Distinctiveness of others, mutability of selves: Their impact on self-evaluations.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology2000, Vol. 79, No. 6, 1068-1087

Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0022-3514/00/S5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.79.6.1068

Distinctness of Others, Mutability of Selves:Their Impact on Self-Evaluations

Diederik A. Stapel and Willem KoomenUniversity of Amsterdam

The authors postulate that the outcome of social comparison processes is determined by the role socialcomparison information serves during the self-evaluation process. Assimilation is more likely insituations that instigate the inclusion of social comparison information in self-representations. Contrastis the more probable outcome when information about another person is used as a reference point forself-judgments. Whether comparison information instigates interpretation or comparison effects dependson the distinctness of this information as well as the perceived mutability of the self. The authors foundsupport for their perspective using different types of manipulations of the distinctness construct, treatingself-mutability as a contextual as well as an individual-difference variable, and measuring the effects ofsocial comparisons on measures likely to reveal both assimilation and contrast effects (self-evaluativejudgments and behavioral predictions), assimilation effects only (mood measures), and motivationalself-repair effects (importance ratings of the focal comparison dimension).

The self is entwined with social life. People's self-views andself-evaluations are often influenced by the way they measure upto the performance of others. Knowledge about others' accom-plishments may lead people to contemplate their own prospectsand reevaluate their abilities and opinions (Festinger, 1954). Op-portunities for such social comparisons are ubiquitous and difficultto avoid. On a daily, if not hourly, basis people are bombardedwith information about other people's triumphs and failures andabout their actions and lifestyles through social interaction (e.g., afamous colleague across the hallway) and through media exposure(e.g., the attractive protagonist in one's favorite sitcom). Socialcomparisons are part and parcel of daily life and recurrently arriveunbidden. It is difficult to be exposed to somebody's success (orlack thereof) without reflecting on one's own accomplishments orabilities (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995).

People use others to evaluate themselves. But to what effect?Most of the early work on social comparison effects proceededfrom the assumption that comparisons to someone who is better-off (i.e., upward comparisons) are threatening and will dampenself-evaluations, whereas comparisons to someone who is worse-off (i.e., downward comparisons) are self-enhancing and will boostself-evaluations. This has led some researchers to conclude that themost natural and common consequence of social comparison pro-cesses is contrast (see Gilbert et al., 1995; Pelham & Wachsmuth,

Diederik A. Stapel and Willem Koomen, Department of Social Psychol-ogy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

This research was supported by Grants 575-70-074 and 400-72-040from the Dutch Science Foundation (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Weten-schappelijk Onderzoek) and by a fellowship from the Royal NetherlandsAcademy of Arts and Sciences.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to DiederikA. Stapel, who is now at the Department of Social and OrganizationalPsychology, University of Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat 2/1, 9712TS Groningen, the Netherlands. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected].

1995). As Brown (1998) wrote in a summary of the relevantliterature:

Most research shows evidence for a contrast effect: For example, wetend to regard ourselves as more attractive when we are in thecompany of unattractive people than when we are among people whoare very attractive. In a similar vein, we are more apt to think ofourselves as sophisticated and knowledgeable when discussing worldaffairs with the ill-informed than when we are conversing with thepolitically astute, (p. 117)

Notwithstanding the abundance of contrast effects in the socialcomparison literature (see Suls & Wills, 1991; Wood, 1989),recent empirical findings have suggested that the impact of bothupward and downward social comparisons on self-evaluation maybe assimilative as well as contrastive: Another person's successmay be a source of envy and self-doubt or of inspiration andelation, and another person's failure may boost one's sense ofrelative worth or status but can also be depressing or threatening ifit suggests that one's own status is likely to deteriorate. What thendetermines whether the effect of an upward or downward other onself-evaluations is assimilation or contrast?

A review of the relevant literature reveals several importantmoderators (Blanton, in press). For example, in Tesser's (1988)self-evaluation maintenance model, an important force steeringself-maintenance strategies is the relevance of the comparisondimension. Contrast is more likely when the comparison dimen-sion has personal relevance (e.g., a young musician listens to hisbrother, the concert pianist, and feels frustrated), whereas assimi-lation is more likely when the comparison dimension has nopersonal relevance and the other's performance instigates a reflec-tion effect (e.g., a young social psychologist listens to his brother,the concert pianist, and basks in reflected glory). Research byBrown and Brewer and their colleagues pointed at another mod-erator, suggesting that assimilation is more likely than contrastwhen one feels psychologically connected to the other and iden-tifies oneself with him or her, be it in a manner that is relativelynontrivial (e.g., the other is a member of a group that is important

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DISTINCTNESS, SELF-MUTABILITY, SOCIAL COMPARISON 1069

to oneself; see Brewer & Weber, 1994) or trivial (e.g., the other isborn on the same day as oneself; see Brown, Novick, Lord, &Richards, 1992). Recently, Lockwood and Kunda (1997) sug-gested that assimilation, rather than contrast, occurs when theother's performance is perceived as attainable rather than unattain-able. Their findings showed that role models are inspiring andego-inflating when their performance level appears to be withinone's reach (for a similar line of reasoning, see also Major, Testa,& Bylsma, 1991, on the role of "perceived controllability" andAspinwall, 1997, on the role of "self-expectancies" in the outcomeof social comparison). In a related vein, Buunk, Collins, Taylor,Van Yperen, and Dakoff (1990) found that cancer patients feelrelatively optimistic and hopeful after contacts with good copersand long-term survivors when they have high self-esteem and theirfocus is self-improvement rather than self-evaluation (see alsoBuunk & Ybema, 1997; Taylor & Lobel, 1989).

In the present study, we set out to further the understanding ofwhat determines the consequences of self-evaluative comparisonsby focusing less on the direction of social comparison information(i.e., is it upward or downward?) but more on the manner of its useduring the self-evaluation process. We tested the hypothesis that animportant determinant of the impact of information about an"other" on self-evaluations is the role this information is likely toserve in the self-evaluation process. What many recent investiga-tions of the self-evaluative consequences of social comparisoninformation have in common is that comparison information ismore likely to lead to assimilation when this information is "in-cluded in," that is, is perceived as part of the self, whereas contrastis more likely when such inclusion process does not occur. Whenthe latter is the case, the other is more likely to function as acomparison standard against which the self is contrasted. In otherwords, the common thread running through investigations of theimportance of personal relevance, psychological closeness, attain-ability, self-esteem, and improvement goals for the occurrence ofaffiliation (Taylor & Lobel, 1989), reflection (Tesser, 1988), iden-tification (Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown et al., 1992), and inspi-ration (Buunk et al., 1990; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) versuscontrast effects may be the following: Assimilation is more likelyin situations that instigate the inclusion of social comparisoninformation in self-definitions or self-evaluations, whereas con-trast is the more probable outcome when information about an-other person is used as a reference point for self-judgments.Looking at the issue from this rather general perspective (cf.Schwarz & Bless, 1992) begs the question, What then are impor-tant determinants of whether inclusion or exclusion and compari-son processes will be instigated? In the current studies, our ap-proach to answering this question is informed by a generalperspective on the cognitive processes underlying the constructionof judgments (cf., Kruglanski & Mayeless, 1990; Wills & Suls,1991). This perspective is reflected in several recent models ofknowledge accessibility effects that either implicitly assume orexplicitly postulate a direct relation between the consequences ofaccessible information and the role such information serves in theconstruction of judgments (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Manis & Paske-witz, 1984; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Stapel, Koomen, & Van derPligt, 1996, 1997; Trope, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1989; for reviews,see Martin & Tesser, 1992; Stapel & Koomen, in press). Specif-ically, it has been posited that assimilation is more likely wheninformation is used as an interpretation frame during the encoding

of disambiguation of a stimulus, whereas contrast is the morelikely outcome when information is used as a comparison standard.Recent tests of this interpretation-comparison logic have identi-fied several determinants of whether the impact of information onsubsequent evaluations is more likely to be driven either by inter-pretation or by comparison processes (see Schwarz & Bless, 1992;Stapel & Koomen, in press; Stapel et al., 1996,1997). We focus ontwo such factors that seem to be especially relevant to socialcomparison effects: (a) the distinctness of the information aboutthe other and (b) the perceived mutability of the self. Specifically,social comparison information will result in contrastive compari-son effects when this information is distinct. Assimilation willoccur when the information activated during social comparison isindistinct and when the self is seen as mutable. The reasoningbehind these predictions is relatively straightforward.

Distinctness of Social Comparison Information

Helson (1964) noted that stimuli that do not provide informationthat is perceived as distinctive will not be used as subjectivestandards for purposes of comparison. Distinct person information(e.g., information about "Leon") constitutes a separate entity withclear object boundaries and is therefore more likely to be used asa comparison standard in the construction of self-judgments thanindistinct, abstract information (e.g., "intelligent") that can be lesseasily used as a clear and specific anchor point. Wyer and Srull(1989) argued that information is more likely to serve as a com-parison standard in social judgments when a distinct actor-traitlink (e.g., "Leon is intelligent") is activated than when that infor-mation merely consists of indistinct trait concepts (e.g., "intelli-gent"). When information is indistinct, assimilation rather thancontrast is likely to occur. As Murphy and Zajonc (1993) put it,such "diffuse" information "can 'spill over' onto unrelated stim-uli" (p. 736; for a review of empirical corroborations of this claim,see Stapel & Koomen, in press). In the current set of experiments,we tested the influence of distinctness in a more direct way (byexposing participants either to abstract trait information or toconcrete actor-trait links) as well as in a less direct, but ecologi-cally more valid, way (e.g., by either simply exposing participantsto social comparison information or giving participants an explicitimpression set while they processed such information).

Mutability of the Self

Previous research on the distinctness criterion (see above) hassuggested that distinct social comparison information is less likelyto be used as an interpretation frame for self-evaluations thanindistinct information. Does this mean that indistinct social com-parison information will result in assimilation by default? No. Forassimilation to occur, there must be room in people's self-viewsfor inclusion. This is more likely to be the case when the self isperceived as a mutable rather than an immutable entity. When theimage of who or what one is on a certain dimension is unclear andcan be influenced relatively easily, indistinct social comparisoninformation is more likely to be used for self-definitional purposes,for constructing a representation or evaluation of relevantself-aspects.

Thus, for assimilative interpretation effects to occur, socialcomparison information needs to be indistinct and self-views need

1070 STAPEL AND KOOMEN

to be mutable. No such assimilation effects should emerge whenthe self is viewed as immutable. Contrast is likely to occur whensocial comparison information is perceived as distinct. Here, selfmutability is not an issue because such contrast effects reflect theuse of information as a comparison anchor rather than an inter-pretation frame. Accordingly, the emergence of such contrasteffects should be independent of whether the self is perceived as amutable or immutable entity (cf. Stapel et al., 1996, 1997). Thislast hypothesis may sound somewhat counterintuitive. Why shouldself-evaluations be affected by social comparisons when peoplehave clear, immutable self-views? Is not it more likely that undersuch circumstances the self is immune for social comparisoneffects? Not necessarily. Suppose one has a clear and stable pictureof one's height or weight. One is not searching for relevantfeedback or other information that fulfills a need to know moreabout oneself on these dimensions (cf. Campbell, 1990). One iswho one is. In this case, social experience is unlikely to have anassimilative interpretation effect because there is no room in one'sself-view for inclusion of new information, because there is noth-ing to be interpreted or construed. Still, contrast effects may occurwhen distinct social comparison information changes one's rela-tive standing on a particular dimension. That is, one is more likelyto evaluate oneself as less intelligent after reading the autobiogra-phy of Marie Curie than after scanning the latest tabloid informa-tion about Pamela Anderson Lee. Such information is likely tochange the anchor or standard against which one evaluates oneself,irrespective of whether one's assessment of how intelligent one is,is relatively clear or unclear.

In sum, then, informed by recent studies on the consequences ofaccessible information (see Martin & Tesser, 1992; Stapel &Koomen, in press), we formulated an interaction hypothesis ofsocial comparison effects that may further the understanding of thebasic psychological principles underlying the self-evaluative con-sequences of social information. This interaction hypothesis positsthat to be able to understand and predict the self-evaluative con-sequences of social comparisons, one needs to look at both sides ofthe social comparison equation. The impact of social comparisoninformation on self-evaluation is likely to be determined by aninteraction between features of this information (e.g., the distinct-ness of activated information) and features of the self (e.g., theperceived mutability of relevant aspects of the self). Together,these features determine whether the impact of social comparisoninformation will be driven primarily by assimilative interpretationor contrastive comparison processes.

