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DISARMAMENT:WEAPON

o{CONQUEST

Robert Morris

BOOKMAILERNew York

Copyrigh' 1963 by Robert Morris

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number63-22628

FIRST EDITION

All rights reserved, including the right to reproducethis book or portions thereof in any form .

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my mother, Sarah Williams Morris,for her loving affection and indeed to all motherswho yearn for real disarmament .

FOREWORD

This book is written because I feel that veryfew people understand what our policy is as wecoexist with Soviet power on the earth and in theuniverse.

There are enough escaping manifestations ofunderlying policy to sketch its lineaments suffi-ciently for us to know generally where, unless it isreversed, we are going. The people controlling ourdestiny should, I contend, let us know what is go-ing on. We may not like what they have plannedfor us. But, certainly, open discussion has alwaysbeen a hallmark of a free society ; and great civili-zations, from Greece with its Socrates, to moderntimes, have always had the right to examine thefoundations of their policies .

This book, then, is written in the spirit whichprompted Socrates, who by constant probing up-held the right to know where he was, and wherehe was going.

Our leaders are talking about Disarmament .When we analyze what they mean by "Disarma-ment", we find it to be something very much dif-ferent, indeed, from the conventional meaning ofthat word. Let us have a look, and make somecomments along the way .

ROBERT MORRISAugust 1963

CONTENTS

Chapter I THE PROBLEM 1Chapter II OUTCROPPINGS OF OUR

4POLICYChapter III THE ROSTOW

MEMORANDUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Chapter IV "DISARMAMENT" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Chapter

Chapter

V

VI

STATE DEPARTMENTDOCUMENT 727728U.S. ARMS CONTROL36

Chapter VII WE OFFER A TREATY

39Chapter VIII IT IS FOR REAL45Chapter IX ADLAI STEVENSON

CARRIES IT FORWARD 47Chapter

Chapter

X THE PRESIDENT'S

XI

SPEECH AT AMERICANUNIVERSITY50"THE INTERNATIONAL

ChapterRULE OF LAW"

54XII UNESCO57

Chapter XIII WHAT IS WRONG WITHTHIS POLICY?67

Chapter XIV WHOSE INTERNATIONALLAW?70

Chapter XV THE SECRETARIAT 72Chapter XVI HOW CAN DISARMAMENT

Chapter XVIIBE ACHIEVED104THE STEP AHEAD126

Chapter XVIII THE HARVEST 135APPENDIX 140

I THE PROBLEM

The principal problem, from our point of viewon the world scene, stems from Soviet power . Thisforce has declared war on us, again and again .Khrushchev has often said that the United Stateswill be Soviet in the next generation. Every authori-tative Soviet resolution, declaration and utterancespeaks of victory of World Communism over us .Soviet leaders work day and night for the defeatof the United States of America .

These Soviet leaders are achieving spectacularsuccess. During World War II, they had one countryand one base of power. They now have extendedtheir cruel domination over one third of the earth'sconventional surface and have made great inroadsin the second, or neutral third of our sphere. Inouter space they have done even better . This suc-cess has results that extend into every phase of ourexistence.

Actually, when you examine the ingredients,the Soviets are waging World War III against usand our allies. They have killed millions of men onthe battlefields, in the streets, and on the tortureracks. They have taken more terrain than the Gen-ghis Khans, the Attillas, the Hitlers and the Tojoscombined. Recently, they have moved an expedition-ary force across the Atlantic to our doorstep and es-tablished a missile base in Cuba, as well as an airbase, a submarine base, and a base for sabotage andinfiltration. From Cuba, all South America now isunder siege .

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As I write this, Communists are making theirway down the Ho Chi Minh trail into Laos wherethey are putting the finishing touches to the con-quest of that hub of Southeast Asia. They arewaging war and committing terror in SouthernViet Nam. They hold the hundreds of millions ofChinese in bondage. Their domination embraces thevastness of Siberia, Sakhalin, Manchuria, Mongoliaand Tibet.

No such martial blight has struck humanity inmodern times.

The effective leadership of the United Statesshould be able to understand these elemental facts .Yet, as far as successful action has been concerned,these leaders have not even recognized the, problem .

The fall of China was achieved largely by whatour own policy planners and diplomats wrought.The United States Senate had a two-year damagesurvey made, and it established authoritatively, bya unanimous report, that Americans were, in largemeasure, responsible for the conquest of China .

With respect to Cuba, it has been quite con-clusively established that Castro, the Communist,received help from the United States where policyplanners worked to undermine the government thatCastro was stalking . When these planners leveledthat government, they recognized Castro, the Com-munist, ignoring other available alternatives .

After Castro came to power, these men whoshould have been thwarting Soviet power broughthim to the United States, enhanced his prestigeand proceeded to subsidize his fledgling government .

When Khrushchev moved tanks, MIGs and elec-tronic equipment to the island base, our governmentspokesmen minimized, and even denied, that these

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weapons of war were brought almost to our veryshores. When the troops came, they were called"technicians", not by Castro, but by our own gov-ernment spokesmen who should have been soundingthe alarm instead of putting our people to sleep .

When it became apparent that an expeditionaryforce had, indeed, landed, we were told that it waspurely a defensive move, made because Castro wasweak and needed shoring up . When the missiles ap-peared they were "defensive" missiles .

These planners have been working, obviously,to put us to sleep. Why?

In little Laos, the situation is much the same .While Soviet power moves forward remorselessly,we struggle, not to roll it back, but to coexist withit in a coalition government . And, while we neutral-ize and spike the guns of Laotians who want to de-fend their land, Communists move on with theirconquests, their killings, and their acts of terror .

While the Soviet leaders have been moving ag-gressively ahead, we have persisted in attributingto them oulr norms of morality, our standards ofright and wrong, and our respect for the solemnityof the plighted word .

The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, have aslogan expressing their attitude toward thesethings : "Treaties, like pie crusts, are made only tobe broken." They live up to this slogan -and, on thebasis of the record, a Soviet promise is worthless .

Not so long ago, it was said that our policy wasone of "containment." While it was largely unsuc-cessful, at least containment was the goal. The fail-ure was in the implementation and in the actions ofthe personnel responsible . Now, however, our goal isquite different-different, and yet, scarcely known .

3

II OUTCROPPINGS OF OURPOLICY

For years, in the semi-official and official circlesof Washington, we kept hearing what we discernedto be the outcroppings of an extraordinary policy .The people responsible for planning would, fromtime to time, say that we should not directly opposeCommunist power or Communist institutions, butrather try to persuade Soviet leaders to tone downtheir conspicuously aggressive utterances and ac-tions. They said that since Communist institutions,such as forced-labor camps, were here to stay, oneshould not inveigh against them lest that futile ac-tion lead to unnecessary aggravations . Confronta-tion between Communist and Free World forcesbecame a dirty word . Escalation, the word used todescribe the growth of a small conflict into a largerone, became the favorite word of the planners whocounselled retreat or inaction in the face of theSoviet movement forward .

The Korean War, which was to mark the firsttime that the nation was denied a victory that itshighly competent military leaders said could andshould have been achieved, raised the specter, tosome, that victory for freedom was not the goalof our policy .

Then the paralysis, or worse, of the mightyUnited States, when the self-emancipated Hungar-ian people were ruthlessly crushed by the "Butchersof Budapest", showed that our talk of "liberation"of the captive peoples was hollow, indeed .

4

It was not the threat of nuclear war that causedour retreat in Korea, because when General Mac-Arthur was recalled in 1951 the Soviet Union wasnot a nuclear power. In 1956, when Hungary wascrushed, the Soviets could not have held a candleto us in nuclear prowess .

Thus, while we began to see a lapsing in policyaway from containment, the new substitute wasnever spelled out . In 1961, the Fulbright Memoran-dum saw the light of day and a fragment was re-vealed. We learned then, of the dangers of Cubaand Laos. These, we were told, were dangers, notbecause they represented Soviet victories and theenslavement of more millions of people, but ratherbecause they set in motion a "desire" in the Ameri-can people "to hit the Communists with everythingwe've got."

This new emerging policy never was set forthclearly, however, until two events broke into thenews-our Disarmament Program and the RostowMemorandum.

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III THE ROSTOWMEMORANDUM

Let us look first at the Rostow Memorandumalthough it was not the first of the two revealingdocuments to break forth, in point of time .

Walt W. Rostow is the Chief Policy Planner ofthe United States State Department. For manyyears he worked on covert CIA projects at Massa-chusetts Institute of Technology and elsewhere . Heis also Counsel to the State Department. He speakswith authority .

We are fortunate to have in Washington todayan enterprising reporter, Willard Edwards of theChicago Tribune . Mr. Edwards has had extensiveexperience ; he has excellent sources . Through him,we were able to learn about the "Memorandum"which Mr. Rostow has refused to give to the UnitedStates Senate, claiming "executive privilege ."

I have checked the accuracy of the Edwards ac-count of this important policy paper which SenatorEverett McKinley Dirksen made the object of aSenate inquiry, and I am going to let the Congres-sional Record of June 18, 1962 tell the story of thischapter : (pages 9966, 9967, 9968)

WALT W. ROSTOW'S DRAFT OF STRATEGYMR. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, over the past

weekend there appeared in the Sunday and Mondaymorning editions of the Chicago Tribune two lengthystories under the byline of Willard Edwards pur-porting to digest the so-called Rostow draft of a

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blueprint for future strategy in the struggle againstcommunism.

For many months now we have been told thatthis document has been in a state of preparationunder the guiding hand of Walt W . Rostow, StateDepartment counselor and chairman of its PolicyPlanning Board .

On several occasions there have appeared in thepress other stories discussing this draft of strategy,but none has presented so much in such detail asMr. Edwards' story and I am impelled to believethat it is probably accurate .

Many of us who are not unfamiliar with Ros-tow's thinking have awaited the birth of this newmaster strategy with considerable trepidation. Mr.Rostow has never been a very devoted disciple ofthe tough policy line toward Russia. It now develops,on the basis of the Chicago Tribune articles, thatMr. Rostow holds some unique ideas about the So-viet Union that are considerably closer to the fuzzythinking of the late and lamented "Liberal Papers"than even the most liberal Member of this bodywould be willing to accept .

The core of Mr. Rostow's proposal is an as-sumption that the Soviet Union and its Communistmasters are "mellowing" ; that Russia is becominga mature state ; that if we are only nice to theSoviets they will drop all of their suspicions of thefree world and peace will finally bloom .

The most amazing Rostow thesis is this : Thatboth the United States and Russia are losing powerand authority in their respective worlds and thatan area of "overlapping interests" is developing inwhich meaningful agreements may be concludedbetween the Communist and non-Communist worlds .

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Mr. Rostow sees no victory by the United Statesover the Soviet Union . Mr. Rostow sees no victoryby capitalism over communism. In fact Mr. Rostowis a man of little hope and the last person in myopinion who should have been chosen for the all-important task of directing the continuing reviewof our foreign policy .

The basic philosophy of successful conflict isalways to pursue a winning course and alwayschange a losing game . Every high school coach,every big league manager knows this. But ap-parently our State Department planners do not .

If Mr. Rostow's assumption that the SovietUnion is softening is correct, then what may I askcaused it to mellow? To me the answer is obvious .The only time we have ever gotten anywhere withthe Soviet Union-the only times the Soviet Unionhas ever mellowed-have been when the UnitedStates was tough .

So logic would say that if Mr . Rostow's basicassumption were correct and that the Soviet Unionis softening, Mr. Rostow is recommending a courseexactly diametric to American interests .

But the disconcerting part of the whole pictureis this : Our intelligence agencies say there is littleor no evidence to support any such assumption asthat made by Mr. Rostow.

How does Mr. Rostow explain the recent Rus-sian course of breaking the moratorium on nucleartesting? How does he explain their recent announce-ment that they are now going to test a 100-megatonbomb in retaliation for our resumption of testing?

Does the presence of our Armed Forces inThailand indicate the Communists are mellowing?Does the presence of our Armed Forces in Vietnam

8

indicate the Communists are mellowing?I think the Senate is entitled to know-perhaps

through questioning by the appropriate committee-what intelligence information Mr. Rostow pos-sesses to support his basic assumption . Mr. Ed-wards' articles indicate that Mr. Rostow has heldthis opinion for at least 10 years . If it is only opinion,I would suggest that it is not proper ground onwhich to stake the entire future of the Americanpeople .

I ask unanimous consent to include as part ofmy remarks Mr. Edwards' articles, so that theSenate may examine them in detail.

There being no objection, the articles were or-dered to be printed in the Record, as follows

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 17, 1962]Draft Foreign Policy Revision Bowing to Reds

(By Willard Edwards .)Washington, June 16.-A master plan for his-

toric changes in U.S. foreign policy has been readiedfor President Kennedy's consideration .

It embraces the theme that the Soviet Union'sdomestic and foreign policies are mellowing andthe way is open for meaningful agreement betweenthe Communist and non-Communist worlds .

This proposed guide for future decisions by thePresident and the National Security Council, theNation's highest strategy group, advances thesetheories

Russia's leaders are beginning to realize thatneither the United States nor the Soviet Union candefeat the other in the world of the future .

FIND NO BASIS FOR ITBoth the United States and Russia are losing

power and authority in their respective areas and9

an area of overlapping interests is developing inwhich mutually profitable agreements may be ne-gotiated .

Envisioning, as it does, Communist abandon-ment of the goal of world conquest, this blueprintfor future strategy has aroused heated disputefrom military leaders and intelligence agencies whocan detect no evidence to support its assumptions .

They quarrel with the contention that concili-ation can be as important as a strong defense infuture relations with the Kremlin .

Leading sponsor of the plan, which has beenmore than a year in preparation, is Walt W. Ros-tow, State Department counselor and Chairman ofits Policy Planning Board . He acknowledges thata strong educational campaign will be needed tosell Congress and the public if the proposals aregiven official sanction.

SHAPED CAMPAIGN SPEECHESCompiled under Rostow's supervision, the

strategy plan represents the work of many officialsin the White House, State, Treasury, and DefenseDepartments. It has been steadily revised and editeddown, from an original volume of 285 pages to ashorter draft .

Despite a host of contributors, the plans bearsthe Rostow stamp. A former member of the facultyof Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rostow,45, is the President's top foreign policy adviser . Heplayed a major role in shaping Kennedy's foreignpolicy speeches in the Presidential campaign andwas deputy special assistant to the President untilhe took over his present State Department post lastDecember 6.

Rostow's brand of philosophy, not concealed in10

books, articles, theses, and speeches in recent years,has always envisioned the "evolution" of SovietRussia into a "mature" state which will come torealize the outdating of the Marxian theory of theclass struggle as the moving force in history .

FOR A NEW YOUNG PRESIDENTAs long ago as 1956, he voiced confidence that

Communist leaders in the next decade would mendtheir ways and in 1958 he was depicting Russia asabout ready to enter "the age of high mass con-sumption" reached by the United States a quartercentury earlier .

He has now translated this optimistic convic-tion into a blueprint for basic national securitypolicy, designed to govern future decisions at thehighest levels .

It is a conception calculated to stimulate andenthuse a new, young President who could insure asecure place in history as the American leader whobrought peace to the world, ending not only thedread potentialities of nuclear conflict, but theharassments of cold war conflicts which drain theeconomy.

NOT A SHRED OF PROOFIt is also a theory which has stirred many in

the Government's intelligence agencies to alarm.They report not a scrap of hard data to support theroseate assumptions of the State Department plan-ner .

They note no lessening of Communist intransi-gence nor of grim determination to "bury" the freeworld. They see in the Rostow recommendations atotal misconception of the nature of the Communistconspiracy ; a naive brushing off of its treachery asevidenced in a long history of broken treaties and

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agreements while steadily pursuing the goal ofworld conquest .

Rostow believes that Premier Nikita Khrushchevof Russia and his associates do not want a majorwar. He concedes their desire for a total victory forcommunism but he glimpses changes beneath thesurface of old Communist objectives and . a willing-ness among some in Russia to modify old ideologicalformula in the light of changing reality .

UNITED STATES ON WANE, HE SAYSNeither Russia nor the United States is going

to dominate this century, he contends. To those whospeak of a "victory" or "win" policy in the coldwar, he retorts that neither of the great leadingnations will win over the other . Rather, the victorywill be one of "men and nations" voluntarily co-operating under the principles of the United Na-tions Charter.

"And we deeply believe this victory will come-on both sides of the Iron Curtain," he concludes .

The policy outline pictures the United Statesand Russia as two aging combatants, both showingsigns of waning prestige and power. There is adiffusion of power away from Moscow within theCommunist bloc, it asserts, and away from theUnited States within the free world .

In lesser degree, the "evolution" theory is alsoapplied to Red China and the same conciliatory tac-tics are advocated. The Chinese Communists canbe encouraged to "evolution" into a peaceful stateby showing them we have no aggressive intentions .

Possibilities should be explored for expandingcontact with Red China, placing it, according toone objector, in the same position as Yugoslavia andPoland.

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CAN'T PROMOTE A SPLITThere is no final bar to entrance of Commu-

nist China into more normal relations with theUnited States if they are prepared to modify pres-ent policies, the policy paper asserts . In the mean-time, unnecessary provocations should be avoidedand informal negotiations pursued .

There is little that the United States can doto promote a Sino-Soviet split, the paper contends .

The proposed foreign policy guide book doesnot suggest any weakening of national defense andincludes recommendations for a greater buildupof the nation's capacity to wage conventional war-fare.

It estimates Soviet policy as designed to avoidany actions which would bring about a nuclear war,ruling out the belief of many military leaders thatthe Communists will strike whenever they thinkthey can destroy us .

WE WILL WAIT TO BE HITAny idea of the United States contemplating

a "first strike" is ruled out. Planning in that direc-tion is not relevant since the United States doesnot plan to initiate a nuclear attack on Communistnations. Military men assail the section as againstall sound principles of war for which planningagainst all contingencies is essential .

Despite all rebuffs to date, strenuous effortsshould be continued to get an agreement on limitedarms control, the policy paper recommends. It issuggested that the United States might advance aprogram not requiring formal negotiations .

Again, objectors to this recommendation ar-gued, the proposal totally disregards the natureof the Communist enemy. Any information fur-

13

nished to Communists will be used against us andany such action will never change their basic aims .

REDS GOING PEACEFULSince both arms control planning and research

and military planning are directed toward nationalsecurity, the strategy outline asserts, they should beintegrated. General and complete disarmament isa goal which must never be obscured .

There was objection from military men to inclu-sion of this section. They argued that the natureof communism is disregarded in a process of reason-ing which contends that the United States will besecure in a disarmed world .

In seeming answer to these contentions, theproposed policy emphasizes the assumption that theSoviet policy will evolve into a peaceful state .

Even if Communist leaders are unwilling toshare the U.S. image of the world's future in thedegree necessary to negotiate major arms reduc-tion programs, they may come to realize the dan-gers of accident, miscalculation, and failure of com-munications and thus be willing to join the UnitedStates in limited measures to reduce those dangers .

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1962]Soft Red Line Must Be "Sold"-Rostow

(By Willard Edwards)Washington, June 17 .-A systematic publicity

campaign will be necessary to sell Congress and theAmerican people on the merits of a bold new foreignpolicy advocating conciliation of Russia, a State De-partment planner has advised .

The problem of this gap between Governmentand popular thinking is tackled with candor by WaltW. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's

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policy planning board in his draft of a master planwhich awaits President Kennedy's consideration .

The new policy, the work of a number of ex-perts in Government under Rostow's supervision, isbased upon the theory that Russian domestic andforeign policies have mellowed during the post-Stalin period. It holds the way has been opened forcooperation between the Communist and non-Com-munist worlds.

EDUCATION IS NEEDEDSince the evidence in the form of deeds and

words by Soviet leaders, runs directly contrary tothis assumption, Congress and the people, the Ros-tow outline confesses, must be educated to accept-ance of a fresh approach .

In typical State Department parlance, this canbe accomplished by "systematic exposition in formsappropriate for public presentation." The term "in-doctrination" is avoided .

One of the appropriate methods of public en-lightenment, favored highly by the Kennedy ad-ministration, is the newspaper "leak ." This involvesfunnelling of selected information to favored re-porters .

CITE "OUTMODED" POLICIESAlthough the Rostow document is presumed

to be confidential and described by a State Depart-ment spokesman as a "working draft," hints of itscontents have been leaked in the last 3 months tothree newspapers, a news magazine, and a syndicatedcolumn. The resulting articles in the main, featureit as "a premise, balanced, and complete masterplan of global objectives and strategies" whichwould replace "old policies," manufactured undercrisis conditions .

15

These inspired stories lacked detail, in most in-stances, but stressed the need for replacement ofpolicies "left over" from the Eisenhower admini-stration. The existence of "ambiguities" has per-mitted dispute between partisans of different con-cepts and contributed to varying interpretations ofpolicy, they noted .

HINT ON A-STRATEGYOne "leak" was definite, however, in reporting

a provision that the United States would neverstrike the first nuclear blow unless it were facedwith a massive conventional assault, such as a full-scale invasion of Western Europe .

Another revealed proposed new policies for deal-ing with the problem of the "two Chinas" on themainland and Formosa .

Speeches and statements by administrationspokesmen to condition Congress and the publicto the new policy are also suggested in the Rostowdocument. Rostow has set a good example in thisrespect. In a number of addresses, he has statedhis conviction that neither the United States norRussia can win the cold war, that capitalism willnot triumph over communism, and that the fate ofthe world will be settled by forces now at work onboth sides of the Iron Curtain .

SEES NEW LINEUPIn a speech June 3 at Minneapolis, Rostow

said"It is sometimes asked if our policy is a no-win

policy. Our answer is this-we do not expect thisplanet to be forever split between a Communist blocand a free world . We expect this planet to organ-ize itself in time on the principles of voluntary co-operation among independent nation states dedi-

16

cated to human freedom. We expect the principlethat `governments derive their just powers from theconsent of the governed' to triumph on both sidesof the Iron Curtain .

