Disaster Risk Assessment Report - Nelson Mandela …€¦ · Disaster Risk Assessment Report Final...

Disaster Risk Assessment Report

Final Report

Report Prepared for

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality

Disaster Management Centre

Project No 404277

March 2010

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Draft Report Page i

VANL/STOM/HINA 404277_NMBM_DRA_Report_20100330f_Final February 2010

Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality PO Box 579

Port Elizabeth

6000

SRK Project Number 404277

SRK Consulting (Pretoria) Suite 47, Rynlal Building 320 The Hillside, Lynnwood, 0081, Pretoria South Africa P.O. Box 35290 Menlo Park 0102 South Africa Tel: +27 (0)12 361 9821 Fax: +27 (0)12 361 9912

SRK Consulting (Port Elizabeth) Ground Floor Bay Suites 1a Humewood Road Humerail PO Box 21842 Port Elizabeth 6000 South Africa Tel: +27 (0) 41 509 4800 Fax: +27 (0) 41 509 4850

Contact:

Matt Braune, Pr Eng, Partner

[email protected]

SRK Pretoria

March 2010

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Draft Report Page ii


Compiled by: Reviewed by: Theuns van der Linde (MIRMSA, MDMISA) Matt Braune Pr.Eng Scientist Partner

Inputs by: Martin Stols GISc Tg (SA)

Andre Hindley BLC LLB, CMC, MPMISA

External Reviewer: Maryna Storie PrGISc, MDMISA, SSAG

The results contained in this report represent the findings of the high-level Disaster Risk Assessment that was conducted for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality during 2009/2010. These results are aimed at informing Disaster Risk Management

activities, and should not be used or applied in other applications.

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... xii Summary of principal objectives ................................................................................................... xii Outline of work program relevant to this report ............................................................................ xii Overview of Results of the Disaster Risk Assessment ............................................................... xiii Conclusions and Findings ............................................................................................................ xiv

Recommendations ........................................................................................................................ xv

1 Introduction ...................................... ..................................................................... 1

2 Background and Brief .............................. ............................................................ 1

2.1 Geographical Setting ............................................................................................................. 1

2.2 The context of Disaster Risk Management in the NMBM ..................................................... 2

2.3 Background and objectives ................................................................................................... 2

2.4 Requirements in terms of Disaster Risk Assessments ......................................................... 3

3 Work Program ...................................... ................................................................. 5

3.1 Work program relevant to this report .................................................................................... 5

3.2 Main Project team .................................................................................................................. 6

4 Disaster Risk Assessment Methodology .............. .............................................. 7

4.1 Spatial and Non-Spatial Data Collection ............................................................................... 7

4.2 Setting of Standards & Guidelines for DRA .......................................................................... 8

4.3 Preparation of Base maps, Data collection sheets and Database for Key Stakeholder Consultations ......................................................................................................................... 8

4.4 Key Stakeholder Consultation (HAZMAT Investigation) ....................................................... 9

4.5 Disaster Management Centre (DMC) arrange consultation workshops ............................. 11

4.6 Creation of Maps and Data Collection Sheets for Workshops ........................................... 12

4.7 Capacity Building and Community Participation workshops .............................................. 12

4.8 Capturing of Data in GIS and Risk Modelling ..................................................................... 13

4.9 Creation of HVMCR Maps and Disaster Risk Profiles ........................................................ 14

4.10 Recommendations on Risk Reduction activities ................................................................. 14

4.11 Compilation of Draft Report and Workshop ........................................................................ 14

4.12 Report Review Process ....................................................................................................... 14

4.13 Updating and Delivery of Final Report ................................................................................ 14

5 Risk Model and Variables .......................... ......................................................... 15

5.1 The Disaster Risk Formula .................................................................................................. 15

5.2 Concepts and Model Variables ........................................................................................... 16

5.3 The Use of GIS .................................................................................................................... 18 5.3.1 What is a GIS ........................................................................................................................ 18 5.3.2 Software ................................................................................................................................ 19 5.3.3 Coordinate System ................................................................................................................ 19 5.3.4 Data directory structure ......................................................................................................... 19

5.4 Hazard Severity Indices and Mapping ................................................................................ 20 5.4.1 Hazards Description and Categories .................................................................................... 20 5.4.2 Approach to Hazard Profiling ................................................................................................ 23 5.4.3 Hazard Profiling through Stakeholder Consultation and Indigenous Knowledge ................. 23 5.4.4 Desk-Top Hazard Profiling .................................................................................................... 24 5.4.5 GIS Based Hazard Profiling .................................................................................................. 25 5.4.6 Finalizing the Hazard Profile ................................................................................................. 25

5.5 Vulnerability Indices and Mapping ...................................................................................... 26 5.5.1 General Vulnerability Description .......................................................................................... 26 5.5.2 Vulnerability Rating: Combined Land Cover / Land Use Data Layer .................................... 26 5.5.3 Vulnerability Rating: Socio-Economic Ward Profiles ............................................................ 27 5.5.4 Finalizing the Vulnerability Profile ......................................................................................... 28

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5.6 Resilience Indices and Mapping ......................................................................................... 28 5.6.1 Resilience Profiling through Stakeholder Consultation ......................................................... 28 5.6.2 GIS Based Resilience Profiling ............................................................................................. 29 5.6.3 Finalizing the Resilience Profile ............................................................................................ 31

5.7 Risk Profiling and Rating ..................................................................................................... 32 5.7.1 Interpreting the Results ......................................................................................................... 32

5.8 Assumptions and Limitations .............................................................................................. 33 5.8.1 Data Limitations and Challenges .......................................................................................... 33 5.8.2 Limitations and Challenges to the Methodology ................................................................... 34

6 Status Quo Assessment of the NMBM ................. ............................................. 35

6.1 Geographical Setting ........................................................................................................... 36

6.2 Weather and Climate ........................................................................................................... 36

6.3 Natural Environment ............................................................................................................ 39 6.3.1 Coastline and Marine Environmental .................................................................................... 39 6.3.2 Biodiversity ............................................................................................................................ 41

6.4 Built Environment ................................................................................................................ 42 6.4.1 Land-use Trends ................................................................................................................... 42

6.5 Population and Socio-Economic Characteristics ................................................................ 43 6.5.1 Provincial Socio-Economic Trends ....................................................................................... 43 6.5.2 Population ............................................................................................................................. 44 6.5.3 Education .............................................................................................................................. 46 6.5.4 Employment .......................................................................................................................... 47 6.5.5 Household Income ................................................................................................................ 47

6.6 Industrial and Economic Activities....................................................................................... 49 6.6.1 Sectoral Contribution ............................................................................................................. 49 6.6.2 Economy ............................................................................................................................... 49 6.6.3 Tourism ................................................................................................................................. 51 6.6.4 Mineral Resources and Mining .............................................................................................. 51

6.7 Housing and Service Delivery ............................................................................................. 51 6.7.1 Housing ................................................................................................................................. 52 6.7.2 Water ..................................................................................................................................... 54 6.7.3 Energy ................................................................................................................................... 57 6.7.4 Sanitation .............................................................................................................................. 58 6.7.5 Health .................................................................................................................................... 60 6.7.6 Waste Management .............................................................................................................. 61 6.7.7 Safety and security ................................................................................................................ 66

6.8 Infrastructure ........................................................................................................................ 68 6.8.1 Roads .................................................................................................................................... 68

6.9 Facilities ............................................................................................................................... 69 6.9.1 Education Facilities ............................................................................................................... 69 6.9.2 Community Facilities ............................................................................................................. 69

6.10 The IDP and Disaster Management .................................................................................... 70 6.10.1 Key IDP Priorities in the NMBM ............................................................................................ 70 6.10.2 IDP Five Year Performance Plan .......................................................................................... 70

7 Hazard Profile .................................... .................................................................. 77

7.1 Transport Hazards ............................................................................................................... 77 7.1.1 Air Transportation .................................................................................................................. 77 7.1.2 Rail Transportation ................................................................................................................ 79 7.1.3 Road Transportation ............................................................................................................. 80 7.1.4 Water Transportation ............................................................................................................ 83

7.2 Civil Unrest .......................................................................................................................... 85 7.2.1 Demonstrations / Riots .......................................................................................................... 85 7.2.2 Refugees, Displaced People and Illegal Immigration ........................................................... 86 7.2.3 Xenophobic Violence ............................................................................................................ 88 7.2.4 Terrorism ............................................................................................................................... 90 7.2.5 Armed Conflict (Civil/Political War) ....................................................................................... 92 7.2.6 Crime ..................................................................................................................................... 92

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7.3 Environmental Degradation ................................................................................................. 96 7.3.1 Deforestation ......................................................................................................................... 98 7.3.2 Erosion .................................................................................................................................. 98 7.3.3 Land Degradation ................................................................................................................ 100 7.3.4 Loss of Biodiversity ............................................................................................................. 103

7.4 Disease / Health - Disease: Animal................................................................................... 104

7.5 Disease / Health - Disease: Human .................................................................................. 105 7.5.1 HIV/AIDS ............................................................................................................................. 106 7.5.2 TB, MBR-TD and XDR-TB .................................................................................................. 109 7.5.3 Other Diseases .................................................................................................................... 113

7.6 Disease / Health - Disease: Plants.................................................................................... 115

7.7 Fire Hazards ...................................................................................................................... 115 7.7.1 Veld, Forest Fires and Wild Fire .......................................................................................... 115 7.7.2 Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Fires ...................................................................... 118

7.8 Floods (River, Urban & Dam Failure) ................................................................................ 121 7.8.1 River & Urban Flooding ....................................................................................................... 122 7.8.2 Dam Failure Flooding .......................................................................................................... 123

7.9 Geological Hazards ........................................................................................................... 124 7.9.1 Earthquake .......................................................................................................................... 125 7.9.2 Landslides/Mud flows/Rock-fall and Subsidence ................................................................ 129

7.10 Hydro-meteorological Hazards .......................................................................................... 131 7.10.1 Drought ................................................................................................................................ 132 7.10.2 Severe Storms (Wind, Hail, Lightning, Fog) ........................................................................ 134 7.10.3 Desertification ...................................................................................................................... 139 7.10.4 Extreme Temperatures ....................................................................................................... 139

7.11 Hazardous Material (Spill / Release / Fire / Explosion) .................................................... 141

7.12 Infestations ........................................................................................................................ 144 7.12.1 Plant Infestations (Intruder Plants) ...................................................................................... 144 7.12.2 Other Infestation Hazards ................................................................................................... 146

7.13 Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure ................................................................ 146 7.13.1 Electrical .............................................................................................................................. 147 7.13.2 Information Technology ....................................................................................................... 148 7.13.3 Sanitation ............................................................................................................................ 148 7.13.4 Transport ............................................................................................................................. 149 7.13.5 Gas ...................................................................................................................................... 149 7.13.6 Water ................................................................................................................................... 149

7.14 Major Event Hazards ......................................................................................................... 150

7.15 Pollution ............................................................................................................................. 151 7.15.1 Air Pollution ......................................................................................................................... 152 7.15.2 Land Pollution ...................................................................................................................... 153 7.15.3 Water Pollution (Fresh and Sea) ......................................................................................... 153

7.16 Structural Failure ............................................................................................................... 154

7.17 Oceanographic .................................................................................................................. 155 7.17.1 Tsunami ............................................................................................................................... 155 7.17.2 Sea Level Rise (Climate Change) ....................................................................................... 156 7.17.3 Storm Surge ........................................................................................................................ 157

7.18 Climate Change ................................................................................................................. 158

7.19 Astrophysical Hazards ....................................................................................................... 165 7.19.1 Space weather .................................................................................................................... 165 7.19.2 Meteorite impacts ................................................................................................................ 166

8 Vulnerability Profile of the NMBM ................. .................................................. 167

8.1 Vulnerability Considerations in NMBM .............................................................................. 168

8.2 Vulnerability (Land Cover/Use Ratings) ............................................................................ 171

8.3 Vulnerability (Socio-economic Profiles) ............................................................................ 171

9 Resilience Profile of the NMBM .................... ................................................... 175

9.1 Description of Resilience Role Players ............................................................................. 175 9.1.1 Beach office ......................................................................................................................... 175 9.1.2 Business and the Chamber of Commerce .......................................................................... 176

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9.1.3 Community Representatives ............................................................................................... 176 9.1.4 Healthcare related Representatives .................................................................................... 177 9.1.5 Department of Home Affairs ................................................................................................ 179 9.1.6 Department of Water Affairs ................................................................................................ 180 9.1.7 Disaster Management ......................................................................................................... 180 9.1.8 Electricity Department ......................................................................................................... 181 9.1.9 Fire Service ......................................................................................................................... 181 9.1.10 Housing ............................................................................................................................... 182 9.1.11 Traffic Department............................................................................................................... 184 9.1.12 Nelson Mandela Municipality (climate change) ................................................................... 184 9.1.13 Non Governmental Organizations ....................................................................................... 184 9.1.14 Representative from Airport / ACSA ................................................................................... 185 9.1.15 Representatives from Industry & Waste Management Companies .................................... 185 9.1.16 South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) ............................................................. 187 9.1.17 South African National Defence Force ................................................................................ 189 9.1.18 South African Police Service ............................................................................................... 189 9.1.19 Weather Services ................................................................................................................ 191

9.2 Stakeholder Resilience Profile .......................................................................................... 191

9.3 GIS based Resilience mapping for the NMBM ................................................................. 193

9.4 Resilience factors for Wards in the NMBM ....................................................................... 195

10 Risk Assessment and Modelling Results ............. .......................................... 197

10.1 Prioritised Risk Profile ....................................................................................................... 197

11 Conclusions and Main Findings ..................... ................................................. 198

11.1 Comparison with Previous Disaster Risk Assessment ..................................................... 200

12 Recommendations and Action Plan ................... ............................................. 202

13 References and Data Sources ....................... .................................................. 203

Annexure A – Hazard Categories and Listing ........ ..................................................... 207

Annexure B – GIS RHVMC Modelling & Buffer Guideline s ........................................ 208

Annexure C – Consultation & Workshop Data Collectio n Sheets ............................. 209

Annexure D – Risk Reduction Measures .............. ....................................................... 210

Annexure E – Workshop Attendance Register ......... ................................................... 211

Annexure F – Hazard Maps .......................... ................................................................. 212

Annexure G – Vulnerability Map .................... ............................................................... 213

Annexure H – Resilience Map ....................... ................................................................ 214

Annexure I – Ward Based Risk Maps ................. .......................................................... 215

Annexure J – Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis for the NMBM ........................ 216

Annexure K – Electronic Copy of Report and Project Data ....................................... 217

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List of Tables

Table 1-1: Prioritized Risk Ratings for the NMBM. ................................................................... xiii Table 2-1: Requirements related to Disaster Risk Assessments ............................................... 3 Table 4-1: Typical Spatial and Non-Spatial Data used in Disaster Risk Assessments ............. 7 Table 4-2: Information Captured on the Individual Stakeholder Consultations (Industries) .... 10 Table 4-3: Information collected during Workshops and Stakeholder Consultations .............. 13 Table 5-1: Classification of Hazards according to the National Disaster Management

Framework ............................................................................................................... 21 Table 5-2: Hazards considered during the Disaster Risk Assessment .................................... 22 Table 5-3: Hazard Class Events ............................................................................................... 24 Table 5-4: Vulnerability Factors ................................................................................................ 27 Table 5-5: Resilience values used for Land-use/Land-cover resilience mapping. .................. 31 Table 5-6: Rating Classifications in Reporting Tables and Maps ............................................. 33 Table 6-1: IWMP Projects and Status. ...................................................................................... 65 Table 6-2: Road Categories in the NMBM. ............................................................................... 68 Table 7-1: Air Transportation Hazard Statistics ........................................................................ 78 Table 7-2: Rail Transportation Hazard Statistics ...................................................................... 79 Table 7-3: Road Transportation Hazard Statistics .................................................................... 82 Table 7-4: Water Transportation Hazard Statistics ................................................................... 85 Table 7-5: Terrorism Hazard Statistics ..................................................................................... 91 Table 7-6: Ambulance Incident and Rescue Statistics related to Human Health and Disease

Hazards .................................................................................................................. 114 Table 7-7: Vegetation Fires Statistics ..................................................................................... 117 Table 7-8: Building, Informal Settlement and Rubbish Fires Statistics .................................. 119 Table 7-9: Fire Hazard Classification ...................................................................................... 120 Table 7-10: Historical Record of Seismic Activity in the vicinity of the NMBM ......................... 126 Table 7-11: Earthquake Probability (Fernandez and Guzman (1979a in ESKOM 2001)) ....... 128 Table 7-12: Drought hazard indicator ....................................................................................... 133 Table 7-13: Hazardous Material and Industrial Accident Events in the NMBM. ...................... 142 Table 7-14: Spillage Events in the NMBM. ............................................................................... 152 Table 7-15: Summary of impacts and possible mitigation measures ....................................... 164 Table 8-1: Socio Economic Vulnerability Indicator ................................................................. 172 Table 9-1: Results of Self-evaluation: Beach Office ............................................................... 175 Table 9-2: Function of Community members and Authorities ................................................ 177 Table 9-3: Results of Self-evaluation: Community Representatives ...................................... 177 Table 9-4: Results of Self-evaluation: Health Related Role Players ...................................... 178 Table 9-5: Results of Self-evaluation: Disaster Management ................................................ 180 Table 9-6: Results of Self-evaluation: Electricity .................................................................... 181 Table 9-7: Results of Self-evaluation: Fire Services............................................................... 182 Table 9-8: Results of Self-evaluation: NMBM (Climate) ......................................................... 184 Table 9-9: Results of Self-evaluation: Non-Governmental Organizations ............................. 185 Table 9-10: Results of Self-evaluation: Airport / ACSA ............................................................ 185 Table 9-11: Results of Self-evaluation: Industry ....................................................................... 186 Table 9-12: Results of Self-evaluation: SAMSA ....................................................................... 188 Table 9-13: Results of Self-evaluation: South African National Defence Force ...................... 189 Table 9-14: Average Resilience ratings: SAWS ....................................................................... 191 Table 9-15: Average Resilience ratings from Stakeholder Consultations ................................ 192 Table 10-1: Prioritized Risk Ratings for the NMBM .................................................................. 197

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List of Figures

Figure 2-1: Location of the NMBM Municipality ................. ...................................................... 1

Figure 5-1: Relationship of Hazard, Vulnerability, Resilience a nd Risk levels ................... 17

Figure 5-2: Data Layers to be used in the Disaster Risk Modelin g ...................................... 18

Figure 5-3: Directory structure for the digital data for the pr oject ....................................... 20

Figure 5-4: Hazard Categories ................................. ................................................................. 21

Figure 5-5: Calculation of Indicative Hazard Values based on St akeholder Inputs ........... 24

Figure 5-6: Hazard Assessment and Reporting Approach .......... ......................................... 25

Figure 5-7: Vulnerability Assessment and Reporting Approach ... ....................................... 28

Figure 5-8: Resilience mapping based on location of Fire Statio ns in the NMBM. ............ 30

Figure 5-9: Resilience Assessment and Reporting Approach for th e NMBM ..................... 32

Figure 6-1: NMBM Locality Map ................................. ............................................................... 35

Figure 6-2: Temperatures in the NMBM .......................... ......................................................... 37

Figure 6-3: Rainfall in the NMBM .............................. ................................................................ 38

Figure 6-4: Annual Average Rainfall in the NMBM ............... .................................................. 38

Figure 6-5: Wind rose for Port Elizabeth ...................... ........................................................... 39

Figure 6-6: Comparison of Population on Metropolitan Level .... .......................................... 44

Figure 6-7: Comparison of Population on Provincial Level ...... ............................................ 44

Figure 6-8: Population Density in the NMBM .................... ...................................................... 45

Figure 6-9: Age Distribution (Comparison) ..................... ........................................................ 46

Figure 6-10: Level of Education in the NMBM..................... ...................................................... 47

Figure 6-11: Annual Household Income ........................... ......................................................... 48

Figure 6-12: Annual Household Income (Comparison) .............. ............................................. 48

Figure 6-13: Sectoral Contribution to GGVA ..................... ........................................................ 49

Figure 6-14: Distribution of Dwelling type in the NMBM. ........ ................................................ 52

Figure 6-15: Type of Main Dwelling ............................. ............................................................... 53

Figure 6-16: Type of Main Dwelling (Comparison) ................ ................................................... 53

Figure 6-17: Access to Water ................................... ................................................................... 54

Figure 6-18: Access to Water (Comparison) ...................... ....................................................... 54

Figure 6-19: Energy for Cooking and Heating in the NMBM ........ ........................................... 57

Figure 6-20: Energy for Cooking (Comparison) ................... .................................................... 57

Figure 6-21: Access to Toilet Facilities in the NMBM ........... ................................................... 59

Figure 6-22: Access to Toilet Facilities (Comparison) .......... ................................................... 59

Figure 6-23: Refuse Removal .................................... .................................................................. 64

Figure 6-24: Refuse Removal (Comparison) ....................... ...................................................... 64

Figure 7-1: Air Transport Hazard in the NMBM .................. ..................................................... 79

Figure 7-2: Number of Vehicle involved in Fatal Crashes in the Eastern Cape .................. 80

Figure 7-3: Number of Fatalities per Type of Vehicle in the Eas tern Cape ......................... 81

Figure 7-4: Road and Rail Transport Hazard .................... ....................................................... 83

Figure 7-5: Vessels Transfer Zones in the NMBM ................ .................................................. 84

Figure 7-6: UNHCR Country Operations Profile – South Africa ... ........................................ 87

Figure 7-7: Terrorism Threat Conditions ....................... .......................................................... 91

Figure 7-8: Selected Crime Levels in the NMBM ................. ................................................... 94

Figure 7-9: Total murder and population levels for selected are as in the NMBM .............. 95

Figure 7-10: Civil unrest hazard ............................... ................................................................... 96

Figure 7-11: Distribution of land degradation based on Combined Degradation Index. ... 101

Figure 7-12: Land use in coastal Metropolitan and District Munic ipalities. ........................ 102

Figure 7-13: Estuary health in South Africa. ................... ........................................................ 103

Figure 7-14: Environmental Degradation Hazard .................. ................................................. 104

Figure 7-15: Animal Disease Hazard ............................. ........................................................... 105

Figure 7-16: Life expectancy of South Africans, 1950 – 2005 .... ........................................... 107

Figure 7-17: HIV prevalence among antenatal clinic attendees in South Africa ................ 107

Figure 7-18: HIV Antenatal Survey Prevalence by District: Easter n Cape (2006) ............... 108

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Figure 7-19: HIV Antenatal Survey Prevalence by District: Easter n Cape (2006) ............... 108

Figure 7-20: Total XDR-TB cases reported in the period 2004 – 20 07 in South Africa ...... 110

Figure 7-21: Total XDR-TB cases reported in the period 2004 – 20 07 in South Africa ...... 112

Figure 7-22: Human Disease Hazard .............................. .......................................................... 114

Figure 7-23: Municipalities classified according to levels of ve ld fire risk (April 2003) .... 116

Figure 7-24: Fire Hazard ....................................... ..................................................................... 121

Figure 7-25: Flood Hazard ...................................... ................................................................... 124

Figure 7-26: Geological Hazards ................................ .............................................................. 130

Figure 7-27: Drought hazard .................................... ................................................................. 134

Figure 7-28: Patterns of Risk to Severe Storms in the Eastern Ca pe .................................. 136

Figure 7-29: Severe Storms hazard .............................. ............................................................ 137

Figure 7-30: Global Mean Temperature Anomaly (1995 – 2004) ..... ...................................... 140

Figure 7-31: Hazardous Material hazard ......................... ......................................................... 143

Figure 7-32: Percentage cover by alien invasive plants per quate rnary catchment .......... 145

Figure 7-33: Potential Distribution of Alien Invasive Plant Spec ies .................................... 145

Figure 7-34: Plant Infestation Hazard .......................... ............................................................. 146

Figure 7-35: Infrastructure Failure Hazard ..................... ......................................................... 150

Figure 7-36: Major Events Hazard ............................... ............................................................. 151

Figure 7-37: Air, Land and Water pollution Hazard .............. .................................................. 153

Figure 7-38: Structural Failure Hazard ......................... ............................................................ 154

Figure 7-39: Tsunami Hazard for the NMBM ....................... .................................................... 156

Figure 7-40: Storm Surge Hazard in the NMBM .................... .................................................. 158

Figure 7-41: Projected temperature and precipitation changes for Africa .......................... 159

Figure 7-42: Regional scale projected precipitation change ..... ........................................... 160

Figure 7-43: Observed and projected (SRES A1B scenario) sea leve l rise ......................... 161

Figure 7-44: Illustration of temperature rise and sea level rise continuing long after reduction of CO2 emissions to a neutral level ..... .................................................... 162

Figure 7-45: (a) Results of climatic model where 0=unsuitable cl imate for malarial vectors and 1=suitable climate and (b) Historical malaria r isk areas in South Africa and Namibia and annual malaria cases per district in Bo tswana. ................................ 163

Figure 8-1: Distribution of Poverty across South Africa showing the Ten Poorest Municipalities .................................... ........................................................................... 167

Figure 8-2: Poverty Indicators by Province .................... ....................................................... 168

Figure 8-3: NMBM Land Use Vulnerability ....................... ..................................................... 171

Figure 8-4: Census Vulnerability Indicator .................... ........................................................ 174

Figure 9-1: Location of Healthcare related facilities in the NM BM ..................................... 178

Figure 9-2: Average Resilience Ratings for Health Services .... .......................................... 179

Figure 9-3: Location of Fire Stations in the NMBM ............. ................................................. 182

Figure 9-4: Location of Police Stations in the NMBM ........... ............................................... 190

Figure 9-5: Average Resilience Rating for the NMBM role players .................................... 192

Figure 9-6: Resilience mapping based on location of key facilit ies in the NMBM. .......... 193

Figure 9-7: Resilience mapping based on Land-use / Land-cover i n the NMBM. ............ 194

Figure 9-8: Resilience levels in the NMBM. .................... ....................................................... 195

Figure 9-9: Average Resilience Level per Ward ................. .................................................. 196

Figure 11-1: Comparison between the prioritized risk ratings of the 2005 and the 2010 Disaster Risk Assessment for the NMBM. ............ .................................................... 201

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Glossary

AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency/Immunodeficiency Syndrome

C: Capacity

CFR: Cape Floristic Region

CME: Coronal Mass Ejections

DEAT: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism

DM: Disaster Management

DMC: Disaster Management Centre

DMO: Disaster Management Officer

DMP: Disaster Management Plan

DRA: Disaster Risk Assessment

DRM: Disaster Risk Management

EMS (1): Emergency Management Services

EMS (2): Emergency Medical Services

ERM: Enterprise Risk Management

FET: Further Education and Training

FIFA: Fédération Internationale de Football Association

(International Federation of Association Football)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GGVA: Geographical Growth Value Add

GIS: Geographical Information Systems

GPSDM: Green Paper on Disaster Management

H: Hazard

HAZMAT: Hazardous Materials

HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus

HVMCR: Hazard, Vulnerability, Manageability, Capacity & Risk

HVRes: Hazard, Vulnerability & Resilience

I: Impact

ICSU: International Council for Science

ICV: Incident Command Vehicle

IDP: Integrated Development Plan

IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons

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VANL/STOM/HINA 404277_NMBM_DRA_Report_20100330f_Final June 2009

IMS: Internet mapping system

KPAs: Key Performance Areas

KPIs: Key Performance Indicators

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)

LM: Local Municipality

M: Manageability

MHI: Major Hazardous Installations

MDMC: Municipal Disaster Management Centre

MVA(s): Motor Vehicle Accident(s)

NDMC: National Disaster Management Centre

NDMF: National Disaster Management Framework

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NMBM: Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality

NSoER: National State of the Environment Report

NSRI: National Sea Rescue Institute

PDMC: Provincial Disaster Management Centre

PSC: Project Steering Committee

R: Risk

RHVMC: Risk, Hazard, Vulnerability, Manageability, Capacity

SANDF: South African National Defence Force

SAPS: South African Police Service

SAWS: South African Weather Services

SDF: Spatial Development Framework

SDR: Service Delivery Region

SOP: Standard Operating Procedures

SRK: SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd

TB: Tuberculosis

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

V: Vulnerability

WMO: World Meteorological Organisation

WHO: World Health Organisation

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Executive Summary

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) appointed SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd (SRK) to

conduct a Disaster Risk Assessment (DRA) and develop Disaster Risk Reduction and Contingency

Plans for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality.

This report presents a description of the Disaster Risk Assessment process conducted for the

NMBM, as well as the associated results, conclusions and recommendations of the assessment.

Summary of principal objectives

The objective of this project includes:

• Conducting a Disaster Risk Assessment for the NMBM;

• Creation of two Contingency Plans, including Risk Reduction Plans for two prioritized

risks: Floods and Transportation of Hazardous Materials; and

• Compiling a Disaster Management Plan.

Outline of work program relevant to this report

The project included the following main activities relevant to this report:

• Phase 1– Preparation

o Review of existing status and plans of the NMBM, including assessing the latest Integrated Developed Plan (IDP), etc.

• Phase 2 – Disaster Risk Assessment o Spatial and Non-Spatial Data Collection;

o Setting of Standards & Guidelines for DRA;

o Preparation of Base maps, Data collection sheets and Database for Key Stakeholder

Consultations;

o Key Stakeholder Consultation and HAZMAT Investigation;

o Creation of Maps and Data Collection Sheets for Workshops;

o Capacity Building and Community Participation workshops;

o Capturing of Data in GIS & Risk Modelling;

o Creation of HVMCR Maps and Disaster Risk Profiles;

o Recommendations on Risk Reduction activities;

o Compilation of Draft Disaster Risk Assessment Report;

o Workshop on Draft DRA Report;

o Circulation of Draft Report;

o Updating and Delivery of Final Report.

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Draft Report Page xiii


Overview of Results of the Disaster Risk Assessment

The risk profile for the NMBM is based on the data received from the workshop consultations, as

well as the base data (including reports) collected during the study. The stakeholder perception data

and local resilience data were compared with the desktop hazard assessment results, and the hazard

severity value was adopted. The Risk Prioritization for the NMBM is shown below:

Table 1-1: Prioritized Risk Ratings for the NMBM.

Hazard Name Prioritized Risk Ratings

Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Floods (River, Urban & Dam Failure) 0.85

Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Fire/Explosion (Storage & Transportation) 0.85

Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Spill/Release (Storage & Transportation) 0.82

Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Severe Storms (Wind, Hail, Snow, Lightning, Fog) 0.81

Disease / Health - Disease: Human 0.78

Hydro-meteorological - Drought 0.78

Environmental Degradation 0.76

Fire Hazards - Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Area 0.76

Fire Hazards - Veld/Forest Fires 0.73

Pollution - Water Pollution (Fresh and Sea) 0.72

Major Event Hazards (Cultural, Religious, Political, Recreational, Commercial, Sport) 0.71

Oceanographic - Storm Surge 0.71

Transport Hazards - Road Transportation 0.70

Civil Unrest - Xenophobic Violence 0.69

Structural Failure 0.68

Pollution - Land Pollution 0.68

Civil Unrest - Terrorism 0.67

Oceanographic - Sea Level Rise (Climate Change) 0.67

Pollution - Air Pollution 0.65

Civil Unrest - Demonstrations / Riots 0.65

Oceanographic - Tsunami 0.65

Transport Hazards - Rail Transportation 0.64

Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure 0.64

Civil Unrest - Armed Conflict (Civil/Political War) 0.61

Disease / Health - Disease: Animal 0.61

Geological Hazards - Earthquake 0.60

Transport Hazards - Air Transportation 0.58

Transport Hazards - Water Transportation 0.57

Civil Unrest - Refugees / Displaced People 0.51

Infestations - Plant Infestations (Intruder Plants) 0.44

Disease / Health - Disease: Plants 0.41

Radio Active Fall-out NA

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Draft Report Page xiv


Conclusions and Findings

This report includes the final findings of the disaster risk assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality. The main findings were:

i. The highest rated risks in the municipality were identified as Hydro-meteorological Risks (Floods and Storms) and Hazardous Material Risks (Spill/Release & Fire/Explosion).

ii. Hydro-meteorological Risks: Risks associated with climatic conditions have long been a

problem in the NMBM, and extreme weather events have been part of regular burdens that

communities in the NMBM have had to learn to live with. However, uncertainty with

regards to changing weather patterns (which may lead to even more high intensity events)

and continued urbanisation has highlighted the need for decisive action with regard to

managing risks associated with floods and severe storms in the NMBM.

iii. Hazardous Material Risks: Due to the prominent role that the manufacturing sector and

industry plays in the NMBM, as well as the movement of hazardous material through the

NMBM (from the harbours and industries), the NMBM can be considered to be at high risk

to hazards associated with hazardous material. This risk relates to fires, explosions and

accidental spill or release of hazardous material both on-site, and during road or rail

transportation. A hazardous material disaster can have a severe impact on the NMBM

community, causing structural damage, injuries or fatalities, environmental degradation and

even displacement of individuals.

iv. Human Disease Hazards, especially challenges associated with HIV/AIDS poses an

enormous challenge to the Eastern Cape, as well as to the NMBM. HIV/AIDS not only has

a serious impact on the infected individual, but also has numerous secondary impacts on

affected communities, including decreased productivity of workers, increased absenteeism

and additional costs of training new workers. It also represents a greater demand and

pressure on health facilities. Another serious impact related to HIV/AIDS is the problem

associated with orphans and child headed households. HIV/AIDS therefore not only has the

direct consequence of reduction in health, or loss of life, but the secondary effects can

further increase the vulnerability of communities to other non-related hazards. Other

diseases included under the human health and disease category includes Tuberculosis (TB).

v. Other top rated risks in the NMBM include:

• Hydro-meteorological – Drought;

• Environmental Degradation; and

• Fire Hazards - Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Area.

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Draft Report Page xv


Recommendations

The recommendations based on the results of the Risk Assessment include the following proposed

actions and projects:

• The completion of a detailed HAZMAT risk assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality;

• The establishment / expansion of a HAZMAT working group or advisory committee in the

Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality;

• The completion of a health related needs and vulnerability assessment for the Nelson

Mandela Bay Municipality;

• The completion of a detailed drought risk assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality;

• The implementation / establishment of a Comprehensive Information Management System

that can be used for the capturing of information with regards to incidents in the NMBM.

• Detailed flood line delineations and assessments related to the impact of storm and tidal

surges and sea level rise on the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality;

• Development of a Flood Hazard Management System for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality; and

• The development of contingency plans for the remaining disaster risks.

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Draft Report Page 1


Suite 47, Rynlal Building 320 The Hillside, Lynnwood, 0081, Pretoria South Africa P.O. Box 35290 Menlo Park 0102 South Africa Tel: +27 (0)12 361 9821

Fax: +27 (0)12 361 9912

March 2010

1 Introduction The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) appointed SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd (SRK) to

conduct a Disaster Risk Assessment (DRA) and develop Disaster Risk Reduction and Contingency

Plans for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality.

This report presents a description of the Disaster Risk Assessment process conducted for the

NMBM, as well as the associated results, conclusions and recommendations of the assessment.

2 Background and Brief 2.1 Geographical Setting

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is located to the south-east of the Cacadu District, in the

south-western region of the Eastern Cape Province.

Figure 2-1: Location of the NMBM Municipality

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Final Report Page 2

VANL/STOM/HINA 404277_NMBM_DRA_Report_20100330f_Final March 2010

2.2 The context of Disaster Risk Management in the NMBM

The NMBM Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy Framework describes the context of DRM in

the NMBM as follows:

“The area of the NMBM is constantly threatened by hazards of natural, technological and

environmental origin. It is increasingly exposed to the devastating effects of a range of severe hydro

meteorological events including severe storms; floods; severe winds; and veld fires. The incidence of

epidemic diseases of biological origin affecting humans has also shown an increase in recent years.

Due to the highly industrialized economic activity which takes place in the metropole, industrial

hazards including hazardous materials spillages; explosions; industrial fires; as well as the ensuing

risk of air and water pollution continue to pose major challenges. The effects of global warming and

the threats posed by a rise in sea levels on the coastline; as well as the possibility of the secondary

effects of predicted seismic activity in the oceans to the east which could have significant impact on

the Algoa Bay area, cannot be ignored. The risk of major air and road traffic accidents cannot be

ruled out due to the fact that the Port Elizabeth Airport is located within the residential area close to

critical lifeline infrastructure; and that national roads traverse the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipal

area. The extensive port activities taking place in the Port Elizabeth harbour and the Port of Gqurha

pose very specific threats to both the economic and environmental well being of the Nelson Mandela

Bay Municipal area as a whole.” The aim of this DRA report is to further investigate these risks,

and to identify contributing risk factors, and possible risk reduction and management initiatives.

2.3 Background and objectives

The Disaster Management Act (Act 57 of 2002) as well as the National Disaster Management

Framework (2005), requires that Municipalities conduct disaster risk assessments for their area of

jurisdiction. The main aim of this project was to conduct a comprehensive disaster risk assessment,

as well as the development of disaster risk reduction contingency plans for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality. A Disaster Risk Assessment (DRA) was conducted for the NMBM in 2005. The

results of the previous assessment was also taken into account and expanded upon in this assessment.

The main objective of the Disaster Risk Assessment was to provide the NMBM with relevant

information to enable and support the required disaster risk reduction planning and activities

undertaken by the Municipality. The required information includes information related to the levels

of disaster risks, hazards, vulnerabilities, manageability, and capacities (RHVMC) within the area of

jurisdiction of the NMBM. The deliverables also included suitable rating, mapping and

prioritization of the RHVMC levels for the NMBM.



2.4 Requirements in terms of Disaster Risk Assessme nts

Disaster Risk Assessments are a requirement as stipulated in the guiding documents with regards to

Disaster Management in South Africa, including the Disaster Management Act and the National

Disaster Management Framework (2005) (NDMF). These two documents also outline certain

requirements with regards to Disaster Risk Assessments. Below is a summary of the requirements

related to Disaster Risk Assessments, as well as how the DRA methodology ensured that these

requirements were met by the approach followed in this assessment.

Table 2-1: Requirements related to Disaster Risk As sessments

Requirement Section

NDMF:

2.3 Monitoring, updating and disseminating disaster risk information

• Available statistics were included in the assessment.

• Findings from the previous assessment were

considered during this assessment.

• Where appropriate, recommendations for improvement

of risk information are made.

Act:

47. (1) A municipal disaster management centre, to the extent that it

has the capacity, must give guidance to organs of state, the private

sector, non-governmental organisations, communities and individuals

in the municipal area to assess and prevent or reduce the risk of

disasters, including-

(a) ways and means of-

(i) determining levels of risk;

(ii) assessing the vulnerability of communities and households to

disasters that may occur;

(iii) increasing the capacity of communities and households to

minimise the risk and impact of disasters that may occur: and

(iv) monitoring the likelihood of, and the state of alertness to.

disasters that may occur;

These aspects are considered in this report.

Act:

Section 52: Preparation of disaster management plans by municipal

entities

This document only addresses the methodology and results

of the disaster risk assessment. However, the project also

covers disaster management planning (see other

deliverables of this project)

Integration of Disaster Management Plan with IDP

This disaster risk assessment includes an assessment of the

priorities of the NMBM IDP in terms of Disaster

Management. The main recommendations of the DRA will

be presented in a suitable format to be included in the IDP.



Requirement Section

The Act (Section 53 2) e)

• A disaster management plan for a municipal area must form an

integral part of the municipality’s integrated development plan;

• anticipate the types of disaster that are likely to occur in the

municipal area and their possible effects;

• place emphasis on measures that reduce the vulnerability of

disaster-prone areas, communities and households;

…

identify the areas, communities or households at risk;

identification of areas, communities or households at risk: state in this

methodology at which scale/level the assessment is done.

Reduction measures are be included in the

recommendations.

The methodology allows for the identification of

communities and households at risk.

Act: Section 53 2) f)

take into account indigenous knowledge relating to disaster

management

Indigenous knowledge was collected through the

consultation process.

Section 53 4) requires consultation with neighbouring municipalities

Representatives from neighbouring municipalities were

invited to the consultation workshops. Characteristics of

neighbouring municipalities are discussed in the Status Quo

assessment.

NDMF:

Key performance area 2, section 2.1: identification of stakeholders.

List of stakeholders invited to workshops and consultations

are in line with requirements of members of the DMAF.

NDMF:

Section 2.1.1.1: The framework specifically refers to events of

frequency/seasonality, and scale/magnitude, speed of onset, affected

area and duration

These characteristics of the hazards were taken into account

in the DRA.

NDMF:

The risk assessment must include: setting priorities for action to be

taken

Priorities for action forms part of the recommendations.

NDMF:

Section 2.1.2: Identify if the risk is becoming more serious? This aspect is included in the assessment.

NDMF:

Section 2.1.3.5: link the risk assessment with the disaster risk

management planning

Reduction measures and risk management planning are

included in the recommendations.

NDMF:

Section 2.1.4: Community-based disaster risk assessment

Community-based disaster risk assessment was not part of

this project’s scope. Representatives of communities were

invited to stakeholder consultations. Stakeholder

consultations and collection of indigenous knowledge was

included in this assessment.



3 Work Program 3.1 Work program relevant to this report

The principal stages of the project were as follows:

• Phase 1– Preparation

o Review of existing status and plans of the NMBM, including assessing latest IDP, etc.

• Phase 2 – Disaster Risk Assessment o Spatial and Non-Spatial Data Collection;

o Setting of Standards & Guidelines for DRA;

o Preparation of Base maps, Data collection sheets and Database for Key Stakeholder

Consultations;

o Key Stakeholder Consultation and HAZMAT Investigation;

o Creation of Maps and Data Collection Sheets for Workshops;

o Capacity Building and Community Participation workshops;

o Capturing of Data in GIS & Risk Modelling;

o Creation of HVMCR Maps and Disaster Risk Profiles;

o Recommendations on Risk Reduction activities;

o Compilation of Draft Disaster Risk Assessment Report;

o Workshop on Draft DRA Report;

o Circulation of Draft Report; and

o Updating and Delivery of Final Report.

The Disaster Risk Assessment was conducted during Phase 2, and the methodology is discussed in more detail in Section 4 of this report.

The final deliverables of the project are:

• Project Plan; • Record of Community Engagement activities, including workshop attendance Registers;

• Hazard Maps, indicating the hazard levels of various hazards within the NMBM; • Vulnerability Maps indicating the vulnerability of communities to identified hazards

throughout the NMBM; • Resilience Maps illustrating information with regard to the identified Manageability and

Capacity levels throughout the NMBM; • Risk Maps and tables indicating the levels of risk of identified hazards throughout the

NMBM; • A Risk Reduction Plan and two (2) Contingency Plans (floods and transportation of

hazardous materials); and • A Disaster Management Plan with the above attached.



