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Dismantling an International Fraud Ring in Brazil cliff jordan oct 2003 Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) Conference San Diego, California
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Dismantling an
International Fraud Ring in Brazil cliff jordan
oct 2003
Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) ConferenceSan Diego, California
Purpose of Discussion
1. Share our lessons learned from experience with International Fraud Ring in Brazil
2. Discuss impact of Sep 11th on Telephone Fraud in Brazil
Our Industry Environment
For example: 0021-1-914-827-9086 0023-1-240-337-5907
call via Embratel
call via Intelig
Anatel Regulations for
Fixed Line Local and LD Operators1. Not allowed to discriminate against customers based on
credit history or ability to pay for basic service.
2. Not allowed to block service for Bad Debt until after 2 warnings and 30 days have passed from due date of invoice.
3. Basic Customers are NOT Subscribed to an LD Operator. They choose the LD Operator at the time of dialing the LD call.
Our HistoryJun 1999 – Sep 2000
Jun 1999 – PIC Code dialing started. Jan 2000 – Billing customers started. Jul 2000 – First Fraud Reports Aug 2000 – Blocking of International calls begins Sep 2000 – Fraud Control Department organized
Sep 20, 2000 – First Police Action for Fraud
1 Manager + 1 Analyst + 1 Developer = NEED MORE HELP FAST!!
Step 1 – Brazil Fraudster calls Saudi Fraudster and sets up Long Duration callStep 2 – Saudi Fraudster with client tells Brazil Fraudster where his client
wants to call (eg. friend in India)
Typical Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
Step 3 – Brazil Fraudster makes second call (eg. India)Step 4 – Brazil Fraudster conferences the two calls togetherStep 5 – Saudi client talks to friend in India
Typical Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
Step 6 – Brazil Fraudster and Saudi Fraudster settle the money between them
Typical Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
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Oct 2000 – Dec 2000
Investigated Fraud Systems and purchased Sheriff
a) CDR Basedb) Near Realtimec) Greater Influence on Customized Developmentd) Neural Network Enginee) Thresholdsf) Case Manager
To be installed in Feb 2001. Until then.....
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Oct 2000 – Dec 2000
We were blocking MANIACS!
a) Long Duration calls to Hot Countries over 2 hoursb) Accumulated duration to Hot Countries of 5 hours + per day
Hot Countries = Mideast and some LatAm Countriesc) No pre-checking of Customer Info, Payment Infod) Used above criteria and GUT Feelings!e) 98% Accuracy
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Oct 2000 – Dec 2000
We made a COUPLE of little mistakes...
a) Blocked a TV Network for calls related to international news gathering
b) Blocked an Isreali Hospital
We got executive direction to validate customer first!
Result?.....
one week without blocking!
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Oct 2000 – Dec 2000
We Then Recognized...
1. Sheriff would not be agressive enough for this fraud.
2. We needed a system that could do the following:
• Automatically Blacklist B number after Long Duration call• Automatically Blacklist A number after Long Duration call
• Stop the Long Duration call in progress
3. We heard of a system that could meet these needs...For us it was ECTEL’s FraudView system – discussions began
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Jan 2001 – Mar 2001
Progress...
1. Hired 5 more analysts and 3 supervisors and trained them!2. Installed Sheriff in February 2001
Result? ..... Fraud amount dropped!
3. Began sharing of information with our competitor Intelig4. Decided to attempt a second police action in March in Rio
Allowed fraud in prep for police action
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Jan 2001 – Mar 2001
Second Police Action, Rio – March 9th, 2001
Please meet:Ismael – from PalestineSyed – from Bangladesh
New Fraud Technology...
DTMF boxes
Step 1 – Saudi Fraudster calls DTMF box in Brazil which triggers first Long Duration call from Brazil to Saudi.
DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
Step 2 – Saudi Fraudster sends via DTMF a code and destination phone number (eg. India) across Long Duration call
#1 0021-91-345-6667
DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
Step 3 – Box automatically opens second line, dials destination (eg. India), and conferences the two calls
Step 4 – When call to India completes, India disconnects call
#1 0021-91-345-6667
DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
Step 5 – Box is now ready to accept another DTMF command
#1 0021-254-567-2223
DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
Step 5 – Box is now ready to accept another DTMF command
#1 0021-964-654-1112
DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
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Jan 2001 – Mar 2001
Second Police Action, Rio – March 9th, 2001
Please meet:Ismael – from PalestineSyed – from Bangladesh
New Fraud Technology...
