CHAPTER 8:#1:MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES IN GENERAL:

G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983

BERNARDINO MARCELINO, vs. THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., et. Al.

ESCOLIN, J.:

*petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance

Trial was conducted and the same was concluded

on August 4, 1975, both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda

o given thirty [30] days to submit their respective memoranda

Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed by the

People.

On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for

promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975.

On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement, raising for

the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days

from submission thereof for decision.

Meanwhile, counsel for the accused filed before the Supreme Court the present petition.

Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the

1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance

thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.

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ISSUE:

W/N the trial court maintained jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

Supreme Court - the petition is hereby dismissed

on November 28, 1975, or eighty- five [851 days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed

submitted for decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case

No. 5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period

prescribed by the Constitution

the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court.

There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment

and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether

or not respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation

of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at at a later date,

considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event

which is beyond the control of the judge.

Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution

o SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or

matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for the

Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate

courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.

The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by express

provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." 

"The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of

expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing

the letter of the law."

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"the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of

statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to

effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. "

Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict have been

held by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the

judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated it."

"the legal distinction between directory and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to

statutory laws."

the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the

general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed

therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of

Article X of the New Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all

courts ... " And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of

expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure.

declares that constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters

merely procedural.

The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the general public than

would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision would

result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts are resolved, the very

instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the

alloted term. Such an absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental

law.

the constitutional provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus, where the contrary

construction) would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, it should not be followed. "

Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

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CHAPTER 8:#2:MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES IN GENERAL:

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS v. CAG.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997)

FACTS:

The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home

Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did

not file its corporate bylaws.

Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and

South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically

dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in

the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC

declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said

decision. Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation

results in its automatic dissolution?

HELD:

No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws.

The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The

language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the

word “must” or “shall”.

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CHAPTER 8:#3:MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES IN GENERAL:

G.R. No. L-24583            October 29, 1966

MAGDALENA SIBULO VDA. DE MESA, et. Al. vs. HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS and/or Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAXIMINO A. ARGANA, et. Al.

CASTRO, J.:

*petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction

FACTS:

Opponents for the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal were Francisco De Mesa and Maximino A. Argana. The

electorate's choice, as tallied by the local board of canvassers, was De Mesa. Elected vice-mayor with him

was Demetrio R. Loresca. Duly, proclaimed elected, these two qualified and assumed their respective

positions upon the commencement of their term of office.

defeated candidate Argana, charging the perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in

certain precincts, protested the election of De Mesa

however, an assassin's bullet felled De Mesa, and, forthwith, vice-mayor Loresca was, by operation of law,

duly installed as his successor

In the election case, meanwhile, the protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on

revision of ballots. Expressly to hear protestee's view thereon and to afford him a chance to propose his

commissioners, this motion was set for hearing but, quite understandably, no appearance was entered for

the deceased protestee. Accordingly, on May 6, 1964, the court a quo required the protestee's widow and

children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for said protestee, if they so

desired. They did not, however, comply. Taking no further action in the premises, the trial court left the

matter at that.

Then proceeding ex parte, the protestant Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners

on revision of ballots

without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative — as indeed none had thus far been named

— the trial court granted the motion aforesaid.

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the trial court - adjudged the protestant Maximino A. Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal

in the 1963 elections, and taxed the costs and expenses of the protest against the estate of the deceased

protestee Francisco De Mesa

within the reglementary period for the finality of the decision aforesaid, a three-pronged move was taken

by De Mesa's widow

the court a quo - denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee, and order

stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of

appeal

Argana qualified as mayor and assumed office

In the meantime, Demetrio R. Loresca made common cause with De Mesa's widow and the local Liberal

Party Chapter, and moved for leave to be added to and/or substituted as party-protestee, claiming a legal

and continuing interest in the outcome of the election protest as successor to De Mesa.

the trial court dictated twin order (1) granting the protestant's motion to strike out the notice of appeal

heretofore adverted to; and (2) denying Loresca's motion to be substituted a party-protestee

Court of Appeals - sustaining the validity of the proceedings had and taken by the Court of First Instance

ISSUE:

is the determination of the legal effect of the proceedings taken by the trial court in the election contest

before it subsequent to the demise of the protestee De Mesa

RULING:

Supreme Court – the judgment under review is reversed

the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him,

and it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment

despite the death of the protestee

o SEC. 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall

order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted

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for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the

legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to

procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by

the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the

deceased. . . . (Rule 3.)

