Deliverable: D10.6 Version: V1.0 Date: 2020-10-13 Page 1 (47) UNCLASSIFIED 1 UNCLASSIFIED Enhanced Neutralisation of explosive Threats Reaching Across the Plot Deliverable D10.6: Final workshop report Dissemination level: Unclassified CO Version: V1.0 Date: 2020-10-13 1 UNCLASSIFIED is equal to CONFIDENTIAL (within EU but are not classified as EU-CONFIDENTIAL) or CUI This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 740560. Project coordinator: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI designation no.: FOI-2016-171 UTRIKESSEKRETESS Enligt 15 kap. 1 § OSL (2009:400) SÄKERHETSSKYDDS- KLASSIFICERAD 2020-11-25 Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI
Transcript
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Enhanced Neutralisation of explosive
Threats Reaching Across the Plot
Deliverable D10.6:
Final workshop report
Dissemination level: Unclassified CO
Version: V1.0
Date: 2020-10-13
1 UNCLASSIFIED is equal to CONFIDENTIAL (within EU but are not classified as EU-CONFIDENTIAL) or CUI
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 740560.
Project coordinator: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
FOI designation no.: FOI-2016-171
UTRIKESSEKRETESS Enligt 15 kap. 1 § OSL (2009:400)
SÄKERHETSSKYDDS-
KLASSIFICERAD
2020-11-25
Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI
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Author
Partner First name Last Name
ENEA Roberto Chirico
Contributors
Partner First name Last Name
FOI Hans Önnerud
CBRNE Stephen Swain
Home Office Hemant Desai
INTA Óscar González Espasandín
FOI Sara Wallin
Fraunhofer Daniel Lückerath
TNO Oscar van der Jagt
TNO Jaap de Ruiter
FFI Rune Lausund
KEMEA Ioannis Daniilidis
CBRNE Irina Marsh
CBRNE Nigel Hale
CBRNE Dominic Kelly
FIOD (SPB member) Ruud Leeuwendaal
CBRNE Lindsay Clutterbuck
TNO Martijn Koolloos
UC3M Henar Miguélez
UC3M José Loya
NFI Mattijs Koeberg
Version no.
Date Released by Comments Document version
V1.0 2020-10-13 ENEA First version delivered Final
Delivery Date:
M42 (October-2020)
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Summary This document is developed as part of the ENTRAP project, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program, under the Grant Agreement number 740560.
The final Workshop report corresponds to Deliverable 10.6 of Work Package 10 (WP10) – Exploitation and dissemination.
The final ENTRAP Workshop held the 6th of October, 2020, organised in the form of a videoconference, successfully brought all major players of the ENTRAP project, the partners and the Stakeholders and Practitioners Board members, together.
The final Workshop was an opportunity for the ENTRAP partners to present the main unclassified outcomes of the project.
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................................. 4
2. About ENTRAP ........................................................................................................................................... 7
3.6. Gap analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 13
4.1. Vision paper ..................................................................................................................................... 19
Appendix A. Agenda ..................................................................................................................................... 22
Appendix B. List of participants ................................................................................................................... 23
Appendix C. Presentations ........................................................................................................................... 24
1. Introduction ENTRAP aimed to create step-change for the development and deployment of new IED prevention tools and techniques. Strategies for impartial assessments of existing and emerging counter-tools different in different IED related scenarios are developed. The purpose was to support practitioners that protect society from, and respond to, incidents involving IED threats. Structure and framework To structure terrorist plots which involve the use of IEDs, a scenario structure with identified key activities was developed. The project made assessments based on selected historical plots, as well as potential future scenarios and trends in emerging explosive threats.
Capabilities required to counter these plots were divided into four capability domains: Prevent, Detect, React, and Mitigate. A detailed capability hierarchy was developed to identify and structure counter terrorism capabilities.
Information on more than 450 existing and emerging counter-tools was collected. The information was compiled and collected in a database and connected to the capability hierarchy, such that it supports further assessment. Effectiveness assessments Among existing and emerging counter-tools some are more effective than others, in the light of different attack scenarios. In ENTRAP assessments were based on Operational research methods and effectiveness was evaluated in iterative actions with increasing level of detail and focus. One assessment method uses evaluation through serious gaming. For the game a Red team (‘Terrorists’) and a Blue team (Counter-terrorism officials) is set up and Actions and counter-actions, including the use of counter-tools, are simulated. Results were analysed for use of resources and capabilities, and their effectiveness.
