Disraeli, Derby and the Suez Canal, 1875:Some Myths Reassessed*
GEOFFREY HICKSUniversity of East Anglia
AbstractThis article reconsiders Britain’s Suez Canal share purchase of November 1875. By meansof close consideration of high politics and utilizing a range of overlooked sources, itproposes that a number of myths have arisen. It suggests that the role of the primeminister, Benjamin Disraeli, has been exaggerated in the existing historiography, as hasthe resistance of his foreign secretary, the fifteenth earl of Derby. This obscures cabinet-level debates in which there was a more sophisticated assessment of – and debate about– foreign policy objectives than has hitherto been presented. Accounts of the purchasehave also tended to see it as the first sign of a new policy, that of an extended Britishcommitment in Egypt. It is suggested here that such a commitment was, rather, theunintended consequence of a pragmatic policy. Instead, the intention was quite theopposite: to control and minimize British entanglements in the east.
The British government’s purchase of a 44 per cent stake in the SuezCanal Company in November 1875 was a dramatic act, with aloan hastily obtained for the purpose by the prime minister, Ben-
jamin Disraeli. ‘In many ways’, notes D. A. Farnie in his comprehensivehistory of the Canal, ‘the purchase seemed eminently characteristic ofDisraeli, who loved the calculated surprise, the hurried decision and theimmediate triumph’.1 Perhaps because of its drama, it has also generateda number of myths, not least about its leading actor. This account of thepurchase will reassess three aspects of the Suez affair. First, it will suggestthat the prevailing historiographical view of the purchase obscures theprocess by which the Canal shares were obtained, by exaggerating bothDisraeli’s role and the objections raised by his foreign secretary, thefifteenth earl of Derby. The purchase is regularly presented as Disraeli’sinitiative, taken against one, several or all of his cabinet colleagues.Implicitly or explicitly, what we might call the ‘Disraeli myth’ is thusperpetuated: that the prime minister embodied patriotism, creativity,
* I am grateful to the two anonymous readers for their very helpful comments.1 D. A. Farnie, East and West of Suez: the Suez Canal in History, 1854–1956 (Oxford, 1969)[hereafter Farnie, East and West of Suez], p. 236.
vision and decisiveness in foreign policy, as well as being its driving force.This distorts our picture of the government as a whole. Secondly, it willpropose that the events of late 1875 did demonstrate the growing tensionbetween the Conservatism exemplified by Derby, on the one hand, andDisraeli’s desire for a more active policy, on the other. This had nothingto do with Derby’s mythical opposition to the share purchase. He dif-fered from the prime minister over the handling of its consequences, adifference rather more revealing about the nature of policy. Finally, closeanalysis of these events also raises questions about the process of causa-tion. It demonstrates the weakness of the teleology underpinning thehistoriography, that the share purchase was the beginning of a newstrategy in the east – one that would lead both to Disraeli’s great successat the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and to ever deeper British commitmentin Egypt. While the share purchase marked a greater British commitmentin Egypt, it was the unintended consequence of an act designed to defendexisting British interests, not to pursue new ones. In the wake of thepurchase, moreover, the cabinet’s principal motivation was quite theopposite: to minimize British entanglements.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain had maintained a keeninterest in the Eastern Mediterranean, where there was a nexus of Britishinterests, strategic and commercial. In the post-Napoleonic period, therewas much European interest and investment in Egypt, nominally part ofthe Ottoman empire but ruled by its semi-autonomous pashas. Britain’srole there expanded after a trade treaty was signed in 1841. In the secondhalf of the nineteenth century, as the Ottoman empire struggled with evergreater internal pressures and Egypt pursued its own independent path,politically and industrially, European interests in Egypt grew. TheFrench, under Ferdinand de Lesseps, built the Suez Canal, completed in1869, while British finance and workers made a significant contributionto the development of Egyptian infrastructure. Increasingly, Britishnationals were employed in Egyptian service. At the same time, Britishimperial interests were more and more centred upon India. The easternMediterranean, with its Suez route to India, was a concern to Britishpoliticians and merchants as they watched the financial and politicaldecay of the Ottoman empire, which it had been British policy to upholdsince the 1830s. By the mid-1870s, there was a growing fear that Britainwas vulnerable to another power – probably France or Russia – obstruct-ing British access to the Canal or disrupting the waterway itself.2
In 1875, the financial position of the Ottoman empire and of Egyptitself forced the pace of events. During the Khedive Ismail’s reign, Egyp-tian debts increased dramatically. What had been a debt of around £3million in 1862 had, by 1875, risen to a sum in excess of £60 million, inaddition to the Khedive’s own personal debts of some £11 million.3 Most
2 For such fears, see, e.g., ibid., p. 238.3 Estimates vary as to the exact level of debt. For example, Richard A. Atkins puts it at £60 millionin funded debt in 1873, with another £20 million in unfunded debt added by 1875; Niall Ferguson
such debts were owed to British and French interests. It was the Turkishsituation, however, that acted as the catalyst for British intervention. Inearly October 1875, the Ottoman empire announced its bankruptcy,thereby undermining the Egyptian ability to borrow money.4 TheKhedive needed money, fast. On 15 November 1875, Frederick Green-wood, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, warned Lord Derby, foreignsecretary in Britain’s Conservative government, that the Khedive wasthinking of selling to the French the reversion of his 176,602 canal shares,equivalent to a 44 per cent interest in the Suez Canal Company.5 Laterthat day, according to Greenwood, there was a meeting between Derbyand the prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, to discuss the matter. WhenGreenwood called at the Foreign Office on 16 November, he found thata British bid for the shares was ‘as good as settled.’6 Derby then raised thequestion in cabinet on 17 November. After a series of cabinet meetings,it was agreed that the government would seek to obtain the shares. TheKhedive formally offered them for £4 million on 23 November andthe cabinet agreed to buy them the following day, with Rothschilds thebankers providing the money in the absence of parliament. From theprime minister’s point of view, as John Charmley has described, ‘it gaveBritain a stake in a vital artery of imperial trade and security, andsymbolised her determination to assert her interests in regions of theworld where they were under threat.’7
The purchase was handled with all Disraeli’s flair for a good story. Itpresented the opportunity to flatter Queen Victoria with the breathlessnews, regularly repeated by his biographers, that ‘you have it, Madam’;infinitely more exciting than ‘your Majesty’s government has purchasedthe reversion of 44 per cent of the shares’, as Derby might have put it.8
posits a figure of £76 million (Egyptian) in 1876, as well as the Khedive’s personal debt; while PeterCain suggests it was £68 million in 1879, at the end of the Khedive’s reign, with a short-term debt of£30 million. Whatever the precise figure, with debt repayments equivalent to about half of Egypt’sexpenditure, the situation was perceived as unsustainable. Richard A. Atkins, ‘The Conservativesand Egypt, 1875–80’ [hereafter Atkins, ‘Conservatives and Egypt’], Journal of Imperial and Com-monwealth History, ii (1974), 190–205, at p. 191; Niall Ferguson, The World’s Banker: The Historyof the House of Rothschild (1998) [hereafter Ferguson, World’s Banker], p. 818; P. J. Cain, ‘Characterand Imperialism: The British Financial Administration of Egypt, 1878–1914’ [hereafter Cain, ‘Char-acter and Imperialism’], Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, xxxiv (2006), 177–200, atp. 180.4 Ferguson puts the Ottoman bankruptcy announcement on 7 Oct., Millman the day before. Fer-guson, World’s Banker, p. 820; Richard Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question 1875–1878(Oxford, 1979), p. 27.5 A Selection from the Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826–93) betweenSeptember 1869 and March 1878, ed. John Vincent (1994) [hereafter Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary], 15Nov. 1875, p. 252.6 Frederick Greenwood to C. C. Osborne, 17 March 1900, Osborne Mss., British Library, AdditionalManuscripts [hereafter BL Add. Mss.] 46408, fo. 27.7 John Charmley, Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power, 1874–1914 (1999) [hereafterCharmley, Splendid Isolation?], p. 17.8 Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 24 Nov. 1875, G. E. Buckle (in succession to W. F. Monypenny), TheLife of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, v: 1868–1876 (1920) [hereafter Buckle, Disraeli],p. 448.