Research Overview

In the present five experiments, we put our interaction perspec-tive on social comparison effects to a first empirical test. Toincrease the generalizability of our findings, we used differenttypes of manipulations of the two constructs under investigationhere: the perceived distinctness of social comparison informationand the perceived mutability of the self. Specifically, in Experi-ments 1 to 3, we treated self-mutability as a contextual variablethat can be manipulated by subtly activating mutable versus im-mutable self-views. In Experiments 4 and 5, we treated self-mutability as a chronic, individual difference variable and prese-lected participants who scored high or low on Campbell's (1990)Self-Concept Clarity Scale.

We also investigated the impact of the distinctness construct byusing several manipulations. In Experiments 1 and 5, participantswere given upward or downward comparison information andwere instructed to either memorize this information or form animpression of the protagonist. Because earlier research has shownthat distinct actor-trait links will be activated under impressionconditions, whereas abstract behavior labels are more likely to beactivated under memory instructions, this manipulation is relevantto testing the distinctness factor (see Uleman, Newman, & Mos-kowitz, 1996). In Experiment 3, we manipulated distinctness byexposing participants to an upward or downward comparison otherand manipulating whether participants were asked to give judg-ments of this other before they reported their self-evaluations.Social cognition research has shown that explicitly evaluating anobject renders its mental representation concrete and distinct ratherthan abstract and indistinct (e.g., Martin & Seta, 1983). Thus,judgment order (other-self, self-other) is another useful way ofstudying the impact of the perceived distinctness of social com-parison information on self-evaluations. Thus, together, Experi-ments 1, 3, and 5 test the hypothesis that whether an impressionformation goal is active (through implicit goal activation or ex-plicit judgment) determines whether exposure to social compari-son information results in assimilation or contrast. In Experi-ments 2 and 4, the distinctness factor is studied in a more directway. In these experiments, participants are either subtly exposed toindistinct, abstract trait information (e.g., intelligent) or to personnames that exemplify this information (e.g., Einstein).

In each of the experiments reported here, the impact of thesedifferent manipulations of the mutability and distinctness factorson participants' self-evaluations was measured by asking them tojudge themselves on a number of 7-point trait dimensions. How-ever, besides this traditional measure of social comparison effects(see Suls & Wills, 1991; Wood, 1989), in Experiments 2 to 4, weincluded measures of the perceived importance of the focal com-parison dimension and measures of participants' mood, and inExperiment 5, we included measures of behavioral predictions togauge self-evaluations. Together, these different types of manip-ulations and measures enable us to more effectively tap the psy-chological mechanisms underlying the self-evaluative conse-quences of the distinctness and mutability constructs and thus helpin the quest for a more complete understanding of the socialcomparison process.

Experiment 1

As outlined above, one important determinant of the self-evaluative consequences of social comparison information is theperceived distinctness of such information. The implicit assump-tion of most social comparison research is that when we areexposed to an individual's successes or failures, self-evaluationsare affected by more or less automatic computations of the simi-larities or differences between this specific other and self (seeGilbert et al., 1995; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Mussweiler &Strack, 2000; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995; Suls & Wills, 1991;Wood, 1989). Social cognition research suggests, however, that onperceiving a person, one immediately infers abstract constructssuch as personality traits and stereotypes. For example, research onstereotyping effects has demonstrated that exposure to a memberof a stereotyped group (e.g., Mike, a football hooligan) may


automatically activate a stereotypical trait construct (e.g., "aggres-sive"; see Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Similarly, research onspontaneous trait inferences suggest that seeing behavior (e.g.,Thomas helps an old lady cross the street) is sufficient for thespontaneous activation of the relevant trait concept (e.g., "help-ful") (e.g., Uleman et al., 1996). In other words, what is cogni-tively activated by exposure to social comparison information isneither solely nor necessarily a distinct actor-trait link (e.g., "Mikeis aggressive," "Thomas is helpful"). However, the competitive(e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970), performance-oriented (e.g., Tesser,1988), or explicitly comparative (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breiten-becher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Buunk et al., 1990; Muss-weiler & Strack, 2000; Taylor & Lobel, 1989) context in maysocial comparison studies might have increased the activation ofdistinct actor-trait links relative to that of abstract trait concepts insuch studies. Hence, although research has demonstrated thatexposure to social behavior may activate trait concepts as well asactor-trait links, to date, investigations of the impact of socialcomparison information on self-evaluations have mainly been con-cerned with the impact of distinct actor-trait links on self-evaluations. We address this void in the literature by investigatingand comparing the impact of distinct actor-trait links and indistincttrait concepts on self-evaluations.

In the present study, we exposed participants to behavior de-scriptions of an upward or downward comparison other underconditions that should instigate the processing of these behaviorseither in terms of indistinct traits or distinct actor-trait links.Specifically, a number of investigations have demonstrated thatactor-trait links (e.g., "Stanley is sweet") are more likely to beactivated when participants have an impression formation goalwhen perceiving behavior (e.g., "Please try to form an impressionof this person"), whereas abstract behavior labels (e.g., "sweet")are more likely to be activated under memory instructions (e.g.,"Please try to remember these behavior descriptions," see Stapel etal., 1996; Uleman et al., 1996). Thus, the perceived distinctness ofsocial comparison information may be affected by the goal withwhich people approach and process information. This, in turn, mayaffect the self-evaluative consequences of this information.

Our interaction hypothesis posits that these self-evaluative con-sequences are also dependent on the perceived malleability ofpeople's self-views. That is, whereas distinct social comparisoninformation is likely to yield contrastive comparison effects, inde-pendent of whether people view the self as a mutable or immutableentity, indistinct information is likely to yield assimilation whenthe self is seen as mutable but not when seen as immutable. In thepresent experiment, we manipulated perceived self-mutability byfocusing participants on the mutable, variable aspects of the self(e.g., "You behave differently at a party than at home with yourparents") and asking them to give self-ratings as they are "at thismoment" versus making salient the immutable, stable aspects ofthe self (e.g., "You have a certain personality that does not changefrom day to day") and asking them to give self-ratings that reflecttheir personality. As Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, and Baldwin (1999)recently wrote, "the self is, at the same time, responsive to socialforces but stable in the face of highly variable social inputs" (p.24). Making one of these aspects of the complex self-systemsalient should increase the relative accessibility of mutable versusimmutable self-views and thus should allow us to investigate theinteraction between the distinctness and mutability constructs.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred eighty-five students were randomly assigned to the con-ditions of a 2 (valence of other: positive vs. negative) X 2 (instruction:memorization vs. impression) X 2 (self-view: mutable, immutable)between-subjects design or to one of two (mutable vs. immutable) controlconditions in which participants were asked to give self-evaluations butwere not exposed to social comparison information. Participants re-ceived 10 guilders (approximately U.S. $4) for their participation.

Procedure and Materials

On arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in individualcubicles. They were told that they would participate in unrelated studiesand that they would receive all instructions from a computer. The exper-imenter started the computer program and left the cubicle. The computerprogram randomly assigned participants to 1 of the 10 conditions of thisstudy.

Social comparison information. In the memorization and impressionconditions, participants received eight short paragraphs, describing either asuccessful, attractive, intelligent, and well-liked student (positive condi-tion) or an unsuccessful, unattractive, unintelligent, and less likable student(negative condition). For male participants, the protagonist in these para-graphs was male (named "Paul"). For female participants, the protagonistwas female (named "Paula"). All participants were told to carefully readthese paragraphs and that each of these paragraphs would appear on thescreen for 5 s. Pretests had shown that this was sufficient time to carefullyread these paragraphs. The first two paragraphs students read were neutralfiller statements (e.g., "Paul[a] is a student at the University of Amsterdam.He [She] is 22 years old and lives together with several fellow students ina large house near the center of town."). The order in which the next sixparagraphs were presented was randomized. Examples of positive para-graphs are "Most people say Paul[a] is intelligent, attractive, and friendly.He [She] has many friends" and "Although Paul[a] never studies very longfor his [her] mid-terms or finals, he [she] always scores high on tests andwrites clever and interesting papers." In the negative conditions, thoseparagraphs read "Most people say Paul[a] is not very intelligent, relativelyunattractive, and not so friendly. He [She] does not have many friends,"and "Although Paul[a] always studies quite long for his [her] mid-terms offinals, he [she] always scores low on tests and writes bad and uninterestingpapers."

Before being exposed to the social comparison information, participantswere given instructions concerning how to process this information. Theseinstructions were modeled after earlier investigations of the impact ofprocessing goals on judgment (see Stapel et al., 1996; Uleman et al., 1996).Memorization participants were informed that they were participating in astudy of sentence memory and that their task was to memorize the contentsof each of the six behavior descriptions that would appear on the screen.Impression participants were informed that they were participating in astudy of impression formation and that their task was to read the sixparagraphs that would appear on the screen to form an impression of theperson described (Paul or Paula) and his or her characteristics.

Self-evaluation. After completion of the social comparison informa-tion task, memorization and impression participants were asked to start thesecond task, self-evaluation. For control participants, the computer pro-gram immediately started this self-evaluation task. This task was intro-duced as part of a general survey among the student population of theNetherlands. All participants were first asked several general questions forstatistical purposes (e.g., age, gender, place of birth, study major). Afterthis, participants in the self-mutability condition were given the followingintroduction to the self-evaluation part of the questionnaire:

Now we want to ask you some questions about how you see yourselfat this moment. As you know, our personalities are transient and


Table 1Mean Self-Evaluations as a Function of Valence Other (Positivevs. Negative), Instruction (Memorization vs. Impression),and Self-View (Mutable vs. Immutable)

Self-evaluation

MutableImmutable

Memorization

Positive

7565

Negative

6066

Impression

Positive Negative

59 8059 81

Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 100. Higher numbers indicate more positiveself-evaluations. Mean self-evaluations were 69 in the mutable controlcondition and 66 in the immutable control condition.

malleable. We behave differently at a party with friends than at homewith our parents. Sometimes we feel unhappy and dissatisfied,whereas at other times we feel happy and are relatively content withourselves.

Participants in the self-immutability condition were given a differentintroduction to the self-evaluative questions:

Now we want to ask you some questions about how you see yourself.As you know, every person has a certain personality. Sometimes youfeel happy, whereas at other times you feel a little depressed, but thestructure of your personality will always constitute a solid backgroundfactor. There are certain things that you like or dislike because that iswho you are.

After having read this mutability manipulation, all participants ratedthemselves on the following 12 adjectives that were presented to themscreen by screen: attractive, kind, bright, successful, sincere, dexterous,undetermined, incompetent, hostile, average, egotistical, and arrogant.These items were rated using the computer mouse as a pointer on 100-pointscales with endpoints labeled 1 (not at all) and 100 (very). The order inwhich these items were presented was randomized. Next, as a manipulationcheck of the mutability manipulation, participants were asked to indicatewhether they thought personality was a variable (scored as "1") or stable(scored as "7") construct.

Debriefing. On completion of the questionnaire, participants wereasked to return to the experimenter. Participants were carefully debriefedabout the goal and purpose of the ostensibly unrelated experiments. Spe-cifically, a funneling procedure was used (see Bargh, 1997) to tap theextent to which participants were aware of the relation between the differ-ent studies. None of the participants indicated suspicion of the actualrelation between the tasks. Furthermore, when explicitly asked, none of theparticipants felt the first task might have influenced their performance onthe self-evaluation task. After debriefing, participants were thanked, paid,and dismissed.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Check

First, we checked whether the self-mutability manipulation waseffective by investigating the impact of the experimental manipu-lations on participants' ratings of the variability question. Asexpected, the relevant analysis of variance (ANOVA) over thecomplete design revealed a main effect of self-mutability on thisrating dimension, F(l, 283) = 105.72, p < .01 (other effects, ps >.13). Participants who were given the "self-is-mutable" text indeedrated personality to be more variable (M = 3.8) than participantswho were given the "self-is-immutable" text (M = 5.3).

Main Analyses

We averaged all self-evaluation items into a single index afterreverse scoring the negative items (Cronbach's a = .71). Next, weinvestigated whether the mutability manipulation had an effect onthe self-evaluation when no social comparison was presented toparticipants. Analyses revealed that the self-mutability self-view(M = 69) and the self-immutability self-view (M = 66) controlconditions did not differ significantly from each other.

The effects of valence other (positive vs. negative), instruction(memorization vs. impression), and self-view (immutable vs. mu-table) on the self-evaluation index were investigated by perform-ing a Valence of Other X Instruction X Self-View ANOVA. Thisrevealed the predicted Valence of Other X Instruction X Self-View interaction, F(l, 218) = 6.17, p < .05, a Valence of Other XSelf-View interaction, F(l, 218) = 7.70, p < .01, a Valence ofOther X Instruction interaction, F(l, 218) = 86.33, p < .01, andmain effects of valence other, F(l, 218) = 24.42, p < .01, andinstruction, F(l, 218) = 4.99, p < .05.