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Gap analysis Based on the effectiveness assessments and a structured blue side-red side confrontation setting with a range of IED attack scenarios, the existing gaps in the system were identified and prioritized. The prioritized gaps, needs and opportunities for improvement were subjected to analysis how they can be bridged through future R&D. Cost assessment A cost analysis was performed and cost-effective counter-tools are identified. A quantitative method was used based on available actual cost figures, and a qualitative method was applied based on expert judgement. Ethical and legal considerations Compliance of emerging counter-tools with the European legal framework was addressed, and an ethical impact assessment raised awareness among the operational decision makers and end-users. Recommendations for future research With the assessments and the gap analysis as base, suggestions on future needed security research are made, with the aim to strengthen the future societal preparedness of countering explosive threats.
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2. About ENTRAP
2.1. ENTRAP Presenter Hans Önnerud (FOI)
Content of the presentation
The presentation was titled: About ENTRAP – ENTRAP Final Workshop The presentation provided a general description about the ENTRAP where the following items were addressed:
The tasks that should be addressed according to the H2020 call.
The partners of ENTRAP
An overview of the meetings and workshops that have been done.
An overview of the different research parts of ENTRAP
A description of the terminology: Prevent, Detect, React, Mitigate
Conclusions
In a nutshell, the research project ENTRAP was described.
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2.2. SPB interaction Presenter Steve Swain (CBRNE)
Content of the presentation
The presentation included the following key points:
The purpose of the Stakeholder Practitioner Board (SPB) including (i) Identify key desirables sought by the SPB organisations; (ii) Provide guidance on credible and emerging scenarios; (iii) The modus operandi of security services processes and procedures; (iv) Advice on the applicability of what the project is looking at and (v) An assessment of the combination of effectiveness, efficiency and costs of the project solutions.
The nations represented: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norther Ireland, Norway, Spain; Sweden and the UK. There were also EU Agencies.
The types of organisations: Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), Bomb Disposal Units (EXPOs), Other First Responder Agencies, Security and Intelligence Agencies, Government Organisations and Laboratories and Selected Private Sector Organisations.
The SPB represented EU agencies (x4), Fire and Rescue (x1), Government Agencies (x 11), LEAs (x 22), Military (x1) and Private Sector Organisations (x3).
The SPB met on 8 occasions in Sweden, the UK, Germany and virtually on line.
Key areas of concern highlighted by the SPB at the commencement of the Project included: a. Terrorist Modus Operandi (MO) and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)
i. The nexus between terrorists and organised crime groups ii. Lawfully obtained explosives that can be adapted for terrorist use
iii. The availability of HME precursors b. Improvements
i. A broader understanding of IEDs and terrorist MOs ii. Better modelling of the operational effectiveness of IED counter measures
iii. Procurement procedures for precursors c. IED specific
i. The explosive material used by terrorists to cause danger to life and property d. Improvements
i. Better mapping of the trade in IED precursors and components ii. Better detection of explosives and precursors
iii. Sharing of information across borders for better understanding and response iv. Identification of the IED threat chain and of the elements vulnerable to counter
terrorism e. Overall CT Response
i. Faster and more effective international co-operation ii. Evaluation of current and emerging counter tools against IED threat
Conclusions
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SPB input to Project ENTRAP has been:
Constructive in the sense of the continuous contributions the SPB made to the individual Work Packages in the Project
Dynamic by enabling the Project to reflect on and absorb the lessons of real-world events and developing counter terrorism responses as they have occurred
The SPB has achieved this across the Project by acting as:
A reliable source of informed comment and relevant advice
A source of specialised knowledge and subject matter information
A means to provide practical experience and expertise
A channel to deliver both practitioner insights and to stimulate the insights of researchers The SPB brought a significant dimension to the ENTRAP Project from which the results that have flowed. The following 15 x SPB Members attended the Final Conference:
Organisation Country Type of Organisation
Senior Police Advisor DSTL UK LEA
Presidenza Del Consiglio Dei Ministry (Polo Technologico) Italy Government Agency
Royal Netherlands Marechaussee / Sector Knowledge Netherlands LEA