It is no argument against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement of a legal

representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory

word "shall." While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted to as guides in the

ascertainment of the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute

and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire

provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the

other, the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory

construction. Thus, Black is authority for the rule that "Where the statute provides for the doing of some act

which is required by justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or public officer

with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals,

the permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted

upon as a duty"

The matter here involved not only concerns public interest but also goes into the jurisdiction of the trial

court and is of the essence of the proceedings taken thereon. On this point, there is authority to the effect

that in statutes relating to procedure, as is the one now under consideration, every act which is

jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party

affected, is mandatory

The trial court, it will be recalled in its order of May 6, 1964, required the widow and children of the

deceased protestee to appear and be substituted for and on his behalf and to protect his interest in the case.

But when they failed to comply — mainly because of the shock and agony that followed in the wake of the

violent death of the protestee — the trial court took no further steps in the premises and, instead, at the

instance of the protestant, declared said widow and children non-suited, proceeded with the case ex parte,

and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention and/or substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee.

In these moves, the trial court did not only merit the unqualified sanction of the Court of Appeals but the

latter, taking an even more radical of the matter, actually held that the rule relied upon has no application

to election cases.

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CHAPTER 9:#4:PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE STATUTES IN GENERAL:

Co v. CAG.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993)

FACTS:

Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated

Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two

days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal complaint for

violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. At the time of the

issuance of the check, the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not

considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner is criminally liable.

HELD:

No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the

prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given

retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of

Justice.

CHAPTER 9:#5:PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE STATUTES IN GENERAL:

#9:STATUTES SUBSTANTIVE IN NATURE:

CHAPTER 10:#17:AMENDMENT:

G.R. No. L-2671             August 30, 1950ANICETA IBURAN, vs. MAGDALENO LABES,

FACTS:

an action of unlawful detainer

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Justice of the Peace's jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case as one of unlawful detainer

It is the contention of the defendant and appellant that the allegations in the complaint bring the case

within the provisions of Act No. 4054, known as Tenancy Law, and its amendments.

It should be stated that section 29 of Act No. 4054, which was approved on February 27, 1933, provides

"That this Act shall take effect only in the provinces where the majority of the municipal councils shall, by

resolution, have petitioned for its application to the Governor-General, who thereupon shall, by

proclamation, fix the date when this law shall take effect in said provinces," and that it was only on

November 12, 1946, when that Act as amended was declared in full force and effect in Cebu by Executive

Proclamation No. 14 of the President. It should be also stated that on the date of the proclamation, the

present case had been decided by the Justice of the Peace against the defendant, the latter had appealed to

the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff had reproduced her complaint and the defendant had filed his

answer in the latter court, and execution of the Justice of the Peace's judgment had been issued although

the execution apparently had not been carried out. It thus only remained for the Court of First Instance to

hear and decide the action.

ISSUE:

W/N Act No. 4054 should be given a retroactive effect?

RULING:

Supreme Court – judgment is affirmed

Statutes are presumed to be prospective only in their operation rather than retrospective or retroactive,

unless the contrary clearly appears, or is clearly, plainly, and unequivocally expressed or necessarily

implied.

by its terms, a statute is to apply "hereafter", or "thereafter", or is to take effect at a fixed future date, or

immediately, or which contains, in the enacting clause, the phrase "from and after the passing of this Act,"

or contains the words "shall have been made," or "from and after," a designated date . . ., it is prospective

only in operation

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The presumption is stronger against retroactivity of a statute with reference to pending actions or

proceedings. It has been generally held that "no statute shall be so construed as to give it retroactive effect

so as to affect pending litigation."

"Statutes which affect or change a remedy are presumed intended to exempt pending cases and

proceedings from their operation unless the contrary appears."