3.2 Main Project team

The key project team consisted of the following persons:

Consultant’s Team

Matt Braune represented the partners of SRK Consulting and acted as the Project Director.

Andre Hindley acted as the overall Project Manager on behalf of SRK Consulting. He was also

responsible for specialist inputs on the project, as well as the compilation of the Disaster Risk

Reduction and Contingency Plans.

Martin Stols is a Scientist at SRK Consulting and was responsible for the GIS and Disaster Risk

Modelling component of the Project. Martin acted as a risk assessment specialist and was also

responsible for the creation of data layers, data rasterization and the risk modelling process.

Theuns van der Linde is a Scientist at SRK Consulting and acted as the project administrator and

risk assessment specialist. He was involved in abstraction of information from the workshop data

sheets as well as risk reporting.

Elias Sithole is a Director at Umata Development Solutions and acted as specialist facilitator during

the Stakeholder Consultations and Skills Transfer.

Sheldon Vandrey is a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Technician. Sheldon was involved

in the local data collection and data management, as well as local coordination activities on the

project.

Maryna Storie is a Principal Consultant at ERM Southern Africa and acted as external reviewer on

this project. Maryna was involved in the first Disaster Risk Assessment that was conducted for the

NMBM in 2005.

NMBM Project Team:

Mr H Lansdown acted as the Project Management on behalf of the NMBM DMC.

Mr T Cameron is a DM Officer, and assistance with inputs and co-ordination as required by the

NMBM DMC.

NMBM DMC staff provided inputs and were capacitated on the project.



4 Disaster Risk Assessment Methodology In order for the disaster risk assessment to provide valid results, the process needs to be based on

scientific principles and accurate information. The methodology followed during the Disaster Risk

Assessment process is discussed below:

4.1 Spatial and Non-Spatial Data Collection

Time frame: September 2009 – February 2010

The entire disaster risk assessment is based on, and requires specific data and information. This data

and information includes both spatial and non-spatial data as well as electronic and hard copy data.

Examples of typical spatial and non-spatial data are shown below:

Table 4-1: Typical Spatial and Non-Spatial Data use d in Disaster Risk Assessments

Types of Data Spatial Data Non-Spatial Data

Description of Data Spatial data relates to data that can be represented spatially.

This includes GIS Data as well as maps and drawings.

Non-Spatial data relates to data which is

not represented spatially. This includes

reports and statistics in tabular format.

Typical examples of

data to be used in Disaster Risk Assessments

• Infrastructure: Roads, Rail, Water and Sewerage

lines, Water and Sewerage Treatment works,

Reservoirs, Power lines and Power sub stations, Gas

or Petrol Pipelines, Airports, etc.;

• Land use and Land cover data: Classification of the

environment based on its use or physical

characteristics.

• Government Buildings and Critical Facilities: Key

Ministerial and Government Buildings, Government

Offices, Police Stations, Fire Stations, Hospitals,

Clinics, Schools, Location of all Government or

Council properties, Government warehouses and

storage areas.

• Other Buildings and Land-use data: Stadiums,

Sport fields, Waste and Landfill Sites, Surveyed Land-

parcels with land-use labels, etc.

• Administrative boundaries: Boundaries for the

District, Municipalities and Wards

• Cadastral data: Erven, Farms, Servitudes

• Topographic data: Rivers, Streams, Contours,

Dolomite and Undermined areas, flood lines, etc.

• Remote Sensing data: Aerial Photography or Satellite

Images.

• Statistical data: Demography, socio economical and

health related.

• Integrated Development Plans and Spatial Development Frameworks;

• Census Statistics;

• General statistics, including

Health, Crime, Rainfall, Floods,

Fire, etc.;

• Information on disaster management capacity; and

• Specific reports, including reports

of floods, drought, geological

problems, accidents, illegal

immigrants and refugees, major

hazardous installations and health.



4.2 Setting of Standards & Guidelines for DRA

Timeframe: October 2009 – November 2009

During October and November 2009 the initial standards and guidelines with regard to the proposed

risk assessment methodology were compiled. These guidelines provided an overview of the

proposed disaster risk assessment process, and were presented to the Project PSC on 18 November

2009. The presented methodology served as guide for the risk assessment process

The standards and guidelines included:

• A description of the proposed methodology;

• A description of the proposed level of details, based on the available data;

• Risk Modelling and Mapping Guidelines; and

• Guidelines for the workshop and stakeholder consultation process.

During this phase, the clustering of wards for the Capacity Building and Community Participation

workshops (See Section 4.7) was to take place. This would have been required in order to identify

the focus areas for each of the workshops. However, it was decided by the PSC that a total of two

workshops would be held, and each of the workshops would focus on the entire municipality. The

first workshop was scheduled for representatives from municipal departments and line-functions,

while the second workshop was scheduled for representatives from the community, including

Community Development Workers and Councillors.

4.3 Preparation of Base maps, Data collection sheet s and Database for Key Stakeholder Consultations

Timeframe: October 2009

The collection of indigenous knowledge as well as specific disaster management related information

from representatives in the NMBM was required during the disaster risk assessment process. This

was done through various individual stakeholder consultation sessions and community participation

workshops. The first set of consultations involved key individual focus group discussions with

representatives from major industries in the NMBM.

In order to facilitate the consultation process and to collect and capture information in a suitable

format, it was necessary to create specific data collection base maps and sheets. These maps and

sheets were used during the consultations to capture collected information.



4.4 Key Stakeholder Consultation (HAZMAT Investigat ion)

Timeframe: November 2009

Key stakeholder consultations with representatives from major industries in the NMBM were

conducted during November 2010. During these consultations, information with regards to the

facilities was collected by making use of the created data capturing sheets and maps. The data

capturing sheet provided for the collection of information shown in Table 4-2 below:



Table 4-2: Information Captured on the Individual S takeholder Consultations (Industries) Category Type of Information Category Type of Information

General

Information

• Name of Facility

• Category of Facility

o Major Hazardous Installation: y/n

o National Key Point: y/n

• Address of Facility

o Postal Address

o Physical Address

o Location of Facility (Grid Code)

• Contact details

o Title, Name & Surname

o Designation

o Telephone numbers (office and after hours)

o Cell phone numbers

o Fax numbers

o Email address

o Website

• Type of Operation and process at facility

• Information related to completed:

o Disaster Risk Assessments

o Enterprise Risk Assessments

o Response and Recovery Plans

o Mitigation Plans

Hazard Specific

Information

• On-site material

o Type and Quantity of on-site hazardous material

o Associated risks with on-site material

• Transportation of Material

o General considerations related to transportation of material

o Identification of mode and route of transportation, including road, rail, sea or

air.

o Routes followed

o Source and destination

• Information on previous hazardous material incidents

o Date

o Nature and description of event

o On- or off-site event

o Location of event (grid code)

o Effect of event on people, infrastructure, property, environment, etc.

o Cause of event

• Frequency of incidents/events, such as:

o Spills

o Explosions, and

o Fires

Resilience Information

• Self-evaluation of Facility’s Resources on a scale from 1 – 3.

o Staff

o Expertise

o Vehicles

o Equipment

o Funding

o Risk Reduction plans

o Response Plans

• Identification of challenges experienced by facility in terms of safety, security and

disaster management

• Greatest needs in terms of safety, security and disaster management

Other Information • Additional Comments, remarks or recommendations



A total of 11 representatives from industries in the NMBM were consulted. They included

representatives from Afrox, Bulk Oil Supplies, Cadbury, Fresh Produce Terminal, Rennies

Distribution, SAB, Umicore, Vita Foam, and Shell Aviation Jet A1 fuel depot.

Results of these consultations were incorporated into the Disaster Risk Profiling and are discussed in

Section 7.11.

4.5 Disaster Management Centre (DMC) arrange consul tation workshops

Timeframe: October 2009 – January 2010

The NMBM DMC arranged the Capacity Building and Community Participation workshops. The

aim of these workshops was to collect indigenous knowledge as well as disaster management related

information from various stakeholders and representatives in the NMBM.

Typical key stakeholders that were invited to the workshop included:

• The NMBM DMC staff;

• Ward and Portfolio Councillors; • Ward Committee Members;

• All Departmental Managers / Senior Representatives from each department; • Organized Business;

• Organized Labour; • Mining and Large Industry;

• Insurance Industry; • Representatives from Agricultural Sector; • Medical, Paramedical and Hospitals; • Institutions of Education, including Schools and University;

• South African Police Service;

• South African National Defence Force; • Representatives from the Provincial and National Government and neighbouring

Municipalities Disaster Management representatives;

• Representatives from Utilities (Electricity, Water, etc.); • Fire Protection Authorities and similar entities/organizations such as Working for Water and

Roads Agencies; • Transportation organizations (Spoornet, etc); • Non-governmental organizations, Community based development workers and disaster

management volunteers; • Traditional leaders; • Religious and Welfare organizations; and

• Representatives from all the National Key Points in the Municipal area.



4.6 Creation of Maps and Data Collection Sheets for Workshops

Timeframe: October 2009 – January 2010

As was the case with the individual stakeholder consultations, it was necessary to create specific data

collection base maps and sheets in order to facilitate the consultation process and to be able to

collect and capture information in a suitable format. These maps and sheets were used during the

consultations to capture collected information.

4.7 Capacity Building and Community Participation w orkshops

Timeframe: January 2010 – February 2010

As part of incorporating indigenous knowledge, capacity building and community participation and

input workshops were held on 21 and 22 January 2010. An attendance register completed at these

workshops is shown in Appendix E. Following these workshops, additional individual stakeholder

consultations with key representatives were conducted. Where individual stakeholder consultations

were not possible, telephonic interviews were held with key representatives. Stakeholders consulted

during Activity 7 included:

• Community Representative (Councillors);

• Department of Health;

• Disaster Management;

• Electricity Department;

• Emergency Medical Services (Public);

• Fire Service;

• Hospital (Private & Public);

• Red Cross;

• Representative from Airport / ACSA;

• South African National Defence Force;

• Weather Services;

• Enviroserve Waste Management;

• SAMA (South African Marine Authority);

• Nelson Mandela Municipality (climate change); and

• Beach offices.

The data collection sheets used during these consultation and workshop sessions provided for the

following hazard and resilience related information to be captured:



Table 4-3: Information collected during Workshops a nd Stakeholder Consultations

Category Type of Information

General Information • Municipality name

Hazard Specific Information

• Name of Hazard Event

• Description of Event

• Actual vs. Potential event

• History of event (frequency)

• Date of Last Occurrence

• Location of Hazard Event

o Map Grid Code

o Suburb, road, etc.

• Seasonal occurrence

• Perception with regard to increasing occurrence

• Duration of Event and Effects

• Effects on:

o People

o Buildings & Contents

o Infrastructure

o Environment

o Economic Activities

• Cause of event

• Size of area affected

• Secondary Hazards

• Predictability and Early-warning

• Current plans and policies in place to reduce risk / severity

• The biggest obstacles in reducing risk / hazard?

• Hazard related aspects in IDP?

• Priority to reduce hazard

• Comments

Resilience Information

• Self-evaluation of Facility’s Resources on a scale from 1 – 3.

o Staff & Human Resources

o Expertise, Experience & Specialist Knowledge

o Vehicles

o Equipment

o Funding/Budget

o Prevention, Mitigation & Risk Reduction Plans

o Response & Recovery Plans

• Identification of challenges experienced by role players / departments in terms of safety, security and

disaster management

• Greatest needs in terms of safety, security and disaster management

Other Information • Additional Comments, remarks or recommendations

The information collected during these consultations and workshops were incorporated into the Risk

Profiling process and are discussed in Section 7.

4.8 Capturing of Data in GIS and Risk Modelling

Timeframe: December 2010 – February 2010

After the consultations, all the relevant information was captured into the appropriate electronic

formats and prepared for the risk modelling. Base data from various collected documents and

reports were also captured and included in the Risk Profiling.

More detail with regard to the Risk Profiling is provided in Section 5.



4.9 Creation of HVMCR Maps and Disaster Risk Profil es

Timeframe: February 2010

The results from the Disaster Risk Model were used to compile the various HVRes and Risk maps,

while information collected from workshop consultations as well as information abstracted from

base data sources were used to compile disaster risk profiles for the NMBM. These results are

shown in Section 10.

4.10 Recommendations on Risk Reduction activities


Recommendations on Risk Reduction activities were based on the results of the Risk Assessment.

These recommendations are discussed in Section 12.

4.11 Compilation of Draft Report and Workshop


The draft DRA report contained the draft findings of the disaster risk assessment. The draft report

was presented to stakeholders in the NMBM on 18 February 2010 and 4 March 2010. Stakeholders

were presented with an opportunity to provide any additional input and comments on the draft report

and results. These comments and inputs were then used to update the report, in order to compile the

Final Disaster Risk Assessment Report.

4.12 Report Review Process

The review of the Disaster Risk Assessment report consists of the following activities:

• Stakeholders Review: The Draft Report (Version 1) was presented at a Stakeholder

Participation Workshop on 18 February 2010 in Port Elizabeth. The complete report was also

circulated to various stakeholders for comment and feedback.

• Feedback Meeting: A meeting was held in Port Elizabeth on 4 March 2010 during which

additional comments and feedback was discussed with role-players in the NMBM.

• External Specialist Review: The Draft Report (Version 1) was provided to the external

reviewer on the project. Comments received from the reviewer forms part of the report review

process.

Comments and input received during the review process was, where possible, incorporated in the

final report. Additional feedback related to received comments was also provided to the NMBM

DMC is a letter accompanying the final report.

4.13 Updating and Delivery of Final Report

Timeframe: March 2010

The Final Report was compiled and delivered to the NMBM DMC, together with all the created GIS

data and electronic copies of the report.



5 Risk Model and Variables The Disaster Risk Assessment approach will be conducted in terms of a guiding theoretical

framework. This theoretical framework provides the guiding principles for setting up and running

the disaster risk model during the conducting of the disaster risk assessment.

A model can be defined as a representation of a set of components, a process, a system, or subject

area, generally developed for understanding, analysis, improvement, and/or replacement of the

subject under investigation. A model therefore provides the opportunity to represent certain aspects

of reality in order to illustrate or determine relationships, impacts or influences that normally might

be difficult to identify. Due to the fact that disaster risk management takes place in complex and

dynamic environments, modelling is ideally suited to determine disaster risk levels.

The disaster risk model was used to represent relevant aspects and characteristics of the NMBM in

order to illustrate the effects of interaction between various HVRe-levels and to calculate relative

levels of disaster risk. It was therefore important to ensure that the results achieved from this

modelling process are accurate, by making use of accurate and sufficient data as a basis for the risk

model.

It should be mentioned that it would be possible to model an exact and detailed replica of the

NMBM study area in a spatial model. Therefore, in order to represent the complex and intricate

NMBM area in a manageable and cost effective spatial model, specific assumptions were made to

represent a simplified, but still appropriate model, of the NMBM. Furthermore, specific limitations

and challenges with regards to the base data, information and modelling approach were identified

during the assessment process. Some of these assumptions and limitations are presented in Section

5.8.

The guiding theoretical framework as well as technical aspects of the risk modelling and assessment

process are discussed below:

5.1 The Disaster Risk Formula

The Disaster Risk Model is based on an internationally accepted mathematical formula, which is

supported by the NDMF, taking into account the various factors that constitute the level of risk,

based on specific hazards, in a specific area. The mathematical formula can be illustrated as:

where:

Risk The probability of harmful consequences or expected losses resulting from the

interactions of hazards and vulnerable conditions. Conventionally risk is expressed as follows: Risk

(R) = Hazard x Vulnerability. However, the concepts of Manageability and Capacity (combined as

Resilience) are also included in the formula.

Hazard x Vulnerability Manageability + Capacity

Risk =



Hazard A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon and/or human activity that may

cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental

degradation.

Vulnerability The degree to which an individual, a household, a community, an area or a

development may be adversely affected by the impact of a hazard. Conditions of vulnerability and

susceptibility to the impact of hazards are determined by political, physical, social, economic and

environmental factors or processes. The political aspect of vulnerability is not included in this

assessment since it entails a long process of investigating the political climate and culture of

different areas within the study area, which is a complete long-term study on its own.

Manageability For the purpose of this assessment Manageability will be defined as the combination

of all the strengths and resources available within the government departments and line-functions

(such as Fire Services, South African Police Service, Department of Health, etc) that can reduce the

level of risk or mitigate the effects of a disaster. Capacity may include physical, institutional, social

or economic means as well as skilled personnel or collective attributes such as leadership and

management.

Capacity For the purpose of this assessment Capacity will be defined as the combination of all

the strengths and resources available within the community or society (including NGOs, CBOs,

Faith Based Organizations, etc.) that can reduce the level of risk or the effects of a disaster. Capacity

may include physical, institutional, social or economic means as well as skilled personnel or

collective attributes such as leadership and management.

Resilience The combined value between the Manageability and Capacity values are referred to

as the Resilience value.

5.2 Concepts and Model Variables

In order to accurately interpret the results from the risk assessment, it is important to understand the

effects of different HVRes levels on calculated Risk levels. The underlying principle of the Disaster

Risk formula is that an increased Hazard and Vulnerability level, combined with decreased

Resilience levels will lead to an increased Risk level. Whereas, a reduced Hazard and Vulnerability

level, combined with an increased Resilience level, will lead to a decreased Risk level. A change in

any one of the individual HVRes values will have an impact on the resulting Risk level. This

relationship is shown below:



Hazard Vulnerability Resilience Risk

Hazard Vulnerability Resilience Risk

Figure 5-1: Relationship of Hazard, Vulnerability, Resilience and Risk levels

An example of a flood hazard event can be used to illustrate this relationship:

Example 1 – High Disaster Risk

A severe flood event, with high water levels and velocities (high hazard value) occurs in an informal

settlement community, where the community has a low income, low level of general health and

informal structures (high vulnerability value). It is also indicated that the local authorities and line

functions (fire services, police, health facilities) or the community based NGOs do not have adequate

resources (such as vehicles, equipment or human resources) to respond to an event (low resilience

value). These circumstances contribute to a high Disaster Risk value.

Example 2 – Low Disaster Risk

A low severity flood event, with low water levels and a low velocity (low hazard value) occurs in a

formal and established community. The community has a high income level, high level of general

health and the infrastructure in the community is designed and constructed to a suitable standard

with required storm water management infrastructure. It is also indicated that both the local

authorities and community based NGOs have adequate levels of resources to respond to this type of

event. This community will be classified as having a low disaster risk level with regard to this flood

event.

It should be remembered that areas with a high vulnerability do not necessary also have a low

resilience value, and that any combination of different hazard, vulnerability and resilience values can

be identified in an area or community. The interaction between these levels is important to

understand and interpret the results (and limitations) or the disaster risk assessment.



5.3 The Use of GIS

Extensive use is made of a Geographical Information System (GIS) during the disaster risk

assessment process. This section provides an overview of the GIS approach for the risk assessment

for the NMBM.

5.3.1 What is a GIS

A Geographical Information Systems (GIS) is an information system that uses a computer to collect,

store, manipulate, analyze, and display geographically referenced data. It consists of various

components, including data, people, hardware, software and processes. Data related to the hazard,

vulnerability, and resilience levels of a specific area or feature is also mostly related to a specific

geographical location on the earth’s surface, and can therefore be represented in a GIS.

The level of disaster risk in a specific area depends on a range of interrelated factors. Amongst these

factors are the spatial extent and distribution of the HVRe related features. A GIS is therefore

ideally suited to conduct this type of modelling process.

In order to present the various HVRes-levels spatially, various individual GIS data layers will be

created. These data layers are used to calculate and spatially represent the risk levels in this study

area. This process is represented below:

Hazard Layer Vulnerability Layer Manageability Layer Capacity Layer

(Hazard x Vulnerability) ÷ (Manageability + Capacity) = RISK

Risk Layer

Figure 5-2: Data Layers to be used in the Disaster Risk Modeling

Even though the Spatial Modelling component of the Risk Assessment process involves a complex

process of inputs and outputs, the basic process is related to the principle described in the previous

section. In the simplest form, the Risk Assessment Process involves the following steps:

• Input; • Processing; and • Output.

Input used in the Risk Assessment process relates to the collected spatial and non-spatial data, and

information. These are further supplemented and refined by using inputs received from participants

and stakeholders through the workshops and consultation sessions.

Processing involves the capturing, transforming/projecting, format changing, quality

control/checking and calculation in both the spatial (GIS) and non-spatial environments. It also

includes re-visiting aspects that may have been collected during the input stage which may need

clarification, i.e. data based on certain stakeholder perceptions or spatial data that may need to be

adjusted/edited.



Output is mostly in the form of descriptions, values or ratings and is presented in the report in the

form of qualitative descriptions, quantitative tables and figures. Maps will be presented as an

integral part of the output since it will clearly identify areas and communities at risk.

5.3.2 Software

The risk assessment includes a spatial disaster risk modelling process. This modelling process was

conducted by making use of ESRI’s ArcView9.3™ software and it’s Spatial Analyst Extension.

5.3.3 Coordinate System

The technical characteristics of the utilised GIS data are described below:

• Datum: Hartebeeshoek 1994; Lo25;

• Projection: Transverse Mercator;

• False Easting: 0.000000;

• False Northing: 0.000000;

• Central Meridian: 25.000000;

• Scale Factor: 1.000000;

• Latitude of Origin: 0.000000;

• Linear Unit: Meter.

5.3.4 Data directory structure

The spatial data structure was designed based on the risk assessment modelling guidelines:

• Base data: Information such as the Demarcated municipal boundaries, wards, cadastre

(erfs/stands) and topographic data, which is not used in the modelling process but used for

mapping purposes.

• Capacity and Manageability: Locations of Fire and Emergency services, police, clinics,

hospitals and other relevant organisations.

• Hazards: All spatial hazard data gathered as well as desktop hazard analysis results.

• Vulnerability: Gathered vulnerability data as well as desktop vulnerability analysis results.

Figure 5-3 provides a view of the directory structure:



Figure 5-3: Directory structure for the digital dat a for the project

5.4 Hazard Severity Indices and Mapping

This section describes the technical aspects and approach used to conduct the hazard assessment and

profiling for the NMBM.

5.4.1 Hazards Description and Categories

The National Disaster Management Framework provides a list of hazards to be considered during a

disaster risk assessment. The hazard categorization is shown in Table 5-1:



Table 5-1: Classification of Hazards according to t he National Disaster Management Framework

For the purpose of the Disaster Risk Assessment for the NMBM, Table 5-1 was further refined and

expanded, and the following hazard categorization was used:

Figure 5-4: Hazard Categories

Each of these main hazard categories contained a number of individual hazards. In order to facilitate

reporting as well as the creation of maps, these individual hazards were grouped into ‘Combined

Hazard Categories’. These categories are shown in Table 5-2:



Table 5-2: Hazards considered during the Disaster R isk Assessment

Hazard Category and Name Transport Hazards - Air Transportation Transport Hazards - Rail Transportation Transport Hazards - Road Transportation Transport Hazards - Water Transportation Civil Unrest - Demonstrations / Riots Civil Unrest - Refugees / Displaced People Civil Unrest - Xenophobic Violence Civil Unrest - Terrorism Civil Unrest - Armed Conflict (Civil/Political War) Civil Unrest - Crime Hydro-meteorological - Drought Environmental Degradation - Deforestation Environmental Degradation - Erosion Environmental Degradation - Land Degradation Environmental Degradation - Loss of Biodiversity Disease / Health - Disease: Animal Disease / Health - Disease: Human Disease / Health - Disease: Plants Fire Hazards - Veld/Forest Fires Fire Hazards - Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Area Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Floods (River, Urban & Dam Failure) Geological Hazards - Earthquake Geological Hazards - Landslides/Mud flows Geological Hazards - Rock-fall Geological Hazards - Subsidence Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Severe Storms (Wind, Hail, Snow, Lightning, Fog) Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Desertification Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Extreme Temperatures Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Spill/Release (Storage & Transportation) Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Fire/Explosion (Storage & Transportation) Infestations - Plant Infestations (Intruder Plants) Infestations - Animal Infestation / Over Population Infestations - Insect Infestation Infestations - Algal Bloom (Red Tide) Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure - Electrical Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure - Information Technology Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure - Sanitation Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure - Transport Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure - Gas Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure - Water Major Event Hazards (Cultural, Religious, Political, Recreational, Commercial, Sport) Pollution - Air Pollution Pollution - Land Pollution Pollution - Water Pollution (Fresh and Sea) Structural Failure - Bridge Failure Structural Failure - Building Failure Structural Failure - Dam failure Oceanographic - Tsunami Oceanographic - Sea Level Rise (Climate Change) Oceanographic - Storm Surge



5.4.2 Approach to Hazard Profiling

The South African National Disaster Management Act as well as the NDMF stipulates that

indigenous knowledge relating to disaster management should be included in Disaster Management

planning, as well as in disaster risk assessments. However, indigenous knowledge, especially when

related to the occurrences of hazard events and disasters, might sometimes be based on a particular

individual’s perception and memory, and might therefore not always be entirely accurate. It is

therefore often valuable to verify indigenous knowledge in a group set-up, where information can be

discussed and verified by more than one member of a specific community. Alternative sources of

information such as incident reports and statistics can provide a formal record of events. However,

formal records might not always be available, or statistics might be captured incorrectly and not

always illustrate or take into account all factors related to specific events (Adams 2001).

For this assessment and related hazard profiling, three approaches were used to compile the hazard

profile of the NMBM. These approaches were:

• Hazard profiling through individual stakeholder consultations and focus group discussions to collect specialist and indigenous knowledge with regards to hazards in the NMBM;

• Desk-top hazard profiling through the use of statistics, reports and base data; and

• GIS Based hazard profiling through the use of GIS base data to identify hazards based on local conditions in the NMBM.

The results of these 3 approaches were compared and are presented in the relevant sections of this

report.

5.4.3 Hazard Profiling through Stakeholder Consulta tion and Indigenous Knowledge

As outlined in Section 4, hazard data was collected during individual stakeholder consultations as

well as capacity building and community participation workshops. The information collected during

these workshops and consultations was captured in an electronic format, and used to calculate

indicative hazard ratings for the various identified hazards. This was done by assigning specific

ratings and weights to the various hazard characteristics. The hazard characteristics used in the

calculation of the indicative hazard ratings were:

• Possibility of occurrence of hazard event (actual vs. probability); • History of occurrence of hazard event; • Seasonal occurrence of hazard event; • Increase in hazard event occurrence;

• Duration of hazard event and effect; • Predictability of event and early warning;

• Effect of hazard event on People; • Effect of hazard event on Buildings;

• Effect of hazard event on Infrastructure; • Effect of hazard event on Environment;

• Effect of hazard event on Economy; and • Size of Area Affected by Hazard event.



An example of the calculation of an indicative hazard rating based on stakeholder inputs is shown in

Figure 5-5:

Stakeholder

Classification

0 - No

1 - Not yet

2 - Has

occurred

X in X

4 seasons

OR

12 months

0 - unkn

1 - Yes

2 - No

1-5 1-5

1 - No

2 - Partia l

3 - Yes

0 - No

1 - Minor

2 - Severe

3 - Tota l

0 - No

1 - Minor

2 - Severe

3 - Total

0 - No

1 - Minor

2 - Severe

3 - Tota l

0 - No

1 - Minor

2 - Severe

3 - Tota l

0 - No

1 - Minor

2 - Severe

3 - Total

1 - prop

2 - ward

3 - few wards

4 - enti re

Hazard

IndicatorsPossibility History Seasonal Increase Duration

Predictab

ility

Effect

People

Effect

Buildings

Effect

Infrastructu

re

Effect

Environment

Effect

EconomyArea Affected

Indicator

Weighting3% 16% 3% 3% 16% 3% 16% 9% 16% 3% 9% 3% 100%

Civil Unrest -

Crime

Robbing of

tourists

Indicator Rating

(0-1)1.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.37

Indicative

Hazard

RatingHazard

Category

Hazard

Description

Figure 5-5: Calculation of Indicative Hazard Values based on Stakeholder Inputs

Representatives were also asked to classify the identified events as either a Class 1, 2 or 3 event.

The description of these classes is shown in Table 5-3:

Table 5-3: Hazard Class Events

Class 1 Class 2 Class 3

Regular Events

(Ordinary, day-to-day

Activities/Incidents)

Rare Events

(Out of ordinary, but still

manageable)

Extreme occurrences

(Extraordinary events, disaster events,

not manageable)

The indicative hazard values based on the stakeholder inputs were compared with the desktop hazard

profiling results in order to compile the hazard profiling tables for the NMBM. The indicative

values were also incorporated into the GIS Hazard Profile of the NMBM.

5.4.4 Desk-Top Hazard Profiling

The desktop hazard profiling was done based on information abstracted from existing base data and

statistics. A desktop hazard assessment was conducted, focussing on the following hazard severity

indicators:

• Disaster Risk (y/n); • Frequency of Occurrence; • Likelihood / Probability; • Seasonal Pattern; • Predictability & possibility for

Early Warning; • Location; • Spatial Extent of Hazard Event

Effect; • Duration of Actual Hazard Event;

• Speed of Onset; • Secondary Hazards; • Effect on People; • Effect on Infrastructure/Services; • Effect on Buildings; • Effect on Environment Resources

(Animals, Plants, Water, Soil); and

• Media value or Reputational risk.

The results received from the desktop assessment were compared with the results from the GIS

modelling, previous assessments and stakeholder perception value, and all of this information was

used to compile the final risk ratings for the NMBM.

Hazard 1 Cat 1

SRK Consulting (Pty) Ltd Disaster Risk Assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality – Final Report 25


5.4.5 GIS Based Hazard Profiling

Hazard profiles were also represented spatially by making use of a GIS. This was done by

considering the land-use/land-cover data of the NMBM, and then mapping specific hazards

applicable to the different land-use/land-cover categories as well as particular features in the

NMBM. The hazard mapping and buffering guidelines are attached in Annexure B – GIS RHVMC

Modelling & Buffer Guidelines.

Information received from stakeholders, as well as information from base data was also included in

the GIS hazard mapping.

5.4.6 Finalizing the Hazard Profile

Figure 5-6 is a summary of the process followed to finalize the hazard values during the NMBM

DRA.

Workshop ConsultationHazard Values

Desktop Hazard Assessment(Non-Spatial)

Desktop Hazard Assessment(Spatial - GIS)

Hazard Ratings

GIS Base Data

Hazard Rating Tables (per Ward)

Hazard Maps

Hazard Rating Tables (for Metro)

Report and StatisticsHazard

Description

HAZARD ASSESSMENT & REPORTING

GIS Hazard Data Layer

Figure 5-6: Hazard Assessment and Reporting Approac h



5.5 Vulnerability Indices and Mapping

Vulnerability assessments and reporting also form part of the DRA process. This vulnerability

profiling for the NMBM consists of three processes. These processes are discussed in the following

sections:

5.5.1 General Vulnerability Description

During the first process, the vulnerability of the NMBM is described in terms of general

vulnerability indicators. This mainly includes census and community survey information. During

this assessment, the vulnerability of the NMBM is described and compared with key indicators of

neighbouring municipalities and areas. This assessment is mainly done in the form of a qualitative

and quantitative description of vulnerability, without the use of specific vulnerability ratings.

5.5.2 Vulnerability Rating: Combined Land Cover / L and Use Data Layer

The second approach to vulnerability mapping in the NMBM involves the classification of land

use/land-cover data. Land use data was used to classify the vulnerability of various land uses within

the study area to the effects of different types of hazards. The vulnerability of the various areas in

the NMBM was classified in terms of social, structural, environmental and economic vulnerability.

This profiling was based on a newly created data layer. This data layer was created after reviewing

and combining the zoning and land-cover data received from the NMBM and the NDMC by making

use of Points of Interest and Arial photography data. Specific vulnerability factors for Social,

Structural and Economic vulnerability was assigned the created data layer. The Environmental

vulnerability was based on the Ecosystems Status 2007 data received from the NMBM. The results

of this vulnerability profiling are discussed in Section 8.2.



Table 5-4: Vulnerability Factors

Land-Use Soci Stru Eco Land-Use Soci Stru Eco

Agriculture 0.30 0.60 0.70 Open Space 0.10 0.10 0.10

Airfield 0.60 0.80 0.60 Park 0.30 0.10 0.10

Airport 0.80 1.00 0.80 Plantations 0.10 0.30 0.70

Authority 0.60 0.60 0.60 Prison 1.00 0.70 0.20

Business 0.70 0.70 0.70 Private Nature Reserve 0.30 0.50 0.50

Canal 0.10 0.50 0.10 Race Track (Cars) 0.60 0.60 0.30

Cemeteries and Sewage Disposal 0.10 0.60 0.20 Railways 0.10 0.80 0.40

Church 0.80 0.60 0.20 Residential 0.80 0.60 0.30

Coastline 0.20 0.10 0.20 Residential Rural 0.70 0.50 0.10

Commercial 0.70 0.70 0.80 Resort 0.90 0.70 0.60

Creche 1.00 0.60 0.30 Roads and Parking Areas 0.10 0.60 0.30

Dam 0.10 0.80 0.10 Rural Residential 0.70 0.40 0.10

Game Farm 0.30 0.50 0.60 Saltworks 0.20 0.30 0.60

Government 0.60 0.70 0.60 Schools 1.00 0.70 0.20

Harbour 0.70 0.80 1.00 Services/Servitude 0.10 0.80 0.20

Hospital 1.00 0.80 0.50 Small holdings 0.60 0.60 0.50

Industrial 0.70 0.80 0.80 Special Environmental 0.10 0.20 0.20

Informal Settlements 1.00 0.30 0.20 Sport Stadium 1.00 0.70 0.30

Institutional 0.60 0.60 0.60 Sport and Recreation 0.60 0.40 0.10

Lighthouse 0.40 0.80 0.20 Undeveloped Disturbed Areas 0.10 0.10 0.10

Local Authority 0.60 0.60 0.40 Undeveloped Natural Areas 0.10 0.10 0.10

Major Hazardous Installation 0.60 0.80 1.00 University 0.80 0.80 0.50

Mine 0.60 0.60 0.60 Waste Site 0.10 0.10 0.30

National Park 0.30 0.50 0.50 Waterbody 0.10 0.10 0.10

Note: Soc – Social, Stru – Structural, Eco – Economic.

5.5.3 Vulnerability Rating: Socio-Economic Ward Pro files

The third approach in assessing the vulnerability in the NMBM is by making use of socio-economic

data for each of the wards in the NMBM. The Census 20011 data (StatsSA, 2001) was used for this

assessment.

During the Socio-economic ward assessment, key census indicators were used to calculate the

relative vulnerability of each of the wards in the NMBM. Indicators that were used included:

• Access to potable water;

• Access to serviced (piped/pumped) sanitation;

• Access to communication; and

• Access to energy sources.

The results of this assessment are discussed under Section 8.3.

1 See Assumptions and Limitations with regard to the Census 2001 data under Section 5.8.



5.5.4 Finalizing the Vulnerability Profile

Figure 5-7 represents an overview of the process followed to conduct the Vulnerability assessment

for the NMBM.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT & REPORTING

GIS Vulnerability Data Layer

Desktop Vulnerability Assessment(Spatial - GIS)

Vulnerability Description

Vulnerability Rating Tables (per Ward)

Vulnerability Maps

Report and Statistics

GIS Base Data Census DataVulnerability Rating Tables (per Ward)

Figure 5-7: Vulnerability Assessment and Reporting Approach

5.6 Resilience Indices and Mapping

Resilience mapping was required as part of this assessment. Resilience Mapping refers to a

combination of “Manageability” and ”Capacity”. The resilience assessment consisted of two main

activities. The first was based on resilience profiling based on input received from stakeholders. The

second approach was GIS based resilience mapping.

5.6.1 Resilience Profiling through Stakeholder Cons ultation

During the stakeholder consultation workshops and interviews, representatives from various

departments and line functions were provided with the opportunity to do a self assessment of their

own organization in terms of the capacity to fulfil their responsibility in disaster management. The

representatives were provided with a questionnaire, instructing them to rate the capacity of their own

line function/department in terms of the capacity to conduct the required day-to-day, disaster risk

reduction as well as disaster response activities. Representatives were also instructed that the result

of the assessment should not act as a ‘wish list’ but should reflect the current and actual resources

required to adequately perform disaster management related activities.



Representatives were asked to rate their capacity in terms of the following aspects:

• Staff/Human Resources; • Expertise, Experience & Specialist Knowledge; • Vehicles;

• Equipment; • Funding/Budget;

• Facilities/Buildings; • Risk Reduction Plans, Policies & Programmes; and • Response Plans, Policies & Programmes.

Representatives were instructed to rate the above mentioned categories in terms of one of the

following ratings:

• 1 Representing an insufficient level of resources, equipment, or plans to fulfil the

disaster management related responsibilities;

• 2 Representing a sufficient level of resources, equipment, or plans to fulfil the disaster

management related responsibilities; and

• 3 Representing a more than sufficient level of resources, equipment, or plans to fulfil

the disaster management related responsibilities.

Representatives also had the opportunity to identify and describe specific needs their organization

has in order to reduce disaster risk or ensure a more effective response to disasters. It should,

however, be mentioned that, the results achieved during the capacity self-evaluation is based only on

the feedback received from the representatives, and was not subjected to additional confirmation and

verification, and should therefore be seen in this light.

The result of this assessment was used to calculate average resilience values for each of the role

players and the results are discussed in Section 9.1.

5.6.2 GIS Based Resilience Profiling

In order to model the disaster risk in the NMBM spatially, it was required to represent the resilience

values spatially. This was done by creating and combining a number of GIS datasets:

The first approach related to mapping the location of key line-functions, and to represent

approximate service areas spatially. The basis of this approach relates to the assumption that

communities that are located in proximity of facilities such as hospitals, police stations and fire

stations, might have relatively more access to services than communities located far away from

facilities. Based on this, it was therefore assumed that communities closer to facilities will have a

comparatively higher resilience value, than communities that were located further away from

facilities.

An example of resilience mapping based on the location of key facilities (fire stations) is shown in

Figure 5-8.



Figure 5-8: Resilience mapping based on location of Fire Stations in the NMBM.

The second approach to resilience mapping is based on the land-use/land-cover data. The basis of

this approach relates to the assumption that certain land-use/land-cover types can facilitate disaster

management actions better than other land-use/land-cover types. As an example, it can be assumed

that disaster management role players can respond more effectively to disaster and incidents by

making use of established roads and infrastructure, as opposed to undeveloped areas. Based on this,

developed and serviced areas will have a higher resilience value, than undeveloped or un-serviced

areas.

In order to compile a resilience map based on land-use/land-cover data, specific resilience values

had to be assigned to difference land-use/land-cover classifications. The values used during this

assessment are shown in Table 5-5:



Table 5-5: Resilience values used for Land-use/Land -cover resilience mapping.

Landuse Core Landuse Core

Agriculture 0.500 Open Space 0.300

Airfield 0.627 Park 0.500

Airport 0.627 Plantations 0.700

Authority 0.600 Prison 0.700

Business 0.750 Private Nature Reserve 0.600

Canal 0.100 Race Track (Cars) 0.700

Cemeteries and Sewage Disposal 0.500 Railways 0.500

Church 0.600 Residential 0.550

Coastline 0.100 Residential Rural 0.550

Commercial 0.750 Resort 0.700

Creche/nursery/pre-school 0.600 Roads and Parking Areas 0.500

Dam 0.100 Rural Residential 0.550

Game Farm 0.600 Salt works 0.300

Government 0.600 Schools 0.500

Harbour 0.650 Services/Servitude 0.667

Hospital 0.617 Small holdings 0.550

Industrial 0.777 Special Environmental 0.300

Informal Settlements 0.200 Sport Stadium 0.600

Institutional 0.600 Sport and Recreation 0.500

Lighthouse 0.600 Undeveloped Disturbed Areas 0.300

Local Authority 0.600 Undeveloped Natural Areas 0.300

Major Hazardous Installation 0.800 University 0.600

Mine 0.600 Waste Site 0.300

National Park 0.500 Water body 0.100

The results from the land-use/land-cover resilience mapping are shown in Section 9.3. The two

created resilience data layers were combined to create a single resilience data layer which was used

in the disaster risk model. This layer was also used to abstract resilience values for each of the

wards for the NMBM.

5.6.3 Finalizing the Resilience Profile

The final resilience profile (consisting of Capacity & Manageability data) for the NMBM consisted

of a number of final deliverables:

• The first deliverable is the description of the various resilience role players as contained in

Sections 9.1 and 9.2.

• The second deliverable is the Resilience map as shown in Section 9.3.

• The third deliverable is the resilience factors per ward, as shown in Section 9.4.

These components should not be considered as stand-alone resilience profiles of the NMBM, but

should be considered together in order to analyse and understand the resilience profile of the

NMBM:



RESILIENCE (CAPACITY & MANAGEABILITY) ASSESSMENT & REPORTING

GIS Resilience Data Layer

Workshop ConsultationResilience Values

Analysis of Location(Spatial - GIS)

Resilience Ratings

GIS Base Data

Resilience Rating Tables (per Ward)

Resilience Maps

Resilience Rating Tables (per RP & Metro)

Resilience DescriptionReports and Statistics

Figure 5-9: Resilience Assessment and Reporting App roach for the NMBM

5.7 Risk Profiling and Rating

The final risk values were calculated by making use of the defined risk formula, and combining the

appropriate HVRe values and data layers. The result of this process included maps, descriptions and

rating tables.

5.7.1 Interpreting the Results

The deliverables from the Risk Assessment include, amongst other items, various maps and tables.

In addition to ratings, colour coding is also used to represent various hazard, vulnerability, resilience

or risk levels.

In interpreting the maps and tables, it is important to consider the following:

Tables – The tables represent the quantitative results of the various calculations, and provide a tool

for comparing different levels of the classifications, for example, the severity of various hazards. In

most cases, the tables are also colour coded, with Red indicating a negative value (High Hazard,

Vulnerability or Risk), with Green indication a positive value (Low Hazard, Vulnerability or Risk).

Maps – The results contained in the maps provides a spatial representation of the various Hazard,

Vulnerability, Resilience and Risk levels. For example, Road Transport Hazards may be high on

major routes. It should however be stated that maps represent only a spatial representation of the

component under investigation, and different maps should not be compared with one another. For

example, a Red Hazard Rating on a Fire Hazard map should not be compared with a Red Hazard

Rating for Transportation Hazards. The rating only relates to the spatial occurrence of the hazard.

All comparison should be done on the basis of the provided prioritization table which was compiled

for the NMBM.



