digests_freedom of expression.docx

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1 Gonzales v. COMELEC

Case Digests on Freedom of Expression Mark Justin Mooc

Gonzales v. COMELEC

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 4880 on the grounds that it violates their rights

such as freedom of speech, of assembly, to form associations or societies. More so, they

question the forms of election campaigns enumerated in the act.

Facts:

1. Congress passed a statute (RA 4880) which was designed to maintain the purityand integrity of the electoral process and calling a halt to the undesirable

practice of prolonged political campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils not

the least of which is the ever- increasing cost of seeking public office.

2. Cabigao was an incumbent council in the 4 thdistrict of Manila and the officialcandidate of the Nacionalista Party for the position of Vice Mayor. He was

subsequently elected to that position. Meanwhile, Gonzales is a private individual,

a registered voter in the City, and a political leader.

3. They claim that the enforcement of RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights suchas freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and right to form associations or

societies for purposes not contrary to law. Specifically, they challenge the validity

of two new sections included in the Revised E lection Code under RA 4880 which

was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967. The said sections prohibit the too

early nomination of candidates and limit the period of election campaign and

political activity. More so, after defining the terms candidates and election

campaign/partisan political activity,the acts which constitute election campaign

were specified, and that simple expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the

election was not to be considered as part of an election campaign. This prohibition

was furthered by a proviso which provided that nothing stated in the Act shall be

understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political

problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public

office whom he supports.

4. The acts deemed included in the terms election campaign of partisan politicalactivity are: (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other

groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any

campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political

conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or o ther similar

assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or

propaganda for or against a candidate; (c) making speeches, announcements or

commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or

candidate for public office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign literature or

materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any

campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (f) giving, soliciting,

or receiving contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or

indirectly.

Ruling:

1. The Court held that the challenged statute cannot be declared unconstitutional onseveral grounds. First, it is premature to challenge the statutes validity. Second,

the required number of votes was not met when the Court deliberated on the

scope of election campaigns or partisan political activities. Precisely, the Court

declared that RA 4880 could have been narrowly drawn and practices prohibited be

more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid

limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.

2. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamentalpostulate of our constitutional system. No law shall be passed abridging the

freedom of speech or of the press. What does it embrace? At the very least, free

speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and

truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There isto be then to previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent

liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages or

contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive

evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

3. The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression isundeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining

the truth, of securing participation by th e people in social including political

decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.

The trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the

broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It

represents a profound commitment to the principle that debate of public issueshould be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. It is not going too far, according to

another American decision, to view the function of free speech as inviting dispute.

It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a co ndition of unrest,

creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.

4. Freedom of speech and of the press th us means something more than the right toapprove existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to

official measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of

public consequence.


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2 Gonzales v. COMELEC


5. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that theright is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the

freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society

preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an

absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and under all

circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other

societal values that press for recognition.

6. As for freedom of assembly, the Bill of Rights as thus noted prohibits abridgment bylaw of freedom of speech or of the press. The Bill of Rights likewise extends the

same protection to the rights of people peaceably to assemble. As pointed in US v.

Bustos, this right is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and

complements the right of free speech.

7. Assembly means a right on the p art of citizens to meet peaceably for consultationin respect to public affairs.

8. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority in Thomasv. Collins, it was not accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom o f speech

and of the press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people

peaceably to assemble and to petition the gov ernment for redress of grievances.

All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights and

assurance afforded by the clause of this section of the Bill of Rights, wherein they

are contained, applies to all. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right

(right of people peaceably to assemble) is not to be limited, much less denied,

except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that

Congress has a right to prevent.

9. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form association for purposesnot contrary to law. With or without a constitutional provision of this character, it

may be assumed that the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or

society exists. With the explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be on the

matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantees, which are mostly

American in origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous cast and could be

traced to the Malolos Constitution.

10. In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should be on itspolitical significance. If such a right were non-existent, then the likelihood of a one-

party government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may become

unavoidable. Political opposition will simply cease to exist; minority groups may be

outlawed, constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well

become a thing of the past.

11. Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in th e sense that therecould be an abridgment of the right to form associations or societies when their

purposes are contrary to law. It is submitted that the phrase for purposes not

contrary to law is another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for

unless an association or society could be shown to create an imminent danger to

public safety, there is no justification for abridging the right to form associations or

societies.

12. In considering whether Republic 4880 is violative of the rights of free speech, freepress, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, the Co urt cannot ignore

the legislative declarationthat its enactment was in response to a serious

substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger o f happening,

but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To

asset otherwise would be to close ones eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor

can we ignore the express legislative purpose apparent in the proviso that simple

expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the elections shall not be

considered as part of an election campaign, and in the other proviso that nothing

herein stated shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views

on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of t he

candidates for public office whom he supports. Such limitations qualify the entire

provision restricting the period of an election campaign or partisan political

activity.