DTMF boxes
Arrest
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Jan 2001 – Mar 2001
Installed Pilot Version of FraudView – March 12th, 2001Discovered:
1. We could now see the DTMF signals sent by Fraudsters2. We could automatically block when DTMF patterns seen3. Block = Insert SILENCE on the line
We configured FraudView to automatically:1. Block when detection of reverse direction DTMF signals sent
by Fraudsters2. Blacklist and Block on Long Duration calls to Hot Countries
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Apr 2001 – Jun 2001
Began using both Sheriff and Pilot Version of FraudView
Did another police action in May, again in Rio
Signed contract for ECTEL FraudView
De-installed Pilot Version of FraudView as part of installation of Production FraudView
Allowed fraud in prep for police action
Fraud rose with Sheriff alone
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Apr 2001 – Jun 2001
May 30th, 2001Rio de Janeiro
Names Unknown – 4 BraziliansMeet:
Fraudsters were trained and brought in from Foz de Iguaçu.Were paid a little over minimum wageClaimed their boss was Arab from Foz de Iguaçu.
Arrest
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Hired 12 new fraud analysts and 7 support staff
FML trained new analysts and support staff
Jul 2001 – Sep 2001
Installation of Production FraudView complete
Fraud dropped!
It now became very difficult for the Arab International Fraud Ring to complete the Long Duration leg!
Step 1 – Try to setup Long Duration call
A DESPERATE Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
a. Hacked into PABX in Greece and reoriginated to Saudi – caught via DTMF!
Step 1 – Try to setup Long Duration calla. Hacked into PABX in Japan and reoriginated to Saudi – caught via DTMF!
A DESPERATE Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
Step 1 – Try to setup Long Duration calla. Hacked into PABX in Texas, US and reoriginated to Saudi – caught via DTMF!
A DESPERATE Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring
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Jul 2001 – Sep 2001
Sep 11!
September 11, 2001 – Hot Country traffic at average levels
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Jul 2001 – Sep 2001
Sep 11!
September 11, 2001An event that begs a whole set of questions...
2. Could it be that terrorists are frauding our network like the call-sellers, Drug dealers, and the Arms dealers?
1. Did any of the communications of the Sep 11th terrorist attack pass through the Embratel network as part of the fraud that we had been fighting?
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Jul 2001 – Sep 2001
Sep 11!
September 11, 2001
5. What will be the impacts on our industry as a result of the new realities of terrorism?
4. Does the Arab International Fraud Ring have any connections or is affiliated with al Qaeda or any other terrorist group?
3. Is al Qaeda or any other terrorist group funded by this Arab International Fraud Ring?
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Jul 2001 – Sep 2001
Sep 11!
September 11, 2001
Stay tuned.... Some answers to these and other like questions are coming in the next the few slides...
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 2001
The fraud amounts dropped even further in October.
We increased the complexity of the filters and were able to quickly find the fraudsters as soon as they made their first call.
The month the dominos began to fall for the Arab International Fraud Ring in Brazil....
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 5th, 2001Meet:
Roberto Barreto de Matos, 23 anos
Telephone Technician
Salvador, Bahia (northeast Brazil)
Contracted by unknown Arab from Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil to setup and maintain a clandestine switch.Falsified Identification Documents to adquire 16 telephone lines. Used computer and modems.Was paid R$3000 monthly to maintain the systemSuspicious neighbors notified the police which led to the search warrent and subsequent arrest.
Arrest
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 5th, 2001
José de Fatima Carnietto – innocent victim of stolen ID
Rented an apt in Cascavel (near Foz de Iguaçu) in Jun 01.
Foz de Iguaçu, Cascavel and surrounding area
There lived 4 men between 20 and 26 years old.Adquired several telephone lines. Completed calls to:Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Italy, USA, Canada, Sudan, and Egypt
Fraudsters stole his ID.
Meet:
Calls made between June 26 and Aug 23. Abandoned apt. Owner entered apartment on Oct and phone bills, and called police.We found over 50 accounts with name Fatima Carnietto.
NEVER FOUND
NEVER FOUND
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 10th, 2001Meet:Valdir Vitalino
Clipped onto at least 10 seperate accounts in Maringá between July and August.
Maringá, near Foz de Iguaçu
Completed calls to:Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Africa, and Pakistan
Believed to have run at least 6 clandestine switches in the area of Maringá.
Ederaldo Felix dos Santos
Police found passport of Ederaldo with US Visa application.
Idiane Aparecida WolffJosé Antonio de Sá
Bank transactions with fraudsters in Saudi done through Bank West Union in Paraguay in name of
Maria Lúcia Ferreira Josefi.
Alex Honorato da SilvaDaniel Trabanca
Arrest
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Arrest
ed
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
Visit to Foz de IguaçuBorder town between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay
Strong Arab community (over 20,000 residents)Location of largest waterfalls in Western Hemisphere
Headquarters for Arab International Fraud Ring in Brazil
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Visit to Foz de IguaçuBin Laden visted Foz along with other South
American towns in this region between 1995 and 1999.
