Guilatco v. City of Dagupan FACTS: Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a nationalroad) when she accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her hospitalization and continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable togo to work, thereby losing her income. She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovialself since she is unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She filed an action fordamages against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that themanhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or supervision of the City ofDagupan. ISSUE: Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco. HELD: Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defectiveroad or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either controlor supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case, this control or supervision isprovided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties includethe care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter of Dagupan providesthat the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and theregulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly indicatesthat the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
Transcript
Guilatco v. City of DagupanFACTS:Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a nationalroad) when she accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her hospitalization and continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable togo to work, thereby losing her income. She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovialself since she is unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She filed an action fordamages against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that themanhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or supervision of the City ofDagupan.
ISSUE:Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco.
HELD:Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defectiveroad or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either controlor supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case, this control or supervision isprovided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties includethe care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter of Dagupan providesthat the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and theregulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly indicatesthat the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner's warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No.13 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
FACTS:Ordinance 22 entitled AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OFDAGUPAN was enacted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. The said ordinance was imposing additional requirements to that of thenational law Act 496. Ordinance 22 was annulled by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals whosedecision reads as follows:Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to besubmitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by theDirector of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of theordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the CityEngineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivisionowner additional conditions.
ISSUE: Were the decisions of the CFI and CA to annul the said ordinance was correct?
HELD:Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guiseof implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to preventbigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on.This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from thenational legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating thisauthority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.
Title of the Case:VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, et. al., petitioners,vs.The Honorable EDGARDO PARAS , et. al.,respondents
G.R. No. & Date:L-42571-72. July 25, 1983Ponente:FERNANDO, J.
Doctrine/Topic:Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles ofBills; Subject shall be expressed in the title
Facts of the Case:1.Vicente DeLa Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and cabarets in Bulacan.
2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as aprohibition and closure ordinance which wasbased on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (butwas originally enacted on June 20, 1953).
3. The said RA is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTINGMUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILSTHE POWER TO REGULATE THEESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE ANDOPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVETERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS."
4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city boardor council of each chartered city shall have thepower to regulate by ordinance the establishment,maintenance and operation of night clubs,cabarets …and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction .”
5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section wasamended to include not merely the power toregulate, but likewise "prohibit."
6. The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938.7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibitionwith preliminary injunction were
filed on thegrounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null and voidas a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling; (2)Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners'right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given topetitioners was in effect withdrawn without
judicialhearing; and (3)That under Presidential DecreeNo. 189 (as amended, by Presidential Decree No.259 the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, hasbeen transferred to the Department of Tourism.
8. The respondent Judge issued a restrainingorder on November 7, 1975. Then came onJanuary 15, 1976 the decision upholding theconstitutionality and validity of Ordinance No.84 and dismissing the cases. Hence, thispetition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUEWhether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibitthe exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of nightclubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, suchclubs employing hostesses
HELDA.Decision:The SC held that municipal corporations cannotprohibit the operation of night clubs. They may beregulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed,set aside, and nullified.Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of theMunicipality of Bocaue is declared void andunconstitutional.B. Rationale:Since there is no dispute as the title limits thepower to regulating, not prohibiting, it would resultin the statute being invalid if, as was done by theMunicipality of Bocaue, the operation of a nightclub was prohibited.A refusal to grant licenses, because no suchbusinesses could legally open, would be subjectto judicial correction. That is to comply with thelegislative will to allow the operation andcontinued existence of night clubs subject toappropriate regulations.It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if onlythe above portion of the Act were considered, amunicipal council may go as far as to prohibit theoperation of night clubs. If that were all, then theappealed decision is not devoid of support in law. Additionally, the title was not in any way altered,as the exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.There is thus support for the view advanced bypetitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutionalquestion. The Constitution mandates: "Every billshall embrace only one subject which shall beexpressed in the title thereof."
City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE:Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD:The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
J. Gancayo
Facts:Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonmentThe complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and notadmission rates.The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.
Issue:Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?
Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government.People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinanceTo invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to theprescriptions of the fundamental lawThe court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests thatbirth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited bymovie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price ofadmission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves.A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain.In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable.While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence
[Digest] Ortigas vs. FEATI (1979)ORTIGAS & CO. , L IMITED PARTENRSHIP V. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO. (1979)
Santos, J.
Facts:· Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to the public particularly Highway Hills subdivision along EDSA· March 4, 1952 – Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over Lots 5 and 6 Block 31, Highway Hills· July 19, 1962 – Augusto and Natividad transferred their rights and interests in favor of Emma Chavezo Transfer contained the following restrictions and stipulations:§ For residential purposes only§ All buildings and improvements (except fences) should use strong building material, have modern sanitary installations connected to the public sewer or own septic tank and shall not be more than 2 meters from the boundary lines· Resolution 27 – Feb 4, 1960 – reclassified the western part of EDSA (Shaw boulevard to Pasig River) as a commercial and industrial zone· Such restrictions were annotated on the TCTs· July 23, 1962 - Feati bank bought Lot 5 from Emma Chavez while lot 6 was purchased by Republic Flour Mills
· May 5, 1963 – Feati Bank began laying foundation and construction of a building for banking purposes on lots 5 and 6· Ortigas & Co. Demanded that they comply with the annotated restrictions· Feati Bank refused arguing that it was following the zoning regulations· Ortigas & Co. filed a case in the lower courts which held that Resolution No. 27 was a valid exercise of police power of the municipality hence the zoning is binding and takes precedence over the annotations in the TCTs because “private interest should bow down to general interest and welfare.”· March 2, 1965 – motion for reconsideration by Ortigas & Co. which was denied on March 26, 1965· April 2, 1965 Ortigas filed notice of appeal which was given due course on April 14, 1965 hence this case.