To assess the pattern of this interaction, we conducted separateanalyses for the memorization conditions (for which we predictedassimilation, but only when participants' self-views were mutable)and the impression conditions (for which we predicted contrast,independent of participants' self-views) of the design. Table 1presents mean self-evaluation for each of the conditions.1

Memorization conditions. An ANOVA revealed the predictedValence of Other X Self-View interaction, F(l, 107) = 12.70, p <.01. As can be seen in Table 1, this interaction reflects that forparticipants for whom the mutable aspects of the self were madesalient, assimilation occurred. Self-evaluations were more positive(M = 75) after exposure to positive social comparison informationthan after exposure to negative social comparison information(M = 60), F(l, 107) = 21.07, p < .01. Self-evaluations were notaffected by social comparison information when self-views wereimmutable (F < 1). Here, self-evaluations in the positive condition(M = 65) and negative condition (M = 66) were similar to therelevant control group (M = 66) and halfway between self-evaluations in the mutable conditions.

Impression conditions. An ANOVA revealed the predictedmain effect of valence other, F(l, 111) = 110.53, p < .01. As canbe seen in Table 1, this effect reflects that independent of self-mutability, contrast occurred. Self-evaluations were less positive(M = 59) after exposure to positive social comparison informationthan after exposure to negative social comparison information(M = 81).

These results show that the impact of social comparison infor-mation on self-evaluations is dependent on the goal (memorizationvs. impression) with which this information is processed and theself-view (mutable vs. immutable) that is salient at the time ofself-evaluation. Because earlier research has demonstrated the linkbetween memorization and impression goals and the distinctnessof the so-activated information, this experiment provides the firstsupport for the interaction hypothesis of social comparison effects.

1 It is important to note that in this experiment as well as in the other fourexperiments reported, analyses for single self-evaluation items showedsimilar patterns (in terms of both direction and strength) of results as theanalyses over the composite evaluation index that was based on therelevant items.


Social comparison information yields contrast when this informa-tion is perceived as a distinct actor-trait link, whereas assimilationwill occur when the activated information is indistinct and the selfis perceived as mutable.

Experiment 2

In our first experiment we put our interaction hypothesis of theself-evaluative consequences of social comparisons to a first test.Although successful, our approach to testing the distinctness com-ponent of the interaction hypothesis was relatively indirect. Dis-tinctness was manipulated by giving participants either a memo-rization instruction (which is supposed to lead to trait activationduring encoding) or an impression instruction (which is supposedto lead to actor-trait activation during encoding) before exposureto behavior descriptions of an upward or downward other. In thepresent experiment, we tested the interaction hypothesis by meansof a more direct route. We used a priming procedure (see Herr,1986) to make either indistinct trait or distinct person informationdirectly accessible just before participants made self-evaluations.Specially, in the indistinct trait priming conditions, participantswere primed with intelligent versus stupid. In the distinct personpriming conditions, participants were primed with names of fa-mous or well-known people associated with a relatively high(Einstein) or low (Gordon, a Dutch vocalist, who was rated asrelatively unintelligent in a pretest) degree of intelligence. Afterthe priming manipulation, participants were asked to evaluatethemselves on adjectives that were either related or unrelated to theintelligence dimension. As in Experiment 1, self-mutability wasmanipulated by making either the transient or stable aspects of theself-system salient. For trait primes, we expected assimilation, butonly when the self was perceived as mutable. Participants primedwith intelligent should evaluate themselves as more intelligentthan those primed with stupid. For person primes, we expectedcontrast, independent of the level of self-mutability. Participantsprimed with the name of a particularly bright person shouldevaluate themselves as less intelligent than those primed with thename of a person who is perceived to be relatively unintelligent.

Because of the dimension-specific nature of the trait and personprimes, these assimilation and contrast effects were most likely tooccur on intelligence-related items. Thus, compared with Experi-ment 1, where the social comparison information consisted ofdescriptions of either high or low degrees of intelligence, attrac-tiveness, and friendliness (see Experiment 1, Method), and effectswere found on diverse range of self-evaluations, in the presentexperiment social comparison is much more specific (i.e., concernsone dimension), and therefore the self-evaluative consequences arelikely to be more specific. As earlier research on informationaccessibility effects has shown, specific (rather than general) prim-ing is likely to affect a restricted (rather than a broad) range ofresponses (see Stapel & Koomen, in press). Or, in social compar-ison parlance: Being outperformed in mathematics is likely to havea different effect on self-judgments of one's artistic skills than onself-judgments of one's mathematical skills.

Besides asking participants to evaluate themselves on severalintelligence-related and intelligence-unrelated adjectives, we alsoincluded two other measures to tap the impact of primed socialcomparison information on self-evaluations, namely an importancemeasure and a mood measure.

Importance

After participants had completed the self-evaluation measure,we gave them a measure designed to tap the personal importanceof several characteristics, such as healthy, rich, attractive, and mostimportantly—the focal trait of the current experiment, intelligent.By asking participants to indicate how important they feel "beingintelligent" is, we may be able to find evidence for self-repair orself-maintenance (cf. Campbell, 1986; Tesser, 1988) strategiesin conditions in which the self-evaluative consequences ofintelligence-related social comparison information are relativelynegative or painful. That is, if one's judgment of one'sintelligence-level is relatively negative because Albert Einstein isan activated comparison standard, one may lower one's ratings ofthe importance of intelligence to remedy the pain: It does not feelso bad to be unintelligent when intelligence is not such an impor-tant personality characteristic. Tesser and his colleagues (Tesser,1988; Tesser & Campbell, 1983; Tesser & Paulhus, 1983) haveindeed demonstrated that dimensions are rated less important andless self-relevant when social comparisons have negative conse-quences compared with when they have positive consequences. Onthe basis of these findings, we predicted that the importance ratingsof intelligence would show a self-repair pattern (cf. Campbell,1986; Lewicki, 1985; Rosenberg, 1979, Tesser, 1988). Importanceratings of dimensions that were not the focus of the intelligence-oriented social comparison information should not differ betweenconditions (e.g., health, attractiveness). However, importance rat-ings of intelligence should be lower in conditions in which socialcomparison information had a negative effect (i.e., the positiveperson priming conditions and the negative trait priming andmutable self condition) compared with the other conditions.

Mood

In addition to the self-evaluation and importance ratings, wealso included a measure of participants' mood. Immediately afterparticipants had completed the trait or person priming procedure,we asked them to indicate how negative or positive their mood was"at this moment" after they had completed the priming task. Thus,not only in the self-mutable conditions but also in the self-immutable conditions this measure was a first, global, and tempo-rary assessment of the impact on affect of the priming manipula-tion. On the basis of our hypothesis that trait priming will instigateinterpretation processes and person priming will instigate compar-ison processes, we predicted the following. The trait primingepisode should lead to assimilation on the general mood measurebecause priming positive or negative traits is likely to activate (viaspreading activation) other positive or negative cognitions, respec-tively. These cognitions are likely to be included in, to informjudgment when people are asked how they feel, especially whenthis question is framed in general terms and immediately followsthe priming episode (see Erber, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987;Schwarz, 1990). Our interaction hypothesis suggests that personpriming will activate not only cognitions of a particular valenceother but also person-self comparisons (e.g., "I am less intelligentthan Einstein"; see Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). In terms of generalaffect, the valence of the primes ("Einstein is intelligent" —»positive) and the valence of self-cognitions ("I am not intelligent" —»negative) may thus work in opposite directions. Hence, person


priming is less likely to have impact on a general measure of theaffect generated by the priming episode.

Method


One hundred fifty-seven students were randomly assigned to the condi-tions of a 2 (valence: intelligent vs. unintelligent) X 2 (type: trait vs.person) X 2 (self-view: mutable vs. immutable) between-subjects design orto one of two (mutable vs. immutable) control conditions in which partic-ipants were asked to give self-evaluations but did not perform the primingtask. Participants received partial course credit for their participation.


Participants were led to believe that they participated in two ostensiblyunrelated studies. To ensure that they did not think the two studies wererelated, the studies were part of a general testing session in which partic-ipants were given several questionnaires to fill out. Furthermore, thematerials of the two studies were printed in different letter types and ondifferent colors of paper (see Stapel & Koomen, in press). Participants inthe trait- and person-priming conditions first performed the priming taskand then the self-evaluation task. Participants in the control condition didnot perform the priming task.

Social comparison information. The priming task was entitled "WordPuzzle" and consisted of one page with a 20 X 20 matrix of letters withfive words embedded therein (cf. Herr, 1986). A list of these words wasprovided to ensure that participants could find all the words. Two of thefive words were priming stimuli; the other three words were fillers (e.g.,table, painting). In the positive trait priming condition the primes wereintelligent and smart. In the negative trait priming condition the primeswere stupid and dumb. In the positive person priming condition the primeswere Albert and Einstein. In the negative person priming condition theprimes were Singer and Gordon. Gordon is a famous Dutch vocalist andtelevision personality. A pretest (n = 14) had indicated that Dutch studentsrate Gordon as relatively unintelligent (M = 3.2 on a 7-point unintelligent-intelligent scale). Einstein scored wry high on this pretest (M = 6.6).

Mood. After completion of the priming task, participants were asked toindicate, on a scale ranging from 1 (negative) to 7 (positive), "how positiveor negative your mood is at this moment, now that you have finished theword puzzle task."

Self-evaluation. After completion of the mood measure, participantswere asked to start the second task, self-evaluation. Control participantsimmediately started this self-evaluation task. This task and the mutabilitymanipulation were identical to Experiment 1, with the following excep-tions: After having read this mutability manipulation, all participants ratedthemselves on the following 14 adjectives that were presented in thefollowing order: attractive, intelligent, kind, friendly, successful, sincere,dexterous, undetermined, incompetent, hostile, average, egotistical, bright,and arrogant. Intelligence-related (intelligent, incompetent, bright) andintelligence-unrelated rating scales were thus interspersed with each other.Ratings were made along a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Afterthese self-evaluations, participants were given the mutability manipulationcheck.

Importance. Next, participants were asked to indicate how importantfor them personally it was to possess the following characteristics: healthy,rich, attractive, intelligent, independent, honest, and friendly. Ratings weremade along a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).

Debriefing. On completion of the questionnaires, participants weredebriefed about the goal and purpose of the ostensibly unrelated experi-ments (see Experiment 1). None of the participants indicated suspicion ofthe actual relation between the tasks.


Manipulation Check

First, the effects of the independent variables on the variabilityquestion were checked. As expected, an ANOVA over the com-plete design revealed a main effect of self-mutability on this ratingdimension, F(l, 155) = 23.19, p < .01 (other effects, Fs < 1).Participants who were given the "self is mutable" text indeed ratedpersonality to be more variable (M = 4.2) than participants whowere given the "self is immutable" text (M = 5.1).

Self-Evaluation

First, the effects of the independent variables were tested inANOVAs on each of the 14 self-evaluation items. As predicted,this revealed effects on the intelligence-related but not on theintelligence-unrelated ratings (Fs < 1). After reverse scoring thenegative item, we averaged the intelligence-related self-evaluationitems (intelligent, incompetent, bright) into a single index (Cron-bach's a = .82) that was used in the following analyses. Next, weinvestigated whether the mutability manipulation had an effect onself-evaluation when no primes were activated. Analyses revealedthat the mutable self-view (M = 5.4) and the immutable self-view(M = 5.7) control conditions did not differ significantly from eachother.

The effects of valence (intelligent vs. unintelligent), type (traitvs. person), and self-view (immutable vs. mutable) on the self-evaluation index were investigated by performing a Valence XType X Self-View ANOVA. This revealed the predicted Va-lence X Type X Self-View interaction, F(l, 120) = 8.79, p < .01and a Valence X Type interaction, F(l, 120) = 53.82, p < .01(other effects, ps > .07).

To assess the pattern of this interaction, we conducted separateanalyses for the trait priming conditions (for which we predictedassimilation, but only when participants' self-views were mutable)and the person priming conditions (for which we predicted con-trast, independent of participants' self-views) of the design (cf.Experiment 1). Table 2 presents self-evaluation means for each ofthe conditions.