Table 5-6: Rating Classifications in Reporting Tabl es and Maps

Colour Hazard Vulnerability Resilience Risk Priorit y

Red A high hazard rating, causing an increased risk

A high vulnerability rating, causing an increased risk rating

A low resilience rating, causing a increased risk

A high risk rating

Higher Priority, mitigation or treatment options should be implemented over a shorter term

Yellow A medium hazard rating

A medium vulnerability rating

A medium resilience rating

A medium risk rating

Medium Priority, mitigation or treatment measures should be implemented over the medium term

Green A low hazard rating, causing a decreased risk

A low vulnerability rating, causing a decreased risk rating

A high resilience rating, causing a decreased risk rating

A low risk rating

Lower Priority, mitigation or treatment measures should be implemented over a longer term

It is important to consider that the highest risk rating will be achieved in an area where the Hazard

and Vulnerability levels are high, while the Resilience levels are low. This interaction between the

three components should be considered to determine the risk level within any area under

investigation.

5.8 Assumptions and Limitations

5.8.1 Data Limitations and Challenges

It should be noted that SRK are not custodians of any of the project data and therefore cannot

guarantee the accuracy of data received from the data custodians consulted during this project or any

of the involved stakeholders. Where multiple sets of the same data were gathered the data was

evaluated and an attempt was made to use the most accurate or most recently available data.

It should also be considered that most spatial entities are dynamic and changes occur over time.

Changes in land use for instance can have major implications on the modelling results as both a large

amount of hazard information and vulnerability information is based on land use data.

It must therefore also be considered that the modelling of disaster risk is a dynamic process that

needs to be updated regularly to reflect any changes in the physical environment and human

settlement and activities.

The following specific challenges were experienced with regard to the project approach and related

aspects:

• The land use data used for hazard and vulnerability modeling was created by merging the 2006

land cover, most recent zoning data and list of informal settlements received from Nelson

Mandela Municipality into a single polygon layer. (Also see description in Section 5.5.2). This

layer was then overlaid on the 2007 aerial photography and points of interest from Business

Connexion (Pty) Ltd and GISCOE (Pty) Ltd. The general current land use was then captured

from this information in a desktop exercise. This process required extensive input in terms of

adjusting and confirming that the land-cover/land-use data layer used in the assessment was as

accurate as reasonably possible. It is, however, foreseen that there will still be gaps in the land

use data especially as the zoning data received from NMBM is in places not representative of the

actual land use.



• Statistics from the Fire Services (DMC) were useful, but only provided the total number of

events over a particular period, and does not provide any information with regards to trends or

new developments. Calculated probabilities and frequency therefore represent an indication of a

probability or frequency based on the number of incidents over the entire period, and do not

necessarily represent the current probability or frequency of any particular event occurring.

• The statistics and classes/categories were used “as is” and the classification of different events

was not investigated or verified.

• There is a serious need for a comprehensive Information Management System that can be used

for the capturing of information with regard to incidents in the NMBM. Due to the current need,

incident related statistics were only available from the Fire Services, and more detailed analysis

of incidents or events was not possible. Statistics and information from other line functions

(such as private emergency services or the SAPS) were not included in this assessment, but

inputs received from these stakeholders during individual interviews were incorporated where

possible.

• Information used during the status quo assessment and vulnerability mapping consisted of both

the StatsSA 2007 Community survey as well as the 2001 StatsSA Census data. Due to the fact

that 2007 Community Survey data was only available for municipal level, and not ward level,

comparison of ward level vulnerability was done with 2001 Census information. This

information is currently considered outdated, and it is recommended that the vulnerability

mapping exercise be repeated as soon as the Census data from the next census (Census 2011) is

made available.

5.8.2 Limitations and Challenges to the Methodology

• The project scope did not allow for independent and in depth assessment of the resilience levels

of departments, line-functions or community role-players. The results from the self-evaluation

were used as a basic indication of the resilience levels (capacity and manageability) and needs

within the NMBM. It is proposed that a more detailed and in depth assessment of resilience be

conducted.

• Resilience values are not hazard specific, but average multi-hazard resilience values for role

players in the NMBM were used. It is proposed that, should additional funds be available, a

more detailed hazard-specific resilience assessment be conducted in the NMBM.



6 Status Quo Assessment of the NMBM The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) was established in 2000 by joining the local

authorities of Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Despatch and several smaller adjacent local authorities into

one metropolitan municipality with a new demarcated boundary (NMBM 2006). The boundary is

shown in Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1: NMBM Locality Map



The current characteristics of the NMBM need to be taken into account during the Risk Assessment

process. This section focuses on the characteristics of the NMBM, and investigates how the current

situation impacts on disaster risks in the NMBM.

6.1 Geographical Setting

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is located to the south-east of the Cacadu District, in the

south-western region of the Eastern Cape Province. The Municipal area extends from the mouth of

the van Stadens River in the south-west to the Sundays River mouth in the north-east, incorporating

Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Despatch, and covers an area of 195 412 ha (1 954 km2) (SRK, 2009).

A number of major geographical features predominate the landscape of Nelson Mandela Bay, in

particular the Winterhoek Mountains in the north-west and the van Stadensberg mountains in the

south-west. The two half-heart bays of Algoa and St Francis, which straddle the eastern and

southern coastline of Nelson Mandela Bay respectively, are separated by the Cape Recife headland

in the south-east. A series of ancient coastal dunes, which are vegetated by a mosaic of Indian

Ocean forest, Subtropical thicket and Coastal fynbos characterise the southern part of the

Municipality (SRK, 2009).

Four major rivers (Sundays, Swartkops, Maitland and van Stadens Rivers) and their associated

estuaries are present within Nelson Mandela Bay, with two each along the south-western and north-

eastern seaboards. The lower reaches of the Papenkuils River have been canalized for decades, are

severely degraded, and consequently no longer functional as an estuary (SRK, 2009).

About 40% of the natural features of the Municipality have already been lost due to urban

development, industry, cultivation, grazing, mining and alien plant infestation. The central and

eastern parts of the Municipality are largely developed for residential, commercial and industrial

purposes. The northern, western and most southern parts of Nelson Mandela Bay are rural in nature

and are predominantly used for agricultural, low density residential and conservation purposes. Due

to the formal safe-guarding of natural areas via nature reserves and limited development in some

areas to date, vast parts of the Municipality are of high scenic value and underpin Nelson Mandela

Bay's tourism economy (SRK, 2009).

6.2 Weather and Climate

The climate is mild and generally frost-free in winter. The summers can be very warm. Rainfall has

a peak in autumn and spring with a maximum of not more than 500 mm. Desiccating, stiff winds

from the southeast and the southwest that blow in most months further contribute to the aridity of the

area (NMBM, 2009).

The weather of the NMBM area is mainly dependent on atmospheric depressions that move over the

region in an easterly direction followed by anticyclones (Stone et al. 1998 in NMBM, 2009). In

winter, the approaching depression is preceded by a coastal low-pressure system accompanied by a

north-easterly wind, changing either to northerly or northwesterly berg winds. Following the low-

pressure system, the westerly to southwesterly wind brings cooler weather with low cloud. As the

depression passes, there is a tendency for more wind and rain to occur. Winds are often strong,



sometimes giving rise to gales and rain lasting from 12 to 36 hours. In summer, the passage of

coastal low pressure systems are followed by cloudy, occasionally rainy weather brought about by

following cells of high pressure. Temperature inversions are commonly observed during winter

mornings above the study area and have the tendency to inhibit vertical air pollution dispersion

(NMBM, 2009).

The climate of Nelson Mandela Bay is complex, as it falls at the confluence of several climatic

regimes, the most important of which are temperate and subtropical. The area has a warm temperate

climate and the temperature ranges are not extreme. Exceptionally high temperatures may be

experienced during berg wind conditions, which occur frequently during autumn and winter prior to

the arrival of low pressure systems from the west. Extreme temperatures also occur during summer,

with little accompanying wind (SRK, 2009). Average maximum and minimum monthly

temperatures for Port Elizabeth are shown below.

10 118

42

-1 -12 2

3 69

39 3841

3935

32 3331

39 3936 36

-5

5

15

25

35

45

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Temperature in the NMBM(oC)

1961-1990: Lowest Recorded 1961-1990: Highest Recorded

1961-1990: Avg Daily Max 1961-1990: Avg Daily Min

1957 - 2002: Avg Monthly Max 1957 - 2002: Avg Monthly Min

Source: NMBM, 2009 & SRK, 2009

Figure 6-2: Temperatures in the NMBM

The Nelson Mandela Bay area has a bimodal rainfall pattern, with peaks in autumn and spring.

Annual rainfall in Nelson Mandela Bay ranges from 440 mm to 820 mm. The annual rainfall for

Port Elizabeth's is approximately 618 mm; however, the Coega area receives approximately 400 mm

of rain annually. Rain occurs throughout the year as a result of convective summer rain and winter

rain associated with the passage of frontal troughs. The long-term average rainfall data for Port

Elizabeth is illustrated in Figure 6-3. The annual mean relative humidity of the air is 78%. Port

Elizabeth can expect about 16 thunderstorm days per annum (Stone et al, 1998 in SRK, 2009).



36.8 39.5 51.4 50 51.1 56.8 49.1 71.6 52.8

57.8 57.9

43.468

121

224

10576

6099

77

429

46 52

95

10

100

1000

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Rainfall in the NMBM(mm)

1961 - 1990: Avg Monthly (mm) 1970 - 2004: Avg Monthly (mm)

1961 - 1990: Max 24h Rainfall

Source: NMBM 2009 & SRK 2009

Figure 6-3: Rainfall in the NMBM

Source: Water Research Commission (2005)

Figure 6-4: Annual Average Rainfall in the NMBM

Winds at Port Elizabeth reflect the seasonal variation of the atmospheric circulation systems and the

influence of coastal lows. Westerly to south-westerly winds are the most prevalent, but during the

summer months, easterly to south-easterly winds are almost as frequent. During winter, offshore

(north-westerly) winds occur more frequently than in summer. This region of the South African

coast experiences strong winds and occasional gales regardless of the season. The prevailing

direction of these winds is west-south-west to south-west (Figure 8). Fresh winds (of >8 m.s-1) are

fairly frequent, with the highest prevalence of strong winds in September to December (Stone et al.

1998 in NMBM, 2009).



Source: SA Weather Services in NMBM, 2009

Figure 6-5: Wind rose for Port Elizabeth

6.3 Natural Environment

6.3.1 Coastline and Marine Environmental

The Nelson Mandela Bay coastline is almost 100km in length, extending from the mouth of the van

Stadens River in the south-west to the Sundays River mouth in the north-east. The two half-heart

bays of Algoa and St Francis, which straddle the eastern and southern coastline of Nelson Mandela

Bay respectively, are separated by the Cape Recife headland. The southern beaches are interspersed

with rocky and sandy shores, with the north-eastern beaches predominated by sandy shores (SRK,

2008).

However, the characters of all the beaches are highly diverse due to the varied influences of deep-sea

swell height, period and direction, prevailing winds, local geology and oceanography, and the Cape

Recife headland. Four functional estuaries are present within Nelson Mandela Bay, with two each

along the south-western and north-eastern seaboards. The north-eastern estuaries at the mouths of

the Swartkops and Sundays Rivers are characterized by substantial freshwater inputs from these



perennial rivers and are permanently open to the sea. The south-western estuaries at the mouths of

the Maitland and van Stadens Rivers receive limited, seasonal freshwater input and are

predominantly closed. They are generally only open after substantial rainfall or very high surf

events. The lower reaches of the Papenkuils River have been canalized for decades, are severely

degraded, and consequently no longer functional as an estuary (SRK, 2008).

High levels of phyto- and zooplankton production along the coast support commercially viable

shoals of epipelagic fish, such as Anchovy and Pilchard. These species form the food base for

substantial diversity and abundance of predatory fish, seabirds and marine mammals (Smale et al,

1994 in SRK,, 2008). The abundance of shellfish along the coastline is also notable. The islands of

Brenton, Jahleel and St Croix (collectively known as the Islands of the Cross) occur a few kilometers

offshore of the north-eastern seaboard and are located between the mouths of the Swartkops and

Sundays Rivers (SRK, 2008).

The southern rural coastal zone of Nelson Mandela Bay, which extends from the van Stadens River

mouth to Cape Recife point, is characterized by a series of ancient dunes, which are vegetated by a

mosaic of Indian Ocean forest, Subtropical thicket and Coastal fynbos. The series of dunes increases

rapidly in altitude, from sea level to 270 m over as little as 1.6 km in places. This rapid change in

topography provides expansive vistas of the southern coastal belt of Nelson Mandela Bay, with

much of this area being characterized by intact natural vegetation, farmland or small urban nodes. As

such this area remains of immense aesthetic beauty, unlike much of the coastal zone in and around

the country's cities and large towns. Mobile dune systems feed sand into bays along the southern

coastal belt and are flanked by permanent or temporarily stable vegetated areas. In light of the

contrast of landscapes, the relatively unspoilt vistas and the country roads in this area, the southern

rural coastal zone of Nelson Mandela Bay is a prime tourist attraction of Nelson Mandela Bay (SRK,

2008).

The near shore environment of the area is predominated by rocky wave-cut platforms, sandy

beaches, and mobile dune fields. The near shore is subject to substantial wave action, particularly

during the winter months when large, long-period south-westerly swells originating in the southern

ocean meet their final destination along the rocky and sandy shores of this section of coastline. The

area is also exposed to periodic strong- to gale-force south-westerly winds throughout the year (SRK

, 2008).

The southern urban coastal zone of Port Elizabeth is one of the longest permanently inhabited parts

of Nelson Mandela Bay. The sheltered nature of the coast line due to the influence of the Cape

Recife peninsula resulted in this section of the coast being the only safe anchorage along the south-

eastern Cape coast until the 18th century. The very gradual gradient of the shoreline provides ideal

bathing opportunities, with the most popular beaches including Hobie Beach, Humewood Beach,

Kings Beach and Pollok Beach. The maintenance of green open space between the beaches and

adjacent infrastructure has ensured that the visual characteristics of the beaches have not been lost

(SRK, 2008).



The Port Elizabeth harbour lies at the non-functional mouth of the Baakens River. The port is

moderate in size and provides berthing for a resident fleet of yachts and fishing vessels, as well as

passing container vessels, amongst others. The Port Elizabeth harbour and adjacent retail area was

earmarked in 2002 for urban renewal by the Mandela Bay Development Agency, which could result

in the development of a waterfront within the existing Port Elizabeth harbour (SRK, 2008).

The coastline north of the Port Elizabeth harbour has been subject to substantial erosion due to the

impediment of sand deposition beyond the harbour breakwater. However, the re-establishment of

the North End beach via the pumping of sand across the breakwater has recently been mooted (SRK,

2008).

The northern peri-urban and rural beaches of Nelson Mandela Bay extend from the Swartkops River

mouth to the Sundays River mouth, forming part of the expansive Algoa Bay dunefield. These

beaches are predominated by sandy shores. The beaches provide excellent shore-angling

opportunities and play host to regular competitions. The beaches are well used for walking,

particularly for dogs. The beaches of Joost Park and Wells Estate are also very popular during the

summer months for swimming, sunbathing, picnicking and braaiing. The Algoa Bay section of

Nelson Mandela Bay is also home to 2 island groups, namely the Islands of the Cross (St Croix,

Jahleel, and Brenton islands) and the Bird Island group (Bird, Seal and Stag islands and the Black

Rocks outcrop), which are important roosting and breading sites for seabirds (SRK, 2008).

6.3.2 Biodiversity

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is situated in the southern-eastern most corner of the Cape

Floristic Region (CFR), South Africa. The CFR is an area of exceptional floristic diversity and

endemism (Cowling and Hilton-Taylor, 1994). A conservation priority within the CFR is the

lowlands of the Nelson Mandela Metropole. Nelson Mandela Bay is an area of convergence of five

of South Africa's seven biomes; namely the Fynbos, Subtropical Thicket, Forest, Nama Karoo, and

Grassland biomes (Low & Rebelo, 1998). Such a concentration of biomes, particularly within a city,

is unparalleled in the world. The remaining natural habitats of the area are currently being severely

fragmented by urban development, industry, cultivation, grazing, mining and alien plant infestation

(SRK, 2009).

Based on the geographical location of Nelson Mandela Bay, tourism development is a major catalyst

for economic growth and a local strength. Bed-nights spent in Nelson Mandela Bay have been

consistently increasing with a 10% annual increase in the occupancy rate. The quality of the local

beaches is confirmed by the fact that no less than four beaches have Blue Flag status (IDP, 2009).

Nelson Mandela Bay is an excellent point from which to explore African big game and wildlife. The

City is situated within half an hour’s drive of world acclaimed game reserves with the Big Five and

which include the famous Addo National Elephant Park and Shamwari Game Reserve (IDP, 2009).

Known for its great biodiversity, the area has no less than five of the six land biomes in South

Africa. The region also contains three of the 21 internationally recognised biodiversity hotspots

(IDP, 2009).



6.4 Built Environment

The development and expansion of Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Despatch since 1820 has taken

place in a fairly slow, yet steady manner. During this time a number of conservation areas (nature

reserves) were also established. However, a marked increase in urban development has taken place

in the now Nelson Mandela Bay municipal area since 2000, which reached a peak between 2003 and

2005 as a result of a national residential property boom (SRK, 2009). This has resulted in a

substantial recent loss of natural areas within the Municipality. Furthermore, difficulties in applying

sound land use planning and management principles have also resulted in inappropriate

developments at key locations within the Nelson Mandela Bay coastal zone (e.g. Noordhoek

Boathouses and the lower parts of the Blue Horizon Bay village) (SRK, 2009).

Urban residents around the world are becoming increasingly isolated from the natural environment,

with a consequent substantial decrease in awareness of the natural environment, and its value to

society, amongst city dwellers (Balmford, 2002). This phenomenon is particularly relevant within

the context of Nelson Mandela Bay, the Eastern Cape Province's largest city. However, conversely,

improved road infrastructure has provided greater access to the natural, cultural, historical and scenic

resources of Nelson Mandela Bay. This has provided increased opportunities for the residents of,

and visitors to, Nelson Mandela Bay to develop an appreciation for these resources and an increased

awareness of the pressures upon them (e.g. urban sprawl, coastal ribbon development, etc.) (SRK,

2009).

6.4.1 Land-use Trends

The steady international recovery of the Rand since late 2001, the strong management of inflation in

South Africa in recent years, steady economic growth, improved investor confidence in the country,

and reductions in domestic interest rates have all translated into greater private sector investment in

South Africa since 2001 as well as a boom in the national property market between 2002 and mid-

2006.

These factors, coupled with government's aggressive infrastructure development plan that includes

the development of the Ngqura Port and Coega Industrial Development Zone in Nelson Mandela

Bay, have resulted to a vastly increased demand for land for residential, commercial and industrial

purposes in the Municipality over the last five years (SRK, 2009).

In view of the growing economy and demand for food, intensive agriculture in the Municipality has

shown a moderate increase in land requirements, but this has been largely limited to chicken

batteries and piggeries that have primarily been established on existing agricultural lands (SRK,

2009).

However, the continued low returns experienced within the conventional extensive agricultural

sector (e.g. dairy and cattle farming) in the Municipality has further entrenched the long-standing

stagnation and decline of this sector. Responses to such pressures have resulted in either exits from

the sector entirely, a switch to other extensive agricultural practices (e.g. game farming), or the

adoption of beneficiation approaches. The overall result of these responses from a land use

perspective, coupled with the continued demand for land for residential, intensive agricultural and

industrial purposes, has been a negative growth in traditional extensive agricultural land use in the



Municipality and the conversion of many farms to residential estates, game farms and lodges,

chicken batteries and piggeries, and industrial land (SRK, 2009).

The primary areas that have experience major residential growth have been Lorraine, Motherwell,

Blue Water Bay, Summerstrand, and Bloemendal. The primary areas that have experience major

industrial growth have been Coega and Greenbushes. The primary areas that have experience major

commercial growth have been Walmer, Newton Park and Motherwell.

The demand for land has also resulted in a marked increase in property values in recent years, which

began as early as 1999, peaked between 2003 and late 2004, and then began to slow slightly into

2006 and more so into 2007. The increase in values has continued in recent months, but at a

progressively reduced rate due to three upward adjustments in the interest rate (SRK, 2009).

6.5 Population and Socio-Economic Characteristics

6.5.1 Provincial Socio-Economic Trends

The Rapid Assessment of Service Delivery and Socio-Economic Survey conducted for the Eastern

Cape Province in 2006 recorded some information with regard to the Provincial Socio-economic

trends. Even though some of these aspects might not have a direct impact on the NMBM, it is

important to consider the indirect impact of these trends on the NMBM.

Migration: Migration is increasingly motivated by access to development and infrastructure. In the

1990s, the most dramatic shift was the establishment of hundreds of new informal settlements in

small towns. Inter-rural movement within same districts was a dominant trend. Long distance

migration saw former homeland residents (mostly men) pour into major metropolitan areas like Cape

Town while women opted for urban centers closer to home. After 2000 there was a striking new

tendency for women to engage in circular migration – joining the formal job sector in urban areas

while maintaining a strong attachment to their rural homes and kin. Metropolitan areas continue to

swell with an influx of migrants from rural areas and former homelands (ECP, 2006).

The following findings with regard to Poverty, Vulnerable Groups & Basic Service Delivery are

important from a disaster management point of view:

• Households were most likely to invest in funerals, reflecting HIV/Aids.

• In rural areas, especially former Ciskei and Transkei, 1/3 of households were headed by

women over 65.

• Three out of four informal settlement households had an income of less than R1500 a month.

• Urban households had, on average, twice as much access to services than rural households.

• 7 out of 10 urban households rated their municipality “bad” while about half rated their

municipality “very bad” (ECP, 2006).



6.5.2 Population

Nelson Mandela Bay has a population of 1,1 million and covers an area of 1 950 km². It is estimated

that there are 289 000 households in formal areas. Although the situation changes constantly, the

most recent studies show that there are 38 000 households in informal areas and approximately 42

000 qualifying households in backyard shacks (IDP, 2009).

NMBM

City of Tshwane

City of Cape Town

City of

Johannesburg

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

3,500,000

4,000,000

4,500,000

Population Estimates

Source: 2007 Community Survey, StatsSA

Figure 6-6: Comparison of Population on Metropolita n Level

In comparison to other Metropolitan municipalities in South Africa, the NMBM has a total lower

population. The comparison between the NMBM population and neighbouring municipalities in the

Eastern Cape is shown below:

UkhahlambaCacadu

Alfred Nzo

Chris Hani

NMBM

Amatole

O.R.Tambo

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

1,800,000

2,000,000

Population Estimates

Source: 2007 Community Survey, StatsSA

Figure 6-7: Comparison of Population on Provincial Level



Population density is an important factor for disaster management planning and risk assessments.

Figure 6-8 illustrates the variations of population density within the NMBM. Each dot represents a

100 people. The dots are, however, randomly placed, and do not necessarily represent a particular

settlement of suburb.

Source: StatsSA Census 2001

Figure 6-8: Population Density in the NMBM

The age profile of the NMBM also plays an important role in disaster management, especially with

regard to vulnerability and resilience indicators. Changes in the age profile over a particular time

period can also provide insight into the movement of people between areas. According to the IDP

(2009) 35% of NMB’s population is under 19 years of age. A comparison between the NMBM and

neighbouring municipalities in the Eastern Cape is provided below:



Based on: Community Survey 2007. StatsSA

Figure 6-9: Age Distribution (Comparison)

Based on the Figure 6-9, it can be seen that the NMBM has a comparatively lower percentage of

younger residents, but has a comparatively higher percentage of individuals over the age of mid-

twenty. This trend again changes at age groups of roughly above 60. The reason for this trend was

not confirmed, but it might be due to the movement of individuals from neighbouring municipalities

into the NMBM in search of jobs. Individuals not able to work (younger than early twenties, and

older than sixties) possible prefer to live in neighbouring local municipalities.

6.5.3 Education

There is a very strong correlation between level of education and standard of living. The poverty

rate among people in South Africa with no education is sixty nine percent (69%), compared with

fifty four percent (54%) among people with primary education, twenty four percent (24%) among

those with secondary education, and three percent (3%) among those with tertiary education

(Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, 1998). Poor households are characterized by a lack of wage

income; either as a result of unemployment or of low-paying employment due to lack of education,

and typically rely on multiple sources of income, which help reduce risk of suffering income poverty

(O’Connor, 1991). The provision of educational services and proper schooling is therefore a very

effective method of reducing poverty and thereby reducing vulnerability and disaster risk.

The level of education for individuals in the NMBM is shown in Figure 6-10:



26.1%

36.5%

14.5%

5.4%2.7%

0.4%

3.9%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

Grade 0 - 7 Grade 8 - 12 Grade 12 C Cert & Dipl Degree M/PHD No Schooling

Level of Education


Figure 6-10: Level of Education in the NMBM

According to the IDP (2009) 66% of the NMBM population older than 20 years do not have matric,

while 20% of residents have no or limited schooling (IDP, 2009).

6.5.4 Employment

Employment levels can impact significantly on the vulnerability and resilience profiles of the

NMBM. According to the IDP (2009) the current unemployment rate in the NBMB is estimated at

approximately 35%, while 107 239 of the total number of 289 000 households (37%) are classified

as indigent (poor). It is further estimated that 44% of households access at least one social grant, and

that the NMBM has a 30% HIV/AIDS Prevalence rate according to Antenatal care statistics (IDP,

2009).

6.5.5 Household Income

The relatively low levels of educational attainment and high levels of unemployment amongst

economically active individuals play out in low household incomes, shown in Figure 6-11.



11.10% 11.20%

34.40%

20.90%

10.70%

1.00% 0.30%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

No income R1 - R9 600 R9 601 -

R38 400

R38 401 -

R153 600

R153 601 -

R614 400

R614 401 -

R2 457 600

R2 457 601

or more

Annual Household Income


Figure 6-11: Annual Household Income

The majority of households in the NMBM receive income below the minimum household

subsistence level of R19,200 per year, with more than a fifth receiving no income at all (IDP, 2009).

The income levels shown here have an adverse impact on households’ ability to provide adequate

shelter and nutrition, to contribute to rates and taxes, and to create circumstances conducive to

learning and self-development (IDP, 2009). A comparison between the household income levels of

the NMBM and neighboring municipalities are shown below:

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

No

inc

om

e R1

R4

80

1

R9

60

1

R1

9 2

01

R3

8 4

01

R7

6 8

01

R1

53

60

1

R3

07

20

1

R6

14

40

1

R1

22

8 8

01

R2

45

7 6

01

+

Annual Household Income (Comparison)

NMBM

Cacadu

Amatole

Chris Hani

DC14: Ukhahlamba

O.R.Tambo

Alfred Nzo


Figure 6-12: Annual Household Income (Comparison)

Based on Figure 6-12, the NMBM generally has a lower percentage of households with an annual

income of less than +/- R20 000 compared to the majority of the neighbouring municipalities, and

has a comparatively larger percentage of households with an annual income more than +/- R20 000.



6.6 Industrial and Economic Activities

Industrial and economic activity is a key indicator with regard to the vulnerability of the NMBM

economy to particular hazards. For example, in economies that rely heavily on agriculture for

income, hazards such as droughts, severe storms or animal disease can cause severe disruption to

communities. The economy of the NMBM is discussed below:

6.6.1 Sectoral Contribution

Manufacturing is the single largest contributor to the Geographical Growth Value Add (GGVA) in

the NMBM (31,1%) followed by Community Services (27%). Figure 6-13 below indicates the

sectoral contribution to the GGVA of Nelson Mandela Bay.

0.3%

0.7%1.6%

2.4%

9.7%13.2%

14.1%

27.0%

31.1%

Sectoral Contribution

Mining

Agriculture

Electricity

Construction

Transport

Trade

Finance

Community Services

Manufacturing

Source: IDP, 2009 (Census 2001, Statistics South Africa)

Figure 6-13: Sectoral Contribution to GGVA

6.6.2 Economy

Whilst Nelson Mandela Bay is undoubtedly an important node of activity within the Eastern Cape

and within the national and global contexts, some weaknesses exist, which include the dominance of

the automotive sector, which is prone to global economic volatility. Insufficient and unreliable

energy sources also pose a major obstacle (IDP, 2009).



Countering these weaknesses would inter alia require the following (IDP, 2009):

• Diversification of the economy.

• Investment in intellectual capital, creativity and technical capability of the labour force through skills development.

• Acceleration of public and private sector investment.

• Provision of entrepreneurship support.

Amongst the strengths of the local economy are (IDP, 2009):

• A relatively young population (37% under 19 years and 26% under 40 years).

• A high quality natural coastal environment.

• Enormous tourism potential, with five of the six biomes in South Africa present in the area; important heritage sites; four Blue Flag beaches; and in the vicinity of major internationally acclaimed game reserves.

• Vast tracks of government-owned land.

• Higher education institutions with recognized sectoral expertise (training and capacity development).

• Good transport connectivity.

• A well-established manufacturing infrastructure.

• Coega infrastructure.

Weaknesses include the following (IDP, 2009):

• Shortage of technical skills.

• Lack of diversification in local economy.

• Inadequate investment in maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure.

• Poor ICT connectivity.

• Absence of regular and updated local economic statistics.

• Inadequate packaging of tourism and marketing initiatives.

Acknowledging the strengths and attending to the weaknesses of the local economy as well as

maximising the available opportunities will go a long way in boosting the local economy (IDP,

2009).



6.6.3 Tourism

Based on the geographical location of Nelson Mandela Bay, tourism development is a major catalyst

for economic growth and a local strength. Bed-nights spent in Nelson Mandela Bay have been

consistently increasing with a 10% annual increase in the occupancy rate. The quality of the local

beaches is confirmed by the fact that no less than four beaches have Blue Flag status (IDP, 2009).

Nelson Mandela Bay is an excellent point from which to explore African big game and wildlife. The

City is situated within half an hour’s drive of world acclaimed game reserves with the Big Five and

which include the famous Addo National Elephant Park and Shamwari Game Reserve (IDP, 2009).

Known for its great biodiversity, the area has no less than five of the six land biomes in South

Africa. The region also contains three of the 21 internationally recognized biodiversity hotspots.

The beachfront is the city’s greatest natural asset, totaling approximately 100 km of beach and

coastline. This largely underdeveloped and unexploited area has the potential of forming the

foundation of a thriving tourism, recreation and holiday industry (IDP, 2009).

6.6.4 Mineral Resources and Mining

Despite being a key industry in South Africa, mining is one of the smallest production sectors in the

Eastern Cape Province. The area is fairly poorly gifted with mineral deposits in the coastal zone and

throughout the Nelson Mandela Bay area. Consequently, these resources make a very small

contribution to the municipal Gross Domestic Product (GDP), except for the production of table and

laboratory salt (Department of Minerals and Energy, 2002 in SRK, 2008). Limestone, dune sand

(quartz), quartzitic sandstone and clay are mined at locations throughout the Municipality. No

economically viable gas or oil fields have been located off-shore of the Municipality's beaches,

despite comprehensive seismic surveys (Toerien and Hill, 1989).

6.7 Housing and Service Delivery

Housing and services delivery is one of the key indicators of community vulnerability within any

area. The IDP prioritizes housing and service delivery by identifying the following three IDP

priorities (IDP, 2009):

• Provision of quality housing;

• Provision of community amenities and facilities; and

• Development, provision and maintenance of infrastructure;

Housing and service delivery in the NMBM are discussed in more detail below.



6.7.1 Housing

According to the IDP (2009), the Municipality has, since 2000, constructed 34 081 low-cost houses.

The current housing backlog is estimated at approximately 80 000 units. The census 2001 statistics

provides an overview of the distribution of housing in the NMBM. This is shown in the figure

below:

Based on: 2001 Census Data. StatsSA

Figure 6-14: Distribution of Dwelling type in the N MBM.

Figure 6-14 provides an overview of the dominant type of housing in different parts of the NMBM.

The identified areas are rated according to the type of housing (either formal, informal or

traditional). The results from the StatsSA community survey also offer some insight into the

distribution of the type of housing in the NMBM.



85.10%

0.70%

13.70%

0.40%0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

Formal Structure Traditional

Dwelling

Informal Dwelling Other

Type of Main Dwelling


Figure 6-15: Type of Main Dwelling

From Figure 6-15 it is clear that the majority of main dwelling types in the NMBM are considered

‘formal structures’. Figure 6-16 offers a comparison of the types of housing in the NMBM,

compared to neighbouring municipalities in the Eastern Cape.

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Formal

Structure

Traditional

Dwelling

Informal

Dwelling

Other

Type of Main Dwelling (Comparison)

NMBM

Cacadu

Amatole

Chris Hani

Ukhahlamba

O.R.Tambo

Alfred Nzo


Figure 6-16: Type of Main Dwelling (Comparison)

Based on this comparison, the NMBM is shown to have a much higher percentage of formal

structures than some of the other municipalities. The only municipality that compares well with the

NMBM is the Cacadu district, but this comparison does not take the total number of people in each

of the municipalities into account.



6.7.2 Water

Access to water is another key indicator determining the vulnerability of a community. According to

the StatsSA Community Survey (2007), the NMBM provides piped water to inhabitants as shown in

Figure 6-17:

71.00%

16.40%

11.00%

0.60% 0.20% 0.70%0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

Piped water

inside

dwelling

Piped water

inside yard

Piped water

outside yard

Borehole Rain water

tank

Other

Access to Water


Figure 6-17: Access to Water

In comparing the access to water between the NMBM and neighbouring municipalities, it is shown

that the population in the NMBM has better access to piped water than some of the communities in

neighbouring municipalities.

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%

Pip

ed

wa

ter

insi

de

dw

ell

ing

Pip

ed

wa

ter

insi

de

yard

Pip

ed

wa

ter

ou

tsid

e

yard B

ore

ho

le

Sp

rin

g

Da

m/p

oo

l

Riv

er/

stre

am

Ve

nd

or

Ra

in w

ate

r ta

nk

Oth

er

Access to Water (Comparison)

NMBM

Cacadu

Amatole

Chris Hani

Ukhahlamba

O.R.Tambo

Alfred Nzo


Figure 6-18: Access to Water (Comparison)



The IDP (2009) identifies that altogether 100% of households in the NMBM have access to a basic

level of water within a 200 m radius. The IDP (2009) places a further emphasis on water service

delivery and infrastructure development. The following is an extract from the IDP:

Water service delivery and Infrastructure development planning in the IDP

The Integrated Development Plan 2006 – 2011 of the NMBM contains a section on the Service

delivery and infrastructure development. This also contains a description on the development of

Water Services. Key extracts of the development plan is provided below:

Water services

“With the publication of the Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997), all South African water services

authorities were required to prepare a Water Services Development Plan (WSDP). The WSDP is a

business plan setting out the way in which a specific water services authority plan delivers water

services to individuals and businesses in its area of jurisdiction. It also describes the current and

future consumer profile, the types of services that are provided, the infrastructure requirements, a

water balance, organizational and financial arrangements to be used, an assessment of the viability of

the approach, and an overview of environmental issues. Following these analyses, important issues

that may impact on the provision of effective and sustainable water and sanitation services need to

be identified and strategies must be formulated to improve service provision.

The Municipality’s revised WSDP (2006), which is applicable over a five-year period, recommends

new capital projects for its Capital Budget. A longer-term analysis and integration of future water

demand and infrastructure are, however, necessary. In order to address the latter, a Water Master

Plan (WMP) was approved by Council in October 2007.

The WMP is a plan that identifies the gaps in the provision of water to meet the needs set out in the

WSDP. The WMP is a longer-term plan that covers the period up to 2020, far extending beyond the

five-year period covered by the WSDP so as to meet the long-term water requirements of Nelson

Mandela Bay.

Key strategic goals and challenges

In addition to the Water Services Act, the Municipality’s WSDP is informed by the National

Strategic Framework for Water Services (September 2003), which is a critical policy document that

sets out the future national approach to the provision of water services. Key focus areas of the Water

Services Delivery Plan include the following:

(a) Provision of free basic water.

(b) Development of a comprehensive Water Management Strategy.

(c) Transformation of the Municipality into a world-class water service provider.

(d) Financial accountability and sustainability.

(e) Establishment of a comprehensive Customer Care and Management Strategy.

(f) Ensuring quality (regular testing of water to ensure that it meets the required standard),

sustainable and affordable services to all.



Critical challenges

(a) Meeting the national target for the provision of basic services to all by 2008 (for water) and 2010

(for sanitation).

(b) Accelerating the eradication of basic service backlogs.

(c) Successful implementation of the Water Demand Management Strategy and achieving the

targeted reduction.

(d) Timeous provision of infrastructure to meet developmental growth needs.

(e) Maintenance of infrastructure to ensure continued operation.

(f) Limited financial resources.

The strategies to address these challenges are presented below.

Strategies to address challenges

(a) Detailed planning and financial provision for infrastructure capacity upgrade are required over

the period 2007 – 2009 to increase the treatment and transfer capacities of the bulk supply system

from the “restricted” yield of 250 Ml/day supplied from all sources to the “unrestricted” yield of

some 278 Ml/day.

(b) The Municipality is prioritising the implementation of a Water Demand Management Programme

to accelerate and achieve an overall saving in water usage of more than 20 Ml/day. Currently, the

Programme is implemented by metering all connections, replacing old meters with new ones,

developing a meter replacing programme for large industrial meters, and metering all standpipes to

informal settlements.

During the 2009/10 financial year, the framework for the established of a Water Demand

Management Unit (WMDU) will be in place. Once the Unit is established it will develop a clear

strategy that will address the WDM over the short to long term.

(c) One of the options to increase the water resources capacity of the NMBMM is the use of sea

water.

(d) A detailed plan for a Return Effluent Scheme to treat and supply water from the Fishwater Flats

Wastewater Treatment Works to Coega IDZ will be implemented through a public-private

partnership.

(e) The conclusion of the Bulk Water Supply Agreement (Orange River Project) between the

NMBMM and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) will be expedited.

(f) The NMBMM must consider the implementation of a Service Levies Policy for all new

subdivisions and developments to ensure that capital is available for ad hoc service extensions.



6.7.3 Energy

Access and sources of energy not only influence the hazard profile of an area, but also have an

impact on the health and vulnerability of communities. The figure below is based on the StatsSA

2007 Community survey results, and provides an overview of the access to energy for cooking and

heating in the NMBM.

Electricity Gas Paraffin Wood CoalAnimal

dungSolar Other

Cooking 85.30% 1.10% 13.20% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0

Heating 74.30% 0.60% 21.10% 1.90% 0.10% 0.00% 0 2.00%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Energy for Cooking and Heating


Figure 6-19: Energy for Cooking and Heating in the NMBM

In comparing the general source of energy used for cooking in the NMBM. It is shown that the

NMBM population groups have comparatively more access to electricity for cooking than

communities in some of the neighbouring municipalities.


Figure 6-20: Energy for Cooking (Comparison)



The IDP (2009) further indicates that altogether 97% of households in formally demarcated

municipal residential areas have access to a basic level of electricity. However, there are challenges

around the increase in electricity tariffs (IDP 2009). The IDP further places emphasis on electricity

service delivery – the following is a section from the IDP:

Electricity service delivery and Infrastructure development planning in the IDP


delivery and infrastructure development. This also contains a description on the provision of

Electricity Services. Key extracts of the development plan is provided below.

Provision of electricity

The Municipality is faced with the major challenge of ensuring that all households in Nelson

Mandela Bay, both in formal and informal areas, have access to electricity. Although currently 97%

of households on officially surveyed sites have access to electricity, the Municipality is mindful of

the remainder of our residents who are staying in informal areas (IDP 2009).

Furthermore, the Municipality, as is the rest of the country, is faced with the problem of load

shedding and the resultant distribution disruptions. This highlights the need to save and conserve

energy. In this regard, the Municipality is investigating the use of alternative renewable energy

sources, such as wind turbines, solar heating and electricity generation from solid waste. A number

of other energy-efficient measures are being introduced. An Energy Efficiency Centre has been

established in conjunction with business and academia in order to promote energy efficiency in the

Metro (IDP 2009).

The Municipality also needs to eliminate electricity losses, either from technical causes or through

theft. Technical losses are minimised through infrastructure maintenance. The Municipality is also

expected to provide the necessary infrastructure to support investment and future growth (IDP 2009).

6.7.4 Sanitation

Sanitation is also a key consideration, influencing both the vulnerability and hazard profile of

communities. Based on the StatsSA 2007 Community Survey results, a large percentage of

communities in the NMBM have access to flush toilets. A comparison with regards to access to

toilet facilities between the NMBM and other municipalities is shown in Figure 6-21.



85.0%

2.6%0.5% 0.4%

4.0%

0.1%5.9%

1.5%0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

Flush

(sewerage

system)

Flush

(septic tank)

Dry toilet Pit toilet

(ventilation)

Pit toilet Chemical

toilet

Bucket toilet

system

None

Toilet Facilities


Figure 6-21: Access to Toilet Facilities in the NMB M

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Flush (sewerage

system)

Flush

(septic tank)

Dry toilet Pit toilet

(ventilation)

Pit toilet Chemical toilet Bucket toilet

system

None

Toilet Facilities (Comparison)

NMBM Cacadu Amatole Chris Hani Ukhahlamba O.R.Tambo Alfred Nzo


Figure 6-22: Access to Toilet Facilities (Compariso n)

The IDP (2009) indicates that altogether 91% of households have access to a basic level of

sanitation. The IDP places further emphasis on sanitation service delivery – the following is an

extract from the IDP:



Sanitation service delivery and Infrastructure development planning in the IDP


delivery and infrastructure development. This also contains a description on the provision of

sanitation. Key extracts of the development plan is provided below.

Provision of sanitation

Access to sanitation is a vital prerequisite for restoring the dignity of local communities. In addition

to the provision of water, sanitation is therefore a key focus area of the Municipality. Currently, 16

000 households do not have access to a basic level of sanitation, as they are being serviced through

the bucket system. It should be noted that this figure of 16 000 households excludes the sharing of

buckets by more than one informal household (IDP 2009).

A Sanitation Master Plan is being developed to meet the long-term needs of Nelson Mandela Bay, as

well as the national sanitation target for 2010. It will be approved during the 2009/10 financial year.

The Plan will cover the current sanitation status and future requirements in terms of anticipated

growth. In addition to the provision of sanitation in the formal areas, the Municipality is also

focusing on alternative sanitation technology in the informal areas. Studies in this regard have been

concluded and the results are being evaluated for implementation (IDP 2009).

6.7.5 Health

According to the IDP (2009) the Municipality is mandated to provide quality primary health and

environmental services to all its inhabitants and occupational health, safety and wellness to its

employees. Functional areas under primary health include HIV and AIDS, TB management and

control, health care for women and children, and the provision, upgrading and management of

municipal public health facilities. Environmental services cover functional areas such as

environmental management, waste management, parks and environmental health.

The Municipality is faced with the following public health challenges:

(a) High levels of HIV and AIDS and TB.

(b) Insufficient and delayed subsidies from the Province.

(c) Environmental challenges.

(d) Illegal dumping.