VTT Finland Private Sector
RIVS GIGN France LEA
Royal Netherlands Marechaussee / Headquarters /Nationwide Tactical Command
Netherlands LEA
Arup Group UK Private Sector
FIOD - Fiscal Intelligence Service (Ministry of Finance) Netherlands Government Agency
London Fire Brigade UK Fire and Rescue
International Centre of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI)
UK LEA
Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence
Spain LEA
Spanish National Police (IEDD & CBRN) Spain LEA
Agenzia del Trasporto Autoferrotranviario del Comune di Roma (ATAC SpA)
Italy Government Agency
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Resilience Development and Analysis Department)
Inventory of counter-tools input: Diverse counter tools (both existing and emerging) have been identified from different sources collected by partners, by screening completed and ongoing research programmes and interfacing with the Practitioners board, such as: EU FP7 funded projects, EU H2020 funded projects, EU others, National projects, NATO projects, COTS, Terrorist attack Scenarios. The counter tools are linked to the capability hierarchy. Inventory of counter-tools output: database of projects and counter tools Report 1: Categorisation of research projects on countering explosives misuse in terrorist attacks Report 2: Preliminary to full report on the inventory of methods and tools to counter a terrorist attack Objective: To compile the available results and knowledge and thus progress of relevant security research in order to feed the effectiveness assessments, gap analysis and gap bridging and cost assessment of ENTRAP. The database is useful itself for practitioners Database In the Access database, the identified research projects were grouped by the projects position in the counter terrorist timeline (prevention, detection, react, mitigate). The complete data collected on each project is stored in the database.
145 different Projects have been assessed.
480 counter tools collected. Detailed info on about 200 tools.
Supports further assessment (used in combination with operational research OR tools), of effectiveness, gap analysis and gap bridging, and cost assessment.
Game cards allow to present relevant and concise counter-tool information in assessment activities.
Validation process: Game Cards corresponding to each counter tool were validated by ENTRAP project partners and practitioners (LEAs, etc.). Positive feedback, but some minor limitations detected.
Conclusions
145 different Projects assessed and 480 counter tools collected in a database. Of these, about 200 tools are represented by a Game Card.
The Game Cards have some limitations intrinsic to its nature, which are not an impediment to the purpose of being useful in subsequent assessment tasks such as effectiveness assessments, gap analysis and cost assessment.
Practitioners and experts have validated the counter tools in form of Game Cards through different workshops and meetings.
After the presentation of some statistics related with categorisation of counter tools, the first analysis reveals the lack of counter tools in Prevent and Mitigate domain, as well as training and regulation.
There is prevalence of counter tools in form of hardware.
Subsequent assessments have analysed if there is a gap in these fields and possible recommendations for the future.
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3.4. Scenario/capability matrix assessments Presenter Sara Wallin (FOI)
Content of the presentation
The presentation was titled: Assessments – The Scenario/capability matrix. The presentation contained a description on the following items:
In a block chart, the steps of the effectiveness assessments were described.
Assessments was informed to be done in an iterative approach where a high degree of complexity in the assessment was done on few tools. For less complex assessments a large number of tools were assessed.
A description of the high level assessment approach concerning 12 historical plots used in ENTRAP.
An example illustrating how scores for different tools were acquired.
A description on how workshops was set-up for the assessments where subject matter experts were used for the assessments.
An example of an assessment protocol
An overview of the assessed tools in relation to the different methods used and their place in the hierarchy (prevent, detect, react, mitigate).
The presentation ended with some take-aways from the assessments (lessons learned).
Conclusions
An overview of how assessments were made and examples of results were given to the audience.
3.5. Serious gaming assessments Presenter Daniel Lückerath (Fraunhofer)
Content of the presentation
The presentation briefly introduced ENTRAP Gaming, a gamified assessment approach for counter-tools; how it was employed in ENTRAP, what results were achieved, and the main take-away messages from applying the approach.
Conclusions
ENTRAP Gaming works extremely well for: o assessing counter-tools in detail, against a specific plot; o getting “information by-catch” from practitioners; and o including perspectives from multiple actors in the assessment.