The obtaining of the loan itself was related in a vignette penned by MontyCorry, Disraeli’s private secretary, which had him haring off to theRothschilds at the prime minister’s behest.9 There, when he was asked forsecurity for the loan, after Lionel Rothschild nonchalantly popped ‘amuscatel grape’ in his mouth, Corry apparently offered ‘The BritishGovernment’ and the deal was done.10 Even Disraeli’s official biographerconceded that we ‘need not take as gospel the whole of this picturesquedetail’, which Niall Ferguson describes as ‘partly fantasy’.11 Whatever thedetails, the purchase was conducted at great speed and on the hoof. Inthis respect it was in the pragmatic tradition of British foreign policythroughout the nineteenth century. It has been suggested, however, thatit represented a more deliberate policy. Ferguson, for example, has pro-posed that the purchase of the shares ‘signalled a renewed British deter-mination to exert influence on the Eastern Question as a whole’.12 In themost recent account of the eastern crisis, Miloš Kovic has suggested thatDisraeli had an unfolding vision for a reordering of the east, of which theSuez purchase was evidence.13 Although Disraeli harboured vaguedesigns to address the Eastern Question, however, and by 1878 it wasclear that there would be a new settlement, the difference between thesigns of change as we view them retrospectively and the messy unplannedprocess of change itself is crucial. All roads in foreign policy did notnecessarily lead to 1878, any more than all roads thereafter led inevitablyto August 1914.
This teleology would not be so easy to sustain were it not for the overlydeterministic view of Disraeli’s role in the process that has dominated thehistoriography. It has established on Suez a dichotomy between thedynamic prime minister on the one hand and Derby (sometimes withthe rest of the cabinet) on the other. A persistent historiographical featureis the prime minister driving his unwilling and havering colleagues tosupport his purchase. As with so much of the Disraeli myth, this has itsroots in the case made by his six-volume official biography. The author ofvolume v, George Earle Buckle, suggested that the proposal to purchasethe Khedive’s shares was ‘naturally not at first welcomed by the cautiousDerby’.14 He also alleged that it is clear ‘from Disraeli’s reports to theQueen and from his private letters’ (hardly the most objective accounts)that ‘the initiative was his and the cabinet, though in the end unanimous,contained influential members who were reluctant to take such a very
9 Buckle, Disraeli, pp. 446–7. A detailed account of the Rothschilds’ role in the purchase may befound in: Lord Rothschild, ‘You Have It, Madam’: The Purchase, in 1875, of Suez Canal Shares byDisraeli and Baron Lionel de Rothschild (1980).10 Buckle, Disraeli, p. 447.11 Ibid.; Ferguson, World’s Banker, p. 821.12 Ferguson, World’s Banker, p. 826.13 Miloš Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question (Oxford, 2011) [hereafter Kovic, Disraeli and theEastern Question], pp. 94–5.14 Buckle, Disraeli, p. 439.
new departure.’15 Buckle’s version of Disraelian initiative has grown inthe telling. Seton-Watson described how Disraeli ‘at once grasped thesignificance of the whole affair’ and ‘induced a somewhat reluctantcabinet to accept his idea’.16 By the time Robert Blake retold the story inthe 1960s, Derby’s caution had become intransigence: ‘Derby’s instinct,as always when faced with a novel and unprecedented proposal, was tosay no.’17 Without offering any evidence at all, Blake turned Buckle’s‘reluctant’ cabinet into a resistant one: ‘Most of his colleagues, includingCairns, Derby and Northcote, were against him.’18 D. A. Farnie wasmore sceptical of this analysis, downgrading Disraeli’s role and notinghow, at the time, ‘journalists of repute . . . gave the credit not to Disraelibut to Derby’.19 Richard A. Atkins nevertheless recounted how ‘Disraeliand his colleagues (with the principal exception of Lord Derby, theforeign secretary) . . . welcomed the shares’ availability.’20 John Vincent’ssuggestion in 1994, that it was far from being ‘chiefly a Disraelian coup,as myth once had it’, seems to have gone unheeded.21 Niall Fergusonasserted that ‘Derby and the Chancellor Sir Stafford Northcote wereagainst accepting the offer, arguing that the canal should be controlled byan International Commission; but . . . Disraeli eventually prevailed.’22
Paul Smith described the matter as Disraeli’s ‘one striking personal ini-tiative’.23 More recently, the author of Greenwood’s entry in the OxfordDictionary of National Biography suggested that Derby was ‘notimpressed by Greenwood’s insistence that it was a vital British interestthat the canal should not be wholly French-owned’.24 Derby’s allegedestimation of national priorities ‘was shared by the rest of the cabinet, butDisraeli persuaded them otherwise’.25
Dramatic Disraelian initiative is the first element of myth-making overSuez that requires debunking. Such charisma may drive plots in novels ofthe kind in which Disraeli specialized, but it rarely drives the machineryof constitutional government. It is clear from the evidence now availablethat the decision to purchase the Khedive’s interest in the Suez CanalCompany was a collective one by the cabinet, who were consulted for-mally on six occasions in little over a week, in addition to separate
15 Ibid., p. 442.16 R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy andParty Politics (1935), 1962 edn., p. 26.17 Robert Blake, Disraeli (1966), p. 582.18 Ibid.19 Farnie, East and West of Suez, p. 236.20 Atkins, ‘Conservatives and Egypt’, 191.21 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, introduction, p. 21.22 Ferguson, World’s Banker, p. 821. Ferguson seems to have confused the decision to purchase theshares with later discussions about an international commission, for detailed consideration of whichsee below.23 Paul Smith, Disraeli (Cambridge, 1996), p. 197.24 A. J. A. Morris, ‘Frederick Greenwood’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [hereafterODNB], ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, 60 vols. (Oxford, 2004), xxiii. 623.25 Ibid.
consultation between Derby and Disraeli. ‘The cabinet’, as Parry hasnoted, ‘agreed on the importance of the British securing some stake.’26
The magnitude of the decision was such that no prime minister couldhave acted alone on the matter. As Professor Vincent has pointed out, itdemonstrates the ‘strength of cabinet government’.27 He has describedhow Derby’s record of meetings in his diary reveal that ‘no piece ofbusiness received closer attention in 1875.’28 Close examination ofDerby’s diary and that of the colonial secretary, the earl of Carnarvon,reveal that there were cabinet meetings discussing the canal question on17, 18, 22 (which Derby missed through illness), 23, 24 and 25 Novem-ber.29 By Victorian standards, that was a high level of consultation; bymodern standards, it would be an exceptional number. Even at the heightof the eastern crisis in 1877 and early 1878 there was not the samefrequency of meetings. The three key discussions were on 17, 22 and 24November: at the cabinet on 17 November it was agreed that Britainshould seek to obtain the shares; on 22 November Disraeli was autho-rized to obtain a loan from a bank in the absence of parliament; and on24 November a special meeting was called at which the final agreementwas secured to trump a French offer for the shares.