To address these challenges, the Municipality initiated a number of intervention programmes as

detailed below (IDP 2009):



(a) Integrated Environmental Plan

An Integrated Environmental Plan is one of the key sector plans of the IDP. The key components of

the Integrated Environmental Plan are the following:

• Environmental Management Systems (EMS), which is under implementation.

• State of Environment Report (SoER), which is developed annually.

• Nelson Mandela Open Space System (NMMOSS), which is under implementation.

• Integrated Waste Management Plan (IWMP), which is under implementation.

• Coastal Management Plan (CMP), which is under implementation.

• Water Master Plan (WMP), which is under implementation.

• Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Strategies, which are under implementation.

• Greening Policy, which is under implementation (IDP 2009).

The following key plans and strategies are under development:

• Bioregional Plan (BP), to be completed by June 2010.

• Environmental Management Framework (EMF) to be completed by June 2010.

• Integrated Air Quality Management Plan (IAQMP), to be completed by June 2010 (IDP 2009).

Key health statistics in the NMBM as identified by the IDP (2009) include:

• Nelson Mandela Bay has 41 permanent and satellite municipal clinics and 13 mobile clinics;

these include three day hospitals and 9 Eastern Cape Department Clinics.

There are eight hospitals (four provincial and four private) in the NMBM.

• Since 2000, nine primary health care clinics have been built and ten have been upgraded.

• Nurse to patient ratio in the NMBM is – 1:43.

Results from a self-evaluation capacity assessment of health related role-players are discussed in

Section 9.1.4.

6.7.6 Waste Management

Waste management not only influences the vulnerability and hazard profile of human populations,

but can also have a severe impact on environmental quality in the NMBM. The NMBM Waste

Management Sub-directorate provides an appropriate general waste collection service to households

and businesses; cleansing services (incorporating street sweeping, litter picking, removal of illegal

dumping on municipal public open spaces) as well as operates general waste landfill sites and

transfer stations (NMBM 2010a).



According to the NMBM (2010a), the achievements during 2007/08 with regard to Waste

Management IDP targets included:

• Total number of households with basic level of solid waste removal (formal, informal & peri-

urban): 275 441 households;

• Number of new households provided during 2007/08 financial year with basic level of solid

waste removal: 934 households (458 in formal urban areas: kerbside collection; 358 in informal

urban areas & 118 new households in informal peri-urban areas: communal service) versus the

IDP target of 500 households. In addition to the 934 new service, 790 households initially

provided with NMBM communal service in previous financial years were upgraded to a

kerbside wheely bin service;

• Implementation of Community Based Cleansing Programmes (Ward Based Cleaning

Programme; Ward Based Litter picking Awareness and Major Routes Cleaning Programme);

and

• Number of Integrated Waste Management Plan projects implemented: reported below under

IWMP Projects.

The NMBM (2010a) also indicated that the NMBM implement a number of IWMP projects:

• Waste Exchange Project: The Waste Management Sub-directorate successfully launched a

Waste Exchange Project i.e. a recognized waste reduction method which is viewed as a virtual

meeting place that links waste generators with possible users of waste.

• Waste Management Bylaws: Uniform bylaws incorporating bylaws from the erstwhile

municipalities (Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Despatch and Western District Council areas) were

finalised during the 2007/08 financial year. Such milestone should assist in amongst other issues

combating of illegal dumping.

• Continuous implementation and support to Cooperatives: The existing eight Community

Cooperatives rendering waste management services implemented their cleansing and waste

collection functions with eagerness during the 2007/08 financial year, resulting in the Cleanest

Town evaluation complementing the NMBM approach in building capacity for entrepreneurs

while rendering an essential municipal service. The ninth Cooperative for Colchester will

commence during the first quarter of the 2008/09 financial year.

• Introduction of the Benchmarking Project between City of Gothernburg and NMBM: The

project aims to benchmark (i.e. analyze and compare) Customer Care Systems between NMBM

and the City of Gothenburg. Some of the objectives include: creating an understanding of how



Customer Care can be more effectively used as an indicator of the public opinion on service

delivery & improvement of the understanding of acceptable levels of performance.

• Introduction of a uniform system of the Litter picking & Awareness Programme: In April

2007, a uniform approach in the implementation of the previous three to four litter picking

project. The uniform approach has ensured that all volunteers have operating specifications (5

hours, 5 days/week, rotating on 2 monthly basis with a stipend of R6 and R8.50 for Participants

and Supervisors respectively). Further, environmental awareness has also been incorporated in

the revised programme.

• Transfer Stations:

o Better management of the formal transfer stations: five formal transfer stations were

outsourced to local entrepreneurs during the 2007/08 financial year leading to better

management of the sites. The entrepreneurs have also been given a responsibility to

recover any recyclable waste materials. It should be noted that the use of local

entrepreneurs and the close proximity of the transfer stations has earned the NMBM

favourable points on the Cleanest Town Competition.

o New transfer stations: construction of the Motherwell site (Gogo Street) funded by the

Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism is near completion.

o Informal transfer stations: 10 sites located in Motherwell, Ibhayi and Northern areas

have been upgraded (fenced, lockable gates, gravelled for easy access) during the

financial year.

• Rendering of Waste Management Services using Community Cooperatives (Impumelelo

Awards): In 2005, Waste Management appointed five Community Cooperatives to render its

waste management services (waste collection, cleansing and transportation of such waste to a

permitted waste disposal site) for a three year period. The contract made provision for support

(training on business, waste management and interpersonal skills) as well as a monitoring &

evaluation process coupled with implementation of penalties in cases on non- performance.

According to the IDP (2009) altogether 100% of formal households have access to a basic level of

solid waste collection services within the urban edge. There are, however, challenges around illegal

dumping and the provision of basic level of service to peri-urban areas. The figures below provide

an overview of the waste management in the NMBM as well as neighbouring municipalities.



76.70%

11.30% 3.40% 3.50% 4.70% 0.40%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Removed at

least once a

week

Removed

less often

Communal

refuse

dump

Own refuse

dump

No disposal Other

Refuse Disposal


Figure 6-23: Refuse Removal

76.70%

11.30%3.40% 3.50%

4.70%0.40%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

Re

mo

ve

d a

t le

ast

on

ce

a w

ee

k

Re

mo

ve

d le

ss

oft

en

Co

mm

un

al

refu

se

du

mp

Ow

n r

efu

se d

um

p

No

dis

po

sal

Oth

er

Refuse Removal (Comparison)

NMBM

Cacadu

Amatole

Chris Hani

Ukhahlamba

O.R.Tambo

Alfred Nzo


Figure 6-24: Refuse Removal (Comparison)

The IDP (2009) also addresses the issue of waste management services in the NMBM. The

following is an extract of the IDP:

The Municipality is responsible for providing quality, sustainable waste management services to the

people of Nelson Mandela Bay in order to ensure a clean and healthy environment. In this regard,

the Municipality provides a general waste collection and cleansing service to its residents and

operates general waste landfill sites and transfer stations.



In line with the National Waste Management Strategy, the Municipality developed an Integrated

Waste Management Plan (IWMP), with the aim of integrating and optimizing waste management, in

order to maximize efficiency and minimize the associated environmental impacts and financial costs.

In line with the National Environmental Management Waste Bill, the Municipality is implementing a

number of projects in terms of the Integrated Waste Management Plan. These projects focus on the

following:

• Waste minimization e.g. an in-house Paper Recycling Project in five of its main paper

generating buildings.

• A Source Separation Recycling Project in Blue Horizon Bay.

• An Electronic Waste Exchange Project.

These projects emanate from the partnership with the City of Göteborg under the Swedish

International Development Agency (IDP 2009).

Table 6-1: IWMP Projects and Status.

Project No Project Title Project Status

1 Inventory of Waste Streams 1 & 2 Differed

2 Development of Waste Information System (WIS) Completed

3 Pilot project: Collection/treatment system for household hazardous waste Differed

4 Development of a medical waste strategy Cancelled

5 Public Awareness Strategy & Campaign Completed

6 Baseline Public Awareness Study and Continued Monitoring Completed

7 Development of mobile waste exhibition In Progress

8 Waste Education at schools In Progress

9 MRF Feasibility Study, Stage II To be implemented in

2009/2010

10 Recycling in Municipal buildings In Progress

11 Kwa-Magxaki Recycling Centre In Progress

12 Motherwell Buy-Back centre In Progress

13 International inventory of recycling projects Differed

14 Forum for Recyclers Cancelled

15 Pilot project: Coloured bag system In Progress

16 Strategy for Waste Management for 2010 Cup In Progress

17 Development of Digital Waste Exchange Completed

18 Pilot backyard/community composting in low income areas Differed

19 Pilot community composting in Colchester Cancelled

20 Pilot backyard composting at Blue Horizon Bay Differed

21 Closure and Rehabilitation of Waste Sites In Progress

22 ISO 14001 compliance at Waste sites In Progress

23 Additional transfer stations/recycling centres In Progress

24 Development of new Metro Waste By-laws Completed

25 Disposal Certificate for Builder's Rubble Cancelled

26 Legislative review Cancelled

27 Review of Cost Recovery/ Equalisation of Tariffs Completed

28 Feasibility Study: Green Procurement In Progress

29 Feasibility Study: Differentiated Tariff System Differed

30 IWMP Awareness Campaign Completed

31 Induction Course Completed

32 Networking with other Municipalities Completed

33 Best practise manual Differed

34 Waste Co-operatives Completed



6.7.7 Safety and security

According to the IDP (2009) the safety and security of all residents, the business community, tourists

and property is a key focus area of this Municipality. In this regard, the Municipality focuses on

crime prevention, disaster management, road and traffic safety, as well as fire and emergency

services. The full participation of all stakeholders, including residents and the business community,

is required to address the challenges around safety and security.

The IDP (2009) identifies a number of programmes that have been developed to address these

challenges. They are discussed in the following extract from the IDP:

Crime Prevention Strategy

The Municipality developed a comprehensive Crime Prevention Strategy, which provides a basic

framework for crime reduction. The objectives of this Crime Prevention Strategy are to:

(a) Assist the SAPS and other state organs to prevent and reduce crime in the NMB area.

(b) Promote community safety awareness.

(c) Promote public knowledge and involvement in community safety structures (IDP 2009).

The components of our Crime Prevention Strategy are:

(a) Development and implementation of effective partnerships with the community and other key stakeholders.

(b) Supporting effective policing and law enforcement through technological aids such as CCTV cameras.

(c) Establishment of a municipal Police Service.

(d) Provision of effective By-law enforcement services.

(e) Protection of municipal assets and staff (IDP 2009).

Disaster Management Plan

The Municipality developed a Disaster Management Plan, which ensures that proactive measures are

put in place to prevent or mitigate the effects of disasters (IDP 2009).

Disaster management is aimed at:

(a) Preventing or reducing the risk of disasters.

(b) Mitigating the severity or consequences of disasters.

(c) Emergency preparedness.

(d) A rapid and effective response to disasters.

(e) Post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation.



The Disaster Management Plan takes into account the vulnerability of the various communities and

prioritises the potential risk accordingly. To mobilize all stakeholders, a Disaster Management

Advisory Forum and local disaster management committees were established (IDP 2009). The key

disaster management focus areas are as follows:

(a) Creating a sustainable municipal institutional capacity for disaster management.

(b) Introducing effective risk reduction strategies.

(c) Disaster risk management planning and the implementation thereof.

(d) Effective disaster response, relief and recovery.

(e) Enhancing public awareness and preparedness, disaster risk management research,

education and training.

(f) Evaluating and improving disaster management implementation in Nelson Mandela Bay.

Fire, traffic and other emergencies

To enhance fire safety, the Municipality has embarked on a programme to upgrade and replace its

fire and emergency vehicles and equipment. Furthermore, an operational 24-hour traffic control

service has been introduced throughout Nelson Mandela Bay (IDP 2009).



6.8 Infrastructure

6.8.1 Roads

A well-maintained road network is the cornerstone of a safe and convenient transport system for

commuters and private motorists, and for commerce and industry. According to the IDP (2009),

central to an effective and well-maintained road network in the NMBM are the following

management systems:

(a) Road Management System;

(b) Bridge Management System; and

(c) Road Sign Management System.

Also important is the development and implementation of a Stormwater Master Plan, traffic calming

measures and the tarring of roads (IDP 2009). The primary road system in Nelson Mandela Bay

comprises the following road categories:

Table 6-2: Road Categories in the NMBM.

Road Category Length (Km)

National Roads 35

Provincial Trunk Roads 81

Provincial Rural Main Roads 264

Provincial District Roads 196

Provincial Minor Roads 240

Provincial Urban Main Roads and Roads of Metropolitan

Significance (main public transport routes) 417

Minor Roads (surfaced) 2 244

Minor Roads (un-surfaced) 630

Total Length 4 104

Source: IDP 2009 (Census 2001, Statistics South Africa)

Roads provide the primary form of access to the coast in Nelson Mandela Bay. The limited

transportation systems in the Municipality restrict access to the coast to transport by private vehicles,

taxis, bus services, private boat or foot (SRK, 2008).

Road access to the coast of Nelson Mandela Bay is excellent, providing good quality roads for both

residents and travelling visitors. The major road in Nelson Mandela Bay is the N2. A number of

well-built secondary roads link the N2 with the coast. Two of the most important coastal roads are

Marine Drive, extending from Summerstrand to Schoenmakerskop, and the main Seaview Road,

extending from Lovemore Heights to Seaview. The road signage and the overall quality of Marine

Drive from the Summerstrand Hotel to Schoenmakerskop must be improved (SRK, 2008). The main

Seaview Road offers access to Sardinia Bay, Kini Bay, Beachview and Maitland River mouth via

arterial roads. A cul-de sac road provides access to Blue Horizon Bay and van Stadens River mouth

from the N2. The travelling distance and limited access to these areas due to the cul-de-sac and

arterial roads restricts the number of users of the coastal zone in these sensitive coastal areas (SRK,

2008).



Currently, access to the coast between the Swartkops and Sundays River mouths is provided via

access points at Blue Water Bay beach, Joost Park and Wells Estate and a series of access roads that

run parallel to the coast between these areas. The roads are located as little as 40 m from the high

water mark in places and should be reviewed in terms of their environmental impact and long-term

viability. No public access to the coast to the east of the Coega River mouth is currently available.

Parking for coastal visitors along the Nelson Mandela Bay beach front is adequate throughout most

of the year. However, traffic congestion is experienced around Kings Beach, Shark Rock Pier and

Wells Estate during the peak holiday seasons of Christmas and Easter. Critical parking problems are

experienced on Boxing Day when more than 100 000 people flock to the beaches (weather

permitting), but due to this being a once-off annual event, additional parking provisions cannot be

justified (SRK, 2008).

6.9 Facilities

Facilities in the NMBM not only serve the normal functions of education or recreation, but can also

support disaster capacity building or disaster response activities in the NMBM.

6.9.1 Education Facilities

According to the IDP (2009) Nelson Mandela Bay possesses excellent educational facilities, which

include:

• A total of 273 schools;

• One university (the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University), which has 20 000 students; and

• Four technical colleges and two Further Education and Training (FET) institutions, namely the

Port Elizabeth College and the Midlands College (IDP 2009).

The Municipality furthermore has a total of 22 libraries, and has embarked on a process of

computerizing its libraries, equipping each with a full office package and internet and e-mail

facilities (IDP 2009).

6.9.2 Community Facilities

Community facilities not only provides space for recreational and other activities to community

members, but can also be used during disaster risk reduction or response initiatives. A number of

community facilities can be identified in the NMBM (IDP, 2009), and includes:

• 31 Community and municipal halls;

• 13 Customer Care Centres;

• 22 Libraries;

• 79 Sports facilities;

• 19 Beaches;

• 18 Pools; and

• 1438 Developed Open Spaces.



6.10 The IDP and Disaster Management

The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) is the NMBM’s principal strategic planning document. The

aim of the IDP is to enhance integrated service delivery and development and to promote

sustainable, integrated communities, providing a full basket of services, as communities cannot be

developed in a fragmented manner. As the key strategic plan of the Municipality, the priorities

identified in the IDP inform all financial planning and budgeting undertaken by the institution.

6.10.1 Key IDP Priorities in the NMBM

The priorities identified in the IDP also have an important influence on disaster risk reduction and

disaster planning in the NMBM. The ideal is that the IDP priorities and strategic focus should be

aligned with disaster risk reduction requirements for the municipality.

During the 2009 IDP process, a number of key priorities were identified in the municipality (IDP

2009). These key priorities have emerged from the consultation processes, which have shaped the

IDP. Some of the key priorities were:

• Provision and expedition of basic service delivery;

• Crime prevention;

• Elimination of illegal dumping;


• Provision of community amenities and facilities;

• Development, provision and maintenance of infrastructure;

• Poverty eradication and job creation;

• Provision of health services and combating diseases such as TB, HIV and AIDS;

• Special sector development (youth, disabled and women); and

• Responsive, people-centred and integrated institution.

The majority of these priorities do have some bearing on aspects that are important in a disaster

management context, and are being discussed in more detail in this report.

6.10.2 IDP Five Year Performance Plan

The IDP (2009) outlines the Five Year Performance Plan with regards to a number of Key

Performance Elements. Below is an extract of the IDP Five Year Performance Plan, with identified

Disaster Management (risk reduction through managing hazards, vulnerabilities and resilience)

related focus activities.



Five Year Performance Plan (IDP 2009). Key

Performance Elements

Strategic Objectives Five-year Programmes/Projects 2009/10 Target

Provision of water

To ensure that all residents of NMB have access to water by 2008

Providing all households with water within a 200 m radius

100% of households to be provided with access to basic potable water supply 7900 new households provided with water connection by June 2010

Provision of bulk water services to support the Housing Programme

Provision of bulk water services in line with low-income housing delivery programme

Housing connections where contractors abandoned sites (Kuyga – 630 units and Kleinskool – 347 units)

Kuyga – project to be completed by June 2010 Kleinskool – project to be completed by June 2010

To implement a Water Demand Management Programme

Reduction in unaccounted for water to 15% by 2011 through the following projects in terms of the Water Demand Management Programme:

Unaccounted for water reduced by 5%, by June 2010

a) Replacement of old domestic meters 10 000 old domestic meters to be replaced as part of Water Demand Management Strategy

b) Development and implementation of water efficiency management educational programmes

Educational programmes to be developed and implemented (Target TBD) Water Demand Management: Strategy and Business Plan complete by September 2009 First contract to go to tender in December 2009

To provide infrastructure to meet developmental needs of Nelson Mandela Bay

Provision of infrastructure to meet growth and development needs of Nelson Mandela Bay

Infrastructure Investment Plan in place by December 2009 Finalisation of the Bulk Water Infrastructure Development Levy Policy by July 2009

To manage water infrastructure assets Infrastructure Asset Management Programme Complete maintenance backlog reports by December 2009 Asset Management Programme in place by June 2010

Provision of sanitation

To provide basic sanitation to all by 2010

Connection of households to sanitation services 7 900 new sanitation connections to be made Provision of bulk sanitation services to support the Housing Programme

Provision of bulk sanitation services in line with low-income housing delivery programme

Investigations into and implementation of alternative methods of sanitation

Investigations, report with recommendations and a policy into alternative method(s) of sanitation to be completed by September 2009 Tenders to be awarded by January 2010

To manage sanitation infrastructure assets Infrastructure Asset Management Programme Complete maintenance backlog reports by December 2009 Asset Management Programme in place by June 2010

Roads and Transportation

To improve public transport in Nelson Mandela Bay

Implementation of Integrated Public Transport System Phase 1 (installation of infrastructure) to be completed Update of five-year plan completed by June 2010

To ensure that all the road construction and maintenance needs of Nelson Mandela Bay are met

Implementation of the following road infrastructure development programmes: (a) Tarring 350 km of road

38 km of roads to be tarred by June 2010

50 culs-de-sac tarred by June 2010

(aa) Tarring of sidewalks 40 km of sidewalks to be tarred by June 2010 (b) Resurfacing 685 km of road 70 km of roads to be resurfaced by June 2010






(c) Rehabilitation/Reconstruction of 69 km of road 14 km of roads to be rehabilitated/ reconstructed by June 2010 (d) Gravelling 250 km of road 50 km of roads to be gravelled by June 2010 (e) Construction and maintenance of bridges Three bridge structures to be rehabilitated

To maintain road infrastructure and eliminate backlogs

Infrastructure Asset Management Programme Update Asset Register, properly valued in accordance with current accounting standards, by 30 June 2010 Update Asset Management Programme by June 2010

To improve road safety through the installation of traffic calming and control measures

Traffic Calming Measures Policy Traffic calming measures to be installed in 20 streets 10 sets of traffic lights to be installed

Stormwater To improve stormwater infrastructure and management across Nelson Mandela Bay

Installation of stormwater drainage to all new residential areas as well as existing residential areas without drainage

5 km of stormwater drainage to be installed

Development of a comprehensive stormwater management system

Asset Management Programme in place by June 2010

Electricity and energy

To provide electricity to all households by 2012

Connection of 15 170 erven by 2012/13 3 200 erven to be connected Connection of 2% erven on officially demarcated sites without electricity

98% of all households on officially surveyed sites provided with access to electricity by June 2010

To implement the EDIR Programme in line with the national timelines

Implementation of the EDIR Programme Section 78 process to be finalized by June 2010

To introduce alternative sources of energy

Implementation of the following renewable energy programmes: (a) Wind turbines

EIA in progress on three potential wind sites – obtain an ROD by June 2010

(b) Solar heating Roll out of solar water heating to: · 50 crèches by June 2010 · 1000 low cost housing units by June 2010

(c) Electricity generation from solid waste Financial close and tender for Phase One to be obtained

(d) Fishwater Flats methane generation Fishwater Flats methane generation, obtain ROD and begin site works by December 2009

(e) Landfill to gas Arlington and Koedoeskloof to start gas flaring by December 2009, and generation by 2010

To conserve energy through the implementation of energy efficient measures

Implementation of the following energy efficient programmes: (a) Introduction of energy efficient lighting in municipal buildings

All municipal buildings fitted with energy efficient lighting by March 2010

(b) Connection of 89 000 households with hot water load control

32 042 households to be connected with hot water load control by June 2010

(c) Replacement of existing streetlights with energy efficient lighting

Phase 1 by June 2010 ± 30 000 (125 MW)

(d) Replacement of traffic light heads with modern, low energy consumption heads or solar heads

100 intersections to be completed by June 2010






(e) Piloting the use of energy back-up on traffic lights under load shedding and power failure conditions

Pilot project to be implemented by November 2009

Development and implementation of electricity efficiency management educational programmes

Educational programmes developed and implemented (Target TBD)

To manage electricity infrastructure assets Infrastructure Asset Management Programme Complete Asset Register, properly valued in accordance with current accounting standards, by December 2009 Asset Management Programme in place by December 2009

Reduce the NMBMM carbon footprint Support the NMBMM Go Green Campaign by the addition of carbon reduction projects

2 new projects by June 2010

To ensure sustainable and effective reduction in electricity losses

Reduction in electricity losses through technical and theft to 6% by 2012/13

Electricity losses reduced to 7% by June 2010

To provide infrastructure to meet developmental needs of Nelson Mandela Bay

Provide infrastructure to meet growth and development needs of Nelson Mandela Bay

Infrastructure Investment Plan to be in place

Primary Health Care Services

To promote access to affordable primary health care services

Construction and upgrading of municipal health facilities

2 municipal primary health care facilities to be constructed (Zanemvula and Langa Kabah clinics) 5 municipal primary health care facilities to be upgraded (Booysens Park, Masakhane, New Brighton, Zwide and Kwazakhele clinics) Clinic computer connectivity to be provided at 100% of clinics

Implementation of a programme on youth-friendly health services

1 municipal primary health care facility (Masakhane) to focus on youth-friendly health services

Implementation of a programme for the provision of disability access infrastructure

100% of municipal primary health care facilities to be provided with disability access

To promote women and children’s health

Recruitment of qualified nursing and other health personnel

1:43 nurse-to-patient ratio

Provision of Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) and Antenatal Care (ANC)

100% of community health clinics to provide Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) 87% of community health clinics to provide Antenatal Care (ANC) services

Provision of the expanded programme on immunization (EPI) to achieve national coverage targets for children

90% coverage of the EPI in children targeted in Nelson Mandela Bay

Roll-out dual therapy to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT)

87% of designated primary health care facilities to provide Dual therapy to prevent mother to child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV

To increase access to antiretroviral treatment (ART) in Nelson Mandela Bay

Increasing the number of primary health care ART sites in Nelson Mandela Bay

3 additional accredited primary health care sites to provide ART services in Nelson Mandela Bay






To prioritize the treatment of TB and improve cure rates in Nelson Mandela Bay

Implementation of TB control programmes, which include the following: • Implementation of the TB Crisis Plan • Strengthening TB treatment programmes to

improve detection, reduce treatment interruptions and improve cure rates

75% New Smear Positive Cure Rate 5% reduction in New Smear Positive Defaulter rate 75% New Smear Positive TB Conversion Rate 99% of TB clients on directly observed therapy (DOTS)

Alignment and integration of activities of TB-supporting NGOs in Nelson Mandela Bay

Implementation Plan to align and integrate activities of TB supporting NGOs developed by September 2009

To implement a disease surveillance outbreak response plan

Implementation of the Disease Outbreak Response Plan

Monthly surveillance Report on all reported outbreaks of notifiable diseases to be compiled

Occupational Health, Safety and Wellness

To ensure the health, safety and wellness of all NMBMM employees

Implementation of Health and Safety Risk Management Programme

Health & safety risk assessment report in place by July 2009 Quarterly submission of reports and inventories of legal compliance by directorates

Implementation of Workplace HIV and AIDS Plan

Implementation of ARV treatment & support programme for employees by June 2010 Reviewal of staff policies and procedures to ensure nondiscrimination and de-stigmatisation by June 2010

Strengthening the Employee Assistance Programme within NMBMM

Investigate the need for psychosocial, relationship and addiction support to reach 50% target coverage by June 2010 Develop and implement Critical Incidence Stress Management Programme for high-risk directorates by June 2010

Implementation of a legally compliant occupational health monitoring and hygienic placement of employees

Quarterly submission of medical surveillance report

Quarterly submission of IOD statistical data

Construction and upgrading of Occupational Health and Wellness Centres

1 municipal occupational health and wellness centre constructed in Walmer by June 2010 1 municipal occupational health and wellness centre upgraded In Uitenhage by June 2010

Waste management

To provide quality sustainable waste management services to ensure a clean and healthy environment

Implementation of the NMBMM Waste Collection Strategy: a) Ensure provision of waste collection service to households in Nelson Mandela Bay

100% of households in formal urban and peri-urban areas to be provided with curbside waste collection services 95% of households in informal urban and peri-urban areas to be provided with basic level of service

b) Implementation of the Waste Management Replacement Policy for Containers

4000 wheelie bins in Uitenhage replaced by 30 June 2010

c) Roll out of Wheelie Bin Programme in terms of Housing Plan

5000 new households to be provided with a wheelie bin service in line with the NMBMM Housing Plan

Ensure implementation of the NMBMM Integrated Waste Management Plan projects: a) Development of Waste Disposal Facilities

2000 cubic metres of airspace to be developed by June 2010

2 transfer stations established by 30 June 2010






b) Introduction of Waste Minimisation Projects 1 Source separation Recycling Project to be successfully implemented by June 2010 Paper recycling introduced in 5 municipal buildings

c) Implementation of alternative service delivery mechanism

Sustaining of 9 Waste Management Cooperatives Sustaining Ward Based Cleaning Programme in 24 wards

d) Conducting of waste awareness 800 awareness events held annually

Eliminate illegal dumping in Nelson Mandela Bay Development of a strategy for the elimination of illegal dumping by September 2009

Parks

Parks is committed to create and maintain landscaped areas and cemeteries in a sustainable, aesthetic eco friendly safe environment to enhance the marketability of NMB & improve the quality of life for all

Development of Public Open Spaces 10 POS to be developed per annum in line with 5 year Greening Plan Planting of trees 2500 trees to be planted per annum

Maintenance and upgrading program 36 cemeteries to be maintained 2 cemeteries (Zwide and Kwanobuhle) to be upgraded

Maintenance programmes 150 POS, Parks and Street Islands to be maintained

Environmental management

To manage and protect the environment and natural assets of Nelson Mandela Bay

Develop environmental management strategies in order to: maintain naturally functioning eco-systems by ensuring sustainable use of natural resources

2 NMMOSS Projects to be implemented Formulation of the Environmental Management Framework by June 2010 Formulation of the Bioregional Plan by June 2010 3 Ecotourism projects within identified nature reserves with direct benefit to adjacent communities to be implemented Formulation of a plan to develop and implement a sustainable green procurement policy by June 2010

Promotion of environmental education and awareness through community based projects and programmes

15 000 people attending Environmental Awareness Programmes by June 2010

Environmental Health

To ensure a safe, healthy and secure environment

Air Pollution and Noise Control: • Pollution Prevention and Reduction Programme

Integrated Air Quality Management Plan to be completed Noise Control and Air Quality By-Law to be completed

Crime prevention To reduce crime and ensure a safe and secure environment

Implementation of Crime Prevention Strategy, which includes the following projects: (a) Promotion of community awareness and involvement

Functional Ward Safety structures established in each Ward by June 2010 8 safety and crime prevention programmes targeting the youth and others, to be implemented as part of social crime prevention plan

(b) Expansion of CCTV network at crime hotspots and other strategic areas (400 CCTV cameras installed including at municipal buildings and NMB Multi-purpose Stadium)

293 CCTV cameras to be installed and monitored

Disaster management

To proactively and effectively prevent, mitigate and respond to disasters

Facilitate the implementation of the Disaster Management Plan by all role-players

2 additional Disaster Management offices to be established A fully functional Disaster Management Advisory Forum (DMAF) in place by December 2009 100% compliance with Disaster Management Plan






Fully upgraded Disaster Management Centre, including a Joint Operations Centre, Operational offices and a GIS office by June 2010

Establishment of Local Disaster Management Committees and Disaster Management Teams in twelve satellite areas

Disaster Management Committees and Disaster Management Teams established in 8 satellite areas by June 2010

Implementation of an early warning system 4 disaster early warning systems Metro-wide by June 2010

Traffic safety To increase visible traffic policing in order to reduce accidents and fatalities on our roads

Traffic Safety Enforcement and Management Programme

20 initiatives to be introduced to reduce road fatalities 30 initiatives to be introduced to reduce public transport related accidents and lawlessness

Implementation of Traffic Fine Collection Programme 60% collection rate to be achieved

Emergency response

To ensure an efficient and effective response to emergencies regarding fire, traffic, security and disasters

Emergency Response Time:

(a) Fire: 10 minutes (b) Disaster: 30 minutes (c) Traffic: 10 minutes (d) Security: 15 minutes

Community education

To promote community safety awareness Development and implementation of an educational programme on fire safety, traffic safety, crime prevention and disaster management

48 programmes on fire safety, traffic safety, crime prevention and disaster management to be held

By-law enforcement

To ensure compliance with municipal by-laws By-law enforcement programmes for fire safety, traffic safety, crime prevention and disaster management

80 inspections to be undertaken to ensure that buildings comply with municipal by-laws 32 inspections to be undertaken of all hospitality institutions to ensure compliance 100 other inspections to be undertaken to enforce by-laws

Protection of Municipal staff and assets

The provision of a system whereby the needs for protection and safekeeping of Municipal employees and assets are met, in order to ensure secure working conditions and reduce unnecessary costs due to loss through negligence or otherwise

Implementation of the Security Master Plan, which includes the following: Risk analysis of identified localities.

16 risk analysis surveys to be completed



7 Hazard Profile This section provides a description of the hazards assessed during the risk assessment, as well as a

description of the characteristics of the NMBM in relation to each of the hazards.

7.1 Transport Hazards

Transportation hazard events, such as motor vehicle accidents, are considered a daily event in the

majority of urban areas in South Africa. This is due to the tendency for these events to be high

frequency, low severity events. However, low frequency, high severity events do occur, and these

are the events that are in the ambit of disaster management. For the purpose of this assessment,

transport disaster was divided into the following four categories:

• Air Transportation;

• Rail Transportation;

• Road Transportation; and

• Water Transportation.

One should be mindful of the fact that transportation ‘emergencies’ can have a disruptive impact on

the NMBM. This is not only the case for the normal day-to-day functioning of the municipality, but

transportation ‘emergencies’ can also have an impact on medical and health operations in the

NMBM. According to the NMBM (s.a.) a transport emergency has the following characteristics and

can have the following impact on medical and health operations in the NMBM:

• The scene may extend for kilometers, and can cause limited access onto highways;

• Access by emergency responders may be limited or delayed in the core of a large event;

• This type of emergency might be responder intensive;

• Hazardous materials and conditions may be involved in these events;

• The events might result in high numbers of high acuity trauma patients;

• Weather conditions may contribute to the emergency, by grounding air transportation and

making ground transportation hazardous; and

• This event may require carrying patients over significant distances to reach transport

vehicles.

7.1.1 Air Transportation

Even though major casualty incidents related to air transportation hazards are rare, the potential risk

presented by air transportation remains present. This is especially the case for a high density urban

environment such as the NMBM. This risk can also increase with an increase in air traffic due to

economic and urban developments or special events leading to an increase in air travelling to and

from the city.



During the stakeholder consultation and community participation process conducted during the

assessment, the following information with regard to air transportation hazards was provided by

stakeholders:

• Air Transportation was generally identified as a Class 2 hazard (Rare Events, out of ordinary,

but still manageable).

• Stakeholders indicated that air transport hazard events are not increasing;

• It was indicated that air transportation hazards are not specifically identified as a focus area in

the IDP.

• The priority to further reduce or manage risks related to this hazard was rated as 5 (not

urgent).

• Representatives also identified that the dump site next to the Port Elizabeth airport as a

concern. This is due to the waste site attracting birds to the area which can increase the risk

of aircraft crashes. It was indicated that the dump site does not have specific plans to manage

this problem, but that the airport has emergency plans for this event. The priority to reduce

or manage the risk associated with the waste site and birds were identified as 1 (Very urgent).

Statistics from the Fire Services (NMBM 2010) provided some information with regards to previous

air transportation hazard events in the NMBM. Analysis of the statistics indicated the following:

Table 7-1: Air Transportation Hazard Statistics

Event Description Probability

(Over a 1 Year Period)

Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Aircraft Accident (Light Aircraft) 39% 1 Event per 930 days -

Aircraft Fires /

Crash

Phase 1 100% 1 Event per 217 days Base data

classified as

Aircraft

Fires

Phase 2 100% 1 Event per 261 days

Phase 3 56% 1 Event per 651 days

Total 100% 1 Event per 100 days

In order to represent the hazard spatially, information with regard to the location of airfields/airports

in the NMBM as well as flight paths were used. This flight path as well as buffer areas around the

airport and local airfields are deemed to be high hazard areas for potential aircraft accidents. The

result of the hazard mapping is shown below:



Figure 7-1: Air Transport Hazard in the NMBM

7.1.2 Rail Transportation

Rail transportation hazards can represent a disaster risk especially if a large number of passengers or

hazardous material is involved. Incidents involving trains and road vehicles, or hazard events such

as structural failure can also lead to mass casualty of high fatality events. No specific information

related to rail transportation hazards were received from stakeholders during the stakeholder

consultation and community participation process. However, information with regard to rail

transportation events was collected from the Fire Services (NMBM 2010) incident records. Analysis

of these statistics indicated the following:

Table 7-2: Rail Transportation Hazard Statistics



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Train Accident 100% 1 Event per 310 days -

Train Fires 73% 1 Event per 501 days -

The hazard associated with Rail transportation was mapped together with Road transportation

hazards.



7.1.3 Road Transportation

According to the WHO (2009) “over 90% of the world’s fatalities on the roads occur in low-income

and middle-income countries, which have only 48% of the world’s registered vehicles. Road traffic

fatality rates in low-income and middle-income countries (21.5 and 19.5 per 100 000 population,

respectively) are double the rates in high-income countries (10.3 per 100 000). Pedestrians,

cyclists, and riders of motorized two-wheeler and their passengers are considered "vulnerable road

users", and account for around 46% of global road traffic deaths. Globally, road traffic crashes

cause over 1.27 million deaths a year. Road traffic fatalities are predicted to rise to the fifth leading

cause of death by 2030, resulting in an estimated 2.4 million fatalities per year. This projected

increase in ranking would be due to a combination of an increase in road traffic deaths and

reductions in deaths due to some other health conditions”.

In the Eastern Cape, road transport hazard events were responsible for an average of 1,311 fatalities

per year over the period of 2001 – 2008. This is nearly 10% of the average total road accident

fatalities in South Africa (13, 382) for the same period. Over this period, an average of 1,392

vehicles was involved in fatal crashes annually. Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 provides information

with regards to accidents recorded in the Eastern Cape over the 2001 – 2008 period.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

EC 764 898 1,080 1,152 1,152 1,367 1,772 1,629 1,329

RSA 11,514 12,725 12,919 13,470 13,470 14,908 16,474 15,612 14,463

500

2,500

4,500

6,500

8,500

10,500

12,500

14,500

16,500

18,500

Ve

hic

les

Number of Vehicles Involved in Fatal Crashes

Figure 7-2: Number of Vehicle involved in Fatal Cra shes in the Eastern Cape



2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Other & Unkwn 54 99 104 92 144 182 226 214

Trucks 63 68 76 115 79 59 20 4

LDV's - Bakkies 176 253 326 332 325 376 416 391

Buses 3 65 41 34 60 112 35 71

Minibus Taxis 68 116 140 94 60 51 11 7

Minibuses 55 49 64 110 119 164 202 279

Motorcars 378 365 377 461 561 801 704 535

-

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

Fa

tali

tie

s

Number of Fatalities per Type of Vehicle(Eastern Cape)

Figure 7-3: Number of Fatalities per Type of Vehicl e in the Eastern Cape

During the stakeholder consultation and community participation process conducted for the

assessment, the following information with regards to road transportation hazards was provided by

stakeholders:

• Road Transportation was generally identified as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary,

day-to-day activities/incidents).

• Stakeholders indicated that road transport hazard events are increasing, and that the main

causes of these events includes reckless driving, inadequate traffic signs, and people talking

on cell phones while driving.

• Specific problem areas identified during consultations were Cape Road, Stafford Road,

Mission Road and Ward 54.

• The main challenges associated with reducing the risk posed by transportation hazards were

identified as the lack of finances. It was, however, indicated that road transportation hazards

are addressed in the IDP in the form of road upgrading projects.

• The priority to further reduce or manage risks related to road transportation hazard was rated

as 1.75, which represents a priority of very to medium urgent.



Information on road transportation hazard events was collected from the Fire Services (NMBM

2010) incident records. Analysis of these statistics indicated the following:

Table 7-3: Road Transportation Hazard Statistics



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Accident Double Light

Vehicle 100% 1 Event per 1 days -

Accident Light Combination 100% 1 Event per 16 days -

Accident Minibus / Light

Combination 100% 1 Event per 50 days -

Accident Multi Light Vehicle 100% 1 Event per 17 days -

Accident Multi Truck 100% 1 Event per 225 days -

Accident Passenger Bus

Heavy 100% 1 Event per 109 days -

Accident Passenger Light

Mini Bus 100% 1 Event per 19 days -

Accident Pedestrian 100% 1 Event per 50 days -

Accident Single Light Vehicle 100% 1 Event per 2 days -

Accident Single Truck 100% 1 Event per 27 days -

Accident Tanker 34% 1 Event per 1086 days -

Transport

Fires Multi Heavy

Vehicles 28% 1 Event per 1303 days

Transport

Fires Multi Light

Vehicles 95% 1 Event per 383 days

Transport

Fires Single Heavy

Vehicle 100% 1 Event per 24 days

Transport

Fires Single Light Vehicle 100% 1 Event per 3 days

The GIS mapping of road and rail transportation hazards is shown below:



Figure 7-4: Road and Rail Transport Hazard

7.1.4 Water Transportation

Due to the location of the NMBM at the coast, and the importance of water transportation both in

terms of the economy and recreational activities, water transportation related hazards can pose a risk

to the NMBM.

The risk associated with water transportation hazards in the NMBM not only include the risk to

human health or safety, but also includes a risk the environment. This is due to the activities

associated with the ports in the NMBM, and the type of material, including hazardous material,

being transported. Figure 7-5 illustrates the Vessels Transfer Zones at one of the ports in the

NMBM. Information related to shipping lanes and other routes were not available during this

assessment.



Figure 7-5: Vessels Transfer Zones in the NMBM

Specific information related to water transportation hazards were received from stakeholders during

the stakeholder consultation and community participation process. The information received

indicated that:

• The water transportation hazard event was identified as a Class 2 hazard (Rare Events, out of

ordinary, but still manageable).

• The identified hazard related to casualties on the ships, and not specifically to accidents or

incidents involving ships.

• It was further indicated that, even though the IDP does not include a specific focus on this

event, plans does exist to manage these events.

• The priority to reduce or manage the risk related to this hazard was rated as 1, which

represents a priority of very urgent.

Information with regard to water transportation and related events was also collected from the Fire

Services (NMBM 2010) incident records as well as the NSRI. Analysis of these statistics indicated

the following:



Table 7-4: Water Transportation Hazard Statistics



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Rescue Water Base 100% 1 Event per 28 days Fire Services

Data Fires Ship Fires 100% 1 Event in 343 days

NSRI

Operations

Commercial Fishing

Boats 100% 1 Event in 46 days

Based on NSRI

Operations:

1 Oct 2007 to

30 Sept 2008

Ski-Boats 100% 1 Event in 91 days

Sailing Craft 100% 1 Event in 52 days

Medical Assistance

(Sea Borne) 100% 1 Event in 41 days

Swimmers 100% 1 Event in 17 days

Paddle Ski’s 100% 1 Event in 73 days

Other 100% 1 Event in 91 days

Total 100% 1 Event in 6 days

Due to a lack of spatially represented information, no specific GIS based hazard mapping was

conducted for water transportation hazards.

7.2 Civil Unrest

Civil unrest and mass disturbances can occur at anytime, and normally lead to destruction of

property and concerns about public safety and security. For the purpose of this assessment civil

unrest hazards were divided into six categories, namely

� Demonstrations and riots;

� Refugees and Internally displaced persons;

� Xenophobic violence;

� Terrorism;

� Armed Conflict; and

� Crime.

According to the NMBM (s.a.) civil unrest, also called civil disorder, can impact on medical and

health operations in the NMBM by restricting the movement of traffic and impairing access and

function of public facilities.

7.2.1 Demonstrations / Riots

Demonstrations and riots are a common occurrence in South Africa although incidents where these

events escalate to physical violence, injuries and damage to property are less frequent. Areas that

are considered likely to be affected by demonstrations and rioting are public buildings, the CBD,

industrial areas, specific informal and informal settlements and main transport routes.



Specific information related to demonstrations and riots was received from stakeholders during

stakeholder consultations. The information indicated that:

• Stakeholders indicated that demonstrations due to a lack of service delivery are a concern in

specific wards in the NMBM. These wards included Ward 2, 3, 4, 21, 30, 34, 36, 38, 41 and

60.