13. According to the act, *i+t shall be unlawful for any political party, politicalcommittee or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office

voted for at large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding an election, and for

any other elective public office earlier than 90 days immediately p receding an

election. This provision affects the right of association. Political parties have less

freedom as to the time during which they nominate candidates; the curtailment is

not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of

legitimate activities, save the above cited, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there

such an infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for

such purpose. Thus, the Court sustained its validity unanimously.

14. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the limitations thus impo sed on theconstitutional rights of free speech and press, of assembly, and of associations cut

deeply into their substance. On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils,

substantial in character, taint the purity of the electoral process. The justification

alleged by the proponents of the measures weighs heavily with the members of the

Court, though in varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid restrictions to


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3 Santiago v. Far East Broadcasting


which such precious freedoms are subjected. They are not unaware of the clear

and present danger that calls for measures that may bear heavily on the exercise of

the cherished rights of expression, of assembly and of association.

15. The Court, with five justices unable to agree, is of the view that nounconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of organizations,

associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of

soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a

candidate or party is restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting or

receiving contribution for election purposes, either directly or indirectly, is equally

free from constitutional infirmity.

16. The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding politicalconventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or o ther similar

assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or

propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all other

legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question. Nevertheless, the Court

rejected the contention that this should be annulled.

17. The other acts, likewise deemed included in election campaign or partisanpolitical activity tax, to the utmost, the judicial predisposition to view with

sympathy legislative efforts to regulate election practices deemed inimical because

of their collision with the preferred right of freedom of expression. From the

outset, such provisions did occasional divergence of views among the members of

the Court. Originally, only a minority was for their being adjudged as invalid. It is

not so any more. This is merely to emphasize that the scope of the curtailment to

which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the recognition

of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the

debasement of the electoral process.

18. The majority of the Court is of the belief that the ban on the solicitation orundertaking of any campaign or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an

individual, the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding

interview for or against the election for any party or candidate for public office, or

the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, suffers from th e

corrosion of invalidity. However, to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality, it

lacks one more affirmative vote to that effect.

19. It is understandable for Congress to believe that without the limitations set forth inthe challenged legislation, the laudable purpose of RA 4880 would be frustrated

and nullified. Whatever persuasive force such approach may command failed to

elicit the assert of a majority of the Court. This is not to say that the conclusion

reached by the minority that the above portions of the statute now assailed has

passed the constitutional test is devoid of merit. It only indicates that for the

majority, the prohibition of any s peeches, announcements or commentaries, or the

holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public

office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature

or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or that

undertaking of any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party,

is repugnant to a constitutional command. To that extent, the challenged statute

prohibits what under the Constitution cannot by any law be abridged.

20. In terms of the permissible scope o f legislation that otherwise could be justifiedunder the clear and present danger doctrine, it is considered opinion of the

majority, though lacking the necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that

the challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices

prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as

to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.

21. It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental purpose belegitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle

fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. For

precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to our most

precious freedoms.

22. It is of the opinion that it would be premature, to say at least, for a judgment ofnullity of any provision found in RA 4880. The need for adjudication arises only if in

the implementation of the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional application of its

provisions.

Santiago v. Far East Broadcasting

Santiago, the campaign manager of the Popular Front Sumulong, asked Far East

Broadcasting for the purchase of air time for the broadcast of the political speeches delivered

at the Opera House. However, respondent would only do so if the party submits in advance

the complete manuscript of the speeches to be delivered.

Facts:

1. Petitioner (Santiago), being the campaign manager of the political party PopularFront Sumulong, asked respondent (Far East Broadcasting) for the purchase of air

time for the broadcast of the partys political speeches at the Opera House on

September 3, 1941.


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4 Primicias v. Fugoso


2. However, respondent refused to do so except should the party submit in advancethe complete manuscript of contemplated speeches. Because of this, petitioner

questioned the act of respondent in refusing to allow the use of its station for

broadcasting the speeches and constitutes unlawful censorship and a violation of

the freedom of speech guaranteed by our Constitution.

Ruling:

1. It is clear from the laws and the regulations adverted to that the r espondent hadthe right to require the petitioner to submit the manuscript of the speeches which

he intended to broadcast.

2. The Court failed to perceive the cogency of such argument. It does not bolster upthe case for the petitioner. It impliedly admits that a speech that may endanger

public safety may be censored and disapproved for broadcasting. How could the

censor verify the petitioners claim that the speeches he intended to broadcast

offered no danger to public safety or pubic mo rality, if the petitioner refused to

submit the manuscript or even its gist? If the petitioner had complied with

respondents requirement and the respondent had arbitrarily and unreasonablyrefused to permit said speeches to be broadcasted, he might have reason to

complain.