Some drawbacks of ENTRAP Gaming: o Live exercises require a substantial amount of time and personnel/participants (30
people over 1.5 days for 6 games); o More statistical analyses of results requires substantially more games; o Lone-wolf plots are usually not suitable for gaming.
General observations: o Assessment of tool (technical) effectiveness requires tool demonstration; o Assessment against specific quantifiable measures (e.g. earliness of detection) based on
artificial “simulation” is not feasible; o From a researcher perspective: Information base (plots, actions, tools, etc.) needs to be
improved.
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3.6. Gap analysis Presenter Oscar van de Jagt & Jaap de Ruiter (TNO)
Content of the presentation
The gap analysis and gap bridging work focused on gaps (not countermeasures) and followed these steps:
harvesting of gaps (in workshops with selected SPB members, questionnaires, analysis of Capability Hierarchy and CT database)
prioritization and clustering of gaps (from 70 to 21 and 13 clusters: 2xP, 5xD, 5xT, 1xM) using a scoring method based on input from SPB members and project experts
prioritized gap bridging (producing recommendations on technology development)
assessment of added value of bridging gaps by confrontation with attack scenarios (7 historical scenarios and 18 hypothetical forward looking scenarios, generated for this purpose using a TNO tool)
Drawing conclusions
Conclusions
Bridging prioritized gaps has considerable expected impact in IED attack scenarios: o in most scenarios there is at least 1 bridged gap with very high impact score (likely stopping
the plot) and more than 1 with high impact score (seriously hindering the plot) o in all scenarios some gaps have a certain impact o following gaps have considerable impact in many scenarios, and/or decisive impact in at least
one: P2, P3, P4, D3, R4, R5, R6, M1, M2
Assessment of impact shows that prioritized gaps are indeed well prioritized, because bridging of them really makes a difference. o Selected scenarios always cover the future for an unknown part. When more or different
scenarios would be selected, the impact scores per bridged gaps would change, but it is expected that this conclusion will hold.
The road towards step changes in resilience of society against IED attacks requires: o Research & development in areas with high expected payoff. The gap analysis has formulated
for 13 gap-clusters (areas) recommendations for technology development (sensing technology - optical standoff, evd; unmanned and autonomous vehicle technology; software and algorithms - including AI and ‘Big Data’; network technology, data fusion and System-of-Systems; counter UAV technology).
o Supporting scientific research (explosive blast-structure interaction; plume behaviour for explosive and explosive precursor vapours; screening topologies for explosives detection), and testing & trialling
o Non-technical aspect to be covered, notably the ELSA aspects of implementation o New counter-terrorism strategy concepts for adequate implementation (a long term, top-
down approach in which countries develop a common vision on collaboration in general and on information sharing between organisations and countries in particular - aligned with current EU initiatives; a short-term, bottom-up approach to solve urgent problems e.g. in information sharing and collaboration)
To assess the cost associated with the development, implementation and use of the most efficient countertools.
Key objectives:
Assess costs associated with raising the technological readiness level of emerging counter-tools;
Assess costs associated with the procurement and implementation of effective counter-tools;
Assess costs associated with the operational use of effective counter-tools;
Identify the most cost-effective counter-tools across the timeline of the plot. Objectives and approach of the cost assessment:
Assess costs associated with o raising the TRL of emerging counter-terrorism tools (CT-Ts); o procurement and implementation of CT-Ts; o operational use of CT-Ts
In order to enable identification of the most cost-effective CT-Ts.