• Stakeholders considered this type of demonstrations and riots as a Class 1 hazard (regular

events, ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents), and indicated that these events are on the

increase.

• Stakeholders indicated that the main cause of these demonstrations and riots are related to

corruption, and that the problem of demonstrations and riots is not addresses in the IDP.

• The priority to reduce or manage the risk related to demonstrations and riots was rated as 1,

which represents a priority of very urgent.

Hazards related to demonstrations and riots were mapped in combination with other hazards under

the civil unrest category.

7.2.2 Refugees, Displaced People and Illegal Immigr ation

The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of

being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group

or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear,

is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”

The UNHCR (2009) suggests that South Africa hosts approximately 40,000 refugees and over

100,000 asylum-seekers. According to the UNHCR these individuals come from approximately 52

countries, but most are from Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

Rwanda, Somalia and Zimbabwe. The majority of refugees and asylum-seekers live in the main

urban centres, such as Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria.



Source: UNHCR 2009

Figure 7-6: UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Sout h Africa

According to a report of MSF (2007) South Africa has become the leading destination in the region

for migrants fleeing economic and political chaos in neighboring countries. The main reason for

these individuals to come to South Africa is in search of jobs and safety. MSF estimates that

between 2,000 and 6,000 people cross the border into South Africa every day. The impact of these

people on South Africa is quite substantial.

The DEAT (2006) estimates that, immigration from Africa, is to some extent, counterbalancing the

downward trends in natural population growth. According to the DEAT (2006) the number of those

entering from outside the country is difficult to measure, because of illegal immigration into South

Africa and because of insufficiently understood circulatory migration patterns of people moving

between rural and urban areas. As an indicator, between the 1996 and 2001 censuses, the number of

persons who indicated that they were born in Southern African Development Community (SADC)

countries increased by 158 000, while the number living in South Africa but born in other African

countries increased by 21 800. Recent reports on asylum seekers show a similar upward trend. In

2004, 104 000 applications for asylum were received by authorities, more than double the figure for

2000 (DEAT, 2006).

Displaced people can include refugees or asylum seekers, but can also consist of local residents

displaced by the effects of a disaster event. This is often the case with fire or flooding disasters in

informal settlements. Housing or relocation of displaced persons should be carefully managed in

order to ensure that risks related to secondary hazards, such as disease or environmental degradation,

is reduced and managed appropriately.



Representatives consulted during this disaster risk assessment identified concerns related to refugees

(and possible illegal immigrants) and displaced persons in the NMBM. The information received

from community representatives indicated that:

• Stakeholders considered hazards associated with refugees and displaced people as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents).

• Refugees and displaced persons seem to be a concern in all the wards, but especially in the Motherwell area.

• The main challenge in dealing with refugees, displaced people and illegal immigration was perceived corruption in the Department of Home Affairs. A lack of government refugee policy for South Africa was also indicated as a challenge.

• Interesting enough, the priority to reduce or manage the risk related to refugees, displaced people and illegal immigration was classified by the representatives as 5 (Not an urgent priority).

Hazard mapping for refugees, displaced individuals and illegal immigration was combined with

other hazards under the civil unrest category and is presented at the end of this section on civil unrest

hazards.

7.2.3 Xenophobic Violence

As discussed in the previous section, South African has experienced an influx of immigrants from

neighbouring countries. This has increased the potential risk of xenophobic violence. According to

the UNHCR (2009) refugees, immigrants and asylum-seekers generally tend to settle in the main

urban centres, such as Port Elizabeth. However, unemployment in such centres is often already a

concern for local residents, an influx of immigrants might aggravate the situation. In many areas of

South Africa the competition for employment and resources has led to frustration and boiled over

into violence affecting many communities.

The exact number of foreign nationals currently residing in South Africa is unknown. According to

the UNHCR (2009) Zimbabweans have sought asylum in South Africa in growing numbers since the

disputed March 2008 elections in their country. They join the very large community of

Zimbabweans already living in South Africa, many of whom have no legal status and suffer great

hardship. Even though refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa enjoy freedom of movement,

the challenges they face when trying to integrate into local communities were highlighted by the

xenophobic attacks on foreigners in May 2008. These resulted in the deaths of more than 60 people

and the displacement of some 46,000 others in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria.

According to Misago (2009), violence against foreign nationals and other ‘outsiders’ has been a

long-standing feature of post-Apartheid South Africa. However, the intensity and scale of the May

2008 attacks was extraordinary. What started off as an isolated incidence of anti-foreigner violence

in Alexandra on 11 May, quickly spread to other townships and informal settlements across the

country. After two weeks and the deployment of the Army, the violence subsided. In its wake, 62

people, including 21 South Africans, were dead; at least 670 wounded; dozens of women raped; and



at least 100 000 persons displaced and property worth millions of Rand looted, destroyed or seized

by local residents and leaders.

A study by the International Organization for Migration (Misago 2009) reports as follows:

“There are broad structural and historical factors that led to the May 2008 violence including the

legacy of institutional discrimination and generalised mistrust among citizens, police, and the

elected leaders. But these cannot explain the location and timing of the attacks. Similarly, this

study finds little evidence to support early accounts blaming the eruption of the violence on a ‘third

force’, poor border control, changes in national political leadership, or rising food and commodity

prices. These factors may have contributed to generalised tensions, but they cannot explain why

violence occurred in some places and not others.

In explaining the timing and location of violence, this study’s findings are that in almost all cases

where violence occurred, it was organised and led by local groups and individuals in an effort to

claim or consolidate the authority and power needed to further their political and economic

interests. It therefore finds that most violence against non-nationals and other ‘outsiders’ which

occurred in May 2008 is rooted in the micro-politics of the country’s townships and informal

settlements. By comparing affected and non-affected areas, this report shows that only a trusted,

competent and committed leadership (from grassroots to high-level officialdom) can make a

significant difference in terms of preventing social tensions from turning into xenophobic violence.

In responding to the threats and outbreaks of violence, the study finds that local leaders and police

were typically reluctant to intervene on behalf of victims. In some cases, this was because they

supported the community’s hostile attitudes towards foreign nationals. In others, they feared losing

legitimacy and political positions if they were seen as defending unpopular groups. In almost all

instances, local leaders and police spoke of their incapacity to counter violence and violent

tendencies within their communities.”

The study further summarizes incidents and reactions related to xenophobic violence in South

Africa. The following abstracts relate to the timeline of some of the incidents within the Eastern

Cape Province:

Feb 2007 Motherwell (Eastern Cape): Violence triggered by the accidental shooting of a

young South African man (by a Somali shop owner) results in the looting of over

one-hundred Somali-owned shops in a 24 hour period.

Jan 2008 Duncan Village (Eastern Cape): Two Somalis are found burned to death in their

shop. Police later arrest seven people in connection with the incident after finding

them in possession of property belonging to the deceased.

Jan 2008 Jeffrey’s Bay (Eastern Cape): After a Somali shop owner allegedly shoots dead a

suspected thief, a crowd of residents attack Somali-owned shops, and many Somali

nationals seek shelter at the police station.

24 May 2008 George (Eastern Cape) Attacks said to have broken out (during the spate of May

2008 attacks).



It is important to consider the possible causes of the xenophobic violence in order to reduce the risk

of future attacks. Misago (2009) identified the following aspects as contributing but insufficient

conditions for the development of the outbreaks:

• High unemployment rates;

• Poor service delivery;

• Impunity;

• Limited knowledge of country’s immigration laws and policies; and

• Local authorities’ support and enforcement of illegal practices.

The following features (“triggers”) were shared by the sites affected during the May 2008 violence

(Misago 2009):

• Elevated crime levels (real or perceived);

• Ethnic divides and tensions;

• History of organised violence;

• Absence of institutionalised leadership;

• The emergence of informal leadership groups;

• Forced removals as tool for consolidating power;

• Instigators of the attacks;

• Lack of conflict resolution mechanisms; and

• Inability of local government to exercise authority in multi-party constituencies.

Based on these and other factors, it is important to consider suitable risk reduction activities in order

to prevent the occurrence of xenophobic violence in the NMBM.

7.2.4 Terrorism

In general terms, terrorism has not been perceived as a high probability risk in South Africa for the

last decade or more. This might be due to the seeming stable political environment, as well as a lack

of actual or perceived terrorism threats in South Africa over the last few years. According to a

report in 2009 (AON, 2009) the terrorism threat conditions in South Africa was estimated on the

level of a “Guarded threat”, which is the second lowest classification, regarded as a general risk

with no credible threats to specific targets. However, attacks on a soccer team in Angola, and the

upcoming FIFA 2010 World Cup to be hosted in South Africa, has raised a number of questions

with regard to the threat of terrorism during the event.



Source: AON Group, 2009

Figure 7-7: Terrorism Threat Conditions

Even though terrorism is, generally speaking, not considered as a severe threat in South Africa,

applicable indicators should be monitored to anticipate and manage possible future risks. With the

planning associated with the FIFA 2010 Soccer World Cup, especially related to safety and security

surrounding the event, it is strongly recommended that coordination and cooperation between all the

relevant role-players should be encouraged in order to assess, mitigate, prepare for and ensure an

effective response to any eventuality, including terrorism. These actions should, however, not stop

after the FIFA event, but should become standard practise following the event.

The only information captured from the Fire Services (NMBM 2010) incident records that can be

classified as being related to terrorism, is related to the history of bomb threats in the NMBM.

Keeping the limitations in mind, it should be mentioned that the history of a set of events, especially

man-made events, cannot primarily be used as an estimation of future events. This is also the case

for terrorism hazards. The statistics below are, however, provided as guidelines, but it is important

to consider contributing factors that can substantially change the risk profile of the NMBM in the

near future, and thereby increase the risks associated with civil unrest hazards, such as terrorism.

Analysis of the statistics received from the Fire Services indicated the following:

Table 7-5: Terrorism Hazard Statistics



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Bomb Threat Only 78% 1 Event in 15 months -



In preparation of possible terrorist events, it is important to consider the potential impact of an act of

terror in medical / health operations in the NMBM. This can include:

• Acts of terror may not be identified as a terrorist act early in the response;

• These situations may require a highly complex response, involving many agencies and

disciplines;

• The event may take many forms, including explosion, chemical, radiological, biological or

other attack;

• A need for evidence preservation may complicate the response; and

• A risk of a secondary event targeting responders may be present.

7.2.5 Armed Conflict (Civil/Political War)

According to the ICSU (2007), ongoing conflicts in Africa often exacerbate other hazards. Fragile

and degraded environments can fuel conflict and war, and vice versa. Conflicts aggravate the effects

of natural hazards, such as famine and epidemics, by increasing the vulnerability of societies and

ecosystems already under stress. In turn, the type, onset, and intensity of conflicts are also

influenced by natural environmental hazards. Both are linked, but the relationship is complex.

In 1985, almost all drought-affected African countries (such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, and

Mozambique) were also wracked by civil wars (Timberlake, 1994 in ICSU, 2007). In such times,

governments often allocate resources to war and give low priority to long-term environmental

concerns. The effects of conflicts often remain a problem long after the conflict is over. Today,

landmines and unexploded ordinance affect 30 of Africa’s 54 countries (Human Rights Watch, 1993

& 1994 in ICSU, 2007).

Conflict, and associated land degradation can also give rise to secondary hazards, including the

movement of large numbers of people within the borders of a country or across international borders

(ICSU, 2007).

Although the probability for major armed conflict in South Africa is currently considered low, the

extreme severity of armed conflict does mean that any incident will have serious implications for the

affected community. It is therefore important to carefully monitor indicators related to conflict, and

civil unrest, in order to reduce the risk of wide spread civil conflict in future.

7.2.6 Crime

Crime is not generally included as one of the hazards considered during a disaster risk assessment,

and one might ask why crime is even mentioned in a disaster risk assessment. The reason for this

will be discussed later in this section. It is however necessary to consider the impact of crime in

South Africa, before discussions with regard to crime as a contributor to disaster risk can be

discussed.

According to Du Plessis et al (2005) an accurate analysis of crime in South Africa since the advent

of democracy should begin with a review of the trends before and after 1994. Figures for the pre-

1994 period show that crime rates for most of the country have been increasing since the mid-1980s



(Schönteich and Louw 2001 in Du Plessis et al, 2005). However, because these statistics excluded

crime incidents in the apartheid-era “bantustans,” they are widely regarded as inaccurate. The

figures recorded by the police after 1994 indicate that recorded crime in South Africa has increased

by 30% over the past decade (SAPS 2003 in Du Plessis et al, 2005). Recorded violent crime has

increased more than any other crime type (by 41% compared to 28% for property crime) (Du Plessis

et al, 2005). The official police statistics paint a gloomy picture. But several considerations must be

taken into account when analysing crime in South Africa:

• The reporting phenomenon. A recent national victim survey suggests that less than half of

all crime is reported to the police (Burton, du Plessis, Leggett, Louw, Mistry, and van

Vuuren 2004 in Du Plessis et al, 2005). Moreover, reporting rates were the lowest for those

crime types that, according to the police data, showed the greatest increases (such as robbery

and assault). In addition, according to official statistics, offences that are traditionally well

reported, such as murder and vehicle theft, had decreased since 1994. To some degree,

then, the increase in recorded crime is likely to be a result of increased reporting to the

police. With the greater legitimacy of the justice system in general and an emphasis on

community policing and service delivery, an increase in reporting since 1994 was to be

expected.

• Alternative sources on crime trends. National victim survey findings show that, contrary to

police data, crime rates have not increased over the past five years. Surveys indicate a 2%

drop in overall crime rates between 1998 and 2003.

• There is good news. Murder statistics are widely regarded as most reliable, and the official

data show a consistent decrease in the murder rate since 1994.

• Substantial regional variation. Crime rates and crime trends over time differ substantially

between provinces and cities. For example, the murder rate in the Western Cape in 2002–

2003 was seven times that of Limpopo, the province with the lowest murder rate.

• Violence is the key challenge. It is of concern that over one third of all officially recorded

crime is violent. The categories that present the greatest challenge are murder, armed

robbery, rape, and child rape and abuse.

• The public feel increasingly unsafe. Despite what the statistics say and the substantial efforts

of government and civil society, members of the public feel much less safe now than they

did five years ago (Burton et al. 2004 in Du Plessis et al. 2005).

• Similar factors drive crime in South Africa as elsewhere. The factors that have been

associated with crime in South Africa are similar to those described internationally (Du

Plessis et al, 2005).

Keeping these aspects in mind, one needs to consider the impact of crime on the NMBM, and if

crime does qualify to be considered in a disaster risk assessment. For this assessment, crime is

considered as a sub-hazard under the civil unrest hazard category. However, crime should not only

be considered in the context of a hazard, but also as a contributory factor to vulnerability (See

Section 8). For the purpose of this discussion, crime will be considered as a sub-hazard under Civil

Unrest hazard.



During consultations with representatives of the NMBM, crime was identified as a concern. The

information collected from the representatives indicated that:

• Crime in the NMBM is considered a Class 1 hazard (Regular Events, Ordinary, day-

to-day activities / incidents);

• Ward 10, 11, 31 and 32 were identified as having specific problems associated with

rape, gangsterism, robbery and housebreaking, while Ward 21 and 22 were

identified as areas where tourists are being robbed.

• The main cause of crime was perceived as being related to unemployment levels in

the NMBM; and

• Representatives identified the priority to reduce or manage the risk related to crime

as priority 1 (Very urgent).

• Even though the IDP of the NMBM (IDP 2009) identifies Crime prevention as one

of its key priorities, some representatives indicated that the NMBM IDP does not

address the hazard of crime (especially related to crime against tourists).

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

Apr 03 -

Mar 04

Apr 04 -

Mar 05

Apr 05 -

Mar 06

Apr 06 -

Mar 07

Apr 07 -

Mar 08

Apr 08 -

Mar 09

Selected Crime Levels in the NMBM

Murder

Total sexual crimes

Attempted Murder

Assault with the intent to inflict

grievous bodily harm

Driving under the influence of

alcohol or drugs

Public Violence

Figure 7-8: Selected Crime Levels in the NMBM



Figure 7-9: Total murder and population levels for selected areas in the NMBM

Figure 7-10 represents the results of the Civil Unrest hazard mapping for the NMBM. Areas

identified as high civil unrest hazard areas include industrial areas, government buildings and major

transport routes, as well as areas identified by representatives from the NMBM during stakeholder

consultations.



Figure 7-10: Civil unrest hazard

7.3 Environmental Degradation

For the purpose of this assessment, environmental degradation was divided into four sub-categories.

They included:

• Deforestation;

• Erosion;

• Land Degradation; and

• Loss of Biodiversity.

Environmental degradation may result from a variety of factors, including overpopulation and the

resulting overuse of land and other resources. Intensive farming, for instance, depletes soil fertility,

thus decreasing crop yields. Pollution is also a well known cause of environmental degradation.

Sources of pollution include mines, power generating facilities (especially those burning fossil

fuels), industry and agriculture (Miller, 1999).

In many parts of the world, environmental degradation is an important cause of poverty.

Environmental problems have led to shortages of food, clean water, materials for shelter, and other

essential resources. As natural resources are degraded, people who live directly off the environment

suffer most from the effects.



Even though, the majority of the inhabitants in the NMBM do not live directly off the environment,

Environmental degradation is a key hazard to be considered in the context of the NMBM area.

Environmental degradation is often not considered a disaster risk, due to the fact that the

environmental degradation hazards often leads to slow-onset disasters, with less dramatic results

than other rapid-onset disaster such as fires or floods. However, the characteristic of the NMBM,

especially in terms of biodiversity and ecological characteristics highlight the need to include

environmental degradation in an assessment of this sort. A brief overview of the NMBM in the

context of environmental degradation is provided below:

According to SRK (2009), “the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is situated in the southern-eastern

most corner of the Cape Floristic Region (CFR), South Africa. The CFR is an area of exceptional

floristic diversity and endemism. A conservation priority within the CFR is the lowlands of the

Nelson Mandela Metropole. Nelson Mandela Bay is an area of convergence of five of South Africa's

seven biomes; namely the Fynbos, Subtropical Thicket, Forest, Nama Karoo, and Grassland biomes

(Low & Rebelo, 1998). Such a concentration of biomes, particularly within a city, is unparalleled in

the world. The remaining natural habitats of the area are currently being severely fragmented by

urban development, industry, cultivation, grazing, mining and alien plant infestation.”

Other aspects indentified in the IDP (2009) highlight the importance of the NMBM’s natural

environment, especially for the tourism industry:

• Due to the geographical location of the NMBM, tourism development is a major catalyst for

economic growth and a local strength.

• Tourism can play an important role in the NMBM in terms of job creation. Bed-nights spent

in Nelson Mandela Bay have been consistently increasing with a 10% annual increase in the

occupancy rate. The quality of the local beaches is confirmed by the fact that no less than

four beaches have Blue Flag status.

• Nelson Mandela Bay is an excellent point from which to explore African big game and

wildlife. The City is situated within half an hour’s drive of world acclaimed game reserves

with the Big Five and which include the famous Addo National Elephant Park and

Shamwari Game Reserve.

• Known for its great biodiversity, the area has no less than five of the six land biomes in

South Africa. The region also contains three of the 21 internationally recognised biodiversity

hotspots.

• Totaling approximately 100km of beach and coastline, its beachfront is the city’s greatest

natural asset. This largely underdeveloped and unexploited area has the potential of forming

the foundation of a thriving tourism, recreation and holiday industry.

Environmental degradation hazards are discussed in more detail below:



7.3.1 Deforestation

No specific information with regard to deforestation in the NMBM was received. However, aspects

related to deforestation are covered under the general environmental degradation hazard description

and mapping.

7.3.2 Erosion

Erosion, including soil, wind and water erosion, is often not considered as a major disaster hazard,

but, as is the case with a number of environmental degradation hazards, uncontrolled erosion can

cause severe damage to the environment, and lead to a general reduction in environmental quality.

Erosion in the vicinity of infrastructure, such as roads, pipelines and electricity infrastructure, can

lead to the eventual destruction of the infrastructure.

Soil erosion can result from a number of causes, including overstocking and overgrazing as well as

inappropriate farming techniques. The effect of erosion can include an on-site loss of agricultural

potential and localized environmental damage. Water erosion, on the other hand, can cause

problems in watercourses. This is due to the downstream movement of sediment, causing the silting

up of reservoirs and flooding (DoA, 2006). The sandy nature of the coastal areas is also at risk of

erosion especially if the natural plant cover is stripped (SEA Report, 2000).

According to the DoA (2006), the following types of erosion can be identified:

• Sheet Erosion: Soil erosion is characterised by the down slope removal of soil particles within a thin sheet of water. Sheet erosion occurs when the entire surface of a field is gradually eroded in more or less uniform way. It is a gradual process and it is not immediately obvious that soil is being lost.

• Gully erosion (dongas): Dongas usually occur near the bottom of slopes and are caused by the removal of soil and soft rock as a result of concentrated runoff that forms a deep channel or gully. On steep land, there is often the danger of gullies forming. Water running downhill cuts a channel deep into the soil and where there is a sudden fall, a gully head forms at the lower end of the channel and gradually works its way back uphill. As it does so, it deepens and widens the scar that the gully makes in the hillside. Gully erosion is related to stream bank erosion, in which fast-flowing rivers and streams increasingly cut down their own banks.

• Rill erosion (channel erosion): Channel erosion can occur on steep land or on land that slopes more gently. Because there are always irregularities in a field, water finds hollows in which to settle and low-lying channels through which to run. As the soil from these channels is washed away, channels or miniature dongas are formed in the field.

• Wind erosion: Wind erosion occurs when the land surface is left bare in regions that are arid enough, as a result of low rainfall, to allow the soil to dry out, and flat enough to allow the wind to carry the soil away over several consecutive days. Land may become susceptible to wind erosion through grazing animals, which remove the protective plant cover, and whose hooves break up the soil, especially round watering points. Arable land that has been left bare is also a major problem (DoA, 2006).



According to the DoA (2006) a number of factors can cause or exacerbate soil erosion. These

factors include:

• Slope: The steeper the slope, the greater the erosion, as a result of the increased velocity of

water-flow. The length of the slope is very important, because the greater the size of the

sloping area, the greater the concentration of the flooding water.

• Soil texture: Soil texture is the size distribution of soil particles. The size of particles never

changes. A sandy soil, therefore, remains sandy and a clayey soil remains clayey. The three

main particles are sand, silt and clay. The more sandy a soil the easier it will erode.

• Soil structure: The term soil structure means the grouping or arrangement of soil particles.

Over cultivation and compaction cause the soil to lose its structure and cohesion (ability to

stick together) and it erodes more easily.

A number of characteristics of an area can reduce the occurrence of Erosion (DoA, 2006). These

include:

• Organic material: Organic material is the “glue” that binds the soil particles together and

plays an important part in preventing soil erosion. Organic matter is the main source of

energy for soil organisms, both plant and animal. It also influences the infiltration capacity

of the soil, therefore reducing runoff.

• Vegetation cover: The loss of protective vegetation through overgrazing, ploughing and fire

makes soil vulnerable to being swept away by wind and water. Plants provide protective

cover on the land and prevent soil erosion for the following reasons:

o Plants slow down water as it flows over the land and this allows much of the rain to

soak into the ground.

o Plant roots hold the soil in position and prevent it from being blown or washed

away.

o Plants break the impact of a raindrop before it hits the soil, reducing the soil’s ability

to erode.

o Plants in wetlands and on the banks of rivers are important as they slow down the

flow of the water and their roots bind the soil, preventing erosion.

• Land use: Grass is the best natural soil protector against soil erosion because of its

relatively dense cover. Small grains, such as wheat, offer considerable obstruction to surface

wash. Row crops such as maize and potatoes offer little cover during the early growth stages

and thereby encourage erosion. Fallowed areas, where no crop is grown and all the residue

has been incorporated into the soil, are most subject to erosion (DoA, 2006).



Some of the following measures can be implemented to prevent soil erosion:

• The use of contour ploughing and windbreaks;

• Leave unploughed grass strips between ploughed lands (strip cropping);

• Make sure that there are always plants growing on the soil, and that the soil is rich in humus;

• Avoid overgrazing;

• Allow indigenous plants to grow along riverbanks;

• Conserve wetlands;

• Cultivate land, using a crop rotation system;

• Minimum or no tillage; and

• Encourage water infiltration and reduce water runoff (DoA, 2006).

Representatives consulted during this disaster risk assessment identified concerns related to erosion

in the NMBM. The information received from community representatives indicated that:

• Stakeholders considered erosion Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day

activities/incidents).

• Erosion hazards were identified as a concern in Ward 34 and 38 (erosion next to the road),

while coastal erosion damage, leading to damage to municipal facilities, were identified at

the NMBM coast. In both instances, representative perceived the problem of erosion to be

increasing.

• The main cause for the coastal erosion damage was perceived to be the sea conditions.

• The priority to reduce or manage risks related to erosion hazards was rated as 1.75, which

represents a priority of ‘very to medium urgent’.

7.3.3 Land Degradation

In terms of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, land degradation refers to the

reduction or loss of biological or economic productivity of agricultural lands, woodlands, and

forests. This reduction is mostly result from human activities (DEAT, 2006).

It has been estimated by UNEP that more than a quarter of the African continent is in the process of

becoming useless for cultivation because of land degradation. One of the causes of degradation is

population pressure, which forces farmers to cultivate marginal land (ICSU, 2007).

According to ICSU (2007): “The rural poor, the overwhelming majority of Africa’s population,

destroy their own environment, not out of ignorance but simply for survival. Peasant farmers

preoccupied with survival over-crop marginal land because there is no alternative employment and

no better technologies that they can afford. Pastoralists overstock to improve their chances of

surviving the next drought. Rural dwellers strip trees and shrubs for wood because they need fuel.



In the context of the short-term basic needs of an individual, each decision is rational; in the long

run, the effects are disastrous.”

Desertification refers to land degradation in dry lands that result from both climatic variability and

human activities. Desertification occurs when several degraded patches of land expand and join to

form large, unproductive areas. Thus, desertification occurs over a larger scale than land

degradation and results in the ‘permanent’ loss of productivity and supply of ecosystem services

(DEAT, 2006).

Areas of severe degradation (that is, degradation of both soil and vegetation) and desertification in

South Africa are perceived to correspond closely with the distribution of communal rangelands,

specifically in the steeply sloping environments adjacent to the escarpment in Limpopo, KwaZulu-

Natal, and the Eastern Cape (Figure 7-11). Many communal areas in the Limpopo, North West,

Northern Cape, and Mpumalanga provinces are also severely degraded. The commercial farming

areas with the most severe degradation are located in the Western and Northern Cape provinces.

Wind and water erosion are the major natural causes of soil degradation, while change in species

composition, loss of plant cover, and bush encroachment are the most frequent forms of vegetation

degradation (DEAT, 2006).

Source: DEAT, 2006.

Figure 7-11: Distribution of land degradation based on Combined Degradation Index.



Based on Figure 7-11, it would appear as if the NMBM area has not suffered the same extent of

degradation as some of the other areas in the Eastern Cape Province.

74.4

0.2

12.7 12.6

0

20

40

60

80

100

Natural Land-cover Degradaded land-

cover

Urban land use Agricultural land

use

Land use in Selected Coastal Municipalities (%)

Nelson Mandela Cacadu eThekwini O.R Tambo Cape Town

Based on DEAT, 2006

Figure 7-12: Land use in coastal Metropolitan and D istrict Municipalities.

As show above, 74% of the NMBM area is considered to have natural land-cover, 12.7% is

considered urban land use and 12.6% is considered agricultural use. Only 0.2% is considered to be

degraded (DEAT, 2006). Representatives consulted during the stakeholder consultation sessions

identify only one specific concern with regard to land degradation. Information received indicated

that:

• Representatives considered this type of environmental degradation as a Class 1 hazard

(regular events, ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents).

• According to representatives, mining activities in a small section of the NMBM had a

geological impact on the NMBM.

• Representative further indicated that this type of degradation is increasing and that they do

not feel the IDP addresses this concern adequately.

• Representatives rated the priority to deal with these hazards as 2.5 (Medium urgency).



7.3.4 Loss of Biodiversity

Even though only a small percentage of the NMBM is considered to be degraded, approximately

40% of the natural features of the NMBM have already been lost (SRK 2009). The central and

eastern parts of the Municipality are largely developed for residential, commercial and industrial

purposes, while the northern, western and most southern parts of Nelson Mandela Bay are rural in

nature and are predominantly used for agricultural, low density residential and conservation

purposes. Due to the formal safe-guarding of natural areas via nature reserves and limited

development in some areas to date, vast parts of the Municipality are of high scenic value and

underpin Nelson Mandela Bay's tourism economy (SRK 2009).

Loss of biodiversity, however, is also relevant to the coastal and aquatic areas. Figure 7-13

represents the estuary health in South Africa.

Source: DEAT, 2006

Figure 7-13: Estuary health in South Africa.

The combined environmental degradation hazard map for the NMBM is shown below:



Figure 7-14: Environmental Degradation Hazard

The majority of environmental degradation was identified in the central and eastern part of the

NMBM.

7.4 Disease / Health - Disease: Animal

The Eastern Cape has previously experience problems with animal diseases, both related to animals

in game reserves and protected areas, as well as animals in agricultural environments. During the

consultations with representatives from the NMBM, the following was identified with regard to

animal disease hazards in the NMBM:

• Swine flu was identified as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day

activities/incidents) in all the wards of the NMBM.

• The priority to reduce or manage risks related to this hazard was rated as 2.5 (medium

urgency).

• A concern with regard to diseases caused/carried by rats was also identified as a concern in

all the wards. The priority to deal with this hazard was identified as 1 (Very urgent).

The result of the GIS based animal disease hazard mapping is shown below:



Figure 7-15: Animal Disease Hazard

7.5 Disease / Health - Disease: Human

Human disease and health hazards pose a severe threat to a large number of South African

communities. According to MSF (2007) it is estimated by the UN that over 5.5 million people in

South Africa are HIV positive and about a million are in urgent need of anti-retroviral treatment

(ART). Tuberculosis (TB) is the leading cause of illness and death among those living with HIV

(MSF 2007).

TB, HIV and AIDS are also considered a problem in the NMBM, and this is reflected in the IDP,

with one of the IDP priorities being identified as “Provision of health services and combating

diseases such as TB, HIV and AIDS” (IDP 2009).

However, the burden of disease also includes other diseases. Several notifiable diseases in South

Africa have strong environmental links. Hepatitis and cholera are most often transmitted through

contaminated water, whereas typhoid fever is often associated with lack of clean water supply and

sanitation facilities, unplanned urbanization, and increased movement of migrant workers (DEAT,

2006).



With regards to primary health care, the NMBM is guided by the following Millennium

Development Goals (IDP 2009):

• Between 1990 and 2015 to reduce by 2/3 the under five mortality rate;

• Between 1990 and 2015 to reduce by ¾ the maternal mortality rate;

• To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS; and

• To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidents of malaria and other major diseases

such as TB.

According to the IDP (2009) a priority of the Municipality is to ensure universal access to all

primary health care. In this regard, the following is considered by the NMBM in providing universal

access to primary health facilities:

• the proximity of health facilities to communities;

• the conditions of the facilities;

• the levels of services provided; and

• the availability of health personnel.

Specific concerns with regards to human health in the NMBM will be discussed in more detail

below.

7.5.1 HIV/AIDS

Recent statistics on the impact of AIDS on sub-Saharan Africa indicates that the HIV and AIDS

epidemic will potentially have a devastating effect on the growth of the South African economy,

especially in the longer term. Excessively high morbidity rates amongst the most productive

segment of the labour force (especially 15–49-year-olds) impact on labour productivity, GDP growth

rates, and cost burdens to the state in terms of health care and orphaned children (DEAT, 2006).

More recently, however, life expectancy has declined dramatically, mostly because of the increased

number of HIV and AIDS infections. Although average life expectancy peaked at 67 years in 1985,

it has declined dramatically since then. It was predicted that that average life expectancy in 2004

would fall below 50 years, with 48.5 years for men and 52.7 years for women. The average for the

period 2000–2005 dropped to 46 years. It has been estimated that, by 2010, South Africa’s life

expectancy will be 48 years for those living with HIV and AIDS and 68.2 years for those who are

HIV negative (Dorrington et al. (2004) in DEAT, 2006). This situation mirrors trends in the southern

African region (DEAT, 2006).



Note: these figures are averaged over 5-yearly periods and so yearly peaks and troughs are not shown.

Source: DEAT, 2006

Figure 7-16: Life expectancy of South Africans, 195 0 – 2005

Typical other impacts of AIDS include decreased productivity of workers, increased absenteeism

and additional costs of training of new workers. It also represents a greater demand and pressure on

health facilities and as the statistics gathered from antenatal clinics indicate a very real problem of

AIDS orphans and child (minor) headed households.

The HIV prevalence according to the DoH (2007) is shown in Figure 7-17 below.

Source: DoH, 2007

Figure 7-17: HIV prevalence among antenatal clinic attendees in South Africa



Source: DoH, 2007

Figure 7-18: HIV Antenatal Survey Prevalence by Dis trict: Eastern Cape (2006)

Source: DoH, 2007

Figure 7-19: HIV Antenatal Survey Prevalence by Dis trict: Eastern Cape (2006)



During stakeholder consultations in the NMBM, representatives identified HIV/AIDS as a human

disease health hazard. Information provided by stakeholders indicated that:

• Stakeholders perceive HIV/AIDS as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day


• The perception of stakeholders is that the cases of HIV/AIDS are increasing, and that the

main cause of the spread of HIV/AIDS relates to “sex, drugs and alcohol”.

• Stakeholders have identified that plans are being implemented, and that the Council has

established a disease management committee.

• The priority to manage and reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS was rated as priority 1 hazard (very

urgent).

According to the IDP (2009) to combat HIV and AIDS and TB, the Municipality has developed and

is currently implementing an integrated HIV and AIDS Plan focusing on the following:

• Prevention, treatment, care, support, monitoring, evaluation and research.

• Broadening access to basic services.

• Employee wellness and support.

All these initiatives require an integrated approach by the three spheres of government. Accordingly,

the Municipality established a multi-stakeholder Metropolitan AIDS Council, which sits quarterly

(IDP 2009).

7.5.2 TB, MBR-TD and XDR-TB

According to the DEAT (2006), Statistics South Africa figures show that tuberculosis (TB) was the

most dominant contributor to the growth in mortality between 1997 and 2002. Commonly referred

to as a ‘disease of poverty’, TB has the highest prevalence among South Africa’s poor. Between

1997 and 2001, TB contributed to 8% of deaths and was identified as one of the five leading

underlying causes of death among South Africans. A total of 224 420 cases of TB were registered

during 2002, representing an increase of 16% from 2001 and an incidence of 494 cases per 100 000

people (DEAT, 2006).

South Africa is burdened by one of the worst TB epidemics in the world. The human

immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is one of the most important factors responsible for exacerbating the

TB epidemic. The estimated percentage of people infected with TB who are also HIV-positive is

estimated to be around 53%. A serious challenge in the fight against TB is the emergence of the

multi drug resistant TB (MDR-TB) and the extremely drug resistant TB (XDR-TB) strains (DoH,

2008).



In early 2005, physicians at one of the rural hospitals in KwaZulu-Natal were concerned by the high

death rate among patients infected with HIV who also had tuberculosis. Studies conducted in the

area showed that of the 544 patients studied, 221 had (MDR-TB) and of these 221 cases, 53 had

XDR-TB. Of 53 patients with XDR tuberculosis, 55% claimed they had never been treated for TB

before, thus had no history of failing to complete the medication course, which usually leads to

resistance. This implied that they had primary infection with an XDR strain. In September 2006,

the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that a deadly strain of XDR-TB had been

detected in Tugela Ferry, a rural town in KwaZulu-Natal province, the Epicenter of South Africa’s

HIV and AIDS epidemic. By 1st December 2006, South Africa had reported more than 300 cases of

XDR-TB. A total of 1,213 XDR-TB cases were reported between the year 2004 and 2007. The

number of XDR-TB cases has been escalating at alarming rates over the years. Overall, XDR-TB

cases have increased by 86% in 2007 compared to 2004 (DoH 2008).

Source: DOH, 2008

Figure 7-20: Total XDR-TB cases reported in the per iod 2004 – 2007 in South Africa

The emergence of resistance to drugs used to treat TB, and particularly MDR-TB has become a

significant public health problem in a number of countries, including South Africa. In many

countries, the extent of drug resistance is unknown and the management of patients with MDR-TB is

inadequate. According to the WHO (2006) in countries where drug resistance has been identified,

specific measures need to be taken within TB control programmes to address the problem through

appropriate management of patients and adoption of strategies to prevent the propagation and

dissemination of drug-resistant TB, including MDR-TB.

South Africa faces one of the worst tuberculosis (TB) epidemics in the world. As a result of

inappropriate or ineffective treatment, multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) has also arisen in all nine

provinces, placing a severe burden on the South African health system. Multidrug-resistant TB

(MDR-TB) is essentially a man-made problem. In the majority of cases, it emerges when a TB



patient receives inappropriate or ineffective treatment, which allows naturally-occurring resistant TB

bacteria to survive and multiply. Strains of MDR-TB can also be transmitted directly too susceptible

individuals, such as children and those also infected with HIV (Weyer et al, 2006).

According to Weyer et al (2006) when people with strong immune systems are exposed to MDR-

TB, they can become infected, but will normally not become sick. The MDR-TB bacteria will

remain in their bodies in a dormant state, and cannot be passed on to others. However, once an

infected person’s immune system is compromised – due to illness, a poor diet, stress or HIV – that

person can develop active MDR-TB. At a more advanced stage of the disease (when sputum tests

detect organisms under the microscope), and once a patient develops a cough, they can infect others

in their immediate environment.

The following provides an overview of some of the challenges associated with MDR-TB as

identified by Weyer et al (2006):

• High case load, despite low prevalence o MDR-TB makes up 2,9% of TB cases.

o A recent MRC study showed that there are 6 000 cases of MDR-TB in South Africa

per year.

• High risk o The infectious stage of MDR-TB (positive sputum smear) in actively coughing

patients is very contagious.

o HIV-positive individuals (who have compromised immune systems) are at a very

high risk of developing active MDR-TB after infection.

o Children are at high risk of developing active MDR-TB once they are infected.

o On average, 10% of otherwise healthy individuals infected with MDR-TB will

develop active disease in their lifetime.

• Expensive treatment o Drugs cost R30 000 per patient, compared to R300 for drug-susceptible TB.

o Treatment takes up to 24 months.

o Patients need to be hospitalised for 4–6 months.

o Laboratory investigations are extensive (monthly bacteriological cultures).

o Drug toxicity necessitates additional laboratory screening (eg. liver and kidney

function, audiometry).

The Eastern Cape has also experienced a number of cases of XDR-TB. Figure 7-21 illustrates the

total number of XDR-TB cases reported in the period 2004 – 2007 in each province.



2004 2005 2006 2007

Eastern Cape 0 1 45 132

Free State 0 4 4 4

Gauteng 32 6 44 42

Kwazulu-Natal 19 158 279 277

Limpopo 1 0 0 4

Mpumalanga 0 0 0 7

Northern Cape 4 5 19 7

North West 0 3 12 3

Western Cape 18 7 16 60

0 1

45

132

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Total Number of XDR-TB cases reported in South Africa

(2004 - 2007)

Based on DoH, 2008

Figure 7-21: Total XDR-TB cases reported in the per iod 2004 – 2007 in South Africa

Of the 1,213 cases reported during this period, the majority (60%) were from KwaZulu-Natal,

followed by Eastern Cape (15%), and Gauteng Province (10%) The number of XDR-TB cases

reported in KwaZulu-Natal increased dramatically from 19 in 2004 to 277 cases in 2007 (DoH

2008).

TB is also considered a severe problem in the NMBM and according to the IDP (2009) Nelson

Mandela Bay has been identified by the national government as a TB crisis district and is therefore

charged with implementing the National Health TB Crisis Plan. According to the DoH (2008) the

following are recommended for the management of XDR-TB:

• Susceptibility testing is recommended for patients with treatment interruptions. Routine sputum

culture and susceptibility testing of all patients suspected of having TB should form part of a

multifaceted approach to identifying and addressing TB drug resistance.

• Political Support and funding allocated to strengthen the response to MDR-TB and XDR-TB,

including improvement of facilities where patients with drug resistant strains of TB are

hospitalised.



• Strengthening of surveillance and establishing early warning systems.

• The development of drug resistance may result from inappropriate treatment regimens (e.g.

choice of drugs, dosage, duration of treatment), programme factors (irregular drug supply,

inadequacy of health personnel). As a result, ongoing monitoring and evaluation programs are

therefore critical for strengthen the shortcoming (DoH 2008).

7.5.3 Other Diseases

As in any other region of South Africa, the poor experience above normal rates of infectious disease.

Malnutrition lowers the body’s resistance to illness and illness aggravates malnutrition. Inadequate

services and shelter or housing also creates conditions that promote disease. Without decent

protection, many of the poor are exposed to severe and dangerous weather as well as to bacteria and

viruses carried by other people and animals (Colgan, 2002).

The pattern of disease differs dramatically between First and Third World countries. The major

killers in the First World are cancer (15%) and circulatory diseases (32%), whereas in the Third

World cancer accounts for (4%) and circulatory diseases (15%). The big killers in the poor countries

are infectious, parasitic and respiratory diseases, often worsened by the effects of malnutrition and

the HIV/Aids epidemic. These diseases cause forty four percent (44%) of deaths in the Third World

compared to eleven percent (11%) in the First World (Harrison, 1993; Colgan, 2002).

Disease also has major economic implications through the costs of caring for the ill, ill people not

being able to go to work, and the loss of breadwinners in many families. A family's well-being is

strongly linked with the physical health of its members so when an economically active family-

member becomes ill or disabled, the entire family faces an economic as well as a physical burden.

During consultations with representatives from the NMBM, other diseases were also identified as a

concern. Information received from representatives indicates that:

• Both Cholera and Measles are considered a Class 2 hazard (Rare Events, out of the ordinary,

but still manageable) in the NMBM;

• Representatives identified measles as a concern in all of the wards, while Cholera was

identified as a concern in Wards 33, 36, 37, 40 and 41;

• The main cause of Cholera was identified as a lack of sanitation and funding.

Representatives further indicated that the IDP does not adequately address the problems

associated with Cholera and Measles.

• The priority to manage and reduce the risk of Cholera was rated as 1 (Very urgent) while the

priority to manage measles was rated as 2.5 (Medium urgency).

