I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e

Headquarters U.S. Air Force

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Directed Energy Solutions

Col Mike “Montana” EdwardsOctober 2006

UNCLASSIFIED BRIEFING

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• Problem• Task Forces & Priorities• DETF• EPTF• Passive Defense• Active Defense• Advantages• Roadmap—FP & ATL• Barriers

OVERVIEW

Protection

Offensive

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• DE denies full kill chain-even at low power levels• Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage & Assess• Space or Air

• Proliferation of DE devices• Threatening devices available today

• Use: Non-State actors or US civilians• Future: more power, smaller and agile

PROBLEM

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TASK FORCESDETF established Sep 2004

• 2-Star GOSG

• 75 DOTMLPF Action Items

EPTF established Oct 2004• DOD, DHS, DOT & DOJ

JIAG established Oct 2005• OSD, JOINT, Services & DHS

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PRIORITIES1. People 3. Capabilities2. Systems

Policy & CONOPS

Education & TrainingSpace

LegalTest & Evaluation

MedicalAcquisition

Modeling & Simulation

DOTMLPF

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PEOPLE20 Tasks—Protection • Procedures• Requirements• Training

Eye Protection Task Force

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Eye Protection Task Force (EPTF)

• Established Tech Transfer Policy• Created common Threat Document• Created civilian solution• Driving to common military solution• Commercial & First Response LEP design• Efforts expanding—ID DOD technologies• DOD LEP Roadmap • Developing Acquisition Mechanism

EPTF

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Eye Protection Task Force (EPTF)

• Established Tech Transfer Policy• Created common Threat Document• Created civilian solution• Driving to common military solution• Commercial & First Response LEP design• Efforts expanding—ID DOD technologies• DOD LEP Roadmap • Developing Acquisition Mechanism

EPTF

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SYSTEMS19 Tasks--Protection• Risk Assessments• Funding• Evaluation of Programs• Standardization

JSF & F-22Policy

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SYSTEM PRIORITIES

ACC StudyFundingTradesRed/Blue Study

PolicyJSFF-22SpaceSDB

Near Mid Far

LASERSLASERSHEL HEL

UltraUltra--Short Short Adv HPMAdv HPMRFRF??

Agile LASERSAgile LASERSHPM HPM

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CAPABILITIES

36 assigned Tasks• DE Roadmap• CRRA Process• Develop Strategic & Tactical Policies• Develop Offensive/Defensive Capabilities• Validate CONOPS• Moving to Offensive use

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PASSIVE/ACTIVE DEFENSE

Near Mid Far

Stand alone—integrated—networked Warning Devices

Sensor/Guidance/LASINT Devices

LASERSLASERSHEL HEL

UltraUltra--Short Short Adv HPMAdv HPM

Agile LASERSAgile LASERSHPM HPM

RFRF??

Who shoots first wins—OALAIRCM / DIRCM

LIDAR

Countermeasures

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• Precision– Can Target specific component– may require better aim point selection & maintenance

• Deep magazine—”Load Out” determined by power supply and duty cycle

• Limited Collateral Damage– Unintended effects must be understood and quantified

• Graduated Effects– Impact on Battle Damage Assessment, Target Regeneration/Repair

• “Instantaneous” Attack—WAR• Reduces predictive ISR requirement

• Long time of fall and flight munitions—Collateral damage issues

• NEED SPEED OF LIGHT TO FIGHT SPEED OF LIGHT• Requirement to find them first

LASER ADVANTAGES

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• All Weather—WAR • Non-lethal• Covert action is possible• Low targeting, tracking, and

pointing accuracies are required• Protective measures are not readily

available• Reconstitution is easier

RF ADVANTAGES

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• Passive/Active Defense development—sensors

• Support Non-Lethal• HPM Munitions & Platform • Force Protection• Advanced Tactical Laser

• ATL—DE Cornerstone

OFFENSIVE ROADMAP

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Develop cost effective, multi-use, integrated and interoperable solutions and generate residual benefits across DOD and external agencies

Act RecoverAssessDetect Decide

USA

USAF

USN

USMC

DHS

COMMON OPERATIONS, COMMON THREATS, COMMON SOLUTIONS…

Common threats:Insurgents/Terrorist direct attacks

IEDs and MinesIn Direct Fire Rockets, Arty, Mortars

UAVs, RCAs and Cruise MissilesCBRNE

MANPADsUnknown/Emerging

Joint Integration Advisory Group (JIAG)

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• Create Joint Force Protection capabilities • Decrease consumer costs & duplication• Increase interoperability• Expand customer base

