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Dissemination of Combat Information 6 October 1952

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    UNCLASSIFIED OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

    F o r t Monroe , Virginia ATTNG-26 350. 05/59(DOCI)(C)(6 Oct 52} 6 October 1952

    OCT 1 G i952('noV l .....

    TO: See distribution

    1. In accordance with SR M ~ ! J P ~ e ~ ~ l n g ;; f Combat Information, th e inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of theAr my, A rm y Field Forces , and the service schools for evaluat ion andnecessary action. I t m ay be appropr ia te , in cer ta in cases , for theseagencies to take action upon a single extracted i tem; in others , i t m aybe desirable to develop a c r o s s - ~ e c t i o n of accumulated extracts on apar t icu la r subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted i temserves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

    2. Copies are furnished to other mili tary agencies to keep theminformed concerning thea ter problems from the front l ine through thelogist ical command.

    3. These EXTRACTS are der ived f rom repor ts which are c las sified SECRET. F o r the greater convenience of the user , this Officedowngrades each extracted i tem to the lowest class i f ica t ion compatiblewith secur i ty . No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion ofthe extracted r emar ks . so that none of the original intent is lost .

    4. Combat informat ion EXTRACTS herein which are applicableto training at the company-bat tery level also appear in A r m y Field

    - -Pe. . . . . . .- . : r ~ ~ I N G BUL'LETINS.LIBRARY

    1 InclExtrac ts f rom S oure e s490 thru 514

    DISTRIB UTION:(Over) Copy No ~ 3 3

    CN 27060

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    UNCLASSIFIED2

    DISTRIB UTION:1 - 3 ACOFS, G-l , DA 102-111 Chief Signal Off icer4- 6 ACOFS, G-2, DA 112-121 The Surgeon Genera l7- 21 ACOFS, G-3, DA 122-125 Chief of Transportat ion22- 41 ACOFS, G-4, DA CG's 42- 43 The Adjutant General 126-127 The Ar mor ed Cen te r44- 45 Chief of Chaplains 128-129 The Arti l lery Center46- 55 Chief Chemical Office r 130-131 The Infantry Center56- 65 Chief of engineers Comdt 66- 67 Chief of Finance 132-133 A rm y War College68- 69 Chief of Information 134-135 CGSC 70- 71 The Inspector General 136-137 Army Genera l 72- 73 The Judge Advocate SchoolGenera l 138-139 A s s t Comdt, The Art i l le ry74- 75 Chief of Military School, AA&GM BranchHistory P r es 76- 77 Chief, National Guard 140 A F F Bd No 1Bureau 141 A FF Bd No 2 78- 87 Chief of Ordnanc e 142 A FF Bd No 3 88- 89 The Provos t Marsha l 143 A FF Bd No 4General 144 CO, Arct ic Test 90- 99 The Quar t e rmas te r BranchGenera l Chiefs 100-101 Executive for Reserve 145 A FF HRU No 1and ROTC Affai rs 146 A FF HRU No 2

    Copie s furnished:147-246 TAG (40 ea CINCFE; 10 ea CINe 's and CGls other

    Major Oversea Commands)CGls

    247-248 F i r s t A rm y 249-250 Second Army 251-252" Thi rd Army 253-254 Four th Army 255-256 Fifth Army 257-258 Sixth A rm y 259-262 A rm y AA Command 263-264 Mili ta ry Dist r ict of Washington 265-266 Tact ical Air Command 267-268 Chief of Naval Opera t ions , Dept of the Navy

    269 CO, Mountain &: Cold Weather Tng Command 270-271 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, A ir Command and Staff

    School, A ir University (See next page)

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    UNCLASS'F\EOATTNG-26 350. 05/59{DOCI)(C)(6 Oct 52}Subject: Dissemination of Combat InformationCopies furnished: {Cant}

    6 October 1952

    27 2 -273274-275276-277278-279280-281282-283

    284285

    286287

    288-321322-323324-328329-332

    33 333433533633733833934034 134 234334434 5

    346-355

    Comdt of Cadets , US Military AcademyComdt

    A rm ed Forces Staff College, NO BMarine Corps SchoolUSAF Air-Ground Operat ions SchoolCounter Intel l igence Corps SchoolThe Provost Marsha l Genera l ' s School

    Offic.er in Charge. Atlantic Flee t Intel l igence Cen,Attn: Ground Forces Officer

    Gen Om ar Bradley, Chairman,Wash 25, DC

    OCAFFGlG2G3 {14 cy G3{26}}G4RDArms GpChaplainC m lComptEngrInfoMedO rdPMOMSigTransDCOFSAG RecordsExtra copies

    Joint Chiefs of Staff, DA.