The assessment combines Life Cycle Cost of counter tools with development cost estimation to raise TRL by combining two methods
Main steps of a cost – effective analysis:
Select/develop scenarios
Develop effectiveness model
Preference modelling
Define baseline system
Identify and describe candidate CMs/CTs
Score of alternatives on criteria and aggregate effectiveness
Adding costs
Presentation/discussion cost effectiveness of alternatives
Conclusions
No European baseline system exist
Each nation has to use their own baseline system
The decision makers in two nations may therefore end up with different decisions regarding the same proposed C-T
3.8. Implementation aspects - ethics Presenter Ioannis Daniilidis (KEMEA) – Irina Marsh, Nigel Hale, Dominic Kelly (CBRNE)
Content of the presentation
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In the course of the presentation, the objectives of the work that was carried out in the frame of WP11: Ethical, Legal and Social Impact were presented and the actions of achieving the objectives were described. The objectives were the following:
management of data produced in the course of the project; procedures concerning research activities as identified and established according to EU (GDPR) and national directives: Data Management Plan and Research Ethics guidelines and Protocol
determination and compliance to the European legal framework for emerging counter-tools: Legal Consideration Study
ensuring the public acceptance and ethical consideration of existing and emerging counter-tools: Ethical and Effective Guidelines for development and deployment of counter-tools for prevention
consideration of the possible uses/misuses of the appropriate technology (including dual use), based on the operational research (OR) framework : Ethical impact assessment report for studied counter tools
Details on the approach for the description of the legal frame and the instruments that were deployed was provided, namely:
– General Data Protection Regulation (2016/ 679 & 680 / EU -GDPR) and – the Police and Criminal Justice Authorities Directive (2016/680/ EU –PCJA.
Examples of the challenges that technology enablers pose to the legal frame were presented for each of the phases of the timeline of a plot. Such were:
Prevent: Ability to monitor the communications of entire groups and nations on a mass scale is possible
Detect: Collection and processing of data collected through biometrics, trace detection, social media etc
React: Network dynamics for accessing mobile networks and raising awareness in case of an incident
Mitigate: Analysis of data collection as digital forensics from both physical and digital surveillance Once the legal frame was defined, the ethical dimension was described where the emphasis on the anticipation of the ethical dilemmas of the professionals upon decision making, such as:
Ensuring the legitimacy of interventions
Striving for operational cost effectiveness
Balancing duty of transparency and sensitivity of material
Maintaining integrity in the face of different moral values was analysed, since when methods of counter terrorism are considered, it is imperative that these must fulfil the requirements of proportionality, necessity and accountability. Furthermore, whenever information is processed for security purposes, by using any means and methods, it must consider the right to data protection. The aforementioned framework of legal and ethical considerations reflect the concern of the deployed tools and measures to the societal web and the security and safety of public. The presentation continued with the “translation” of the theoretical reporting of the legal and ethical frames (reports “D11.1: Legal Consideration Study”, “D11.2: Ethical and Effective Guidelines for development and deployment of counter-tools for prevention”) to the implementation stage, where potential deployment of tools and measures are evaluated in terms of the risks associated with the usage of these tools and measures. The procedure for the evaluation is the Ethical Impact Assessment (EIA). ENTRAP’s and more specifically WP11’s contribution to the structure of the EIA is the development of two new ethical tools aimed at the phases of deployment and use of counter-tools:
Ethical Risk Assessment Form (ERA Form): This Form provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which the counter-tools challenge the established ethical values, principles and legislations identified.
Misuse Risk Assessment Form (MRA Form): This Form provides an opportunity to engage in anticipatory risk assessment in respect of the possibility for the misuse of counter-tools. It is recommended the MRA is used for the assessment of counter-tools based on surveillance
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technologies (public space surveillance, network and targeted device surveillance, big data, data matching, linkage & analysis and location tracking technologies).
These forms are available in electronic format and example assessments are available from CBRNE Ltd. https://www.cbrneltd.com/contact_us.html. A handbook was prepared describing the “Ethical Assessment of the Use / Misuse of Terrorism Countertools – A Handbook for Law Enforcement Officials” was presented. The handbook aims to help law enforcement professionals understand the ethical issues and challenges inherent in the use of counter-tools for combating terrorist threats in the context of law enforcement and counter-terrorism actions. The handbook can be used at a strategic level, during the planning and procurement phase. It can act as a reference point for the ethical assessment of tools and techniques in specific scenarios, such as responding to bombing and suicide bombing incidents (IED and PBIED terrorism), domestic law enforcement and counter-terrorism. Furthermore, it can be used for training of people engaging in this field of counter-terrorism and for raising awareness and making possible the translation of the ethical and legal framework to an operational and practical guideline.
Conclusions
Deployment of counter tools and measures requires compliance with the established legal and ethical directives and norms of the EU (and not limited to).