The account bequeathed to us, of Disraelian dominance over Derbyiteresistance, is at odds with what seems to have been the prosaic reality ofthese meetings. After minimal discussion, the cabinet was united in itspolicy: there was no dissent, it was not Disraeli’s decision nor his ‘strikingpersonal initiative’. On this there is unanimity in the surviving records.Disraeli’s own account noted that it was Derby who had ‘brought thematter before Cabinet’, though after the prime minister had persuadedhim of the necessity of the purchase, and ministers were ‘unanimous intheir decision, that the interest of the Khedive should, if possible, beobtained’.30 Derby was emphatic in his record of the meeting: ‘it wasagreed without dissent.’31 Carnarvon, too, noted how Derby had raisedthe matter, then ‘Disraeli put the question [as to] what we could do.’32
This was not the prime minister driving the reluctant cabinet, but theforeign secretary presenting the situation and the prime minister seekingthe views of his colleagues; a good example of cabinet government inaction. Then, Carnarvon recorded, ‘it was carried at once by a sort of
26 Jonathan Parry, ‘Benjamin Disraeli’, ODNB, xvi.287.27 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, introduction, p. 21.28 Ibid.29 Ferguson (World’s Banker, p. 821) excludes the first cabinet discussion in his account of thetransaction. Lord Rothschild suggests there was also a discussion in cabinet on 19 Nov., but thisderives from a misunderstanding about Disraeli’s letter to the queen of that date, in which he referredambiguously to the previous day’s cabinet. ‘You Have It, Madam’, pp. 15–17. Derby’s diary showsthat the discussion to which the Prime Minister referred was on 18 Nov. Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary,18 Nov. 1875, pp. 253–4.30 Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 18 Nov. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 443.31 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 17 Nov. 1875, p. 253.32 The Political Diaries of the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 1857–1890, ed. Peter Gordon [hereafterCarnarvon Diary] (Cambridge, 2009), 17 Nov. 1875, pp. 273–4.
whirlwind of argument that Derby would telegraph immediately to saythat we would buy if terms could be settled.’33 He was struck by thedegree of unanimity and lack of engagement: ‘There was no difference ofopinion though it should be said that Cairns [the Lord Chancellor],Salisbury [Secretary of State for India] and myself with Derby were theonly persons who said anything.’34 Gathorne Hardy, the secretary of statefor war, preoccupied with illness, evidently thought the whole business sounremarkable that he did not even discuss it in his own diary, though hemade a record of the meeting.35 The cabinet’s fourth diarist, the earl ofMalmesbury (the Lord Privy Seal), thought the purchase ‘desirable’ butwas more concerned about defence discussions.36 That is not to say therewere no reservations (Sir Stafford Northcote, the chancellor of the exche-quer, in particular, had many), nor is it to deny Disraeli’s role in obtain-ing the funds for the purchase, but the decision was a cabinet one andunanimous.
What, then, of the much-vaunted Derbyite resistance? Perhaps it is tothe meeting between Derby and Disraeli on 15 November that we mustlook for evidence of this. Exactly what transpired at the meeting isunclear. We only know it took place from Greenwood’s later account andby inference from Disraeli’s letters. Derby’s diary includes no record of it.After Greenwood had been to see him, he noted that ‘Mr Greenwood ofthe Pall Mall Gazette called with a story that the Khedive is going to sellhis share in the Suez canal to a French company, which I don’t believe,but telegraphed to Cairo to make sure.’37 The following day, his entrymerely recorded that Greenwood had been right: ‘The report of theKhedive wishing to sell his interest in the canal to a French companyappears to have some truth in it.’38 Of an encounter with his leader thereis no account. If the entry he has left is a guide to his thoughts, then it isunsurprising. Derby was always more interested in facts than sentiment,and seems on this occasion to have been convinced by them. The storyabout the sale was true, so he was persuaded of the necessity to buy. Itwas uncharacteristic of him to make no mention of the meeting withDisraeli, but perhaps it was because he thought it of little consequence.Disraeli did not. The prime minister believed (or, at least, he told thequeen, which by no means meant the same thing) that it was because hehad been so ‘decided and absolute with Lord Derby on this head, that heultimately adopted my views and brought the matter before the Cabi-net’.39 He maintained that Derby had been persuaded by the force of his
33 Ibid., p. 274.34 Ibid.35 18 Nov. 1875, The Diary of Gathorne Hardy, later Lord Cranbrook, 1866–1892: Political Selec-tions, ed. Nancy E. Johnson [hereafter Hardy Diary] (Oxford, 1981), p. 254. And see below.36 Unpublished political diary, 24 Nov. 1875, Hampshire Record Office, Malmesbury Papers 9M73/79.37 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 15 Nov. 1875, p. 252.38 Ibid., 16 Nov. 1875, p. 253.39 Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 18 Nov. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 443.
argument. On 25 November, after the loan to finance the purchase hadbeen agreed, Disraeli again told the queen that ‘at first Lord Derby hadbeen much against the plan.’40 Yet if Derby was ‘much against’ the plan,it seems odd that he left so little record of his objections, given theextensive lists of his views – one way or another – that he normallyproduced.
What seems more likely is that Derby behaved as any foreign secre-tary might have done when presented with news which seemed unlikelyand a proposition on the back of it that a very large amount of tax-payers’ money be disbursed: he checked the facts and he tested theproposal exhaustively. Here it is useful to examine the account left byFrederick Greenwood, the man who brought the news precipitating thepurchase. Twenty-five years later, in a series of letters to C. C. Osbornewhich seem never to have been used by historians, he recorded hisversion of the events in 1875.41 He claimed that ‘a little while before’ theevents of November 1875 he had ‘got the idea into my head’ thatBritain might purchase an interest in the canal, and then he heard that‘these shares, wh. I thought so good to get but so very unlikely, mightbe got.’42 He went to see Derby (not Disraeli), whom he thought ‘ofcourse the right person to go to’.43 According to Greenwood, when hesuggested a British purchase, the foreign secretary had ‘some strongreasons against it’, which Greenwood summarized for Osborne: ‘theimpossibility of the govt. buying shares in a commercial undertaking:no authority for that, no money for that, no precedent: & House ofCommons not sitting, to be asked for authority and cash. There wereother objections.’44 Greenwood recorded how he had ‘combated’ theseobjections ‘as best I could’.45 His account of Derby’s response soundsplausible, given the foreign secretary’s characteristic caution. Thereseems nothing in Derby’s reaction, as described by Greenwood, thatone would not expect of a level-headed minister. What was more, asGreenwood recalled, Derby agreed that the proposal ‘was then to belaid before Mr Disraeli, wh. was done by Lord Derby at once: I meanthe same morning.’46 There was no hesitation or stonewalling by theforeign secretary, and his diary records none either.
At Derby’s meeting with Disraeli, it seems very likely that he presentedthe same kind of reasoned objections to the prime minister as he had to
40 Disraeli’s words were recorded by Queen Victoria in her journal, 25 Nov. 1875, The Letters ofQueen Victoria, ed. G. E. Buckle, 2nd ser., 3 vols. (1926), ii. 428.41 This valuable source consists of three letters written by Greenwood, by this time seventy years old,on 17 March 1900, 20 March 1900 and 26 April 1900. They are preserved in the papers of CharlesChurchill Osborne, sometime secretary to Baroness Burdett-Coutts: Osborne Mss., BL Add. Mss.46408, fos. 26–30.42 Greenwood to Osborne, 17 March 1900, Osborne Mss., BL Add. Mss. 46408, fo. 26.43 Ibid.44 Ibid., fos. 26–7.45 Ibid., fo. 27.46 Ibid.