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 17th, 2001Meet:
Roberto Alli Chinais – Lebanon, Leader of GroupCuritiba, Brazil
Ran clandestine switches in Curitiba in June 2000 and Feb 2001
Deivis Helen Calamucci - Lebanon
Federal Police claim Roberto Alli Chinais is another member of the Arab Mafia in Brazil.
Mohamed Mahmoud El Husseini - KuweitHachem Mahmoud Husseini - Kuweit Arr
estedCHINAIS FLED
Arrest
edArr
ested
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 18th, 2001Meet:
Muhamed Hassan Atwi - LebanonFoz de Iguaçu, Brazil
Were arrested for running clandestine switches in Foz de Iguaçu, within 1st day of fraud.
Paulo César Caramorí - Brasilian Names Unknown – 3 Brazilians
Embratel and Intelig acted together and sent Federal Police two addresses. Federal Police secured search warrents within 2 hours and sent agents to both addresses.
At other address they found nothing but telephone wires. Neighbors said that 3 occupants had just fled from the apartment with telephone equipment in hand.
At one address, they found the 1 Arab and 1 Brazilian and arrested them.
Arrest
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 19th, 2001Meet:unknown
Brasilia, Brazil
Federal Police found a PABX setup as a clandestine switch in an apartment in Brasilia.Found also with equipment a package of cocaine.
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
October 24th, 2001Meet:
Jamil Alkayal – Lebanon
Mato Grosso, Brazil
Were arrested Oct 10th for suspicion of communications with terrorist groups.
Ghassan Jamil Al Kayal - Lebanon
Police found 2 clandestine switches in Mato Grosso believed to be run by these men.
Rubens Nunes de Barros - Brasilian
Police found 8 clandestine switches in Cuiabá believed to be run by these men.
Arrest
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Oct 2001 – Dec 2001
November 22nd, 2001Meet:
Darko Kuvic – Croatia
Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil
Claimed they were tourists.
Ivan Balic - Croatia
No information on who hired them.
Thomas Slov - Croatia
Were arrested within one day of the start of the fraud.Were routing calls through a calling card service in the US to Kuweit and Saudi Arabia.
Arrest
ed
Relationship with Arab
Mafia?
Interesting Relationships Found by Police
Ederaldo Felix dos Santos
Afif Abib Eid
Paulo César Caramouri
Muhamed Hassan Atwi
Owns electronics store in
Ciudade del Este, Paraguay
Owns videogame store in
Ciudade del Este, Paraguay
Ran clandestine switches in Maringá,
Brazil
Ran clandestine switches in Foz de
Iguaçu, Brazil
Accused of transfering $50 Million USD to Hezbollah
Assad Ahmad Barakat
Accused of imposing monthly tax to Arab owned stores in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay to fund Hezbollah
Pro-Terrorist Propaganda and training material found in raid of his residence in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay in December 2001. Barakat fled to Brazil.
Interesting Relationships Found by Police
Afif Abib Eid Muhamed Hassan Atwi
Owns electronics store in
Ciudade del Este, Paraguay
Owns videogame store in
Ciudade del Este, Paraguay
Assad Ahmad Barakat
Accused of imposing monthly tax to Arab owned stores in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay to fund HezbollahAccused of transfering $50 Million USD to HezbollahPro-Terrorist Propaganda and training material found in raid
of his residence in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay in December 2001. Barakat fled to Brazil.
Arrested in Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil on charges of terrorism in June of 2002. Captured while exiting his electronics store. Sent to maximum security prison in Brasilia.
Nov 2002, Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, a worker for Barakat was arrested in Ciudad del Este on suspicion of raising funds for Hezbollah. Detained after police saw him writing down license-plate numbers outside a U.S.-sponsored disaster-management meeting.
May 2003, Hassan Abdallah Dayoub, married to Barakat´s first cousin was arrested in the airport at Asuncion, Paraguay while trying to smuggle 5 pounds of cocaine on a trip to Syria.
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December, 2001
The month of December appeared very quiet from the Arab International Fraud Ring! Did we win the fraud war?
Did they decide to no longer commit telephone fraud?Why do we have an upward trend then in December?
The fraud moved to .....
CELLULAR!
All Brasil’s Intl Cellular traffic goes through Embratel and Intelig (competitor).
This created a business opportunity for Embratel to market fraud service...
Other related frauds began in 2002 that are related to this International Arab Fraud Ring:
1. Clandestine Switches providing exclusive VIP cellular service for prison inmates, specifically to brasilian mafia leaders.