The NMBM Fires Services statistics were also used to identify events related to human health and

disease hazards. Even though these statistics only provide an overview o the activities of the Fire

Services, the following was calculated based on the received statistics:



Table 7-6: Ambulance Incident and Rescue Statistics related to Human Health and Disease Hazards



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Ambulance

Incident

Assault 17% 1 Event per 5.9 years Based on Fire

Services Statistics

only, and does not

include information

from other

Emergency

Services.

Cardiac 11% 1 Event per 8.9 years

Collapse 6% 1 Event per 17.8 years

Maternity 17% 1 Event per 5.9 years

Medical 100% 1 Event per 0.9 years

Miscellaneous 28% 1 Event per 3.6 years

Removal 17% 1 Event per 5.9 years

Total 100% 1 Event per 0.5 years

Rescues

Land Base 100% 1 Event per 19.1 days Based only on Fire

Services Statistics Land Based* 6% 1 Event per 6,513 days

Medical Rescue 100% 1 Event per 28.1 days * -Category seems to be part of the Land Base category, however, investigation into classifications was not included as part of this assessment.

The GIS human disease and health hazard map for the NMBM are shown below:

Figure 7-22: Human Disease Hazard



7.6 Disease / Health - Disease: Plants

No specific information with regard to plant disease hazards in the NMBM was received.

7.7 Fire Hazards

Fire hazards are considered a risk for both urban and developed areas as well as rural and

undeveloped areas. Fire can also be considered both a naturally occurring hazard, caused by lighting

or other natural processes, and also a man-made hazard, when considered in developed urban areas.

For the purpose of this disaster risk assessment, fire hazards were divided into:

• Formal & Informal Settlement and Urban Fires; and

• Veld and Forest Fires.

7.7.1 Veld, Forest Fires and Wild Fire

Much of sub-Saharan Africa is susceptible to fires, which destroy pastures, crops, buildings, and

infrastructure. Even though natural fires can be ignited by lightning, human beings are mostly

responsible for veld fires (ICSU, 2007).

The large area affected by fires has implications for short-term productivity and long-term land

degradation processes, which eventually contribute to famine during drought periods. Combined

with intense drought, these fires destroy biodiversity and reduce the regeneration capacity of the

vegetation. Although fires cause few deaths, valuable resources are lost, thereby contributing to

poverty. Pasture is destroyed, and animals have to be moved or funds allocated to purchase their

feed. According to the Air Pollution Information Network Africa (APINA), fires also affect air

quality and generate greenhouse gases. In addition, they can affect hydrological processes such as

run-off and may lead to soil erosion (ICSU, 2007).

The risk associated with veldfires in South Africa is substantial, and veldfires cause severe losses to

life, property and the environment in most areas of the country. However, this risk has two parts:

first, that arising from wildfires (i.e. unwanted veldfires) that cause damage to assets, and, second,

the risk arising from ecologically inappropriate fire regimes in environments where fire plays an

ecological role. As in most countries with wildfires, the risk can be managed to acceptable levels at

acceptable cost, provided a comprehensive approach, based on integrated natural resource

management within a proper development planning and management framework, is adopted and

applied consistently (Kruger, et al., 2006).

Kruger, et al., (2006) compiled a risk classification, in order to classifying vegetation types and each

metropolitan and local municipality in South Africa according to classes of wildfire risk. It also

deals with the environmental risk associated with inappropriate fire regimes. “These two dimensions

of risk need to be examined together, since experience in South Africa and elsewhere has shown that



managing the two dimensions separately leads inevitably to long-term environmental and resource

degradation, rising costs of wildfire suppression and intractable problems in maintaining a safe

environment.” (Kruger, et al., 2006).

The term ‘wildfire risk’ was used as the standard sense, i.e. it is the chance of a fire igniting,

spreading and causing damage to one or more assets, measured in terms of likelihood and

consequence to the assets.

The risk classification was based in the first place on information on the prevailing natural

vegetation in any part of the country. For each vegetation type, the likelihood of wildfires occurring

in that vegetation was established, and the consequences that arise in modern times when such

wildfires occur. This combination of likelihood and consequence allows the risk to be rated. Then,

using the spatial distribution of vegetation types, a risk class was assigned to each metropolitan and

local municipality.

Figure 7-23: Municipalities classified according to levels of veld fire risk (April 2003)



Based on this assessment, the NMBM is located in a Low Risk Veldfire area. Representatives from

the NMBM also provided information with regard to veld fire hazards. Information collected from

the individuals indicated that:

• Veld fires are considered a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day


• It was the perception of representatives that the main cause of the identified veld fires in the

NMBM was arson, and the priority to reduce and manage the risk of veldfire was identified

as 1 (Very urgent).

Statistics with regard to vegetation fires was received from the Fire Services. Results based on

calculations of the probability and frequency of recorded events is shown below:

Table 7-7: Vegetation Fires Statistics



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Vegetation Fires

Bush, Forests &

Plantation 100% 1 Event per 241 days

Based only

on Fire

Services

Statistics

Grass/Bush All

other Areas 6% 1 Event per 6,513 days

Grass / Bush on

Pavement 100% 1 Event per 12.4 days

Grass / Bush

Open Areas 100% 1 Event per 0.2 days

Total 100% 1 Event per 0.2 days

Source: NMBM, 2010.

The NMBM (s.a.) identified potential impacts of ‘bush’ fire on medical and health operations in the

NMBM. These include:

• Fire may threaten, damaged or destroyed fixed facilities including medical and emergency

services;

• Response to fire events might require evacuation of entire communities and/or medical

facilities;

• Fire can impair land transportation;

• Air quality can cause health problems for vulnerable populations well outside of the area

threatened by the fire;

• Fire suppression needs may limit personnel availability for emergency medical response;

• Fire often causes hazardous conditions for field responders; and

• Fire may be sustained and require a response for several weeks.



7.7.2 Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Fires

Veld fires are not the only form of fire that can pose a risk to the NMBM, but formal and informal

settlement and urban fires can also pose a serious risk to the NMBM.

Informal settlements often do not comply with local requirements for conventional (formal)

townships and are consequently areas of increasingly high risk with regard to fire. This is also due to

the following general characteristics of informal settlements (CM, s.a.):

• Informal settlements often have inadequate infrastructure;

• The informal settlement and surrounding environment is often considered unsuitable;

• Informal settlement are often characterised by population densities that are uncontrolled and

unhealthy high;

• There is often poor access to health and educational facilities as well as employment

opportunities in informal settlements;

• Informal settlement often have a lack of effective governance and management; and

• Individual dwellings within informal settlements are often considered inadequate.

All of the above factors can contribute to an increased risk of fire in informal settlements. Formally

established urban environments, such as areas in the NMBM, are also at risk to fire. During

consultations with stakeholders in the NMBM, the following information with regard to fires in the

NMBM was collected:

• Fires (Formal and Informal Settlement Fires) were rated as a Class 1 hazard (regular events,

ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents).

• The main areas identified by representatives where fires are a concern are Wards 34, 36, 41,

42 and 53.

• The main causes of fire hazards in these areas were identified as “human negligence,

candles, using fires inside houses/dwellings, and alcohol.

• The main challenges associated with dealing with fire hazards were identified as a lack of

service delivery; however representatives indicated that fire hazards are considered in the

IDP.

• The priority to deal with fire hazards were rated as 1 (Very urgent).

Statistics received from the Fire Services (NMBM, 2010) indicated the following with regard to

building, informal settlement and rubbish fires in the NMBM.



Table 7-8: Building, Informal Settlement and Rubbis h Fires Statistics



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Building Fires

All Other

Buildings 100% 1 Event per 2.8 days

Based only

on Fire

Services

Statistics

Auto Fire

Alarms 100% 1 Event per 86.8 days

Dwelling /

Outhouses 100% 1 Event per 1.8 days

Informal

Dwellings 100% 1 Event per 9.1 days

Total 100% 1 Event per 1 days

Informal

Settlement Fires

All Other

Buildings 17% 1 Event per 2,171 days

Dwellings /

Outhouses 100% 1 Event per 8.6 days


Rubbish Fires

Bins & Drums 100% 1 Event per 21.6 days

Enclosed 100% 1 Event per 11.0 days

Open Area 100% 1 Event per 5.9 days


The NMBM (s.a.) indicated that large urban fires can have the following impact on medical and

health operations in the NMBM:

• May consume large areas;

• Fire events can disrupt the movement of traffic and utilities; and

• Fire suppression needs may limit the availability of personnel for emergency medical

response.

The Fire hazard modelling for the NMBM was based on the land-use/land-cover map of the NMBM.

The various land-use categories were classified in terms of fire related factors, and these factors were

used to map fire hazard areas in the NMBM. The factors are shown below:



Table 7-9: Fire Hazard Classification

Landuse Fire Hazard

Value Landuse

Fire Hazard

Value











Creche 0.47 Roads and Parking Areas 0.37


Game Farm 0.57 Saltworks 0.30











National Park 0.57 Waterbody 0.37

Figure 7-24 indicates the fire hazard scenario for the NMBM based on the characteristics of the

associated land use of an area.



Figure 7-24: Fire Hazard

7.8 Floods (River, Urban & Dam Failure)

Also see Section 7.10 for more information on the Hydro-meteorological hazards in the NMBM.

This section also contains additional information on flooding in the NMBM.

Floods are among the most devastating natural hazards in Africa, whereas flash floods are among the

greatest hazards arising from tropical cyclones and severe storms. Floods and flash floods cause loss

of life, damage to property, and promote the spread of diseases such as cholera. From 1900 to 2006,

floods in Africa killed nearly 20 000 people, affected nearly 40 million more, and caused damage

estimated at about US$4 billion (ICSU, 2007). While the primary cause of flooding is abnormally

high rainfall, there are many human-induced contributory causes such as:

• land degradation;

• deforestation of catchment areas;

• increased population density along riverbanks;

• poor land use planning, zoning, and control of flood plain development;

• inadequate drainage, particularly in cities; and

• inadequate management of discharges from river reservoirs (ICSU, 2007).

Flooding can also be caused by the failure of dams, both constructed and natural.



7.8.1 River & Urban Flooding

A flood is generally a normal event for any river or stream that could occur over a period of time

varying from several times a year to once every few hundred years. Floods are caused when excess

water from heavy rainfall, snowmelt or storm surge accumulates and overflows the river or stream’s

normal path onto its banks and adjacent floodplains (Miller, 1997).

Several factors determine the severity of floods, including rainfall intensity and duration. A large

amount of rainfall in a short time span can cause flash flooding. A small amount of rain can also

cause flooding if the soil is saturated from a previous wet period, or if the rain is concentrated in

areas where the surface is impermeable, such as in developed areas where most of the surface is

covered with concrete, tar and other building materials (Federal Emergency Management Agency,

1997).

Topography and groundcover are also contributing factors for floods. Water runoff is higher in areas

with a steep slope and low vegetation density. Urbanization of floodplains and manipulation of

stream channels have increased both the frequency and magnitude of floods in many areas. Floods

are most common in the season of highest precipitation (Miller, 1997).

According to Sampson (2007) flooding has always been an integral part of the Port Elizabeth city’s

history. This is well documented and all should be fully aware of the destructive nature of these

severe rainfall events. Be that as it may, numerous warnings have gone unheeded and development

has taken place on wetlands, marshes, flood plains and even in a lagoon (the Baakens lagoon was

reclaimed), leading to a substantial loss of life and damage to property during flood events.

It must be stated that the extreme events that occur in the NMBM area, although widespread, have a

small central area of about 5 to 10 km in diameter where extreme rainfall values are recorded,

sometimes double that of an area 5 to 10km away. As technology and more recording stations are

added to the area, this is seen in all of these events, no matter their severity (Sampson, 2007).

Representatives from the NMBM identified flooding as a concern in the NMBM. Information

received from the representatives indicated that:

• Floods were rated as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day

activities/incidents) being caused by poor drainage system.

• Areas that were specifically identified as high risk areas to flooding were Ward 11, 35, 38

and Soza street.

• Representatives indicated that a lack of funding was the main constraint in managing floods,

but that the IDP does make provision for risk reduction related to floods.

• The priority to deal with flood hazards was rated as 1 (Very urgent).



The NMBM (s.a.) indicates that the characteristics of flooding: (riverine, flash, floodplain or other)

and the main impact on Medical and Health Operations in the NMBM may include:

• Flooding can be rapid in onset or development;

• Flooding can impair land transportation;

• Flooding can lead to the closure or a diminished functionality of some fixed facilities;

• Flooding can lead to the disruption of utilities;

• Flooding may require evacuation of medical facilities;

• Flooding can cause hazardous conditions for field responders, and may interfere with

emergency personnel reporting for duty;

• Flooding can also lead to the release of hazardous materials; and

• Flooding events can be sustained for several days (NMBM, s.a.).

7.8.2 Dam Failure Flooding

No specific information with regards to dam failure was received. However, the NMBM (s.a.)

indicates that flooding due to dam failures can have the following impact on Medical and Health

Operations in the NMBM:

• Flooding may require evacuation of large areas, including health facilities and emergency

services locations; and

• Flooding caused by dam failure can restrict or impair land transportation;

All the impacts of river and urban flooding do also apply to flooding due to failure of dams. Figure

7-25 represents the results of the flood hazard mapping for the NMBM.



Figure 7-25: Flood Hazard

7.9 Geological Hazards

Disasters due to geological hazards have a far smaller impact on sub-Saharan Africa than those due

to hydro-meteorological hazards (ICSU, 2007). Earthquakes account for 2%, and landslides and

volcanic hazards account for 1% of the number of hazards occurring on the African continent,

however, the impact of these hazards may change in future (ICSU, 2007). For the purpose of this

assessment, geological hazards were divided into three categories, namely:

• Earthquakes;

• Landslides, mud flows and rock-falls; and

• Subsidence.



7.9.1 Earthquake

ICSU (2007) describes the risk of earthquakes in the southern African region as follows:

“Sub-Saharan Africa is largely a stable intra-plate region characterized by relatively low levels of

seismic activity, with earthquakes randomly distributed in space and time. The only parts of sub-

Saharan Africa that do not display the characteristics of an intra-plate region are the East African

Rift System and the Cameroon Volcanic Line, where earthquakes are associated with active fault

zones and volcanic activity.

Earthquakes also occur occasionally in the Cape Fold Belt in South Africa. In this region, the most

destructive recorded earthquake was a M6.3 event that took place on 29 September 1969 in the

Ceres–Tulbagh region of the Western Cape, which killed 12 people. Aftershock activity had virtually

ceased when a M5.7 event occurred on 14 April 1970, causing further damage in the towns of Ceres

and Wolseley.

The impoundment of reservoirs has also been known to trigger earthquakes. Seismicity has been

associated with the Gariep Dam in South Africa and the Katse Dam in Lesotho. Mining-related

earthquakes pose a significant hazard to mineworkers in the gold and platinum mining districts of

South Africa. Thousands of mineworkers have perished during the last century as a result of rock

bursting. No member of the public has suffered fatal or even serious injuries due to mining-related

earthquakes, although some events have damaged surface structures. The M5.3 event on 9 March

2005 near Stilfontein (South Africa), for example, caused serious damage to schools, commercial

properties, apartment blocks, the civic centre, and 25 houses.

However, African research institutions have limited capability to mitigate and respond to

earthquake hazards and disasters. Currently, no earthquake warning system in the region comes

close to the required level of reliability. A sustainable earthquake disaster mitigation strategy

requires the compilation of base maps of known faults, as well as efforts to detect possible unknown

faults. It is also necessary to build interactive databases of high-risk areas and integrate them with

population distribution, seismic history, and vulnerability to hazards and disasters” (ICSU, 2007).

South Africa as a whole does not normally get large tremors except in the Witwatersrand where they

result from mining activities (Markman, 2010). A number of seismic events have been recorded in

and surrounding the NMBM area, and are shown below (ESKOM s.a.):



Table 7-10: Historical Record of Seismic Activity i n the vicinity of the NMBM

Source: ESKOM, s.a.

In addition to the record above, Markman (2010) describes the history of earthquakes and

earthquake risk in the NMBM as follows:

“Earthquakes are not unknown events in the Eastern Cape, with tremors having been felt in Port

Elizabeth more than a few times and the last quake in the region a mere two months ago offshore.”

Markman (2010) mentioned that the following events have taken place in the NMBM:

• One of the earliest recorded earthquakes struck at 10.15pm on Tuesday, May 21, 1850. The

shock was not very severe, but “sufficient to alarm the more nervous members of our

population and to awaken from their first slumbers those who had retired at a very early hour

to rest,” reported the Eastern Province Herald. The earth shook for about a minute and those

inside their homes described the shaking as though it was a very violent wind. The

newspaper reported that there had never been an earthquake in the young town before. “The

shock was felt most severely towards the north and west ends of the town. It was sufficient

in these quarters to move lighter articles, such as glasses, mantle-piece ornaments, etc, from

their places,” the Herald reported. After the earthquake had subsided, most residents went

outside to inspect their buildings for damage. The air was very still and a heavy dew had

descended. Several people said they had perceived a sulphurous smell during the earthquake.

There are reports in Morse Jones’s Lower Albany Chronicle in which it was noted the

tremor was also felt in the Lower Albany area and had been violent enough to inspire the

local Xhosa community to come up with a special word for it: inyikima.

• In January 1900, a quake was felt in the Tsitsikamma area strong enough to dislodge

crockery from shelves in some houses.

• Another tremor was felt in Port Elizabeth in 1912.



• On December 4, 1920, a tremor lasting about 20 seconds, the result of a strong earthquake

out at sea, was felt in Port Elizabeth, Cape Town and George.

• In 1929, an early morning earthquake large enough to cause damage to buildings was felt in

Grahamstown.

• This was followed on August 9, 1932 by a fair-sized tremor felt in Alice, Queenstown and

Graaff-Reinet.

• There have been several other occasions when Port Elizabeth felt the earth shake. At 3am on

January 12, 1968, a tremor shook the Eastern and Southern Cape and was felt in Port

Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Mossel Bay and Graaff-Reinet. It lasted about two minutes and was

hard enough in Uitenhage to cause furniture to move and pictures to fall from the walls of

homes. In Joubertina, Leon Olivier, 14, was shaken off his bed. A glass containing false

teeth, which was knocked off a table, became a talking point.

• On October 3, 1977, a tremor felt at many places in Port Elizabeth between New Brighton,

Summerstrand and Seaview, was recorded in Pretoria. It was not to be the last.

• The Herald reported that at 8.55pm on Sunday, October 5, 1986, a strong tremor – registered

at 4.9 on the Richter scale – “rocked buildings and sent people fleeing from their homes” as

it rippled its way through large sections of Natal and the Eastern Cape. The tremor was felt

in Port Elizabeth, East London, Aliwal North, Queenstown, Elliot, Mthatha and Durban. A

caller to The Herald said it had been violent enough to knock ornaments from a table. On the

Port Elizabeth beachfront, residents in Mutualhof (now The Beaches) in Humewood and

Marine Towers in Summerstrand reported a severe shaking which “seemed to last a few

minutes”. Residents in Swartkops, Greenbushes, North End and Kini Bay all reported

feeling the tremor. Dr Robert Kleywegt, of the Mineral and Energy Affairs Department, said

at the time that coastal towns and cities were particularly prone to the effects of minor

tremors. “Along the coast, a lot of high-rise buildings are on poor foundations – piles driven

into waterlogged sand.” It is believed that the tremor’s epicenter was in Lesotho or the

north- Eastern Cape.

• The worst earthquake to hit South Africa struck on September 29, 1969, when nine people

were killed in the areas of Tulbagh, Prince Albert, Ceres and Wolseley during a 6.5

magnitude earthquake. Damage, which included many historic buildings in Tulbagh, totaled

R20-million.

• The most recent earthquake occurred two months ago – on December 1 – 10km off the

Transkei coast.



According to Markman (2010) there are three ancient fault lines in Port Elizabeth where some slight

movements can still occur. They include the following:

• The Moregrove fault runs along the Port Elizabeth beachfront from Pollok Beach,

Summerstrand, along the shoreline, through the Baakens Valley and ending at the

Moregrove quarry near the Kragga Kamma interchange. The water which continually runs

across Lower Valley Road near the old PE Tramways building is underground water seeping

to the surface through the Moregrove fault;

• Another, the so-called Chelsea- Noordhoek fault, runs parallel to the Schoenmakerskop

coast; and

• The third fault runs in the Coega area.

Buettner (in Markman 2010) states that “major seismic activity in the region was linked to the break-

up of the super- continent Gondwana (about) 150 to 125 million years ago. At that time, the Earth’s

crust was stretched and extended, forming faults, fractures along of which crustal blocks moved

downwards. The major tectonic movements came to an end more than 100 million years ago, and

what causes occasional tremors nowadays is just an aftermath which is not likely to end up in a

significant earthquake.”

According to Fernandez and Guzman (1979a in ESKOM 2001) the Modified Mercalli Scale

Intensities are unlikely to exceed VI every 100 years or VII every 500 years in the NMBM region.

Approximate probabilities for earthquakes of this nature are presented below:

Table 7-11: Earthquake Probability (Fernandez and G uzman (1979a in ESKOM 2001))

Event Description

Probability

(Over a 1 Year

Period)

Frequency of

Events

(Rounded)

Comment

Earthquake

MMS: VI

(Strong)

Felt by all; many frightened and run

outdoors, walk unsteadily. Windows,

dishes, glassware broken; books fall

off shelves; some heavy furniture

moved or overturned; a few instances

of fallen plaster. Damage slight.

1% 1 in 100 Years

Information

related to other

intensity events is

not shown. Earthquake

MMS: VII

(Very Strong)

Damage slight in specially designed

structures; considerable in ordinary

substantial buildings with partial

collapse. Damage great in poorly built

structures. Fall of chimneys, factory

stacks, columns, monuments, walls.

Heavy furniture moved.

0.2% 1 in 500 Years

Source: NMBM, 2010.



An area-characteristic probabilistic seismic hazard assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality (Kijko 2010) concluded that:

“The result of the investigation is that the seismic risk faced by the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality, Port Elizabeth is non negligible. This study is only based on PSHA calculations. For

structures of high importance (ports), and that pose a high environmental risk, (like chemical

factories), a full–scale seismic–hazard investigation is required which encompasses the following:

• The investigation of applicable guidelines, codes and standards available nationally and

internationally for the seismic design of critical facilities;

• The derivation of a seismotectonic model for the region;

• The investigation of ground–motion attenuation models for the region;

• The investigation of the potential for surface faulting or deformation at the site; and

• The investigation of the secondary effects of earthquakes such as liquefaction, landslides

and tsunamis”

The Council for Geoscience (CGS 2010) also recommended that “a proper seismic hazard

assessment be undertaken, given the seismo-tectonic setting of the greater Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality area”.

According to the NMBM (s.a.), earthquakes can have the following impact on medical and health

operations in the NMBM:

• Structural and non-structural damage can occur to fixed facilities including medical and emergency services sites;

• Evacuation of facilities might be required;

• Earthquakes may cause impaired ground transportation and disruption of utilities;

• Earthquake events may give risk to secondary hazards such as fires, landslides, and dam failure;

• A high incidence of blunt and penetrating trauma and secondary medical emergencies can be associated with earthquake events; and

• Displaced populations may be reluctant to accept shelter indoors.

7.9.2 Landslides/Mud flows/Rock-fall and Subsidence

Mass movements, which include a range of natural phenomena such as landslides, mudflows,

erosion, and siltation, are affected by rock and soil types, rainfall patterns, topography, and

vegetation. Human factors that contribute to mass movements include overpopulation,

deforestation, and poor land management practices. Landslides and mudflows can cause

considerable loss of life, and damage to croplands and infrastructure such as highways, railways, and

pipelines (ICSU, 2007).



No specific information with regards to landslides and associated hazards was received from

representatives in the NMBM. The only information received from representatives related to a

degradation hazard associated with mining activities, and leading to a geological impact. Even

though this does not necessarily constitute a geological hazard, the nature of the hazard identified by

the stakeholder is unclear, and was therefore also considered a geological hazard until more

information related to the hazard can be confirmed.

According to the NMBM (s.a.), landslides or subsidence can have the following impact on medical

and health operations in the NMBM:

• Landslides can impair land transportation;

• Landslides and subsidence can impact on fixed facilities;

• Utilities can be disrupted by landslides or subsidence; and

• The risk of subsequent landslides can be increased.

Figure 7-26: Geological Hazards

No further information with regard to Geological hazards was received.



7.10 Hydro-meteorological Hazards

According to the World Meteorological Organization, ninety percent (90%) of all natural disasters

worldwide are related to weather, climate and water (Sampson, 2007).

In sub-Saharan Africa, hydro-meteorological events account for most of the disasters, and they

impact on nearly every country. They include floods, tropical cyclones, storm wave surges,

droughts, extremely high temperatures (global warming), wildfires, sand or dust storms, and

landslides and avalanches. According to ICSU (2007) in the period 1975–2002, disasters of hydro-

meteorological origin constituted 59% of the total number of natural disasters that occurred in sub-

Saharan, with floods accounting for 27%, droughts for 21%, windstorms (particularly tropical

cyclones) for 9%, and wildfires for 1%. An alarming trend is the increasing number of people

affected by natural hazards of hydro-meteorological origin, with drought, flooding, and windstorms

accounting for 90% of the total number of people affected. Global climate change will continue to

alter the risk associated with hydro-meteorological hazards (ICSU, 2007).

South Africa is particularly vulnerable to floods, drought, bush fires, severe thunder storms and

extreme heat and cold. The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipal area is no stranger to floods

and water restrictions, as most residents will attest to. Gale force winds have also become an

irritating norm, but their threat has been minimised in recent times. However, droughts and flooding

have always been a part of the city’s history and are often “forgotten” or “ignored” when they have

not occurred for an extended period. The effects can range from minor damage to catastrophic

devastation, as was the case in 1968 when there was widespread damage and destruction (Sampson,

2007).

Sampson (2007) summarizes the NMBM’s profile with regard to hydro-meteorological hazards as

follows: “…the largest meteorological risk to the city, however, is its erratic rainfall, i.e. too much or

too little. Essentially the NMMM area’s rainfall is unreliable and susceptible to extended periods of

below average rainfall. Floods and droughts are an integral part of the NMBM’s history. Although

rainfall averages do not reflect a relatively dry area (634 mm per year) the area seldom receives

“normal” average rainfall. In fact the metropolitan area does not receive average annual rainfall

60% of the time. Considering this fact, it is evident that the area is reliant on extreme events (floods)

to ensure the water supply of the metropolitan area. The system which provides the NMBM with

these extreme rainfalls events is known as a cut-off low. It can yield a rainfall figure equal to a

normal monthly, six monthly or even a yearly average in less than 24 hours, as occurred in 1968

when 429 mm was measured in the space of a few hours. Besides convective events (thunderstorms)

that can lead to flash flooding, it is the cut-off low that is the major cause of flooding in and around

the metropolitan area. However, as previously mentioned an absence of these severe events for an

extended period will result in a “drought” and thus water restrictions for the NMBM. To simplify

matters, if the city is not recovering from flooding it will generally be experiencing drought

(Sampson, 2007).



7.10.1 Drought

Future projections show a net overall global drying trend, and the proportion of the land surface

affected by extreme drought is predicted to increase from 1% at present to 30% by the end of the

21st century. The drying trend is related to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses and

sulphate aerosols into the atmosphere (Burke et al., 2006). Although droughts under current climate

conditions affect many parts of the globe, they are a particular concern in sub-Saharan Africa. A

large part of sub-Saharan Africa is susceptible to drought. In southern Africa, severe droughts (such

as those of 1982–1983 and 1997–1998) have been linked to the El Niño–Southern Oscillation

(ENSO) phenomenon. Nearly all climate change projections signal greater chances of severe

droughts over southern Africa, particularly in the central and western areas (IPCC, 2001; Scholes &

Biggs, 2004 in ICSU, 2007). According to ICSU (2007) the most serious result of drought is

famine. Drought and famine are not sudden events but rather the end result of long-term degradation

of the environment due to poor land use and irrational exploitation of natural resources.

According to Sampson (2007) in a South African context, the concept of drought is not easily

defined. The South African Weather Service defines drought on the basis of the degree of dryness in

comparison to “normal” or average amounts of rainfall for a particular area or place and the duration

of the dry period. This is what is termed a meteorological drought. The common practice to date

has been to use the percentage of normal rainfall as an indicator of drought. Less than 75% of

normal rainfall is regarded as a severe meteorological drought but a shortfall of 80% of normal will

cause crop and water shortages, which will ultimately affect social and economic factors. Normal

rainfall for a particular place is calculated using rainfall figures for at least 30 years. Other climatic

factors such as high temperature, high wind, low soil moisture and low relative humidity can

significantly aggravate the severity of drought conditions and these should also be taken into

account. Assessing the severity of a drought period and the magnitude of the impact based purely on

the definition of a “percentage of normal rainfall” is extremely difficult and so it has become

necessary to look at introducing other “drought indices” to assist decision-makers (Sampson, 2007).

According to Mortimore (1998) drought can be defined in several different ways. Drought always

implies a reduction in rainfall, but this reduction can have variable impacts depending on the length

of the drought and the deviation from the expected or average rainfall of an area. Drought can

therefore have several different definitions:

• Meteorological drought is usually identified when there is a reduction in the expected or average rainfall of an area.

• Hydrological drought implies a deficiency in ground and surface water conditions, often linked only indirectly to rainfall because of interregional water transfers by rivers or pipelines or storage in dams or reservoirs.

• Agricultural drought is a deficiency defined in relation to a particular crop and its requirements. For example, we know how much rain is needed to produce a certain amount of a specific crop type and any rainfall less than that expected or outside the specific crop’s growing season, would lead to a drop in production.

• Ecological drought is a situation in which the rainfall is insufficient to support normal growth of the natural vegetation (Mortimore, 1998).



At the time of this assessment, the NMBM had been reported to be experiencing a severe drought

period. This was also mentioned by representatives of the NMBM during consultation sessions.

Information received from stakeholders indicated that:

• Drought is considered a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day

activities/incidents) affecting all the wards within the NMBM;

• Based on the response from individuals, the perceived cause of the drought is related to

“Climate change” and that there is a shortage of dams in the NMBM.

• Secondary hazards caused by the event include death of livestock and poor agricultural

yield.

• Representatives also indicated that the priority to deal with drought hazards is considered

very urgent (1).

In order to represent the drought hazard spatially, the land-use/land-cover data of the NMBM was

used. The different land-use categories were assigned a value, based on the probable impact the

drought hazard might have on the particular land-use. For example: Agricultural areas are the most

likely to experience the impact of drought, while industries with large water demand could also be

negatively affected. The ratings used for the drought mapping are shown below:

Table 7-12: Drought hazard indicator

Landuse Core Landuse Core











Creche 0.50 Roads and Parking Areas 0.10


Game Farm 0.70 Saltworks 0.60











National Park 0.70 Waterbody 0.60

The result of the drought mapping is shown in Figure 7-27.



Figure 7-27: Drought hazard

7.10.2 Severe Storms (Wind, Hail, Lightning, Fog)

Severe storms can cause wide spread damage, destruction and loss of life. For the purpose of this

assessment, severe storms will be considered to include high winds, hail, lightning and fog hazards.

According to Pyle (2006) “severe convective storms are recognized as exceptionally powerful and

destructive meteorological events which result in both death and loss of property, as well as

livelihood in many parts of the world. The frequency and magnitude of severe weather events such

as tropical cyclones, hailstorms, droughts and floods appears to be on the increase globally. …

Severe storms in the Eastern Cape are a more frequent and severe phenomenon than has been

reported in the past, and pose a significant risk for various geographic populations in terms of loss of

life, injury and impact on livelihoods. Historical under-reporting of storms has resulted in an under-

emphasis of the significant impact on marginalised and highly vulnerable rural populations.”

This provides a brief overview of the challenges faced by municipalities, including the NMBM, in

the Eastern Cape.



The research conducted by Pale (2006) focused on Severe Convective Storm Risk in the Eastern

Cape Province of South Africa. Extracts from the findings of the research included:

• The number of reported storm events in the province has increased since 1981; most

noticeably from 1992. This is most likely as a result of improved reporting of storms,

particularly in the rural areas of the former Ciskei and Transkei self-governing territories.

Historical under-reporting of storms in these eastern areas prior to 1992 has resulted in a

skewed distribution pattern for the time series.

• The number of reported storms of greater impact (TS3-TS5 category storms) has increased

markedly since 1981.

• The geographic distribution of storms is concentrated in the rural eastern and northeastern

parts of the province.

• A higher frequency of reported storms is found in the eastern areas since 1992.

• Storm impacts (loss of life and injury, loss of livelihood and damage to infrastructure) are

significantly more severe in the rural eastern areas of the province.

• Lightning accounts for a disproportionately high loss of life and injury in the extreme north-

eastern parts. This is true despite the fact that lightning events are most likely to be

significantly under-reported.

• Hailstorms are the most frequently reported hazard and account for significant economic

losses to commercial farmers in the central and western parts of the province, in particular.

Even though the study focused on the entire Eastern Cape, the results of the study provide an

indication on the type of severe storm hazards experienced in the Eastern Cape, and the possible

impact of these hazards on the NMBM. The findings of Pale (2006) included a risk map related to

Severe Storms in the Eastern Cape (See Figure 7-28). According to this map, the NMBM is

classified as having a very high storm risk.



Source: Pyle, 2006.

Figure 7-28: Patterns of Risk to Severe Storms in t he Eastern Cape

The NMBM (s.a.) also recognises the risk associated with hydro-meteorological hazards in the

NMBM area, and identified the following potential impacts these hazard events can have on medical

and health operations in the NMBM:

• These events can cause physical damage to facilities including medical, communications and

emergency services sites;

• Events can disrupt utilities impair land transportation, and grounding or air transportation;

• Severe hydro-meteorological events can also create hazardous conditions for field

responders as well as cause hazardous material releases and fires; and

• Severe hydro-meteorological events can increase the risk of structural collapse.



Representatives from the NMBM identified hydro-meteorological hazards as a concern in the

NMBM. Information received from stakeholders indicated that:

• Lightning, severe storms and wind are all considered a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents) affecting all the wards within the NMBM;

• Representatives indicated that the primary impact of the hazard events causes destruction of houses and infrastructure, falling of trees and safety concerns with regard to electricity.

• The main causes of these hazards were identified as change of weather patterns, while all representatives were under the impression that the hazardous events are increasing.

• One of the main challenges in reducing risks associated with hydro-meteorological hazards relates to “corruption in housing delivery”.

• The average priority to implement risk reduction and hazard mitigation measures were rated as 1.5, representing a Very Urgent to Medium Urgency Level.

Below is the severe storm hazard map for the NMBM.

Figure 7-29: Severe Storms hazard



Pyle (2006) pointed to a need for strengthening institutional capacities in a number of spheres to

prevent and mitigate the impact of storms in the Eastern Cape. Some of these aspects might also be

of value for the NMBM, and included:

• Strengthening institutional capabilities in the more remote rural parts of the province to

provide effective prevention and mitigation in high risk areas. This is also applicable to

more remote parts in the NMBM, and will be discussed in more detail under Section 9.3.

• Improving communication of early warnings of rapid-onset severe storms to high risk

remote rural areas. This can be achieved by installing more public telephones in remote

areas, using local radio stations to disseminate warnings and by having a better organised

system of key contacts, such as community liaison officers, who would be able to

disseminate warnings more effectively to local communities. Given the quick onset of severe

storms, timeous warning is a critical factor in mitigating their impact on communities.

• Educating communities in the rural areas about severe storm hazards and precautions to be

taken in the event of severe storms. Suggested examples of education initiatives include

making use of teachers and schools (as part of the curriculum), distributing information

brochures at clinics, community centres and shops, education “roadshows” by disaster

management practitioners, etc.

• Improving the recording and tracking of severe storm events by disaster management

authorities. Although reporting of events has improved, there is still no systematic method

of recording and keeping an inventory/database of storms and related impacts at an

institutional level. It is suggested that this be broadened to include all severe weather

impacts, not only severe storms. Such a crucial task needs to be centralised at the provincial

disaster management centre in Bisho. At a national level, the National Disaster

Management Centre in Pretoria needs to assume the responsibility of maintaining a

national register of severe weather events, as stipulated in the Disaster Management Act

(2002). To the researcher’s knowledge, this key responsibility has not been assumed yet in

any systematic way at provincial or national level.

• Implementing medium to long-term developmental programmes by the state and provincial

government aimed at decreasing the vulnerability of marginalized populations, particularly

in the eastern parts of the province. This study has clearly shown the very high levels of

vulnerability to storm impacts in the impoverished rural areas of the province.

Developmental programmes need to be expedited in order to build resilience and to raise

the general standard of living of poor rural communities. This should include, inter alia:

o Accelerating programmes to build more robust houses that can withstand the impact

of severe storms.

o Improving health services, in particular the number of clinics and hospitals to deal

with injuries resulting from severe storms.



o Upgrading the condition of secondary gravel roads to facilitate better access to

communities by emergency services in the event of storms.

o Improving the general level of education of rural communities, including adult

education initiatives.

o Creation of sustainable work opportunities to raise the income level of rural

communities. It is recognised that this is an exceptionally difficult objective to

achieve, even in the long term, given the historical impoverishment of the former

Transkei and Ciskei areas. Nonetheless, the researcher is of the opinion that poverty

reduction is the single most important long-term strategy in building resilience and

capacity in communities to withstand the impact of storms.

Most of the above comments can equally apply, not only for hydro-meteorological hazards, but for a

range of other hazards in other parts of the country. Additional mitigation and risk reduction

measures will be discussed under Section12.

7.10.3 Desertification

Desertification is discussed as a hazard contributing to Environmental Degradation in Section 7.3 of

this report.

7.10.4 Extreme Temperatures

Also refer to the Status Quo Assessment (Section 6.2) for more information regarding extreme

temperatures in the NMBM.

Extreme temperatures, including an extreme increase or decrease in temperature can cause severe

disruption to communities. Extreme temperature hazards not only impact on the health and well-

being of humans, especially vulnerable groups, but also cause damage to infrastructure (ICSU,

2007).

As shown Figure 7-30, studies on climate change reveal that Africa, like the rest of the world,

became warmer during the past century, and temperatures are expected to continue rising in the

future. Extreme events such as heat waves are predicted to be among the hazards that will be

associated with climate change (Díaz et al., 2004 in ICSU, 2007).



IPCC (2001) in ICSU (2007)

Figure 7-30: Global Mean Temperature Anomaly (1995 – 2004)

Climate change studies focusing on heat wave trends in Africa are lacking. However, indications for

other parts of the world such as North America and Europe are that global warming will lead to

more intense, frequent, and longer lasting heat waves during the 21st century (Meehl & Tebaldi,

2004 in ICSU, 2007). The problem of hazards such as heat waves in Africa will be exacerbated by

changes in lifestyle linked to urbanization and general lack of preparedness for such events (ICSU,

2007).

During consultations with representatives in the NMBM, extreme temperature hazard events were

identified as a concern in the NMBM. Information collected from representatives indicated that:

• Extreme temperature hazards are considered a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-

to-day activities/incidents) affecting all the wards within the NMBM;

• Extremely high temperatures were identified as a concern in Uitenhage and Despatch, while

extreme cold temperatures were identified as a concern in all the wards.

• Representatives indicated that hazards associated with extreme temperatures are not

addressed in the IDP, and also rated the importance of managing risk associated with

extreme temperatures as 2.5 (medium urgency).



The NMBM (s.a.) identified potential impacts of extreme temperature events (environmental

emergencies) on medical/health operations in the NMBM. These include:

• Utilities may be unable to cope with the increased demand (electricity);

• Extreme temperatures may create hazardous working conditions for field responders;

• The demand for service by medically fragile individuals may overwhelm response resources

and available inpatient services;

• Extreme temperature events may be sustained for many days or weeks.

7.11 Hazardous Material (Spill / Release / Fire / E xplosion)

Hazardous material, including hazardous waste, is a major concern for authorities all over South

Africa, including the NMBM. Due to the large amount of industries in the NMBM, hazardous

material can be considered as one of the top risks in the NMBM.

For the purpose of this assessment, hazardous material will be considered in the context of both the

spillage or release as well as fires or explosion of hazardous material. These events should also be

considered not only at the site or facility where the hazardous materials are manufactured, stored or

utilized, but also during transportation to, and from the facilities.

A substance may be considered hazardous if it is flammable, explosive, toxic, corrosive, radioactive

and cryogenic, or readily decomposes to give off oxygen at elevated temperatures. There are

thousands of substances that possess one or more of these qualities and can therefore be considered

as hazardous. Multiple hazards can be associated with many substances and the intermixing of

chemicals can further complicate the behaviour and hazardousness of a substance (Irvin and Strong,

1997).

Compressed gases are especially hazardous as they often involve multiple hazards, such as poisons,

oxidizers, cryogenics and the hazard of the pressure in the storage container itself. If the container

fails it could be turned into a projectile or an explosive device. Flammable liquids are slightly less

hazardous than gases, but are the cause of more incidents as they are more abundant. Commonly

encountered flammable liquids include: petrol, oil, diesel, paraffin, benzene, alcohols, pesticides and

jet fuel (Burke, 2003).

Industrial activities all over the world generate large volumes of hazardous waste and by-products

that need to be stored, transported or disposed of safely (Johnson, 1999). As there are quite a

number of industries in the NMBM and the fact that hazardous material was frequently mentioned as

a concern during consultations with local representatives, it became clear that hazardous materials

poses a serious threat to the environment and community of the NMBM.



During consultation sessions, representatives from the NMBM identified hazardous material as a

major hazard in the NMBM. Information collected from representatives indicated that:

• Hazardous material incidents (related to fires and explosions) were classified as Class 2

events (Rare Events, out of ordinary, but still manageable);

• Representatives indicated that HazMat events, particularly related to fires and explosions on

ships, are a specific concern. It was indicated that partial early warning does exist for these

types of events.

• The priority to reduce the risk of these events was rated as 1 (Urgent Priority)

• A hazmat event related to the spillage of oil at Coega was identified by representatives. This

event was rated as a Class 2 events (Rare Events, out of ordinary, but still manageable).

• It was further indicated that possible secondary effects related to this hazard included loss of

biodiversity, but that an early warning system as well as suitable plans are in place to

manage this type of incident. The priority to deal with this type of risk was classified as 1

(Very urgent).

• The spillage of hazardous material on roads throughout the metro was also identified as a

Class 2 event (Rare Events, out of ordinary, but still manageable) by representatives. The

main cause of this type of spillage was identified as road accidents involving hazardous

materials.

• A Class 1 hazardous event (regular event, ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents) was

identified with regard to the industrial spillage of toxic materials in Ward 5, 7 and 16. The

cause of these events was identified as the “release of chemicals by industry”. The main

challenge associated with this event was identified as a “lack of proper planning”. The

priority to deal with this hazard was rated as 2.5 (Medium urgency).

Statistics collected from the NMBM Fire Services (NMBM, 2010), provided an overview of the

hazardous material incidents and industrial accidents the Fire Services generally respond to. This

information is shown below:

Table 7-13: Hazardous Material and Industrial Accid ent Events in the NMBM.