Greenwood. But if Derby had been as ‘much against’ the plan as thequeen later believed, one would have expected more evidence of hisobjections to have survived. Derby’s stubbornness in eastern matterswould lead to an irreparable split between the two men only two and ahalf years later, and it seems implausible that if Disraeli had been ‘sodecided and absolute with Lord Derby’ as he had suggested to the queen,Derby would meekly have subsided to the point where he became theprime minister’s mouthpiece in cabinet on 17 November. As the easterncrisis would demonstrate, the more ‘decided and absolute’ people becamewith Derby, the more obstructive he tended to become in turn. Given thestrength of Derby’s position in cabinet, he could easily have taken hisobjections to his colleagues and argued them with authority, as he didover another offer from the Khedive a few weeks later and over theAndrássy Memorandum in early 1876, in both cases getting his way. Wecan never know for certain what passed between the two men. It mayindeed be that Derby’s objections were squashed by the prime minister,that he was won round by reasoned argument, or that he never substan-tially disagreed in the first place and it suited Disraeli’s narrative to claima victory over the foreign secretary’s pusillanimity. The first explanationcertainly leant verisimilitude to the story of the Disraelian coup. Anotherpossibility is that Lady Derby may have helped persuade her husband,after being alerted by a family friend, Sir John Pender.47 What we can becertain of is that, if Derby had been sceptical, his scepticism passedunusually quickly and he was won round to the idea of purchasing theshares. What was more, unlike Northcote, he displayed no objection topossessing them thereafter. On 26 November he assured Disraeli that ‘theSuez business is likely to be popular. First impressions are everywhere inits favor [sic].’48
The exact manner in which Derby dealt with the question of the sharepurchase might not be of note, except regarding his own reputation, wereit not for the fact that the story of his resistance exaggerates Disraeli’sown role, distorting our picture of him and of the government’s foreignpolicy as a whole. Disraeli could never have taken such a dramaticinitiative without consulting the cabinet extensively and obtaining itssupport. He simply did not have the power to do so. The cabinet, whichlooked to Derby to initiate and guide discussion on foreign policy, wasunanimous in support of the line the foreign secretary advocated:
47 This was the suggestion made by Pender’s wife in a letter on 28 Nov. 1875: Hugh Barty-King, ‘SirJohn Pender’, Dictionary of Business Biography: A Biographical Dictionary of Business Leaders activein Britain, 1860–1980, ed. David J. Jeremy and Christine Shaw, 5 vols. (1984), iv. 612. The researchbeing undertaken by Jennifer Davey into Lady Derby’s role may reveal more about this. See, e.g.,John Charmley and Jennifer Davey, ‘The Invisible Politician: Mary Derby and the Eastern Crisis’,in On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800–1945, ed. John Fisher andAntony Best (Farnham, 2011), pp. 17–34. I am grateful to Professor A. C. Howe for alerting me tothe Pender reference.48 Derby to Disraeli, 26 Nov. 1875, Bodleian Library, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 238.
purchase of the shares. Moreover, Derby was in the moderate, pragmaticcentre of a cabinet that was, essentially, mid-Victorian and un-Disraelianin many of its characteristics.49
Cabinet involvement in the detail of diplomacy was minimal, as hadhabitually been the case in the nineteenth century. For example, if we areto believe Carnarvon’s diary, the only ministers who spoke at the cabinetmeeting on 17 November were the four men with most immediate respon-sibility for Britain’s fortunes in the east – the prime minister, foreignsecretary, colonial and India secretaries – and Lord Cairns, the lordchancellor.50 Even Northcote, who had strong private views on thesubject, seems not to have said much at the crucial meetings. Carnarvonwas perturbed by the lack of contributions, which he thought ‘suggests arather serious inference, by the way’.51 The inference one draws as ahistorian, however, is that the mid-Victorian pattern was being contin-ued.52 This was Conservative government before public opinion hadmeaningfully intruded on diplomacy and before cabinets would turn intocollections of armchair experts on foreign policy, with whom even thedominant third Marquis of Salisbury would have to contend by the turnof the century. Before the late nineteenth century, ministers in general,and Conservative cabinets in particular, showed little interest in the detailof foreign policy. There were occasional exceptions such as the Aberdeencoalition, with its quartet of ex-foreign secretaries, but foreign policyrarely excited interest.53 The nature of diplomacy meant that only theforeign secretary, the prime minister and the monarch were privy to itsinner workings; it was much more in the control of individuals than wasthe case with other departmental portfolios. In common with their pre-decessors in the 1850s and 1860s, Conservative politicians were at thisstage happy to let their leaders define policy and offer occasionalthoughts from the sidelines. Only from the autumn of 1876 onwards didthey begin to involve themselves more, as a combination of public cam-paigns and the collapse of the Derby–Disraeli relationship in 1877 threat-ened the break-up of the government, while Russian aggression playedon their nerves. The lack of involvement in 1875 was typical of mid-Victorian Conservative policy before it was superseded by high Victorianimperial concerns.
For those in the 1870s who did take an interest, their views on foreignpolicy owed much to the mid-Victorian Conservative inheritance. Tradi-tional Conservative policy inclined to non-interventionism, alongsideoccasional cooperation with other powers to ensure that problems were
49 For a discussion of Conservative foreign policy in the mid-Victorian period, see: Geoffrey Hicks,Peace, War and Party Politics: The Conservatives and Europe, 1846–59 (Manchester, 2007) [hereafterHicks, Peace, War and Party Politics], passim; Charmley, Splendid Isolation?, p. 23.50 Carnarvon Diary, 17 Nov. 1875, p. 274.51 Ibid.52 See e.g. Hicks, Peace, War and Party Politics, p. 16.53 See e.g. J. Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition 1852–1855 (Cambridge, 1968), passim.
neutralized.54 Its instinctive aloofness from European entanglements andits focus on the high seas that bore trade around and beyond Britainseemed to many all the wiser in the wake of the Crimean War, the traumaof which had helped define a generation. In this period, however, therewas a growing tension between those with a traditional Conservativemindset and those, like Disraeli, of a more active, interventionist bent.55
The period from 1874 to 1878 was a crucial one in the development of amore active policy, but it was a contested policy.56 Subsequent to theeastern crisis of 1878, when Disraeli’s policy triumphed and Derbyresigned in disgust, any alternative has been submerged beneath the jointDisraeli–Bismarck victory. The narrative of international politics in the1870s and 1880s is Bismarck’s; Disraeli, so the logic goes, played by therules of Bismarckian realpolitik and succeeded. The story of Britishforeign policy between 1874 and 1880 has become that of Disraeli’ssearch for prestige.57 Yet, in the management of foreign policy beforeDerby’s resignation in 1878, a different strategy was being pursued – onewhich can be seen in the aftermath of the purchase. Moreover, whereDisraeli was opposed, such opposition was by no means confined toDerby, though the 1878 denouement might indicate otherwise. Disraeli’scabinet was not particularly Disraelian, but motivated by a range ofother impulses. Conservative policy-makers in 1875 were, as they hadbeen for decades, predominantly moderate, cautious and non-interventionist.
At the opposite extreme to the prime minister, with his taste for thegrand gesture as exemplified by the Suez purchase, were those who weresuspicious of imperial expansion as a matter of course. Despite Derby’shistoriographical reputation for timidity, the foreign secretary did notbelong in this category. Sir Stafford Northcote’s reaction to the purchasebest demonstrates the suspicion of imperialism in the mid-Victorianmindset. A traditional Conservative wariness of commitment was evidentin his letter to Disraeli on 23 November 1875: ‘The end and object whichwe have in view is’, he reminded the prime minister, ‘to secure for our-selves an uninterrupted passage to the East. We don’t want exclusiveprivileges, and we don’t want territory.’58 Northcote’s instinct was toconciliate the other powers and at the same time internationalize theproblem of managing the waterway, with an arrangement ‘by which the
54 See, e.g., Angus Hawkins, ‘Derby Redivivus: Reflections on the Political Achievement of theFourteenth Earl of Derby’, in Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, 1820–1920: The Derbys andtheir World, ed. Geoffrey Hicks (Farnham, 2011) [hereafter Hicks (ed.), Conservatism and BritishForeign Policy], pp. 19–39, at 27–9. For a discussion of different traditions, see: John Charmley,‘Traditions of Conservative Foreign Policy’, ibid., pp. 215–28.55 See e.g. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?, pp. 15–23.56 See e.g. Bendor Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “Most Isolationist Foreign Secretary”: The Fifteenth Earland the Eastern Crisis 1876–1878’ [hereafter Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “Most Isolationist Foreign Sec-retary” ’], Hicks (ed.), Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, pp. 129–67.57 See, e.g., Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, p. 314; Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “Most IsolationistForeign Secretary” ’, p. 142.58 Northcote to Disraeli, 23 Nov. 1875, copy, Iddesleigh Mss., BL Add. Mss. 50017, fo. 108.
canal could be placed under the guardianship of all the powers’ andwhich would ‘provide for the execution of the works necessary for itsmaintenance in an efficient manner’.59 This was a typical ‘concert’mindset of the mid-Victorian era, inclined to cooperation and compro-mise in the tradition of Viscount Castlereagh and his disciple, the fourthearl of Aberdeen.60 As Chancellor, Northcote was also conscious of thedangers of financial commitments. His concern was shared by his deputy,W. H. Smith, the financial secretary to the treasury, a rising star whowould soon join the cabinet.61 When further opportunities for Britishcommitment emerged later in the year, Derby and the lord chancellor,Lord Cairns, explored the financial risks in some detail.62 Cairns sup-ported Derby and Northcote in resisting any British exposure to suchrisks.63 Conservative ministers exhibited the same desires that had moti-vated their predecessors: save money, maintain British commerce andavoid the antagonism of other powers or foreign entanglements.
