Distributed Energy ResourcesOperational Impacts
Jenny Riesz
Principal, Operational Analysis & Engineering
About AEMOWe operate Australia's National Electricity Market and power grid in Australia’s eastern and south-eastern seaboard, and the Wholesale Electricity Market and power grid in south-west WA.
Both markets supply more than 220 terawatt hours of electricity each year.
We also operate retail and wholesale gas markets across south-eastern Australia and Victoria’s gas pipeline grid.
Collectively NEM & WEM traded over A$20 billion in the last financial year.
Ownership
Marketparticipants
40%Governments of Australia
60%
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Growth in DER
Rooftop PV
Storage
AEMO’s forecast for the NEM:
• Distributed Energy
Resources (DER) are
growing rapidly
• The transition to
decentralised resources
could represent the
most significant power
system transformation
since it was established
3
Context
Rooftop PV
Minimum demand in South Australia:
4
DER generation will soon match
entire demand in some NEM
regions.
• What will this mean for the
power system?
• How do we affordably
maintain security and
reliability for customers
throughout this transition?
• What actions do we need to
take?
Technical challenges
Voltage management
• Emerging challenges
managing
transmission &
distribution voltages at
times of low
operational demand
Visibility
• Need for collection of
standing data on DER
installed for
forecasting, system
planning, and stability
studies
VPP management
• Unmanaged rapid
movement of large
virtual power plants
could cause increased
need for frequency
control, and system
security challenges
Orchestration
• Need for coordination
between AEMO and
distribution networks
in DER dispatch
Emergency Frequency
Control Schemes
• Emergency Frequency
Control Schemes and
special protection
schemes may no
longer operate
successfully under
high rooftop PV
conditions
System restoration
• Unmanaged DER
operation may
interfere with
progressive restoration
of load during a
system restart process
System Strength
• Potential for system
strength challenges to
emerge at the
distribution level,
affecting DER
operation, protection,
etc.
PV feed in management
• Need for mechanisms
to actively manage
and optimise DER
generation to maintain
dispatch flexibility
A suite of technical
challenges identified,
requiring action to
maintain system security
for customers.
Performance standards
• Need for review of
performance
standards for DER to
ensure they
adequately support
system security needs
Dynamic models
• Dynamic models do
not generally capture
the behavior of DER
during disturbances
with sufficient
accuracy.
Focus on these two in
this presentation
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Disturbance ride-through • Disturbance ride-through essential for maintaining power
system security
• Problematic DER behaviour identified for:
• Voltage disturbances
• Frequency disturbances
• Voltage phase angle jump (instantaneous phase shift in sinusoidal voltage waveforms)
• Widespread disconnection of DER during disturbances could lead to system black
• Must be addressed prior to installation via appropriate performance standards
• Following slides present case studies and issues identified
• This is work in progress! Preliminary results only.
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Voltage disturbances
3rd March 2017Demand in South Australia:
• Series of faults resulted in the loss of
~610 MW of generation in SA
• Flows on Heywood interconnector
increased to ~918 MW.
• Estimated that demand reduced
~400 MW
• Estimated that distributed PV
reduced by ~150 MW (40%)
• Loss of more PV would have
increased flows on Heywood
interconnector further.
Analysis by Naomi Stringer, UNSW Sydney
Data from Solar Analytics
Generation by distributed PV:
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Data from Solar Analytics
(~200 distributed PV
systems) confirms
disconnection of some
inverters:
18th January 2018
• Fault on 500 kV network in
Victoria
• ~160 distributed PV sites
monitored by Solar Analytics
• Aggregate distributed PV
generation observed to reduce by
28% (~180 MW loss estimated
across VIC).
Analysis by Naomi Stringer, UNSW Sydney
Data from Solar Analytics
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Bench testing of PV inverters
• Bench testing program• Collaboration with UNSW Sydney, funded by ARENA
• Laboratory conditions
• Tested 5 inverters so far (preliminary findings)
• Voltage testing results:• Two inverters observed to trip during a short duration voltage sag. Need to clarify
in standard.
• Only 1 inverter performed Volt-Watt response correctly. The other 4 inverters were either too slow, or result in a disconnection. Need to clarify in standard.
10Bench testing by UNSW Sydney as part of an ARENA-funded collaboration with AEMO, TasNetworks & ElectraNet
Frequency disturbances
Frequency disturbances
Analysis by Shabir Ahmadyar, UNSW Sydney
Data from TasNetworks
25 Aug 2018, 1:11pm
Estimated PV capacity factor: 44%
Possible reduction in PV generation: 18%
13 Aug 2018, 8:43am
Estimated PV capacity factor: 21%
Possible reduction in PV generation: 48%
• Frequency disturbances recorded at a
primarily residential feeder in
Tasmania
• Frequency falls to below 49Hz over
~5s
• Active power supplied to the feeder
increases suddenly
• Further investigation underway to
determine whether this is due to DER
disconnection, and whether this
feeder is representative of all
Tasmanian PV
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Bench testing of PV inverters• Laboratory conditions
• Preliminary frequency testing results:
• Two inverters observed to trip too quickly on under-
frequency.