    3 U N C l ~ S S \ f \ O

    http:///reader/full/Offic.erhttp:///reader/full/Offic.er
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    .'UNCLASSIFIED C:16895 - :a.

    SOURCE: Command Report - I US CorpsDATE: January 1952 Source No 490

    (SECRET)MECHANIZED AND EMPLACED FLAME THROWERS. - An a r mor ed

    1/4- ton t ruck was built and demonstra ted, car ry ing the sponson and t r ans miss ion units f rom the mechanized flame thrower , M3-4-3 , to which wasconnected 100 feet of 3/4- inch engineer a ir hose coupled to a portable f lameth rower gun. This vehicle will be fur ther modif ied before i ts use.

    Requirements for emplaced f lame throwe rs were received during theper iod. The necessary hose, weighing over 8000 pounds , to provide a 100foot extension for each emp laced f lame thrower , arr ived by a ir on 14 January 1952. Action was taken to secure ex t ra f lame guns and a ir compr es so r s .Issue of this i tem is expected to begin ear ly in February .

    SOURCE: Command Repor t - 21st AAA AW Battalion (SP) D A T E : May 1952 Source No 491

    (RESTRICTED)COMMUNICATION ON M-16 HALF TRACK. - P as t exper ience has

    proven the need for a reliable method of voice communicat ion f rom the squadleader to the gunner in the M45 tu r re t . During operations the noise of thepower charger combined w ~ t h the sound of the f ou r . 50 ca l iber machine gunsf i r ing m akes w ord-of-mouth communicat ion next to impossible .

    Recommendat ion: That a ll M-16 ' s be equipped with a bui l t -in com municat ion system between the gunner and th e squad l eader .

    (OCAFF Cornment: All M16's are being modified to include the bui l t in commWlication system as recommended . )

    OverINCLOSURE

    U N C L A S S I F ~ O '

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    U N C L A S S \ \ ~ \ E D Counterf i re plots that "tie in" with known enemy posi t ions frequent ly a ref i red upon by a battal ion volley, or m o r e . Counterf i re plots that a re invery close to the front l ines a re given to the infant ry mor ta r s to f i re ; how ever , this is the case only infrequently. The major i ty of counterf i re plotsa re the resu l t of enemy art i l lery fire ra the r than active mor ta r posi t ions,whereas the ar t i l l e ry ' s counte rmorta r r ada r picks up only active mor ta r s .

    I t is not recommended that the T/O&:E be changed to incorporate thecounterf i re platoon as a par t of the art i l lery organizat ion. Rather , i t isrecommended that the relat ionship and degree of cooperat ion between thear t i l l e ry and the counterfire platoon be fos tered to the highest degree formaximum efficiency and effect iveness . I t is believed that this coordinat ioncan be implemented by having the counterfire plott ing cen t ra l located at thedirec t support art i l lery battal ion fire direction center whenever and whereverfeasible .(RESTRICTED)

    ARTILLERY PROTECTION FOR AIRCRAFT. - High per formancea i r c ra f t operat ing in close support of infantry are subjected to heavy groundf i re f rom the enemy. The necess i ty for low level reconnaissance f l ightsand fighter s t r ikes has resul ted in frequent losses of friendly a i r c ra f t toever increasing enemy smal l ar rns and antia ircraft f i re . The ar t i l l e ry hasat tempted to minimize these losses by firing flak suppress ion in the a reawhere fighters will str ike . Flak suppress ion programs a re s tandard opera t ing procedure in the 25th Division Arti l lery , and though the results of thesesuppres sive f ires a re not clearly ascer ta ined , they no doubt reduce theamount of enemy ' an t ia i rcraf t f i re , at least t emporar i ly .

    I t is presen t ly necessa ry to give ar t i l l e ry clearance for a reas wherelo w level flights will be' made, ei ther for reconnaissance o r for a str ike .These prohibi t ions on art i l lery fi ring a re res t r ic t ive and frequent , andthough maximum coordina t ion is effected between the S3 and G3 A ir onrestr ic t ing a reas for ai rcraf t c learance , never theless the continuity of

    ,a r t i l lery miss ions is continually in terrupted with resul tant loss of effect ,and both a ir and ground suffer from i t.