Trait priming conditions. An ANOVA revealed the predictedValence X Self-View interaction, F(l, 58) = 8.75,p < .01. As canbe seen in Table 2, this interaction reflects that for participants forwhom the mutable aspects of the self were made salient, assimi-lation occurred. Self-evaluations were more positive (M = 6.1)

Table 2Mean Self-Evaluations on Intelligence-Related Items as aFunction of Valence (Intelligent vs. Unintelligent), Type (Traitvs. Person), and Self-View (Mutable vs. Immutable)

Self-evaluation

MutableImmutable

Intelligent

6.15.7

Trait

Unintelligent

4.95.5

Person

Intelligent Unintelligent

5.0 6.15.1 5.9

Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher numbers indicate more positiveself-evaluations. Mean self-evaluations were 5.4 in the mutable controlcondition and 5.7 in the immutable control condition.


after exposure to positive traits than after exposure to negativetraits (A/ = 4.9), F(l, 58) = 24.53,/? < .01. Self-evaluations werenot affected by trait priming when self-views were immutable(F < 1). Here, self-evaluations in the positive condition (M = 5.7)and negative condition (M = 5.5) were similar to the relevantcontrol group (M = 5.7) and halfway between self-evaluations inthe mutable conditions.

Person priming conditions. An ANOVA revealed the pre-dicted main effect of valence, F(l, 62) = 47.41, p < .01. As canbe seen in Table 2, this effect reflects that independent of self-mutability, contrast occurred. Self-evaluations were less positive(M = 5.1) after exposure to an intelligent person (Albert Einstein)than after exposure to a less intelligent person (vocalist Gordon,M = 6.0).

Importance

Valence X Type X Self-View ANOVAs for each of the impor-tance ratings revealed that our manipulations did not affect theperceived importance of being healthy, rich, attractive, indepen-dent, honest, or friendly (Fs < 1). An ANOVA did show effects onthe perceived importance of being intelligent, as revealed in aValence X Type X Self-View interaction, F(l, 120) = 4.12,/? <.05, a Valence X Type interaction, F(l, 120) = 51.89,/? < .01, anda Type X Self-View interaction, F(l, 120) = 6.41, p < .05 (otherps > .17). Table 3 shows that, as predicted, intelligence impor-tance ratings were lower in conditions in which social comparisoninformation had a negative effect (i.e., the positive person/mutableself, M = 4.9; positive person/immutable self, M = 5.0; negativetrait/mutable self, M = 4.9) compared with the other experimentalconditions (i.e., the negative person/mutable self, M = 6.4; nega-tive person/immutable self, M = 6.0; positive trait/mutable self,M = 6.1; positive trait/immutable self, M = 6.3; negative trait/immutable self, M = 5.8) and the relevant control conditions(mutable self-view control condition, M = 6.4; immutable self-view control condition, M = 6.1; for all comparisons betweenself-deflated and the self-not-deflated conditions, ps < .05).

Table 3Mean Importance Ratings of Being Intelligent and MoodRatings as a Function of Valence (Intelligent vs. Unintelligent),Type (Trait vs. Person), and Self-View (Mutable vs. Immutable)

Measure

Importance ofintelligence

MutableImmutable

MoodMutableImmutable

Intelligent

6.16.3

5.65.9

Trait

Unintelligent

4.95.8

4.54.7

Person

Intelligent

4.95.0

4.95.0

Unintelligent

6.46.0

5.35.0

Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher numbers indicate more importantor positive ratings. Mean importance ratings and mood ratings were 6.4and 5.1, respectively, in the mutable control condition and 6.1 and 5.0,respectively, in the immutable control condition.

Mood

As predicted, mood judgments showed that the priming episodeaffected only general affect in the trait priming conditions. AValence X Type X Self-View ANOVA revealed the predictedValence X Type interaction, F(l, 120) = 10.97, p < .01, and amain effect of Valence, F(l, 120) = 6.47, p < .05. As Table 3,shows, participants in the positive trait priming conditions reportedto be in a more positive mood after completing the priming task(M = 5.8) than participants in the negative trait priming conditions(M = 4.6), F(l, 120) = 17.03, p < .01, whereas mood judgmentswere unaffected after person priming (F < 1).

Together, these results provide further support for the hypoth-esis that the self-evaluative consequences of social comparisoninformation are likely to be contrastive when that information isdistinct (i.e., represents a person), whereas these consequences aremore likely to be assimilative when activated information is in-distinct (e.g., represents a trait) and when the self is perceived asmutable, such that inclusion of this information in one's self-perception is possible. As such, these findings corroborate theresults of the first experiment. There are a few notable differencesbetween the present experiment and the first experiment, however.First, in the present experiment, distinctness of social comparisoninformation was manipulated in a more direct way (by means ofabstract trait vs. concrete person priming). Furthermore, we addedan importance measure and found evidence for self-repair effectsin conditions in which the self-evaluative consequences of socialcomparison information were negative. Also, including a generalmood measure immediately after participants were exposed toeither trait or person information enabled us to tap the immediate,affective impact of this priming manipulation and showed that traitbut not person priming had an (assimilative) impact on moodjudgments. Although this effect supports our predictions, it isdifficult to relate the effect to previous social comparison studies.Some earlier studies of social comparison effects on mood alsofound assimilation (e.g., Gump & Kulik, 1997; Ybema & Buunk,1995), whereas others found contrast on mood measures (e.g.,Gibbons, 1986; Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997).

We believe that a parsimonious explanation of the discrepanciesbetween our mood findings and previous mood findings, as well asbetween our mood findings and self-evaluation findings, can befound in the way these constructs were measured. The moodmeasure was presented as part of the priming task. Participantswere asked to report how they felt as a result of this priming task.The self-evaluation measure was presented as such: Participantswere asked to reflect on their personalities. Thus, whereas the sortof mood judgment we asked of participants is likely to have tappedglobal affective feelings generated rather spontaneously by thepriming episode (cf. Gilbert et al., 1995; Kulik & Gump, 1997),our self-evaluation measure tapped more reflexive, self-relatedresponses to the primed information. Future researchers may wantto investigate whether this distinction (between global in-formation-based reactions and reflexive self-evaluations) may behelpful in explaining the discrepancies in people's affective reac-tions to social comparison information noted above. The relationbetween the self-evaluation and ratings of importance nicelyshows the added value of including the importance measure. As inExperiment 1, the self-evaluation measures indicated a relativelynondefensive (interpretative or comparative) use of social compar-


ison information in the construction of self-evaluations. That is,self-evaluations showed a relatively symmetric pattern: The im-pact of social comparison information for conditions in which thiseffect was positive for one's self-worth ("I am very intelligent")was similar to conditions in which the effect was negative forone's self-worth ("I am not very intelligent"). When viewed inisolation, the self-evaluation measure thus shows no evidence fordefensive, self-serving mechanisms following exposure to socialcomparison information. The importance ratings, however, changethis. These ratings do show an asymmetric, self-serving pattern:The perceived importance of intelligence was rated as relativelylow only when the consequences of social comparison informationfor one's intelligence had been negative. This suggests that bylowering their rating of the importance of being intelligent, par-ticipants attempted to remedy the negative impact social compar-ison information had had on their self-evaluations on thisdimension.

Experiment 3

In the first two experiments, we tested the distinctness compo-nent of our interaction hypothesis in two different ways. In Ex-periment 1, distinctness was manipulated by giving participantseither a memorization or an impression instruction before exposureto behavior descriptions of an upward or downward other. InExperiment, 2 distinctness was manipulated by directly exposingparticipants to either an indistinct trait concept or distinct personinformation. In the present experiment, we tested the validity ofthe distinctness logic for predictions of the self-evaluative impactof social comparisons by means of a third route: We tested thehypothesis that when confronted with a description of anotherperson, distinct person information is more likely to be activated,and thus contrast is more likely to ensue, when one is asked toexplicitly judge this person on relevant dimensions. This is lesslikely when no explicit judgment needs to be given. In this case,exposure to behavior is more likely to activate indistinct traitconcepts such that assimilation on subsequent self-evaluations ismore likely, particularly if people's self-views allow for inclusionof the so-activated information.

Previous research supports our argument that explicit judgmentmakes stimuli more distinct. Psychophysical studies have shown,for example, that when an object is explicitly evaluated or judged,associated attribute information is clearly connected and confinedto this object (see Parducci & Wedell, 1990). Studies of socialcognition have demonstrated that explicitly evaluating an objectrenders its mental representation concrete and distinct rather thanabstract and indistinct (see Martin & Seta, 1983; Murphy &Zajonc, 1993; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). Furthermore, as Par-ducci has noted in several reviews of the relevant literature, stimuliare most likely to become objects of comparison when they areexplicitly judged (Parducci & Wedell, 1990; see also Gilbert et al.,1995). In other words, although never tested directly, previousstudies of psychophysical and comparative judgment suggest thatwhen an upward or downward comparison other is explicitlyevaluated before self-judgments are constructed, this other is morelikely to be used as a comparison standard and contrast shouldoccur (Martin & Seta, 1983; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). Whenexposure to an upward or downward comparison other is notimmediately followed by an explicit evaluation of this person, the

so-activated information is likely to be relatively indistinct andabstract, which (as we have demonstrated) makes the occurrenceof assimilation more likely.

We would like to stress that this prediction should not be takento mean that explicit judgment of comparison others is a necessaryprecondition for the occurrence of such contrast effects. Explicitjudgment is but one route through which social comparison infor-mation may be perceived relatively distinct and concrete such thatcontrast is more likely. Experiment 1 showed that an impressiongoal is also sufficient to instigate encoding processes that makecontrast more likely. In other words, not judgment per se, butperceiving a target person with the goal of forming an impressionmay lead to the activation of a distinct representation of thisperson. Furthermore, Experiment 2 suggests that not even the goalor act of impression formation is necessary for the occurrence ofcomparative contrast. In that study, we predicted and found con-trast on self-evaluation after priming the name of a well-knownperson (e.g., Albert Einstein). No impression goal or explicitjudgment was needed for this effect to obtain.

At first sight, there seems to be a discrepancy between thefindings of Experiment 1 on the one hand and the findings ofExperiment 2 on the other hand. Why was it that in Experiment 1,information about an upward or downward comparison other led tocontrast only when one was asked to form an impression of thisperson, whereas in Experiment 2, no such impression set wasneeded to obtain contrast? Fortunately, the answer to this questionis relatively simple. It has to do with the difference between theimpact of a well-known person who exemplifies a particular di-mension and the impact of information about a stranger who isdescribed as scoring relatively high on this dimension. Culturalicons, such as Albert Einstein or Cindy Crawford, exemplifycertain categories (intelligence and beauty, respectively), andtherefore by themselves they constitute a distinct and separateentity with clear object boundaries that is more likely to be used asa comparison standard (see Stapel et al., 1997). The differencebetween the target stimuli used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2is thus a difference in novelty. Well-known person stimuli (Ein-stein, Crawford, your parents, your partner, your roommate) arelikely to activate distinct actor-trait links (Einstein-intelligent,Crawford-beautiful, mother-caring) because clear impressionsand concrete evaluations are likely to be spontaneously activatedon exposure (see Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Dijksterhuis etal., 1998; Uleman et al., 1996). For new-person stimuli, however,prestored judgments are less likely to be retrieved on exposure.Here, interpretative processes are needed to form distinct actor-trait links. The present experiment tests the hypothesis that explicitjudgments may aid in the formation of such links.

We tested the judgment hypothesis by giving all participants adescription of either a very intelligent or a very unintelligentperson they had never met before and then asking them either tofirst give self-evaluations and then judge this person on severaldimensions, or vice versa. Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, wetested our predictions about the self-evaluative consequences ofexplicit judgment versus no explicit judgment of a comparisonother on the self-evaluation measure as well as on the importanceand mood measures (see Experiment 2). On the basis of thefindings of Experiment 2, we predicted that the importance ratingswould show a self-repair pattern: Importance ratings of the focalcomparison dimension should be lower in conditions in which


social comparison information had a negative effect comparedwith the other conditions. As for the impact of social comparisoninformation global affect, we predicted we would find a similarpattern as in Experiment 2. In conditions in which participantswere given information about an (upward- or downward-comparison) other but did not form an evaluative impression ofthis person (no-judgment other conditions), we expected assimila-tion. Here, the general evaluative tone of the person description islikely to inform mood judgments that immediately follow it. Inconditions in which the person description is immediately fol-lowed by judgments of this person, we expected no effects on ourmood measure. Here, the person description activates not onlyevaluatively toned (positive or negative) information, but alsoinstigates person-self comparison processes that are likely to havean opposite impact on general affect (see Experiment 2).