The effectiveness and engagement of any tools and procedures is evaluated and reflected by the society’s acceptance; if the public web is threatened or violated these will be rejected.
ELSA’s facets such as privacy, freedoms, dignity, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights were illuminated and projected as necessary conditions when considering the use of tools and measures. It is imperative that the aforementioned parameters are included even in the early stages of the design of the tools and procedures.
Projection and promotion of the larger EIA evaluation framework and the specific ERA & MRA tools to LEAs for the use and evaluation as a management tool and during training of the practitioners.
Interaction and collaboration between parties engaged in the area of legal and ethical studies as well as researchers, policy makers, industry, practitioner agencies (LEAs etc) must be established to identify risks, mitigation strategies, gaps and propose solutions through an iterative and focused when required process of fine-tuning.
The objective of Spiritus Calidus was to develop / enhance financial based countermeasure(s). This was done by a real-time exercise using financial intelligence, financial (criminal) investigations, legal powers and public-private cooperation. Participating stakeholders of the exercise were institutes (government and research), banks and retailers. The exercise existed of 5 phases during which financial identities were created, “normal” purchases were performed, and precursors were purchased. The transactions were monitored automatically and manually and after the virtual attack some additional manual transaction was performed.
Conclusions
Automated TM: Extra measures/tools are needed to identify suspicious transactions with precursors;
Manual TM: Only few leads are needed to get it started;
Further tool development is desired, followed by pilot testing
Special attention for new test operation and overcoming legal barriers
1. How can we assess the need for Counter IED Tool Step Changes? 2. How the C-IED Step Change Assessment fits into the ENTRAP Project The Assessment was built on all the relevant ENTRAP research results, findings and insights so it is grounded in ‘hard’ science but the rankings produced by the Survey should be regarded as the collective opinion of the Questionnaire respondents 3. The SPB C-IED Survey:
a. Starting Point: i. Most relevant ENTRAP results, findings, insights gathered & collated
ii. Examined to find most appropriate ones from perspective of C-IED Tools iii. Focus was on their purpose, function and utility, not on issues of performance,
reliability, costs etc. b. Final total of 33 results, findings, insights selected as the basis for the Assessment c. Next Step: Create a typology (categorisation) based on their common factors
4. Typology results: Part 1 a. The 33 results, findings & insights generally fell into six broad ‘areas of CT endeavour’:
i. Explosives & Precursors ii. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
iii. Drone-Borne IEDs (DBIEDs) iv. Potential or suspected terrorist behaviour v. Protective measures
vi. High level counter-IED Measures (i.e. where a number or range of tools may be utilised and/or other CT activities or actions are also required)
5. Typology Results: Part 2 In addition, when analysed by their purpose & function, all of the 33 selected ENTRAP results, findings & insights fell into one of three categories: a. Specific counter IED tools b. Generic types of counter IED tools c. Broad IED counter measures
6. How the C-IED Step Change Assessment Priority Rankings were derived. a. Final 33 selected C-IED Tool related results, findings & insights were summarised & listed b. 3 SPB Survey Questions were asked about each one on the list c. Answers were analysed and grouped; fell into 3 clusters d. Clusters ranked by Questionnaire results… End result - C-IED Step Change Assessment: Survey Priority Rankings 1st, 2nd, 3rd
7. SPB Survey Questions were framed as follows: a. Is a step change needed in this case? b. Should a step change be treated as a priority? c. Which three step changes are the highest priority?