    I t is bel ieved that both ground and a ir would benefit by allowing a r t i l le ry to continue f ir ing in and around areas where high per formance ai rcraf twill operate. The ,:hance of airplanes being hit by ar t i l l e ry fire would beinf ini tesimal , part icularly with the res t r ic t ion which would be placed on highangle and the f ir ing of variable t ime fuzed shell . The few losses of ai rcraf tto fr iendly art i l lery would be negligible compared to the losses from heavy

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    ,WeRET SSElWTr "'W2"TaUNCLASSIFIED 4

    . enemy ground fire no w incurred. Continuation of ar t i l lery f i res iI i a,reaswhere a irc ra f t would operate should be of considerable value in curtai l ingthe enemy's abil i ty to fire smal l a r m s and ant ia i rc raf t weapons from pos i t ions in the open.

    I t is recommended that a revision be made in the standing operat ing procedures requi r ing ar t i l le ry to cease f ir ing in areas where a irc ra f t will operate at low levels . Allowing ar t i l le ry to continue f ir ing in areas where a irc ra f t fly a t low levels will benefit all concerned and deny the enemy their p r e sen t freedom to infl ict heavy losses to our aircraf t .

    (OCAFF Comments : I t is believed the CVT fuze now under developmentwill increase the safety of a irc ra f t operat ing in vicinity of areas under ar t i l lery f i re . )

    SOURCE: Command Report - 55th QM Base DepotDATE: February 1952 Source No 493

    (RESTRICTED)PACKAGING OF SUPPLIES, -It has been conclusively proven here

    that commercia l - type packing cannot withstand th e multiple -handling involvedover the distances the i tems travel . Crates containing cabbage, l emons ,and orange s a re examples of inferior quality of packaging due to the use ofcommercia l - type packing. The broken and crushed cra tes , result ing f romrough handling and the use of ro l le r conveyors , have crea ted a t remendousrepack problem in this operat ion of the depot. Wet weather , in par t icu lar ,weakens any commercia l - type carton. I t is st rongly recommended that noi t ems be shipped in corrrnercial packages.

    SOURCE: Command Report - 59th Ordnance GroupDATE: May 1952 Source No 494

    (RESTRICTED)DEFECTS IN L-20 AIRCRAFT. - The following unsatisfactory con

    ditions have been discovered on the L-20 ai rcraf t since their arr ival in Korea:

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    '. SEtAEY's !! iJOPV PI liZ ))ONUNCLASSIFIED

    a . Aircraf t have had brake trouble; i. e . , losing of brake cl ips.b. Tail wheel shimmy.c. Engines s t a r t e r clutch sl ipping, and in some ins tance s clutch

    grabbing, caused by instal lat ion of worn units .d. Rudder s tops on aft end of fuselage bending badly,e . Rudder locks will not stay in position in gusty winds.f. Excess ive side play in th e at tachment fitting. top tail wheeloleo s t ru t to the fuselage.g. Door locks a re a source of t rouble as they a re manufactured oftoo l ight mater ia l .h. Door la tches are not substant ia l enough to withstand hard andextensive usage.i . Valve clearance too large on the engine.j . Red datum line used for measur ing extension of tai l oleo s t ru tpeels off.k. Caps for bomb shackle cannon plugs mounted in the,wings aremiss ion .1. Static ground wire's break off.m. Each inspection panel on the wing is secured by mounting screws

    of different size and length. This condit ion necessi ta tes carrying to o muchstock.n. Fron t inner cylinder baffles are- mounted to o t ight and too high

    up the cyl inder fins. Mounting brackets crack and rub on the cyl inder .Baffle mounting brackets should be mounted a t leas t three fins down f romthe bar re l head.

    o. Carbure tor heat scoop mounted between the to p cyl inders breaksloose f rom mounting bracket s , Bracket ma te r i a l is not heavy 'enough to withs tand engine vib ra t ions .

    UNCLASSIFIED o ~ e r ..! J t i o ~ W & N

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    SOURCE: Command Repor t - 72d Tank Battal ionDATE: May 1952 Source No 495

    (RESTRICTED)GUNNERY TRAINING. - Our t raining program fi t ted in nicely with

    the combat miss ion on the l ine. The lessons learned while in contact withthe enemy were res tudied by the companies , faults wer'e corrected, andtraining was insti tuted to take care of any weaknesses noticed while on l ine.We fOW'ld that gunnery is of paramount importance and so i t was s t ressedabove all .

    The use of the IOOO-inch range is recommended highly. The m en notonly enjoy this type fi ring, but receive much valuable t raining in al l phasesof gunnery. Training on a moving t a rge t range is a lso recommended. Muchsuccess has b een at ta ined by our units in tracking beer cans floating downa s t ream. Competit ion-is fos tered in this type t raining and the benefi ts a reimmense .

    SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Division

    DATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 496

    (RESTRICTED)FINANCE RECOMMENDATIONS. - Recommend that a more detai led

    orientat ion on the mat te r s of personal finance be given a t the POEls to a llpersonnel , officer and enl is ted, who a re on orders for Korea. This orienta t ion should s t res s:

    a. The complete lack of need for money in Korea except for a fewdol lars a month for PX supplies;

    b: The whole scope of al lo tments , with emphasis placed on increas ing both the amount and the number of al lotments;c. The fact that accrued pay may be allowed to remain on the mili tary

    pay record and may be drawn par t ia l ly or in full at any t ime.

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    B C j ' ~ rquem::" "OJ OHM) JOI,UNCLASS\F\ED

    I t is recommended that action be taken to change the cur r icu la ofpersonnel schools to include m ore thorough indoctr ina t ion of persons beingschooled in personnel mat t e r s in the f inance al lotment system.

    All finance personnel assigned to a fore ign thea te r should be e i thergraduates of the _:..rmy Finance School or individuals who have a minimumof tw o years experience in a r my f inance work.

    More machinery in the nature of adding machines , typewri ters , moneyl i s t e r s , etc , should be init ially assigned to each infantry division financeoffice in the field. The minimum requirements for a divis ion f inance officein the field should be as follows:

    Adding machines 20Typewri ters 16Computers & money l i s ters 4Addressograph machines 4Graphotype rna hine 1

    A study should be made for the purpose .o f sett ing up a more accura teloca tor serv ice . Many documents are forwarded, to this stat ion as long ass ix months subsequent to the evacuation of personnel for medica l reasonsor through nor mal rotat ion channels to the CONUS.

    I t is recommended tha t , instead of the sys tem now in use under p a r a grap11 175, S R 3 5-2000 -1 , Notice of Exception be forwarded direct ly to thesubject serv iceman stat ion ra ther than the present sys tem of re lying on' sthe forwarding of DD Form 118. This would cut down on paper work andaddi t ional cor respondence . The t ime element involved between receivinga charge or a credi t and the record ing of such on the mil i ta ry pay recordwould be substant ia l ly reduced.

    Serv ice schools for officers should s t r ess m ore real is t ical ly theresponsibi l i t ies and duties of class A agents under AR 35-320 and paragraph163, SR 35-20 00- .

    Action should be taken to insure that all ports of embarkat ion ca r e fully serv ice all n1ilitary pay records pr ior to the serv iceman 's depar turefrom the CONUS.

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    The mil i ta ry pay r ecord should be surveyed with the aim of having i topera te on a yearly bas i s ra the r than a twice-year ly basis .

    SOURCE: Command Revor t - 7th Infantry Division Art i l le ryDATE: Apr i l 1952 Source No 497

    (CONFIDENTIAL)DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY MOR TARS. - Ene m y mor ta r s continue

    to infl ict a large percen tage of the friendly casual t ies sustained. This weaponi s s t i l l one of the mos t difficult t a rge t s to loca te and des t roy o r even neutra l ize . P r e s e n t methods of detec t ion a re unsa t i s fac tory . RecOlnmend thatevery effor t be made to expedite the development of improved radar se ts tobe used for this purpose .

    (OCAFF Comment: I t is bel ieved the new A N / MPO -I0 will fulfi l l therequ i rements outl ined. )

    SOURCE: Command Repor t - 21s t AAA AW Battal ion (SP) DATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 498

    (RESTRICTED)AIDS TO INDIRECT FIRING FOR QUAD 50's . - This battal ion has

    exper imented successfu l ly with a number of aids to indirect f ir ing for Quad50 's . These include the adoption of azimuth and elevation scales for layingthe guns, the checking of the cor rec tnes s of azimuth and elevat ion by theuse of the aiming circ le and gunners quadrant , and the irr lprovisation of apanorarr l ic sight for the same purpose . We also found tha t speed and accuracy in adjus t ing f i re can be obtained e a s ie r when platoon com m ande r s haveacted as forward observers . The question of the effect of indirect f i re ofQuad 50's remains a specula t ive one. Since H&I f i re i s accompl ished a tnightti lne, resu l t s cannot be observed. We rnus t continue to depend on PWin terrogat ion for OLd only measure of effect iveness . This informat ion i sgenera l ly nonexis: _:nt, and, even if available, is not always re l iable .

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    UNCLASS\F1EDI t i s recommended that;a . The AA&GM Branch of The Art i l le ry School conduct exper iments

    with Quad 50 indirect fi ring to determine i ts effect iveness on area t a rge tsa t ranges between 5000 yards and 6500 yards , using A PI or incendiaryammuni t ion.

    b. All platoon l eaders have some forward observers experience inadjust ing ar t i l lery f i re .

    c. That any future AA mater ie l always be constructed with methodsof set t ing and reading azimuths and elevations.