Method


One hundred twenty-four students were randomly assigned to the con-ditions of a 2 (valence of other: intelligent vs. unintelligent) X 2 (judgment:self-then-other vs. other-then-self) X (self-view: mutable vs. immutable)between-subjects design or to one of two (mutable vs. immutable) controlconditions in which participants were asked to give self-evaluations but didnot read and judge information about another person. Participants receivedpartial course credit for their participation.


In ways similar to Experiment 2, participants were led to believe thatthey participated in two ostensibly unrelated studies. The general experi-mental procedure was modeled after that of Lockwood and Kunda (1997,p. 94). Experimental participants first participated in a "media study." Theyread a bogus newspaper article describing a male student who was eithervery intelligent or quite unintelligent. The intelligent target was describedas very intelligent, always scoring high on tests, meeting intellectualchallenges with enthusiasm, playing chess and go, and always willing tohelp other students with their problems. Participants were told that a fellowstudent of the target described him as follows: "He is definitely thebrightest and most innovative, free-spirited thinker of our group." Theunintelligent target was described as unintelligent, not interested in any-thing particular, mostly scoring low on tests, trying to find the easy way outwhen confronted with intellectual challenges, and spending his time incoffee shops and bars instead of in school. Participants were told that afellow student of the target described him as follows: "The only way he canpass a test is by cheating."

Participants' task was to guess in which Dutch daily newspaper orweekly magazine the article about the (intelligent or unintelligent) studentcould have been published. After having read the short newspaper articleand having written down their answers, participants turned to the next task.Self-then-other participants were first given the self-evaluation question-naire (see Experiment 2) and then were asked to judge the target on severaldimensions. For other-then-self participants, the order in which these twotasks were given was reversed. In the control conditions, participants didnot perform the "media study" task and thus did not rate the target person.

Target Person Ratings

Experimental participants rated the target person on the following sixadjectives: attractive, incompetent, intelligent, successful, dexterous, lazy.All items were rated on a 7-point scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) and 7(very).

Mood. In the self-then-other conditions, after having read the newspa-per article, participants were asked to indicate on a scale ranging from 1(negative) to 7 (positive) "how positive or negative your mood is at thismoment." In the other-then-self conditions, participants were asked thisquestion after they had given their judgments of the target person (butbefore they were given the self-evaluation task).

Self-evaluation, importance, and debriefing. The self-evaluation taskand the mutability manipulation were identical to those in Experiment 2.All participants rated themselves on intelligence-related and intelligence-unrelated adjectives and indicated the personal importance of severalpersonality characteristics. Next, participants were given the mutabilitymanipulation check and were debriefed (no participant indicated suspicionof the actual relation between the tasks).


Manipulation Checks

First, the effects of the independent variables on the variabilityquestion were checked. As expected, an ANOVA over the com-plete design revealed a main effect of self-mutability on this ratingdimension, F(l, 116) = 5.39, p < .05 (other effects, Fs < 1).Participants who were given the self-is-mutable text indeed ratedpersonality to be more variable (M = 4.2) than participants whowere given the self-is-immutable text (M = 4.7).

Next, we checked whether the intelligent target person wasindeed judged more positively on the relevant dimensions than theunintelligent target. After reverse scoring the three negative items,we averaged the six target-evaluation items into a single index(Cronbach's « = .87). A Valence of Other X Judgment X Self-View ANOVA revealed the predicted main effect of valence other,F(l, 116) = 163.42, p < .01 (other effects, Fs < 1). Participantsjudged the intelligent target more as such (M = 6.6) than theunintelligent target (M = 4.1).

Self-Evaluation

First, the effects of the independent variables were tested inANOVAs on each of the 14 self-evaluation items. As in Experi-ment 2, this revealed effects on the intelligence-related but not onthe intelligence-unrelated ratings (Fs < 1). After reverse scoringthe negative item, we averaged the intelligence-related self-evaluation items into a single self-evaluation index (Cronbach'sa = .79). Next, we investigated whether the mutability manipu-lation had an effect on the self-evaluation index when no news-paper article was given. Analyses revealed that the mutable self-view (M = 5.5) and the immutable self-view (M = 5.6) controlconditions did not differ significantly from each other.

The effects of valence other (intelligent vs. unintelligent), judg-ment (self-then-other vs. other-then-self), and self-view (immuta-ble vs. mutable) on the self-evaluation index were investigated byperforming a Valence of Other X Judgment X Self-ViewANOVA. This revealed the predicted Valence of Other X Judg-ment X Self-View interaction, F(l, 116) = 5.55, p < .05, aValence of Other X Self-View interaction, F(l, 116) = 5.50, p <.01, and a Valence of Other X Judgment interaction, F(l,116) = 36.04, p < .01 (other effects, ps > .19).

As we did in Experiments 1 and 2, to assess the pattern of thisinteraction, we conducted separate analyses for the self-then-otherconditions (for which we predicted assimilation, but only whenparticipants' self-views were mutable) and the other-then-self con-


ditions (for which we predicted contrast, independent of partici-pants' self-views) of the design. Table 4 presents self-evaluationmeans for each of the conditions.

Self-then-other conditions. An ANOVA revealed the pre-dicted Valence Other X Self-View interaction, F(l, 58) = 5.57,p < .01. As can be seen in Table 4, this interaction reflects that forparticipants for whom the mutable aspects of the self were madesalient, assimilation occurred. Self-evaluations were more positive(M = 6.1) after exposure to an intelligent target than after exposureto an unintelligent target (M = 4.8), F(l, 58) = 22.72, p < .01.Self-evaluations were not affected by valence other when self-views were immutable (F < 1). Here, self-evaluations in theintelligent-other and the unintelligent-other conditions were iden-tical (M = 5.5) to each other, similar to the relevant control group(M = 5.6) and halfway between self-evaluations in the mutableconditions.

Other-then-self conditions. An ANOVA revealed the pre-dicted main effect of valence other, F(l, 58) = 26.60, p < .01. Ascan be seen in Table 4, this effect reflects that independent ofself-mutability, contrast occurred. Self-evaluations were less pos-itive (A/ = 5.0) after exposure to an intelligent person than afterexposure to an unintelligent person (M = 6.0).

Importance

Valence of Other X Judgment X Self-View ANOVAs for eachof the importance ratings revealed that our manipulations onlyaffected the perceived importance of being intelligent, as revealedin a Valence of Other X Self-View interaction, F(l, 116) = 3.91,p = .05, a Valence of Other X Judgment interaction, F(l,116) = 29.80, p < .01, and a main effect of self-view, F(l,116) = 6.58, p < .05 (other ps > .11). Table 5 shows that aspredicted, intelligence importance ratings were lower in conditionsin which social comparison information had a negative effect (i.e.,intelligent-target/other-then-self/mutable-self, M = 5 . 1 ; intelligenttarget/other-then-self/immutable self, M = 5.1; unintelligent tar-get/self-then-other/mutable self, M = 5.0) compared to the otherexperimental conditions (i.e., unintelligent target/other-then-self/mutable self, M = 5.9; unintelligent target/other-then-self/immu-table self, M = 6.4; unintelligent target/self-then-other/immutableself, M = 5.9; intelligent target/self-then-other/mutable self,M = 6.0; intelligent target/self-then-other/immutable self,M = 6.2) and the relevant control conditions (mutable self-view

Table 4Mean Self-Evaluations on^Jntelligence-Related Items as aFunction of Valence Other (Intelligent vs. Unintelligent),Judgment (Self-Then-Other vs. Other-Then-Self), andSelf-View (Mutable vs. Immutable)

Table 5Mean Importance Ratings of Being Intelligent and MoodRatings as a Function of Valence Other (Intelligent vs.Unintelligent), Judgment (Self-Then-Other vs. Other-Then-Self), and Self-View (Mutable vs. Immutable)

Self-evaluation

MutableImmutable

Self-then-other

Intelligent

6.15.5

Unintelligent

4.85.5

Other-then-self

Intelligent

5.14.9

Unintelligent

6.05.9

Measure

Importance ofintelligence

MutableImmutable

MoodMutableImmutable

Self-then-other

Intelligent

6.06.2

5.65.5

Unintelligent

5.05.9

4.44.6

Other-then-self

Intelligent

5.15.1

4.95.2

Unintelligent

5.96.4

5.05.1

Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher numbers indicate more positiveself-evaluations. Mean self-evaluations were 5.5 in the mutable controlcondition and 5.6 in the immutable control condition.

Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher numbers indicate more importantor positive ratings. Mean importance ratings and mood ratings were 6.0and 5.2, respectively, in the mutable control condition and 6.1 and 5.0,respectively, in the immutable control condition.

control condition, M = 6.0; immutable self-view control condition,M = 6.1; for all comparisons between self-deflated and the self-not-deflated conditions, ps < .05).

Mood

As predicted, mood judgments showed that the priming episodeonly affected general affect in the self-then-other conditions. AValence of Other X Judgment X Self-View ANOVA revealed aValence of Other X Judgment interaction, F(l, 116) = 8.68, p <.01, and a main effect of valence other, F(l, 116) = 5.78, p < .05.As Table 5 shows, self-then-other participants, who read a news-paper article about an intelligent person and then were asked abouttheir general mood, reported to be in a more positive mood afterreading about an intelligent person (M = 5.6) than after readingabout an unintelligent person (M = 4.5), F(l, 116) = 15.04, p <.01. The mood measure showed no effect in the other-then-selfconditions, where it followed target judgments (Fs < 1). Thislatter effect should be interpreted with caution. In the self-then-other conditions, mood was measured before target judgmentswere given, whereas in the other-then-self conditions, it was mea-sured after these judgments were given. The lack of mood effectsin the other-then-self conditions may thus be caused by the timingof this measure (after instead of before target judgments) ratherthan by the kind of information elicited by the target description(distinct instead of indistinct).

Together, these results provide further support for the hypoth-esis that the self-evaluative consequences of social comparisoninformation are likely to be contrastive when that information isdistinct (i.e., is explicitly judged on relevant dimensions), whereasassimilation is more likely when activated information is indistinct(i.e., is encoded but not with the goal to form an explicit impres-sion) and when the self is perceived as mutable, such that inclusionof this information in one's self-perception is possible. As such,these findings corroborate the results of the first two experiments,and do so through yet another manipulation of the distinctnessconstruct. Furthermore, the pattern of findings on the mood andimportance measures was very similar to the results of Experi-


ment 2 and thus increases their validity: The mood measure againshowed that when information about a target person is likely to beindistinct (i.e., is read but not explicitly judged), mood is morelikely to be affected than when this information is clearly con-nected and confined to the target person (i.e., is explicitly evalu-ated or judged). However, because the timing of the mood measurediffered between the relevant conditions, this interpretation shouldbe taken with caution (see above). The importance measureshowed evidence for self-repair effects in conditions in which theself-evaluative consequences of social comparison informationwere negative.

Experiment 4

In the first three experiments, we found support for our Dis-tinctness X Self-Mutability hypothesis of the self-evaluative con-sequences of social comparison. When taken together, these threestudies differed mainly in the manipulations used to change theperceived distinctness of social comparison information. In Exper-iment 4, we turned our focus on self-mutablity by investigatingwhether the importance of perceived mutability of self-views fordetermining the nature of social comparison effects could also bedemonstrated in a study that relied on ongoing individual differ-ences rather than on external circumstances. Demonstrating thatindividual differences in the mutablity of the self may determinethe self-evaluative impact of social comparison information willadd to the importance of this variable for understanding socialcomparison effects. We chose Campbell's (1990) Self-ConceptClarity Scale as an indicator of individual's views about themutability of the self.

Campbell (1990) proposed that people vary in the clarity withwhich they understand themselves. She labeled this individualdifference self-concept clarity, defined as "the extent to which thecontents of an individual's self-concept (e.g. personal attributes)are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, andtemporally stable" (Campbell et al., 1996, p. 141). One means ofmeasuring self-concept clarity was to use the Self-Concept ClarityScale. This scale includes items designed to measure the confi-dence aspect of self-concept clarity, as well as the internal consis-tency, and temporal stability of individuals' self-concept. Items ofthe Self-Concept Clarity Scale suggest that self-concept clarity isclosely related to the construct that concerns us in the presentstudy, that is, the degree to which self-knowledge is uncertain andone views the self as mutable and unstable. The following exam-ples illustrate this: "I spend a lot of time wondering about whatkind of person I really am," "My beliefs about myself change veryfrequently," "In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and whatI am."