Another example of the traditional Conservative mindset, though notat Northcote’s extreme, can be discerned in the reflections of the LordPrivy Seal, former foreign secretary Lord Malmesbury. The eternal veri-ties of Britain’s naval defences were far more important to him than thepurchase of the canal shares. In his diary entry for 24 November 1875,after noting the agreement over the canal, he recorded ‘a pressingdemand from Hunt [First Lord of the Admiralty] for 12 gunboats forChina’. This was refused ‘in an offhand manner. I tried for six’, hecomplained, ‘but not one member seems to care for the state of the navy& Derby tho’ F[oreign]. Sec[retary] less than any one’.64 Malmesbury hadlong been an advocate of a strong ‘blue-water’ defence policy and hadserved in the cabinet of 1858–9 that had sanctioned naval expansion inthe face of an increased French threat. His outrage was not entirelyreasonable; the previous day, the cabinet had discussed a memorandumby Hunt on the state of the navy and had already agreed to authorizebuilding six new gunboats six months ahead of schedule.65 Yet, for him,the naval weakness was worrying: ‘It is inconceivable unless they disbe-lieve the statements of the Admiralty. We are 10 ships short of our peaceestablish[men]t & the Cabinet will only give 2 gunboats & 6 sloops –therefore the deficit will increase yearly in effective men of war’. Malm-esbury had never much cared for the east, and, for him, the purchase of
59 Ibid.60 For a discussion of the ‘concert’ tradition, see e.g. Hicks, Peace, War and Party Politics, pp. 246–7.61 Smith would have preferred to have bought the Canal outright to avoid any commitment to anythird parties. See: Viscount Chilston, W. H. Smith (1965), p. 89. Northcote described Smith as ‘agood deal startled at the largeness of the Rothschild Commission’, Northcote to Disraeli, 24 Nov.1875, copy, Iddesleigh Mss., BL Add. Mss. 50017, fo. 121.62 See e.g. Derby to Cairns, 4 Dec. 1875 and 6 Dec. 1875, The National Archives [hereafter TNA],Cairns Mss., PRO 30/51, fos. 169 and 175.63 Derby to Disraeli, 2 Dec. 1875, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 249; Northcote to Carnarvon, 3 Dec.1875, Carnarvon Mss., BL Add. Mss. 60767, fo.46. See also detailed account below.64 Unpublished political diary, 24 Nov. 1875, Malmesbury Papers 9M73/79.65 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 23 Nov. 1875, p. 255.
the canal shares was an expensive sideshow given the naval deficiencies.‘Some day we must rue this [defence] policy’, he thought, ‘& at the samemeeting we borrow £4 000 000 to hold less than half the shares of theFrench Suez Canal Co – desirable in itself but not to be compared inimportance to having ships to guard our commerce & support ourforeign policy!’66 Although his argument was defeated in cabinet, it wasrepresentative of views that had characterized the Conservative party inthe mid-nineteenth century. For such men, the objective was to sustainBritish strength by maintaining the navy above all else.67
Derby was neither quite as worried as Northcote nor as distracted asMalmesbury. Nevertheless, in the medium to long term he was concernedabout limiting British liabilities in Egypt, and, more importantly in theshort term, he perceived a danger if the share purchase was treated insuch a way that it became divisive in international affairs. A persistentfeature of mid-Victorian Conservatism had been the difference betweenDisraeli, on the one hand, who had been prepared to risk provocativepolicies if they were more ‘active’, and his colleagues (usually led by ascion of the Stanley family) on the other, who represented party ortho-doxy and whose view of the European concert had always been moreconciliatory.68 This situation persisted in the 1870s, which is unsurprisinggiven that until 1878 Conservative foreign policy was still mid-Victorianin its characteristics and still controlled by a Stanley.
In the ‘concert’ tradition of Conservative policy, Derby worried aboutthe implications of the Suez purchase for Britain’s relationship with theother powers. In particular, he was taken aback by the force of publicopinion, which was enthusiastically in favour of the purchase. He wasconcerned about its power to antagonize others. It is worth quoting infull his diary entry for 29 November 1875, given the light it sheds uponhis subsequent handling of the issue and later tensions over policy:
So far as I can make out, the purchase is universally popular. I might sayeven more, it seems to have created a feeling of something like enthusiasmfar in excess of the real importance of the transaction. It is a completepolitical success: yet the very fact of its being so causes me some uneasiness:for it shows the intense desire for action abroad that pervades the publicmind, the impatience created by long diplomatic inactivity, and thestrength of a feeling which might under certain circumstances, take theform of a cry for war. It shows also what guess-work the management ofan English administration is. A few years ago, such a proceeding as thepurchase by the State of shares in a foreign company would have beenthought absurd, and the minister who proposed it ruined in publicopinion.69
66 Unpublished political diary, 24 Nov. 1875, Malmesbury Papers 9M73/79.67 Charmley regards such concerns as central to what he calls the ‘Country Party’ tradition in Britishforeign policy. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?, pp. 399–400.68 See: Hicks, Peace, War and Party Politics, passim.69 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 29 Nov. 1875, p. 257.
Derby was caught out, not for the last time, by the way in which thepublic mood had swung away from the non-interventionist certainties ofthe 1860s. As a young man, he had been deeply affected by the experienceof the Crimean War.70 His reluctance to commit Britain to an activeforeign policy owed much to that experience, but he had underestimatedthe extent to which the pendulum could swing the other way.
Nevertheless, the foreign secretary was determined to operate wher-ever possible to restrain popular belligerence in the pursuit of peace andthus the security of British interests overseas. Kovic has claimed that inthe relationship between the two men, Disraeli ‘dominated both as theprime minister and as the older, protectively disposed friend, as well asthe stronger personality’.71 As Kovic himself describes, however, Derbywas quite determined and able to resist the prime minister when hethought Disraeli was endangering British interests with aggressive pos-turing, even within weeks of the Suez decision.72 Disraeli had neither themastery of detail nor of his cabinet to dominate, at least until Salisburywas won over to his side in December 1877. As the man in day-to-daycharge of policy, what Derby sought to do was what his father had donein the 1850s and 1860s: keep relations on an even keel with all theEuropean powers while avoiding British over-extension. In the queen’ssummary of Derby’s attitude, he therefore ‘tried to pour as much coldwater as he could on the great success of the affair’, which was a goodmetaphor for Derby’s approach to the aftermath of the purchase.73 It is inthe tension thereby generated that we may perceive the differences thatwould flare up with such explosive force in 1877–8.