    (OCAFF Comment: Al l Quad 50, M16 1s, are being modified to provideazimuth and' elev,ation scale for ground fi ring. )

    SOURCE: Command Report - 90th Field Art i l le ry Ba'tta1ionDATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 49 9

    (RESTRIC'TED)ZEROING INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. - Due to the difficulty of marking

    and scoring the improvised targets on the two-hundred-yard carbine range,the zeroing of individual weapons was a t ime -consuming procedure . Thisproblem has been solved by having each luan fire five rounds a t a range oftwelve and one-hal f yards on a one-inch bul l is -eye. The set t ing thus obtainedi s very near ly co r rec t for two hundred yards . This method is result ing inl a rge savings in t ime and alnmunit icn .

    (OCAFF Comment: See Depar tment of the A r m y Training Circula r19, 1952.)

    SOURCE: Command Report - 724th Trans Railway Operat ions Battal ion DATE: March 1952 Source No 500

    (RESTRICTED)STANDARDIZATION OF STATION RECORDS, - Standard operat ing

    procedures for mainta ining records at stat ions and the handling of t ra inOver

    U N C l ~ S S \ f \ f . . O " 9 ,,.::az.,urIlleS! " e;;,zmON

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    consis ts have been se t up in orde r to have a uniform method a t each s ta t ion.This will pe rmi t the efficient rep lacement or rota t ion of personnel betweenstat ions and el iminate de lays in delivery of shipments and possibi l i ty ofpi l ferage.

    Recommendat ions . - Recommend tha t the Transportat ion School studythe problem and publish a manual prescr ib ing a uniform sys tem for record keeping by s ta t ions to include courses for MO S 3069 and MO S 3047 a t theTransportat ion School.

    SOURCE: Command Report - Tokyo Engineer Works O r d n a n c ~ Shops, 8231 AU

    DATE': Apri l 1952 Source No 501

    (RESTRICTED)SHORTAGE OF SPARE PARTS. - Many par t s have been in shor t supply,

    due to inabili ty to procure ei ther from the CONUS or f rom loca l sources .Cylinder s l eeves have been cri t ical ly short , so that a backlog of over 1000engine blocks to be s leeved has been generated.

    Steps are being take'n to m ee t this problem chiefly by the developmentof indigenous sources of supply, and new and i mpr oved reclamat ion proce dures ,

    The r ece ip t of substandard par ts from the CONUS is causing considerableconcern to this instal lat ion, Although the proport ion of unsat i sfactory par t sis low compared to the total number of par t s used, i t i s g rea t enough to causeser ious problems in the supply of component par ts to the assembly l ines.On a number of occas ions a presumed l1normal1t supply of par ts in the ware house has turned into a ser ious shortage when uncrated and found to be defec t ive' This situation has impl ica t ions beyond causing product ion difficult ies.These are the use of government funds to procure unsat i sfactory par ts , thecos t of shipment from the CONUS and the use of valuable cargo space to t r ans por t them to the F ar Eas t .

    Difficulty is experienced as a resul t of receIvIng boxes of mater ia lwhich a re incorrect ly rna rked as to nomencla ture or quantity. Incorrectmarkings have resul ted in production diff icult ies by causing par t s shor tages ,and at the same t ime have crea ted a problem in maintaining co r rec t stock card balances,

    UNCLASSifiED

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    UNClASSlflEOSOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps, Pa r t 3, Book IIDATE: January 1952 Source No 502

    (RESTRICTED)RECOVERY OF DAMAGED ARMORED VEHICLES. - One noteworthy

    method of towing ar rangement for recovering a vehicle has been tes ted byone a rmored unit and has decreased the t ime of p r e p a r a t i ~ n fo1- evacuationto 30 seconds and requires th e employment of only one man. The specialequipment required for this ar rangement consis t s of approximately fifteenfeet of chain, of one inch stock, l inks of which are large enough to go overthe towing shackes, and a towing shackle welded to the center of the fronta rmo r plate, approximate ly a t the same elevation as th e to p of the t rack.The heavy chain is general ly car r ied by attaching the tw o ends to the s tandardtowing shackles on the front of the tank and looping the center of the chainover th e tank as described above. This ar rangement ~ a y be used to hookonto the front or r ea r of a damaged tank, depending on the reguirements ofth e situation.