We reasoned that individual differences in self-concept claritycould influence the self-evaluative consequences of social com-parison information. Our interaction hypothesis and the self-mutability effects of Experiments 1 to 3 suggest that self-conceptclarity is likely to moderate whether social comparison informa-tion will be included in self judgments—such that assimilationensues. Assimilation effects are especially likely to occur when theactivated information is indistinct. Therefore, in the present exper-iment, we put the impact of self-concept clarity to a first test in astudy of the effect of indistinct social comparison information(trait priming, cf. Experiment 2) on self-evaluation. We predicted

assimilation would occur for participants who scored low on theSelf-Concept Clarity Scale (i.e., those who had an unclear andunstable self-concept) whereas no effect would occur for thosewho scored high on the Self-Concept Clarity Scale. Similar toExperiments 2 and 3, we also included an importance measure asan indicator of self-repair and a mood measure to gauge generalaffect elicited by the trait priming procedure.

Method


Seventy-eight students who were preselected on the basis of their scoreson the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (top 30%, bottom 30%), were primedwith either intelligence or stupid in a trait priming task. The design of thisstudy was thus a 2 (valence: intelligent vs. unintelligent) X 2 (self-conceptclarity: low vs. high) between-subjects design. Participants received partialcourse credit for their participation.


Self-concept clarity. The Self-Concept Clarity Scale, the priming task,self-evaluation, and importance and mood ratings were part of a generaltesting session in which several questionnaires were administered. Partic-ipants were thus led to believe that the studies of interest had no relationwith each other. First, all participants filled out a Dutch version of the12-item Self-Concept Clarity Scale (for details, see Campbell, 1990;Campbell et al., 1996). We used participants' scores on this measure(Cronbach's a = .80) to create two experimental conditions. Participantswhose scores were in the top 30% constituted the high-clarity group andthe bottom 30% constituted the low-clarity group.

Trait priming. After completion of the Self-Concept Clarity Scale,participants filled our five filler questionnaires. Next, they were given thetrait priming task. This task was identical to the task used in Experiment 2.Participants were given a word puzzle designed to activate intelligent andsmart versus stupid and dumb.

Mood. After completion of the priming task, participants were pre-sented with the mood measure we used previously (see Experiment 2).

Self-evaluation, importance, and debriefing. The self-evaluation taskwas identical to that in Experiment 2, except that the instructions designedto activate either mutable or immutable self-views were deleted. Allparticipants rated themselves on intelligence-related and intelligence-unrelated adjectives and indicated the personal importance of severalcharacterisitcs. Next, participants were given the mutability question andwere debriefed (no participant indicated suspicion of the actual relationbetween the tasks).


Self-Evaluation

The impact of self-clarity and trait priming was tested inANOVAs on each of the 14 self-evaluation items. As in Experi-ments 2 and 3, this revealed effects on the intelligence-related butnot on the intelligence-unrelated ratings (Fs < 1). After reversescoring the negative item, we averaged the intelligence-relatedself-evaluation items into a single index (Cronbach's a = .86) thatwas used in the main analyses. A Valence X Self-Clarity ANOVAon the self-evaluation index revealed the predicted interaction,F(l, 74) = 5.74, p < .05, and a main effect of valence, F(l,74) = 9.45, p < .01. Subsequent analyses revealed, as can be seenin Table 6, that for low-clarity participants, self-evaluations weremore positive (M = 6.1) after exposure to positive traits than after


Table 6Mean Self-Evaluations on Intelligence-Related Items as aFunction of the Valence (Intelligent vs. Unintelligent) ofActivated Trait Concepts and Self-Concept Clarity(Low vs. High)

Self-evaluation Intelligent Unintelligent

LowHigh

6.15.8

5.35.7

Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher numbers indicate more positiveself-evaluations.

exposure to negative traits (M = 5.3), F(l, 74) = 4.13, p < .05, anassimilation effect. For high-clarity participants, self-evaluationswere not affected by trait priming. Here, self-evaluations afterpositive (M = 5.8) and negative (M = 5.7) trait priming weresimilar (F < I).2

Importance

Valence X Self-Clarity ANOVAs for each of the importanceratings only showed effects on the perceived importance of beingintelligent, as revealed in a Valence X Self-Clarity interaction,F(l, 74) = 3.97, p = .05, an effect of valence, F(l, 74) = 14.67,p < .01, and an effect of self-clarity, F(l, 74) = 10.15, p < .01.Table 7 shows that as predicted, intelligence importance ratingswere lower in conditions in which trait priming had a negativeeffect (i.e., negative trait/low self-clarity self, M = 4.9) comparedwith the other conditions (positive trait/low self-clarity condition,M = 5.8; positive trait/high self-clarity condition, M = 5.9; neg-ative trait/high self-clarity condition, M = 6.1; for all comparisonsbetween the self-deflated and the self-not-deflated conditions,ps < .05).

Mood

Similar to Experiments 2 and 3, our mood measure showed thatpriming indistinct traits affected participants' mood judgments. AValence X Self-Clarity ANOVA revealed the predicted maineffect of valence, F(l, 74) = 20.91, p < .01. As Table 7 shows,participants in the positive trait priming conditions reported to bein a more positive mood after completing the priming task

Table 7Mean Importance Ratings of Being Intelligent and MoodRatings as a Function of the Valence (Intelligent vs.Unintelligent) of Activated Trait Concepts andSelf-Concept Clarity (Low vs. High)

Measure Intelligent Unintelligent

Importance of intelligenceLowHigh

MoodLowHigh

5.85.9

5.45.3

4.96.1

4.54.3

(M = 5.4) than participants in the negative trait priming conditions(M = 4.4), F(l, 74) = 21.32, p < .01 (other Fs < 1).

These findings converge nicely with our earlier findings.Whereas in Experiments 1 to 3, self-mutability was contextuallyinduced, in the present study it was treated as an individualdifference variable as measured by the Self-Concept Clarity Scale.Self-clarity level is important in how one reacts to activated socialinformation. Whereas contextually activated trait information af-fected mood judgments for both high- and low-clarity participants,this information had an effect only on self-evaluation for partici-pants who had a relatively unclear self-concept. The importancemeasure again showed that when the effect on self-evaluation wasnegative, the importance of the focal dimension (intelligence) wasrated lower—a result that could be seen as an attempt to repairone's self-image.

Experiment 5

In four experiments, we found clear support for our interaction(Distinctness X Self-Mutability) hypothesis of the self-evaluativeconsequences of social comparisons. In each of the previous stud-ies, however, we used subjectively anchored rating dimensions asthe main dependent measure. This begs the question, To whatextent are the effects we have reported so far dependent on the useof such rating scales? We do not think that the interpretative versuscomparative effects of social comparison information will surfaceonly when one uses subjectively anchored self-evaluative ratingscales as the main dependent measures. Our interaction hypothesisconcerns the processing of social comparison information, not theconstruction of responses on rating dimensions. The hypothesisstates that whether social comparison information is likely toinstigate interpretative or comparative processes is a function ofthe perceived distinctness of this information and the perceivedmutability of self-views. These effects are thought to be indepen-dent of whether or not self-evaluation occurs on subjectivelyanchored rating scales.

In the present experiment, therefore, we included a measure ofbehavioral predictions (cf. Kunda, Sinclair, & Griffin, 1997) to testthe Distinctness X Self-Mutability hypothesis. That is, we exposedparticipants to social comparison information as we did previously.However, after the social comparison information was presented,we gave participants short vignettes and instructed them to vividlyimagine the situation described. Next, for each of the vignettes, weasked participants to predict how they would perform or act in thesituations described in the vignettes (cf. Kunda et al., 1997). Theinclusion of these behavioral predictions as an indicator of self-evaluation allows us to tap self-evaluation effects in a way that isdifferent from the more traditional measure we used in Experi-ments 1 to 4. This increases the validity and generalizability of theDistinctness X Self-Mutability logic.

Similar to Experiment 4, the impact of self-mutability was

Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher numbers indicate more importantor positive ratings.

2 Analyses of effects on the variability question revealed that low self-clarity participants scored higher on our variability question than highself-clarity participants. An ANOVA revealed a main effect of self-conceptclarity, F(l, 74) = 4.45, p < .01 (other effects, Fs < 1). Similar to theself-mutability effects of Experiments 1 to 3, low self-clarity participantsrated personality to be more variable (M = 4.2) than did high self-clarityparticipants (M = 4.9).


studied by dividing participants into a group that scored high anda group that scored low on the Self-Concept Clarity Scale. Thedistinctness manipulation was similar to the one used in Experi-ment 1: Participants were given upward or downward comparisoninformation and were instructed to either memorize this informa-tion or form an impression of the protagonist. Under memorizationinstructions, the comparison information is less likely to becomedistinct and assimilation is likely to occur for low-clarity partici-pants. Under impression formation instructions, distinct actor-traitlinks are likely to be activated and comparison information islikely to result in contrast, for low- as well as high-clarityparticipants.

Method


One hundred twenty-three students, who were preselected on the basis oftheir scores on the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (top 30%, bottom 30%),were given information about either an upward- or a downward-comparison other and instructed to either memorize this information orform an impression of the protagonist. The design of this study was thus a 2(valence of other: positive vs. negative) X 2 (instruction: memorization vs.impression) X 2 (Self-Concept Clarity: low vs. high) between-subjectsdesign. Participants received 10 guilders (approximately U.S. $4) for theirparticipation.


As in Experiment 1, the questionnaires were administered one-by-onevia computers. On arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed inindividual cubicles. They were told that they would participate in unrelatedstudies and that they would receive all instructions from a computer. Theexperimenter started the computer program and left the cubicle.

Self-concept clarity. First, all participants completed the 12-item ver-sion of the Self-Concept Clarity Scale. As in Experiment 4, we usedparticipants' scores on this measure (Cronbach's a = .82) to create ahigh-clarity group (top 30%) and a low-clarity group (bottom 30%).

Social comparison information. After completion of the Self-ConceptClarity Scale, participants completed three short filler tasks. Next, socialcomparison information was presented. This part of the experiment wasidentical to Experiment 1. In the positive condition, participants wereexposed to upward comparison information. In the negative condition,participants were exposed to downward comparison information. Memo-rization participants were to memorize the contents of the information.Impression participants were instructed to form an impression of the persondescribed.

Behavioral predictions, self-evaluation, and debriefing. After comple-tion of the social comparison information task, the behavioral predictiontask was started. Participants were presented with two vignettes and in-structed to vividly imagine the situation described (cf. Kunda et al., 1997).The first vignette was titled "Tork." This vignette described a new (fic-tional) adventure game, named 'Tork," one can play on the computer andthat was "slowly becoming more and more popular in Western Europe andthe U.S." It was explained that "To win a game of Tork one needs to beable to think logically, and be assertive and intelligent in one's reactions tothe moves of the other players." At the end of the vignette, participantswere told that "At a game of Tork most people score between 20-80points. The player with most points wins the game. Imagine that you willplay a game of Tork. How many points do you think you will score?"Respondents responded by typing a number between 20 and 80.

The second vignette was titled "Freud." In this vignette, participantswere asked to imagine that they were psychology majors who had com-pleted 3 years of study at the University of Amsterdam.

A friend of yours you have known since high school approaches youwith a difficult question about Freud's theory of the unconscious. Healready asked several people, but nobody knows the answer. Now hecomes to you because "you have been studying Psychology for quitea while now."

Then, respondents were asked "How would you respond?" They couldanswer this question by rank ordering six "behavior descriptions" accord-ing to the likelihood they would act as described, ranking from 1 (mostlikely) to 6 (least likely). The behavior descriptions were pretested (n = 7)as varying in the degree to which the actor (i.e., the respondent) isintelligent (i.e., is knowledgeable about Freud's theory after 3 years ofextensive training in psychology). The order in which these descriptionswere presented was randomized, but here we list them from high (intelli-gent = 1) to low (unintelligent = 6):

(1) You know the answer and explain your friend Freud's theory; (2)You have a vague sense that you somehow know the answer, you goback to one of your textbooks and then explain your friend Freud'stheory; (3) You have a vague sense that you somehow know theanswer, you give your friend a somewhat vague and abstract answer.You are not satisfied with your answer, but your friend is quitecontent; (4) Several basic psychological theories come to mind, butsomehow you are unable to retrieve the details of Freud's theory; (5)You discover you have forgotten everything about Freud's theory; (6)You point your friend to the Psychology library.

After having read and responded to the Tork and Freud vignettes,participants were given the self-evaluation task. This task was identical tothe one used in Experiment 1, except that the introduction designed toactivate either mutable or immutable self-views was deleted, and 7-pointscales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very), were used. All participantsrated themselves on the following 12 adjectives: attractive, kind, bright,successful, sincere, dexterous, undetermined, incompetent, hostile, aver-age, egotistical, and arrogant. The order in which these items werepresented was randomized. Next, participants were given the mutabilityquestion and were debriefed (no participant indicated suspicion of theactual relation between the tasks). No mood or importance measures wereincluded.