Conclusions
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SPB Survey Questionnaire results: C-IED Step Change Rankings of Highest Priority d. First: ‘Prevention of IED attacks by detecting explosives’ e. Second: ‘Countering terrorist use of Drones and utilizing Drones for CT’ f. Third: ‘Effective communication, collaboration & cooperation’
Ranked 1st- Highest Priority scores for Step Change: ‘Prevention of IED attacks by detecting explosives’ Includes C-IED Tool/Tool Types/Counter Measures as identified by ENTRAP: a. Detection of explosives, explosive precursors, manufacture of explosive b. Quantities for detection range from trace amounts to bulk; chemical specific c. Stand-off capability, non-intrusive and/or covert d. Portable for deployment and mobile when in operation e. Effective against static and dynamic targets; targets can be individuals and/or vehicles f. Able to function against:
i. individual persons; crowds; area-wide ii. vehicles; premises
Ranked 2nd: High Priority (Mid-range scores) ‘Countering terrorist use of Drones and utilizing Drones for CT’ a. ‘Countering Drone borne IEDs (DBIEDs)’:
i. Includes C-IED Tool/Tool Types/Counter Measures as identified by ENTRAP: i) Detection/identification of hostile/suspect drones
ii. ii)Safe neutralisation/disruption when airborne b. ‘Utilising Drones for C-IED purposes’:
i. Includes C-IED Tool/Tool Types/Counter Measures identified by ENTRAP: Sensors/systems to be drone mounted Capability to detect explosive presence or its manufacture
ii. Surveillance of crowded or vulnerable areas [Plus: An outlier result relating to ‘explosive detection in a railway environment’]
Ranked 3rd: High Priority (Low range) ‘Enhanced communication’ Includes C-IED Tool/Tool Types/Counter Measures identified by ENTRAP (as part of broader counter terrorism measures to prevent terrorist IED attacks): a. Within and between operational organisations/units… b. Within and between researchers/developers of C-IED technology…
AND c. Between both these areas of endeavour and at all levels d. there must be effective communication, collaboration, and cooperation
[Plus: An outlier result relating to ‘blast protection for first responders’]
Additional aspects relating to Step Changes: a. Step change may be needed beyond counter terrorism tools and technologies e.g. new CT
MO and TTPs to deal with PBIED. b. Step changes in counter terrorism do not necessarily require new inventions or ground-
breaking concepts e.g. passing new laws, wider implementation of CT measures proven useful elsewhere.
c. Terrorist innovations can result in step changes to their own capabilities e.g. PBIEDs from 1990s; DBIEDs from 2017 (Venezuela) & April 2020 (Mexico)
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4. ENTRAP Vision
4.1. Vision paper Presenter Martijn Koolloos (TNO)
Content of the presentation
The goal is the ENTRAP’s view on a virtual state of counter terrorism in Europe. General Challenges are identified through:
Stakeholder needs
Assessment of CTs
Gap Analysis The aspects of implementation are:
Technological
Cost Effectiveness
ELSI
Training ENTRAP has described 16 visions
10 technological in the domains Prevent (1), Detect (3), React (4) and Mitigate (2)
6 overarching visions that enable the technological visions
Each vision is described by a narrative, the challenges to overcome and recommendations The Vision on Countering of Drone Borne IEDs has been presented in detail
Conclusions
The Vision Paper presents 16 visions originating from the ENTRAP project
These visions are technological and enabling
New CTs is not always a prerequisite
The Vision Paper may contribute to a Roadmap to a more secure Europe
The Vision paper will be available for all stakeholders
4.2. Recommendations Presenter José A. Loya (UC3M)
Content of the presentation
Important goal of ENTRAP: give an overview of expected trends for the future Which are the emerging future scenarios? Historical, probably future scenarios based on various studies Which counter-tools could be developed or used to encounter these future scenarios? Available CT, weak-points and required actions: Driving forces Which are the technical requirements for future CTs? Technologies, topics, R&D actions How can we decide to promote a counter-tool over others? Efficiency assessment proposal
Conclusions
Weak points and GAPs in countertools in present and future scenarios have been detected, requiring particular actions.
Is proposed a Driving Forces classification (based on STEPL analysis). The DF hierarchy is connected to particular requirements.
Some research topics (technologies) associated to the four capability stages of the terrorist timeplot, have been identified.
Efficiency assessment questionary for CTs (similar to risk maps) is proposed. Allows to compare CTs and help authorities to take decisions promoting a CT over others.
Forensic intelligence: very early in the ENTRAP time line. In depth technical analysis and overview of forensic methodologies to support forensic intelligence. Literature Review. Workshop on Forensic Explosives Intelligence. Decision support: a tool that helps to optimise decisions under uncertainty (complex situations, time constraint).