"It will not be a victory of the United Statesover Russia. It will be a victory of men and nationsover the forces that wish to entrap and to exploittheir revolutionary aspirations ."

In another speech to the special warfare schoolat Fort Bragg, N.C., he voiced the same sentimentsand added "It will not be a victory of capitalismover socialism."

Two years ago, in a California speech, he out-lined Russia's fears that other nations would getthe nuclear bomb, calling the prospect of nuclearweapons in Chinese hands "a latent nightmare" forthe Kremlin .

RUSSIA OUR ALLYHe saw in this a possibility that Russia might

find "the only logical course is to make a commoncause with the United States to establish a mini-mum framework of order ."

Thus, Rostow's policy draft contains few sur-prises to students of his record . He is aware of theinitial lack of popular acceptance which will greetits unfolding. Suggested in the draft is a shiftingof emphasis, particularly in the public conscious-ness, from the problem of opposing Communist ag-gression to exploiting opportunities in building andextending "a community of free nations ."

These "opportunities" are described in the docu-ment as growing from a gathering historical trendtoward fragmentation in the Communist bloc andsome relaxation of internal controls in the SovietUnion and its satellites .

17

Thus, Communist regimes and peoples are tobe dealt with in terms of "overlapping interest," aphrase which is also popular with Rostow in publicstatements.

The United States Information Agency mustbe used abroad to define and dramatize the "limitedbut real areas of overlapping interests" between theUnited States and other governments and peoples,the paper asserts .

Students of Communist policy eye this allegedintertwining of interests with strong doubt, notingthat Communists have never admitted any interestwhich lies outside world domination .

One theme is consistent in the proposed strategyplan-continuing communication with Russia, in-formal and formal, direct and indirect, must bemaintained in order to dispel its fears of the UnitedStates and give it a clear understanding of ourpeaceful intentions .

Rising tensions or the pleas of our allies or ofthe American public must be ignored in any crisiswith Russia. The temptation must be avoided toprolong or expand any crisis in an effort to degradeor embarrass the Soviets in the eyes of the world .

The Soviet Union, the paper advises, must begranted its status as a great power and induced, byword and deed, to fuller participation and influencein the community of free nations if its leaders showa genuine interest and will for such constructiveconsideration .

EASY ON SATELLITESGentle treatment of the satellite nations is ad-

vocated. No official attacks should be made againsttheir regimes, whatever the provocation, and evencriticism should be softened. Western Europe, at

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the same time, must be encouraged to closer rela-tionship with the satellites and urged to furnishaid to them .

East Germany, the policy draft says, cannot beforever insulated from dealings with the UnitedStates and business must be transacted with them .

Above all, no encouragement or support mustbe given to armed uprisings in eastern Europe .This is a continuance of policy in existence for sev-eral years .

These proposals, one critic noted, will in effectrecognize the satellites, including East Germany, aslegitimate regimes, disregard the principle of self-de-termination, and cause the captive peoples to lose allhope of freeing themselves from Communist rule .

A POPULAR WORLDThe plan is concerned with the promotion of

rapid industrial growth and full employment in theUnited States . Unless there is great prosperity here,it noted, it will be extremely difficult to obtain con-gressional and popular consent for allocation of re-sources to international purposes or liberal tradeadjustments .

The word "modernization" appears frequentlyin the plan in relation to the development of nations.The strength of international communism, it states,can best be sapped by strengthening the perform-ance of the free community through "moderniza-tion." Opponents of the policy draft have suggestedthat "modernization" may be a synonym for "Demo-cratic socialization."

The United States must expand its participa-tion in institutions and organizations "which tran-scend the independent powers of the nation-state,"the outline proposes.

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It seeks progressive moves toward a legal or-der which lays down and enforces essential rules ofconduct in interstate relations which will "providesure and equitable means for the settlement of in-ternational disputes."

Again, in arguments over this proposal, it wasnoted that it presupposes Communist submissionto the law. One expert recalled the sardonic com-ment made by the late Andrei Y. Vishinsky, chiefdelegate to the United Nations. He once told theU.N. .

"What laws? We make our own . We do notabide by bourgeoise law."

SEEKS MODERN ALLIESOn balance, the draft asserts, American inter-

ests will be better served by leaning toward nationswith modern ideas rather than sticking to old allieswith outmoded notions . The paper identifies neitherthe modern states nor the old friends, conceding nogeneral rule can cover this situation .

As a final touch, the policy paper suggests thatdenial of foreign aid can be as useful as supplyingit. In Laos, where aid was withdrawn to force acoalition with Communists, this policy has alreadybeen implemented, it was noted .

MR. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I might add, asa postscript, that I believe a great deal more willbe said about this subject because without doubt itwill be one of the most important challenges beforethe American people and this country as we dealwith this comment upon the so-called policy orstrategy that we are to employ in the days ahead .

More than a year has passed since this dis-closure, and unfolding events clearly reveal the ac-

20

curacy of the Edwards articles .Briefly, the contention of Mr . Rostow was that

Soviet power was "mellowing" and that the SovietUnion was "evolving" into a "mature" state andthat we should help this process. For this reason wehad to reject any desire for a victory over Sovietpower. Instead, we were to work for a victory of"men and nations" cooperating under the bannerof the United Nations .

Accordingly, we were to extend "gentle treat-ment" toward the satellites. We were not to be hos-tile to these Soviet regimes, no matter what theprovocation ; under no circumstances should we en-courage armed uprisings on the part of the captivepeoples. The Chinese Communists, even, were tobe encouraged toward this evolutionary process byour showing them that we have no aggressive in-tentions toward them .

According to the Rostow memorandum we wereto work, strenuously, always toward the goal ofgeneral and complete disarmament, despite all re-buffs, "even to the extent of advancing a programnot requiring formal negotiations." (Emphasis mine)

Events of the passing year have revealed thatthis is, indeed, our policy today .

But, in the United States, not one person in athousand knows that this is our foreign policy .Some people have heard the expression that we havea "no win" policy, but "no win" tells only part ofthe story. When all the pieces are put into place, ourpolicy calls for an affirmative drive toward a mam-moth "accommodation" with Soviet power . There-fore, the enemy is not Khrushchev, or his cronies, butthose people here and abroad who are against whatwill be shown to be a merger with the Soviet Union .

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Because Americans do not know that this isState Department policy, they cannot understandwhy we will not raise a finger for the Cuban exilesbut, instead, arrest the determined freedom fighterswho want to free Cuba. Nor can they understandwhy the State Department issues a report on thesavage and blood-soaked Budapest regime that readslike a product of Kadar's own propaganda agency.For the same reason Americans do not understandwhy we lavish billions on the cruel dictators Tito,Gomulka and Sukarno .

Last year, when the United States sent gunsand planes to shoot down President Tshombe's sup-porters who wanted a certain amount of autonomyin their land, plain citizens could not understandwhy we would commit such nonsensical deeds . Ifthey could have read the Rostow report, or hadstudied our so-called "disarmament" policy, it wouldhave become clear.

When we forced General Nosavan and the loyalLaotians into a forced coalition with the Commu-nists in Laos, people were perplexed . They shouldnot have been. Our whole policy reflects, despitesteadfast Soviet intransigence, a determined driveto effect what has been called a "peaceful mergerwith the Soviet Union ."

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IV "DISARMAMENT"

In 1959, Khrushchev, ringed by United Statesdefensive bases in Allied countries, able to recognizein our Strategic Airforce Command and in our Navywith its Polaris submarines, enough power to de-stroy him several times over, took an assessment ofwhere he stood . He knew that there was only thismighty force between him and his dream, and thedream of Lenin and of Stalin before him, the dreamof world domination . So, he moved against thismighty force-not as Hitler moved, but by a strate-gem which he called "Disarmament ."

Speaking on September 18, 1959, at the UnitedNations General Assembly, Khrushchev proposedthat "over a period of four years, all states shouldeffect complete disarmament, and should no longerhave any means of waging war."

The reaction to this was soon forthcoming .The New York Times commented editorially thenext day : "The Soviets still seek a one-sided West-ern disarmament, based on paper pacts, the scrapsof which litter their path to empire ."

Speaking to the U .S .S.R. Supreme Soviet onOctober 31 of that year, Khrushchev said : "We pro-pose to effect as quickly as possible, approximatelyin four years, general and complete disarmament ofstates. This means that all armed forces are to bedisbanded, all armament liquidated, war productiondiscontinued, and nuclear, chemical, bacteriologi-cal, and rocket weapons banned and destroyed for

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good ; that war ministries and general staffs shouldbe abolished ; that foreign military bases on foreignterritory should be liquidated, that nobody wouldreceive military training again, and that expendi-tures for military purposes of any kind shouldcease."

The skepticism which had been expressed by TheNew York Times, and virtually every other majornewspaper in the country, did not long prevail .Walt W. Rostow and Jerome Wiesner, advisers tothe newly-elected President, John F . Kennedy, wentto Moscow in late 1960 and returned amid rumblingsabout some kind of agreement on disarmament .

Bilateral talks between the Soviet Union andthe United States then took place in Washingtonfrom June 19 to June 30 ; in Moscow from July 17to 29, and in New York from September 6 to 19 .By September 20, 1961, we had actually come toan agreed set of eight principles on disarmamentwith Soviet delegate to the United Nations, ValerinZorin. They appear as follows, in the Report of theU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency :

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agree-ment on a program which will insure that (a) dis-armament is general and complete and war is nolonger an instrument for settling internationalproblems, and (b) such disarmament is accompan-ied by the establishment of reliable procedures forthe peaceful settlement of disputes and effectivearrangements for the maintenance of peace in ac-cordance with the principles of the United NationsCharter .

2. The program for general and complete dis-armament shall insure that states will have at theirdisposal only those nonnuclear armaments, forces,

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facilities, and establishments as are agreed to benecessary to maintain internal order and protectthe personal security of citizens ; and that statesshall support and provide agreed manpower for aU.N. peace force .

3. To this end, the program for general andcomplete disarmament shall contain the necessaryprovisions, with respect to the military establish-ment of every nation, for-

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantlingof military establishments, including bases, cessa-tion of the production of armaments as well astheir liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses ;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear,chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons ofmass destruction and cessation of the productionof such weapons ;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery ofweapons of mass destruction ;

(d) Abolishment of the organizations and in-stitutions designed to organize the military ef-fort of states, cessation of military training, andclosing of all military training institutions ;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures .4. The disarmament program should be imple-

mented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it iscompleted, with each measure and stage carried outwithin specified time limits . Transition to a subse-quent stage in the process of disarmament shouldtake place upon a review of the implementation ofmeasures included in the preceding stage and upona decision that all such measures have been imple-mented and verified and that any additional veri-fication arrangements required for measures in thenext stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate .

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5. All measures of general and complete dis-armament should be balanced so that at no stage ofthe implementation of the treaty could any stateor group of states gain military advantage and thatsecurity is insured equally for all .

6. All disarmament measures should be imple-mented from beginning to end under such strict andeffective international control 'as would provide firmassurance that all parties are honoring their obliga-tions. During and after the implementation of gen-eral and complete disarmament, the most thoroughcontrol should be exercised, the nature and extentof such control depending on the requirements forverification of the disarmament measures being car-ried out in each stage. To implement control overand inspection of disarmament, an InternationalDisarmament Organization, including all parties tothe agreement, should be created within the frame-work of the United Nations . This International Dis-armament Organization and its inspectors shouldbe assured unrestricted access without veto to allplaces as necessary for the purpose of effectiveverification .

7. Progress in disarmament should be accom-panied by measures to strengthen institutions formaintaining peace and the settlement of interna-tional disputes by peaceful means . During and afterthe implementation of the program of general andcomplete disarmament, there should be taken, inaccordance with the principles of the United Na-tions Charter, the necessary measures to maintaininternational peace and security, including the obli-gation of states to place at the disposal of the UnitedNations agreed manpower necessary for an inter-national peace force to be equipped with agreed

26

types of armaments. Arrangements for the use ofthis force should insure that the United Nationscan effectively deter or suppress any threat or useof arms in violation of the purposes and principlesof the United Nations .

8. States participating in the negotiations shouldseek to achieve and implement the widest possibleagreement at the earliest possible date . Effortsshould continue without interruption until agree-ment upon the total program has been achieved,and efforts to insure early agreement on and imple-mentation of measures of disarmament should beundertaken without prejudicing progress on agree-ment on the total program and in such a way thatthese measures would facilitate and form part ofthat program.

Here was the transition from the Khrushchevdemand of 1959 to our own policy of today . Theworld was generally scoffing at Khrushchev in 1959when he proclaimed this goal. It should have knownfrom past performances that this new stratagemportended great changes, not in the Soviet Empirebut here in the heartland of capitalism . The wholeSoviet apparatus went to work on us .

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V STATE DEPARTMENTDOCUMENT 7277

By September 25, 1961, there was presented tothe United Nations the United States' own "Pro-gram for General and Complete Disarmament." Thisprovided as follows

FREEDOM FROM WARTHE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENTIN A PEACEFUL WORLD

SUMMARYDISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

The over-all goal of the United States is a free,secure, and peaceful world of independent statesadhering to common standards of justice and inter-national conduct and subjecting the use of force tothe rule of law ; a world which has achieved generaland complete disarmament under effective interna-tional control ; and a world in which adjustmentto change takes place in accordance with the prin-ciples of the United Nations .

In order to make possible the achievement ofthat goal, the program sets forth the followingspecific objectives toward which nations should di-rect their efforts :

The disbanding of all national armed forces andthe prohibition of their reestablishment in any formwhatsoever other than those required to preserveinternal order and for contributions to a United Na-tions Peace Force ;

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The elimination from national arsenals of allarmaments, including all weapons of mass destruc-tion and the means for their delivery, other thanthose required for a United Nations Peace Forceand for maintaining internal order ;

The institution of effective means for the enm •forcement of international agreements, for the set-tlement of disputes, and for the maintenance ofpeace in accordance with the principles of the UnitedNations ;

The establishment and effective operation ofan International Disarmament Organization withinthe framework of the United Nations to insure com-pliance at all times with all disarmament obliga-tions.

TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATESThe negotiating states are called upon to de-

velop the program into a detailed plan for generaland complete disarmament and to continue theirefforts without interruption until the whole programhas been achieved. To this end, they are to seek thewidest possible area of agreement at the earliest pos-sible date. At the same time, and without prejudiceto progress on the disarmament program, they areto seek agreement on those immediate measuresthat would contribute to the common security ofnations and that could facilitate and form part ofthe total program.

GOVERNING PRINCIPLESThe program sets forth a series of general

principles to guide the negotiating states in theirwork. These make clear that :

As states relinquish their arms, the United Na-tions must be progressively strengthened in order toimprove its capacity to assure international security

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and the peaceful settlement of disputes ;Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as pos-

sible, until it is completed, in stages containing bal-anced, phased, and safeguarded measures ;

Each measure and stage should be carried outin an agreed period of time, with transition fromone stage to the next to take place as soon as allmeasures in the preceding stage have been carriedout and verified and as soon as necessary arrange-ments for verification of the next stage have beenmade ;

Inspection and verification must establish boththat nations carry out scheduled limitations or re-ductions and that they do not retain armed forcesand armaments in excess of those permitted at anystage of the disarmament process ; and

Disarmament must take place in a manner thatwill not affect adversely the security of any state .

DISARMAMENT STAGESThe program provides for progressive disarma-

ment steps to take place in three stages and for thesimultaneous strengthening of international insti-tutions .

FIRST STAGEThe first stage contains measures which would

significantly reduce the capabilities of nations towage aggressive war. Implementation of this stagewould mean that :

THE NUCLEAR THREATWOULD BE REDUCED :

All states would have adhered to a treaty ef-fectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons .

The production of fissionable materials for usein weapons would be stopped and quantities of such

30

materials from past production would be convertedto non-weapons uses .

States owning nuclear weapons would not re-linquish control of such weapons to any nation notowning them and would not transmit to any suchnation information or material necessary for theirmanufacture .

States not owning nuclear weapons would notmanufacture them or attempt to obtain control ofsuch weapons belonging to other ' states .

A Commission of Experts would be establishedto report on the feasibility and means for the veri-fied reduction and eventual elimination of nuclearweapons stockpiles .

STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLESWOULD BE REDUCED

Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles ofspecified categories and weapons designed to coun-ter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levelsby equitable and balanced steps ; their productionwould be discontinued or limited ; their testing wouldbe limited or halted.

ARMS AND ARMED FORCESWOULD BE REDUCED

The armed forces of the United States and theSoviet Union would be limited to 2 .1 million meneach (with appropriate levels not exceeding thatamount for other militarily significant states) ;levels of armaments would be correspondingly re-duced and their production would be limited .

An Experts Commission would be establishedto examine and report on the feasibility and meansof accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventualelimination of all chemical, biological and radiologi-cal weapons.

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PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACEWOULD BE PROMOTED

The placing in orbit or stationing in outerspace of weapons capable of producing mass destruc-tion would be prohibited .

States would give advance notification of spacevehicle and missile launchings .

U.N. PEACE-KEEPING POWERSWOULD BE STRENGTHENED :

Measures would be taken to develop andstrengthen United Nations arrangements for arbi-tration, for the development of international law,and for the establishment in Stage II of a perma-nent U.N. Peace Force.

AN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENTORGANIZATION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED

FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OFTHE DISARMAMENT PROGRAM:

Its functions would be expanded progressivelyas disarmament proceeds.

It would certify to all states that agreed reduc-tions have taken place and that retained forcesand armaments do not exceed permitted levels .

It would determine the transition from onestage to the next .

STATES WOULD BE COMMITTED TOOTHER MEASURES TO REDUCE

INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND TOPROTECT AGAINST THE CHANCE OFWAR BY ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION,

OR SURPRISE ATTACK :States would be committed to refrain from the

threat or use of any type of armed force contraryto the principles of the U .N. Charter and to refrain

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from 'indirect aggression and subversion againstany country.

A U.N. peace observation group would be avail-able to investigate any situation which might con-stitute a threat to or breach of the peace .

States would be committed to give advance no-tice of major military movements which might causealarm ; observation posts would be established to re-port on concentrations and movements of militaryforces .

SECOND STAGEThe second stage contains a series of measures

which would bring within sight a world in whichthere would be freedom from war. Implementationof all measures in the second stage would mean

Further substantial reductions in the armedforces, armaments, and military establishments ofstates, including strategic nuclear weapons deliveryvehicles and countering weapons ;

Further development of methods for the peace-ful settlement of disputes under the United Nations ;

Establishment of a permanent internationalpeace force within the United Nations ;

Depending on the findings of an Experts Com-mission, a halt in the production of chemical, bac-teriological, and radiological weapons and a reduc-tion of existing stocks or their conversion to peace-ful uses ;

On the basis of the findings of an Experts Com-mission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons ;

The dismantling or the conversion to peacefuluses of certain military bases and facilities wher-ever located ; and

The strengthening and enlargement of the In-ternational Disarmament Organization to enable it

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to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to de-termine the transition to Stage III .

THIRD STAGEDuring the third stage of the program, the

states of the world, building on the experience andconfidence gained in successfully implementing themeasures of the first two stages, would take finalsteps toward the goal of a world in which

States would retain only those forces, non-nuc-lear armaments, and establishments required for thepurpose of maintaining internal order ; they wouldalso support and provide agreed manpower for aU.N. Peace Force .

The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreedtypes and quantities of armaments, would be fullyfunctioning .

The manufacture of armaments would be pro-hibited except for those of agreed types and quanti-ties to be used by the U .N. Peace Force and those re-quired to maintain internal order. All other arma-ments would be destroyed or converted to peacefulpurposes .

The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Na-tions would be sufficiently strong and the obligationsof all states under such arrangements sufficientlyfar-reaching as to assure peace and the just settle-ment of differences in a disarmed world .

Here is our policy set forth . Our planners beganto move, not to extend freedom or to thwart Sovietaggression, but to bring about the reduction of mili-tary forces and to build up an International PeaceForce under the United Nations which would rulethe world. That became the main preoccupation while

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Khrushchev maintained his power drive . The So-viets were, in their own words, the "locomotive" ofhistory, while we, psychologically, were preparingfor accommodation and disarmament . We were be-ing put off balance.

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VI U.S. ARMS CONTROL

To implement this disarmament program, theUnited States Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency was set up by Act of Congress . Here is thebackground and the purpose of the organization asit appears in the Agency's own first annual report(page 3)

The act establishes the U .S. Arms Control andDisarmament Agency . It defines "arms control" and"disarmament" to mean the identification, verifica-tion, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, orelimination, of armed forces and armaments of allkinds under international agreement including thenecessary steps taken under such an agreement toestablish an effective system of international control,or to create and strengthen international organiza-tions for the maintenance of peace . The act assertsthat the Agency must have such a position withinthe Government that it can provide the President,the Secretary of State, other officials of the Execu-tive branch, and the Congress, with recommendationsconcerning U.S. arms control and disarmament pol-icy. In addition, it describes in general terms thenature and quality of the staff which the Director isrequired to assemble. It provides that the organi-zation must have the capacity to provide essentialscientific, economic, political, military, psychologi-cal and technological information upon which realis-tic arms control and disarmament policy must be

36

based. The organization must also be able to carryout these primary functions :

(a) The conduct, support, and coordination ofresearch for arms control and disarmament policyformulation

(b) The preparation for and management ofU.S. participation in international negotiations inthe. arms control and disarmament field ;

(c) The dissemination and coordination ofpublic information concerning arms control anddisarmament ; and

(d) The preparation for, operation of, or, asappropriate, direction of U .S . participation in suchcontrol systems as may become part of U .S. armscontrol and disarmament activities .