Behavioral Predictions

The Tork vignette. Participants' predictions of how well theywould score (20-80) on a game of Tork was taken as the depen-dent measure. An ANOVA revealed the predicted Valence ofOther X Instruction X Self-Clarity interaction, F(l, 115) = 4.92,p < .05, a Valence Other X Instruction interaction, F(l,115) = 15.24, p < .01, and a Valence Other X Self-Clarityinteraction, F(l, 115) = 3.79, p = .06 (other Fs < 1). Table 8presents predicted Tork scores for each of the conditions.

Analyses in the memorization conditions (for which we pre-dicted assimilation, but only when participants' self-views weremutable) revealed the predicted Valence of Other X Self-Clarityinteraction, F(l, 55) = 8.32, p < .01, and a main effect of Valenceof Other, F(l, 55) = 5.97, p < .05. This interaction reflects that forlow self-clarity participants, predicted Tork scores were morepositive (M = 65) after exposure to positive social comparisoninformation than after exposure to negative social comparisoninformation (M = 37), F(l, 55) = 14.89, p < .01, whereas for highself-clarity participants, predicted Tork scores were not affected bysocial comparison information (Ms = 51 and 53, respectively; F <


Table 8Mean Behavior Predictions of Tork Score and Freud Answerand Self-Evaluations as a Function of Valence Other (Positivevs. Negative), Instruction (Memorization vs. Impression),and Self-Concept Clarity (Low vs. High)

Measure

Tork scoreLowHigh

Freud answerLowHigh

Self-evaluationLowHigh

Memorization

Positive

6551

2.02.5

6.15.5

Negative

3753

3.32.6

5.05.4

Impression

Positive

4443

3.73.2

5.14.9

Negative

6157

1.81.9

6.06.1

Note. Tork scores range from 20 (negative) to 80 (positive). Freudanswers are rankings of possible responses, ranging from 1 (positive) to 6(negative). Self-evaluations range from 1 (negative) to 7 (positive).

1). Analyses in the impression conditions (for which we predictedcontrast, independent of participants' self-views) revealed the pre-dicted main effect of valence other, F(l, 60) = 9.55, p < .01. Thiseffect reflects that, independent of self-concept clarity, predictedTork scores were less positive (M = 44) after exposure to positivesocial comparison information than after exposure to negativesocial comparison information (M = 59), a contrast effect.

The Freud vignette. Participants rank ordered six behavioraldescriptions according to the likelihood that they would engage inthe behavior described. These descriptions were pretested as vary-ing in the degree to which they displayed intelligent behavior. Thedependent measure was participants' ranking (1-6) of the mostpositive (intelligent) response option (see Method section). AnANOVA revealed the predicted Valence of Other X Instruction XSelf-Clarity interaction, F(l, 115) = 4.33, p < .05, a Valence ofOther X Instruction interaction, F(l, 115) = 29.70, p < .01, anda main effect of valence other, F(l, 115) = 4.49, p < .05 (otherFs < 1). Table 8 presents participants' mean Freud answers foreach of the conditions.

Analyses in the memorization conditions revealed the predictedValence of Other X Self-Clarity interaction, F(l, 55) = 3.78, p =.06, and a main effect of Valence other, F(l, 55) = 5.11, p < .05.This interaction reflects that low self-clarity participants rankedthe most intelligent behavior description higher (i.e., thought theywere more likely to behave in an intelligent way; M = 2.0) afterexposure to positive social comparison information than afterexposure to negative social comparison information (M = 3.3),F(l, 55) = 9.17,p < .01, whereas for high self-clarity participants,rankings were not affected by social comparison information(Ms = 2.5 and 2.6, respectively). An ANOVA in the impressionconditions revealed the predicted main effect of valence other, F( 1,60) = 31.08, p < .01. This effect reflects that independent ofself-concept clarity, participants ranked the most intelligent behav-ior description lower (i.e., thought they were less likely to behavein an intelligent way; M = 3.4) after exposure to positive socialcomparison information than after exposure to negative socialcomparison information (M = 1.9), a contrast effect.

Self-Evaluation

We averaged all self-evaluation items into a single index afterreverse scoring the negative items (Cronbach's a = .76) to gen-erate a Self-Evaluation Index (see Experiment 1). An ANOVA onthe self-evaluation index revealed the predicted Valence ofOther X Instruction X Self-Clarity interaction, F(l, 115) = 5.45,p < .05, and a Valence of Other X Instruction interaction, F(l,115) = 30.64, p < .01 (other ps > .14). Table 8 presents meanself-evaluation for each of the conditions.

Analyses in the memorization conditions revealed the predictedValence of Other X Self-Clarity interaction, F(l, 55) = 7.19, p =.01,andamain effect of valence of other, F(l,55) = 8.96,p< .01.As can be seen in Table 8, this interaction reflects that for lowself-clarity participants self-evaluations were more positive(M = 6.1) after exposure to positive social comparison informationthan after exposure to negative social comparison information(M = 5.0), F(l, 55) = 17.10,p < .01, whereas for high self-clarityparticipants, self-evaluations were not affected by social compar-ison information (Ms = 5.5 and 5.4, respectively). An ANOVA inthe impression conditions revealed the predicted main effect ofvalence other, F(l, 60) = 23.08, p < .01. As can be seen inTable 8, this effect reflects that independent of self-concept clarity,self-evaluations were less positive (M = 5.0) after exposure topositive social comparison information than after exposure tonegative social comparison information (M = 6.1), a contrasteffect.3

These results show a now familiar pattern. The impact of socialcomparison information on self-evaluations is dependent on boththe distinctness (as manipulated through memorization versus im-pression instruction) of the so-activated information and the mu-tability or clarity of people's self-views (as measured by theSelf-Concept Clarity Scale). The added value of the present ex-periment comes from the measurement of behavioral predictions.The use of subjectively anchored self-evaluation scales is not aprecondition for finding the hypothesized interpretative assimila-tion and comparative contrast effects. We asked participants topredict how high they would score on a new, intelligence-orientedgame and asked them how they would respond when someoneasked them a difficult question about Freud's theory of uncon-sciousness. Our findings clearly support the notion that such be-havioral predictions would be affected by social comparison in-formation in a way that is akin to the self-evaluation effectsdemonstrated in Experiments 1 to 4. Social comparison informa-tion yields contrast when this information is perceived as a distinctactor-trait link, whereas assimilation will occur when the activatedinformation is indistinct and one's self-concept is relatively un-clear and unstable.

General Discussion

Our self-evaluations are often influenced by the behavior, per-formance, or evaluation of others. We use others to evaluate

3 Similar to Experiment 4, an ANOVA of effects on the variabilityquestion revealed a main effect of self-concept clarity on this ratingdimension, F(\, 115) = 7.46,p<.01 (other effects, Fs < 1). Similar to theprevious experiments, low self-clarity participants rated personality to bemore variable (M = 4.0) than did high self-clarity participants (M = 4.7).


ourselves. But to what effect? This question formed the mainimpetus for the present research endeavor. What determines theimpact of social comparison processes on self-evaluation? Thecurrent five experiments provide an answer to this question that is(hopefully) loud and clear. Whether the impact of social compar-isons is assimilative or contrastive is a function of both the per-ceived distinctness of the activated information and the perceivedmutability of relevant self-views. When the behavior of a compar-ison target activates distinct actor-trait links (e.g., "Stanley isrich"), self-evaluation is likely to show a contrast effect (e.g., "Iam poor"). Distinct information is more likely to be used as acomparison standard during the self-evaluation process such thatcontrast ensues. When the behavior of a comparison target acti-vates indistinct trait information (e.g., "rich"), self-evaluation islikely to show an assimilation effect (e.g., "I am rich"). Suchassimilative interpretation effects are especially likely to occurwhen one's self-concept is mutable or unclear, such that there isroom for inclusion and/or a need for filling in the gaps. Assimi-lative interpretation effects are less likely to occur for those whoseself-views are immutable, clear, and stable.

The current findings thus suggest that an important determinantof the self-evaluative consequences of social comparison informa-tion is the manner of its use during the self-evaluation process. Todate, social comparison research has given little to no attention tothe role of social comparison information during the self-evaluation process. Grounded in research on the basic principlesunderlying accessibility effects (see Higgins, 1996; Martin &Tesser, 1992; Stapel & Koomen, in press), the present studyprovides the first explicit test of and support for the interactionhypothesis of social comparison effects: Distinctness of other andmutability of self jointly determine whether social comparisoninformation yields assimilative interpretation or contrastive com-parison effects. Distinctness and mutability determine the rolesocial comparison information serves in the construction of self-views and self-evaluations. What people see when they perceiveothers together with how people see themselves affects the impactof others on themselves.

By stressing the notion that others may activate different kindsof information (i.e., distinct or indistinct), the present studiessuggest that one reason why contrast is often labeled as the mostnatural, common, or automatic social comparison effect (seeBrown, 1998; Gilbert et al., 1995; Hoyle et al., 1999) is that todate, most social comparison research has mainly been concernedwith the impact of distinct, explicitly evaluated person informationon self-evaluations. As our research suggests, an impression goalor a judgment task is sufficient to turn assimilative interpretationeffects into comparative contrast effects. One important implica-tion of each of the five experiments presented here is thus thatthere is no direct link from "perception of person" to "cognitiverepresentation of person." Exposure to social behavior may acti-vate abstract trait concepts as well as distinct person representa-tions. What is activated depends on the context in which thebehavior is received, perceived, and encoded.

As Experiments 1, 3, and 5 show, one important contextualdeterminant of the consequences of social comparison effects iswhether one approaches comparison information with an impres-sion formation mind-set. Although we used relatively crude tech-niques (cf. Bargh, 1997) to investigate the impact of impressionformation on subsequent social comparison processes, the real life

implications are hard to miss. Situations in which impressionformation is important (e.g., in evaluative, competitive settingssuch as job interviews) are more likely to instigate contrastiveother-self comparison processes than when impression formationis not the primary goal (e.g., in nonevaluative settings such asdinner parties or family gatherings). Studies of social comparisonprocesses in relatively competitive or performance-oriented con-texts seem to support this conjecture (see Brown et al., 1992;Morse & Gergen, 1970; Tesser, 1988).

Because we manipulated the distinctness construct in severalways, the present set of studies show the theoretical importance ofthis construct for social comparison processes as well as its use-fulness for the understanding and prediction of real life socialcomparison effects. The self-mutability findings may be viewed ina similar way. Distinguishing assimilative interpretation effectsfrom comparative contrast effects, the self-mutability construct isessential in understanding the dual role (of interpretation frameand comparison standard) social comparison information may playin the construction of self-judgments. On a more practical level,the findings of Experiments 1 to 3 may be interpreted as evidencefor the notion that situational forces may shape the perceivedmutability of one's self-concept and so affect the outcome of socialcomparison processes. These experiments suggest that in situationsin which the self is viewed as mutable and unclear (e.g., in newsettings, such as the first day at school), social comparison effectsmay be dramatically different than in situations in which the self isviewed as immutable and clear (e.g., in known settings, such asdinner with one's best friend). Experiments 4 and 5 suggest thatself-mutability may also be conceptualized as an ongoing individ-ual difference by showing the impact of self-concept clarity on thenature of social comparison effects. How others affect one's self-evaluation is thus partly dependent on whether one has a clearsense of who one is. Ironically, even people who possess a clearand stable self-concept are not totally immune to the impact ofothers on their self-evaluations. A clear self-concept may preventthe occurrence of assimilative interpretation effects, but not theoccurrence of comparative contrast effects.

Campbell (1990; Campbell et al., 1996) has shown that self-concept clarity is highly correlated with self-esteem. That is,individuals with low self-esteem often have an unclear and unsta-ble self-concept, whereas people with high self-esteem often havea clear and stable self-concept. In view of the similarity of resultsbetween our experiments in which self-mutability was a contextualvariable and our experiments in which it was an individual differ-ence variable, it is rather unlikely that self-esteem variations couldexplain the self-mutability effects in the latter studies. However,future studies may want to investigate if and how self-esteemmoderates the outcome of social comparison processes in wayssimilar to the effects of self-mutability.