Proclamation No. 14 declared "The Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act to be in full force and effect from and

after the date of this proclamation throughout the Philippines." These words clearly import an intent to

make the proclamation prospective.

The provision of Act No. 4045 that the date of its effectivity in a province was to be fixed by the Chief

Executive depending upon the wishes of the majority of the municipal councils thereof, is the strongest

argument against the theory that such proclamation when issued should cover previous cases. Obviously

there was in the mind of the Legislature no pressing need for the application of this legislation, when it was

passed, to all the provinces. Hand in hand with this idea was the notion that the conditions affecting the

relations between landlords and tenants in a given province did not demand the operation of the law

therein before Proclamation No. 14 was promulgated.

CHAPTER 9:#6:EX POST FACTO LAW:

G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982

RUFINO V. NUÑEZ petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

FERNANDO, C.J.:

*petition for certiorari and prohibition

FACTS:

Petitioner was accused before the SB of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents

committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases

upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds

o denied

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petitioner claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court

is violative of the due process,  equal protection,  and ex post facto  clauses of the Constitution

ISSUES:

W/N PD# 1486 is unconstitutional for being violative of ex-post facto clause of the Constitution?

RULING:

Supreme Court – petition is dismissed

The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the

Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or

eroded efficacy wise ... ."  A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of

permisiveness of such an argument.

"An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which

was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,

when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to

the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or

different testimony . than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil rights and

remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was

lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become

entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." 

Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful

protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be

argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is

hardly a controversial matter.

"An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the

law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a

crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a

greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal

rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the

commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

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The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded

o taking "from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution

as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of

the offense charged against him." The crucial words are "vital for the protection of life and liberty"

of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate

tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the

negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a

division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding

Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily

with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division

shall be necessary for rendering judgment. "  Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a

review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.

Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is

no review of the facts. What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining

whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the

constitutional presumption of innocence  has been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on

the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a

finding of guilt has been satisfied

CHAPTER 9:#7:WHEN LAWS APPLIED RETROACTIVELY:

People v. MoranG.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923)

FACTS:

Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision was published, it was increased

to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which

was enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922.

ISSUE:

W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be

retroactive with respect to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC.

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HELD:

Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Furthermore,

Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to Art. 7, the SC

contends that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws. Also, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected

with that of the penalty. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution

of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it makes no exception. Statutes are not construed to have

retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. The new law

shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust

and enforcing the latter would be contradictory.

CHAPTER 9:#8:WHEN LAWS APPLIED RETROACTIVELY:

Laceste v. SantosG.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932)

FACTS:

Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the

RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal

prosecution. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty

through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment

any longer based on the last sentence of Art. 344 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect.

HELD:

Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an

exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies.

Conscience and good law justify this exception.

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CHAPTER 9:#10:STATUTES AFFECTING VESTED RIGHTS:

G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS,

MELO, J.:

FACTS:

The accused-appellants were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape

After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered finding them guilty and sentencing the accused to a

death penalty and indemnification

ISSUE:

When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants,

did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover

them?

RULING:

Supreme Court – the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with modifications

o In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua

At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death

However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of

Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon

accused-appellants.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987

Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its

discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the

legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty

Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.

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Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had

retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on

January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by

the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof

"for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still

at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering that the provision provides that

"[a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers

intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having

been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already

imposed is automatically — without need for any executive action — commuted

There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited

accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .

although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is

serving the same."

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it

shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute

which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a

subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law

Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the

statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants' right to be

benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised

Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.

Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested

the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective

operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly

declared or is necessarily implied from the language used

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CHAPTER 9:#11:STATUTES AFFECTING OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACT:

People v. ZetaG.R. No. L-7140 (December 22, 1955)--

FACTS:

Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount

received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in

force was C.A. No. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would

collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount

collected was void and illegal.

ISSUE:

W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect.

HELD:

No. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. There is a need of

a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Laws cannot be given retroactive

effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. Furthermore, strict construction on the law was made so as

not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect.