    SOURCE: Command Report - OM Petroleum Operation GroupDATE: May 1952 Source No 503

    (RESTRICTED)GASOLINE DRUMS - CLEANING COSTS. - A novel method of lessening

    drum cleaning costs was insti tuted with a saving of approximately 35 perdrum filled without cleaning. Previously, re turned empty drums were sentto the contractor for cleaning and recondit ioning. Many of these drums,already clean inside, could have been immediately reused without cleaningexcept for th e uncertainty regarding l i q u i d ~ t i g h t integri ty of each drum. Inorde r to avoid th e necess i ty of spending money on drum cleaning when i t wasnot absolutely necessary , a method of testing clean drum s for leaks wasdeveloped. A set of immersion tanks was designed and const ructed at a cos tof approximately $250.00. In the bath severa l drums a t one t ime can beimmersed and tested. Bubbles appear if there are any leaks. Clean drumsprocessed tbis way and found to be sound are earmarked for reuse withoutfur ther processing. Approximately 700 drums can be processed in one 8hour shift. I t is anticipated that half will be found suitable for refi l l ing without cleaning, effecting a saving of $125. 00 pe r 8-hour shif t worked.

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    UNCLASS1F1EDSOURCE: Command Report - 27th Infantry RegimentDATE: May 1952 Source No 504

    (RESTRICTED)REPLACEMENT TRAINING DEFICIENCY. - Replacements were

    found to be deficient in the ope ra tion of th e 50 Cal. MG and the MIC SniperRif le.

    SOURCE: Command Repor t - 25th Medical Battal ion

    DATE: May 1952 Source No 505(RESTRIC TED)

    IMPROPERLY TRAINED REPLACEMENTS. - Very l i t t le or ienta t ionhas been necessary for the EM replacements being ass igned to ambulanceand clear ing companies . However , considerable difficulty has been encount e red in Headquarters Company where many men have been given supplyMOSls for which they are untrained and unqualif ied. and consequently havebeen malass igned. The motor sect ion has had difficulty in obtaining schoolt ra ined mechanics . par ts men, and veh iele drivers .

    SOURCE: Command Repor t - 223rd Infantry RegimentDATE: May 1952 Source No 506

    (RESTRICTED)REPLACEMENTS. - Replacements received have not been of a high

    enough cal iber to assume duties without considerable training and indoct r ination. In order to give this training and indoctr inat ion i t has become neces sary to augment exist ing T /O&E. Adequate off icer replacements have beenrece ived. Warrant officers are st i l l in grea t demand and are apparent lyunavailable. A major problem is reclassificat ion of replacements who donot have a profi le that meets th e basic requirements of SR 615-25-15. R eclass i f ica t ion and reprofi1ing boards have been set up and will be functioningto t ry to el iminate malas s ignments .

    UNCL"SS\f\O

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    -ESSI;; ; I Ii i SUNClASS\F\EDA maj or problem a rose in office r as s ignm ents . As phase out and

    rota t ion re l ieved capta ins and IYlajor s, junior office rs mus t be as s ignedthe i r jobs . Replacements coming in with required rank m u s t be placedin the posi t ion commensura te to thei r rank, displacing the jun ior off icer .This cons tan t shuffling requi res an enornlOUS amount of paper work andsomet i mes leads to ten1porary confusion in assignlYlents and records. . I tbecame neces sa ry to se t up an ass ignment process ing form and an SOPto cope with the problem.(RESTRICTED)

    HEAVY MORTAR COMPANY. - Two recommenda t ions for a changein the T/O&'E were cons idered of pr in la ry importal1ce. Fi r s t , a r ev i s ionto desIgnate three forward obse rve r t eams with each platoon so tha t a teamcould be ass igned to each l ine company; Korean te r ra in affords only l imi tedobservat ion . Second, increase the number of SCR 610 radios so that eachforward obse rve r , each platoon, f ire direc t ion center and the company c o m mander would have one available; SCR 300 radios have been found inadequatein the presen t situation.

    * * *(RESTRICTED)

    RAID ON ENEMY BUNKERS AND FOR TIFICA TIONS. - On 7 May theIlkR platoon conducted a night ra id on enemy bunker s and for t i f ica t ions inf ront of the r ight battalion. Three s ix-man squads were uti l ized in theencounte r with two being used to isolate the posi t ion and prevent the enemyf rom inter fer ing with the m is sion while the third was succes sfuHy comple t ingthe dest ruct ion of five bunkers on the reverse slope of the hill .

