted fact that an

election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties fully

knew. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special election may

be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein "would affect the result of the

election." This "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the


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precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his

closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where

there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election";

hence, a special election must be held. Consequently, the holding of a special election in

Precinct No. 13 can only be determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been

included in the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

We may further state that the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7

can by no means be validly included in the municipal canvass. The summary of the evidence in

the "preparation" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7, both in the challenged Resolution and

in the separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall,

leaves no room for doubt that there was actually no countingof the votes in Precinct No. 7.

Quoted in the challenged Resolution is a portion of the testimony of Sabina T. Jarito, Precinct

Chairman of Precinct No. 7, which clearly shows that on questions by COMELEC Chairman

Christian S. Monsod and Commissioner Vicente B. de Lima, the witness candidly admitted that

the election returns were prepared at the"munisipyo"or municipal building and not at the

polling place of Precinct No. 7 in barangay Camaya-an. 15This "munisipyo"is located at

the poblacionof Silvino Lobos. Under the law, the board of election inspectors shall prepare the

election returns simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling place.16

There is noevidence whatsoever that the COMELEC had, for valid reasons, authorized the transfer of venue

of the counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7 from the polling place in barangay Camaya-an to

the municipal building and that the counting did in fact take place at the latter. Although in the

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall there is a reference

to Exhibit "E," the Joint Affidavit of Sabina Jarito and Mevilyn Surio wherein they declare that after

the voting the Board of Election Inspectors unanimously approved to transfer the counting of

votes to the Municipal Building in the Poblacion of Silvino Lobos, which was allegedly concurred

in by all the watchers of political parties and the candidates present, the alleged "counting" at

the municipal building was denied by no less than the Municipal Election Officer of Silvino Lobos,

Antonio Tepace, and the Municipal Treasurer thereof, Mr. Gabriel Basarte, in their affidavits

marked as Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "G,"

respectively. 17

Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid election returns could be

made and any copy of election returns purporting to come therefrom is a fabrication.

Arecountthereof, which presupposes aprior count, would obviously be unwarranted.

Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in order. Sections 234,

235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus still inapplicable. And, in the light of what

we stated before in relation to the holding of a special election, such a count of the votes of

Precinct No. 7 must, perforce, precede the special election in Precinct No. 13.

II.

Ong's first grievance in G. R. No. 113509 is without merit.

The order of the COMELEC for the correction of the manifest error in the municipal certificate of

canvass of Las Navas was made pursuant to the declaration made by this Court in G. R. No.

105717 (Ong vs. COMELEC) 18that:

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise

in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the


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25/53

Lucero24,272 as against 24,068will be reduced to either 175

or 173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29

or a high of 31 votes as reflected in the election returns of Precinct

No. 7.

Without preempting the exact figures which only the special

Provincial Board of Canvassers can correctly determine,undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be

held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of

Silvino Lobos.

. . .

Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over

petitioner Lucero, We answer in the affirmative. According to

Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No.

13 istwo hundred thirteen (213).Since the lead of respondent Ong

is less than the number of registered voters, the votes in that

precinct could affect the existing result because of the possibilitythat petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that

precinct and that majority might be more than the present lead of

Ong. 19

On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, 20the following computation is

in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of

24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from

Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is

admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13. 21

The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code

have indeed been met.

In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not

later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the

election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election

not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The

second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant

case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the

electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the

opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of

the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that G. R.

No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court. 22Considering then that the

petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that

since the term of the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special

election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered "reasonably close

to the date of the election not held." Ong's postulation should then be rejected.

In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible application,

by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no special election in

the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if the


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vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election," and

of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House

of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of

the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to

fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer thanninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in

case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be

held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the

underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy

occurred within a certain period before the next presidential election or the next regular

election, as the case may be, is obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred

in the holding of a special election when a regular election is, after all, less than a year

away. The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory

proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Section 6

of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special election in the former is to fill permanentvacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress

occurring after the election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by

reason of a failure of election. Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail

minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates

who, by the result of the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the

failure of election. On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the

President, Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a

Representative, district-wide. Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant

case, presupposes that no candidate had been proclaimed and therefore the people

of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the House

of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning

candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation until the end of

the term. under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected officials

have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office.

Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the

holding of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section

4 of R. A. No. 7166.

Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's disposition of

Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and proclaimed the

duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar despite the fact

that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of

the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the election in

Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an incomplete

canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of PrecinctNo. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the

Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very

least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

I. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G. R. No. 113509; and


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II. In G. R. No. 113107, DIRECTING the respondent Commission on Elections to:

(1) Reconvene, in its main office of Manila, within five (5) days from notice hereof,

the Special Board of Canvassers of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern

Samar, which shall then, as a special Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No.

7 of said municipality, within forty-eight (48) hours from its reconvening, count the

ballots of said Precinct No. 7, and deliver to the special Provincial Board ofCanvassers of the said Province a copy of the election returns;

(2) Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within the same period as aforestated,

the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar which shall then,

within seventy-two (72) hours from its reconvening:

(a) Include in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Silvino Lobos

(1) the total number of votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and for

petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr., respectively, in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino

Lobos as recorded in the election returns submitted by the

aforementioned special Municipal Board of Canvassers, and (2)

the forty-three (43) votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and thetwo (2) votes for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. as reflected in the

election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared,

after a recount of the ballots, by the special Board of Canvassers;

and after such inclusions to enter the new totals of the votes for

the petitioners in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(b) Retabulate the total number of votes for Wilmar P. Lucero for

the Municipality of Las Navas, Northern Samar, which shall be two

thousand and five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the

Statement of Votes (C.E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by

the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Las Navas, and to enter the

same in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(c) After the accomplishment of all the foregoing, to sum up anew

in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass the canvassed municipal

certificates of canvass of all the municipalities of the Second

Legislative District of Northern Samar and if the same would

establish that the difference in votes between petitioner Wilmar P.

Lucero and petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. is less than two hundred and

thirteen (213), hence the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13

would unavoidably and inevitably affect then the result of the

election, to report to the Commission on Elections such fact and to

furnish the latter with a certified photocopy of the Certificate of

Provincial Canvass;

(3) Within three (3) days after receipt of the aforesaid report from the special

Provincial Board of Canvassers, to CALL a special election in Precinct No. 13 of

Silvino Lobos, which shall be held not later than thirty (30) days from such call; a

copy of the election returns of said special election shall forthwith be transmitted

to the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, which shall then

enter the results thereof in its canvass and make a final summation of the results in

the Certificate of Provincial Canvass, and thereafter, pursuant to the Omnibus

Election Code, pertinent election laws and rules and resolutions of the


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The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to

join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayanng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang

Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain

provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject

thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of

the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of

the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar

of Activities for

local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the

referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution

No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that

proposes an amendment of a national law

ISSUE:

1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.

2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal

Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of

Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law.

HELD:


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1.

YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private

respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM

only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word

"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec

labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum

Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum

Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat,

not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise

is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose

bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly.

On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or

measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without

action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises

administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct

of elections.

These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot

control or change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal

stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the

people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the

people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights

and obligations can be enforced or implemented there under. At this point, it is merely a

proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.

Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical

questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review

Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.

However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not

been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower

court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable

pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included

verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or

action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of

and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.


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4. PERALTA vs. COMELEC

Facts:Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the

Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The

period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election,

excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the

constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President

and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the

period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the

Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of

election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Issue:Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional

Held:The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in

the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang

Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on

Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate

the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the

interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent

President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law

shall have been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is

an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President

has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the

country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the

nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the

period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the

Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978

Election Code.

5. Occena vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang

Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing

their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of

the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the

present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is


32/53

the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the

contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang

Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held:It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In

the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition

and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to

four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to

the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful

purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It

made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect.

With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinalpostulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be

obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were

resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be

too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative

aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme

Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the

acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an

affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere

dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in

Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case

in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of theeffectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

6. Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino vs COMELEC

Facts:

The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) informed the COMELEC by

way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized

representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The

same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General,

Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador

Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.


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However, Rep. Aquino filed his comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have

the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation

filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard

the same.

Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided

because of a struggle of authority between Party Chairman Edgardo Angara and Party

Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two different sets of candidates

under the same party, LDP.

The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution has recognized the

factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets

of nominations and endorsements by the same party.

Held:

Yes. The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by

the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.

7. Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec

Facts:Herein case involves two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging

Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on March 26,

2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those

herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private

respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized

and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or

overrepresented.

Issues:

1.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. 2.Whether or not the

party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus

Resolution No. 3785.


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Held:

1. Yes. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified

from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,

Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be

elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or

organizations.

2. Yes. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the

purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. (e.g. Section 5,

Article VI of the Constitution)

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-

list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a

statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the

words and the phrases with which they are associated or rela

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