The present research shows a pattern of results that may belabeled "cognitive" as well as "affective" or "self-serving." Let usstart with the rational side of things. In each of the five experi-ments, the impact of social comparison information on respon-dents' self-evaluations was symmetric, showing a pattern that wasnot self-serving. That is, independent of whether they were self-glorifying or self-deprecating, the outcome of self-evaluation pro-cesses followed the interpretation-comparison logic of the Dis-tinctness X Mutability hypothesis. The effects on self-evaluationswere symmetric: There was no evidence that positive effects were


stronger or larger than negative effects. In a sense then, the currentfindings nicely mirror the findings of earlier work on the impact ofknowledge accessibility on person perception (see Higgins, 1996;Martin & Tesser, 1992), especially where they suggest that inter-pretation processes are more likely to yield assimilation and thatcomparison processes are more likely to yield contrast (e.g.,Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Stapel & Koomen, in press). The currentfindings thus provide the first support that these basic principlesand processes underlying assimilation and contrast in person per-ception are also mediating such effects in self-perception. Viewedfrom this perspective, self-attributes are cognitive structures, andtherefore the processes underlying changes in the self do not differdramatically from the processes affecting other cognitive struc-tures (cf. Higgins, Van Hook, & Dorfman, 1988).

On the one hand, the symmetric, non-self-serving pattern of ourself-evaluation findings points to the robustness of the Distinct-ness X Mutability logic. Whether social comparisons have thepredicted self-evaluative effects is not dependent on the self-servingness of the outcome. On the other hand, however, thenon-self-serving pattern of the self-evaluation findings is perhapssomewhat surprising. Previous studies of the effects of self-evaluative comparisons often (e.g., Brown et al., 1992; Lockwood& Kunda, 1997), but not always (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994),show self-serving patterns. Although it is unclear exactly whatdetermines whether self-evaluative comparisons will be self-serving, research indicates that self-evaluations are more likely tobe self-serving when the focal comparison dimension is important,the comparison target is psychologically close, the comparisoncontext is competitive, or the evaluation task is self-involving (seeBrown, 1998; Hoyle et al., 1999; Tesser, 1988). Furthermore,research by Gilbert et al. (1995) suggests that people may be morelikely to attempt to undo the (negative) consequences of socialcomparisons in self-involving, competitive comparison contexts.In the current experiments, we presented respondents with com-parison targets who were not psychologically close or particularlysimilar to them (i.e., names of famous people and descriptions ofstrangers). Moreover, comparison information and self-evaluationwere presented in different, ostensibly unrelated, tasks, and theevaluation task was presented as a survey and thus not particularlyself-involving. Our goal was to investigate implicit rather thanexplicit social comparison processes: Our experiments show theself-evaluative consequences of social comparisons in situations inwhich comparison others are ground rather than figure in theself-evaluation process. A question for future inquiry is to whatextent this may have led to the rational, symmetric pattern of theself-evaluation findings.

Notwithstanding these comments on the symmetric pattern ofthe present self-evaluation results, it is important to note that in ourstudies, respondents' ratings of the importance of the focal com-parison dimension did show self-serving patterns. These impor-tance ratings showed a self-repair pattern: They were lower whensocial comparison had had a negative effect on self-evaluation thanwhen it had had a positive effect on self-evaluation (cf. Campbell,1986; Lewicki, 1985; Rosenberg, 1979; Tesser, 1988). In otherwords, although the self-evaluation measure suggests that socialcomparison information is not processed more defensively when itreflects negatively rather than positively on the self, the impor-tance measure subtly reveals that negative comparison effects hurtand instigate self-serving repair strategies. Thus, motivation and

affect did play a role in the situations we created for our partici-pants. However, apparently these processes could not play a role inthe rather cognitive and rational (cf. Morling & Epstein, 1997)process of self-evaluation. The importance rating task, however,having less reality constraints, offered participants an opportunityto express themselves more defensively and alleviate the pain ofnegative self-evaluative comparisons. An important implication ofthis finding is that it suggests that selecting certain dependentvariables over others may lead to a "you find what you are lookingfor" effect. For example, our self-evaluation measure revealedboth assimilation and contrast effects, our mood measure onlyrevealed assimilation effects, and our importance measure showedself-repair effects. Similar to previous investigations, this suggeststhat evaluative self-judgments and more motivational or affectivereactions to social information involve somewhat different pro-cesses, show different effects, and, as such, will often be onlymodestly related to one another (see Gilbert et al., 1995; Kulik &Gump, 1997; Morling & Epstein, 1997; Wood, 1996).

Although in the present investigations the focus has been ontests of our interaction hypothesis, it is important to note that wedo not want to claim that distinctness and self-mutability are theonly constructs that may determine whether the impact of socialcomparison information is more likely to be driven either byinterpretation processes (which make other-self inclusion and thusassimilation more likely) or by comparison processes (which makeother-self comparison and thus contrast more likely). We focusedon distinctness and self-mutability because these two factorsseemed especially relevant for social comparison effects and be-cause previous social comparison research has not given muchattention to the importance of these factors for the outcome ofself-evaluative comparisons. Distinctness and self-mutability arebut two constructs that may determine what role social comparisoninformation is likely to serve in the construction of self-evaluations. An interesting avenue for future research is to inves-tigate how other constructs may moderate the interpretative versuscomparative use of social comparison information. Two likelycandidates are the extremity of the comparison other's position onthe focal dimension and the extent to which the comparison otherand the self are psychologically close (i.e., similar on salientbackground dimensions).4

When it concerns similarity, in earlier research on the impact ofpriming on person judgments we demonstrated that a certaindegree of similarity seems to be necessary for comparison contrastto occur (e.g., Stapel et al., 1996; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998; seealso Festinger's, 1954, "similarity hypothesis"). That is, we foundthat person primes (e.g., Hitler vs. Mandela) led to contrast insubsequent person judgments, whereas animal primes (e.g., shark

4 It is unfortunate that although the importance of similarity for socialcomparison effects is widely acknowledged (see Wood, 1989), "statementsabout the role of similarity in comparative appraisal have been notoriouslyvague" (Miller & Prentice, 1996, p. 813). The concept of "similarity" isused to refer to the distance between self and other on the focal dimension(dissimilar: "Paul scored 10,1 scored 5 on the test"; similar: "Paul scored 6,I scored 5") as well as self-other distance on nonfocal dimensions (dis-similar: "Paul is from New York, I am from Valencia"; similar: "Paul is mytwin brother"). We like to distinguish these two kinds of other-self distanceas "extremity" and "similarity," respectively (cf. Goethals & Darley,1977).


vs. puppy) led to assimilation. Apparently, animals are not easilycompared with persons, just like apples are not easily comparedwith oranges. Translated to our current concerns, other-self sim-ilarity may thus be an important determinant of whether distinctcomparison information (e.g., actor-trait links) will actually resultin contrast. A distinct-person description that is perceived as verydissimilar and therefore as irrelevant for comparison purposes isunlikely to instigate comparison processes (see Tesser, 1988). Astudy by Cash, Cash, and Butters (1983) nicely illustrates this:Female respondents who had been shown photographs of espe-cially attractive females judged themselves as less attractive, butthis effect disappeared when the women in the photographs weredescribed as professional models. Apparently, models are irrele-vant comparison standards for mortals (see also Brown et al,1992; Miller & Prentice, 1996).

Extremity is another factor that may determine whether socialcomparison information will be included in or compared andcontrasted with self-perceptions. In classic studies of psychophys-ics and social judgment, extremity is the factor most frequentlyconsidered in the explanation of assimilation and contrast effects.Extreme information is more likely to be used as an anchor withwhich a target stimulus is contrasted than moderate information(e.g., Sherif & Hovland, 1961). As Hogarth and Einhorn (1992)put it, "The bigger the anchor, the harder it will fall" (p. 14). As anillustration of this principle, Herr (1986) found that person judg-ments showed contrast after activating extreme person primes(e.g., Ghandi), whereas assimilation occurred when moderatelyextreme person primes were used (e.g., Robin Hood). Koomen,Stapel, Jansen, and In 't Veld (1998) showed that such moderateperson priming will result in assimilation only if the primes arepresented before the target stimulus is encoded, thus when they canact as an interpretation frame (see also Stapel & Koomen, inpress). Presenting primes after target encoding but before targetjudgment does not result in interpretative assimilation effects.Translated to the domain of social comparison effects, these resultssuggest that similar to the proposed effects of similarity, theperceived extremity of a comparison other may be an importantdeterminant of whether distinct comparison information will actu-ally result in contrast. Given that the self is viewed as mutable,distinct but moderately extreme comparison information shouldyield interpretative assimilation effects on self-evaluation, whereasdistinct and extreme comparison information should lead to com-parative contrast effects.

In sum then, the interpretation-comparison approach followedhere provides a perspective on understanding social comparisoneffects in which the focus is on relatively general judgmentalprinciples and relatively basic cognitive processes. Viewed fromthis perspective, relatively new constructs, such as distinctness andmutability, but also more well-known variables, such as extremityand similarity, are important determinants of how and to whateffect comparison information is used. Future investigations maywant to test the viability of the interpretation-comparison logic tofurther the understanding of other important mediators of socialcomparison effects.

Of course, we do not think that all social comparison effects canbe explained perfectly by using our interpretation-comparisonlogic. Previous social comparison research clearly shows the com-plexity of the myriad of psychological mechanisms and processesunderlying social comparison effects (see Blanton, in press; Wills

& Suls, 1991; Wood, 1989). However, the interpretation-comparison perspective may allow us to weave a common threadthrough earlier investigations of the self-evaluative consequencesof social comparison effects. For example, previous research hassuggested that social comparison may lead to assimilation forseveral different reasons. Assimilation may occur when individu-als affiliate with upward others in an attempt to improve them-selves (Taylor & Lobel, 1989). Also, assimilation may occur whenoutstanding performances of close others reflect positively upononeself (Tesser, 1988) or when such performances have an inspi-rational effect (Buunk et al., 1990; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).And, finally, assimilation may occur because one identifies with orfeels connected with the comparison others (Brewer & Weber,1994; Brown et al., 1992). We do not want to claim that affiliation,reflection, inspiration, and identification are actually different la-bels for the same effect. To the contrary, each of these labels refersto a specific psychological mechanism. For example, as Lockwoodand Kunda (1997) noted, reflection and identification are effectsthat involve the collective self, whereas inspiration concerns thepersonal self. However, on a general judgment level, each of theseeffects refer to the inclusion of comparison information in in-dividuals' representations of their self-concepts. Thus, theinterpretation-comparison perspective enables researchers to seethe communalities between effects that on the surface are noteasily categorized as such (see Taylor & Lobel, 1989).

We hope that in future research the interpretation-comparisonlogic may be applied to understanding the processes underlying theimpact on self-evaluation of such classic factors as personal rele-vance (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Tesser, 1988), psychologicalcloseness (Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995; Tesser, 1988), and self-esteem (Buunk et al., 1990). As we noted above, self-conceptclarity and self-esteem are highly correlated (Campbell, 1990;Campbell et al., 1996). This suggests that interpretation-comparison processes may mediate the impact of self-esteem onsocial comparison effects. Similarly, our discussion of the impor-tance of similarity for the occurrence of assimilation versus con-trast suggests that interpretation-comparison processes may me-diate the impact of similarity or psychological closeness on socialcomparison effects. In a like manner, the impact of personalrelevance on the outcome of social comparison effects may bemediated by interpretation-comparison processes. Tesser (1988;Tesser & Campbell, 1980; Tesser & Paulhus, 1983) has shown thatbeing outperformed by a close other on a personally irrelevantdimension is likely to result in a positive reflection or assimilationeffect (e.g., "My brother is an excellent tennis player, I bask inreflected glory"). However, when the focal comparison dimensionis personally relevant, comparison contrast is likely to ensue (e.g.,"My brother is a famous social psychologist, I feel worthless").One could argue that when a dimension is personally relevant, oneis especially sensitive to information concerning this dimension(see Brown, 1998; Hoyle et al., 1999; Sedikides, 1995) and thus ismore inclined to process this information in a differentiative orcomparative manner. Conversely, when a dimension is personallyirrelevant, one is likely to be rather insensitive to informationconcerning this dimension and thus is more inclined to process thisinformation in a more holistic, integrative, or interpretative manner(cf. Geers & Lassiter, 1999; Isbell & Wyer, 1999). Hence,interpretation-comparison processes may be underlying the im-pact of personal relevance on social comparison effects.


All in all, the present results and discussion suggest that tryingto understand social comparison effects from a perspective that isconcerned with uncovering the basic cognitive principles andprocesses underlying these effects not only points to novel deter-minants of whether self-other comparisons result in assimilationor contrast but also suggests an integrative framework for under-standing some of the divergent findings of previous investigationsin this domain of social psychological inquiry.

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Received March 24, 2000Revision received June 13, 2000

Accepted June 20, 2000

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Distinctiveness of others, mutability of selves: Their impact on self-evaluations.

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