2. The switches were setup by people trained by the Arab Fraud Ring.
3. Recordings done by the Federal Police of these cellular calls reveal how drugs, arms, and prostitution are trafficked, and how the money is laundered and transferred via banks in Paraguay.
4. Fernandinho Beira-Mar, largest supplier of drugs to Rio continues his operations while in prison getting drugs from FARC in Columbia and buying and selling of arms coming in from the tri-border area (Foz de Iguaçu). Thousands of Russian made AK-47s and millions of bullets and attempts at buying Stinger Missiles.
5. Fernandinho is recorded ordering his contact on the outside to contact the “Lebonese Terrorists in Foz de Iguaçu” to learn how to put together a Clandestine Switch.
6. By way of the Clandestine Switches, prisoners launched a “follow-me” telephone fraud scheme that victimized many brasilian residents.
2002 - 2003
Some key regulations for Cellular companies changed in 2003 in Brasil:1. All cellular customers can now pick their long distance
carrier with each call (casual calling).a) This shifted the responsibility of long distance
fraud to the long distance carriers.2. All cellular companies can now offer long distance
service with their own pic-codea) This means they are responsible for the fraud that
happens with their pic-code
Net result for Embratel: As the dominant carrier, we lost some traffic to competition in 2003. However, we still have some of the smaller companies with their own long distance pic-code requesting our realtime fraud service in addition to transport of their calls.
2003
17-10-03 18:26:41 1199953229 00xx9616490780C0 497.95Date / Time Origen-Brasil Intl Destination Dur (min)
DTMF = >003149413142539<014941142599<01129420841>003161296420841>00152511133568<0152511158<999>999>999<999<0215949425792#<0155949425792
17-10-03 09:48:57 2799820666 00xx96638354362B 99.87Date / Time Origen-Brasil Intl Destination Dur (min)
DTMF = >001592431881207<01592431881207*>999<999<99999999>99999999>9999990015999<9999990015999>0015999<0015999<01592431587803>999<99999
Recent Examples of Fraud Trafficfrom a cellco using our network...
Comment: This is a call from a cell phone (part of a clandestine switch) in Brasil to Saudi Arabia. The destination sent reverse DTMF to open up other lines to call via Telefonica (0015) to Pakistan (92431881207) and (9243158780).
Comment: This is a call from a cell phone (part of a clandestine switch) in Brasil to Lebanon. The destination sent reverse DTMF to open up other lines to call via Telemar (0031) to Germany (49413142539, 4941142599) and Australia (61296420841). Then calls were routed through Embratel to French Guiana (5949425792).
1.
2.
Date / Time Origen-Brasil Intl Destination Dur (min)
Recent Examples of Fraud Trafficfrom a cellco using our network...
Comment: This is a call from a cell phone (part of a clandestine switch) in Brasil to Poland. The destination sent reverse DTMF to open up other lines to call via Embratel (0021) to Vietnam (84350848013).
3.20-10-03 10:20:49 1196000909 00xx48693269071 88.83
DTMF = <021842407408#>002184240674038#<**>***>002184350848013#<02184350848013#>002184350848013#<02184350848013#>***<***>111111<111111<0
• The losses for this Cellco in August of 2003 for NOT using our realtime fraud service are between 3 and 4 Million Reais (1.0 – 1.4 Million dollars).
Summary of Lessons Learned For Embratel
1. One secret to success in stopping fraud is to have good equipment (systems) and well trained analysts. (6 month ROI or less is entirely possible)
2. Realtime Detection (SS7 monitoring), DTMF detection, and Realtime Blocking, proved INVALUABLE in detection and halting of this Call-Sell fraud.
3. We knew that associated with telephone fraud was drug trafficking, arms dealing, but now also we understand that it is also associated with terrorism. KNOW YOUR CUSTOMERS!
4. Working cooperatively with the law enforcement can be beneficial to both parties. 5. You may win a battle and secure a product/service from fraud, but the war still goes on as the fraudster moves to another weakness in your network.
6. Sharing of fraud data and working cooperatively with your competitor truly helps both mutually and helps clean up the industry.
Interesting Reading on the Internet linking TERRORISM with telephone fraud:
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/11/07/inv.terror.south/
http://oglobo.globo.com/especiais/terror/1721902.htm
http://www.meib.org/articles/0201_l2.htm
http://epoca.globo.com/edic/20011022/especial1a.htm
English
Portuguese
Also other articles documenting individual cases are available. Email request to: [email protected]
clifford m. jordanmanager - fraud control and prevention
[email protected]@mci.com
55-21-2519-2032
http://www.terra.com.br/istoe/1675/internacional/ 1675_triplice_encrenca2.htm Italian
http://www.panorama.it/mondo/americhe/articolo/ix1-A020001020446/idpag1-1