One way in which Derby and others sought to ensure that the sharespurchase would neither antagonize other powers nor unduly embroilBritain was by exploring the possibility of an international commission tomanage the Canal. This proposal seems to have emerged in the discus-sions subsequent to the purchase itself, and was to be left hanging for thepowers to accept if they wished. Northcote and Derby were its principalsponsors in cabinet, with Northcote the more enthusiastic. For Derby, itssymbolism as a peace offering was its real virtue, even if it did not cometo pass. Others were unconvinced of the utility of either making the offerin principle or creating any commission in practice. Carnarvon raised thematter with Disraeli on 29 November, voicing what would doubtlesshave been a popular objection: ‘People here will I think be inclined to saythat we are frightened at our own boldness and that having secured anational point of vantage we are imperilling it for a theoretical andcosmopolitan object.’74 Evidently agitated, he wrote to Derby, too,
70 Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “Most Isolationist Foreign Secretary” ’, p. 132.71 Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, p. 83.72 Over the Andrássy Note in January 1876. Ibid., pp. 98–100.73 Queen Victoria to Disraeli, 3 Dec. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 452.74 Carnarvon to Disraeli, 29 Nov. 1875, copy, TNA, Carnarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/11, fo. 49 (thebulk of the Carnarvon Mss. are in the British Library, but there is a small collection of politicalpapers in The National Archives).
warning him that ministers needed to ‘consider well before we commitourselves to any such an offer’.75 Disraeli, as he explained to the Queen,‘felt the shock’ of Derby’s ‘cold water’ and ‘endeavoured to guard againstit’ by forwarding Carnarvon’s objections to Derby.76 Derby told Carnar-von in no uncertain terms that: ‘I don’t agree in your view about thecanal.’ He reminded Carnarvon that ‘we disclaim the idea of acquiringexclusive rights, and only insist that nobody else shall have them to ourdisadvantage.’ He suggested that the Suez Canal ‘ought not, in thecommon interest, to be in the hands of any one Power’. He accepted thatCarnarvon’s was ‘no doubt the more “spirited” and would be the morepopular opinion: but England is not all Europe: and even in the days ofBismarck I believe in justice.’ In any case, he pointed out that ‘publiclyand privately I have expressed the opinion which you deprecate.’ He hadalready outlined in parliament the case for an international authority andhe reminded Carnarvon that he had not ‘put forward the idea of acommission’, but rather intimated ‘readiness to accept it if desired byothers’.77 The following day, with Derby’s acquiescence, The Times pub-lished a letter from the Comte d’Harcourt, the French ambassador inLondon, to the Duc Decazes, the French foreign minister, in whichDerby was quoted as saying that he ‘would not oppose any arrangementwhich would place the Suez Canal under the management of an interna-tional syndicate’.78
Then cold water was poured on the prime minister too. Disraeli gota summarized and sharper version than Carnarvon: Derby told him itwas ‘useless now to discuss the point’ since his discussion with theFrench on the matter was already in the public domain.79 This was nota foreign secretary so completely dominated by his leader that hemeekly caved in, but neither was it one who endangered British inter-ests. His intention, as he had explained to Carnarvon and Disraeli, wasto ensure that Britain met its strategic and commercial needs, which theshare purchase had done, but then to act within the reasonable boundsof justice by declaring no interest in obtaining sole control over theCanal or over Egypt itself. A few weeks later, in a speech at the Edin-burgh Corn Exchange, he made a point of declaring that ‘we seek noexclusion, no monopoly, only a secure passage for ourselves, and thesame security we are willing that all the world should enjoy.’80 To goagainst the popular tide in this way, Farnie notes, ‘required consider-able moral courage’.81 As Derby’s diary had made clear, he did not
75 Carnarvon to Derby, 1 Dec. 1875, copy, TNA, Carnarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/8, fo. 42.76 Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 5 Dec. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 453; Disraeli to Derby, 2 Dec. 1875,Liverpool Record Office, Derby Papers, 920 DER (15) 16/2/1.77 Derby to Carnarvon, 2 Dec. 1875, TNA, Carnarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/8, fo. 43.78 D’Harcourt to Decazes, 27 Nov. 1875, The Times, 3 Dec. 1875.79 Derby to Disraeli, 3 Dec. 1875, Dep. Hughenden, 112/2, fo.261.80 Speech to Conservative working men at Edinburgh Corn Exchange, 17 Dec. 1875, The Times, 18Dec. 1875.81 Farnie, East and West of Suez, p. 245.
want the popular mood to damage relations with other powers. Giventhat a revolt against Ottoman rule in the Balkans had been growingsince the summer and would require a multilateral solution, this musthave seemed a sensible precaution. The international commission cameto nothing; but nothing suggests he expected it to succeed.82 The pointof the offer was not whether or not it was accepted, but its implicitrecognition of the importance of tone in diplomacy and the rejection ofBismarckian methods. It maintained the style of foreign policy pursuedby his Conservative predecessors. It may also have been a belatedattempt to assert some control over foreign policy in the wake of Dis-raelian posturing over Suez.
For Derby, the real purpose of offering an international commissionwas to keep the French sweet. France was the only other power withsignificant interests in Egypt, and was hugely sensitive about Britishinterference there. As Carnarvon appreciated, ‘France alone will be reallyirritated at our recent move.’83 The French had, effectively, been isolatedsince 1871. Given that Anglo-French relations were amicable in the wakeof Russo-British support for France during the ‘War-in-Sight’ crisis a fewmonths earlier, there seemed little point in antagonizing Britain’s nearestneighbour and colonial rival.84 Moreover, Derby knew full well thatGermany would welcome any division between Britain and France. Henoted how Count von Münster, the German ambassador in London, was‘much delighted with the Suez transaction, chiefly because of the annoy-ance which he thinks it will give in France’.85 Sure enough, a few weekslater, in a letter reproduced by Buckle, Corry conveyed a warning fromMünster to beware that ‘the game of the [Liberal] front bench opposite’would be to represent the purchase ‘at Lord D[erby]’s valuation’.86
Buckle presumably quoted this as evidence of foreign approval of Dis-raeli’s methods, but it was a transparent attempt to persuade him toneutralize Derby’s emollient language and keep Anglo-French tensionsimmering. Edgar Feuchtwanger has suggested of Disraeli that, if ‘onecan detect any continuous thread in his vision of foreign policy, it is hisfaith that a good understanding with France should be its cornerstone.’87
82 The note at the bottom of his letter to Carnarvon on 2 Dec. suggested quite the reverse: ‘I do notpropose to put forward the idea of a commission – the French would probably not listen to it: butonly to intimate readiness to accept it if desired by others.’ Derby to Carnarvon, 2 Dec. 1875, TNA,Carnarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/8, fo. 43.83 Carnarvon to Disraeli, 29 Nov. 1875, copy, TNA, Carnarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/11, fo. 49.84 For details of ‘War-in-Sight’, see, e.g., T. G. Otte, ‘ “Only wants quiet riding”?: Disraeli, theFifteenth Earl of Derby and the “War-in-Sight Crisis” ’, in Hicks (ed.), Conservatism and BritishForeign Policy, pp. 99–127. See also Bendor Grosvenor’s rather different account of that crisis:‘Britain’s “Most Isolationist Foreign Secretary” ’, pp. 135–8.85 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 27 Nov. 1875, p. 257.86 Corry to Disraeli, 29 Dec. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 456.87 Edgar Feuchtwanger, ‘ “Jew Feelings” and Realpolitik: Disraeli and the Making of Foreign andImperial Policy’, in Disraeli’s Jewishness, ed. Todd M. Endelman and Tony Kushner (2002), p. 191.Others have made similar claims, but the evidence for Disraeli’s francophilia seems thin.
Over Suez, however, the prime minister extended his Francophilia notmuch further than gleefully telling the queen how France had been ‘out-generaled’.88
Disraeli’s colleagues had a greater concern for French amour proprethan the prime minister. Northcote was concerned lest the government‘do anything needlessly to arouse the jealousy of the French’, while inDerby’s view, France ‘would accept any policy, or act with any ally,rather than appear to be shut out: provided France can appear to haveregained some of her influence in Europe, they care little for the rest.’89
Accordingly, even before the deal was settled on the shares, Paris wasinformed by its London embassy on 20 November that Derby had raisedthe possibility of the international commission.90 He followed that up bymeeting with Harcourt on 27 November, the import of which discussionwas made public, along with the letter of 20 November, in The Times on3 December. Derby explained to the prime minister the importance ofhaving ‘mollified’ Harcourt ‘by way of showing that nothing againstFrench interests is intended’.91 As Northcote had warned Disraeli a fewdays earlier, ‘Suspicion will be excited that we mean quietly to buyourselves into a preponderating position, and then turn the whole thing[the Canal] into an English property. I don’t like it.’92 It was clear that theFrench would not like it either, and effort was therefore expended oncalming their fears. Derby’s caution would prove amply justified in the1880s, when Anglo-French relations were ruined for two decades overEgypt, but Disraeli neither welcomed nor appreciated Derby’s ‘coldwater’ peacemaking.