• JCB Approved effort 29 Sep• Lead is now Army 3-Star TRADOC• Effort now called Integrated Unit, Base and

Installation Protection (IUBIP)• AAC will lead capabilities assessment team

Joint Integration Advisory Group (JIAG)

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• Fills QDR force requirements & CRRA gaps• Potential to greatly lower:

• Collateral Damage • Reconstitution Costs

• Provides new capabilities against targets• New effects & new targets can be engaged

• Path for rapid HEL employment--only mature program• Lowers cost for future DE weapons• Captures knowledge for Electric Lasers

• Numerous components remain

ADVANCED TACTICAL LASER

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ATL ANSWERSIntegration

1. Weapon integration2. System power and thermal control3. Aircraft4. Avionics and BMC4I

Laser device (COIL)5. Resonator optics6. Beam management7. Power distribution and

management8. Cooling

Optical systems9. Acquisition Tracking and Pointing

(ATP)10. Sensors11. Beam Director12. Beam director aero-optical effects

Beam Propagation Effects13. Precision Engagement14. Target / material interactions15. Collateral damage effects16. Weapon command and control

Operational concept17. System capabilities / trades18. CONOPS Modeling & Simulation19. Mission planning20. Master Test Plan / System Test &

Evaluation

Logistics and support21. Training22. Infrastructure and logistic support23. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability

(RAM)24. GSE & STE25. Software

Knowledge & Components for

Electric-based WeaponSubstantial– 16 Elements

Some– 9 ElementsLittle or none– 0 Elements

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Supports Development of Future HEL CapabilitiesEffects analysis (target vulnerability)Counter IED & UAVsISR (LIDAR)Bomber defenseTactical defenseGround attackCollateral damage assessmentsExploitation of non-lethal to lethal capability

AAC will lead ATL post ACTD effort

ATL is High Energy Laser (HEL) Cornerstone

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Removal of Barriers

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Policy • Principal USECDEF for Policy

• Approved Dep SECDEF support memo• Approved insertion of DE into DSPS• Support DE insertion into JCOFA

• DE Threats will be in STARS• AF Hardening Policy within 6 Months

BARRIERS

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCEAIR FORCE POLICY DIRECTIVE 62-2

(DATE)Developmental Engineering

SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY

2. The Air Force will ensure its mission critical systems are capable of surviving against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, laser, and other forms of electronic threats. The Air Force must also apply counter-optical augmentation as an essential consideration.The purpose of system susceptibility characterization is to accurately and objectively measure and document the response of the device under test to survivability threats.

POLICY

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• Modeling & Simulation—Engineer to Aircrew• AFAMS established as POC for M&S action items• 159 Codes identified (2-3 are V, V & A)—share codes• ID gaps in capabilities• Develop proposal for funding & fixing shortfalls• Insert DE into models—Space & JCOFA

• Education & Training• ACC AFI will make it annual requirement• AFIT developing curriculum for Senior leaders and AOs• Syllabus changes within Weapons Schools etc• AF/SG & ACC developed classified training CD• MCM 3-1 Tactics/Threat Manual—insertion of DE• JMEMS—insertion of DE

BARRIERS

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• Medical & Bio-effects• AF will be executive agent (EA) for post event treatment• Prioritizing Bio-effects studies • Increasing funding for Bio-effects and treatment work

• Intelligence• Developed tie between NORTHCOM & Civilian Intel• Selection of DE center of Intelligence—J2 engaged• Standardizing reporting and tracking of events-J2• Creating strategic DE intelligence capabilities• Sponsoring development of DE sensors• Threat Study by HQ A-8 & ACC

BARRIERS

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BARRIERS

Additional Efforts• Test & Evaluation Infrastructure– ACC & DETEC• Legal, Public Affairs, Strategic CommunicationsInstitutionalization of DE• HQ AF DE Requirements Division

• A5RE & A5RW• ACC & AAC established DE Branches • AFMC established DE IPT—Expand

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• Working Broad front across DOTMLPF• Barriers to DE are being removed

• Working requirements & funding• Offensive and Defensive efforts should be

worked together• CONOPS Exist

Getting the truth and cost effective solutions and options to our senior

leaders

SUMMARY

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• JSF Protection Working Group• Blessed by JSF Joint Programming Office• Addressing EOTS & DAS protection • Characterize Optical Augmentation & DE vulnerabilities

• F-22 Protection Effort• MG Lewis F-22 PEO supports• Characterize RF vulnerabilities

SYSTEMS