Primicias v. Fugoso

The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza

Miranda for purposes of petitioning the government for redress to grievances. However, the

City Mayor, founding his actions on Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, did not

issue the permit.

Facts:

1. The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a publicmeeting at Plaza Miranda on a Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the

purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances.

2. However, the Mayor of the City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not issue thepermit. For this purpose, the campaign manager of the party (Cipriano Primicias)

instituted this action for mandamus.

3. Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the power of the CityMayor of Manila to grant or issue permits for the holding of assembly or meeting,

parade or procession. Moreover, he would be able to determine where to hold

such activities.

Ruling:

1. The right to freedom of s peech, and to peacefully assemble and petition thegovernment for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of thepeople recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries.

But, it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies

that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it

shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor

injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the

exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police

power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,

morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

2. Under Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of the City of Manila, thatthe holding of athletic games, sports or exercises during the celebration of national

holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day ofany district may be permitted provided that a permit be issued by the Mayor who

shall determine the streets, or public places or portions thereof where said

activities may be held. From the Revised Ordinance of the City, there is no express

and separate provision regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any

street or public places.

3. As Section 1119 is susceptible to two constructions: one, that the Mayor of the Cityis vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the

holding of a lawful assembly or meeting in the streets and other public places of

the City, and second, that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be

granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latters reasonable discretion to

determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, theCourt believed that it must adopt the second construction. It means that the

ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the

permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the

streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting

be held.

4. The other alternative when adopted because it would mean that the Mayor has thepower to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to

authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for


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5 Mutuc v. COMELEC


holding of meetings, parades or processions. Moreover, said construction would

render the ordinance invalid and void as it contravenes constitutional limitations.

5. The Mayor reasoned that, in granting the p ermit, the speeches delivered in themeeting would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their

government and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches

of the peace and a disruption of public order. In reiterating the pronouncements of

the US Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, *f+ear of serious injury cannot

alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and

burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of

irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable

ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be

reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.

Mutuc v. COMELEC

Mutuc seeks to be a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his campaigns, he

used political jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers.

Facts:

1. Amelito Mutuc is a candidate for delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.In his making his candidacy known, he used jingles in his mobile units equipped

with sound systems and loud speakers.

2. By a telegram sent to him on October 29, 1970, the COMELEC informed Mutuc thathis certificate of candidacy was given due course, but prohibited him from using

jingles in his mobile units. However, according to Mutuc, the said order is violative

of his constitutional right especially his freedom to speech.

3. However, COMELEC contends that the justification for the prohibition waspremised on the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it

unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sampleballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever

nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,

matches, cigarettes and the like whether of domestic or foreign origin. More so,

the contention was that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the

recorded or taped voice of a singer and t herefore a tangible propaganda material,

under the above statute subject to confiscation.

Ruling:

1. In unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speechor a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls

all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the

dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of

suffrage.

2. What the COMELEC did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evilagainst which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could COMELEC justify its

action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would

be free, either by himself or through o thers, to use his mobile loudspeakers.

Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculate by confining it to a

speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape

or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent

Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous

restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the

Constitution in express terms assures.

3. Mutuc was allowed to use political taped jingles.Navarro v. Villegas

The City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for an

assembly.

Facts:

1. The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grantpermits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and

holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal

activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an

alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of demonstration sought to be held t hat

afternoon.2. The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to o ne at

the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of

public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an

aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means

of preventing such disorders.

Ruling:


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6 Reyes v. Bagatsing


1. Every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such astate of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,

storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the

general detriment of the public.

2. Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor togrant petitioners application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court denied

the writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their petition.

Reyes v. Bagatsing

The Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It would start in Luneta

Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After the march, a program would follow

whereby two brief speeches were to be delivered. However, the City Mayor did not act on the

request of organization for permit.

Facts:

1. Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Co alition, sought a permitfrom the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a public park, to

the gates of the US Embassy which is two blocks away. The march would be

attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference.

2. A short program would be held after the march. During the program, there wouldbe a delivery of two brief speeches. After which, a petition based on the resolution

adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament,

World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would

be presented to a representative of the Embassy o r any of its perso nnel who may

be there so that it may be delivered to the US Ambassador.

3. The Mayor of the City of Manila however intruded by not acting on the request ofthe organization for permit. Rather, he suggested with the recommendation of thepolice authorities that a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be held at the

Rizal Coliseum. As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization, filed a suit for

mandamus.

Ruling:

1. Reyes petition was granted.2. The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rig hts to free speech

and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is

quite explicit that *n+o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of

the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the

Government for redress of grievances. Free speech, like free press, may be

identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public

concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous

restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel

suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings

unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has

a right to prevent.

3. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably forconsultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be

accorded the utmost deference and freedom of expression, of a clear and present

danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. It is not to be

limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of

expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a

right to prevent.

4. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that itis a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and com plements the

right of free speech.

5. Reiterating the ruling in Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held that itwas not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the

press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to

assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these

rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is

a limitation placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is called upon t o

examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole

justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the

maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave

and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, of

other legitimate public interest.

6. What is guaranteed by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may notadvocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the

cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or

assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.

The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in US v. Apurado, *i+t is

rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the pub lic assembly of

the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on


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7 Cabansag v. Fernandez


such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the

greater the grievances and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule,

will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. It

bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct,

injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to

ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the

high estate occupied by intellectual liberty is our scheme of values.

7. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, thereis freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the

permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access

becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The

principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in

these words: The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly

are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting i s held but

as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their

utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution

protects.

8. There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were markedby turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the

guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here

respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a

permit would be granted. While prudence requires that there be a realistic

appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all

the relevant circumstances, still the assumptionespecially so where the assembly

is scheduled for a specific public placeis that the permit must he for the assembly

being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberta,

speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it

may be exercised in some other place.

9. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensingauthority of the date, the public place where and t he time when it will take place.

If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its

legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to

enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid

objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is

an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and

present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view

that there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the

applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether

favourable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.

Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

10. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom, arehighly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly

stressed that on the judiciaryeven more so than on the other departments

rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to

such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course,

dispense with what has been felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the

sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to

incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of suds rights, enjoying as they

do precedence and primacy.

Cabansag v. Fernandez

Cabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission seeking for

the fast resolution of his case pending at the CFI of Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that

Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for a line in his letter.

Facts:

1. Petitioner (Apolonio Cabansag) sought for the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandezfrom a parcel of land who, o n the other end, filed their answer and a motion to

dismiss. Even though pleadings were submitted, the hearings were suspended

several times from 1947 to 1952.

2. Upon President Magsaysays assumption in office and creation of PresidentialComplaints and Action Commission (PCAC), Cabansag wrote the PCAC, a letter copy

which he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the CFI of

Pangasinan. He claimed that the case which had been long been pending be

decided already. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the said letter to the Clerk of CFIPangasinan.

3. Counsel for defendants (Atty. Manuel Fernandez) filed a motion before JudgeMorfe praying that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged

scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC when he wrote thru the

careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer.

Ruling:


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8 Cabansag v. Fernandez


1. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of itscitizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a

redress of grievances. The First Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees

that right against abridgment by Congress. But mention does not argue exclusion

elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those

fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and

political institutionsprinciples which the 14thAmendment embodies in the

general terms of its due process clause.

2. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary throughwhich that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means

of assuring judges their independence is a free press.

3. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflictingrights of similar import in an att empt to draw the proper constitut ional boundary

between freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary. These are

the clear and present danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule.

4. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence ofthe comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of

imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to

be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented. And this evil is

primarily the disorderly and unfair administration of justice. This test establishes

a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words

maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be

abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm

the administration of justice. The US Supreme Court has made the significant

suggestion that this rule is an appropriate guide in determining the

constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to

prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the

right of privacy. The Court furthers clear and present danger of substantive evil

as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an

impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the

evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high A public

utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of

freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still

pending in the courts, upon the t heory that in such a case, it must be necessarily

tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of

engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a

judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional

right of freedom of speech and press.

5. As declared in Craig v. Harney, the US Supreme Court said that the *f+reedom ofspeech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for

contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a

serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in

contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular

or to belittle him The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications

concerning a judges decision is not alone t he measure of the power to punish for

contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a

likely, threat to the administration of justice. Furthered in Pennekamp v. Florida,

*a+nd in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by

newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such

criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that freedom

of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible

tendency to influence pending cases. Thus, the question in every case, according

to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and

are of such a nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about

the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of

proximity and degree.

6. The second, which is the dangerous tendency rule, has been adopted in caseswhere extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of

expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins.

There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies

in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for

redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the Constitution, are not absolute. As

held in Gilbert v. Minnesota, *t+hey are subject to restrictions and limitations, one

of them being the protection of the courts against contempt.

7. As furthered by the US Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New Y ork, the dangeroustendency rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a

dangerous tendency which the State has a right to prevent, then such words are

punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,

violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated

in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably

calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is

sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring


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9 Ruiz v. Gordon


about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil

which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

8. It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and ofthe press, which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute r ight to

speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choos e, or an

unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of

language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.

Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited, this freedom is an

inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might

become the scourge of the Republic.