CHAPTER 9:#12:REPEALING & AMENDATORY ACTS:

CHAPTER 10:#16:AMENDMENT:

#25:REPEAL:

G.R. No. L-14406             June 30, 1961MARCELINO BUYCO, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO BRANCH, Iloilo City,

FACTS:

On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent

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The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay

Acknowledgment Certificate payable in thirty (30) years

petitioner offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan with his said backpay

acknowledgment certificate but respondent answered petitioner that since respondent's motion

for reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B. Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, L-8782, (52

O.G. 2522) was still under consideration by this Court (S.C.) respondent "cannot yet grant"

petitioner's request

Court had denied respondent's motion for reconsideration

petitioner again wrote reiterating his request to pay the obligation with said certificate

respondent answered petitioner that in view of the amendment of its charter on June 16, 1956 by

R.A. No. 1576, it could not accept petitioner's certificate

Mandamus case

The Court of First Instance granted the petition and ordered the respondent bank "to give due

course on the vested right of the petitioner acquired previous to the enactment of Republic Act No.

1576 by accepting his backpay acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of the

petitioner with respondent Bank with costs of the proceedings against respondent.

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner bank should have accepted the offer made by the respondent?

RULING:

Supreme Court – mandamus is the proper remedy and the judgment appealed from is hereby

affirmed

"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided"

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It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator

may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions

all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and

intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is

necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against

retrospective effect

These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain

any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its language. It simply

states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the

present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is

familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all

rights that had accrued prior to such amendment

It is true that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,

except when the law itself authorizes their validity" (Art. 5, New Civil Code). It should be recalled,

however, that since the prohibitive amendment of the appellant's charter should not be given

retroactive effect; and that the law, at the time appellee made his offer, allowed, in fact compelled,

the respondent bank to accept the appellee's certificate, the above provision finds no application

herein.

CHAPTER 9:#13:PROCEDURAL LAWS:

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-54305 (February 14, 1990)

FACTS:

Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was

granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Petitioner also

entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of

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BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner

from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, 9 mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became

the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appeal, CUENCO-

VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-

COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a

number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operating agreement which

BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission, the

trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281.

ISSUE:

W/N P.D. 1281 prevails.

HELD:

P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application.

CHAPTER 9:#14:PROCEDURAL LAWS:

G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN,

FACTS:

herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan filed a

complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate

of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo

allegations:

o has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time,

plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a

consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the

ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo

o Chad had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative

father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late

Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff

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o The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate

estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an

inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine

and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him

support pendente lite.

Petitioner filed motion to dismiss

trial court:

o denied and the case as set for pre-trial

o resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring

additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance

Court of Appeals

o Granted the petition filed by the petitioner and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's

motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10)

days from notice thereof

In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the

motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses

another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner

CA - dismissing the petition

ISSUE:

W/N Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect?

RULING:

Supreme Court – the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court

of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto

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Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead,

paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on

the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are

created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.

Article 285 of the Civil Code

o Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime

of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the

action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code:

o Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the

same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action

is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the

lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a

final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private

handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if

the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child,

or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the

action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not

prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes

essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a

vested right or not.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in

nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and

proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may

be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be

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governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested

rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the

instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of

the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The

trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that

private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

CHAPTER 10:#18:REVISION & CODIFICATION:

CHAPTER 10:#19:REPEAL:

Mecano v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement

denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended.

Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from

March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount

of which he is claiming from the COA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that

the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

ISSUE:

1. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA.

2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

HELD:

Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether

or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although not included in the

reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal, and the Court considers such

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implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second

sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of

compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC … whose

benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.”

CHAPTER 10:#20:REPEAL:

People v. AlmueteG.R. No. L-26551 (February 27, 1976)

FACTS:

Almuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). The

accused, tenants of Fernando, allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or

obtaining her consent. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense,

there was no longer any law punishing the act.

ISSUE:

W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed.

HELD:

Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the

time of the act. The ALRC suspended the ATL. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share

tenancy system. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy

system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and

the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. The legislative intent not to punish

anymore the tenant’s act of prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent statute,

revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. The repeal of a penal

law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its

repeal.

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