• Appears to be a serious non-compliance with AS4777.2-
2015.
Under frequency ride-through
• One inverter tripped on RoCoF levels above 0.4Hz/s.
• RoCoF ride-through not addressed in standard at present
RoCoF
• One inverter responds slowly to an over-frequency (~30s)
• Strictly compliant with the standard, but not useful for
assisting with frequency management
Over-frequency droop
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Inverter trips in t < 50 ms
Grid frequency step 50 → 45Hz (Inv #2)
Bench testing by UNSW Sydney as part of an ARENA-funded
collaboration with AEMO, TasNetworks & ElectraNet
Emergency frequency control
• DER over-frequency droop response could become essential for system security
• Few centralised units operating at times of high DER generation – inadequate capacity to trip to
correct an emergency over-frequency
• Needs to be adequately fast
• Required in emergency situations where contingency size exceeds frequency reserves, typically
large disturbances, high RoCoF
• But slow enough to avoid mal-operation (need adequate time to measure a stable grid frequency)
• Could rapid ramp down of bulk rooftop PV cause distribution voltage issues?
• And could this lead to widespread PV tripping on under-voltage?
• Enable mandatory Volt-Var responses to allow DER to assist with local voltage management while
responding to frequency?
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Phase angle jump
Phase angle jump
Voltage phase
jump magnitudeInverter 1 Inverter 2 Inverter 3 Inverter 4 Inverter 5
15° ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
30° Disconnection
Temporary
reduction of power
injected to grid✓
Temporary
reduction of power
injected to grid✓
45° - - ✓ - ✓
90° - - ✓ - ✓
• Observed challenge in California for
utility-scale PV
• Inverter mis-calculates frequency and
activates protection
• Addressed in IEEE 1547-2018 (requires
ride-through for up to 60° jump)
• Bench testing indicates this applies
for distributed PV inverters in the
NEM for voltage phase angle jumps
• Unclear the degree to which phase
angle jump may be visible in the
distribution network
• Examining high speed data
Bench testing of
distributed PV
inverters: (preliminary
findings)
16Bench testing by UNSW Sydney as part of an ARENA-funded collaboration with AEMO, TasNetworks & ElectraNet
High speed data
• High speed data recorded at a local
distribution feeder in QLD, primarily
residential, high levels of distributed
PV
• Several events recorded with high
levels of distributed PV operating,
and see increase in load post
disturbance
• Further investigation to determine
whether this is due to DER
disconnection
• The voltage dip is very shallow.
Could be due to phase angle jump.
Further investigation underway.
15th Feb 2017, 10:34am
12th March 2017, 1:27pm
Analysis by Shabir Ahmadyar, UNSW Sydney
Data from Energy Queensland 17
Adaptation of DER standards
Possible changes to DER performance standards
• Extend as much as possible
Voltage ride-through
• Ride-through requirements for multiple
voltage disturbances
Multiple voltage disturbances
• Default enablement
• Determine relative priorities of control
schemes
• Consider smaller deadbands and settings
aligned with international standards
Volt-Var and Volt-Watt
• Determine appropriate requirements,
considering periods with most generation
from DER
Momentary cessation
• Extend as much as possible
Frequency ride-through
• Ride-through requirements for RoCoF
RoCoF ride-through
• Specify required response times
Over-frequency response
• Require response from already
curtailed inverters
• Specify response times
• Storage systems move to
discharging?
• Other loads (eg. electric vehicles)
Under-frequency response
• Specify ride-through requirements
Phase angle jump
• Emergency feed-in management,
remote querying of device settings,
remote changes to settings
Interoperability
• Review appropriate coverage, including
sizes & types of DER, and consumer
loads
Coverage
• Review compliance mechanisms
Compliance
• Device & architecture properties
Cyber security
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Voltage Disturbances: Frequency Disturbances: Other:
For consultation, implementation to be determined
DERWorkstream
Networkincentives
Datavisibility
System & Marketframework
Technical standards& connections
Operationalprocess
Industry-widecollaboration
Workstreamobjectives
Networkregulation &pricing facilitate DER andbetter customer serviceofferings.
Visibility of DER foroperational, forecasting,planning, and market(incl settlement) functions.
A consistent access regime for all market participants within the confines of customer consent and privacy.
Integrate DER into energy,ancillary and reserve markets.
Market arrangements recognise non-retailer models, including third-party/aggregator concepts.
Evolve market arrangement to a distributed market model.
Where appropriate,a nationally consistentapproach to DERconnections anddevelop DERtechnical standards.
To better understandoperational challenges and DER capabilities to inform operationalprocesses and tools.
Enablers Pilot programs
Cyber security
Digital & Technology Strategies
Integrating DER to maximise consumer value
Industry working together to deliver outcomes for consumers
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•DER represents a significant transition for the electricity
industry
• The impact of DER on power system security must be
considered as a priority
•By identifying challenges early, we can implement the
measures required to affordably maintain security and
reliability for customers throughout this transition
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