Conclusions
Literature review on forensic intelligence is available
Forensics can be of help in intel activities and covert operations
Decision Support may be used in making complex decisions under time constraints, e.g. on the intervention of a potential terrorist
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5. Conclusions
ENTRAP external ethics advisor commented that he was fully informed about the progress and results in
particular from CBRNE. All the research activities were performed respecting all ethics aspects. Potential
misuse of the results was evaluated.
A technical reviewer was positively impressed by the tools developed in ENTRAP, the recommendations
provided, and the gap analysis from TNO.
A technical reviewer commented that ENTRAP achieved the goal that were set in the proposal.
A participant asked about the possibility to receive the ENTRAP reports. In particular, he asked for those
reports in a format suitable to present to decision makers.
Hans replied that a list of report will be provided to all with a template for the request to send to the
commission. The vision paper will be the candidate document to send to decision makers.
Peter de Bruyn (NFI) asked the following question to TNO:
TNO indicated that almost all of the scenarios would have been hindered/blocked by the identified bridged
gaps. In which time frame are most of these bridged gaps: prevent, detect, react or mitigate? And which of
the practitioners will be supported the most with the development of these bridged gaps?
Jaap de Ruiter (TNO) answered:
The impact scores (where this statement was based on) were attributed to 21 prioritized (deemed most
important after analysis of practitioners input) gaps only. The distribution is as follows: Prevent: 4; Detect:
8; React: 7; Mitigate: 2
Many more gaps were identified, but not prioritized as most important. However, it is possible that - if an
impact score would have been attributed to them as well – some could turn out to also hinder/block
scenarios. The distribution of all identified gaps was roughly as follows: Prevent: 24; Detect: 32; React: 20;
Mitigate: 10.
Finally, the selected scenarios provide a view into the past (7 historical scenarios) and into the future (18).
This view is far from complete. A clearer prediction would require a similar analysis with either many more
hypothetical scenarios (which can be generated in principle by the TNO Scenario Generation Tool), or an
intel-driven selection of hypothetical scenarios.
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Appendix A. Agenda
October 6, 2020 ENTRAP Final Workshop Via Webex
Opening Titles Lead
09:30 Webex opening
About ENTRAP
10:00 ENTRAP FOI
10:15 SPB interaction CBRNE
Results
10:25 Terrorism timeline & scenarios DSTL
10:35 Capability hierarchy FOI
10:45 Counter-tools database INTA
10:55 Break
11:05 Scenario/capability matrix assessments FOI
11:15 Serious gaming assessments Fraunhofer
11:25 Gap analysis TNO
11:40 Questions from participants
Lunch break
12:00-13:00 Lunch break
Results
13:00 Implementation aspects - costs FFI
13:10 Implementation aspects- ethics KEMEA/CBRNE
13:30 Operation Spiritus Callidus FIOD - SPB member
13:45 Step-change assessments CBRNE
13.55 Break
ENTRAP vision
14:05 Vision paper TNO
14:15 Recommendations UC3M
14:30 Forensic intelligence NFI
14:45 -15:00 Questions from participants
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Appendix B. List of participants
Number of participants
Organisation
15 SPB members
2 EC, Technical reviewer
1 EC, project officer
1 External Ethics Officer
1 KEMEA
5 CBRNE
1 FFI
1 DSTL
5 TNO
9 FOI
1 Fraunhofer
2 INTERPOL
1 Guardia Civil
1 UC3M
2 NFI
1 INTA
1 ENEA
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Appendix C. Presentations
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ENTRAP Consortium Participant No.
Participant organisation full name Short name
Country Logo
1 (Coordinator)
Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut FOI Sweden
2 Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek
TNO Netherlands
3 Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives
CEA France
4 Agenzia nazionale per le nuove tecnologie, l’energia e lo sviluppo economico sostenibile
ENEA Italy
5 Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der angewandten Forschung e.V.
FhG Germany
6 Nederlands Forensisch Instituut NFI Netherlands
7 The International Criminal Police Organization Interpol France
8 Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt FFI Norway
9 CBRNE Ltd CBRNE United Kingdom
10 Home Office HO United Kingdom
11 National Institute for Aerospace Technology INTA Spain
12 University Carlos III of Madrid UC3M Spain
13 Guardia Civil GUCI Spain
14 Polismyndigheten (Swedish Police Authority) SPA Sweden