9. The Court saw at once that it was far from Cabansags mind to put the court inridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the

letter was addressed for. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in

respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said

that he has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful manoeuvres of a

tactical lawyer. Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever

criticize, the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose

tactical manoeuvres has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The

grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent

indifference in transcribing their notes.

10. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivatingfactor of the lodging of the contempt charge is the fact that the letter was sent to

the Office of the President, asking for help because of the precarious predicament

of Cabansag. Such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so, the danger

must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can the

Court infer that such act has a dangerous tendency to belittle the court or

undermine the administration of justice for Cabansag merely exercised his

constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate

grievance.

Ruiz v. Gordon

A prayer rally and parade/march was to be conducted by petitioners. They allege that the

Mayor of Olongapo City, Gordon, did not act on the matter.

Facts:

1. Petitioner (Ruiz) personally delivered to respondent Mayor of Olongapo City(Richard Gordon) a letter application which sought to request a permit to hold a

prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle on December 4, 1983 from 1:00 pm to early

evening. Ruiz delivered the letter on behalf of the Olongapo Citizens Alliance for

National Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino Justice for All, Concerned Citizen for

Justice and Peace, Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa and United Nationalist

Democratic Organization.

2. Aside from the holding of the prayer-rally, the said groups sought to hold aparade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 pm.

3. In his manifestation, respondent, among others written, mentioned in t heGuardian that he had granted t he permit of the petitioner.

Ruling:

1. As shown both in t he manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamuscould have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on

November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of

exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be t he one most interested in

ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a

reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision of therequest, such part or his representative should be at the office of the public official

concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or

favourable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need

not be waste of time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from

which redress is sought in case of a denial or modification of a request for a permit.

2. The petition is dismissed. The Court deems it best to set forth the above to specifyin more detail, the steps necessary for the judicial protection of constitutional

rights with the least delay and inconvenience to the parties and with the greater

assurance that the factual background on which is dependent the determination of

whether or not the clear and present danger standard has been satisfied.

People v. Perez

Perez uttered phrases which called for the beheading of Wood in a discussion on political

matters.

Facts:

1. Respondent (Isaac Perez), while holding a discussion with several persons onpolitical matters in Pilar, Sorsogon, uttered the phrases: Asin a n mangna Filipinos

na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo no Wood


10/30

10 US v. Bustos


huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot can Filipinas (and the Filipinos, like

myself, must use bolos for cutting off Woods head for having recommended a bad

thing for the Philippines).

2. Leonard Wood was the Governor-General during that time, April 1, 1922. For saidphrases, Perez was accused for violating Article 256 of the Penal Code.

Ruling:

1. It is our course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292(Treason andSedition Law) must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and

the right of the people peaceably to assembly and petition the Government for

redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations

of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature

and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and

effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the

constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and

petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of

constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and theexistence of the State.

2. In the case at bar, the person maligned by the Accused is the Chief Executive of thePhilippine Islands. His official position, like the presidency of the US and other high

offices, under a democratic form of government instead of affording immunity

from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this

instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free

speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There

is a seditious tendency of feeling incompatible with a disposition t o remain loyal to

the Government and obedient to the laws. Being the representative of the

executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power, a seditious

attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of t he Filipino people andon American sovereignty.

3. As a matter of fact, Section 8 of the same act contemplates the said situation. Forsuch reasons, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and

done an act which tended to instigate ot hers to cabal or meet together for

unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and one an act which suggested and

incited rebellious conspiracies, which tended to stir up the people against t he

lawful authorities, which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the

safety or order of the Government.

US v. Bustos

The justice of peace filed a case against numerous citizens of Pampanga after the latters case

was dismissed. They were charged for the libellous statements against him.

Facts:

1. Numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, prepared and signed a petition to theExecutive Secretary through Crossfiled & OBrien charging respondent Roman

Punsalan, justice of peace of Macabebe and Masantol with malfeasance in office.

Likewise, they ask for Punsalans removal.

2. Punsalan was charged for three specific charges which happened to FranciscaPolintan, Valentin Sunga and Leoncio Quiambao. They allege that Punsalan used

his position to benefit from their legal needs like keeping Polintan as a servant for 4

days aside from taking her two chickens and twelve gandus.

3. The case against the justice of peace was dismissed. Thus, Punsalan filed criminalcharges against defendants for the libellous statements against him.

Ruling:

1. The interest of society and the m aintenance of good government demand a fulldiscussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public

men is necessary for free speech. As held in Howarth v. Barlow, the US Supreme

Court declared that *t+he people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their

officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a

despotism. Moreover, the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the

right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of law is a matter of vital

public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for

proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of peace or a judge the

same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. It is a

duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of

any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all to know of any official

dereliction on the part of the magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to

bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty is to inquire into and punish

them.