The law also provides that the Director shallserve as principal adviser to the Secretary of Stateand to the President on arms control and disarma-ment matters. The Director, under the direction ofthe Secretary of State, has primary responsibilitywithin the Government for arms control and dis-armament matters.

NEW ORGANIZATIONIn commencing operations, the new agency took

over the State Department's U .S. Disarmament Ad-ministration, including its personnel and its func-tions.

In anticipation. of expanded staff activity, andin order to provide for the performance of new dutiesimposed by law, a new pattern of internal organi-zation was established .

A general advisory committee, authorized bystatute, will be composed of national leaders in di-verse fields, some of whom have served as senior

37

officials of Government. It will meet periodically toadvise the Director.

The United Nations, too, was working toward"Disarmament." A ten-nation committee on disarm-ament was set up, composed of five western nationsand five Soviet nations . Later this group was ex-panded to eighteen, with the following "neutrals"being added : Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mex-ico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic .It will be readily seen that this selection veers dis-tinctly to Khrushchev's side .

Inasmuch as General de Gaulle rejects the goalof the plan-a merger of forces under the UnitedNations, he did not deign to send a representativeto many of the conferences, so that, in effect, itis a seventeen-nation committee, listing towardKhrushchev's left.

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VII WE OFFER A TREATY

On April 18, 1962, we offered the Soviet Union atreaty to implement our Program for General andComplete Disarmament before the 17-nation Dis-armament Committee at Geneva. It was during thisperiod that Khrushchev moved his expeditionaryforce across the Atlantic to Cuba .

The four-page summary of this "treaty" madeby the United States Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency reads

OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONSOF A TREATY ON GENERAL ANDCOMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A

PEACEFUL WORLDSUMMARY

PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSOF DISARMAMENT

Disarmament would be implemented progres-sively and in a balanced manner so that at no stagecould any state or group of states obtain militaryadvantage. Compliance with obligations would beeffectively verified. As national armaments were re-duced, the United Nations would be progressivelystrengthened .

Disarmament would be accomplished in threestages-the first to be carried out in 3 years ; thesecond, also in 3 years ; and the third, as promptly aspossible within an agreed period of time . Stage Iwould be initiated by the United States, the SovietUnion, and other agreed states . All militarily signif-

39

icant states would participate in Stage II ; and allstates possessing armaments and armed forces, inStage III.

DISARMAMENT MEASURESA. ARMAMENTS. During Stage I, inventories

of major categories of both nuclear delivery vehi-cles and conventional armaments would be reducedby 30 percent. Fixed launching pads would be re-duced with associated missiles . Half of the remain-ing inventories would be eliminated during Stage II,and final reductions would be made in Stage III.Upon the completion of Stage III, states would haveat their disposal only agreed types of nonnucleararmaments for forces required to maintain internalorder and protect the personal security of citizens .

Production of armaments during Stage I wouldbe limited to agreed allowances and would be com-pensated for by the destruction of additional arma-ments to the end that reductions would not be im-paired. In Stage II, production of armaments wouldbe halted except for parts for maintenance of re-tained armaments. Any further production of na-tional armaments would be ended in Stage III ex-cept for production of agreed types of nonnucleararmaments for internal forces .

Military research, development, and testingwould be subject to increasing limitations during thedisarmament process . During Stage III, appropriateaction would be taken to insure that new scientificdiscoveries and technological inventions of militarysignificance were not used for military purposes .

B . ARMED FORCES . Force levels of the UnitedStates and Soviet Union would be reduced to 2 .1million at the end of Stage I . Half of the remainingforces of these two states would be disbanded dur-

40

ing Stage II, and final reductions would be made inStage III. Other states would also progressively re-duce their force levels . By the end of Stage III, stateswould have at their disposal only those agreed forcesand related organizational arrangements requiredto maintain internal order and protect the personalsecurity of citizens .

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Production of fis-sionable materials for use in nuclear weapons wouldbe halted in Stage I, and limitations would be im-posed on the production of fissionable materials forother purposes. The availability of fissionable ma-terials for use in nuclear weapons would be reducedduring Stage I and subsequent stages by safeguardedtransfers to nonnuclear weapons purposes.

If nuclear weapons tests had not already beenhalted under effective international control, arrange-ments to this end would be undertaken in Stage I .States which had manufactured nuclear weaponswould agree in Stage I not to transfer control overnuclear weapons to states which had not manufac-tured them or to assist such states in their manufac-ture. States which had not manufactured nuclearweapons would refrain from seeking them. Trans-fers of fissionable materials between states wouldbe limited to peaceful purposes and would be safe-guarded .

Beginning in Stage II, nonnuclear componentsand assemblies of nuclear weapons would be de-stroyed and limitations would be imposed on furtherproduction or refabrication of nuclear weapons . Atthe end of Stage II, remaining nuclear weaponswould be registered internationally to assist in veri-fying the fact that by the end of Stage III stateswould not have such weapons at their disposal .

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D. OUTER SPACE . The placing of weapons ofmass destruction in orbit would be prohibited inStage I, and limitations would be imposed on theproduction, stockpiling, and testing of boosters forspace vehicles. States would support increased co-operation in peaceful uses of outer space .

E. MILITARY BASES . Reduction of militarybases, wherever they might be located, would be ini-tiated in Stage II, and final reduction would be madein Stage III .

F. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. Military ex-penditures would be reported throughout the dis-armament process .

VERIFICATIONThe verification of disarmament would be the

responsibility of an International Disarmament Or-ganization, which would be established within theframework of the United Nations. Reductions ofarmaments and armed forces would be verified atagreed locations ; and limitations on production, test-ing, and other specified activities, at declared loca-tions. Assurance that agreed levels of armamentsand armed forces were not exceeded and that activi-ties subject to limitation or prohibition were not be-ing conducted clandestinely would be providedthrough arrangements which would relate the ex-tent of inspection at any time to the amount of dis-armament being undertaken and to the risk to thedisarming states of possible violations .

Such assurance might, for example, be accom-plished through arrangements under which stateswould divide themselves into a number of zonesthrough which inspection would be progressivelyextended. By the end of Stage III, when disarma-ment had been completed, all parts of the territory

42

of states would have been inspected .REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WARTo promote confidence and reduce the risk of

war during the disarmament process, states would,beginning in Stage I, give advance notification ofmajor military movements and maneuvers, estab-lish observation posts to report on concentrationsand movements of military forces, and insure rapidand reliable communications among heads of govern-ments and with the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations .

An International Commission on Reduction ofthe Risk of War would examine possible extensionsand improvements of such measures as well as ad-ditional measures to reduce the risk of war throughaccident, miscalculation, failure of communications,or surprise attack .

ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPINGTHE PEACE

In Stage I, states would undertake obligationsto refrain from the threat or use of force of anytype contrary to the United Nations Charter .Throughout the three stages of disarmament, stateswould use all available means for the peaceful set-tlement of disputes, would seek to improve processesfor this purpose, and would support measures to im-prove the capability of the United Nations to main-tain international peace and security .

A United Nations Peace Observation Corpswould be established in Stage I, and a United Na-tions Peace Force, in Stage II. The United NationsPeace Force, which would be equipped with agreedtypes of armaments and would be supplied agreedmanpower by states, would be progressively streng-thened until, in Stage III, it would be fully capable

43

of insuring international security in a disarmedworld.

We see here implementation of the policy totransfer military strength from national armies toan all-powerful United Nations army . Stage I andstage II are to be of three years' duration .

An all-powerful World Court with absolute jur-isdiction also is proposed. The treaty reads

"1. Peaceful Settlement of DisputesA. In light of the study of peaceful settle-ment of disputes conducted during stage I .the Parties to the Treaty would agree tosuch additional steps and arrangements aswere necessary to assure the just and peace-ful settlement of international disputes,whether legal or political in nature .B. The Parties to the Treaty would under-take to accept without reservation, pursuantto Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute ofthe International Court of Justice, the com-pulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decideinternational legal disputes."

This, of course, means the revocation of the Con-nally Reservation . (* )

The Soviets submitted their own version of thattreaty which provided that each of the first twostages be of two years' duration and complete disarmament be achieved in four years .(*) When The United States became a signatory to the U .N .Treaty, the U .S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, underthe Chairmanship of Senator Tom Connally (Dem .-Texas)stipulated that the United States would submit to the U .N .judicial arm, the International Court of Justice, on interna-tional matters, with domestic issues, as decided by the UnitedStates, reserved for the U .S. Courts . This qualification hasbeen known as the Connally Reservation .

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VIII IT IS FOR REAL

During this period clusters of citizens aroundthe country were beginning to learn what our dis-armament policy was. They did not like what theylearned. Concern began to spread .

Some of our leading citizens, noting this trend,had inquired of our Washington officials, includingCabinet officers, about the folly of turning our de-fense establishment over to the United Nations.

Our fellow-citizens were assured by the Wash-ington officials (who were not directly concernedwith disarmament negotiations) that we would notdisarm-that we were only going through the mo-tions in the U.N. to mollify the neutrals. I hadheard earlier that State Department officials werealso telling top newspapermen the same thing .

Let us look at what some of our officials di-rectly concerned were, however, actually saying forthe record : Here is William C . Foster, Director ofthe United States Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency : "U.S . Disarmament proposals are, mostemphatically, not intended for propaganda purposes .They are a sober statement of action policy which,if agreed to by the Soviet Union, could result ina world free from the scourge of war and the dan-gers and burdens of armaments in which the use offorce has been subordinated to the rule of law andin which international adjustments to a changingworld are achieved peacefully . . . the problem is notwhat would happen if U .S . disarmament proposals

45

were accepted . The problem is to gain support forthese proposals and to negotiate the necessary de-tails of them into specific agreements ."

Here is Adlai Stevenson, United States Am-bassador to the U.N., speaking in an official U.S.bulletin entitled "Disarmament-the New U.S. Ini-tiative" : "In short, the United States program callsfor the total elimination of national capacity car-ried out by each side, every step of the way, theplan calls for the creation of an International Dis-armament Organization within the framework ofthe United Nations . . . It is presented in deadearnest."

Arthur H. Dean, our Chief Representative tothe Geneva Disarmament Conference stated offici-ally : "Frankly, in spite of my daily preoccupationwith the affairs of our conference, I still remainin awe of the objective which we have set beforeourselves in Geneva. We are not primarily discus-sing measures to calm the international scene orto facilitate partial disarmament, although thereis some of this. Our main attention is for the reten-tion of limited internal security forces inside eachcountry and for the maintenance of a United Na-tions Peace Force."

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IX ADLAI STEVENSONCARRIES IT FORWARD

In September 1962, Adlai Stevenson, speakingbefore the General Assembly of the United Nations,carried the theme forward . He said :

"A great achievement of our last session wasto endorse an agreement on a set of principlesfor general and complete disarmament in apeaceful world. But we-while we have madesome progress, we have not made enough to-ward transplanting these agreed principlesinto an agreed plan-to move by mutual ac-tions in rapid stages toward total disarmamentand effective international peacekeeping . TheUnited States has proposed such a plan . It hassubmitted its proposals to this Assembly and tothe 18 nation Disarmament Conference at Ge-neva."Mr. Stevenson thus affirmed in September, 1962,

that our "Disarmament Plan" submitted a yearearlier still represented the policy of the UnitedStates of America .

That plan was not a "disarmament" plan at all .Disarmament takes place when all the nations ofworld destroy their arms and effectively agree toarm no more. Our plan advocated the transfer ofmilitary supremacy from where it is now, largelywith the United States, to the nations making upthe General Assembly of the United Nations. Theforce which will, in three stages, possess all theweapons of the world, except for internal policing,

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is called the United Nations Peace Force .On previous occasions, Mr . Stevenson had said,

and this was a necessary corollary of his 1962 po-sition, that the resulting U .N. Peace Force shouldbe stronger than any combination of nations in theworld. Clearly, he intends that the U.N. shouldsupercede his own government in military strength .Under the United States proposal "No state (is) tohave the military power to challenge the progres-sively strengthened U.N. Peace Force."

History and good sense demonstrate that theforce which has all the weapons and the militarypower rules the world . Clearly, what Adlai Steven-son advocated was a United Nations so strong thatit would effectively rule the world-the UnitedStates included . That is what everyone in the UnitedStates should know, for it is our expressed policy .

Secretary of State Rusk said recently that "eachaddition to the list of nuclear powers will make morecomplicated and difficult the negotiations of effec-tive control -arrangements that we must sooner orlater achieve, if we are to avoid the ultimate disasterof nuclear incineration ." At this point, General deGaulle and Sir Winston Churchill expressed deepconcern about giving up their nuclear deterrents andbeing swept away by Dean Rusk and Khrushchev,as tiny dwarfs, in a massive "synthesis", as U Thantcalls the process of merging with Soviet power .

The honest acknowledgment that this "accom-modation" is our policy is long overdue. The Rostowreport should have been released, not hidden by"executive privilege." The treaty that we have puton the table at Geneva, calling for the dismember-ment of our national defense establishment, shouldhave been dramatized, not slyly denied, when con-

48

cerned citizens asked if it was real-as, indeed, it is .We have a right to know these things because

they all add up to the surrender of our heritage .The chimerical assumption that Khrushchev, Mao,and the so-called neutrals like Sukarno would allowus, a small minority, to hold onto our way of life inthe resulting concensus is unreal . The fact of thematter is that Communism is not mellowing at all .It is even more intransigent as it calls over and overfor " victory" for world Communism while its deedsand threats to "pulverize" us implement those never-ending chants .

The missiles in Cuba, the terror campaigns inViet Nam and Angola, the shootings at the BerlinWall, the implacable drive in South America-allmake Walt Rostow sound fantastic .

It was during this period, almost while Ambas-sador Stevenson spoke, that Khrushchev was movingmissiles into Cuba, putting himself in a position tothreaten nuclear blackmail from that vantage point .Soviet missiles in Cuba would take away the thirty-minute-or-so warning time that we now have againstmissiles launched from the Soviet Union . This thirtyminutes is vital because it enables us to get ourdeterrent force off the ground .

Probably no two events better point up the fu-tility of our present policy than these two-the mov-ing of Soviet missiles to Cuba in the days after weput a treaty on the table at Geneva offering to dis-solve our national military defense establishment .

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X THE PRESIDENT'SSPEECH AT AMERICANUNIVERSITY

On June 10, 1963, the underlying story reachedthe surface. This time, it came, not indirectlythrough an enterprising reporter as did the Ros-tow memorandum, but in the President's own wordsat a commencement speech at American Universityin Washington .

Here is what the President said : "Our primarylong-range interest in Geneva, however, is generaland complete disarmament-designed to take placeby stages, permitting parallel political developmentsto build the new institutions of peace which wouldtake the place of arms ."

On the world order, the President, too, reaf-firmed what our policy papers had all recommended-the strengthening of the United Nations into aworld government . His exact words were : "Mean-while, we seek to strengthen the United Nations,to help solve its financial problems to make it a moreeffective instrument for peace, to develop it into agenuine world security system-a system capableof resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insur-ing the security of the large and the small, and ofcreating conditions under which arms can finallybe abolished ."

This speech was a most important reaffirma-tion of our policy that had, up until then, been re-leased piecemeal. It was no longer possible to denythat our policy was to work toward an accommoda-tion with the Soviet Union on the basis of a merger

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with the Soviet Union under the United Nations .Those portions of the Rostow report which had

stated that our goal was a "victory" not of the UnitedStates over the Soviet Union, a "victory" not ofCapitalism over Socialism but rather a victory of"men and nations" under the banner of the UnitedNations, have been officially confirmed . The Presi-dent used the term "Pax Americana" to disavowthe hitherto traditional policy of the United Statesto extend liberty and freedom as civilization hasknown these concepts . This was a milestone .

Reflecting the more direct words of the RostowMemorandum, the President also said : "We must,therefore, persevere in the search for peace in thehope that constructive changes within the Commu-nist bloc might bring within reach solutions whichnow seem beyond us . We must conduct our affairsin such a way that it becomes in the Communists'interest to agree on a genuine peace . And above all,while defending our own vital interests, nuclear po-wers must avert those confrontations which bringan adversary to a choice of either a humiliating re-treat or nuclear war . To adopt that kind of course`in the nuclear age would be evidence only of thebankruptcy of our policy-or of a collective death-wish for the world .

"To secure these ends, America's weapons arenon-provocative, carefully controlled, designed todeter and capable of selective use. Our militaryforces are committed to peace and disciplined inself-restraint . Our diplomats are instructed to avoidunnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hos-tility."

Two days after this conciliatory talk, Khrush-chev detonated two nuclear blasts and followed with

51

another a week later, on June 19 .Then, by way of emphasizing his point, he

spoke before the Plenary Meeting of the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union on June 21, two dayslater, and said

"We must know that the enemy is now sharp-ening his poisonous ideological weapon for morebitter clashes with us . It is reminiscent of whatthe Red Army men said during the Civil Warwe have one outstanding issue with the WhiteGuards on which we cannot agree, the simplequestion of land. The White Guards want tobury us in it and we want to bury them . Whowill bury whom first-this is the little outstand-ing question with capitalism ."We have a similar outstanding question withcapitalism. It wants to bury the socialist sys-tem and we want-and not only want but havedug quite a deep hole, and shall exert effortsto dig this hole deeper-to bury forever thecapitalist system, the system of exploitation,wars, and plunder. That capitalism will collapse,of this there is no doubt . But it will not col-lapse of itself."Our successes will inspire the working class ofall the capitalist countries to more decisive andactive revolutionary class struggle. And wehave helped and will continue to help them byour example of building communism . The peo-ples of the various countries fighting for theirfreedom and independence are receiving as-sistance from us today, and tomorrow therewill be even greater possibilities for renderingassistance of another character ."Still making his point, Khrushchev had the full

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text of his remarks printed in the Moscow News ofJuly 6. (No. 27 (654) page 8 .)

Insofar as I could discern, the State Departmentgave currency neither to this publication nor to thedetonation of the nuclear tests . Apparently this newsdid not fit the image of a "mellowing" Khrushchevwhich the State Department is trying to sell to theAmerican people .

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XI "THE INTERNATIONALRULE OF LAW"

The international rule of law has been an idealof man since the beginning of time . No man of good-will opposes this long-sought dream.

The framework which our planners are usingto relate this dream to reality is fraught with frail-ties and infiltration by a force that is inherentlyanti-law .

The United States State Department, and nowthe President, are offering to disband our militaryestablishments in three stages, if the Soviet Unionand other nations do the same . We are offering towork for the simultaneous creation of an Interna-tional Peace Force that will become progressivelystrengthened so that by Stage III, it will be, in thelanguage of the treaty submitted at Geneva "fullycapable of insuring international security in a dis-armed world ."

Thus, "Disarmament" is being used as a coverfor the creation of an international "rule of law"or world government, with disputes referred to anall-powerful world court. Of course, as we observedearlier, this is not disarmament at all . The result ofthe dissolution of existing armies and the simul-taneous creation of an International Peace Forceis really the transfer of military strength from whereit is now to the United Nations under U Thant . Withthis transfer, Khrushchev will have achieved hisgoal expressed in 1959, of removing the last barrierbetween himself and world domination-the military

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strength of the United States .Should this plan be enacted and carried out, the

United States would disarm . If there were any drag-ging of feet on the part of our leaders, or cheating,there would be vocal forces in the United States toproclaim to the world whatever delay or lapse on ourpart there might be . But in the controlled press ofthe Soviet Union, even if there were limitless in-spection rights, we would never learn the facts ifthe Soviet military hid caches of nuclear arms inthe vastness of Siberia, China, Manchuria, Mongolia,Tibet or Eurasia. All one need do is to look at theextensive areas of the Soviet Empire, with all itsrugged, mountainous terrain of caves and dales, toknow the practical impossibility of inspecting Sovietterritory .

During Stage II, according to the proposedtreaty, all nations will have to submit to the com-pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice .

This is world government in every sense of theword. An all-powerful international army, with anall-powerful court under the same auspices, can beconsidered nothing else but world government . Whatelse does international rule of law imply?

On June 29, 1963, The New York Times saideditorially on this point : "The difficulty is that theessence of law is not only justice ; it implies com-mand. To be binding, world law needs a suprana-tional body with power to enforce the internationallaws that are agreed upon . Otherwise, they are not`law' ; they are principles and practices that wouldbe `obeyed' only by those nations which have ac-cepted the laws."

When the idea of an international army was55

proposed during World War II, it was rejected bythe then leaders of the State Department becauseit necessarily implied "international control of pro-duction, of communications, of transportation andeven labor supply ."

To show how plans are being laid for the far-reaching application of international control of allphases of human endeavor, let the Unesco Conven-tion Against Discrimination in Education speak .

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XII UNESCO

On December 14, 1960 UNESCO, a specializedagency of the United Nations drafted, unanimously,the following resolutions :

B. CONVENTIONAND RECOMMENDATIONS

ADOPTED BY THEGENERAL CONFERENCE

AT ITS ELEVENTH SESSIONARTICLE 1I. Convention Against Discrimination in Education

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term`discrimination' includes any distinction, exclusion,limitation or preference which, being based on race,colour, sex, language, religion, political or otheropinion, national or social origin, economic condi-tion or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifyingor impairing equality of treatment in education andin particulara. Of depriving any person or group of persons ofaccess to education of any type or at any level ;b. Of limiting any person or group of persons toeducation of an inferior standard ;c. Subject to the provisions of Article 2 of this Con-vention, of establishing or maintaining separateeducational systems or institutions for persons orgroups of persons ; ord. Of inflicting on any person or group of persons

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conditions which are incompatible with the dignityof man.