At the same time, in a development ignored by Disraeli’s biographers,further entanglement in Egypt was pre-empted by a troika of cabinetministers. On 2 December, news arrived that the Khedive was preparingto ‘part with his right to 15 per cent on all profits over 5 per cent’, for afurther £2 million, which he maintained the French were ready to offer.93
Derby thought that was ‘a very shadowy kind of property’ and suspectedthe Khedive was playing France and Britain off against one another.94
This time, he made sure the prime minister would be deflected beforeBritain was embroiled too deeply. Whether or not Disraeli would haveseized the bait being offered, ministers were taking no chances. Derbymet with Northcote and Cairns, and they agreed that the offer must bedeclined.95 Northcote told Carnarvon that he doubted whether theFrench really were prepared to buy, but would not care if they did in the
88 Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 24 Nov. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 448.89 Northcote to Carnarvon, 3 Dec. 1875, Carnarvon Mss., BL Add. Mss. 60767, fo. 46; Vincent (ed.),Derby Diary, 22 Nov. 1875, p. 255.90 Gavard to Decazes, 20 Nov. 1875, The Times, 3 Dec. 1875.91 Derby to Disraeli, 30 Nov. 1875, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 242.92 Northcote to Disraeli, 26 Nov. 1875, copy, Iddesleigh Mss., BL Add. Mss. 50017, fo. 130.93 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 2 Dec. 1875, p. 257.94 Ibid.95 Ibid., pp. 257–8.
wake of a British refusal, the key point being that Britain would ‘insist onthe Khédive’s not parting with his reversion, which is a territorial right,or with his right of being represented on the administration of the com-pany’.96 Disraeli was duly warned by Derby, representing Northcote andCairns, that ‘it would not be desirable to bid against the French’, not leastbecause ‘it would look as if we wanted exclusive possession of the canalwhich is just what we have always disclaimed.’97 The prime ministeragreed that a bid was unwise, though on the grounds that the Khedive‘had no right’ to make new arrangements as he had agreed to a Britishmission to examine his finances.98
The difference was subtle, but important: not for the last time, Dis-raeli’s objections were on the grounds of an affront to British prestige,whereas his ministers objected on the grounds of practicality and diplo-matic inexpediency. It seems unlikely that even Disraeli would haveagreed to another purchase so soon after the first, but it is interesting thatministers were concerned about his quixotic tendencies, and that histo-rians have chosen to ignore these exchanges in December, just as theyhave ignored Derby’s dismissal of objections to an international commis-sion. If these exchanges were included, they might contradict the mythconstructed by Disraeli himself. The prime minister did not have mattersall his own way in foreign policy; his ministers were quite able anddetermined to resist him if necessary. Neither was this a meek concessionto French pride or an abandonment of British interests. When, in lateDecember, it seemed as if the French were about to make a bid for theprofits as per the rumours earlier in the month, Derby sent a shot acrossthe Khedive’s bows, ordering that he be warned against ‘taking twomillions at nine per cent interest and thus burdening his revenue for yearsto come. He sh[oul]d rather seek by better administration to economisehis resources.’99 The Khedive got the message: four days later, the newsarrived that he had agreed not to sell the profit rights, but would insteadmortgage them for a ‘limited period’ as security for a new loan.100
Having tried to minimize the damage to international relations in thewake of the purchase and having prevented incurring further economicliabilities, ministers were keen to ensure that Britain was exposed to aslittle financial risk as possible. From the cabinet’s point of view, theappointment of an adviser to help remedy the Khedive’s financial diffi-culties was therefore essential if Britain was to avoid being dragged intoa politico-diplomatic quagmire. Disraeli suggested that ‘there ought to be
96 Northcote to Carnarvon, 3 Dec. 1875, Carnarvon Mss., BL Add. Mss. 60767, fos. 46–7. Lang’s‘tombstone’ biography of Northcote, quoting the same letter, confuses this later proposal with theinitial purchase. Andrew Lang, Life, Letters and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, First Earl ofIddesleigh, 2 vols. (1890), ii. 85.97 Derby to Disraeli, 2 Dec. 1875, Dep. Hughenden 112/2, fo. 249.98 Disraeli to Derby, 3 Dec. 1875, Derby Papers, 920 DER (15) 16/2/1.99 Derby to Cave, telegram, 24 Dec. 1875, TNA, FO 78/2538, no. 7.100 Cave to Derby, telegram, 28 Dec. 1875, TNA, FO 78/2538.
no delay in the appointment of some one’.101 The discussion about who toappoint as the Khedive’s adviser was revealing about the contrastbetween Derby’s and Disraeli’s political instincts. Derby proposed for therole Robert Lowe, the Liberal former chancellor of the exchequer andhome secretary. There would have been three advantages to appointingLowe. As Derby pointed out, after Lowe’s work on the Loans Commit-tee, he ‘would be popular in the City’. Derby was also alive to the politicaladvantage that such an appointment ‘would to some extent identify apossible critic of our policy with that policy’.102 The third, implicit,advantage was that the appointment of a Liberal former chancellorwould increase the weight of Lowe’s findings and enhance cross-partysupport for the purchase. Derby’s instincts were always political, thoughnot necessarily in a narrowly party sense.
Disraeli, though, was persuaded by Northcote’s alternative suggestionof Stephen Cave, the paymaster-general.103 He told Derby that he couldnot ‘approve of the employment of Mr. Lowe, and for this, amongothers, main reason [sic]. Throughout life, he has quarrelled with every-body. We want a calm conciliatory spirit to deal with Egypt; not tooppose their first impressions and suggestions, but to correct, andchange, them, in due time.’104 Disraeli was less forgiving of enemies thanDerby. His contempt for opponents would cost the government dearly inthe court of public opinion in the early stages of the eastern crisis of1876–8 and it may also have done in this case. It is likely that the moresenior, able and experienced Lowe would have been better able to dealwith the Khedive’s finances than Cave, whose limited qualificationsincluded the fact that he ‘likes a warm climate’.105 Nevertheless, it wasCave who went, and the way in which his mission ended also demon-strated the cabinet’s nervousness about becoming too embroiled ineastern affairs. When Cave appeared to be going beyond his remit, thecabinet became worried, as Derby recorded on 26 January 1876: ‘It isclear that he has gone beyond his instructions, and is mixing himself upmore than might be wished with the plans of speculators who are tryingto make a good thing out of the Khedive’s difficulties.’ Consequently, henoted, ‘on the whole we were all agreed that his return was desirable.’106
Hardy, already ‘somewhat disturbed’ by Cave’s behaviour, put it moreabruptly: ‘we discussed Egypt whence we thought Cave had better returnat once and telegraphed accordingly.’107
While the discourse of British officialdom later presented the conditionof Egyptian finances as the justification for British imperialism in the
101 Disraeli to Derby, 26 Nov. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 454.102 Derby to Northcote, 24 Nov. 1875, Iddesleigh Mss., BL Add. Mss. 50022, fo. 119.103 Published accounts of Cave’s career are limited, but there is much useful information in: G. C.Boase, rev. H. C. G. Matthew, ‘Stephen Cave’, ODNB, x. 602.104 Disraeli to Derby, 26 Nov. 1875, Buckle, Disraeli, p. 454.105 Northcote to Disraeli, 23 Nov. 1875, copy, Iddesleigh Mss., BL Add. Mss. 50017, fo. 108.106 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 26 Jan. 1875, pp. 273–4.107 25 Jan. 1875 and 27 Jan. 1875, Johnson (ed.), Hardy Diary, pp. 259 and 260.