2. The right to assemble and petition is a necessary consequence of republicaninstitutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a

right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in r espect to public

affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply without fear


11/30

11 Lagunzad v. Soto vda De Gonzales


of penalty to the appropriate branch or o ffice of the government for a redress of

grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must assume responsibility for

the charges made.

3. The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, which looks tothe free and unfettered administration of justice, through, as an i ncidental result, it

may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant

slanderer.

4. Qualified privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. A communication madebona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an

interest or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person

having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter

which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. Even when the

statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their

truthfulness and the charge is made in go od faith, the mantle of privilege may still

cover the mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege

is not defeated by the mere fact t hat the communication is made in intemperate

terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and

honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials, such an

unintentional error would not take the case out o f the privilege.

5. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination todiscover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny will defeat the

protection which the law throws over privileged communications.

6. A petition prepared and signed at an assembly of numerous citizens includingaffidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of peace with malfeasance in office

and asking for his removal, was presented through lawyers to the Executive

Secretary. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first

instance of the district. The judge of first instance, after investigation,

recommended to the Governor-General that the justice of t he peace filing a motion

for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and

acquitted the justice of the peace. Criminal action was then begun against the

defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive

Secretary was libellous. On a review of the evidence, the Court finds that express

malice was not proved by prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the

petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition

were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The

defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavour

to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good

citizenship.

7. It is true that t he particular words set out in t he information, if said of a privateperson, might well be considered libellous per se. The charges might also under

certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a

general rule, words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace of dishonesty or

corruption or incapacity or misconduct, touching him in his office are actionable.

Lagunzad v. Soto vda De Gonzales

The parties entered into a licensing agreement for the filming of The Moises Padilla Story.

Soto vda. de Gonzales is the mother of Moises. Moises half-sister objecred to the movie as it

exploited Moises life.

Facts:

1. Lagunzad and de Gonzales entered into a licensing agreement for the former wasfilming The Moises Padilla Story. Manuel Lagunzad was a newspaperman and,

through his MML Productions, began the production of the movie. The movie wasbased on the book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.s The Long Dank Night in

Negros.

2. Although the focus on the film on the Moises life, there were portions which dealtwith his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his

mother, Maria Soto Vda. De Gonzales.

3. The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on October 16, 1961. Thirteendays prior to it, Moises half-sister, Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to t he movie as it

exploited Moises life.

Ruling:

1. The Court neither finds merit in petitioners contention that the LicensingAgreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the

press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he has a right to express his

thoughts in film on t he public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint.

2. The clear and present danger rule was applied. In quoting Gonzales v. COMELEC,*t+he prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a

limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and

of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television

and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a court


12/30

12 Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. V. Capulong


to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests

observable in a given situation or type of situation.

3. In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted byrespondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking

into account eh interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular

circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing

Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will hav e to

be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached

when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. V. Capulong

Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. sought to film the EDSA Revolution. They informed Enrile regarding

the motion picture and he wrote that he would not approve the use, appropriation,

reproduction and/ore exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of his family in

any cinema.

Facts:

1. Hal McElroy owns the production company, Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. Through thismovie production company, he intended to make a movie that would depict the

historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA in a six hour mini-series.

2. The proposed motion picture is entitled The Four Day Revolution, and wasendorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the

other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his

approval of the intended film production. Petitioner McElroy had likewise

informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture, enclosing a

synopsis of it.

3. Enrile replied that he would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation,reproduction and/or exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of hisfamily in any cinema or television production. Because of this, petitioners deleted

the name of Enrile in the movie s cript and proceeded to film the projected motion

picture. Despite of the deletion, Enrile still sought to enjoin petitioners from

producing the movie, which was later on granted.

Ruling:

1. Petitioners claim that in producing the The Four Day Revolution, they areexercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under the

Constitution. Private respondent, on the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and

claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would

constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.

2. The freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and producemotion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theatres or to diffuse them

through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally utilized

vehicle of communication and medium of expression.

3. This freedom is available in our country bot h to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the

production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield

monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of

expression. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities

available in our country and hence to exclude commercially-owned and operated

media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and o f

expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties

in our country.

4. The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture does notconstitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondents right of privacy. More

so, the motion picture is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan

Ponce Enrile, but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played

by Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of

government.

5. The privilege of enlightening the public is not limited to the dissemination of newsin the scene of current events. It extends also to information or education, or even

entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts

concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the

reproduction of the public scene in newsreel and travelogues. In determining

where to draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship

over what the public may be permitted to read; and they were understandably

liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt.

6. The line of equilibrium in the specific context o f the instant case between theconstitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may

be marked out in terms o f a requirement that the proposed motion picture must

be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other

words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of

private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must be no presentation of the

private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of


13/30

13 People v. Alarcon


intimate or embarrassing personal facts. To the extent that the motion picture

limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA

Revolution to those events which are directly and r easonably related to the public

facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondents privacy cannot

be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out

even without a license from private respondent.