2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term`education' refers to all types and levels of educa-tion, and includes access to education, the standardand quality of education, and the conditions underwhich it is given .ARTICLE 2

When permitted in a State, the following situa-tions shall not be deemed to constitute discrimina-tion, within the meaning of Article 1 of this con-ventiona. The establishment or maintenance of separate edu-cational systems or institutions for pupils of thetwo sexes, if these systems or institutions offer equi-valent access to education, provide a teaching staffwith qualifications of the same standard as well asschool premises and equipment of the same quality,and afford the opportunity to take the same orequivalent courses of study ;b. The establishment or maintenance, for religiousor linguistic reasons, of separate educational sys-tems or institutions offering an education which isin keeping with the wishes of the pupil's parents orlegal guardians, if participation in such systems orattendance at such institutions is optional and ifthe education provided conforms to such standardsas may be laid down or approved by the competentauthorities, in particular for education of the samelevel ;c. The establishment or maintenance of private edu-cational institutions, if the object of the institutionsis not to secure the exclusion of any group but toprovide educational facilities in addition to thoseprovided by the public authorities, if the institu-

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tions are conducted in accordance with that object,and if the education provided conforms with suchstandards as may be laid down or approved by thecompetent authorities, in particular for education ofthe same level .ARTICLE 3

In order to eliminate and prevent discriminationwithin the meaning of this Convention, the StatesParties thereto undertakea. To abrogate any statutory provisions and any ad-ministrative instructions and to discontinue any ad-ministrative practices which involve discriminationin education ;b. To ensure, by legislation where necessary, thatthere is no discrimination in the admission of pupilsto educational institutions ;c. Not to allow any differences of treatment by thepublic authorities between nationals, except on thebasis of merit or need, in the matter of school feesand the grant of scholarships or other forms ofassistance to pupils and necessary permits and fa-cilities for the pursuit of studies in foreign coun-tries ;d. Not to allow, in any form of assistance grantedby the public authorities to educational institutions,any restrictions or preference based solely on theground that pupils belong to a particular group ;e. To give foreign nationals resident within theirterritory the same access to education as that givento their own nationals .ARTICLE 4

The States Parties to this Convention undertakefurthermore to formulate, develop and apply a na-tional policy which, by methods appropriate to thecircumstances and to national usage, will tend to

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promote equality of opportunity and of treatment inthe matter of education and in particulara. To make primary education free and compulsory ;make secondary education in its different forms gen-erally available and accessible to all ; make highereducation equally accessible to all on the basis of in-dividual capacity ; assure compliance by all with theobligation to attend school prescribed by law ;b. To ensure that the standards of education areequivalent in all public educational institutions ofthe same level, and that the conditions relating tothe quality of the education provided are also equiv-alent ;c. To encourage and intensify by appropriate meth-ods the education of persons who have not receivedany primary education or who have not completedthe entire primary education course and the contin-uation of their education on the basis of individualcapacity ;d. To provide training for the teaching professionwithout discrimination .ARTICLE 5

1. The States Parties to this Convention agreethat :a. Education shall be directed to the full develop-ment of the human personality and to the strength-ening of respect for human rights and fundamentalfreedoms ; it shall promote understanding, toleranceand friendship among all nations, racial or religiousgroups, and shall further the activities of the UnitedNations for the maintenance of peace ;b. It is essential to respect the liberty of parents and,where applicable, of legal guardians, firstly tochoose for their children institutions other thanthose maintained by the public authorities but con-

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forming to such minimum educational standards asmay be laid down or approved by the competentauthorities and, secondly, to ensure in a manner con-sistent with the procedures followed in the State forthe application of its legislation, the religious andmoral education of the children in conformity withtheir own convictions ; and no person or group ofpersons should be compelled to receive religiousinstruction inconsistent with his or their convic-tions ;c. It is essential to recognize the right of membersof national minorities to carry on their own edu-cational activities, including the maintenance ofschools and, depending on the educational policyof each State, the use or the teaching of their ownlanguage, provided however

(i) That this right is not exercised in a mannerwhich prevents the members of these minorities fromunderstanding the culture and language of the com-munity as a whole and from participating in its ac-tivities, or which prejudices national sovereignty ;

(ii) That the standard of education is not lowerthan the general standard laid down or approvedby the competent authorities ; and

(iii) That attendance at such schools is optional .2. The States Parties to this Convention under-

take to take all necessary measures to ensure theapplication of the principles enunciated in para-graph 1 of this Article.ARTICLE 6

In the application of this Convention, the StatesParties to it undertake to pay the greatest atten-tion to any recommendations hereafter adopted bythe General Conference of the United Nations Edu-cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization de-

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fining the measures to be taken against the differentforms of discrimination in education and for thepurpose of ensuring equality of opportunity andtreatment in education .ARTICLE 7

The States Parties to this Convention shall in theirperiodic reports submitted to the General Confer-ence of the United Nations Educational, Scien-tific and Cultural Organization on dates and in amanner to be determined by it, give information onthe legislative and administrative provisions whichthey have adopted and other action which they havetaken for the application of this Convention, includ-ing that taken for the formulation and the develop-ment of the national policy defined in Article 4 aswell as the results achieved and the obstacles en-countered in the application of that policy.ARTICLE 8

Any dispute which may arise between any twoor more States Parties to this Convention concern-ing the interpretation or application of this Con-vention, which is not settled by negotiation shall atthe request of the parties to the dispute be referred,failing other means of settling the dispute, to theInternational Court of Justice for decision .ARTICLE 9

Reservations to this Convention shall not bepermitted .ARTICLE 10

This Convention shall not have the effect ofdiminishing the rights which individuals or groupsmay enjoy by virtue of agreements concluded be-tween two or more States, where such rights are notcontrary to the letter or spirit of this Convention .

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ARTICLE 11This Convention is drawn up in English, French,

Russian and Spanish, the four texts being equallyauthoritative.ARTICLE 12

1. This Convention shall be subject to ratifica-tion or acceptance by States Members of the UnitedNations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-ganization in accordance with their respective con-stitutional procedures.

2. The instruments of ratification or acceptanceshall be deposited with the Director-General of theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization .ARTICLE 13

1 . This Convention shall be open to accession byall States not Members of the United Nations Edu-cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization whichare invited to do so by the Executive Board of theOrganization .

2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit ofan instrument of accession with the Director-Gen-eral of the United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization .ARTICLE 14

This Convention shall enter into force threemonths after the date of the deposit of the third in-strument of ratification, acceptance or accession, butonly with respect to those States which have de-posited their respective instruments on or beforethat date. It shall enter into force with respect toany other State three months after the deposit ofits instrument of ratification, acceptance or acces-sion .

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ARTICLE 15The States Parties to this Convention recognize

that the Convention is applicable not only to theirmetropolitan territory but also to all non-self-gov-erning, trust, colonial and other territories for theinternational relations of which they are respon-sible ; they undertake to consult, if necessary, thegovernments or other competent authorities of theseterritories on or before ratification, acceptance oraccession with a view to securing the application ofthe Convention to those territories, and to notifythe Director-General of the United Nations Edu-cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of theterritories to which it is accordingly applied, thenotification to take effect three months after thedate of its receipt.ARTICLE 16

1. Each State Party to this Convention may de-nounce the Convention on its own behalf or on be-half of any territory for whose international rela-tions it is responsible .

2. The denunciation shall be notified by an in-strument in writing, deposited with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scien-tific and Cultural Organization .

3. The denunciation shall take effect twelvemonths after the receipt of the instrument of de-nunciation .ARTICLE 17

The Director-General of the United NationsEducational, Scientific and Cultural Organizationshall inform the States Members of the Organiza-tion, the States not members of the Organizationwhich are referred to in Article 13, as well as theUnited Nations, of the deposit of all the instruments

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of ratification, acceptance and accession providedfor in Articles 12 and 13, and of the notificationsand denunciations provided for in Articles 15 and16 respectively .

ARTICLE 181. This Convention may be revised by the Gen-

eral Conference of the United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organization . Any such re-vision shall, however, bind only the States whichshall become Parties to the revising convention .

2. If the General Conference should adopt anew convention revising this Convention in wholeor in part, then, unless the new convention other-wise provides, this Convention shall cease to beopen to ratification, acceptance or accession as fromthe date on which the new revising convention en-ters into force.

ARTICLE 19In conformity with Article 102 of the Charter

of the United Nations, this Convention shall beregistered with the Secretariat of the United Na-tions at the request of the Director-General of theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization .

Done in Paris, this fifteenth day of December,1960, in two authentic copies bearing the signaturesof the President of the eleventh session of the Gen-eral Conference and of the Director-General of theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization, which shall be deposited in the ar-chives of the United Nations Educational, Scien-tific and Cultural Organization, and certified truecopies of which shall be delivered to all the States

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referred to in Articles 12 and 13 as well as to theUnited Nations .

While this Convention and these resolutionshave not been submitted to the United States Senatefor ratification, this plan looking to the making ofthe education of all men over the world monolithic,is now actually in the wings .

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XIII WHAT IS WRONG WITHTHIS POLICY?

This blending or "merger" of nations underthe United Nations might be a thrilling concept ifthe United Nations were made up of idealistic menand nations. The fact is that it is not. It is an ad-mixture of power politicians, many of them ruth-less and lawless.

The Soviet Union, with twelve disciplined satel-lites, stands right in the middle of the organization .It has, to start with, 12 votes out of 111 in the Gen-eral Assembly and a minimum of 2 in the 11 nationsSecurity Council .

Furthermore, U Thant has insisted that bristl-ing Red China, still at war with the U .N. itself, beadmitted to the world body. With Khrushchev andMao constituting two of the five permanent mem-bers of the Security Council, the Soviet base wouldbe formidable indeed .

Moreover, there is a whole string of left-lean-ing "neutrals" who regularly vote with Khrushchev,in concert with his campaigns of conquest through"peaceful coexistence" and "decolonialization ." In-donesia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Cambodia,United Arab Republic, Burma, Afghanistan, Laos,Yemen and Brazil are consistent supporters ofKhrushchev's programs in the United Nations .

Further, the bizarre success of the Soviet Unionin infiltrating Western and neutral delegations, andthe Secretariat itself, has made the news over andover. Alger Hiss, the first Secretary General at San

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Francisco, was shown conclusively to have engagedin Soviet espionage . The head of the Canadian dele-gation to the U.N. in the 1950's was shown to havehad important Communist links, and the SenateCommittee on Internal Security put into the recordtestimony concerning his Communist membership,as well as a security report that had severe reper-cussions.

Khrushchev and Mao, and for that matter Go-mulka, Castro and Tito do not use the instrumentsof world peace to work for peace as we know it ."Peace" to a Communist exists when all resistanceto Communism has been broken . That is the mostfundamental concept in the Communist lexicon .

Where Communists are, intrigue will prevail .For the idealistic West or the non-Communist Eastto shut its eyes to this established fact is to courtdisaster .

An even more fundamental defect in this planis the incredible assumption that Khrushchev andhis confederates will allow an international peaceforce to be operational at all . The plan presumesthat the Soviet military will disarm and not con-ceal, deep in the recesses of Siberia and Eurasia,sufficient nuclear strength to bring us to bay whilewe go through with the disarmament process . Com-petent military men and responsible observers ofSoviet strategy have told us that if we had a verit-able army of inspectors with limitless inspectionrights, we could never properly cover the vastnessof the Soviet territory .

Even if the Soviet Union should wait for theUnited States to disarm and for the InternationalPeace Force to come into being and gain enoughmilitary strength to be operational under the terms

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of our proposals, the U .S.S.R. would retain an enor-mous advantage. For, with substantial representa-tion, and with additional infiltration into the "PeaceForce" itself, it could easily work to thwart thediscovery of its own concealed military strength .

There can be no doubt that the Soviets have aplan to control the resulting combine . Failing that,as the record already has demonstrated on severaloccasions, they certainly will have enough powerwithin the "Peace Force" to nullify any repressiveaction against them .

In short, this whole plan will be successful onlywith permanent Soviet good faith and Communistcooperation every step of the way . Not only is thisbeing taken for granted, but there is an equallynaive assumption that Communist nature will changewhen we reach the merger stage and that thesehardened Communists will abandon their goals ofa lifetime and work for what is basically a bour-geois way of life-the international rule of law ascivilized men have envisioned it .

I submit that the record simply does not sup-port the idealistic conclusions of our policy leaders.This, indeed, is a very dangerous game they areplaying.

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XIV WHOSE INTERNATIONALLAW?

The idealistic search for international law isrhapsodic and inviting . But, practically speaking,there are certain elemental facts that cannot bewished away.

Only a handful of the nations in the United Na-tions have a common-law heritage . These are mostlyin the British Commonwealth . Of course, we have it.We, alone, have the very thrilling Bill of Rightswith its solemn guarantees of individual protection .

Only a minority of nations now have the freeenterprise system. Many are either Socialist or out-right Soviet When men of the West talk of "theinternational rule of law" we conjure up the utter-ances of the Cokes and the Blackstones, our Bill ofRights, our Constitution or the French Declarationof the Rights of Man .

However, Khrushchev, Mao, Castro and Titoand their allies have never been students of Coke orBlackstone. They effectively and consistently floutthe principles of the Bill of Rights .

International Law would not be law as we haveknown it but would become an homogenized medleyof the contributions of the Khrushchevs, the Maos,the Castros, the Nassers, the Titos, the Sukarnosand the Adlai Stevensons .

This admixture would be substituted for ourConstitution, our Bill of Rights, our Common Law.Certainly state laws would be diluted beyond recog-nition .

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Is that what our people want? The United Stateswould be an ineffectual minority in this combinewhile the Khrushchevs, the Maos, the Nassers, theSukarnos, the Nkrumahs would have much to sayin setting the new codes of law . They would also gofar toward dominating the creation, the disposi-tion and the utilization of the world army . Theywould help to staff the world court .

Necessarily, this is the end of our thrilling heri-tage for which our forefathers and fathers fought.It is the direct opposite of that for which two mil-lion Americans gave their lives and blood in WorldWar II and in Korea .

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XV THE SECRETARIAT

It will be seen that an important control towerof this stupendous merger will be the Secretariatof the United Nations, headed by the Burmese, UThant.

The Secretariat may be compared to the staffor management of a corporation, the board of di-rectors of which is the General Assembly or theSecurity Council . The General Assembly is advisoryto the Security Council, but, with the passage oftime, is acquiring more and more power of action .

In the General Assembly, the United Stateshas one vote in the one-hundred-eleven-member as-sembly. In a year or so that number will go to 126 .In the Security Council, we have one vote in eleven .

At the head of the Secretariat is the SecretaryGeneral U Thant. He has been elected to serve until1966 .

The Secretary General, under the Charter,should be the "chief administrative officer of theUnited Nations" and should be responsible to thatbody. "The Secretary General and the staff shallnot seek or receive instructions from any govern-ment or from any other authority external to theorganization ."

The Charter of the United Nations gives as thepurposes of the organization the following two pro-visions

"To develop friendly relations among nationsbased on respect for the principle of equal

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rights and self-determination of peoples, andto take other appropriate measures to strength-en universal peace ;"To achieve international cooperation in solv-ing international problems of an economic, so-cial, cultural or humanitarian character, and,in promoting and encouraging respect for hu-man rights and for the fundamental freedomsfor all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-guage or religion ."U Thant has made no effort whatsoever to de-

velop relations based on respect for the principle ofequal rights and self-determinations of peoples . To-day, more than a billion human beings are in Sovietbondage, without fundamental rights and with noth-ing whatsoever to say toward their self-determina-tion .

You will search in vain for any effort on thepart of U Thant in behalf of the right of self-de-termination for the captive people under Soviethegemony. On the other hand this so-called neutralworks day and night to dismantle western "colonial-ism" which is far less repressive than Soviet "col-onialism."

While U Thant presses vigorously against theBelgians, the Portuguese, or the French, he worksequally vigorously to "normalize" Hungarian rela-tions with the U.N. and all the nations of the world .When the "Butchers of Budapest" moved tanks fromthe Soviet Union to crush the Hungarian people,world opinion forced the U.N. to conduct an in-quiry into that act of genocide. Kadar has defiedevery U.N. effort to arrive at the truth, or to imposecensure or sanctions. Yet U Thant works to wipethe slate clean of this sanguinary record, obviously

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for the advantage of Khrushchev and Kadar.Hungary is far more repressive of human

rights than is, for example, Portuguese Angola .They cannot even be compared . Yet the doublestandard of U Thant is marked . Rather than workfor sanctions against Kadar, he works to forgemore securely the chains that bind the Hungarianpeople. He does this as well to Cuba and every otherSoviet colony.

Instead of upholding his obligations under thecharter, U Thant represents himself as the mediatorbetween the bondage of the East and the freedom ofthe West which he equates . In fact, he is not evenneutral between these disparate forces .

For instance, when he made his first speechafter being elected permanent Secretary Generalhe said that he was convinced that Premier Khrush-chev did not want war and was sincere in his callsfor peaceful coexistence. He chided the western na-tions for apparently failing to recognize the "fullsignificance" of the changes in Moscow's thinkingsince the death of Josef Stalin. Thant, however,praised President Kennedy for agreeing to neutral-ization of Laos and thus admitting, wisely, that the"attempt to create a pro-Western government inAsia" had failed . The fact was, of course, that oureffort had been to defend Laos against aggression .Here is what U Thant said

"Mr. Khrushchev, who is now in control of thereins of government, belongs to a different cate-gory of leaders, with a coherent philosophy of theworld based on the thesis, not of the inevitability ofwar, but of the imperative of competive coexistence .We may or may not agree with his philosophy or

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with his aims, but we have very good reasons to be-lieve that he does not want war.

"The West does not seem to appreciate the fullsignificance of this obvious change of political climatein the Soviet Union. Throughout the fifties mostWestern leaders saw the world as a battlefield be-tween two antagonistic systems militantly expres-sing the principles of good and evil. Hence com-promise was betrayal : evil could be held at bay onlyby iron-clad alliances, held together by mutual fearand backed by the constant threat of nuclear war .While this attitude could be criticized as a modernversion of Hobbesian pessimism, it neverthelessprovided a stable and fixed frame of reference inwhich decisions could be taken .

"This concept of iron-clad alliances and this viewof the world purely in terms of black and whitewas, in essence, the Western response to Stalinism .However, this attitude persisted even when the char-acter of Soviet challenge was already changing .This view of the world scene was perhaps partlyresponsible for many newly-independent countriespursuing a policy of nonalignment. President Ken-nedy proved himself to be a leader of vision andimagination when, early last year, he proposed aneutral Laos in return for a cease-fire . Thus thePresident wisely admitted that the attempt tocreate a series of pro-Western governments in Asiahad failed. He accepted the view that the best theWest could hope for in Asia-and for that matterAfrica-is governments which fear outside inter-ference and subversion as much as they hate colonial-ism ; and that the function of Western policy shouldbe the creation of a framework within which theycan exercise their own freedom of choice ."

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Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence is not a mys-tery. It is defined in the Communist manifesto of1960, in the draft platform of the Communist Partyof the Soviet Union of 1961, the most authoritativeSoviet source, and in official Soviet journals as ameans to achieve world wide victory. The Commu-nist manifesto of 1960 referred to it as an "intensi-fication" of the world struggle. Assurances weregiven that "peaceful coexistence" does not mean, ofcourse "peace" in the class struggle between socialismand capitalism or reconciliation of the Communistwith the bourgeois ideology . Peaceful coexistencemeans not only the existence of states with differentsocial systems, but also a definite form of world-wide class struggle between socialism and capitalism .

Khrushchev assured the comrades in 1961 thatit involved "no compromise" in Soviet principles,but was, instead, an "intensification" of the worldstruggle.

Under "peaceful coexistence" Khrushchev hasmoved an expeditionary force across the Atlantic,with missiles, tanks, MIG's, submarines and electronicparaphernalia . He is now mounting from his estab-lished base in Cuba a campaign of terror, subver-sion and infiltration against South America . He iswaging a terror campaign in Angola. He is mov-ing forces down the Ho Chi Minh trail. He is at-tacking in Laos, and South Vietnam. He has built awall in Berlin and shoots down human beings asthey try to escape to freedom. He has human beingson torture racks in Budapest and in Havana . He isexecuting children and forceably taking others fromtheir families to indoctrinate them in Communism .

Indeed, there is nothing "peaceful" about76

Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence." Certainly UThant knows this. His staff, with hundreds of re-search assistants knows it well . He is not a neutralat all. Directly behind U Thant is Assistant Secre-tary General Vladimir P . Suslov, Assistant Secre-tary General in charge of Security Council andPolitical Affairs. Trygve Lie called the post the"premier" Assistant Secretary Generalship becauseof its functional importance . The U.N. Handbookdescribes his duties in this fashion

"The UN Secretariat has eight departments,each under an Under-Secretary. The first is thevery important Department of Political and SecurityCouncil Affairs. The Under-Secretary in charge isone of the senior advisers to the UN Secretary Gen-eral. Within this Department are the General Po-litical Division, the Administrative and General Di-vision and the Disarmament Affairs Group, and thelatter includes the Atomic Energy Section and theConventional Armaments and Enforcement Meas-ures Section .

"The Department provides services for the Se-curity Council and its subsidiary organs, includingthe Committee on Admission of New Members, theDisarmament Commission and the Peace Observa-tion Commission . It prepares papers relating to peacematerials relevant to the work of the DisarmamentCommission ; advises on security aspects of Trustee-ship Agreements for strategic areas ; participateswith the Military Staff Committee Secretariat in theapplication of military enforcement measures ; pro-vides Principal Secretaries and Deputies and Assis-tant Secretaries for Committees created by the UNfor investigation or conciliation ; and performs addi-tional work that may be assigned by the Secretary

77

General." (see UN Yearbook 1952, p . 46 .)When Suslov took the post in April, 1963, he left

the post of first assistant to Soviet Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko. Suslov has been in the Soviet dip-lomatic service since 1953. His predecessors had heldsimilar posts in the Soviet Foreign Office . It is fan-tastic to assume that these hardened Soviet diplo-mats could be dedicated Communists, subject to se-vere Communist discipline, one day, and objectiveinternational civil servants the next .