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Hazardous

Material

Gas Leaks 100% 1 Event per 33.1 days Based only

on Fire

Services

Statistics

Major Spillages 100% 1 Event per 141.6 days

Minor Spillages 100% 1 Event per 93 days

Out of Area 11% 1 Event per 3,257 days

Accident Industrial 17% 1 Event per 2,171 days

Based on: NMBM, 2010



The NMBM (s.a.) identified potential impacts of hazardous material events (fixed and in

transportation) on medical/health operations in the NMBM. These include:

• Hazardous material incidents may require evacuation of large areas and closure of major

transportation routes;

• Safe access by responders may be severely limited;

• The behavior of unknown and mixed commodities may be highly unpredictable;

• Changes in the weather may require major changes in the response;

• High incidence of “worried well” and psychosomatic presentations for care;

• Events may be sustained for a day or more.

The GIS mapping of hazardous material hazards was done by identifying main transportation routes,

facilities and comments received from stakeholders. The result of the hazard mapping is shown

below:

Figure 7-31: Hazardous Material hazard



7.12 Infestations

Infestation hazards, including plant infestation (intruder plants), animal infestation and over

population and algal bloom are often not considered as a traditional disaster risk, but can still cause

extensive environmental damage over a long period of time. These hazards are discussed in more

detail below.

7.12.1 Plant Infestations (Intruder Plants)

An ‘alien’ species is one that has been introduced by humans, deliberately or accidentally, into an

area in which it did not previously occur. In today’s globalized world, species often spread

effortlessly among countries and continents. While not all alien species thrive in their new

environments, some do, becoming ‘invasive’ by spreading at the expense of indigenous species and

causing significant changes to habitats and ecosystem functioning.

One of the main reasons why alien species flourish is that “they are no longer controlled by their

natural predators and pathogens (diseases) with which they have co-evolved in their natural range”.

Correspondingly, indigenous species are at a competitive disadvantage when they encounter such

alien species (having had no evolutionary history of them) and are easily out-competed. Invasive

alien species can occur on land, in the ocean, or in freshwater systems, and can be drawn from any

group of organisms.

Invasive alien plants have invaded over 10 million hectares (ha) of South Africa. Over 750 tree

species and 8 000 herbaceous species have been introduced, with some 1 000 introduced species

now naturalized (that is, neither indigenous nor invasive) and 200 considered invasive.

Of those considered invasive, 117 are categorized as ‘major invaders’, and 84 are considered

‘emerging invaders’. ‘Major invaders’ are those species that are well established, and that already

have a substantial impact on natural and semi-natural ecosystems. ‘Emerging invaders’ currently

have less influence, but have attributes and potentially suitable habitat that could result in increased

range and consequences in the next few decades. Plants constitute most of the invasive species in

South Africa, making up 63% of the 319 species listed as harmful, and they threaten 55% of the Red

Data-listed plants in the country. According to the Working for Water Programme, the impacts of

invasive alien plant infestations are expected to double within 15 years if left uncontrolled.

Figure 7-32 and Figure 7-33 provides an overview of alien invasive plants in South Africa.



Source: National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 2004

Figure 7-32: Percentage cover by alien invasive pla nts per quaternary catchment

Source: National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 2004

Figure 7-33: Potential Distribution of Alien Invasi ve Plant Species



The results of the GIS based hazard mapping related to Plant infestation hazards are shown below.

Figure 7-34: Plant Infestation Hazard

7.12.2 Other Infestation Hazards

No specific information with regard to other infestation hazards such as Animal infestation (or over

population), Insect Infestation or Algal blooms were received.

7.13 Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Fail ure

Infrastructure and service delivery failure hazards are related to the failure of infrastructure systems

and processes such as electricity provision, water provision, sanitation systems, information

technology and communication systems, and transportation infrastructure. Due to the fact that the

NMBM is a fast developing municipality and economic hub of the wider region, the failure of

existing services and infrastructure can cause disruption to communities and the regional economy in

general.



This failure can be caused by inadequate design, inadequate future planning, and a lack of proper

maintenance or uncontrollable phenomena such as flooding or fires. The failure of services can lead

to an increased risk of disaster, e.g. disruption of water can lead to community members drinking

polluted water, which can lead to an outbreak of disease. However, an unrelated disaster event can

also disrupt service delivery, e.g. flooding can damage communication systems or roads, which can

disrupt disaster response and recovery efforts.

The issue of infrastructure failure is addressed by two identified priorities in the NMBM IDP (2009).

These two priorities include:

• Provision and expedition of basic service delivery; and

• Development, provision and maintenance of infrastructure.

It is therefore important that infrastructure is designed, constructed and maintained in order to ensure

that disruption of the services is avoided as far as possible. The specific types of infrastructure and

service delivery failure hazards are briefly discussed below.

7.13.1 Electrical

Disruption of electricity supply is a common problem in South Africa due to cable theft,

maintenance problems and supply issues associated with ESKOM. Except for the disruption of

communities’ lives that electrical failure brings, regular problems with electricity supply can also

affect industry, tourism and the attractiveness of the municipality to foreign investment.

During consultations with representatives from the NMBM, electrical infrastructure and service

delivery failure was identified as a concern. Information received from representatives indicated

that:

• Generally three different types of electricity infrastructure / service delivery failure hazards

were identified.

• The first event was classified as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-day

activities/incidents), and was related to a general lack of electricity in all the wards of the

NMBM. The main reason for this failure was identified as a lack of finances and a lack of

human resources. Additional comments recorded included “Old substation, lack of

maintenance, stealing of electricity cables and lack of human resources”. Secondary

hazards being caused or worsened by this hazard was identified as crime.

• The second hazard incident was also classified as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary,

day-to-day activities/incidents), and was related to the destruction of electricity lines by

weather conditions. The main cause of this hazard was identified as being severe weather,

and specific problem areas were identified as all the wards, but especially in rural areas and

Uitenhage.



• The third event was classified as a Class 2 hazard (Rare events, out of ordinary, but still

manageable). This event related to the theft of underground cables in particular the areas of

Ibhayi, Kwadweni, and Newbrighton. The main cause of this event was identified as

criminal activity, while the main challenge in managing or reducing this event was identified

as a lack of funding.

• All three of these hazards were identified as a priority 1 concern (Very urgent).

The NMBM (s.a.) identified potential impacts of power failures on medical/health operations in the

NMBM. These include:

• Electrical failure may have an impact on essential facilities;

• Electrical failure can also disrupt emergency communications, traffic controls and street

lighting,

• Failure of street lighting and traffic lights can creating hazardous traffic and working

conditions for responders;

• Electrical failure can also create high demands for service for the medically fragile, both in

residences and larger facilities

7.13.2 Information Technology

Information Technology failure is mostly related to the failure or lack of communication technology

such as telephone networks, as well as failure of information technology systems in government

departments. No specific information with regard to this hazard was received during the assessment.

7.13.3 Sanitation

Failure of sanitation systems can increase the risk of hazards such as epidemics, environmental

degradation and pollution. During stakeholder consultations, representatives from the NMBM

identified concerns related to the failure of sanitation infrastructure, as well as problems related to

service delivery. Information received from representatives indicated that:

• Sanitation Service Delivery failure and is considered a Class 1 hazard (regular events,

ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents) affecting mainly Soweto and Zwide Townships;

• Representatives described the problems in these areas as “Bucket System, small pipes used

for sewerage, and lack of infrastructure”.



• The main challenges associated with reducing the risk caused by sanitation service delivery

and sanitation infrastructure failure were identified as a lack of service delivery as well as a

lack of funding. Representatives indicated that the IDP does address problems associated

with sanitation service delivery and sanitation infrastructure failure.

• The priority to address sanitation service delivery and sanitation infrastructure failure was

identified as 1 (very urgent).

7.13.4 Transport

Transportation infrastructure failure (and service delivery failure) relates to the failure of

infrastructure related to roads, rail, and water transportation. During stakeholder consultations,

representatives from the NMBM identified concerns related to the failure of sanitation infrastructure,

as well as problems related to service delivery. Information received from representatives indicated

that:

• Transportation Infrastructure failure was identified as a Class 2 hazard (rare events, out of

ordinary, but still manageable) affecting areas where roads crosses rivers;

• According to representatives the main problem associated with these crossings are

“destruction of roads”. This was identified as a Priority 1 concern (very urgent).

7.13.5 Gas

No information with regard to the failure of gas related infrastructure was received, however, this is

expected to be of concern especially in industrial/harbour areas.

7.13.6 Water

Safe clean water is one of the most basic needs of a community and disruption or lack of such a

service can create multiple secondary hazards such as diseases, reduction in community health, and

pollution. During stakeholder consultations, representatives from the NMBM identified concerns

related to the failure of water infrastructure, as well as problems related to water service delivery.

Information received from representatives indicated that:

• Water Infrastructure/Service Delivery Failure was perceived as a Class 1 hazard (regular

events, ordinary, day-to-day activities/incidents) affecting all the wards within the NMBM;

• The main concern was related to water shortages. It should be kept in mind that, at the time

of this assessment, it was indicated that the NMBM is experiencing a severe drought, and

this identified hazard might be related to the drought hazard event.

• Representatives also commented that “lack of maintenance” is a concern in the municipality

and that “ground water is available but municipality is reluctant to explore the

opportunity”.

• According to representatives, Water Infrastructure and Service Delivery Failure is a Priority

1 hazard (very urgent).



The Infrastructure and Service Delivery failure hazard for the NMBM are shown below:

Figure 7-35: Infrastructure Failure Hazard

7.14 Major Event Hazards

Major event hazards can usually be associated with cultural, religious, political, recreational,

commercial or sporting events where large numbers of people gather at a venue or groups of venues.

Hazards associated with these events include trampling and crushing injuries due to inadequate

crown management, venue design or structural failure.

In the NMBM, there are a number of facilities that can attract large crowds of people. They include

sport fields, churches and mosques, community halls, shopping centres, bus and taxi terminus, the

airport and harbour. Some large events hosted within the NMBM area as well as even smaller

events and gathering such as religious attendance could be identified as potential major event

hazards.

During stakeholder consultations, representatives from the NMBM did not identify specific concerns

or problems associated with major event hazards in the NMBM. However, with the upcoming FIFA

2010 Soccer World Cup to be hosted in the NMBM, problems associated with major events will

need to be considered.



For the purpose of mapping major event hazards in the NMBM, the land-use/land-cover data of the

NMBM was used, and facilities or areas that are considered as possible venues for major events

were identified. The result of the hazard mapping is shown below:

Figure 7-36: Major Events Hazard

7.15 Pollution

The combination of an area with natural beauty and tourist attractions like the NMBM coupled with

major industries and a harbour where fossil fuels are transported makes the Municipality both very

vulnerable to pollution but also highly hazardous, creating a high risk scenario for land and water

pollution.

Information retrieved from the NMBM Fire Services with regards to spillage incidents are shown

below. Not all of these events caused a major pollution incident, but it provides an overview of the

events the Fire Services are regularly involved in with regards to spillage incidents.



Table 7-14: Spillage Events in the NMBM.



Frequency of Events

(Rounded) Comments

Spillage Incidents

Miscellaneous 100% 1 Event per 51.7 days Based only

on Fire

Services

Statistics

Other Products 100% 1 Event per 23.4 days

Petrol/Oil from

MVAs, etc 100% 1 Event per 8.3 days


7.15.1 Air Pollution

Due to the large number of industries and industrial facilities in the NMBM, air pollution can be

considered a problem in the NMBM. According to the NMBM (2010), the following are activities

that create air pollution in the NMBM:

• Fuel combustion from stationary sources – combustion of coal or oil for steam generation

and industrial energy requirements as well as domestic coal and paraffin combustion for

space heating.

• Fuel combustion in mobile sources – cars, passenger vehicles and diesel fuel trucks and

buses.

• Industrial and chemical processes – pollutants as alkali metals and fluorides from the ferro-

alloy industries and organic vapours from chemical production.

• Solid waste disposal – incineration of industrial, residential and hospital wastes.

• Land surface disturbances – construction activities, waste dumps, agricultural activities and

veld fires.

• Illegal burning of garden refuse and waste material.

• Illegal burning of electrical cables and tyres – to retrieve wire for resale.

During stakeholder consultations, representatives from the NMBM identified concerns related to the

air pollution hazards in the NMBM. Information received from representatives indicated that:

• Air pollution incidents were perceived as a Class 1 hazard (regular events, ordinary, day-to-

day activities/incidents) affecting especially Ward 11 and Motherwell.

• The main cause of the air pollution events were identified as the factories in the areas

causing pollution, and representatives also perceived the air pollution events as increasing.

• The challenges associated with dealing with air pollution included a lack of compliance by

foreign factories, and representatives indicated that air pollution causes health complications

for the communities.

• Representatives indicated that the IDP does not adequately address the problems associated

with air pollution. Representatives rated the priority to deal with this type of air pollution

hazard as 2.5 (Medium Urgency).



7.15.2 Land Pollution

Although household waste and waste disposal sites are potential sources of land pollution, pollution

from industry, health facilities, commerce and mining generally pose a much greater threat. The

NMBM IDP (2009) identifies aspects associated with land pollution hazards as one of the IDP

priorities, namely “Elimination of illegal dumping”. No specific information was received from

stakeholders with regard to land pollution hazards in the NMBM.

7.15.3 Water Pollution (Fresh and Sea)

The provision of potable clean water to communities can significantly reduce their risk related to

specific hazards such as human disease hazards. However, as discussed in this report, the NMBM

often experiences problems with regards to water shortages. This only highlights the fact of how

precious water resources are in the NMBM, and the severe impact water pollution can have on the

NMBM. Water pollution caused by spillages from ships can also have a severe impact on the

natural environment of the NMBM. A third concern relates to the treatment of sewerage. The

inadequate management or treatment of sewerage can also have a severe impact on the receiving

water bodies. Mapped pollution hazards in the NMBM are shown below:

Figure 7-37: Air, Land and Water pollution Hazard



7.16 Structural Failure

For the purpose of this study, structural failure hazards were defined as the failure of structures, such

as bridges, buildings or dams due to various causes including inadequate maintenance, inadequate

design, earthquakes, severe weather conditions, etc. The failure of small structures, such as single

houses or small bridges does not usually constitute a disaster risk. However, the failure of larger

structures such as dams, multi-lane bridges and multi-storey buildings may constitute a disaster

event.

No information with regard to structural failure hazards was received from representatives from the

NMBM. For the purpose of mapping the hazard, infrastructure such as dam walls, bridges, stadiums

and other relevant infrastructure were mapped. The result of the hazard mapping is shown below:

Figure 7-38: Structural Failure Hazard



7.17 Oceanographic

For the purpose of this assessment, oceanographic hazards generally related to changes in the sea

level. These include hazard events such as Tsunamis, sea level rise due to climate change and storm

surge.

7.17.1 Tsunami

According to ICSU (2007) a tsunami, also known as a seismic sea wave, is a series of enormous

waves created by an underwater disturbance such as an earthquake, landslide, volcanic eruption, or

meteorite collision. A tsunami can move at hundreds of kilometers per hour in the open ocean and

smash onto landmasses with waves as high as 30 meters or more. All tsunamis are potentially

dangerous, even though they may not damage every shore they hit. They can strike anywhere along

the African coastline (ICSU, 2007).

Beyond the heavy toll on human lives, tsunamis can have an enormous environmental impact that

can affect a region for years after an event. Severe damage can be inflicted on ecosystems such as

coral reefs, forests, coastal wetlands, vegetation, sand dunes and rock formations, biodiversity, and

groundwater. The destruction can further be exacerbated by the spread of solid and liquid waste and

industrial chemicals, water pollution, and the destruction of sewage collection and treatment

systems. Soil and freshwater contamination with infiltrated salt water and salt layer deposits on

arable land can also disrupt future activities (ICSU, 2007).

No specific information was received from representatives from the NMBM with regards to

Tsunami hazards related to the NMBM area. It is expected that the probability of a tsunami

occurring could be very low, but as this is an event with an extreme severe impact, the disaster risk

that a Tsunami pose should not be ignored.

In order to map the hazards related to a Tsunami, the received contour data of the NMBM was used

to create an elevation grid of the Municipality. To indicate the hazard levels of Tsunami all areas

below 10 meter in elevation was regarded as high hazard, between 10 and 20 meter elevation

medium hazard and between 20 and 30 meter as low hazard areas. The results of the hazard

mapping are shown below:



Figure 7-39: Tsunami Hazard for the NMBM

7.17.2 Sea Level Rise (Climate Change)

It is believed that that global climate change can lead to a rise in sea levels. There is, however,

uncertainty with regards to the extent and severity of the change in sea level.

During stakeholder consultations, representatives from the NMBM identified concerns related to the

sea level rise hazards (caused by climate change) in the NMBM. Information received from

representatives indicated that:

• Sea level rise is considered a Class 2 hazard (Rare Events, out of ordinary, but still

manageable) affecting the coastal areas of the NMBM; and

• A secondary hazards associated with sea level rise was identified as flooding. The priority

to deal with this sea level rise hazards (due to climate change) was perceived by the

representatives as 2.5 (medium urgency).



In general, the most significant impacts of sea level rise are expected where problems are already

experienced at present along the Nelson Mandela Bay coast (e.g. Pollok Beach and North End

Beach). In most cases these are the areas where developments have encroached too close to the

highwater line, or at too low an elevation above mean sea level.

Potential negative impacts of sea level rise include damage to and loss of property, changes in ocean

current direction and velocity, reductions in ecosystem functioning, and loss of important tourist

beaches, amongst others (Midgley el al, 2005 in SRK, 2008).

In light of these predicted impacts, it would be prudent to restrict development close to the existing

shoreline, particularly near sandy beaches. Therefore, development setback lines need to be

determined and strictly adhered to.

7.17.3 Storm Surge

Storm surge can be defined as a rise in the coastal water level that could be caused by strong winds

associated with tropical storms and cyclones as well as a low pressure system in the region. A storm

surge can significantly raise the mean water level if combined with existing high tides. This rise in

water level can cause severe flooding in coastal areas, particularly along shallow slopes along the

shoreline.

To identify areas at risk of a storm surge, a lower elevation was used than for a tsunami, but the

probability of a storm surge is much greater than a tsunami, hence the hazard levels are considered to

be high for areas with an elevation below 5m, medium from 5 to 10 meters and low for 10 to 15

meters above sea level.



Figure 7-40: Storm Surge Hazard in the NMBM

7.18 Climate Change

The IPCC (2007) definition of climate change refers to any identifiable change in climate over time

that is attributed to natural variability or human activity. The United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) definition only refers to climate change that is directly

or indirectly attributed to human activity. The causes of climate change are both natural and human-

induced. While the uncertainty in some of the climate change data must be acknowledged, the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) states that: “Most of (>50%) the observed

increased on globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely (conf. >90%)

due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations and that warming is

unequivocal.”



The following points summarize South Africa’s contribution to climate change:

• Due to the dependence on coal for energy, South Africa is the world’s 11th largest emitter of

greenhouse gases;

• Its emissions grew 28% between 1990 and 2000 to 446 Mt of carbon dioxide equivalent;

• South Africa emits as much per person (9.8 tonnes CO2-eq per year) as many developed

countries such as the United Kingdom; and

• The economy is carbon inefficient and intense, equivalent to that of China and well above

the world average as well as the average for OECD countries.

Global circulation models present a mixed picture of the potential climate changes in Africa.

However, continental models project an overall annual warming of about 3.5 to 4 degrees and a

drying of about 15% in southern Africa.

Source: IPCC (2007) – Figure 11.2

Figure 7-41: Projected temperature and precipitatio n changes for Africa

Regional downscaled models have been developed that offer a higher degree of confidence in their

predictions (Hewitson and Crane, 2006). The results of the models are shown in Figure 7-42 below.

The top and bottom rows represent the results of two different models and each of the four figures in

each row represents different climate change scenarios.



The results of regional downscaled models suggest the following climate changes:

• A net drying on the western two-thirds of the subcontinent, south of about 10 degrees South.

• There will be increased summer rainfall in the convective region of the central and eastern

plateau and the Drakensberg Mountains.

• The Western Cape is predicted to face a shorter rainfall season with a slight decrease in

wintertime frontal rainfall and the eastern interior portions of the province likely to

experience increased late summer rainfall.

• Ambient air temperature is predicted to increase across the country between 1 and 4 degrees

Celsius, with the interior experiencing the greatest increases and the coastal zones

experiencing less of an increase.

Source: Hewitson and Crane (2006)

Figure 7-42: Regional scale projected precipitation change

The IPCC (2007) report also states that confidence has increased since the third assessment report

that some weather events and extremes will become more frequent, more widespread and more

intense during the 21st century. There are however large uncertainties associated with extremes due

to incomplete global data sets and model uncertainties (IPCC, 2007).



An average sea level rise of 1.7 ± 0.5 mm.yr-1was observed during the 20th century (IPCC, 2007),

with a slightly higher rate observed between 1961 and 2003. Observations between 1993 and 2003

showed a rise of 3.1 ± 0.7 mm.yr-1. These sea level increases are attributed to a combination of

thermal expansion due to ocean temperature rise and freshwater contributions due to melting of ice

caps, ice shelves and glaciers. Climate model projections indicate that sea level can be expected to

rise by between 0.2 to 0.6 m by 2100. Figure 7-43 shows the observed and projected increases in

sea level.

Figure 7-43: Observed and projected (SRES A1B scena rio) sea level rise

Source: IPCC, Bindoff et al., 2007

Rahmstorf et al. (2007) suggest that based on observations over the last 20 years, the IPCC

projections may have underestimated the changes that will take place and the rate at which they take

place in response to increasing temperature. Below is a generic illustration of the lag effect

predicted to occur after CO2 emissions have been reduced and stabilized. The lag effects on sea

level rise due to the thermal inertia of the oceans and ice sheets and their long time scales for

adjustment.



Source: IPCC, 2001

Figure 7-44: Illustration of temperature rise and s ea level rise continuing long after reduction of CO2 emissions to a neutral level

IPCC (2007) states that it is likely (66 - 90% probability) that future tropical cyclones will become

more intense and have larger peak wind speed and heavier precipitation. Russouw and Theron

(2009) identify the need for further studies on the frequency, intensity and persistence of storms

along the South African coastline and a review of the occurrence of cyclones along the East coast.

Associated with this, trends in wave energy flux as well as wave height must be examined. There is

considerable uncertainty associated with changes in wave action. Waves could be affected in a

number of ways according to PIANC (2008). There could be changes to wave height, frequency and

pathways of high wave spells and changes in wave action due to changes in the frequency and

duration of storms.

Although coastal regions are less likely to experience large increases in temperature owing to the

buffering capacity of the ocean, it is virtually certain (IPCC, 2007a) that there will be fewer cold

days and nights and more frequent hot days and nights. Heat weaves will become more frequent and

longer lasting in a warming climate (Soloman et al. 2007). Increased temperatures coupled with

more frequent and intense extreme events such as storms are likely to have an impact on human

health.



Impacts predicted (High confidence (>80%)) (IPCC, 2007) include:

• Increases in malnutrition and associated disorders;

• Increased deaths due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts;

• Increased occurrence of diarrhoeal disease; and

• Altered distribution of infectious disease vectors.

Figure 7-45 shows the projected suitable climatic areas for malaria (a) and the historical malaria risk

areas (b). This illustrates the impact of climate change on disease vectors. The implications of

climate change on the health sector in the NMBM are that it falls into an area that will experience an

improved climatic condition for malaria, which means that the risk of malaria will increase. Also,

there is likely to be an increased frequency and intensity of heat waves and floods. It will be of

critical importance to anticipate these health impacts and develop an adaptive strategy that includes

education, health care, public health initiatives, infrastructure and economic development.

Source: Craig and Sharp, 2000

Figure 7-45: (a) Results of climatic model where 0= unsuitable climate for malarial vectors and 1=suitable climate and (b) Historical m alaria risk areas in South Africa and Namibia and annual malaria cases per district i n Botswana.



GCM indicates that the frequency of heavy precipitation events is very likely (90 – 99% probability)

to increase, which will augment flood risk (IPCC, 2007). The implications of this are that there is an

increased probability of flooding. Increased run-off and associated flooding will have important

implications for those people living near the rivers in the area, in or near the floodplains. There is a

large amount of uncertainty associated with rainfall and hence runoff predictions at a regional scale.

Rising temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns and run-off will result in additional food

insecurities. Increased temperatures are virtually certain to decrease crop yields due to heat stress

and increased pest outbreaks (FAO, 2008). Increased frequency and intensity of rainfall events may

result in damage to crops, soil erosion and water logging of soils which will make it difficult to

cultivate the land.

In the FAO report (2008), the following impacts on food security are outlined:

• Availability of food due to a reduction in production, which is particularly pertinent in areas

such as uMhlathuze where much of the municipality is rural and self sufficient.

• Access to food can be worsened due to damages to infrastructure and loss of livelihoods.

• Stability of food supply which is influenced by food price fluctuations and a higher

dependency on imports

• Utilization of food can be directly affected by food safety hazards associated with pests and

animal diseases.

Uncertainties exist around degrees to which precipitation, runoff and wave action will change on the

Eastern Cape Coast. Finer scale mapping and modelling of precipitation, temperature and sea level

rise is required to be able to accurately predict the impacts on the NMBM in more detail.

Table 7-15 below presents a summary of the climate change impacts discussed above and possible

adaptation measures to mitigate the impacts.

Table 7-15: Summary of impacts and possible mitigat ion measures

Climate Change Factor Potential Impacts Adaptation and Mitigation Measures

Rising sea level

• Changes to water levels in harbours

• Decreased efficacy of breakwater infrastructure

• Increased erosion of sandy shores

• Revise quay and wharf levels including infrastructure

• Raising existing breakwater structures

• Monitor distances of infrastructure from shoreline, implement policy where necessary to increase distances

Increased extreme weather conditions e.g. storms, tropical cyclones

• Increased damage to infrastructure as a result of increased wave action

• Increased risk of flooding

• Increase maintenance of existing infrastructure

• Review adequacy of protective infrastructure

• Mapping of 1:200 year risk areas

Change in run-off and increased temperatures • Reduction in agricultural productivity

• Educate people about diversified livelihoods

• Investigate alternative crops

Increased temperatures

• Increased incidence of heat waves

• Increased risk of malaria and diarrhoeal disease

• Ensure adequate health services are available

• Use of localised DDT spraying to control mosquito populations

• Educate people about the symptoms and treatment of malaria, and heatstroke

• Promote the use of protective measures such as mosquito nets



7.19 Astrophysical Hazards

7.19.1 Space weather

Because of the limited impact of space weather on countries in Africa compared to other natural

hazards, little research in this area has been conducted in Africa. For the purpose of this assessment,

the discussion on space weather hazards, as provided by ICSU (2007), will be used:

“Adverse space weather associated with coronal mass ejections (CME) and solar flares is a natural

hazard that can affect technological systems such as satellite systems, radio communication, and

electrical power distribution systems in Africa. CMEs entering the Earth’s upper atmosphere cause

large currents (electrojets) in the ionosphere, which interact with and disturb the Earth’s magnetic

field. Low-frequency currents may be induced in power lines, causing severe damage to power

supply equipment and subsequent blackouts. Many other technologies associated with

infrastructure are vulnerable, including radio communication, satellite communications, satellite

systems, global positioning systems, and pipelines. Africa is one of only two continents that do not

yet have Regional Warning Centres (RWCs) for space weather. The Southern African Space

Weather and Ionospheric Information Service (SASW) at the Institute of Maritime Technology in

Cape Town provides the only known warning service in Africa.

The International Space Environment Service (ISES) provides space weather predictions. ISES is a

permanent service of the Federations of Astronomical and Geophysical Data Analysis Services

(FAGS) under the auspices of the International Union of Radio Science (IURS) in association with

the International Astronomical Union (IAU) and the International Union of Geodesy and

Geophysics (IUGG). The mission of the ISES is to encourage and facilitate near-real-time

international monitoring and prediction of the space environment by the rapid exchange of space

environment information to assist users to reduce the impact of space weather on activities of human

interest. Because of the limited impact of space weather, compared to other natural hazards, little

research in this area has been conducted in Africa. The Hermanus Magnetic Observatory, situated

100 km east of Cape Town, has been approached by ISES and by the South African Department of

Communications to join forces with SASW to become the RWC for space weather on the continent.“

(ICSU, 2007).



7.19.2 Meteorite impacts

For the purpose of this assessment, meteorite hazards will be described in terms of the discussion

provided by ICSU (2007):

“The African continent carries the scars of 17 confirmed meteorite impacts, ranging in age from the

2 023-million-year-old Vredefort structure in South Africa, to the 10 000-year-old Aorounga

structure in Chad (Reimold & Gibson, 2005). The number of identified impact structures is low

compared to relatively well-explored regions such as Scandanavia, and it is thought that more

discoveries will very likely be made in the future. While there is no instance of a meteorite impact

disaster during recorded human history, the phenomenon deserves mention in this inventory, as truly

catastrophic losses could result should an impact occur in a densely populated region. For

example, a meteorite that is 50 m in diameter – similar to the one that, 220 000 years ago, created

the relatively modest Tswaing crater (diameter of 1.13 km) north of Pretoria – would have an

explosive force equivalent to 20 to 40 million tons of TNT. Anything in the immediate target area

would be instantly vapourized, and violent wind and ejecta would cause devastation over an area of

1 000 km2 or more.” (ICSU, 2007).



8 Vulnerability Profile of the NMBM In the context of this study, vulnerability can be described as the degree to which an individual, a

household, a community, an area or a development may be adversely affected by the impact of a

hazard. Conditions of vulnerability and susceptibility to the impact of hazards are determined by

physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes.

It is also important to remember that vulnerability is dynamic, not static, as the vulnerability of

communities change due to improvements or degradation of social, environmental and economic

conditions, as well as interventions specifically aimed at reducing vulnerability, such as disaster

mitigating actions (Zschau and Küppers, 2003).

For the purpose of this study, the vulnerability of the area of the NMBM is discussed under three

sections. The first section examines general characteristics of the area based on quantitative and

qualitative data, and refers to some of the characteristics of the NMBM area in the context of the

“Progression of Vulnerability” as proposed by Wisner (2004). The second section relates the land

cover data of the NMBM, while the third section deals with different vulnerability indicators related

to different areas within the NMBM.

Figure 8-1: Distribution of Poverty across South Af rica showing the Ten Poorest Municipalities



8.1 Vulnerability Considerations in NMBM

In a developing country such as South Africa, poor people tend to be the most vulnerable to

environmental disturbance, because they have fewer resources to help them to cope with disaster.

They have low incomes, restricted choices regarding location and employment, are less able to

afford food or to save and accumulate assets, and are often powerless Both global and local

consequences of environmental damage impact upon poor people (DEAT, 2006).

Vulnerability is, however, not the same as poverty, and it is therefore important to distinguish

between ‘Vulnerability’ and ‘Poverty. Rising poverty certainly contributes to rising vulnerability,

but poor people may not necessarily be vulnerable if they live in relatively stable circumstances,

with good infrastructure, communications, and social support systems. Poverty in this context may

be a state of deprivation (lack of adequate access) to key resources needed for full participation in an

economic and social life. Wealthier people can also be vulnerable when they live in unstable and

uncertain environments, such as, for example, those who bear the extreme fire risk to thatched

cottages on the fynbos coast of the South-western Cape (DEAT, 2006).

Even though financial resources (or the lack thereof) do not necessarily determine level of

vulnerability, it is important to consider aspects of poverty in determining vulnerability. According

to the DEAT (2006), seven of the ten poorest municipalities in South Africa are located in the

Eastern Cape. The figure below provides an overview of poverty indicators in South Africa.

* The poverty gap measures the required annual income transfer to all poor households to

bring them out of poverty.

Source: DEAT 2006

Figure 8-2: Poverty Indicators by Province



Based on the figure above, it is clear that poverty is considered a concern in the Eastern Cape

Province. Poverty also seems to be a concern in the NMBM. Poverty might not be considered a

problem to the same extent as in other parts of the Eastern Cape Province, but according to the IDP,

the situational analysis of Nelson Mandela Bay indicates a high level of unemployment and poverty

among residents. Poverty and vulnerability related aspects are also identified as priorities. These

priorities include:


• Poverty eradication and job creation;

• Special sector development (youth, disabled and women);

• Responsive, people-centred and integrated institution; and

• Provision of community amenities and facilities.

Keeping the above mentioned aspects in mind, the specific vulnerability profile of the NMBM can

be influenced by various aspects. The National Disaster Management Framework defines

Vulnerability as “The degree to which an individual, a household, a community, an area or a

development may be adversely affected by the impact of a hazard. Conditions of vulnerability and

susceptibility to the impact of hazards are determined by physical, social, economic and

environmental factors or processes.” A lot of the aspects that can contribute to the vulnerability in

the NMBM were discussed as part of the Status Quo assessment in Section 6, however, key aspects

of the characteristics of the NMBM will be discussed below:

Physical vulnerability of communities can relate to the type of housing, available infrastructure and

the quality of infrastructure. According to StatsSA (2006), an informal dwelling is defined as a

“makeshift structure not approved by a local authority and not intended as a permanent dwelling.

Typically built of found materials (corrugated iron, cardboard, plastic, etc.). Contrasted with formal

dwelling and traditional dwelling.” Informal dwellings, or buildings constructed from low quality

material can be considered more susceptible to the effects of some hazards. The percentage of

formal and informal dwellings within an area can therefore be used as one indicator of the level of

vulnerability of an area. According to Figure 6-15 a relatively high percentage of dwellings within

the NMBM area (85.1%) are considered formal dwellings. Based on this, one can state that the

NMBM area is relatively less vulnerable than the areas surrounding the municipality.

Due to the import role water plays within communities, including the health of community members,

it can be stated that the inadequate quantity or quality of drinking water can increase the

vulnerability of communities to the effects of certain hazards. Because of this, access to water can

also be used as an indicator of relative vulnerability. According to the IDP (2009) 100% of

households in the NMBM have access to a basic level of water within a 200 m radius. Based on

this, it can be stated that the communities within the NMBM area are less vulnerable to hazards such

as waterborne diseases, than their neighboring communities. This assumption, however, does not

take the quality of the water into account, and it should be stated that polluted water can be a hazard,

and also increase the overall vulnerability of the community.



Adequate sanitation is critical to ensure that the appropriate public health conditions are maintained

in a community. Inadequate or unsuitable sanitation or disposal of waste can increase the risk of

disease, and can facilitate the spread of waterborne diseases such as cholera. The access of

community members to proper sanitation, including toilets, can therefore be used as an indicator of

relative vulnerability. It is estimated that nearly 88% of the households within the NMBM have

access to flush toilets. This figure is higher than the neighboring municipalities as well as the

national average of 57.8% (StatsSA 2009).

The type of energy available for cooking and lighting can also serve as an indicator of the relative

vulnerability of communities. In areas without electricity, community members need to make use of

alternative energy sources, such as paraffin, gas or wood. This can have a detrimental effect on the

health of community members, and also pose an increase in the fire hazard, especially in areas with

informal dwellings. According to the IDP (2009) altogether 97% of households in formally

demarcated municipal residential areas have access to a basic level of electricity. However, there are

challenges with regard to provision of electricity in informal settlements.

The social characteristics of a community can also have an impact on the vulnerability of the

community. Wisner (2004) identified a number of characteristics that can increase the vulnerability

of communities. These characteristics includes, amongst others:

• Limited access to power, structures and resources; • Lack of local institutions, training and skills; and • Lack of ethical standards in public life.

Economic characteristics influencing the vulnerability of communities can include aspects such as

the levels of unemployment, levels of income and the percentage of economically active individuals.

Current unemployment rate in the NBMB is estimated at approximately 35%, while 107 239 of the

total number of 289 000 households (37%) are classified as indigent (poor). This has a negative

impact on the vulnerability of the community.

Additional environmental characteristics that can influence the vulnerability of an area are

deforestation, rapid urbanization and a decline in soil productivity (Wisner 2004).

The following steps can be taken to decrease the vulnerability and reduce disaster risk by increasing

resilience in the uMhlathuze area (Wisner 2004):

• Increase the access of vulnerable groups to power structures and resources; • Challenge any ideology, political system or economic system where it causes or increases

vulnerability; • Development of local institutions, education, training and appropriate skill development

opportunities; • Develop and secure local investment and local markets; • Improve ethical standards in public life (including crime prevention, safety and security)

• Manage urbanisation; • Protect natural and forest environments; • Diversify rural income opportunities; and

• Strengthen livelihoods and increase low income levels.



8.2 Vulnerability (Land Cover/Use Ratings)

Land use vulnerability is calculated in terms of the Social, Economic, Environmental and Structural

vulnerability of different land use types found in the Municipality. The land-use vulnerability data

layer was created as discussed in Section 5.5.2. The vulnerability map for the NMBM area based on

Land-use is shown below:

Figure 8-3: NMBM Land Use Vulnerability

8.3 Vulnerability (Socio-economic Profiles)

Socio economic vulnerability was calculated using the available data from the last official census as

received per sub place name. Although this data is dated and the percentage values are most

probably not accurate anymore, the figure could still be used as an average indicator of vulnerability

to provide a comparative vulnerability rating between areas in the NMBM.



The vulnerability was calculates as discussed in Section 5.5.2. The results of Table 8-1 were also

mapped (Figure 8-4) to indicate vulnerable areas spatially. Based on this method the most

vulnerable communities include:

• Motherwell; • Tjoksville; • Kwazakhele • Kwa Langa • Kwazakhele 3 • Motherwell 1; • Port Elizabeth Airport Informal; • Despatch; and • Kwanobuhle 10.

Table 8-1: Socio Economic Vulnerability Indicator

Area Name

Average

Vulnerability

Factor Area Name

Average

Vulnerability

Factor Area Name

Average

Vulnerability

Factor

Motherwell 23.5 Sanctor 94.8 Summerstrand 99

Tjoksville 24.1 Kwanobuhle 8 95.2 Hunter's Retreat 99

Kwazakhele 24.6 Algoa Park 95.5 Framesby 99

Kwa Langa 24.8 Mandela Village 95.6 Sherwood 99

Kwazakhele 3 25.1 Kwanobuhle 2 95.6 Fairbridge Heights 99

Motherwell 1 25.6 Kwadwesi SP 95.6 Overbaakens 99

Port Elizabeth Airport Informal 26.6 Alexander Park Industrial 95.7 De Mist 99

Despatch 26.9 Motherwell 4 95.9 Cradock Place 99

Kwanobuhle 10 27.4 University of Port Elizabeth 95.9 St Georges Park 99

Medina 27.7 Windvogel 95.9 Kwanobuhle 4 99.1

Kwazakhele 1 31 Kwanobuhle 6 96.2 Weybridge Park 99.1

Walmer Location 38.5 Despatch SP 96.6 Taybank 99.1

Kwazakhele 2 39.1 Motherwell 9 96.7 South End 99.1

Masibulele 41.3 Steytler 96.8 Young Park SP 99.1

Tambo 42.4 Springdale 96.8 Bertwood Park 99.2

Kwadwesi 43.8 Kabega Park 96.8 Goldwater 99.2

Bethelsdorp 47.5 Colchester SP 96.9 Khaya Mnandi 99.2

Missionvale 48 Winterhoekpark 96.9 Kwamagxaki 99.2

New Kwadwesi 48 Parkside 97 Bothasrus 99.3

Kabah SP 55.1 Motherwell 2 97.2 Hillside 99.3

Markman Industrial 56.8 McNaughton 97.3 Adcockvale 99.3

Zwide 1 59 Gerald Smith 97.4 Mount Pleasant 99.3

Blikkiesdorp 60.5 Scheepershoogte 97.6 Humewood Coast 99.3

Soweto On Sea 60.5 Emerald Hill 97.7 Tulbach 99.3

Uitenhage SP 63.3 West End 97.7 Lorraine 99.3

Swartkops 68.5 Cannonvale SP 97.8 Westering 99.3

New Brighton 1 69.6 Motherwell 6 97.8 Lovemore Heights 99.4

Motherwell 8 70.6 Mount Road 97.8 Francis Evatt Park 99.4

Motherwell 11 74.3 Sunridge Park 97.8 Woodlands 99.4

Heuwelkruin 75.6 Mill Park 97.8 Gelvan Park 99.4

Kwanobuhle 9 75.7 Kwanobuhle 5 98 Van Riebeeckhoogte 99.4



Area Name

Average

Vulnerability

Factor Area Name

Average

Vulnerability

Factor Area Name

Average

Vulnerability

Factor

Kwazakele 80.5 Rosedale 98 Vanes Estate 99.4

Gqebera SP 81.2 Gelvandale 98 Brymore 99.5

New Brighton 2 81.2 Cotswold 98.1 Kamma Park 99.5

Zwide 2 81.2 Port Elizabeth Central 98.1 Ferguson 99.5

Kabah 81.9 College Hill 98.2 Manor Heights 99.5

Colleen Glen 83.4 Kwaford 98.2 Ben Kamma 99.5

Kwanobuhle 84.4 Lorraine Manor 98.2 Framesby North 99.5

Lovemore Park 84.7 Linton Grange 98.2 Penford 99.6

Mandelaville 84.7 Sidwell 98.2 Valleisig 99.6

Tiryville 84.8 Sans Sousi 98.2 Retief 99.6

Kwazakele 1 86.2 Janssendal 98.3 Mount Croix 99.6

Kwanobuhle 3 86.8 Mountain View 98.3 Glendinningvale 99.6

Kwazakele 3 87.9 Port Elizabeth SP 98.4 Windsor Park 99.7

Port Elizabeth University 87.9 North End 98.4 Redhouse 99.7

Theescombe 88.8 Providentia 98.4 Salisbury Park 99.7

Govan Mbeki 89 Miramar 98.4 Cotswold Ext 99.7

Daleview 89.7 Forest Hill 98.5 Millard Grange 99.7

Kwanobuhle 1 89.7 Jarman 98.5 Booysen Park 99.7

Malabar 89.8 Fernglen 98.5 Kubega Park 99.8

Bloemendal 89.9 Fairview 98.5 Asalia Park 99.8

Parsons Vlei 90 Walmer 98.5 Framesby Ext 99.8

Langa 90.2 Morningside 98.5 Holland Park 99.8

Motherwell 10 90.6 Walmer Heights 98.6 Campher Park 99.8

Soweto-on-Sea 91.4 Glenroy Park 98.6 Kunene Park 99.8

Khaya Mnandi SP 91.5 Thomas Gamble 98.6 Levydale 99.8

Zwide 3 91.6 Kensington 98.6 Mangold Park 99.8

Motherwell SP 92.1 Schauderville 98.6 Van Der Stel 99.9

Bethelsdorp SP 92.1 Moselville 98.7 Cleary Park 99.9

Arcadia 92.4 Despatch Central 98.7 Greenarces 100

Motherwell 7 92.7 Salt Lake 98.7 Perridgevale 100

Kwanobuhle 7 92.9 Springfield 98.8 Walmer Park 100

Fairbridge Heights Ext 93 Broadwood 98.8 Wells Estate 100

Helenvale 93.3 Greenshields Park 98.8 Willow Glen 100

Soweto-on-Sea 93.5 Cannon Hill 98.8 Allenridge West 100

Kwazakele 2 93.5 Rowallan Park 98.9 Cape Road 100

Zwide 4 94 Newton Park 98.9 Amsterdamhoek 100

St Albans Prison 94.2 Glenhurd 98.9 Salt Pan Data not

available

Korsten 94.4 Salsoneville 98.9 Kwanobuhle 11 Data not

available

Parsons Hill 94.4 Western Hills 98.9 Struandale Data not

available

The Vulnerability levels based on the above ratings are shown in Figure 8-4.