People v. Alarcon

A columnist of the Tribune published the copy of a letter in his article. The letter is about the

conviction of 52 tenants of a hacienda.

Facts:

1. A letter signed by one Luis Taruc was addressed to his Excellency, the President ofthe Philippines, and a copy of which, having found its way to a columnist of the

Tribune, was quoted in an article of the said newspaper in its September 23, 1937

issue.

2.

The letter is about the charging and conviction of 52 tenants in Flroridablance,Pampanga for robbery in band because they took each a few cavans of palay for

which they issued the corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda

where they are working. The letter furthers that the tenants havethe right to

take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to given

them rations of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid with their

share of their crop.

3. For this purpose, respondent was required to show cause on grounds of contemptof court.

Ruling:

1. The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well-defined by the casesadjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to

impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a

pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily

punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after cause has ended. It must

clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the

administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for

contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper

comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the

decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once

the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or

amend it. That, the Court believes is the case at bar, for here the Court has a

concession that the letter complained of was published after the CFI of Pampanga

had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision

had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider

its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may

be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without power to

reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case,

and could not have been influenced by the question publication.

2. It is suggested that even if t here had been nothing more pending before the trialcourt, this still had jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for the rule that

the publication scandalized the court. The rule suggested, which has its origin at

common law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and in t he

United States, the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect that

comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty

of the liberty of the press. Other considerations argue against our adoption of the

suggested holding. As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that

newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the

courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal

contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise

after the case has ended. In at least two instances, this court has exercised the

power to punish for contempt on the preservativeand not on the vindictive

principle (Villavicencio v. Lukban), on the corrective and not o n the retaliatory

idea of punishment (In re: Lozano and Quevedo). Contempt of court is in the

nature of a criminal offense, and in considering the probate effects of the article

alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable interference consistent with

the theory of defendants innocence will be indulged, and where a reasonable

doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one of the constructive contempt for

interfering with the due administration of justice, the doubt must be resolved in his

favour and he must be acquitted.

3. Respondent was acquitted.In re: Vicente Sotto

Atty. Vicente Sotto, a member of the Congress, was frustrated with how the Court interpreted

the law he authored in a particular case. In his letter, he mentioned that he would file a bill

seeking the reorganization of the Court.


14/30

14 In re: Laureta


Facts:

1. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement, published in the Manila Times and otherdaily newspapers of the locality, in connection with the Courts decision in In re:

Angel Parazo.

2. Sotto is disappointed with how the Co urt interpreted the Press Freedom Law, ofwhich he is the author, in the case of Angel Parazo. More so, he declared theincompetency of narrow-mindedness of the majority of the Courts members. He

furthers that the only remedy for the deliberate narrow-mindedness is to change

the members of the Court.

Ruling:

1. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soun dness orunsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may

be tolerated; because if well-founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to

the correction of an error if committed but if it is not well-taken and obviously

erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the Court in reversing or modifying its

decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement

that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not

correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill,

which became a law had intended, his criticism might in t hat case be tolerated, for

it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the

court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent

was amended by both Houses of Co ngress, and the clause unless the Court finds

that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State was added or

inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular

member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be

the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.

2. The respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazocase, which was then and still is pending reconsideration of the Parazo case. He

not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a

bill in the next Congress reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the

members of Justices from eleven to seven, as to change the members of this Court

which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent

and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this

Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But, the

respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity o f this Court for the apparent

purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the

administration of justice.

3. It is true that t he constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press mustbe protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of

the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as

the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of citizen,

is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. In the words of Justice

Holmes in US v. Sullens, *t+he administration of justice and the freedom of the

press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be

violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties

and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from

which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right

of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times

to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose

of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair

the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct t he administration of justice, this

Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt.

This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an

orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional

functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a

last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve

its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.

4. Sotto was found guilty of contempt of Court; thus, fined of Php 1,000.In re: Laureta

Ilustre, whose case before the Supreme Court was resolved against her favour, wrote to the

members of the First Division of the Court and threatened them. Furthermore, she filed a

complaint before the Tanodbayan.

Facts:

1. Wenceslao Laureta is the counsel of Eva Ilustre. Ilustre wrote to the members ofthe First Division of the Supreme Court, namely Justices Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz and

Feliciano. In her letter, she threatened the members for their minute resolution

which went against her favour.

2. She threatened the members that the entire Filipino population would know theprocedures in the Court and to charge them, which she apparently did so. She filed


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15 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan


an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan for having knowingly and

deliberately rendered with bad faith, an unjust extended Minute Resolution.