Issues:WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police powerWON Resolution No. 27 can nullify or supersede contractual obligations by Feati Bank and Trust Co.
Held:YES it is a valid exercise police power.YES it can nullify contractual obligations by Feati with Ortigas & Co.
Ratio:· The validity of the resolution was never assailed in the lower courts and can therefore not be raised for the first time on appeal
o The rule against flip flopping issues and arguments prevents deception in courtso Ortigas & Co. also did not dispute the factual findings of the lower court on the validity of the resolution· Assuming arguendo it was properly raised the resolution is still valido RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) Sec 3 empowers municipalities to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipalityo The resolution is regulatory measure!o RA 2264 Sec 12 à any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist à this gives more power to LGUs to promote general welfare, economic conditions, social welfare and material progress in their locality· The non-impairment clause of contracts is not absolute since it must be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police powero when general welfare and private property rights clash, the former must prevail through police powers of the state· Lots 5 and 6 front EDSA and has become surrounded by industrial and commercial complexeso Development in the area has resulted in extreme noise and air pollution that is not conducive to health, safety and welfare of the would-be residents à justifies the usage by Feati Bank of the land for more reasonable purposes
Basco vs PAGCOR
Municipal Corporation – Local Autonomy – imperium in imperio
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCOR’s charter is against the constitutional provision on local autonomy.
Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR’s charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation
with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.
TAN vs. COMELECG.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government CodeFacts:This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.Issue:WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.Held:Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed
new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
Municipality of Parańaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998)
Posted on October 4, 2012
G.R. No. 127820
292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the
Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty
Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed “for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.” Petitioner,
pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991,
previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with
private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized
petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the
clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private
Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause
of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata. On private respondent’s motion, its answer was treated
as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated
as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there
is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief
executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a
law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337,
which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in
effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law
itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the streets of Caloocan.
January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions.
1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the stalls in their street
ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?
HELD: NO
1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because it is going to be contrary to the general law
4.
City of Manila vs. TeoticoCity of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CAG.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CAConcepcion, J.:
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."
JIMENEZ v. CITY OF MANILAG.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987
FACTS: Bernardino Jimenez fell in an uncovered opening o the ground located
within the premises of the Sta. Ana public market. At that time, the market was flooded with ankle-deep rainwater which prevented the opening form being seen. Jimenez, for his part, went to that market to buy bagoong despite the rains. He sustained an injury due to a rusty 4-inch nail which pierced his left leg.
Jimenez sued the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) and the City of Manila for his misfortune. The Sta. Ana Market at that time was under the administration of the AIC by virtue of a management and Operating Contract it had with the City of Manila. The trial court held the AIC responsible but absolved the City of Manila.
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila is indeed not liable?HELD: NO
The City of Manila is liable. Reasons:1) Again, Art. 2189 comes into play, since the injury took place in a public
building.2) Also, Art. 2189 requires that the LGU must retain supervision and
control over the public work in question for it to be held liable. The evidence showed that the Management and Operating Contract explicitly stated that the City of Manila retained supervision and control over the Sta. Ana Market. Also, in a letter to Finance Secretary Cesar Virata, Mayor Raymond Bagatsing admitted this fact of supervision and control. Moreover, Sec. 30(g) of the Local Tax Code says that public markets shall be under the immediate supervision, administration and control of the City Treasurer.
3) Jimenez could not be held for negligence. A customer in a store has every right to presume that the owner will comply with his duty to keep his premises safe for customers. The owner of the market, on the other hand, was proven to have been negligent in not providing a cover for the said opening. The negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.It is not necessary for the LGU to have ownership over the public work in question; mere control and supervision is sufficient.
MACASIANO v. DIOKNOGR 97764 AUGUST 10, 1992
FACTS:
Respondent municipality Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86, series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 19779, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and /or municipal streets, roads, and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea markets and/or vending areas under certain terms and conditions.
On June 20, 19990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to conditions.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Macasiano from enforcing his letter0order against respondent Palanyag.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid
HELD: NO. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are
deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public property unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress (e.g. Section 10, Chapter II, Local Government Code – Closure of Roads)
However, the afore-stated legal provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.
Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or used by the local government unit to private persons.
The closure of a road, street or park should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can “use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed” in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of B.P. Blg. 337, known as the Local Government Code.
Those roads and streets which are available to the pubic in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power tom use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Even assuming, in gratia argument, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the MMA due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance.
MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIESG.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
FACTS:
Mayor Pablo Magtajas and the city legislators denounced the establishment of PAGCOR within their city through an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for using and allowing to be used in its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casinos. Also, an ordinance was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos and providing penalty for its violation. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and is the third highest revenue-earner in the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances are valid as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
HELD: NO.
Petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
TEST OF A VALID ORDINANCE: Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute Must not be unfair or oppressive Must not be partial or discriminatory Must not prohibit but may regulate trade Must not be unreasonable Must be general and consistent with public policy
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
Although LGC is permissible to modify P.D. 1869, there is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal by the former.
LGUs may prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869.
This decree has the statutes of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