All one need do is read, for instance, "TheMoulding of Communists" by Frank S. Meyer, tounderstand the amount of concentrated and exhaus-tive training that goes into making the human beingfit into the Communist mould, to realize that thisnaive concept of an objective Soviet Internationalcivil servant has no foundation in fact.

The predecessor of Suslov was the late EvgeniKiselev. (* )

Suslov's predecessors in this key post have been1946-49 Arkady S . Sobelov, USSR1950-53 Konstantine Zinchenko, USSR

(*)Kiselev held the following posts before moving into thisimportant U.N. post :He was Soviet Consul General in New York during WorldWar II, and our intelligence agencies learned that he carriedon extensive organizational work with Communist frontgroups in this country . Later, he was political adviser toSoviet Marshal Ivan S . Konev, commanding Red forces inAustria. The Associated Press story out of United Nationsin New York describing his appointment as Assistant Secre-tary General stated that "his career has been filled with toughassignments. He was Soviet Ambassador to the United ArabRepublic during the Suez crisis . He was regarded as the manwho engineered the Soviet-U.A.R. arms deal and demon-strated to President Nasser, Soviet sympathy for his aims .He was Ambassador to Hungary 1949-54, when Stalinismwas at its height in that country . In 1948-49 he headed theDepartment of Balkan Countries in the Soviet Foreign Min-istry ."

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1954-57 Ilya Tchernyshev, USSR1957

Dragoslav Protitch, Yugoslavia1957-60 A. Dobrynin, USSR1960-62 George P. Arkadev, USSR1962-63 Eugveni D. Kiselev, USSR

Trygve Lie, in his volume, "In The Cause ofPeace", wrote that the so-called big five had enteredinto an agreement to give this post to a Soviet na-tional. He interpreted the agreement to be bindingonly during his term as Secretary General, but aglance at the actual holders of the post would in-dicate that it probably was of longer duration.

Actually, the underlying situation is worse thanthis. Alger Hiss, who was subsequently convictedfor perjury involving his acts of Soviet espionage,was the organizing Secretary General of the U .N.at San Francisco. He put his proteges into many ofthe key posts in the organization, and many -of themare there today .

The fact is that Ralph Bunche, Suslov and theIndian Narasimhan form a troika of assistants thatruns the Secretariat right behind U Thant.

When the United States Senate Internal Sub-committee held its short inquiry into the Commu-nist political activity of the U .S. citizens in the Sec-retariat, it found it to be heavily infiltrated .

I was the counsel to the Internal Security Sub-committee then. We surveyed the Soviet penetra-tion into the United States representation only inthe Secretariat. We assumed that we had no author-ity to investigate the Secretariat itself, although theHeadquarters Agreement permitting the U .N. oper-ation in New York never has been properly ratified .

Yet, what we uncovered was, to say the least,shocking, by our standards. I summarized these

79

hearings for my book "No Wonder We Are Losing" .Let me use this summary here, as well as a sum-mary of the conclusions of the Subcommittee

The first witness to appear before us in opensession was Alfred J. Van Tassell, who held the po-sition of Chief of the Economic Section of the Tech-nical Assistance Administration . Van Tassell hadentered Government service through the NationalResearch Project of the W.P.A., gone on to theWage-Hour Division of the Department of Laborand from there to the War Production Board andthe Senate Small Business Committee . His last gov-ernment post before moving to the United Nationswas Director of Reports Division of the War AssetsAdministration .

We had received evidence in executive sessionthat during this period Van Tassell was a Commu-nist. When we asked him about this evidence, heinvoked, extensively, his privilege against self-in-crimination. He was to be the first of 26 UnitedNations officials who pleaded the Fifth Amendmentwhen asked about the evidence of their participa-tion in the Communist conspiracy .

It should be pointed out that our Subcommitteehad employed no investigators . The evidence thatwe turned up was evidence that had been readilyavailable. As we were to learn later, it had been al-ready disseminated by the FBI through all the se-curity agencies .

Before the Grand Jury on April 1, Van Tassellhad also invoked his privilege under the FifthAmendment. He told our Subcommittee that he had,first orally and later in writing, given a full reportof his conduct to his superiors at the Secretariat,

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A. H. Feller and Byron Price (both American) andH. L. Keenleyside, (a Canadian) . Not only did VanTassell stay on his job after telling his superiorsabout his claim of privilege but, according to histestimony, Keenleyside had given him an expres-sion of support. Keenleyside continued as head ofUN Technical Assistance. Only after Van Tassellappeared before the Subcommittee in open sessiondid Secretary General Trygve Lie act against him .

Some of the more important United Nationsofficials who could not deny the Committee evidenceof their Communist membership were Joel Gordon,Chief of the Current Trade Analysis Section, Divi-sion of Economic Stability and Development ; JackSargent Harris, Senior Officer, Research Section,Division of Trusteeship of the Department of Trus-teeship and Information for Non Self-GoverningTerritories ; Irving Kaplan, Economic Affairs Officer,Division of Economic Stability and Development ;Frank Bancroft, Editor, Document Control Divi-sion ; Stanley Graze, Project Officer, Technical As-sistance Administration and Julia Older Bazer, Edi-tor of the Editorial Control Section of the Bureauof Documents. All of these people drew large salariesand were in positions to hire and direct the activitiesof scores of other individuals . The Subcommitteewas fortunate in receiving evidence about these par-ticular officials. It lacked the staff facilities to in-quire of others beyond the 26 it brought to the sur-face .

Probably the most important case during thisseries of hearings was Frank V. Coe. He was notassociated with the Secretariat but was the Secre-tary of International Monetary Fund, a specializedagency of the UN. Coe's salary when he was sub-

81

poenaed was $20,000. Coe had entered GovernmentService in the Treasury Department ; he was thefinancial Advisor to the Federal Security Admin-istrator ; he was Assistant Director of the Divisionof Monetary Research, National Advisory DefenseCouncil ; he was executive secretary of the JointWar Production Committee and Assistant to theEconomic Director of the Board of Economic War-fare ; he was Economic Administrator of the For-eign Economic Administration ; Secretary of theNational Advisory Council on International andMonetary Problems ; and Technical Secretary-Gen-eral of the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference .All were positions of tremendous administrativepower and great control over personnel .

Whittaker Chambers, we learned, had told theFBI in 1942 that Coe was involved in the Commu-nist underground. In 1945, Elizabeth Bentley cameforward and told the FBI that Frank Coe had beena Communist subordinate of hers .

The FBI had prepared thirteen security re-ports through the years, detailing this and otherevidence to the various Government agencies . Andyet Coe was able to climb higher and higher in theUnited States Government and then in the Inter-national Monetary Fund until December 2, 1952,when we questioned him and he testified

"MR. MORRIS. I see you were the technicalsecretary at the Bretton Woods Conference?"

"MR. COE. That is correct.""MR. MORRIS. Now, would you describe the

duties of the technical secretary at that time?""MR. COE. The duties of the technical secre-

tary were to see that papers were in order and readyfor the committees, that the meeting places for the

82

committees were arranged, and that all of the ad-ministrative work of the Conference proceeded."

"MR. MORRIS. Well now, during that periodof time, were you the member of an espionage ring,Mr. Coe?"

"MR. COE. Under the protection afforded meby the Fifth Amendment, Mr . Chairman, I respect-fully decline to answer that question."

"MR. MORRIS. Well, you will not tell this com-mittee whether you, while acting as the technicalsecretary of the Bretton Woods Conference, werethen a member of an espionage ring?"

"MR. COE. I think that is the same question .""MR. MORRIS . I just wanted to be sure that

you understood the question that you were refusingto answer ."

The next day, December 3, Coe was dismissed asSecretary of the Fund. The Committee had pro-duced no evidence that had not been available foryears to the appropriate Government agencies, whileCoe was receiving higher and more important as-signments. The FBI, Navy Intelligence and othersecurity agencies knew who the Communists were,but were helpless to do anything . A CongressionalCommittee made remedial action possible .

In three cases, the action of the Subcommitteewas later nullified by an UN Administrative Tri-bunal, which voted cash indemnifications to JackS. Harris, Julia Older Bazer and Frank Bancroft .

Harris during the war was an OSS Military In-telligence Officer in South Africa . At the time ofthe hearings he was Senior Officer of the ResearchSection in the UN Trusteeship Division . When calledby the Subcommittee, Harris refused to answerquestions about his Communist membership. Julia

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Older Bazer, an editor in the Document Control Di-vision, also refused, under the Fifth Amendment .

After our hearings, the three officials, togetherwith eight others, were dismissed by Secretary Gen-eral Trygve Lie. Subsequently, however, the UNAdministrative Tribunal ruled the Secretary Gen-eral's action illegal and awarded $40,000 to Harris,$27,500 to Mrs. Bazer and to Bancroft .

The Subcommittee elected to look into the cir-cumstances surrounding these awards. We learnedthat the Tribunal had based its award to Harris onthe following facts

"(a) Applicant's `outstanding professional com-petence' as consistently referred to in his annualreports ;

"(b) The very limited and specialized natureof his profession as anthropologist and Africanspecialist whereby the opportunities of further em-ployment are rare ;

"(c) The fact that he joined United Nations atthe special request of Mr. Ralph Bunche, Directorof the Trusteeship Division, thereby terminatinghis previous career ;

"(d) His age is now 41 years ;"(e) The fact that his review at the end of

five years' service was due on May 2, 1952, and, hadthe work of review been up to date, might have ex-pected a clear indication that his position was safe-guarded until May 2, 1957 ;

"(f) The adverse comment was made by theState Department in May 1950 but was not suchas to cause any action by the United Nations ;

"(g) His base salary was $11,690 per annum ."The Subcommittee recalled Harris to the stand .

Our rather precise questions elicited these answers84

"MR. MORRIS. Will you answer this question?Have you been a member of branch 1, third part ofthe Second Assembly District, New York City Com-munist Party?"

"MR. HARRIS . In answer to all similar ques-tions I have declined to answer on the groundsstated, and I continue with the same answer ."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you an organizer for theCommunist Party during this period?"

"MR. HARRIS. The same period, the same re-ply, Mr. Morris."

"MR. MORRIS . . . Were you a special assistantto the American Consul General at Lagos, Nigeria,in the years 1942 and 1943?"

"MR. HARRIS. I was, Mr . Morris. Whether itwas 1942 and 1943, I wouldn't recall, but sometimeduring that period."

"MR. MORRIS : Were you a Communist at thattime?"

"MR. HARRIS . Questions of this sort I havealready declined to answer, and I decline now on allgrounds mentioned."

"THE CHAIRMAN. Sustained on the FifthAmendment."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you from the years 1943to 1945 a special assistant to the American ConsulGeneral at Pretoria and Capetown in the Unionof South Africa?"

"MR. HARRIS. I have replied affirmatively onother occasions to this committee, and I do so now ."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you a Communist at thattime?"

"MR. HARRIS. To that question I have re-fused to reply ."

"MR. MORRIS. After leaving the OSS, at that85

time did you become assistant professor of socialsciences at the University of Chicago in 1946?"

"MR. HARRIS. That is true .""MR. MORRIS. Did you, on July 18, 1945, ap-

ply for a position in the Division of Dependent AreaAffairs, in the Office of Special Political Affairs(of the State Department, an office headed by AlgerHiss) ?"

"MR. HARRIS. My answer is the same, Mr.Morris. I decline to answer on the ground stated .

11

"MR. MORRIS. Are you a Communist Partymember now, Mr. Harris?"

"MR. HARRIS. I give exactly the same answerI just gave ."

Frank Bancroft was also recalled by the Sub-committee and the testimony taken during this ses-sion included the following :

"SENATOR WELKER. Now, from the year1943 until the year 1946, were you a member of theCommunist Party?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer, sir, onthe grounds that it might tend to incriminate ." . . .

"MR. MORRIS. Mr. Bancroft . . . Did you nothold in 1944, and through the subsequent perioddescribed by Senator Welker, Communist PartyCard No. 93158?"

"MR. BANCROFT. Sir, I decline to answer onthe ground that it might tend to incriminate me . . ."

"MR. MORRIS. Well, you say that and manyof the other witnesses say that, Mr . Bancroft, butthis Committee simply wants to know if you heldCommunist Party registration certificate No . 93158 ."

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer the86

question on the basis of my rights under the FifthAmendment."

"MR. MORRIS. Do you know Roy Hudson,who has been a member of the National Committeeof the Communist Party?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on thegrounds given."

"MR. MORRIS. Do you know Al Rothbart, anorganizer for the seamen's branch of the waterfrontsection of the Communist Party?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on thegrounds given ."

"MR. MORRIS. Mr. Bancroft, have you everresided at 1008 Webster Street, New Orleans, La.?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I have sir.""MR. MORRIS. Were Communist Party meet-

ings held at your home at that address?""MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on the

grounds given .""MR. MORRIS. Did David Carpenter, the sec-

retary and district organizer of district 20 of theCommunist Party of Texas, visit your residenceon March 20, 1945?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer, sir, onthe grounds given ."

Julia Older Bazer, the recipient of the $27,500award, gave the following responses to the Subcom-mittee

"MR. MORRIS. Mrs. Bazer, isn't it a fact thatyou stayed in Moscow from 1934 to 1937?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion . . ."

"MR. MORRIS. Isn't it true that you had Com-munist training during that period?"

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"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds ."

"MR. MORRIS. Isn't it a fact that while youwere in Moscow you resided with Anna LouiseStrong, roomed with Anna Louise Strong?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds

"MR. MORRIS. Have you not been a writerfor the Moscow Weekly News?"

"MRS. BAZER. Same answer .""MR. MORRIS. Did you take an oath at the

time you were an employee of the United StatesGovernment that you were not a member of an or-ganization that advocated the overthrow of theUnited States government by force and violence?"

"MRS. BAZER. May I confer with my coun-sel?"

"SENATOR JENNER. You may.""MRS. BAJER. I refuse to answer that ques-

tion under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment .""MR. MORRIS . Isn't it a fact, Mrs. Bazer, that

you became employed as the public-relations di-rector of the Russian War Relief at 11 East 30thStreet, New York City, in November 1943, and heldthat position through June of 1944?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds ."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you not the managingeditor of the publication called the American Re-view o f the Soviet Union which was a publicationof 'the American-Russian Institute during 1944 and1945 ?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds."

88

"MR. MORRIS. Did you marry a Dr. NathanHelfgott." . . .

"MRS. BAZER. In 1947 . . . That is correct.""MR. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was not

Dr. Helfgott the doctor for the Soviet Embassy inWashington?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds

"MR. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was notDr. Helfgott a member at large of the CommunistParty over a long period of time prior to his deathon February 20, 1948?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion." . . .

"MR. MORRIS. Did you apply for employmentwith the Soviet Embassy in 1946?

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds ."

"MR. MORRIS . Did you ever work for theSoviet Embassy in 1946?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds ."

"MR. MORRIS. Mrs. Bazer, did you notify theSecretary General on December 4, 1952, that youwere not and never had been a member of the Com-munist Party?"

"MRS. BAZER. I must refuse to answer thatquestion on the same grounds ."

The U. S. delegation to the UN protested thegranting of these three awards as well as the othereight totaling in all $179,120. But it was to no avail .The awards were nevertheless granted .

Here was a Communist victory accomplishedwith the sanction of free delegations. The decisionestablished, in effect, that even if UN authorities

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discovered secret Kremlin agents in their employ,they could do nothing about it. Let it be remem-bered that these were not Soviet-appointed officials,but part of the U .S. quota .

Trygve Lie knew they were Communists andacknowledged that some of them were giving himplenty of trouble. He had appointed a Special Ad-visory Commission to rule on their invocation ofthe Fifth Amendment, and was advised that theirposition was inconsistent with their positions oftrust. Lie thereupon discharged them. But from thatpoint on the Communists had little effective opposi-tion on the real merits of the case, and proceededto score a series of legal victories .

One of the more important witnesses to testifyat our series of hearings on subversion in the UnitedNations was Whittaker Chambers. I visited him athis farm in Westminster during that fall and learnedfrom him that he had known David Zablodowsky,who was head of the Publications Division of the Sec-retariat. He also had had an experience with DavidWeintraub, Director of the Economic Stability andDevelopment Division of the Secretariat, and withIrving Kaplan, Weintraub's assistant . Accordingly,I asked Chambers to testify before us . He dutifullyagreed to be subpoenaed and come to New York onthe morning of October 23.

Chambers testified that in the late 1930's, inthe course of breaking with the Communist under-ground, he decided to establish a name and a real-life personality by taking employment with the U .S. Government . Otherwise he was simply Carl of theCommunist underground, who could have been dis-patched by the Soviet secret police without anyoneknowing of his demise .

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Chambers went on to testify that J . Peters, hissuperior in the espionage network, not knowing hisdesign, offered to help him with this employmentand sent him to the National Research Project ofthe WPA. Peters told Chambers that Weintrauband Kaplan, then co-directors of the National Re-search Project, were both secret Communists. Sowas Weintraub's sister, Rose. Chambers went tothe project, saw Kaplan, and got the desired job .Later, by way of corroborating Chambers' story,the Subcommittee asked Rose Alpher, Weintraub'ssister, if she were a Communist at the time . She in-voked the Fifth Amendment. Kaplan had alreadydone the same .

Later, we acquired evidence of Communistmembership with respect to three other assistantsof Weintraub . When subpoenaed, they invoked theirprivilege under the Fifth Amendment . The threewere Sidney Glassman, Marjorie Zap and HerbertS. Schimmel. We had no facilities to investigatefurther and brought to the surface only what wecould in the few weeks available to us .

As for David Zablodowsky, head of the Publi-cations Division, Chamber testified that, back in1930's, Zablodowsky had done some work for theSoviet underground . This fact was not denied byZablodowsky .

Another important division that was, accord-ing to our evidence, rather seriously infiltrated wasthe Technical Assistance Division under Keenley-side. In addition to Van Tassel, Herman Zap, a train-ing officer, and Stanley Graze, a project officer, in-voked their privilege under the Fifth Amendment . Iasked Graze : "Are you presently engaged in espion-age against the United States?" "Have you ever in

91

the past engaged in espionage against the UnitedStates?" He declined to answer both questions . Sig-nificantly enough, in 1950 Graze was one of SenatorMcCarthy's original 87 cases, all having been clearedby the Tydings Committee over minority protests .

After the hearings on December 2, 1952, werealized that we had to come to a temporary halt.Accordingly the Subcommittee drew up anotherunanimous report which it issued for the benefit ofthe new Senate .

This report read, in part :"The subcommittee sought to determine how it

was that so many officials of questionable loyaltyto the United States could be hired and charged tothe United States quota at the Secretariat . The sub-committee called as witnesses Carlisle Humelsine,Deputy Under Secretary of State in Charge of Se-curity, John D . Hickerson, Assistant Secretary ofState of U.N . Affairs, and Adrian S . Fisher, LegalAdviser for Department of State .

"These State Department officials testified that,although the United Nations was set up in 1946, theyknew of no arrangement undertaken by the StateDepartment prior to the autumn of 1949 to give tothe Secretary-General derogatory security infor-mation concerning United States citizens at theSecretariat . Late in 1949, in response to a requestfrom the Secretary-General, an informal agree-ment was worked out whereby officials of the Secre-tariat gave to the State Department, for securitychecks, a list of United States citizens working forthe Secretariat. Thereupon the State Departmentundertook to assemble such derogatory security in-formation as was available in the United StatesGovernment's files (but undertook no field investi-

92

gation), to have it evaluated by certain State De-partment officers (but not the Department's regu-lar Security Division evaluation officers) and orallyto communicate to unnamed officials of the UnitedNations a conclusion, arrived at by State Depart-ment officials on a basis determined within the De-partment, as to whether the Department desired toobject to the continued employment of any suchperson by the UN .

"A conclusion that the Department would soobject was communicated as an `Adverse' report .In no case was any distinction made, in reporting tothe United Nations, between persons concerningwhom there was no derogatory information, andthose concerning whom there was derogatory in-formation, but to whose continued employment bythe UN the State Department did not at thattime desire to object.

"In nine of the eighteen cases the State Depart-ment, belatedly, made adverse comments and theUnited Nations officials took no action until thesubcommittee hearings. In one case the State De-partment made no adverse comment until after theGrand Jury investigation ; and in two cases untilafter the officials had appeared before the Senatesubcommittee. In six UN Secretariat cases the StateDepartment made no adverse comment .

"This subcommittee feels that the evaluationmade by the State Department in the eight cases(i.e ., the six upon whom no adverse comment wasmade and the two whom comment was made onlyafter the appearance before the Senate Subcommit-tee) was so faulty and so delinquent from a securitystandpoint, as prima facie to justify, if not actuallyrequire, an interrogation to determine if it was the

93

result of any subversive influence . Accordingly, theState Department officials Messrs . Hickerson andHumelsine were asked to give the subcommitteethe names of the evaluating officials and other De-partment officers involved so it could interview themin connection with efforts to determine what fur-ther steps need be taken toward investigating thepossible influence of subversive forces in this con-nection. Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Humelsine refusedto name the State Department officers involved .They refused on the ground that the Secretary ofState had directed them to withhold the names . . . .

"For a period of approximately three years-between the time of the formation of the UnitedNations in 1946 and sometime in 1949-there wasno safeguard whatsoever, from the standpoint ofthe United States, against employment by theUnited Nations of United States citizens who weredisloyal to their country, or were actively engagedin espionage on behalf of some foreign power . . . .We are now confronted with the fact that duringthe years from 1946 to 1949 a number of Americannationals of doubtful loyalty have secured lodg-ment and tenure with the United Nations Organiza-tion. We are in no position to assess the injurywhich they may have dealt to American interestsand security during this period . . .