Ruling:

1. The Court finds Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair commentand criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her lettersaddressed to the individual Justices; in the language of the charges she filed before

the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court

and/or the official actions of the Justices; and in her unjustified outburst that she

can no longer expect justice from the Court. The fact that said letters are not

technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were submitted after the

main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the

contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to

privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan

Gonzales filed a motion for reconsideration. He was found guilty of contempt of court and ofgross misconduct as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.

Ruling:

1. The clear and present danger doctrine invoked by respondents counsel is not amagic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and

judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which

compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked,

absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger doctrine has

been an accepted method for making out the appropriate limits of freedom of

speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which

has been recognized and applied by courts.

2. Under either the clear and present danger test or the balancing-of-interesttest, the Court believes that the statements here made by Gonzales are of such a

nature and were made in such a manner and u nder such circumstances, as to

transcend the permissible limits of free speech. It is important to point out that

the substantive evil which the Supreme Court has a right and duty to prevent

does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or o vert violence

or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the

Supreme Court to confront and prevent a substantive evil consisting not only of

the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance

of the broader evil of the d egradation of the judicial system of a country and the

destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the

bar and officers of the court. The substantive evil here involved,in other words,

is not as palpable as a threat to public disorder or rioting, but is certainly no less

deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.


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16 US v. Kottinger


US v. Kottinger

Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the raided store of Camera Supply Co. of

obscene and indecent pictures. The pictures revealed six different postures of non-Christian

inhabitants of the Philippines.

Facts:

1. The premises of Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila was raided andsubsequent to said raid, post-cards were used as evidence against the manager of

the company (J.J. Kottinger).

2. Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the store of obscene and indecentpictures in violation of Section 12 of Act No. 277. Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel

Law. Section 12 made obscene or indecent publications as misdemeanours. The

pictures reveal six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines,

including the Bontoc Woman, Moros, and Kalinga Girls, among others.

Ruling:

1. The word obscene and the term obscenity may be defined as meaningsomething offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy. Indecency is an act against

good behaviour and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in

determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the

meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as

obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral

influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being

obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and

common sense of men as an indecency.

2. The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscenity or indecent pictures,writings, papers or books. But the words obscene or indecent at themselves

descriptive. They are words in common use and every person of average

intelligence understands their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by

the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for bearing on the issue of

obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend

upon the circumstances of the case.

3. Obscene as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place inthe mails any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication, according to the US Supreme

Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of immorality which has relation

to sexual impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at common law in

prosecutions for obscene libel.

4. The pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as theyappear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or

indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. The pictures in question merely

depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in

unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community,

the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by

photographs of this type. The court is convinced that the post-card pictures in this

case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul or filthy.

Gonzales v. Katigbak

The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, upon condition that certain parts be

changed and removed, classified the motion picture Kapit sa Patalim as for adults only.

Facts:

1.

The motion picture Kapit sa Patalim was classified For Adults Only. As such, thepresident of the Malaya Films (Jose Antonio Gonzales) questioned the scope of the

power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television and how it should

be exercised. The chairman of the said board is Maria Kalaw Katigbak and Gen.

Wilfredo Estrada as its vice-chairman.

2. In classifying the said movie as For Adults Only, there must be made c ertainchanges and deletions enumerated. For this purpose, a petition for certiorari was

filed.

Ruling:

1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideasand the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our

people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing

cultural traits are considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the

importance of motion pictures as an o rgan of public opinion lessened by the fact

that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing

line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such

distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free

expression.


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17 People v. Go Pin


2. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, may beidentified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public

concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom,

as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if there be a clear and

present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.

3. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or freepress. As early as 1909, in the case of US v. Sedano, a prosecution for libel, the

Supreme Court already made clear that freedom of the press co nsists in the right to

print what one chooses without any previous license.

4. It is the opinion of the Court that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation,the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to

safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for

general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to

adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule

and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be

presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity.

5. The test to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clearand present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to

prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no

doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The

causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension

about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if

such danger be only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh (almost)

inevitable. The basic postulate is that where the movies, theatrical productions,

radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are

concernedincluded that they are in freedom of expressioncensorship,

especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest

proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public

morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the

observation of Justice Douglas that every writer, actor, or producer, no matter

what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.

6. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberalapproach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the

patrons have to pay their way, television r eaches every home where there is a set.

Children then likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown.

It cannot be denied that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an

attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

7. The petition was dismissed because the enough number of votes was notmustered.

People v. Go Pin

Go Pin held an exhibition of what was alleged to be indecent and/or immoral pictures in a

recreational center.

Facts:

1. Go Pin, a Chinese citizen, exhibited at t he Globe Arcade in Manila, a recreationalcenter, a large number of one-real 16 mm films about 100 feet in length each,

which are allegedly indecent and/or immoral. He pleaded not guilty at first but

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