region, in 1875 British politicians required a reform of Egyptian financefor precisely the opposite reason: to ensure that Britain was not undulyentangled there.108 Northcote had warned the prime minister that thecabinet did not ‘want to mix ourselves up more than is inevitable with themaintenance of Egypt or of Turkey, or to make ourselves responsible fortheir proceedings’.109 While Disraeli might take no notice of Northcote’sprotest about the share purchase itself, in accepting the necessity for amission to assist the Khedive and the appointment of Cave, he haddemonstrated how seriously he took such warnings. There was no grandplan for the domination or improvement of Egypt. Peter Cain hasdescribed the way in which, as British interference in Egypt increased inthe late nineteenth century, ‘in the eyes of British officials there’, thefinancial crisis was ‘fundamentally a moral one’.110 A resolution of thatmoral crisis, in the eyes of contemporaries, was a precondition to pro-viding political liberties. This had certainly become accepted wisdomwithin a decade. Lord Cromer, for many years de facto ruler of Egypt,would later write of the necessity of preventing a return to ‘the evils ofextreme personal government’ in the country.111 Reflecting on his expe-riences in 1913, he explained how Egyptian autonomy would have beenquite impossible, first and foremost because ‘it would have been quitepremature even to think of’ autonomy ‘until the long struggle againstbankruptcy had been fought and won’, and there were certainly those inthe 1870s who had already spotted an opportunity to effect a greaterreform of Egypt.112 With the purchase of the canal shares, The Times sawthe chance not merely ‘to arrest the financial mismanagement of theProvince’ but to ‘introduce order and economy, to husband its resources,and to elevate its submissive and oppressed population’.113 For mostcontemporaries in 1875, however, these were not the motivations.
The purchase was essentially a defensive act. Cain and Hopkins havesuggested that in the years following the purchase, ‘Britain adopted amuch more assertive policy towards Egypt than [the historians] Robinsonand Gallagher allowed.’114 This was not the case in 1875 and early 1876.The purchase itself was an act borne of fear for British interests. AsDerby conceded, though he was normally suspicious of commitment, ‘wecould not allow nearly half the shares to pass to a French company.’115
Disraeli related to Lady Bradford, in typically exaggerated fashion, theroot of British concerns had Lesseps succeeded in his bid: ‘the whole of
108 For the view of British officialdom, see e.g. Cain, ‘Character and Imperialism’, 181–2.109 Northcote to Disraeli, 23 Nov. 1875, copy, Iddesleigh Mss., BL Add. Mss. 50017, fo. 108.110 Cain, ‘Character and Imperialism’, 182.111 Earl of Cromer, ‘The Capitulations in Egypt’, Political and Literary Essays, 1908–1913 (1913), p.162.112 Ibid., p. 160.113 The Times, 26 Nov. 1875.114 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914 (1993),p. 365.115 Vincent (ed.), Derby Diary, 17 Nov. 1875, p. 253.
the Suez Canal would have belonged to France, and they might have shutit up!’116 The image was fanciful, but the fear was palpable: here was aconcern for economic virility that would increasingly affect British nervesin the late nineteenth century. Greenwood’s Pall Mall Gazette, despite itsbullishness in the matter, set out the case for intervention in defensiveterms: ‘Recent events and recent rumours . . . have shown that at any daywe might find ourselves in the midst of European complications, andconfronted by the immediate necessity of securing our route to India atany cost and in any way.’ It suggested that for other powers, the sharepurchase ‘ought to be reassuring, both as marking, in a way too plain tobe mistaken, the limits of our policy with regard to Egypt, and as testi-fying to our desire to pursue that policy in the most straightforward andpeaceable way’.117 This was perhaps wishful thinking, but it displayed apre-imperial touch of nerves. The Times, despite its moral uplift, alsolinked the purchase with British fears about the Ottoman empire: ‘It isimpossible to separate in our thoughts the purchase of the Suez Canalfrom the question of England’s future relations with Egypt, or the destinyof Egypt from the shadows that darken the Turkish Empire.’ The leader-writer acknowledged the defensive nature of policy: ‘There is an impres-sion that the last few weeks have been a period of anxiety in officialcircles . . . The world . . . will fancy it discerns the apprehensions of thestatesman in the transaction so suddenly completed.’118 Although publicopinion rejoiced in the coup, it was partly fuelled by relief at Britishboldness in the face of apparent danger.
Strategy was improvised amidst such apprehensiveness, in the tradi-tion of British foreign policy. There had been no change in policy and nosystematic assertion of British influence. British policy in the east was nodifferent in 1875 from what it had been for nearly fifty years: to prop upthe Turkish empire and prevent any other power from gaining predomi-nance in Turkish dominions. The purchase of the canal shares helpedachieve the latter objective. This was nothing new, and neither was it theintention of the government to exert influence in any way different fromnormal. Disraeli, of course, had notions of resolving the Eastern Ques-tion. In the wake of the Porte’s bankruptcy, he famously told LadyBradford that ‘I really believe “the Eastern Question” that has hauntedEurope for a century, and which I thought the Crimean War hadadjourned for half another, will fall to my lot to encounter – dare I say –to settle?’119 It is customary to begin accounts of Disraeli’s involvement inthe east with this comment, but here it seems appropriate to concludewith it instead. Disraeli’s romantic scribblings were not policies. The
116 Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 25 Nov. 1875, The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and LadyChesterfield, ed. Marquis of Zetland, 2 vols. (1929) [hereafter Zetland (ed.), Letters of Disraeli], i.305.117 Pall Mall Gazette, 26 Nov. 1875.118 The Times, 26 Nov. 1875.119 Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 3 Nov. 1875, Zetland (ed.), Letters of Disraeli, i. 298.
British commitment in Egypt would deepen by the year, while in 1878 theprime minister would indeed attempt to resolve the Eastern Question, butthe hasty purchase of the Suez Canal shares was a piece of ad hoc,mid-Victorian policy-making. It takes on a symbolic value only in hind-sight and with the burnishing of the Disraeli myth. Later events havegiven to the events of 1875–8 a coherence they did not possess and shouldnot retrospectively be accorded.
Deconstructing the Disraeli myth is a far greater task than one articlecan hope to achieve, but it is clear that the assumptions made aboutforeign policy in this period need to be revisited. While the prime minis-ter’s role in obtaining the finance for purchasing the Suez shares is clear,his initiative in the matter seems rather less dramatic when the prosaicbusiness of government is examined. Neither did Disraeli triumph over arecalcitrant cabinet; on the contrary, his colleagues (Northcote’s silentdisapproval aside) were entirely in accord with the decision, in a discus-sion prompted by Derby. If there was resistance from the foreign secre-tary, the surviving evidence does not support Disraeli’s claims as to itsextent. It seems to have been an assessment of the kind one would expectof a responsible minister. Thereafter, in developments overlooked in theexisting historiography, Derby and key colleagues resisted furtherentanglement and attempted to limit any damage to relations with otherpowers. This approach was entirely in keeping with a mid-VictorianConservatism which sought to avoid unnecessary commitments abroadand to act in concert with other European powers, rather than precipitateconfrontation with them. Derby and Northcote, in particular, withothers to a lesser degree, were keen to minimize financial risk. Derby wasfar more conscious of Anglo-French tensions than was his leader, despiteDisraeli’s reputed francophilia. He was also keen to manage the impactof public opinion upon diplomacy in as careful a manner as possible – aninstinct which would prove useful in the early stages of the eastern crisis,unlike Disraeli’s contempt for the popular mood. The conflict betweenDisraeli’s desire for activity and Derby’s phlegmatic diplomacy was amanifestation of a deeper-seated tension. It would be much more severelyfelt by 1878, when Disraeli would be victorious against the Derbyitecaution that had previously carried the day in a party suspicious of theprime minister’s energy. Finally, the strategy that emerged over the nextdecades, of greater and greater commitment in Egypt, was quite theopposite of that intended by the cabinet in their defensive act of Novem-ber 1875. Ironically, in the wake of the Egyptian occupation of 1882, itwould be Derby who would have to take the helm at the Colonial Officeunder Disraeli’s old nemesis, Gladstone, but by then Disraelian activityhad taken Britain in very different directions from the Derbyite policiesof the mid-Victorian era.120
120 See e.g. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?, pp. 145–51, 183–90.