"When the United States Department of Statefinally took cognizance of the situation respectingpossible disloyalty of United States nationals em-ployed by the United Nations, it was fully at theinstance of the United Nations and not even par-tially as a result of any security officials within theState Department .

"The agreement then entered into between the94

State Department and the United Nations has beenvariously portrayed. Both oral evidence and writ-ten testimony before the subcommittee indicatesthat the State Department undertook to make acheck on persons whose names were submitted bythe United Nations as employees or prospective em-ployees thereof, and as a result of its check to makea report to the United Nations . . . .

"Even within the narrow limits of what theState Department undertook to do, it appears to thesubcommittee that the Department did not performin accordance with its commitment . The Depart-ment failed, over lengthy periods of time, to makeany reports with respect to certain employees of theUnited Nations, whose names had been submittedunder the agreement referred to, in spite of the facttfiat security reports on such employees were heavywith derogatory information . . .

"There is no evidence before us that the StateDepartment has taken any disciplinary actionagainst any of those who may have been guilty ofany errors of omission or commission in connectionwith this matter . . . "

One of the U.N. Security Officers once told meduring the hearings that they were surprised at theparticular individuals we surfaced . They had othersecurity cases, he said,. which they would havethought to be the "real" ones .

Considerably later, In 1961, the Senate InternalSecurity Subcommittee had another fortuitous lookat the makeup of the Secretariat . The occasion wasthe case of Povl Bang-Jensen, the internationalcivil servant who was found dead in New York in1959. He had been approached at the time of theHungarian revolt in 1956 by a cluster of Soviet of-

95

ficials who made an abortive attempt to defect tothe West .

The Subcommittee took the testimony of thewidow of Mr. Bang-Jensen, and this read

THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. BANG-JENSENMR. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge

respecting an approach made to your husband by anindividual member of the Soviet delegation to theUnited Nations or of the Secretariat respecting thedesire of one or more members of that delegationor of the Secretariat to defect to the West?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, in a general way Ido.

MR. SOURWINE. This knowledge comes toyou from communications made to you by yourhusband?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Oral communication .MR. SOURWINE. Yes.MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.MR. SOURWINE. You have no knowledge of

it except what he told you?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Only what he told me,

yes.MR. SOURWINE. And what was it that he

told you about this?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. He told me that there

were several members of the United Nations Secre-tariat who would like to defect . They were unwill-ing to do it through the normal channels becauseone of the bits of information which they told myhusband was that there was infiltration in the se-curity agencies of the U .S. Government, in the CIAand in the State Department, and that they wereunwilling to approach anyone in those particular

96

organizations. They asked my husband if he wouldtake this information for them to the President .

MR. SOURWINE. Of the United States?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Yes.MR. SOURWINE. Now, by "infiltration," did

you understand your husband to mean, or did hemake it clear that he meant Soviet infiltration?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, and they were will-ing to bring some evidence of that, and also evi-dence of some control of the 38th floor, which isthe administrative offices of the United Nations, byRussians when they were given asylum .

MR. SOURWINE. To be sure I understand this,your husband was approached by a single memberof the Soviet delegation or the U .N. Secretariat?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. The information camefrom an individual speaking on behalf of several .

MR. SOURWINE. Yes. Do you know if the in-dividual was, himself, one of the group who wishedto defect?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, yes .MR. SOURWINE. The presumption would

necessarily be that that was so .MRS. BANG-JENSEN. It is more than a pre-

sumption. I know that .MR. SOURWINE. Your husband said this to

you?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Yes.MR. SOURWINE. And this group of defectors,

through the intermediary who approached your hus-band, said that they had information respectingSoviet infiltration of security in the United Na-tions-

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. Not security in97

the United Nations, but the workings of the UnitedNations.

MR. SOURWINE. Respecting Soviet infiltra-tion to the 38th floor, which you say is the admini-strative floor?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.MR. SOURWINE. And respecting Soviet in-

filtration of agencies of the Government of theUnited States?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.MR. SOURWINE. Were those agencies speci-

fied ?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I understood that they

were the CIA and the State Department .MR. SOURWINE. Your husband told you this?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. And the reason

for the reluctance of the men who wanted to defect,to defect through the normal channels, was becausethere was this infiltration .

MR. SOURWINE. They were afraid that theirdesire to defect would become Soviet knowledge be-fore they had achieved safety and there would bereprisals ?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.MR. SOURWINE. And they offered, through

the intermediary who contacted your husband, tobring this information about this infiltration-bring it over and give it to the American authori-ties if their defection could be accomplished andthey could be promised safety?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. They did not giveit to my husband . My husband's role was only thatof an intermediary there .

MR. SOURWINE. He was only told they hadsuch information?

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MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes .MR. SOURWINE. Not what it was?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . No.'MR. SOURWINE . Not the nature of the in-

filtration?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . No.MR. SOURWINE. Did your husband assent to

their desire to have a contact directly to the Pres-ident of the United States?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. No. He felt that thatwould be impractical and not the way to do it, andhe gave the matter some thought and told them thathe would try to find some way in which he couldbring this information to the attention of the properAmerican authorities .

MR. SOURWINE. And did he find such a way?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. He did.MR. SOURWINE. Did he tell you about it?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. He gave this in-

formation to a friend who was a member of theU.S. mission to the United Nations .

MR. SOURWINE. Who was this man?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. It was Mr. James

Barco.MR. SOURWINE. B-a-r-c-o?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.MR. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Barco agree

to do with the information, if you know?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. My husband gave this

information to Mr. Barco orally, in the middle ofthe delegates' lounge at the United Nations . Heasked Mr. Barco to transmit it to the proper Ameri-can authorities-with one restriction, and that wasthat this information was not be put on paper inany form whatsoever .

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MR. SOUR WINE. Did Mr. Barco agree to this?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. He did. He said that

he would give this information to Mr. Lodge. Heasked my husband to go with him later that day togive the information to Mr. Lodge.*

My husband was reluctant to do it. He thoughtMr. Barco could transmit the information himself,and he didn't .

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband told you allthat?

MRS. BANG- JENSEN. Yes, he did .MR. SOURWINE. Did he tell you that he was

satisfied with Mr . Barco's proposal to give this in-formation to Mr. Lodge?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. He presumed Mr .Lodge, as a member of the Cabinet, would take itto the proper authorities.

MR. SOURWINE. As a member of the Cabinet?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Well, isn't he? I'm cor-

rect-I believe he is a member of the Cabinet . Isn'the?

MR. SOURWINE. I think the technical situa-tion is that he is not a member of the Cabinet ; hesits with them .

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Attends Cabinet meet-ings. Excuse me. But, in effect, he is very close to it .

MR. SOUR WINE. Do you know what Mr . Barcodid with this information?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I did not know at thetime. We had since heard that this information wasput in a memorandum and transmitted to the StateDepartment.

MR. SOURWINE. How did you hear this?*The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, then U .S. Ambassadorto the United Nations and head of the U.S. delegation .

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MRS. BANG-JENSEN. That we heard fromjournalists and from people in the United Nations .We did not hear it directly or from Mr . Barco .

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband heard thisand told you about it?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, he did. Yes .MR. SOURWINE. Did the defectors in fact

defect?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Pardon me?MR. SOURWINE. Did these prospective de-

fectors in fact defect?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. No.MR. SOURWINE. Do you know why not?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Well, I presume that

this effort which they made came to nothing, so itwas not possible for them .

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know what hap-pened to them, or any of them?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I know that one wentback to Russia, but I know no more than that abouthim.

MR. SOURWINE . Who was the one that wentback to Russia?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I don't know his name.MR. SOURWINE. But your husband told you

that one had gone back to Russia?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes .MR. SOURWINE . That indicates he knew the

name of at least one of the defectors ; did he not?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Of course he knew the

name of the man with whom he had talked.MR. SOURWINE . That was the man that went

back to Russia?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I believe he also knew

the names of the others, but he did not tell me the101

names, nor did I want to know.

THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MORRISIn the summer of 1958, Bang-Jensen also told

his story of the potential defectors to Judge Morris,whose account parallels that of Mrs . Bang-Jensenon all essential points .

Judge Morris said, in his statement of March15, 1960, to the subcommittee, that Bang-Jensenhad never identified the number of would-be de-fectors, but that he was convinced it was plural be-cause Bang-Jensen had spoken in one case about"the principal one ."

When the "principal defector" spoke of Sovietcontrol over the 38th floor and Soviet infiltrationin American intelligence, Bang-Jensen was at firstskeptical . The defector, or defectors, finally con-vinced him by showing him intercepts of three codedmessages coming through from the Soviets to the38th floor.

On November 20, 1956, Bang-Jensen discussedthe matter with Mr. James Barco, counselor of theAmerican delegation, whom he had come to knowwell in consequence of his service as secretary ofthe Palestine Conciliation Commission .

He asked Mr. Barco's assistance in setting upa meeting with Allen Dulles . According to JudgeMorris' account, Bang-Jensen specifically requestedthat Mr. Barco convey his request orally and thatnone of the information be committed to paper .

Bang-Jensen further informed Judge Morristhat, all told, he met with Mr . Barco eight times'from November 20, 1956, to June 8, 1957, in aneffort to arrange the meeting with Allen Dulles-but that no word ever came back and that the meet-

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ing was never arranged.Judge Morris reported that he had met with

Mr. Barco on August 18, 1958, in an effort to checkout this information. Mr. Barco, in the course ofthis conversation, apparently indicated that he hadreceived some information from Bang-Jensen cor-responding with the information that Bang-Jensenhad later given Judge Morris . He also agreed thatthere had been a number of meetings and that hewould not challenge the figure eight .

Here was evidence that the guiding hand of theproposed merger was actually under Soviet controlat the time of the Hungarian suppression . Yet thissignificant evidence did not even slow up the plan-ners in their mad rush to turn all military powerover to these people at the helm of the instrumentof merger.

I have been urging responsible people in Wash-ington that one of the most elemental preconditionsof this "synthesis" as U Thant calls it, would be athorough investigation of the extent of Communistinfiltration into the control tower itself, the Secre-tariat. On the record, it has been substantial .

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XVI HOW CAN DISARMAMENTBE ACHIEVED

It will be recalled that in his account of theRostow Memorandum, Willard Edwards points outthat disarmament is to be pursued even without aformal agreement.

"Any idea of the United States contemplatinga `first strike' is ruled out. Planning in that di-rection is not relevant since the United Statesdoes not plan to initiate a nuclear attack onCommunist nations. Military men assailed thesection as against all sound principles of warfor which planning against all contingencies isessential ."Despite all rebuffs to date, strenuous effortsshould be continued to get an agreement onlimited arms control, the policy paper recom-mends. It is suggested that the United Statesmight advance a program not requiring formalnegotiations ."There is good reason to believe that we are, in-

deed, beginning to disarm unilaterally. We are with-drawing our B-47s from Europe. We have dis-mantled our missile bases in Turkey. We have with-drawn our B-52s from Italy and England .

Let the U.S. News and World Report of August5, 1963 speak on this

WHERE U.S. HAS CUT BACKNUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEM

Radical cutbacks, as a result, have been put104

into effect where nuclear weapons systems are con-cerned. What the record shows

B.47 bomber. Already cut back from 1,100 to650. Will be down to 300 by next summer, entirelyabandoned by 1966. Power of the B-47 bomb load ismore than 10 megatons-that is, equal to more than10 million tons of TNT .

B-52 bomber. Production was halted despitecongressional desire to continue and the operationalfleet was frozen at 630 planes . Some models will bescrapped inside five years ; other presumably canbe kept flying a few years after that. In the latestmodel, the H series, the B-52 will carry more than50 megatons over a 10,000-mile range .

B-58 bomber . The production line was shut downlast autumn-also over congressional , opposition-after about 80 planes were earmarked for combat-type duty. This plane carries a 15-megaton load atsupersonic speeds .

RS-70 bomber . Planned by the Air Force asbomber of the 1970s, but held up in developmentstage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and many mem-bers of Congress want to see it in production, butchances are slim .

Thor missile. Four bases in England, with 60medium-range missiles capable of reaching into Rus-sia, were ordered dismantled shortly after SovietRussia withdrew its missiles from Cuba .

Jupiter missile. Bases in Italy and Turkey, witha total of 45 missiles, were ordered abandoned . Theyhad just become operational at a cost -of 555 mil-lions.

Skybolt missiles . Designed to extend the life ofthe bomber force well into the 1970s, this projectwas killed, although Britain, which was to share

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the missile, protested strongly .Nike-Zeus "missile killer ." Army requests to

put this antimissile missile around U .S. cities wererefused, over strong protests from Gen . MaxwellD. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The project has been scrapped in the search for asubstitute .

Military satellites . The Midas "spy satellite"was killed after a decision that 15 extra minutes'warning of missile attack was not worth the millionsstill required to perfect it. Numerous other militaryspace projects have been abandoned or delayed .

Navy carriers. Signs point to a cut of as muchas one third in the Navy's fleet of 15 attack carriers .Construction is being delayed on an additional newcarrier authorized by Congress last year .

Overseas bases. Flying bases in England, Mor-occo, Spain, France, Guam and elsewhere have beenor will be shut down. Prospects are for further with-drawals from overseas, possibly involving one of thetwo Army divisions in Korea and some 50,000 menin Europe.

Atomic production . The aim is to shut downhalf of the nation's 14 major plants manufacturingnuclear materials for weapons . The Administrationfeels that the present stockpile is bigger than anydemand it can foresee .

Nuclear-test ban . The U.S. alone took the initia-tive in suspending atmospheric tests in June as evi-dence of good faith before formal test-ban talkswith Russia. Military requests to continue testingwere set aside .

VIEWS OF MILITARY LEADERS-WORRIES ABOUT FUTURE

What does this add up to?106

Testimony released after closed-door hearingsof Congress tells one part of the story. Worry aboutthe future U.S. military position is being expressedon a scale not equaled in recent years.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff,challenged Secretary of Defense Robert S . McNa-mara on the new strategy. He disclosed also thathe had appealed directly to Mr . Kennedy-to noavail-after almost 5 billions was cut from the orig-inal Air Force budget .

Service rivalries were set aside by the JointChiefs of Staff in opposing cuts by the Administra-tion's top civilians in the Pentagon .

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, toldCongress that he had recommended continuing boththe Air Force's RS-70 and the Skybolt. He was not"horse trading" with the Air Force in giving thissupport, he said. These were "purely military judg-ments."

Adm. George W. Anderson, then Chief of NavalOperations, supported Air Force programs and theArmy's Nike-Zeus. He favored extending the lifeof bombers, he explained, because of doubts aboutthe reliability of missiles.

It was General LeMay who came forward withthe most emphasis . He disclosed that the budgetas sent to Congress had been shorn by the Admini-stration of 321 million dollars sought for 100 moreMinuteman missiles, 543 millions for the RS-70 and454 millions for the Skybolt.

This exchange then took place before the HouseSubcommittee on Defense Department Appropria-tions

Representative Gerald R. Ford (Rep.), of Mich-igan : "With the decision on the RS-70 and with the

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decision on Skybolt, with the decision in the Minute-man area as you look down the road, General Le-May, to 1968 and years thereafter, do you feel ourstrategic posture will be as strong, relatively speak-ing, as it is today?"

General LeMay : "You have to visualize whatthe threat is going to be at that time. At this mo-ment, I would say no, and that is what worries me .. . . You cannot buy back time, Mr. Ford."

Representative Ford "Do you accept the phil-osophy that mutual deterrence or nuclear stalemateis inevitable?"

General LeMay : "No, I do not accept thatphilosophy at all.

"I think it is a dangerous philosophy to say :Well, a stalemate is going to exist, we cannot doanything about it ; therefore we do nothing . If weaccept mutual deterrence, this will, I think, inevit-ably lead to defeat . . . ."

Retired Admiral Chester Ward, former JudgeAdvocate General of the United States Navy wasmore emphatic in his speech of April 8, 1963 beforethe Hawaii Foundation for American Freedoms inHonolulu. He said

"We are in much more danger this year thanwe were in Cuba last year because of the greaterinterval since the Soviets first broke the test banin September of 1961. They began preparing theCuban adventure early last year. They had not thenhad time to completely rework their nuclear stock-piles and to manufacture their new warheads withthe more efficient techniques . This year we're gettingfurther and further from the original developmentof their new efficiency, so they now have not only

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these more powerful weapons, but many more ofthem. In this connection, we need to know howwe're being fooled on the "numbers racket" and onthe firepower aspects of nuclear weapons. Under theguise of "modernization" of our defense we are cut-ting down, and even scrapping, our massive nuclearcapability. Consider the removal of the U .S. missilesfrom Turkey and Italy. You'll remember during theCuban crisis, Khrushchev said, "I'll pull these mis-siles out of Cuba if you pull yours out of Turkey andItaly." And the Administration immediately said,for domestic publication, in effect : "No deal, no deal,we don't make deals under pressure." The Admin-istration still denies that we made any such AGREE-MENTS. Nevertheless, as you know, we are nowpresently engaged in pulling those missiles out ofTurkey and out of Italy. Actually, this illustratesanother technique of avoiding telling absolute liesto deceive the people ; we don't make AGREE-MENTS any more, we engage in UNILATERIALACTION.

"The best illustration of the new technique ofsubstituting unilateral action for agreements, is inthe extended nuclear test ban negotiations presentlygoing on. These negotiations cover the de factodisarmament of the U .S. which is actually takingplace. In other words, after all these centuries some-body has finally discovered a useful purpose fordisarmament negotiations . They are wonderful coverfor de facto unilateral disarmament .

"Here is how it, works. We debate furiouslyand continuously on whether we will have seveninspections under a test ban, in Russia, or only two .We came down from 20 to ten to eight to seven .The Soviets three years ago said they'd grant one

109

or two, and they're still saying that. They withdrewthat for a while and re-instated it with great fan-fare. The honest American people tend to think thatif we are debating so vigorously the necessity forseven inspections instead of just two, that we cer-tainly wouldn't do anything dangerous in the wayof nuclear disarmament or actual disarmament.

"Actually, every time we pull one of those mis-siles out of Turkey we are cutting down our nuclearfirepower by a tremendous factor ; worse than that,we are now even withdrawing the B-47 bombersfrom Europe. Intermediate range bombers. Whenone says `intermediate range' bomber, it doesn'tsound nearly so impressive as `intercontinental'bombers. From published figures, however, a B-47can carry about 40 megatons of explosive power todump on the Soviets.

"How much does our most modern missilecarry? Minuteman was originally designed to carrysix-tenths of a megaton, just a little more than onehalf of a megaton . It's probably been stepped upnow, so it can carry perhaps one megaton and theyhope to increase it some day to two . Same with Po-laris. Polaris carried eight-tenths of a megaton ;they hope to build that also up to one megaton ormaybe two. But, they talk about replacing our SACbombers with Polaris, and Minuteman missiles .Every time you replace a B-52-a B-52 can carry60 megatons-with a Minuteman you lose 59 mega-tons, and "replace" it by one megaton. Now thedanger in all this, is that we are withdrawing, scrap-ping our massive nuclear strike capability. The rea-son for the Skybolt scrapping, of course, was notmerely to render prematurely obsolete the British

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Royal Air Force, with its 170 bombers. The primarytarget was the Strategic Air Command of theUnited States with its several thousand bombers .

"These U. S. SAC bombers worry Khrushchev .It was these bombers which actually saved our necksin the Cuban crisis. Once the U-2 photographs hadgiven the warning of the Soviet offensive missilesin Cuba, Strategic Air Command bombers went onairborne alert, or a so-called "slingshot alert," andwe were capable of delivering upon the Soviet Unionsomething like 30 kilo-megatons of destructivepower. Now a kilo-megaton is a thousand-millionton equivalent. Thirty-thousand million tons equiva-lent of destruction on Russia. Now you can begin tosee why it was that Khrushchev withdrew his mis-siles. This is why the only attack which will be madein the nuclear age is a surprise attack .

"Khrushchev pulled those missiles back, not be-cause he was afraid of the United States' `superiorpower,' not because of our `boldness' and our ap-parent `readiness to fight a nuclear war .' He pulledthem back simply because he didn't want 30 kilo-megatons of destruction-30 thousand million tonsof destruction rained on Russia . It would destroyRussia. In point of fact, even 20 kilo-megatonswould probably destroy 90% of the Russian popula-tion, all of its industry and military potential ."

Despite this unilateral disarmament (along thelines of the Rostow Memorandum) I know that in-dividual Senators are being given assurances byleaders of the State Department that they will notput our overall plan into effect without a formaltreaty to be submitted to the Senate for ratification .

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The legislation passed by Congress setting up theU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency soprovides.

Nevertheless, the Administration has a sub-stantial majority in the Senate, and an effort to ob-tain ratification would be accompanied by a surgingemotional backdrop. We are seeing this now (inAugust 1963) in connection with the campaign toget the Test Ban Treaty negotiated in Moscow byUnder-Secretary Averell Harriman ratified.

If the announcement should ever be made thatNikita Khrushchev is prepared to sign a specificdisarmament agreement, there will be diffused overthe whole world such an emotional outpouring ofoptimism that the pressures on individual Senatorsfor ratification will be enormous .

But let us look at the disarmament alreadyengaged in, and then at the two basic elements ofthe planned disarmament and the simultaneousbuild-up of an international peace force .

As we have shown, we are disarming, and Con-gress has nothing to say about it . The RS-70 bomberswhich the military leaders tried to put into produc-tion were amply supported by the Senate and theHouse of Representatives, but they were success-fully vetoed by the Secretary of Defense who con-tended they were not needed .