    SOURCE: Command Repor t - IX Corps , Book IDATE: Apr i l 1952 Source No 507

    (RESTRIC TED)ARMY AIRCRAFT - OPEH.ATIONAL AVERAGE ... The operat ionallevel of L-19 's and L-17 s remained close t6 March f igures in a c r o s s

    sect ion check of records , with averages of 81% and 60% respect ively. Hel i copte rs dropped sharply , howe ve r , from an ope ra t ional leve l of 75o/c to oneof 60%, a decrease r endered l ess s ignif icant by considerat ion of the sma l ln u m b e r of such a irc ra f t invol ved in the calcula t ions . The operat ional averageof the three types combined was 76%. Durin'g a large num be r of the days in

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    which ai rcraf t were out of commission they were awaiting par ts , par t icular lyin the case of the L-17 's and hel icopters . Hydraulic sys tems gave m ostt rouble in the L-17 's , and engine mounts and brake assemblies in the L-19 ' s .shor tage of these la t te r pa,rts keeping two of the planes grounded for morethan three weeks.(RESTRICTED)

    ENEMY AR TILLER Y. - Constant improvement in hosti le art i l lerytechnique was indicated by the increased effect iveness of fire and tendencyto mass f i res of as many as 12 pieces quickly when renumerat ive targetswere otfered. Missions were principa l ly against friendly OP's , patrols o rother targets where observat ion was possible, and often originated fromenemy self -propel led gun units observed in action. However, during themiddle of the month hosti le art i l lery fired a number of counterbat tery mis sions and indicated the capabil i ty of delivering fire up to 10,000 mete r sbehind friendly l ines .

    SOURCE: Command Repor t - 64th Tank Battal ion (Medium) DATE: March 1952 Source No 508

    (RESTRiCTED)SOLDIERS' DEPOSIT. - Although Soldiers ' Deposit is intended as a

    readi ly available and easy means of saving and is operated solely for thesoldier , recommend reconside I,'ation of greate r latitude so that the soldiermay use Soldiers ' Deposit and know that he m ay withdraw his money uponpresentat ion of legit imate reasons for so doing, ra ther than be compel ledto awai t discharge or an emergency.

    SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps , Cml &: LnDATE: March 1952 Source No 509

    (CONFIDENTIAL)X-200 NAPALM LAND MINE. - The X-ZOO napalm land mine is madefrom salvaged 5 -gal lon oil cans. A bur ste r well is provided to protect theburs ter . The burs ter is obtained from the AN( )47 bomb filled with blackpowder and two s t rands of primacord. The burs te r f;l.nd wells a re manufactured by the 92d and 95th Chemical Servi,ce C o , r n p a n ~ e s in 1,(orea. A standard

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    engineer pull o r tr ip type f ir ing device with a No H detonator is requiredfor f ir ing. although the mine can be elect r ical ly detonated. This mine isused in draws, ravines , or cr i t ical approaches into fr iendly l ines. I tsdetonation causes casual t ies and produces back lighting effec ts . Approximate ly 800 were i ssued within th e corps dur ing the month and over 11,000have been drawn by units within the corps s ince the i tem became avai lable .The 1st ROK Division gave credi t to this nline as assist ing in s topping anat tack of battal ion size in thei r a rea. Three dead, badly burned enemybodies were found in the barbed wire af ter the action.(CONFIDENTIAL)

    FLAME THROWER. - A l ightweight, 2-gal lon , portable f lame th rowerwas developed unde r th e s upe rvis ion of the 1 Corps ChemicC}.l Off icer .by the92d Chemical Service Company. This i tem consis ts essent ial ly of a s tandardtank f rom the M2A I or M2A2 por table f lame throwe r , a s tandard p r e s s u r ~ regula tor , a standa rd f lame gun a OJ se rnbl y {rom the M2A 1 f lame thrower ,the s tandard f r ame, and an a ir bottle obtained {rom the A ir For ce 3-manl ife raf t . Average range obtafne,d with this f lame thrower is about 30 yardsbut ranges up to 40 yards have been achieved. Total weight filled is 40 Ibs.This i tem was examined and tested by th e 3d and 45th Infantry Di v i shns andfound favor with them. There is suff icient fuel fo r one good bur s t of f lameand it is anticipated that the shortagp of fu e I from the s tandard f lame th rowerwill be made up by carrying se vc ra 1 mn rc of the l ightweight f lame th rowersin each unit .

    SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps , A r m o rDATE: March 1952 Source No 510

    (RESTRICTED)MECHANICS FOR M4 6 TANKS. - F o r the last tw o o r three months ,

    units equipped with M4 6 tanks we re not rec ci ving mechan ics who were t rainedto repa i r these tanks. This necess i ta ted mechanic t ra ining pr ogr ams , pr i mari iy on-the- job t ra ining. in the units .