Figure 8-4: Census Vulnerability Indicator

This census vulnerability data layer was based on the 2001 Census data, and might be considered

outdated. It is therefore proposed that an updated vulnerability mapping exercise should be

conducted as soon as new census data becomes available after the 2011 census.



9 Resilience Profile of the NMBM The resilience characteristics relate to the capacity within the NMBM area to counter the effects of

hazards and vulnerabilities. Resilience levels consist of Manageability and Capacity values, and are

defined as follows:

Manageability – For the purpose of this assessment Manageability was defined as the combination

of all the strengths and resources available within the government departments and line-functions

that can be used to reduce the level of risk or the effects of a disaster. This includes the level of staff

or human resources, available expertise, suitable experience, available vehicles, equipment, funding

or budget allocations, facilities and risk reduction and response plans.

Capacity – For the purpose of this assessment Capacity was defined as the combination of all the

strengths and resources available within the community or society that can be used to reduce the

level of risk or the effects of a disaster. Capacity was rated by making use of the same classification

as Manageability.

Resilience – The Resilience value defines the total ‘resilience’ level in a specific area or community

based on the Capacity levels of the community, as well as the Manageability levels of the

authorities, government department and line-functions to deal with disaster risk or the effects of

disasters. The Resilience value is calculated by combining the Manageability and Capacity values.

9.1 Description of Resilience Role Players

A description of the responding role-players as well as the results of the self-evaluation are provided

below.

9.1.1 Beach office

The Beach office also took part in the self-evaluation, and the results are shown below:

Table 9-1: Results of Self-evaluation: Beach Office

Role-player Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response Avg

Value

Beach Offices 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13

Specific needs identified by the Beach office representative included:

• a need for better communication with disaster related stakeholders; and

• the formalizing of department risk reduction plans.



9.1.2 Business and the Chamber of Commerce

The private sector plays an important role with regard to disaster management. According to the

GPSDM (1998) “the commercial and private sector can also play an essential role in disaster

mitigation. Usually the role of such players has been in the field of relief and recovery. While the

value of such contributions is great, the commercial sector should play a greater role in the

mitigation of disasters through training, education and capacity building. Involvement by this sector

can also be expanded from that of relief to proactive mitigation.”

It is important that cooperation and coordination between the private sector and the NMBM,

including disaster management, is encouraged. The private sector, however, does not only play a

role in supporting the municipality’s disaster management activities, but should also ensure that

internal risk management activities, especially related to enterprise risk and business continuity

management are in place. This will lead to a more resilient economy in the NMBM.

9.1.3 Community Representatives

According to the GPSDM (1998) “community groups have played and continue to play a major role

in disaster management. They are quick in response, have local knowledge and expertise to their

advantage and can also act as important channels for awareness raising and education. Disaster

management therefore needs to be a coordinated effort between government, various institutions,

non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and the commercial sector.

Where communities are not directly involved and are passive recipients of relief, the result may be

the aggravation of a "dependency" syndrome. Existing community networks and agencies can

therefore play a major role in disaster management, but the pressing need is for such groups to

expand their roles in disaster reduction and mitigation activities and not merely to focus on relief

activities.”

Based on the above, it is important to consider the community in the NMBM not only as helpless

victims of disaster events, but as empowered role-players who can play a valuable role in support of

both pre- and post-disaster activities. Due to this, community representatives were also requested to

conduct a capacity self-evaluation. The focus of this evaluation was based on the available resources

within the community, as well as disaster management specific skills, or activities. Community

members are mostly considered the victims in disaster situations. As a brief summary Table 9-2

provides an overview of the roles various groups within the community can play in disaster

management activities.



Table 9-2: Function of Community members and Author ities

Community Role Player Function The Disaster Management Volunteers

The formal, trained volunteer unit assist Disaster Management in their functions.

The residents and affected communities

Assist with disaster risk reduction and co-operation.

The Ward Councillors The Ward Councillors assist with community liaison.

The Community Leaders The Community Leaders assist with community liaison.

Community Development Workers

CDWs assist with liaison and needs identification.

A total of 6 community representatives took part in the capacity self-evaluation. The result of the

community self-assessment is shown in Table 9-3.

Table 9-3: Results of Self-evaluation: Community Re presentatives

Role player Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response Avg

Value

Community

Representative 1.50 1.67 1.33 1.50 1.67 2.17 1.50 1.83 1.65

The average score achieved by the community representatives was 1.65. This represents a

classification just less than sufficient. The most frequently mentioned needs identified by

community members relates to the response from disaster management after disasters, e.g. clearing

of rubble, and a need of staff to respond to disasters. It seems to suggest that ‘Disaster Management’

might still be primarily associated with disaster response, and not as a risk reduction function.

Other needs identified by community representatives include:

• A need for improved interaction between community representatives, the Directorates in the

NMBM and the SAPS.

• A need for more disaster related education, awareness building and training

9.1.4 Healthcare related Representatives

Healthcare related representatives play a critical role in disaster management. This is not only true

for post-disaster response activities, but more so for pre-disaster risk reduction. Health related role

players can play a valuable role in improving the health of community members, thereby decreasing

vulnerability to some types of hazards, but can also play a role in surveillance and early warning to

identify the outbreak of diseases.

The location of health related facilities within the NMBM was identified based on GIS data received

from the NMBM as well as the NDMC. The location of all the facilities included in the GIS

modelling process is shown below:



Figure 9-1: Location of Healthcare related faciliti es in the NMBM

Representatives from the Department of Health, Emergency Medical Services, Clinics and hospitals

took part in the Capacity self-evaluation. The results of this evaluation are shown below:

Table 9-4: Results of Self-evaluation: Health Relat ed Role Players


Value

Dept of

Health 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.25

EMS (Public) 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.75

Hospital

(Public) 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.50

Hospital

(Private) 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.88

Average 1.25 2.25 1.75 2.00 1.25 2.00 2.25 2.00 1.84

The average rating scored by the health-related role player’s was calculated as 1.84. This is

classified as slightly below “sufficient”. Based on the average values, the greatest need experienced

by health-related role players are insufficient staff (quantity) and insufficient financial resources.

This is shown in Figure 9-2.



1.25

2.25

1.75

2.00

1.25

2.00

2.25

2.001.84

1.00

2.00

3.00

Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response Average

Average Resilience (Health Services)More than sufficient

Insufficient

Sufficient

Figure 9-2: Average Resilience Ratings for Health S ervices

A specific need identified by the representative from the public hospital was a need for increased

security at the hospital.

9.1.5 Department of Home Affairs

The mandates of the Department of Home Affairs are embedded in legislation, as well as other

policy documents. In order to fulfill its mission the Department executes or participates in the

execution of Civic, Immigration and other mandates. Some of the core functions include the

following key services, such as Civic Services. This entails:

• Maintaining the National Population Register;

• Management of records;

• Citizenship;

• Travel documents and passports;and

• Identity documents (DHA 2009).

Immigration services provided by the Department include:

• Admissions;

• Inspectorate;

• Refugee affairs;

• Information co-ordination;

• Policy directives; and

• Counter-xenophobia (DHA 2009).

From this overview, it is evident that the Department of Home Affairs can play an important role in

Disaster Management. This role is especially important when complex disasters or events such as

xenophobic violence occur.



9.1.6 Department of Water Affairs

According to DWAF (2009) “the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry is the custodian of

South Africa's water and forestry resources. It is primarily responsible for the formulation and

implementation of policy governing these two sectors and has override responsibility for water

services provided by local government. While striving to ensure that all South Africans gain access

to clean water and safe sanitation, the water sector also promotes effective and efficient water

resources management to ensure sustainable economic and social development. The forestry

programme promotes the sustainable management of the country's natural forest resources and

commercial forestry for the lasting benefit of the nation.”

Due to the important role that water plays in affecting the vulnerability, resilience and hazard profile

of an area, it is clear that the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) plays an important role in

Disaster Management. Even though the DWA will play a critical role in terms of setting policies

and strategic management of water resources on National level, the local capacity of DWA

representatives will affect the NMBM more directly. Continued cooperation between disaster

management and local representatives of DWA is encouraged.

9.1.7 Disaster Management

The role of the Disaster Management centre is described in the Act and related framework

documents. The Disaster Management functions are overall disaster risk management and co-

ordination, as per section 44 of the Disaster Management Act. This includes a range of activities

both during pre- and post-disaster stages. The results of the self-evaluation of the Disaster

Management Centre (DMC) are shown in Table 9-5 below.

Table 9-5: Results of Self-evaluation: Disaster Man agement


Value

Disaster

Management 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.38

The average rating achieved by the Disaster Management self-evaluation indicates that the NMBM

DMC has insufficient resources to fulfil all its requirements. The specific aspects that were rated as

insufficient included human resources (both in quantity of people as well as expertise), financial

resources and buildings or facilities.

Specific needs identified by the disaster management representative included:

• A need for a fully operational Disaster Management System;

• A need for a practical Disaster Management Plan with Standard Operating Procedures; and

• Greater co-operation of the departments in council in terms of to Disaster Management.



It should be stated that the specific needs identified should be given urgent attention. In order to

effectively implement Disaster Management within a municipality such as the NMBM, an

appropriate investment should be made in human resources, disaster management systems, plans and

procedures. This can only be done with the commitment and co-operation from senior and top

management in the NMBM. Secondly, it should be stated that, according to the act and framework,

disaster management should, to a large extent, play a coordinating function in the municipality. Due

to this, adequate provision and support should be provided to the disaster management function in

order to ensure that the required co-operation and coordination can take place between disaster

management, other departments and the relevant line functions. This, again, can only be done with

adequate support and resources from council and top management.

9.1.8 Electricity Department

Electricity provision plays an important role with regard to disaster management. Not only can the

failure of electricity supply cause wide spread disruption to communities, but extended periods of

disruption can reduce the resilience of community and municipal role players especially in disaster

situations. The self-evaluation results of the electricity function for the NMBM is shown below:

Table 9-6: Results of Self-evaluation: Electricity

Role player Staff Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response Avg

Value

Electricity

Department 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00

The average resilience rating achieved by the electricity department was 2. Specific needs identified

by the representative included insufficient human resources as well as insufficient funds to

adequately fulfil their role in terms of disaster management in the NMBM.

9.1.9 Fire Service

The Fire Service plays a critical role in disaster management. This is not only related to emergency

response for incidents such as fires and accidents, but also relates to fire risk reduction with

inspections and training throughout the municipality.

The location of fire stations within the NMBM was identified based on GIS data received from the

NMBM as well as the NDMC. The location of all the stations included in the GIS modelling

process is shown below:



Figure 9-3: Location of Fire Stations in the NMBM

The results of the self-evaluation of the fire services are shown below:

Table 9-7: Results of Self-evaluation: Fire Service s


Value

Fire Service 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.25

Based on the self-evaluation, it was indicated that the main need for the fire services relates to

insufficient number of staff members.

9.1.10 Housing

The Department of Housing (Department of Human Settlements) derives its mandate mainly from

the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (Act 108 of 1996) (DoH 2009). In terms of

section 26 of the Constitution everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing (Section

26(1)). The state must therefore take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available

resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this right (Section 26(2)). The legislation that the

Department of Housing has promulgated and implemented falls squarely within this Constitutional

imperative (DoH 2009).



Section 2 of the Housing Act, 1997 (Act No. 107 of 1997) compels all three spheres of government

to give priority to the needs of the poor in respect of housing development (Section 2(1)(a)). In

addition all three spheres of government must ensure that housing development:

• provides as wide a choice of housing and tenure options as is reasonably possible;

• is economically, fiscally, socially and financially affordable and sustainable.

• is based on integrated development planning; and

• is administered in a transparent, accountable and equitable manner, and upholds the practice

of good governance (Section 2(1)(c)) (DoH 2009).

The Green Paper on Disaster Management (GPSDM 1998), defines the role of the Department of

Housing as follows:

“The Department of Housing is not directly involved in disaster management. Its main role is to

assist with the establishment of appropriate housing structures, and programmes in the formal

housing sector. To this end it develops and administers national housing policy and legislation.

Disasters are most evident in areas where there is rapid urbanisation, and where informal

settlements occur. Disasters in the housing sector can occur because of improper location of

housing due to non-adherence to standards, and inadequate infrastructure such as electricity, water

and sanitation which can cause health and other risks. A prerequisite for the allocation of housing

subsidies is that housing must be in accordance with building and planning legislation. In this

legislation factors relating to disasters, such as 50-year flood lines, permissible angle slopes, soil

stability and housing densities are dealt with. In cases of emergency, the local authority, or the

SANDF deals with temporary housing needs. Other institutions, such as the Salvation Army and

religious welfare organisations, provide forms of temporary accommodation or shelter. The

involvement of the People's Housing Partnership - a non-governmental organisation programme

aimed at supporting community efforts - could also be asked to support with emergency housing

needs in times of disasters.”

There are a number of factors that can contribute to the vulnerability of a community and individual

families. One of the key factors, however, relates to the quality of housing a community has access

to. Based on the above, there is a responsibility on the NMBM and related departments to play a

specific role in supporting the national and provincial governments in achieving these goals.



9.1.11 Traffic Department

The traffic department plays can play an important role in both pre- as well as post-disaster

situations. Not only does the traffic department assist with managing aspects related to

transportation during emergencies and disasters, but the traffic department has an important

responsibility with regards to risk reduction and law enforcement which can reduce the risk of

disasters.

9.1.12 Nelson Mandela Municipality (climate change)

Representatives from the NMBM Climate section also took part in the self evaluation. The results of

this evaluation are shown below.

Table 9-8: Results of Self-evaluation: NMBM (Climat e)

Role player Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Avg

Value

NMBM (Climate

Change) 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.57

The greatest needs identified by the representative related to equipment, funding and facilities.

9.1.13 Non Governmental Organizations

Non-Governmental, Religious and Faith Based Organizations can play an important role in disaster

management. According to the GPSDM (1998) “non-governmental organisations … have often

played an important relief role in disasters. Some evaluations of past involvement of non-

governmental organisations and during disasters have shown that non-governmental involvement

has generally been positive. This is not to say that all community committees worked well. Some

have been more successful than others. Conflicts between government and non-governmental

organisations, and between community groups, can arise, delaying and hampering disaster

management activities. Because non-governmental organisations can often provide relief more

quickly, and in the case of small disasters, more appropriately, it is important that the government

ensure that non-governmental organisations receive information promptly. At the same time, non-

governmental organisations have much useful information to offer to the local early-warning system.

Non-governmental organisations should therefore be a formal part of the local early-warning

system. Even when disasters are so large that they are beyond the resources of the non-

governmental organisations, these organisations are often able to provide assistance that is

complementary to government. Good links with non-governmental organisations should therefore

be promoted at all levels.” The above section highlights the importance of the role of NGOs in

disaster management. Non-governmental, religious and faith-based organizations were also

included in the self-evaluation exercise. The result achieved are shown below:



Table 9-9: Results of Self-evaluation: Non-Governme ntal Organizations

Role

player Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response

Avg

Value

Red Cross 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.25

The results from the self-evaluation show that the NGOs consider a number of their resources as

insufficient in fulfilling their role in Disaster management. The resources considered insufficient

included human resources, vehicles, equipment, funding and disaster related plans (both risk

reduction and response).

9.1.14 Representative from Airport / ACSA

The Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA), and key supporting services, play a key role in

managing the air transportation in and around South Africa. This has a bearing on Disaster

Management for a number of reasons. The most obvious reason relates to the aspects of safety and

security at South African airports. A lack of adequate safety and security at airports can give rise to

a multitude of problems, which can increase the risk of disaster. This includes air transportation,

terrorism, or human disease disasters.

Air transportation and the associated industries however not only play a role in managing the risks of

disaster, but can play a key role in post-disaster activities. This is especially the case with

facilitating the movement of people, equipment and supplies during the aftermath of a disaster and

during disaster response activities.

A representative from the airport industry took part in the self evaluation. The result of the

evaluation is shown below:

Table 9-10: Results of Self-evaluation: Airport / A CSA


Value

Airport /

ACSA 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.88

Based on this assessment, the main need identified by the representative relates to insufficient funds.

A specific additional need identified by the representative was a need for more medical equipment

and ambulances from EMS.

9.1.15 Representatives from Industry & Waste Manage ment Companies

As is the case with the commercial and private business sector in the NMBM, the industrial sector

plays an important role in disaster management. Manufacturing is the single largest contributor to

the GGVA (31,1%) in the NMBM (See Section 6.6), and therefore plays an important role in the

economy of the NMBM as well as the Eastern Cape region. NMBM has various large industrial

installations which provide a number of benefits to the city, including benefits related to the

economy and job creation. However, major industry can also pose a severe risk with regard to



pollution, fires, explosion and hazardous material. It is therefore critical that there is adequate

communication and coordination between Industry and the Safety and Security role players in the

NMBM, including the Fires Services, EMS and disaster management.

As part of this assessment, consultations were conducted with representatives from a number of

industries and a waste management firm in the NMBM. As part of these consultations,

representatives also conducted a self-evaluation of their disaster management capacity. The average

results of the assessment are shown below:

Table 9-11: Results of Self-evaluation: Industry


Value

Industry & Waste

Management 2.29 2.36 2.13 2.54 2.31 3.00 2.31 2.38 2.35

The average score calculated and based on the results from the representative’s self-evaluation

indicated that industries in the NMBM are generally of the opinion that they have sufficient

resources to fulfil their responsibilities in respect of disaster management. A number of specific

needs and comments were identified during the consultations. These included:

• A critical need with regard to insufficient water pressure in some industrial areas was

identified. This was identified as a big concern for representatives. Representatives

mentioned that this matter was escalated to the Fire Department as well as the City Engineer,

but that a final solution with regards to this matter has not yet been implemented. Another

representative indicated that problems were also experienced with water pressure that was

too high, and caused water pipes to burst. Based on these two complaints it appears that

attention is needed to resolve the problems associated with water pressure in selected areas

of the NMBM. An additional problem was also identified with regards to electricity spikes

and associated problems in the industrial area.

• A need for more involvement and coordination between the Emergency Services (Fire

Services, Traffic, and EMS) and the industries, especially with regard to emergency drills

was identified.

• A number of representatives also indicated that they do not have their own fire services, but

are dependent on assistance from the municipal fire service. This highlights the importance

of adequate coordination and cooperation between industries and the NMBM fire services.

A number of representatives have indicated that they work fairly close with the fire services,

and that the working relationship is generally good. Received comments included “Fire

Department (South End Station) responds quickly and effectively.”

• Representatives also indicated a specific need for training with regard to International

Maritime Dangerous Goods and International Ship and Port Facility Security Code training.

Comments with regards to a need for improvement at the Port of Ngqura with regards to fire

services were also received. A representative also indicated that, according to his



knowledge, the Municipality does not have a HAZCHEM response unit to purge chemical

leakages.

• Specific needs for additional financial resources to improve safety at facilities (to increase

pump capacity, installation of sprinklers, increase perimeter security cameras, capital

expenses to reduce insurance risk, etc.) was also identified.

• A need for an early warning system related to weather systems was identified by a

representative. The early warning system needs to consider operational oceanography buoys

at the coast, and raise awareness about weather systems through the DMC.

Based on the comments, it seems as if representatives from industry recognize the value of improved

cooperation and coordination between various industries, as well as industries and the local safety

and security services. These relationships should be further expanded on to ensure adequate risk

reduction and preparedness.

9.1.16 South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAM SA)

SAMSA was established on 1 April 1998 in terms of the South African Maritime Safety Authority

Act 5 of 1998 with the main objective of leading and championing South Africa’s maritime interests

as custodians and stewards of maritime policy, vigorous promoters of the maritime sector and giving

full and complete effect to their obligations for the benefit of all stakeholder (SAMSA, 2007).

In line with its objectives SAMSA’s primary areas of responsibility include:

• Participating in the development and implementation of national and international maritime

safety and marine environment protection standards;

• Enforcing technical and operational standards for all shipping operations in South African

waters and for South African ships anywhere, to promote responsible operations in terms of

seaworthiness, safety and pollution prevention;

• Enforcing training standards and competency of seafarers;

• Managing the national capability to respond to marine pollution incidents and other maritime

emergencies;

• Operating the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre to coordinate maritime assistance services

and to detect, and coordinate the location and rescue of people in maritime distress situations

throughout the internationally agreed South African Search and Rescue Region;

• Overseeing the provision of maritime distress and safety communications services to discharge

South Africa's responsibilities under the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System;



• Administering South Africa's voluntary ship reporting system (SAFREP) for identifying and

tracking ships at sea for safety purposes and to provide a ships' database for responding to

marine emergencies;

• Investigating maritime casualties; and

• Delivering related services including:

o Public awareness and education in marine safety and pollution prevention;

o Administration of South Africa's ship registration system; and

o Publication of, and access to, ship safety and environmental standards.

SAMSA delivers four main outputs consistent with its mandate and responsibilities (SAMSA, 2007):

• Safety and environment protection standards for responsible maritime transport operations;

• An infrastructure for monitoring and enforcing compliance with safety and environment

protection standards;

• The capability to respond to marine pollution incidents and other maritime emergencies; and

• The capability to detect, locate and rescue people in maritime distress situations.

Based on SAMSA’s activities and main objectives, SAMSA can play a role in disaster management,

especially related to risks associated with maritime operations. A representative from SAMSA also

took part in the capacity self-evaluation. The results are shown below:

Table 9-12: Results of Self-evaluation: SAMSA

Role


Avg

Value

SAMA 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25

During the self-evaluation, SAMSA received a fairly high score (2.25). According to this score,

SAMSA is classified as an organization with sufficient resources to fulfil its disaster management

responsibilities.



9.1.17 South African National Defence Force

According to the GPSDM2 (1998), “the primary role of the SANDF is defense. The SANDF may,

however, be employed for service in the preservation of life, health, or property and for service in

the provision or maintenance of essential services. The SANDF can also be requested to provide

support by other government departments. In the past, the SANDF has provided valuable support

and services to national departments and local government where capacity has been lacking. The

SANDF’s role therefore is cross-cutting and can be used to enhance existing attempts by other

government departments to deal with disaster situations more effectively. The SANDF has

resources, though limited, to carry out search and rescue operations at land, sea and air, to provide

medical support, to transport relief provisions such as food and water, and to undertake the building

of bridges, earth removal and road-building. The SANDF can also have access to military

assistance in disaster relief operations from the other members of the Southern African Development

Community. The SA Air Force can also assist with Search and Rescue Operations. The SANDF has

the capability of communicating with the whole defense force and can rapidly distribute information.

The SANDF works closely with provinces and at the local level, and cooperates with the SAPS

through a system of security committees at all levels.”

It is clear that the SANDF can play a critical role in disaster situations. One such example was the

role the SANDF played during the xenophobic violence in South Africa during May 2008. The

results of the self-evaluation of the SANDF are shown below:

Table 9-13: Results of Self-evaluation: South Afric an National Defence Force

Role


Avg

Value

SANDF 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00

The greatest need identified by the SANDF representative during the capacity self-evaluation related

to insufficient funding. The majority of the other aspects were rated as sufficient.

9.1.18 South African Police Service

According to the GPSDM3 (1998) “the primary role of the SAPS is crime prevention, crime

investigation, and the security of citizens. However, the SAPS may be employed for service in the

preservation of life, health, or property and for service in the provision or maintenance of essential

services and can be requested to provide support by other government departments. In the past, the

SAPS have provided valuable support and services to national departments and local government

where capacity has been lacking. The role therefore is cross-cutting and can be used to enhance

existing attempts by other government departments to deal with disaster situations more effectively.

2 Sections of quote related to SAPS removed to shorten paragraph. 3 Sections of quote related to SANDF removed to shorten paragraph.



The SAPS has been involved in cases of disaster in crime prevention, control of traffic, maintaining

public order and cordoning off and patrolling disaster areas. The SAPS also has a more specialised

role in security-related disasters such as civil unrest, bomb explosions and acts of terror. In

general, the SAPS is involved in most disasters where negligence is suspected and where people are

killed. The SAPS has well-established nodal points which can serve as an early warning system and

can be used to enhance preparedness in cases of crisis. The SAPS also has units at the provincial

and local levels. It is strengthening its networks and can reach all sectors of our society through the

existing Community Policing Forums. These networks are important in mobilizing voluntary

support and disseminating information about disasters to communities. In this way, community

preparedness can be rapidly activated.”

The role that the SAPS plays in terms of specialist as well as supporting function with regard to

disaster management is critical. The location of police stations within the NMBM was identified

based on GIS data received from the NMBM as well as the NDMC. The location of all the stations

included in the GIS modelling process is shown below:

Figure 9-4: Location of Police Stations in the NMBM

The location of these police stations was included in the GIS resilience and risk modelling.



9.1.19 Weather Services

The South African Weather Service (SAWS) became a public entity on 15 July 2001 in terms of the

South African Weather Service Act, Act No. 8 of 2001. In terms of the Act, the company provides

two distinct services, namely public good services which are funded by government, and commercial

services, where the user-pays principle applies. The South African Weather Service is an

authoritative voice for weather and climate forecasting in South Africa and, as a member of the

World Meteorological Organization (WMO), complies with international meteorological standards.

As an Aviation Meteorological Authority, SAWS is designated by the state to provide weather

services to the aviation industry and to fulfill the international obligations of the government under

the Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The company also

provides maritime weather forecasting services for the vast oceans around Southern Africa extending

to Antarctica.

The SAWS can play a very import role especially in the field of early warning and risk reduction in

disaster management. A representative from the SAWS also took part in the self-evaluation of their

capacity in terms of disaster management, and the results are shown below:

Table 9-14: Average Resilience ratings: SAWS

Role-player Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response Average

Weather

Services 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.38

The general capacity of the SAWS in terms of disaster management was rated as being between

“Sufficient” and “More than Sufficient”. Continued coordination, especially in the field of early

warning is therefore proposed, especially in light of the need for an early warning system, as

identified by representatives from industries (See Section 9.1.15).

9.2 Stakeholder Resilience Profile

The overview of the Resilience ratings calculated and based on the self-evaluation of the

representatives in the NMBM is shown in Table 9-15 below:



Table 9-15: Average Resilience ratings from Stakeho lder Consultations

Role-player Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response Average

Industry 2.29 2.36 2.13 2.54 2.31 3 2.31 2.38 2.42

SAWS 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.38

Fire Service 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.25

SAMA 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25

Electricity

Department 1.00 - 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00

SADF 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00

Airport / ACSA 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.88

Health Role-

Players 1.25 2.25 1.75 2.00 1.25 2.00 2.25 2.00 1.84

Community

Representative 1.50 1.67 1.33 1.50 1.67 2.17 1.50 1.83 1.65

NMBM (Climate

Change) 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 - 1.57

Disaster

Management 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.38

Red Cross 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.25

Beach Offices 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13

Average 1.54 1.94 2.02 1.93 1.48 2.17 1.85 1.85 1.84

The average resilience rating achieved by the role players was 1.84. This is slightly below the

“sufficient” category. The average ratings are represented in Figure 9-5.

1.54

1.94 2.02 1.93

1.48

2.17

1.85

1.85 1.84

1.00

2.00

3.00

Staff Expertise Vehicles Equip Funding Building Prevention Response Avg Value

Average Resilience Values

More than sufficient (3)

Insufficient (1)

Sufficient (2)

Figure 9-5: Average Resilience Rating for the NMBM role players

Based on only the average values, the resources that were rated mostly “insufficient” were financial

resources (budget) and human resources (in terms of number of staff members). An interesting

observation is the average rating associated with expertise (1.94). This might be an indication that

the expertise available (such as specialist knowledge and experience) amongst the current human

resources was considered more sufficient, but that the number of staff members was considered

insufficient. Furthermore, based on only the average values, resources such as equipment, disaster



plans (both risk reduction and response) and expertise were considered less than sufficient, however

the tendency average rating were more placed towards the sufficient spectrum than the insufficient

spectrum. The only resource that achieved an average classification of sufficient was building or

facilities resources.

A different analysis of the answers provided by the representatives indicates a similar, but slightly

different picture. In an assessment of the resources that were assigned the lowest rating by each of

the representatives, the greatest needs for resources again related to Financial and Human Resources

(in terms of number of staff members).

9.3 GIS based Resilience mapping for the NMBM

The risk assessment approach also required the spatial mapping of resilience levels in the NMBM.

This was done as described in Section 5.6. The result of the resilience mapping based on the

location of key facilities is shown below:

Figure 9-6: Resilience mapping based on location of key facilities in the NMBM.

Resilience mapping based on land-use/land-cover data was also conducted. The result of this

process is shown below:



Figure 9-7: Resilience mapping based on Land-use / Land-cover in the NMBM.

In order to use a single resilience data layer in the GIS disaster model, the two resilience maps were

combined to create a single resilience map for the NMBM. This map is shown in Figure 9-8 below:



Figure 9-8: Resilience levels in the NMBM.

The hazard, vulnerability and resiliency data was included in the GIS Risk Model, and the risk levels

were calculated based on the methodology discussed in Section 5. The results of the modelling

process are discussed in Section 10.

9.4 Resilience factors for Wards in the NMBM

The GIS resilience data layer was used to calculate resilience values for each of the wards in the

NMBM. The results of this assessment are shown below:



Figure 9-9: Average Resilience Level per Ward



10 Risk Assessment and Modelling Results The Risk modelling process was completed by using the Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity data,

and calculating the risk levels as described in Section 5. The risk modelling results for the NMBM

are presented below.

10.1 Prioritised Risk Profile

The prioritised risk profile for the NMBM is based on the data received from the workshop

consultations, as well as the base data (including reports) collected during the study. The

stakeholder perception data and local resilience data were compared with the desktop hazard

assessment results, and the hazard severity value was adopted. The Risk Prioritization for the

NMBM is shown below:

Table 10-1: Prioritized Risk Ratings for the NMBM

Hazard Name Prioritized

Risk Ratings

Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Floods (River, Urban & Dam Failure) 0.85 Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Fire/Explosion (Storage & Transportation) 0.85 Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Spill/Release (Storage & Transportation) 0.82 Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Severe Storms (Wind, Hail, Lightning, Fog) 0.81


Hydro-meteorological - Drought 0.78

Environmental Degradation 0.76

Fire Hazards - Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Area 0.76

Fire Hazards - Veld/Forest Fires 0.73

Pollution - Water Pollution (Fresh and Sea) 0.72

Major Event Hazards (Cultural, Religious, Political, Recreational, Commercial, Sport) 0.71 Oceanographic - Storm Surge 0.71 Transport Hazards - Road Transportation 0.70 Civil Unrest - Xenophobic Violence 0.69 Structural Failure 0.68 Pollution - Land Pollution 0.68 Civil Unrest - Terrorism 0.67 Oceanographic - Sea Level Rise (Climate Change) 0.67 Pollution - Air Pollution 0.65 Civil Unrest - Demonstrations / Riots 0.65 Oceanographic - Tsunami 0.65 Transport Hazards - Rail Transportation 0.64 Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure 0.64 Civil Unrest - Armed Conflict (Civil/Political War) 0.61 Disease / Health - Disease: Animal 0.61 Geological Hazards - Earthquake 0.60 Transport Hazards - Air Transportation 0.58 Transport Hazards - Water Transportation 0.57 Civil Unrest - Refugees / Displaced People 0.51 Infestations - Plant Infestations (Intruder Plants) 0.44 Disease / Health - Disease: Plants 0.41 Radio Active Fall-out NA



11 Conclusions and Main Findings This report represents the method and findings of the disaster risk assessment for the Nelson

Mandela Bay Municipality. The main findings were:

i. The highest rated risks in the municipality were identified as Hydro-meteorological Risks (Floods and Storms) and Hazardous Material Risks (Spill/Release & Fire/Explosion).

ii. Hydro-meteorological Risks: Risks associated with climatic conditions has long been a

problem in the NMBM, and extreme weather events have been part of regular burdens

communities in the NMBM have had to learn to live with. However, uncertainty with

regards to changing weather patterns (which might lead to even higher intensity events) and

continued urbanisation has highlighted the need for decisive action with regards to managing

risks associated with floods and severe storms in the NMBM.

iii. Hazardous Material Risks: Due to the prominent role that the manufacturing sector and

industry plays in the NMBM as well as the movement of hazardous material through the

NMBM (from the harbours and industries), the NMBM can be considered to be at high risk

for hazards associated with hazardous material. This risk related to fires, explosions and

accidental spill or release of hazardous material both on-site, and during road or rail

transportation. A hazardous material disaster can have a severe impact on the NMBM

community, causing structural damage, injuries or fatalities, environmental degradation and

displacement of individuals.

iv. Human Disease Hazards, especially challenges associated with HIV/AIDS poses an

enormous challenge to the Eastern Cape, as well as the NMBM. HIV/AIDS not only has a

serious impact on the infected individual, but also has numerous secondary impacts on

affected communities, including decreased productivity of workers, increased absenteeism

and additional costs of training of new workers. It also represents a greater demand and

pressure on health facilities. Another serious impact related to HIV/AIDS is the problem

associated with orphans and child headed households. HIV/AIDS therefore not only has the

direct consequence of reduction in health, or loss of life, the secondary effects can further

increase the vulnerability of communities to other non-related hazards. Other diseases

included under the human health and disease category includes Tuberculosis.

v. Other top rated risks in the NMBM include:

• Hydro-meteorological – Drought;

• Environmental Degradation; and

• Fire Hazards - Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Area.



vi. The main disaster risk reduction measures include:

• Flooding and Storm Hazards

o A flood risk assessment should be carried out based on existing floodlines in order

to further prioritize problem areas and define remediation;

o High water markers and beacons to indicate depth of rivers. Maintenance of

beacons, and installation of additional high water markers;

o Ensuring no development and building in floodline areas. Awareness programmes

and law enforcement; and

o Stormwater maintenance. Ongoing stormwater maintenance.

• Industrial Hazards o Survey of industries (for fire and hazardous materials risks); associated updating of

hazard severity map;

o Compilation of hazardous materials register/database, indicating the location and

contents of facilities spatially and in database format;

o Stakeholder meetings to confirm and refine the findings, discuss cooperation to find

solutions to similar challenges; and

o Integrated register/database.

• Human Health Hazards o Epidemic and health statistic tracking and warnings enabling early warning of

possible epidemics.

o Ensure potable water supply delivery to all settlements, even informal settlements if

possible. Water supply delivery programmes in areas where population density is

high but water supply is not available.

o Logging system and monitoring of communicable diseases on a daily basis at clinics

and hospitals, on a central database.

o Continue existing HIV/AIDS programmes.

vii. Due to fairly outdated census data, it is currently not possible to provide an updated

vulnerability profile of the NMBM. However, statistics used (including the 2007

community survey) indicate that the NMBM is, generally speaking, less vulnerable than the

areas neighbouring the NMBM.

viii. Activities to be implemented to improve the Vulnerability of the NMBM include:

• Increase the access of vulnerable groups to services, power structures and resources;

• Develop local institutions, education, training and appropriate skill development

opportunities;

• Develop and secure local investment and local markets;

• Improve ethical standards in public life (including crime prevention, safety and security);



• Manage urbanisation;

• Protect natural and forest environments;

• Diversify income opportunities; and

• Strengthen livelihoods and increase low income levels.

ix. The IDP priorities and IDP Five Year Performance Plan seems to include a number of

priorities that will reduce disaster risk in the NMBM.

x. The average resilience level of role-player within the NMBM was rated as 1,84 on a scale

from 1 (insufficient), 2 (sufficient) and 3 (more than sufficient). This relates to a relatively

high rating, but is still below the ‘sufficient’ level. As a general observation, representatives

that took part in the capacity self-evaluation assessment generally have near sufficient

resources to fulfil some aspects of their disaster management responsibilities. However, the

main needs identified by role players relate to staff (quantity) as well as funding.

The NMBM consists of various areas with different vulnerability and resilience values. It would

appear, however, that the NMBM has made good progress in offering basic services (such as water

and sanitation) to communities. These efforts impact significantly on the vulnerability of

communities, and, where required, should be further expanded. In parallel, a duel focus should be

on specific disaster management related planning (where gaps still exist), and implementation of

suitable hazard mitigation measures related to the highest rated risks.

11.1 Comparison with Previous Disaster Risk Assessm ent

In comparing the results of the 2005 DRA for the NMBM, and the results of the current DRA, the

following is important:

• During the previous DRA, risk was identified according to the formula R= HxV. This is in line with the DM Framework and Act.

• The current assessment, however, also included a high level, basic Resilience assessment (in combining Capacity and Manageability). The aim of this was to do an initial overview of the current capacities in various line functions and departments in the NMBM. It is proposed that this type of assessment (on a more detailed level) should form part of all future assessments in the NMBM in order to identify progress made with regards to building the resilience levels fn role players in the NMBM.

• The hazard categories considered during this assessment were also expanded on and increased from the previous assessment.

A basic comparison of the results achieved during the 2005 and results achieved during the 2010

assessment are shown below:



Hazard Name

DRA 2010

Risk Ratings

(DRA 2010)Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Floods (River, Urban & Dam Failure) 0.85

Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Fire/Explosion (Storage & Transportation) 0.85

Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Spill/Release (Storage & Transportation) 0.82

Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Severe Storms (Wind, Hail, Snow, Lightning, Fog) 0.81


DRA 2005

Hazard CategoriesDRA 2010 Hazard Categories Hydro-meteorological - Drought 0.78

Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Fire/Explosion (Storage & Transportation) 1 Environmental Degradation 0.76

Hazardous Material - Hazmat: Spill/Release (Storage & Transportation) 1 Fire Hazards - Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Area 0.76

Floods Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Floods (River, Urban & Dam Failure) 2 2 Fire Hazards - Veld/Forest Fires 0.73

Severe wind Hydro-meteorological Hazards - Severe Storms (Wind, Hail, Snow, Lightning, Fog) 3 3 Pollution - Water Pollution (Fresh and Sea) 0.72Environmental degradation: loss of biodiversity

Environmental Degradation 4 4 Major Event Hazards (Cultural, Religious, Political, Recreational, Commercial, Sport) 0.71

Fire Hazards - Formal & Informal Settlements / Urban Area 5 Oceanographic - Storm Surge 0.71

Fire Hazards - Veld/Forest Fires 5 Transport Hazards - Road Transportation 0.70

Civil unrest, terrorism Civil Unrest - Terrorism 6 6 Civil Unrest - Xenophobic Violence 0.69

Transport (rail, road, sea, hazmat) Transport Hazards - Rail Transportation 7 7 Structural Failure 0.68

Pollution - Land Pollution 8 Pollution - Land Pollution 0.68

Pollution - Water Pollution (Fresh and Sea) 8 Civil Unrest - Terrorism 0.67

Epidemics Disease / Health - Disease: Human 9 9 Oceanographic - Sea Level Rise (Climate Change) 0.67

Major events Major Event Hazards (Cultural, Religious, Political, Recreational, Commercial, Sport) 11 11 Pollution - Air Pollution 0.65

Major disruption of key services Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure 12 12 Civil Unrest - Demonstrations / Riots 0.65

Major air pollution Winter (informal settlements & industries)

10 Oceanographic - Tsunami 0.65

Major air pollution: Summer (industrial)

14 Transport Hazards - Rail Transportation 0.64

Transport (air) Transport Hazards - Air Transportation 13 13 Infrastructure Failure / Service Delivery Failure 0.64

Tsunamis Oceanographic - Tsunami 15 15 Civil Unrest - Armed Conflict (Civil/Political War) 0.61

Sea level rise Oceanographic - Sea Level Rise (Climate Change) 16 16 Disease / Health - Disease: Animal 0.61

Radio-active fall-out Radio-active fall-out 17 17 Geological Hazards - Earthquake 0.60

Transport Hazards - Air Transportation 0.58

Transport Hazards - Water Transportation 0.57

Civil Unrest - Refugees / Displaced People 0.51

Infestations - Plant Infestations (Intruder Plants) 0.44

Disease / Health - Disease: Plants 0.41

Radio Active Fall-out NA

DRA 2005

12Pollution - Air Pollution

Major surface water/land pollution (inland and coastal)

8

1

Fires (informal settlements & bush fires)

5

Industrial hazards, spillages; Explosions and related fires

Figure 11-1: Comparison between the prioritized ris k ratings of the 2005 and the 2010 Disaster Risk As sessment for the NMBM.



12 Recommendations and Action Plan The recommendations based on the results of the Risk Assessment include the following proposed

actions and projects:

• The completion of a detailed HAZMAT risk assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality;

• The establishment / expansion of HAZMAT working group or advisory committee in the

Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality;

• The completion of a health related needs and vulnerability assessment for the Nelson

Mandela Bay Municipality;

• The completion of a detailed drought risk assessment for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality;

• The implementation / establishment of a Comprehensive Information Management System

that can be used for the capturing of information with regards to incidents in the NMBM;

• Detailed flood lines studies and assessments related to the impact of storm and tidal surges

and sea level rise on the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality;

• Development of a Flood Hazard Management System for the Nelson Mandela Bay

Municipality; and

• The development of contingency plans for the remaining disaster risks.



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Annexure A – Hazard Categories and Listing



Annexure B – GIS RHVMC Modelling & Buffer Guideline s



Annexure C – Consultation & Workshop Data Collectio n Sheets



Annexure D – Risk Reduction Measures



Annexure E – Workshop Attendance Register



Annexure F – Hazard Maps



Annexure G – Vulnerability Map



Annexure H – Resilience Map



Annexure I – Ward Based Risk Maps



Annexure J – Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis for the NMBM



Annexure K – Electronic Copy of Report and Project Data



SRK Report Distribution Record

Report No. 404277 – Final Report

Copy No. 1 – PDF Copy

Name/Title Company Copy Date Authorised by

Mr H Lansdown NMBM Disaster Management Centre

1 31 March 2010

M Braune

SRK Library SRK Consulting 2 31 March

2010 M Braune

SRK Project File SRK Consulting 3 31 March 2010 M Braune

Approval Signature:

This report is protected by copyright vested in SRK Consulting. It may not be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means whatsoever to any person without the written permission of

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