The fact of the matter is that the President ofthe United States, as Commander-in-Chief of allarmed forces, has the power to reduce forces-dras-tically, if so inclined. Without consulting Congress,President Truman built up a powerful U .S. Armythat marched under the banner of the United Na-tions and subsequently President Eisenhower dis-banded much of it, also without consulting Congress .

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The President is almost daily making decisions dis-banding a certain combat or service unit, activatingor inactivating National Guard divisions, or puttingunits of the fleet into mothballs . There is no practi-cable limit to this power .

With respect to the creation of an InternationalPeace Force, this has been done on at least three oc-casions without a treaty.

Here are the provisions of the United NationsCharter which make this possible under the existingU.N. treaty which, incidentally, is the law of theland, equal to our Constitution . Read carefully Ar-ticles 39 through 51 of the Charter

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THEPEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND

ACTS OF AGGRESSIONArticle 39-The Security Council shall deter-

mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breachof the peace, or act of aggression and shall makerecommendations, or decide what measures shall betaken in accordance with the provisions of Articles41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peaceand security .

Article 40-In order to prevent an aggravationof the situation, the Security Council may, beforemaking the recommendations or deciding upon themeasures provided for in Article 41, call upon theparties concerned to comply with such provisionalmeasures as it deems necessary or desirable . Suchprovisional measures shall be without prejudice tothe rights, claims, or position of the parties con-cerned. The Security Council shall duly take ac-

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count of failure to comply with such provisionalmeasures

Article 41-The Security Council may decidewhat measures not involving the use of armed forceare to be employed to give effect to its decisions,and it may call upon members of the United Na-tions to apply such measures. These may includecomplete or partial interruptions of economic rela-tions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,and other means of communication, and the sever-ance of diplomatic relations .

Article 42-Should the Security Council con-sider that measures provided for in Article 41 wouldbe inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate, itmay take such action by air, sea or land forces asmay be necessary to maintain or restore interna-tional peace and security . Such action may includedemonstrations, blockade, and other operations byair, sea or land forces of members of the UnitedNations.

Article 43-1 . All members of the United Na-tions, in order to contribute to the maintenance ofinternational peace and security, undertake to makeavailable to the Security Council, on its call and inaccordance with a special agreement or agreements,armed forces, assistance, and facilities, includingrights of passage, necessary for the purpose of main-taining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall governthe numbers and types of forces, their degree ofreadiness and general location, and the nature ofthe facilities and assistance to be provided .

3. The agreement or agreements shall be nevo-tiated as soon as possible on the initiative of theSecurity Council. They shall be concluded between

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the Security Council and groups of member statesand shall be subject to ratification by the signatorystates in accordance with their constitutional pro-cesses.

Article 44-When the Security Council has de-cided to use force it shall, before calling upon amember not represented on it to provide armedforces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed un-der Article 43, invite that member, if the memberso desires, to participate in the decisions of the Se-curity Council concerning the employment of con-tingents of that member's armed forces.

Article 45-In order to enable the United Na-tions to take urgent military measures, membersshall hold immediately available national air forcecontingents for combined international enforce-ment action. The strength and degree of readinessof these contingents and plans for their combinedaction shall be determined, within the limits laiddown in the special agreement or agreements re-ferred to in Article 43, by the Security Council withthe assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46-Plans for the application of armedforce shall be made by the Security Council withthe assistance of the Military Staff Committee .

Article 47-1. There shall be established a Mili-tary Staff Committee to advise and assist the Se-curity Council on all questions relating to the Se-curity Council's military requirements for the main-tenance of international peace and security, theemployment and command of forces placed at itsdisposal, the regulation of armaments, and possibledisarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consistof the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of

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the Security Council or their representatives . Anymember of the United Nations not permanentlyrepresented on the committee shall be invited bythe committee to be associated with it when the effi-cient discharge of the committee's responsibilitiesrequires the participation of that member in itswork.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be re-sponsible, under the Security Council, for the strate-gic direction of any armed forces placed at the dis-posal of the Security Council. Questions relating tothe command of such forces shall be worked outsubsequently .

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the auth-orization of the Security Council and after consul-tation with appropriate regional agencies, mayestablish regional subcommittees .

Article 48-1 . The action required to carry outthe decisions of the Security Council for the main-tenance of international peace and security shallbe taken by all the members of the United Nations,or by some of them, as the Security Council may de-termine .

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by themembers of the United Nations directly and throughtheir action in the appropriate international agenciesof which they are members.

Article 49-The members of the United Nationsshall join in affording mutual assistance in carry-ing out the measures decided upon by the SecurityCouncil.

Article 50-If preventive or enforcement meas-ures against any state are taken by the SecurityCouncil, any other state, whether a member of theUnited Nations .or not, which finds itself confronted

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with special economic problems arising from thecarrying out of those measures shall have the rightto consult the Security Council with regard to asolution of those problems .

Article 51-Nothing in the present chartershall impair the inherent right of individual orcollective self-defense, if an armed attack occursagainst a member of the organization, until theSecurity Council has taken the measures necessaryto maintain international peace and security . Meas-ures taken by members in the exercise of this rightof self-defense shall be immediately reported to theSecurity Council and shall not in any way affect theauthority and repsonsibility of the Security Coun-cil under the present charter to take at any timesuch action as it may deem necessary in order tomaintain or restore international peace and security .

At the time of the Korean War we moved anarmy under these provisions . Congress was neverasked to ratify that bloody war that was waged forfour years. The U.N. Army in Korea was a power-ful military force, and, while it operated under aUnited Nations that was then generally pro-West-ern in orientation, it can serve as a precedent foranother "Peace Force" doing battle in the yearsahead, without ratification by the Congress .

In 1962 U Thant, with the backing of theUnited States State Department, pressed two in-vasions into Katanga and made good use of "armedforces, assistance and facilities" supplied by theUnited States without ratification by the Congress .

In 1963 U Thant sent a force into Yemen tobolster up the Soviet-Nasser-supported regime ofAl-Salal against "attacks" by the pro-Western

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"royalists" as they are termed in U.N. circles.With these experiences in mind, when we read

the statements of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson open-ing the General Assembly meetings in New York,asking for a "strengthened peace-keeping force" wecan see this avenue being paved . In this way, the goalof an all-powerful military force may be approachedunder the existing U.N. Treaty already signed .Congress need never be consulted .

Obviously, what the people who are directingthe Secretariat have done has been to go beyond theCharter of the United Nations to convert the ideal-istic U.N. into an instrument of world governmentwithout authority. What they have done has neverbeen legally sanctioned. Listen to U Thant himselfon this subject before the Harvard Alumni Associa-tion on June 13, 1963 :

"There has been a tacit transition from the con-cept of collective security as set out in ChapterVII of the United Nations Charter, to a morerealistic idea of peace-keeping ."

This, of course, has been accomplished withoutratification of any kind by the Congress.

It is often forgotten that the United Nationswent into the Congo in the summer of 1960 at thespecific request of Patrice Lumumba, an outspokenKhrushchev sympathizer.

Let us pause here for a moment to look morecarefully at the Yemen adventure . The United Statesquickly recognized the new pro-Soviet regime afterit overthrew the "Royalists." U Thant sent a forceat once supporting the regime's control over thecountry. The New York Times of July 30, 1963 car-ried the following page one story :

WASHINGTON, July 29-"The Soviet Union118

is building a modern jet airport for Yemen . TheUnited States fears that the Russians are planningto use the airport as a stepping-stone to Africa .

"The project is part of an extensive Soviet cam-paign to develop access to Africa and to find a meansof hopping across that continent to reach Cuba byair.

"About 500 Soviet technicians are at work onthe Yemeni airport, which will have an 11,500-footrunway that can handle the largest four-engine So-viet jet aircraft .

"Although the project was requested by the newrepublican Government of Yemen, that barren Mid-dle Eastern country has little use for such a modernfacility.

"Washington is watching the project with con-cern. Analysts here believe the Soviet Union iscounting on the airport to provide access to EastAfrica, improve air connections with India and helpopen shorter routes across Africa to Latin America .

"The importance of African air routes to theSoviet Government was brought home to the Ken-nedy Administration during the Cuban missile crisislast fall.

"At that time Guinea refused to give the SovietUnion permission to land planes on her territoryen route to Cuba with personnel and supplies . Thisaction helped reinforce the United States navalblockade of Cuba .

"In the intervening months, Soviet diplomatshave been engaged in a major effort to extend So-viet air routes into Africa .

"Guinea, Algeria and Morocco have been underpressure to let the Soviet commercial airline, Aero-flot, land on flights to Havana . Ethiopia and Soma-

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lia have been urged to permit Soviet planes to landand proceed down the east coast of Africa .

"The Sudan, which now permits Soviet planesto land and fly westward, has been asked to let theplanes fly south from Khartoum. None of these coun-tries has yielded to Soviet demands .

Vital to Plans"Yemen is vital to Soviet plans because of her

location on the Red Sea opposite East Africa andabout 1,000 miles south of Cairo .

"As long ago as June 10, 1962, Izvestia, theSoviet Government newspaper, published a mapshowing a proposed Soviet air route from India toMadagascar via Yemen .

"Officials here also believe the Soviet Govern-ment could link its India route with its route intoEgypt and the Sudan if it could use Yemen . Yemencould also provide an alternate landing point to theSudan for a Soviet air route across Africa .

"The Soviet Government has been trying to getan air agreement with Yemen. The proposal wasturned down last year by the royalist Governmentbefore it was overthrown .

"Officials here assume that the new republicanGovernment will sign such an agreement when thenew airport is completed . The Soviet Union is pro-viding manpower to build the airport and it is be-lieved to be providing the funds from a $20,000,000development loan recently extended to Yemen ."

Earlier, the same newspaper carried this storyon June 16, 1963 :

"WASHINGTON,. June 15-The number of So-viet military technicians and instructors in Yemenis reported to have increased sharply in recent weeksto about 900 or 1000 . United States and other dip-

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lomatic sources agree on this estimate ."They also have received similar reports that

some of the Russians have flown combat missionsagainst rebellious royalist tribesmen, presumablyin Soviet aircraft brought to Yemen by the UnitedArab Republic.

"The Soviet personnel have been brought in bythe antimonarchist regime of President Abdullahal-Salal, apparently to support him and a UnitedArab Republic force of 28,000 troops against theroyalists.

"Most of the Russians are said to have arrivedsince March, when the United States persuaded theUnited Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia to agree to"disengage" from the Yemen civil war . United Na-tions observers are due in Yemen in the next fewdays to patrol the Saudi frontier against furtiveaid to the royalists. Simultaneously, Egyptian forcesare supposed to begin to withdraw .

60 Present in September"Last September, when President al-Salal de-

posed the Imam, Prince Mohamad Saif al-Islam al-Badr, there were about 60 Soviet technicians inYemen, the remnants of a group of 150 stationedthere in the monarchist days of 1961 . By April, thenumber of Russians was said to have increased to450. The number has doubled since then ."

How long will this basically illegal trend con-tinue? It is illegal because the United Nations Char-ter never was ratified as a framework for worldgovernment. In fact, when it was ratified in 1945,Secretary of State Edward Stettinius formally as-sured the Senate that it was specifically not worldgovernment that was involved .

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The syndicated columnist Edith Kermit Roose-velt in her column that appeared in The Wandererof January 10, 1963 put in one place the statementsthat are attributed to writers for several govern-ment-supported projects . She wrote :

WASHINGTON, D.C.-In an era of news man-agement the best way to learn about Governmentpolicy is at the think factories financed openly orsecretly by Government funds . Here university pro-fessors from all over the country receive grantswhich enable them to learn and then promote theGovernment line. Under the auspices of these "in-dependent, scientific research groups," studies andbooks are published to mold "mature" or "informedpublic opinion ."

A key think factory is the Institute for De-fense Analysis, 1666 Connecticut Avenue N .W. Sev-en-year-old IDA, a non-profit organization whosecontracts are solely with the Federal Government,was founded by a $500,000 grant from the FordFoundation. Its president is-not unexpectedly-Richard M. Bissel, former Deputy Director of theCentral Intelligence Agency .

One of IDA's announced goals is "to returnan Ambassador (particularly a young Ph .D. orgraduate student) to industrial and professionalcircles, inculcated with a view of the world's busi-ness gleaned at first hand ."

IDA presently operates under six contracts .Five for the Defense Department cover weaponssystems evaluation, research and engineering, com-munications techniques, operations research andtraining people in that field for the North AtlanticTreaty Alliance and support for the newly-formed

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Institute of Naval Studies . The sixth contract, withthe State Department, covers studies for the U .S.Disarmament Administration. It is in these IDAstudies that policy is spelled out . Here are somethemes to be promoted over the coming months

"Red China is to be pictured as the real threatin order to persuade the American people of thenecessity for peaceful co-existence with Soviet Rus-sia.

"The specter of China can be an asset in seek-ing military and political arrangements with theSoviets in Europe and, more signficantly, can permita relatively stable period of peaceful co-existence,"writes General "X" in Reactions To A Nuclear-Armed Communist China : Europe And The UnitedKingdom. In the same IDA Study Memorandum,September 15th, 1962, General "X" suggests thatthe United States compromise with Red China overthe fate of Quemoy and Matsu to enlarge what ispurposefully assumed to be "the existing fissure be-tween the Soviets and the Chinese."

The theme of unilateral disarmament is to bemade respectable. In A Proposal For A Ban On TheUse Of Nuclear Weapons, October 6th, 1961, Dr .Morton H. Halperin suggests that even if the Rus-sians don't disarm we should do so anyway .

"Some of these steps," says Dr . Halperin, "mightbe taken unilaterally either with the aim of induc-ing reciprocation or because they are valuable inthemselves independent of the Russian response."

In his IDA Study Memorandum, Arms Con-trol And Inadvertent War, March 10th, 1962, Dr .Halperin says that in arms-control agreements "Itmight be stressed that inspection was not absolutelynecessary" and that "the United States might, in

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fact, want to invite the Soviets to design the inspec-tion procedures if they seem to be interested inthem."

A man to watch for clues to policy is Dr . Lin-coln P. Bloomfield, formerly with the State Depart-ment's disarmament staff and now director of theArms Control Project at the Center for Interna-tional Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-ogy. In IDA Research Memorandum No . 3, ThePolitics Of Arms Control : Troika, Veto And In-ternational Institutions, October 6th, 1961, Dr.Bloomfield points out that "short of a major catas-trophe the difficulties in-obtaining widespread pub-lic approval and explicit Senate ratification of agenuine world government are obvious ."

How then can Federal Government plannersbypass the will of the American people and theirelected representatives? Through disarmament ne-gotiations .

In A World Effectively Controlled By TheUnited Nations, March 10th, 1962, Dr. Bloomfieldexplains that "without disarmament such a system(of world government) is probably unobtainable ."

And how can the American people be con-ditioned to accept the State Department plan toeliminate national armies and replace them with aUN police force?

"If it (world government) came about as a ser-ies of unnerving trips to or over the brink, it wouldcome about at any time," according to Dr. Bloom-field .

World government is to be presented to theAmerican people as the only answer to a war in whichthey would suffer unacceptable destruction or couldnot win .

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This may explain the President's pledge toKhrushchev not to liberate Cuba ; the sending ofAmerican strategic materials behind the Iron Cur-tain and the other "no-win" policies. As Dr. Bloom-field says : "If the Communist dynamic were greatlyabated, the West might lose whatever incentive ithas for world government."-(Copyright 1962 byEdith Kermit Roosevelt Syndicate .)

I have tried to obtain the original documentsmentioned by Miss Roosevelt . When I wrote the or-ganizations involved asking for them, the requestswere refused. In view of what these excerpts pro-fess to say, it would certainly seem appropriate fora Committee or a Subcommittee of the Senate ofthe United States or of the House of Representa-tives to subpoena these papers, and the authorsthereof, to determine if they are written with au-thorization of the Defense or State Departments .

One final word. When we see how over-ridinghave been the United Nations officials when theyhave had only those weapons given them by themember nations, can you imagine how high-handedand arrogant they would be with all the effectiveweapons in the world in their hands

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XVII THE STEP AHEAD

As this is written (August 24, 1963) tremendouspressure is being brought to bear on the highestpolicy level for a Test Ban Treaty. This pressurecampaign is very illuminating.

In 1958, the United States unilaterally stoppedtesting nuclear weapons. At that time, the UnitedStates was far ahead of the Soviets in nuclear ar-senals. That was a desirable situation, because weknow that weapons in our hands would be used toinsure peace .

But by our self-imposed cessation of testingnew nuclear weapons, we allowed the Soviets tocatch up in many respects . Dr. Edward Teller hasestimated that Khrushchev is ahead in some fieldsof nuclear explosives. At any rate, the action on ourpart in refraining from testing was disastrous asfar as our leadership in the field was concerned .

Khrushchev, being a Communist, not only didnot refrain from testing, but used our credulity asa fitting backdrop for secret preparations for a dra-matic series of almost fifty detonations, some ofgreat magnitude .

One would think that this devastating act offolly on our part would be a lesson for our leaderstoday. Apparently it is not.

Duane Thorin, a competent student of Sovietaffairs who served with the Navy for twenty-twoyears and who has recently turned his attention tothis problem of disarmament and test-ban agree-

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ments, wrote the July 1, 1963 Washington Reportof the American Security Council . Because this ar-ticle so concisely sets forth many of the elementsof this problem, I am quoting it herewith in its en-tirity. It is most revealing :

WASHINGTON REPORT"If we don't get an agreement . . . now, I wouldthink generally that the genie is out of thebottle and we will never get him back in."

-President J . F. Kennedy, May 8,1963"Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Mac-millan and I have agreed that high-level discus-sions will shortly begin in Moscow looking to-ward early agreement on a comprehensive testban treaty."

-President J. F. Kennedy, June 10, 1963Why are U. S. policy-makers now placing such

special emphasis on a test ban treaty-more thanmost other elements of their disarmament plans?None of the reasons usually given to the publicseem to explain the now-or-never attitude displayedby Mr. Kennedy. Neither do they justify the conces-sions which U . S. negotiators have offered and seemready to offer in Moscow, in their efforts to enticethe Soviets into immediate agreement . In fact, someof the more widely publicized reasons turn out to besimply promotional propaganda, rather than an ac-tual consideration in policy planning .

For example, one major theme of test banpropaganda has been the claim (now disproved)that continued testing would create great hazardsfrom radioactive fallout . However, in testimonygiven to the Senate Foreign Relations Committeeon March 11, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk dis-

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counted this factor as a primary consideration inour policy, except for its usefulness in promotingthe idea. Mr. Rusk said that the problem of radio-active Tallout was of "secondary importance, butnevertheless significant . . . in large part because ofreal or assumed dangers from fallout . . ." (empha-sis added), which he said has caused nuclear test-ing to become a "key political issue in a great manycountries."

Executive policy-makers are not interested ina test ban treaty primarily for any value which itmight have in itself. To them, it is a "confidence-building" measure ; that is, policy-makers see it asa first step along the road toward further objectiveswhich they have laid out for this Nation under thelabel of "disarmament" . President Kennedy refer-red to the test ban treaty as one of the "first-stepmeasures of arms control", in the June 10 addresswherein he announced the coming high-level ne-gotiations in Moscow. Secretary Rusk, in his March11 statement to the Senate Committee, called is a"necessary" first step. He explained as follows :

"What we need are arrangements on which con-fidence can be built as a matter wholly separatefrom the question of whether the Russians willtrust us or we can trust the Russians, becausethe very arrangements, themselves provide abasis for growing confidence ."This "confidence-building" function of a test

ban treaty in the overall plan for our Nation's dis-armament was set forth even more clearly by aU. S. participant in the Sixth Pugwash Conference(Moscow, Nov.-Dec., 1960) . Mr. Richard Leghornsaid at that meeting :

"Of overwhelming importance will be the com-128

pletion and rapid implementation of a treatybanning nuclear tests . This treaty will be ofmore value as a confidence-building measurethan as a measure of real disarmament . . . .Its successful completion is an absolute `must'for progress toward the disarmament treaty."Walter W. Rostow, chairman of the State De-

partment Policy Planning Council, also a participantin the 1960 Pugwash conference, endorsed and reaf-firmed the Leghorn idea on "confidence-building" .Thus were the Soviets informed as early as 1960 that,from the official U . S. viewpoint, the principle pur-pose of a test ban was to "build confidence" . Ameri-cans, meanwhile, long subjected to diverse propa-ganda on the "need" for a test ban for other reasons,are only now being gradually let in on the real pur-pose it is intended to serve . As to whose confidenceneeds "building"-in announcing unilateral suspen-sion of testing by the U . S. on June 10, President Ken-nedy said he was doing so to "make clear our goodfaith"; as if it were the U . S., rather than the U.S.-S.R., who has proved unworthy of trust.

Possibly to build confidence in the minds ofAmericans, Mr. Rusk and others have claimed that atest ban treaty now would be to the military advan-tage of the U . S., because it would arrest nuclearweapons development in both camps at their presentlevels. This claim presumes a present U . S. superior-ity which is not at all certain in several key elementsof strategic capability and which, according to U . S .weapons experts, cannot be made certain withoutfurther atmospheric testing. Opposition by militarychiefs to Mr. Kennedy's unilateral test suspension isreportedly due largely to this consideration . More-over, both Secretary Rusk (on March 11) and Presi-

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dent Kennedy (on June 10) have acknowledged thatthe Soviet Union cannot be relied upon to abide by atreaty, except insofar as it might be in their own in-terests to do so . As an offset to this recognized Sovietduplicity, Mr. Rusk said the treaty must be designedso that "the scope of any violation which might es-cape detection" 'could not be so extensive as to "sub sstantially affect the military balance ." Additionally,he noted that we should keep ourselves prepared toresume testing in short order (a feat of preparednesswhich Mr. Kennedy called "impossible of excution",in March of 1962) .