    EUSAK Army of f icer a r ranged for a rmy ordnance to conduct an M46tank mechanic school in SC(,Hd which will consis t of a two-weeks course . "Eachtank battal ion will receive i l quota of tw o mechanics per course and each tankcompany will receive a ql lotaof one mechanic per course .

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    16UNCLASSIFIED(RESTRICTED)RECOVER Y PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. - I t is r ecommended

    that al l corps units, when plaJ.lning a r mor ed opera t ions , include in the i rplans suff icient recovery per-sonnel and equipment to r ecover disabled vehicles immedia te ly af ter they' have become irnmobil ized. This will expeditebattlefield recovery and should cut down on the number of vehicles aitandonedin front of our bat t le posi t ions. Vehicles that are not recovered immedia te lyaf ter they have become immobil ized have been zeroed in by enemy ar t i l l e rywhich consequently makes th e recovery task more difficult and dangerous .

    SOURCE: Command Repor t - 224th Infantry RegimentDATE: May 1952 Source No 511

    (RESTRICTED)CONTAINERS F O R . 30 CALIBER MG AMMUNITION. - During the

    month the reg iment has been drawing . 30 cal iber machine-gun ammuni t ionpacked 1500 rounds to the containe r . This pack is unsa t is fac tory for thiste r ra in as it cannot be car r ied into posi t ions without being broken downinto smal le r conta iners . Ammunit ion should be kept in the origina l cont a iner unti l the t ime of expendi ture .

    * * *(RESTRICTED)PERCENTAGE OF WP FOR 4.2" MORTAR. - During the month ofMay the percentage of white phosphorus for 4. 2" mor ta r in the ammuni t ionsupply ra te went f rom 40 per cent to 70 per cent white phosphorus . This pe r ,centage is out of propor t ion to the actua l needs of the regiment based on pas tconsumption. Twenty per cent white phosphorus is recommended.

    SOURCE: Command Report - 56th Amphibious Tank & Trac tor Battal ion DATE: March 1 9 ~ ) 2 Source No 512

    (RESTRICTEJ))AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS. - The f i r s t 30-day training

    per iod at Okinawa r r vcaled th e need for an exper ienced and t rai l led am phibiousreconnaissance tean) from this battalion. A sma l l tean) of severa l enliste,d

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    m en and tw o officers was quickly organized for reef reconnaissance. l i fesaving work and salvage work, In addition, another team wa.s establ ishedto survey pos sible landing beadle s , Both teams we re highly successfuldespi te the lack of necessary equipment. As a resul t three off icers andtwenty-five enlisted men with swimming experience underwent an i n t ~ n s i v e recondi.tioning period and training program. Fur the r t raining of the t eamsis being car r ied on and will continue through the s u m m e r months to determinetheir value for possible incorpora t ion in an amphibious T /O&E.

    SOURCE: Command Report - 1st Field Observat ion BattalionDATE: May 1952 Source No 513

    (RESTRICTED)RECOMMENDATIONS. - Recommend t ~ a t in the t raining of flash

    and sound personnel more attentiofl. be paid to their use as intell igencesources with par t icu lar attention being paid to f ir ing observed ( target gridtype) miss ions , sending in completed intell igence repor t s , and forwardingshe l l - reps and cra t e r analysis reports .

    Recommend tha t strong considerat ion be given to the requirements ofan observat ion battalion for l ight type a irc ra f t in par t icu lar for hel icoptersfor survey work.

    There is an urgent need for at least tw o additional observat ion batte r ies to be assigned to this ' theater to ass is t in giving more coverage tooffset the increased build-up of enemy art i l lery.

    * * *(RESTRICTED). BATTALION WIRE NET MAINTAINED. - The battalion, to fulfilli t s miss ion, has to maintain 752 miles of wire net.

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    SOURCE: Command Report - 143 Fi.eld Arti l lery Battal ionDATE: May 1952 Source No 51 4

    (RESTRICTED)COUNTER MORTAR RADAR SECTION FOR FIELD ARTILLERY

    BATTALION. - Shel l repor ts received from bath art i l lery and infantryobservers a re inaccurate , and quite often lack azimuth and identificat ionof the type of round. This problem is being overcome by sending ar t i l lery and infantry personnel to a division ar t i l le ry shell reporting school ,and by concurrent , on- the- job t raining. The lack of a countermor ta rr adar section l imits our ability to locate enemy mor ta r posi t ions.

    I t i s recommended that both art i l lery and infantry personnel receiveaddit ional training in shel l reporting and cra te r analysis , and that thecountermor ta r radar sect ion be equipped and placed in operation in thebattalion.

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