In view of the real purpose which U. S. policy-makers see for a treaty, could the U. S. public everbe confident that their own officials would tell themof any clandestine Soviet testing? Or would thoseofficials overlook such Soviet duplicity in order notto jeopardize the further goals which they have setfor us in the name of disarmament? Finally, is thereany basis for American confidence in that ultimatedisarmament goal?

Although U . S. policy spokesmen are generallyquite candid about their ultimate objectives in state-ments to the public, its most significant aspect is of-ten obscured by high-sounding talk of "world peace-peaceful coexistence and competition of differentsystems-solving the world's economic and socialproblems-etc." A relatively new theme appeared inMr. Kennedy's June 10 address wherein he said, "ifwe cannot now end our differences, at least we canhelp make the world safe for diversity ." At the 1960Pugwash confrence, Mr. Rostow spoke similarly ofmaking the world "safe for ideological differences ."(A rather preposterous notion when dealing with anideology dedicated to the extinction of diversity.)

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When the emotional appeals are put aside, theultimate goal may well be that expressed by Mr . Ros-tow in his book The United States in the WorldArena, in which he says

"It is a legitimate American national objectiveto see removed from all nations-including theUnited States-the rights to use substantial mil-itary force to pursue their own interests . Sincethis residual right is the right of national sover-eignty and the basis for the existence of an in-ternational arena of power, it is, therefore, anAmerican interest to see an end of nationhoodas it has been historically defined."This would seem to be borne out in the U . S,

proposal for "Complete and General Disarmament"(Sept., 1961) and further evidence is contained inRostow's closing statement to Soviet and other par-ticipants in the 1960 Pugwash conference . He said :

"The maximum objective is a new system of re-lations among states based on general and com-plete disarmament with strict international con-trol."If this grand conception is to come to life thereis need to create a clearly marked turning point. . . First, a completion of the test-ban negotia-tions which should build confidence and open theway to the step beyond ."I think we all understand now that the workdone in the United States on the short run is notdesigned to frustrate long run and more ambi-tious objectives ."I hope that the remarkable channel of commu-nications which the Pugwash movement hasopened will be kept open and rapidly enlarged .. . . I hope our working papers will flow steadily

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back and forth. Some problems we face can onlybe negotiated. But some of them require thatscientists work together not as negotiators butas professional colleagues .""The transition to disarmament and the worldof disarmament are, if I may use the phrase, aNew Frontier."This is a double jeopardy to Freedom's cause in

present U. S. policy. Our unilateral suspension oftesting, plus other self-imposed restraints, while try-ing to woo the Soviets into a test ban agreement,leaves the way open for them to gain a decisive ad-vantage in some key element of strategic power . Thealternate possibility-subordination of our Na-tional military power to an international authorityformed in coalition with the Communists-is but an-other route to the world-wide totalitarian systemprescribed by Karl Marx .

The way to peace between nations and humanfreedom within them is through the proper exerciseof national sovereignties, including military power .Only when there has been a clear return to that pre-mise in our policy planning will the American peoplehave any reason for confidence in the security oftheir Nation and their Freedom .

The press of August 4, 1963 carried the follow-ing story showing how correct Duane Thorin was inhis analysis

LONDON, Aug. 3-U Thant, Secretary Generalof the United Nations, arrived in London tonight onhis way to Moscow to witness the signing of thenuclear test ban treaty by the United States, Britainand the Soviet Union . He denied that he had a per-

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sonal disarmament plan to present ."I am going to Moscow at the invitation of the

U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the U .K.," he said. "I regardthe treaty as an important and symbolic improve-ment in international relationships, especially be-tween East and West .

"It also creates a very congenial atmosphere forfuture negotiations on other aspects of disarma-ment."

Mr. Thant added : "If I am given the opportunityat Monday afternoon's ceremony, I would like tomake some brief observations on the next steps to betaken by the big powers on nuclear disarmament."He declined to be more specific .

I ask the reader-isn't it all there? Walt W .Rostow, now our Chief Policy Planner attending thePugwash Conference in Moscow in December 1960,called for "First a completion of test-ban negotiationwhich should build confidence and open the way tothe step beyond ."

Then, Secretary Dean Rusk called, on March11, 1963, for the test-ban as "a necessary first step ."The Secretary of State told the Senate on that day,remember : "What we need are arrangements onwhich confidence can be built as a matter whollyseparate from the question of whether the Russianswill trust us or we can trust the Russians, becausethe very arrangements themselves provide a basisfor growing confidence ."

Finally, there is the policy of the United Statesitself, working for the dissolution of national armiesand the creation of an all-powerful world army andan international court of justice to which all nationsmust submit. It all fits the formula outlined in Walt

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W. Rostow's book "The United States in the WorldArena" which contains this remarkable statementin the summary : "it is, therefore, an Americaninterest to see an end of nationhood as it has beenhistorically defined ."

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XVIII THE HARVEST

Khrushchev's record is no better now that itever was. In the spring of 1961, President Kennedyand the Soviet Premier made a solemn agreement ona peaceful, neutral and independent Laos. Not onlyhave the Communists shattered this agreement, butthe details of new violations of the accord are break-ing into the newspapers alongside the glowing re-ports of optimism generated by the signing of thetest-ban treaty . The attitude of the State Depart-ment seems to be "Laos was last year's agreement ;this year it will be different."

Khrushchev and Soviet Ambassador AndreiGromyko gave President Kennedy personal assur-ances that no offensive missiles were being movedinto Cuba at the very moment that the lethal wea-pons were, in fact, being mounted and pointed to-ward our cities . This perfidy, perpetrated at the per-sonal level of the President himself, is not even beingmentioned today, although less than a year haspassed since the betrayal. When we reflect on it, thisand other betrayals of confidence seem actually tohave set in motion the present series of negotiations .

Meantime, Soviet espionage is actually more ex-tensive and more grievous than ever before . In viewof what they have been permitted to steal from usin the past, the conclusion about Khrushchev andhis assistants "mellowing" would seem extreme . YetI heard our Attorney General make the statement ontelevision last year .

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Only a few weeks ago, the evidence implicatingSwedish Air Force Colonel Stig Erik Wennerstromwith Nikita Khrushchev's espionage network madethe news. The work of this "Disarmament Official"has been devastating. Let this Associated Press dis-patch from Stockholm relate the extent of the Wen-nerstrom harvest

Stockholm, Sweden, July 14 (AP) "Sweden'sarmed forces have embarked on a massive programto close the defense gap caused by the betrayal ofmilitary secrets to the Soviet Union by Air ForceColonel Stig Erik Wennerstrom .

"There is an atmosphere of almost wartimeurgency at the Defense Ministry .

"Lights burn far into the night as army, navyand air force officers grapple with the task of re-pairing the probable loss of Sweden's entire defensestrategy to the Russians .

"Officers have been recalled from vacation andredeployment of army, navy and air force units mayalready be under way .

"Security services are working day and night toinvestigate other possible leaks in the military estab-lishment or the government .

Sweden Crippled"Everyone-the government, opposition parties,

defense staffs and the newspapers-agrees that Wen-nerstrom crippled Sweden . The tall, suave airmandiplomat has confessed that he gave military secretsto the Russians for 15 years.

"And during that period he had access to Swe-den's entire defense strategy. Defense sites andstrengths? Military codes? Key mobilization andcommunication plans? Wennerstrom knew all about

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these and more . He knew a lot about the North At-lantic Treaty Organization's defense plans and wea-pons. He visited NATO military installations. Hewas in frequent contact with Danish and Norwe-gian military men. He was friendly with many topWestern diplomats here .

"The armed forces are reported to be acting onthe assumption that Wennerstrom `gave away Swe-den' and that the Russians now know all about itsplans to repel a possible Soviet attack .

Acute Crisis"Stockholm's influential Expression-the larg-

est newspaper in Scandinavia-referred to `a timeof acute crisis for our defense' and said editorially .

`The Wennerstrom spying has in essential partsknocked out the Swedish defense. About this all re-ports agree. Hectic measures are being taken to re-pair, if possible, the damage caused .

`The armed forces face an immensely compli-cated and costly task. Fortifications, headquartersand battle stations, hangars, ship tunnels repairshops and storage depots have been built into graniteaccommodations at top-secret locations . Newspapershave reported there are 500 of these .

`Two deep tunnels have been carved out of amountain to accommodate destroyers, submarinesand other naval units. Plans have called for the en-tire navy to be provided with tunnels . These instal-lations cannot be moved even though their locationsmay now be precisely located by the Russians. Mustnew ones be built?

Major Redeployment`The Swedish Royal Air Force of 1,000 all-jet,

first-line planes is said by the Swedes to be the fourthlargest in the world after the U.S. Air Force, the So-

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viet Air Force and the British Royal Air Force . Theair force must now consider whether a major rede-ployment to new bases underground and on the sur-face is needed to maintain its combat effectiveness .

`For its oil supplies Sweden depends entirelyon imports. The safe storage of fuels is essential forits military preparedness. Oil and gasoline are storedin vast underground tanks in rock chambers andabandoned mines. Hidden pipelines link these to theberthing places of tankers and tank cars . It will takeyears and vast sums of money to relocate these .

`Military expenditures now take about one-fifth-of Sweden's national budget. According to some es-timates, it now must spend the equivalent of hun-dreds of millions of dollars more, and quickly, to re-pair the damage of the loss of defense secrets. News-papers predict taxes will be substantially increasedto pay the cost .

`Informed sources say Sweden probably willface vastly increased military research costs as aresult of the Wennerstrom case. Although Swedenis neutral and not a member of NATO, the Westernpowers for some time have quietly passed on to theSwedish armed forces important technical data ondefense matters. They also sold weapons to Sweden.The view here is that the West probably will haltsuch aid in view of uncertainty about Sweden's se-curity system .' "

The Soviet representatives (and their satellites)at the United Nations are committing espionage onan extensive scale . There is absolutely no abatementin their acts of perfidy . News reports regularly at-test to this. Yet our trust in Khrushchev increases,

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almost, it would seem, in proportion to the increaseof the betrayal rate.

Our "Disarmament" posture, reflecting as itdoes that we are again reposing our trust in ourenemy, makes the atmosphere far more conduciveto espionage and penetration into the policy-makinginstitutions of our nation. The record of World WarII when we were conclusively pressured to be alliesof the U.S .S.R. establishes this fact and the surveysmade by Congressional Committees have broughtthis out time and time again .(*)

Thus, while we disarm, and reach into the skyfor this fantastic merger with our dedicated enemy,committing ourselves to a minority position, Khrush-chev pounds on to his self-appointed destiny . The at-mosphere we are creating militates against a realisticdefense of our wonderful heritage .

Strength alone will save us .Substituting trust in Khrushchev for our own

strength is a short-cut to destruction--or, morelikely, to nuclear blackmail .(*)The following statement by J. Edgar Hoover appears onpage 491 of the Hearings before A Subcommittee of the Com-mittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-eighth Congress : "Taking full advantage of the freedomsthat exist in our open society, the Soviet Union continues tocarry out an espionage and intelligence attack against thiscountry on a scale unequaled in history . `Communism overGod. Russia over the world' is a statement attributed to So-viet Premier Khrushchev, at the 22d Congress of the SovietCommunist Party in October 1961. The statement accuratelydescribes the Soviet goal . world conquest . In the pursuit ofthis objective Communists nreach `peaceful coexistence' butthey continue to apply and carry out an espionage effort,characterized by treachery, deceit, and unlawful activities inan attempt to obtain every conceivable type of informationconcerning the security of this country ."

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APPENDIX

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT MORRIS BEFORETHE JOINT COMMITTEES-FOREIGN RELA-TIONS, ARMED SERVICES, AND JOINT ATOM-IC ENERGY 5 PM August 27, 1963 .POINT 1 :

The treaty before the Committees is expresslymade a first step toward "an agreement on generaland complete disarmament." The preamble makesthe point that the "principal aim" of the signatoriesin entering into the accord is "disarmament ." Fur-thermore, the outline of the treaty that we have puton the table at Geneva to achieve disarmament spe-cifically provides that this test ban treaty become an"annex" of that treaty when signed. Our leadershave told the Senate that indeed it is a "first step"toward disarmament .

Thus not only is this treaty indissoluble fromthe disarmament treaty, by its own preamble, bythe express wording of the disarmament treaty andby the declaration of responsible leaders, but it isto be a mere "annex" to the later accord.

Those military leaders, notably the Joint Chiefsof Staff, who have reconciled the treaty to nationalsecurity, have done so on the express condition thatvigorous implementation of safeguards will be main-tained by the defense department including "aggres-sive and comprehensive underground testing to thelimit of the treaty." Other military leaders could noteven make this reconciliation .

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These safeguards go beyond, in urgency, anypresent posture of the Department of Defense andare obviously prompted by the testimony of suchleaders.

As Norman Cousins has pointed out in a recentletter to the editor of The New York Times, thismood is completely out of the spirit of the test bantreaty. It is directly antithetical to the disarmamenttreaty to which this treaty is to be an "annex" . Ne-gotiations will soon be continued on disarmament .This sense of urgency will almost necessarily becomea casualty of the spirit of the U . N. as we strain, aswe have time and time in the past, to "show our goodfaith."

A brief look at our treaty outline which we lavealready put on the table for negotiation at Genevawill reveal that we have already offered to the So-viets the dismantling, not only of testing facilitiesand monitoring stations but our whole defense es-tablishment, in its entirety, with all its personnel, in-cluding the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves. Underthis treaty we have expressly offered to build up anall powerful United Nations army, with ourselveshaving only those forces necessary for "internalpolicing" and for supply to the U. N. force that willcome into being three years after we sign that treaty .

The language of the Outline of the treaty readsREDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES

To the end that upon completion of Stage IIIthey would have at their disposal only thoseforces and organizational arrangements neces-sary for agreed forces to maintain internal or-der and protect the personal security of citizensand that they would be capable of providingagreed manpower for the United Nations Peace

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Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete,the reduction of their force levels, disbandsystems of reserve forces, cause to be disbandedorganizational arrangements comprising andsupporting their national military establish-ment, and terminate the employment of civilianpersonnel associated with the foregoing.It will be seen from this that not only will we

not have a monitoring system or testing facilitiesbut not even a reserve or as much as a Navy league .The high resolve to maintain safeguards now ex-pressed will certainly wane as we make progress, asour leaders are now so confident, toward this dis-armament accord .

On this point we should read Secretary Rusk'sfirm resolve of last year when he said

"In President Kennedy's words of March 2,`We know enough now about broken negotia-tions, secret preparations, and the advantagesgained from a long test series never to offeragain an uninspected moratorium.' The samecould equally be said about an unverified treatyobligation such as the U .S.S.R. is now propos-ing. We do not intend to be caught again as wewere in the autumn of 1961, and there is noreason why we should have to be caught againby a unilateral Soviet decision to resume nuclearweapon tests . This is a risk to national and in-ternational security which the United Statescannot and will not take. A test ban, or any dis-armament measure, will be acceptable to usonly when it is accompanied by adequate meas-ures of verification."

POINT 2 :The presidential transmission of this treaty

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dated August 8 read : "This treaty is the whole agree-ment . . . . The treaty speaks for itself" .

Ambiguities have already been uncovered . Thewords "any other nuclear explosion" ("other" thannuclear test explosions) on their face clearly includedetonations undertaken for self defense, to aid ourallies or for "peaceful uses of the Atom ." The uni-lateral statement of Undersecretary George Ballcannot put any other interpretation on the clearmeaning of the words . There is nothing in interna-tional law to support a contention that the rule ofconstruction of a treaty is any different in this re-spect than the rule of construction of a statute orany legal document, namely, if the document is clearon its face, recourse may not be had to any othersource. If, as the President expressly said in trans-mission, the treaty "speaks for itself", there willhave to be an amendment, if we want the interpreta-tion of the State Department to prevail . Otherwisethis is a trap and incontrovertibly does what theSoviets have been trying to do for years-keep usfrom using modern weapons to defend ourselvesand our lives.

What the State Department has done has beento invoke previous drafts of the treaty including So-viet rejections to come to the conclusion-not possi-bly inferable from the treaty "itself"-that detona-tions for self defense or for defense of our Allies arenot proscribed but that explosions for peaceful con-struction are. Obviously the State Department is notallowing the Treaty to speak for itself as the Presi-dent says. If the drafts and the minutes of the nego-tiations give the answers the Senate desperatelyneeds, then all the minutes and all the drafts andall the correspondence including that between heads

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of State (Khrushchev and our President) on theinstant treaty, and the treaty of which this is to bean "annex", should be made available to the Senatebefore ratification .POINT 3 :

From the State Department interpretation that"Project Plowshares" and the "Peaceful use of theAtom" are now to be shelved in so far as they in-volve nuclear explosions, unless approved by Khrush-chev, we have reached a most unscientific impasse .Many people had hoped that nuclear forces were tobe harnessed for peaceful purposes . Certainly thisportion of the treaty should be amended .POINT 4 :

The treaty could not prevent the Soviets fromtesting, even in the atmosphere, if any one of itssatellites including Cuba and Red China stay out-side its framework . The dispute between the Rus-sians and the Red Chinese is a struggle difficult toanalyze that could be solved tomorrow as was the"struggle" between Tito and Stalin. The Soviet coulduse the sovereignty of any one of its satellites as acover for the illegal testing and no one could do any-thing about it. Moreover, any one of the Satellitescould abrogate, if need be, after signing and givethem their cover.

Despite the hostile talk between the Red Chineseand the Russians, it should be remembered that itwas the Russians who gave the Chinese their nuclearplants and reactors, in the first place .POINT 5

Despite past assurances, there is nothing in thetreaty to prevent the Soviets, as they have in thepast, from translating the scientific information thatthey gained from their spectacular high yield tests

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into lethal weapons in the months ahead and thenabrogating as their constitution provides, at will,and leaving us at their mercy. We could not evenexpeditiously abrogate but would have to wait 90days to withdraw as Mr. Harriman has said. Abro-gation on our part would involve action not onlyby the President, but both Houses of Congress .

The appropriate Committee of the Senate-theJudiciary Committee through its Internal SecuritySubcommittee-has previously set forth the Sovietrecord on previous treaties . May I offer it for therecord at this point. The pattern of violations is in-exorable. It leads to only one workable conclusion .The Soviets will test again when it suits their pur-pose. In fairness to them they do not break thetreaties. They use them as they say they will . "Trea-ties, like pie crusts, are made only to be broken." Itis our foolish attribution to them of our codes, ourstandards, and our respect for the plighted wordthat justifies the word "broken" in this connection .The Soviet code is clear-that which furthers Sovietpurpose is moral, legal, and just. Any other foolishassumption flies in the face of the record and the na-ture of this enemy . When Andrei Vishinsky entereda debate in New York before he died he said : "Laws,what laws? We make our own laws ."POINT 7 :

There is a feeling frequently expressed, as it waslast week by former President Harry S. Truman,that the Soviets really cannot be trusted . Here is howhe was quoted ("The idea is to get a start on thosethings and you can always amend them") . You can-not amend them. The treaty expressly says that the"Original Parties" including the U.S.S.R. can vetoany amendment.

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Moreover, Article Six of our Constitution ex-pressly makes this treaty equal to our very Consti-tution. Thus, it cannot be casual as the former Presi-dent suggests . Has anyone thought through the sig-nificance of the statement that "the principal aim"of the signatories is "Disarmament"? Even thoughit appears in the Preamble, the act of ratification un-der the Constitution gives it extraordinary legalstature. Does it thereby provide authority for legalaction not now authorized by the Constitution? Doesit perhaps set the stage for Executive action by thePresident to implement this Congressional grant ofauthority covering "disarmament?"POINT 8 :

There are to be negotiations after this on a non-aggression pact. It has been said that this treatystands by itself. Demonstrably it does not. The StateDepartment is drawing on outside sources to inter-pret it. Will the minutes and the drafts that the StateDepartment uses to interpret this treaty show thatthere is no connection? Not only would a nonaggres-sion pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pactfreeze us from opposing Communism in the War-saw Pact countries but it would do the same in anycountry such as Cuba, British Guiana, Brazil, thatmight wish to join the Warsaw Pact. What does thisdo to the Monroe Doctrine, the O .A.S. treaties? Itwould make dejure, the present de facto impasse .The Senate should write in an express reservationon this point .POINT 9 :

These are serious commitments made by theratification of this treaty. It would seem that sincethe national election is next year, these things shouldbecome the issues so that the people of the United

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States can speak without being committed irrevo-cably. If there is to be another administration nextyear, why commit it now to these serious risks? Letthe people, the fount of sovereignty speak .POINT 10 :

We always hear, "But this time it is different."Here is what Khrushchev said to the Red Chinese inanswering their charges on July 14, 1963 :

"We (the Soviets) fully stand for the destruc-tion of imperialism and capitalism . We not onlybelieve in the inevitable destruction of capitalismbut are doing everything for this to be accom-plished as soon as possible."

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ROBERT MORRIS

Counsel and Chief Counsel U. S. Senate InternalSecurity Subcommittee 1951-1953 ; 1956-1958.

Counsel U. S . Senate Foreign Relations Committee1950 .

Advisor U. S. Senate Rules Committee 1954.

Officer-in-Charge Advance Psychological WarfareSection of CINCPAC on Guam 1945 .

Officer-in-Charge Soviet Counterintelligence ThirdNaval District 1941-1943 : Officer-in-Charge Coun-terintelligence Third Naval District 1945.

Justice Municipal Court New York City 1953-1956 .

President of University of Dallas 1960-1962 .

Author of "No Wonder We Are Losing", Bookmailer,New York, 1958.

Presently columnist and civil liberties lawyer .

Member of the Texas, New York and United StatesSupreme Court bars .

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